Review no. 54

Review no. 54
Press Review
16—31 October 2013
Table of Contents
Pages
African Union
- The African Union strongly condemns the holding of a unilateral “referendum” in Abyei
- L'Union africaine condamne fermement la tenue d'un «referendum» unilatéral á Abyei
- 403th meeting of the Peace and Security Council on the situation in the Abyei area
- 403ème réunion du Conseil de Paix et Sécurité sur la situation dans le territoire de l’Abyei
- AU Peace and Security Council in historic visit to Mogadishu
- 401ème réunion du Conseil de paix et de sécurité de l'Union africaine sur la situation dans
le territoire de l’Abyei
- 400ème réunion du Conseil de Paix et de Sécurité de l'Union africaine (UA), sur
la situation au Darfour, Soudan
- 400ème réunion du Conseil de Paix et de Sécurité de l'Union africaine (UA),
sur la situation au Darfour, Soudan
- 401st meeting of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union on the situation
in the Abyei Area
- AMISOM head of Mission visits Beledweyne
- L'Union africaine condamne fermement l'assassinat de soldats de maintien
de la paix au Darfour (Soudan)
- L'Union africaine condamne fermement l'assassinat de soldats de maintien
de la paix au Darfour (Soudan)
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Terrorism in Africa
- ICC: Does politics win over justice?
- Afrique : hausse du trafic de drogue alimentant le terrorisme, nouvelle menace pour la sécurité
- International Analysis: Resurgent Regional Terrorism — A Sinister Threat
- Is Al-Qaeda a Threat to Moroccan Stability?
- L'Afrique au défi de la démocratie?
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33
36
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42
Egypt
- Opinion: The Battle for Hearts and Minds
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Kenya
- Al-Shabaab’s Savage Coming of Age: How To Respond – Analysis
- Kenya Seeks Delay To ICC Trials – Analysis
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55
Libya
- Militia feuds threaten new war in post-revolt Libya
- Libya: Terrorists Hijack Revolution
- Al Libi trial, Libya and al Qaeda: What you won't hear in court
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63
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Mali
- Opération de « grande ampleur » au Mali
- Mali: "Des cellules terroristes tentent de se réorganiser"
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Nigeria
- Iran extends reach into Nigeria, working with militants to undermine west
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Tunisia
- Crise tunisienne: «Echec de l’islam politique ou de l'économie, peu importe»
- Comprendre la crise en Tunisie
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Terrorism in the World
India
- Indian Mujahideen: Evolving Challenge – Analysis
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Syria
- Fighting the wrong battles at the wrong time
- Analyse: Al-Qaïda 2.0 en Syrie - recomposition locale de l'islamisme djihadiste
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USA
- U.S. “War On Terror” Has INCREASED Terrorism
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Yemen
- Does America have a “Licence to Kill”? US Drone War on Yemen Violates International Law
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African Union
The African Union strongly condemns the holding of a unilateral
“referendum” in Abyei
Addis Ababa, 28 October 2013: The Chairperson of the Commission of
the African Union (AU), Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, is closely following the situation in the Abyei Area. She has learned, with deep concern, of the organization by
the leadership of the Ngok Dinka community of a unilateral “referendum”, to determine the final status of Abyei.
The Chairperson of the Commission, while understanding the frustrations arising
from the fact that the Abyei referendum has not yet been held, as provided for by
the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), stresses that this unilateral act is unacceptable and irresponsible. She condemns this exercise in the strongest terms
possible. This unilateral act is in violation of the relevant decisions of the AU Peace
and Security Council (PSC), and can only heighten tension on the ground and further complicate the search for a mutually acceptable solution within the framework of existing commitments. She calls on those orchestrating this illegal act to
put an immediate halt to their actions, as they pose a threat to peace in the Abyei
Area, and have the potential to trigger an unprecedented escalation on the ground,
which could negatively affect the continuing normalization of relations between
Sudan and South Sudan, with far-reaching consequences for the region as a whole.
Such escalation could also put the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei
(UNISFA) peacekeepers in a very dangerous position.
The Chairperson of the Commission acknowledges with appreciation the rejection
by the Government of South Sudan of any unilateral action in Abyei. She calls on
the international community, including the United Nations, to condemn the ongoing unilateral and irresponsible action in Abyei, and to prevail upon those concerned to cease it immediately.
The Chairperson of the Commission reiterates the AU’s position on the issue of
Abyei, as contained in relevant PSC communiqués, including AU’s acceptance of the
Proposal submitted by the AU High-Level Implementation Panel on Sudan and
South Sudan (AUHIP) on 21 September 2012. As stressed by the PSC, this Proposal
represents a fair and balanced solution that takes into account existing commitments and the interests of the communities on the ground. The Chairperson of the
Commission also calls for the expeditious implementation of 20 June 2011 Agreement on Temporary Administrative and Security Arrangements for the Abyei Area.
In this respect, she welcomes the decisions reached by the Presidents of Sudan and
South Sudan during their recent Summit in Juba.
The Chairperson of the Commission further urges the Abyei communities to exercise utmost restraint and give maximum cooperation to UNISFA in order to ensure
the maintenance of peace and stability in Abyei. She seizes this opportunity to pay
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tribute to UNISFA for its commendable efforts, in spite of the challenging environment in which it is operating.
The Chairperson of the Commission looks forward to the forthcoming visit of the
PSC to Abyei, and is confident that PSC interactions with all parties concerned can
assist in defusing the prevailing tension and facilitate a consensual way out of the
crisis, with the support of the AUHIP.
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L'Union africaine condamne fermement la tenue d'un «referendum»
unilatéral á Abyei
Addis Abéba, le 28 octobre 2013: La Présidente de la Commission de l'Union africaine (UA), Dr Nkosazana Dlamini- Zuma, suit de près la situation dans le territoire
de l’Abyei. Elle a appris, avec une profonde préoccupation, l'organisation par des
dirigeants de la communauté Dinka Ngok d'un "référendum" unilatéral, afin de déterminer le statut final d'Abyei.
La Président de la Commission, tout en comprenant les frustrations découlant du
fait que le référendum d'Abyei n'a pas encore eu lieu, comme prévu par l'Accord de
paix global (CPA), souligne que cet acte unilatéral est inacceptable et irresponsable.
Elle condamne cet exercice dans les termes les plus énergiques possibles. Cet acte
unilatéral est en violation des décisions pertinentes du Conseil de paix et de sécurité (CPS), et ne peut qu’aggraver la tension sur le terrain et compliquer encore davantage la recherche d'une solution mutuellement acceptable dans le cadre des
engagements existants. Elle appelle ceux qui ont orchestré cet acte illégal à y
mettre un terme immédiat, tant il est vrai que leurs actes constituent une menace
pour la paix dans le territoire de l'Abyei, et ont le potentiel de déclencher une escalade sans précédent sur ??le terrain, qui pourrait affecter négativement le processus de normalisation des relations entre le Soudan et le Soudan du Sud, avec de
lourdes conséquences pour la région dans son ensemble. Une telle escalade pourrait aussi mettre les casques bleus de la Force intérimaire de sécurité des Nations
unies pour Abyei (FISNUA) dans une situation dangereuse.
La Présidente de la Commission prend acte avec satisfaction du rejet par le Gouvernement du Soudan du Sud de toute action unilatérale à Abyei. Elle appelle la
communauté internationale, notamment les Nations unies, à condamner l’action
unilatérale et irresponsable en cours à Abyei et à faire pression sur ses auteurs
pour qu’ils mettent un terme immédiat à leur action.
La Présidente de la Commission réitère la position de l'UA sur la question d'Abyei,
telle que contenue dans les communiqués pertinents du CPS, y compris l'acceptation de la Proposition présentée par le Groupe de mise en œuvre de haut niveau de
l’UA sur le Soudan et le Soudan du Sud, le 21 septembre de 2012. Comme l'a souligné le CPS, cette Proposition représente une solution juste et équilibrée qui tient
compte des engagements existants et des intérêts des communautés sur le terrain.
La Présidente de la Commission appelle également à la mise en œuvre rapide de
l’Accord du 20 juin 2011 sur ??les arrangements administratifs et de sécurité temporaires pour le territoire de l'Abyei. À cet égard, elle se félicite des décisions prises
par les Présidents du Soudan et du Soudan du Sud au cours de leur récent Sommet
à Juba.
La Présidente de la Commission exhorte les communautés d'Abyei à faire preuve
de la plus grande retenue et à coopérer pleinement avec la FISNUA, afin d'assurer
le maintien de la paix et de la stabilité dans le territoire de l’Abyei. Elle saisit cette
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occasion pour rendre hommage à la FISNUA pour ses efforts louables, malgré l’environnement difficile dans lequel la Force opère.
La Présidente de la Commission attend avec intérêt la prochaine visite du CPS à
Abyei, et est convaincue que les interactions que le CPS aura avec toutes les parties
concernées aideront à désamorcer la tension ambiante et faciliteront une sortie de
crise consensuelle, avec le soutien du Groupe de haut niveau.
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403th meeting of the Peace and Security Council on the situation in
the Abyei area
The Peace and Security Council of the African Union (AU), at its 403rdmeeting held
on 26 October 2013, adopted the following decision:
Council,
Takes note of the statements made by the representatives of the Republic of Sudan
and the Republic of South Sudan;
Recalls communiqué PSC/MIN/COMM.1(CCCLXXXVII) Rev.1, adopted at its 387thmeeting held on 29 July 2013, in which it decided to undertake a visit to Abyei to
express support to the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA)
and the people of the Area;
Expresses its deep disappointment and regret that it was unable to undertake the
visit to Abyei, as planned, on 26 and 27 October 2013, and discharge its duties in
accordance with the Peace and Security Council Protocol, due to the insistence of
Sudan that the visit be postponed for contrived security reasons, noting, in this respect, the discrepancies in the analysis, by the Parties, of the situation prevailing in
Abyei. Council considers this to be an obstruction to the discharge of its responsibilities, andrecalls that its visit to Abyei, initially planned to take place from 22 to 23
October 2013, was postponed out of deference to President Omar Hassan Al Bashir
of Sudan and President Salva Kiir Mayardit of South Sudan, who were planning to
meet in Juba, on 22 October 2013,as well as to enable the leaders of the Misseriya
community, who were not in Abyeiat that time, to be present for the visit;
Reiterates its deep concern at the prevailing situation in Abyei, andstresses the
need for active and continued African involvement in support of the efforts aimed
at addressing the challenges at hand in Abyei. Council further reiterates that its visit to Abyeiis aimed at defusing tension on the ground, including averting any unilateral actions, and creating a conducive environment for thepeaceful resolution of
the final status of Abyei. Council stresses that those who obstructed its visit should
bear full responsibility for any resulting negative development in the Area;
Welcomes the full cooperation extended by the Government of South Sudan and
the understanding it has demonstrated in the face of the repeated postponements
of the visit to Abyei. Council urgesthe Government of South Sudan to continue to
demonstrate utmost restraint, and notes with satisfactionits appeal to the Ngok
Dinka community to refrain from any unilateral actions in Abyei;
Recognizes the frustrations arising from the delay in organizing the Abyei referendum that was supposed to take place at the same time as the self-determination
referendum in South Sudan, in accordance with the Abyei Protocol of the 2005
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA). In this regard, Council reiterates its earlier
decisions on the Abyei issue, in particularits full acceptance of, and support to, the
Proposal submitted by the AU High-Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP), on 21
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September 2012. Council once again welcomes South Sudan’s acceptance of the
Proposal and notes that Sudan has not yet accepted it. Council callson the two
countries to intensify their efforts to come to an agreement on the final status of
the Abyei Area on the basis of the AUHIP Proposal, with the support of the Panel.
Council strongly urges the UN Security Council to extend its full support to the
AUHIP Proposal, which is the best way forward in addressing the challenges at
hand;
Calls on the two countries expeditiously to implement the 20 June 2011 Agreement on the Temporary Administrative and Security Arrangements for the Abyei
Area, including the immediate establishment of the organs in charge of the management of the Area. In this respect, Council welcomes the decision reached by
the two Presidents during their Summit meeting of 22 October 2013. Council reiterates that Abyei should be a weapons-free-zone, as well asits request that the
Sudanese Police Force stationed in Diffra should be withdrawn without any further delay. Council further requests the implementation of a disarmament programme in the Area;
Warnsall stakeholders in Abyeito refrain from taking any unilateral action likely to
complicate the situation, and, in this regard, calls for maximum restraint;
Welcomes the outcome of the Summit meeting between the Presidents of Sudan
and South Sudan, on 22 October 2013, in Juba, and stresses that the decisions
agreed upon on that occasion will further enhance the normalization of relations
between Sudan and South Sudan, in line with the landmark Cooperation Agreement of 27 September 2012;
Stresses that the AU has demonstrated utmost solidarity with Sudan and South
Sudan, since the latter’s independence. Council further stresses that, in all its actions it has taken into account Sudan’s challenges.In this regard, Council reaffirms
its commitment to finding African solutions to African problems;
Recalls its mandate as provided in the Peace and Security Council Protocol, and
decides to undertake its visit to Abyei, from 5 to 6 November 2013;
Demands that Sudan must refrain from obstructing its work and extend full cooperation in support of the AU’s efforts to manage and resolvethe situation in
Abyei. In this respect, Council reminds Sudan of its obligations under the Peace
and Security Council Protocol, in particular Article 7, paragraphs 3 and 4;
Commends the laudable work of UNISFA in maintaining security in the Area and
expresses its deep appreciation to the Force for its support in facilitating Council’s
field mission to Abyei;
Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.
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403ème réunion du Conseil de Paix et Sécurité sur la situation dans le
territoire de l’Abyei
Le Conseil de paix et de sécurité de l'Union africaine (UA), en sa
403ème réunion tenue le 26 octobre 2013, a adopté la décision suivante:
Le Conseil,
Prend note des communications faites par les représentants de la République du
Soudan et de la République du Soudan du Sud;
Rappelle le communiqué PSC/MIN/COMM.1(CCCLXXXVII) Rev.1, adopté lors de sa
387ème réunion tenue le 29 juillet 2013, dans lequel il a décidé d’entreprendre une
visite à Abyei pour exprimer son soutien à la Force intérimaire de sécurité des Nations unies pour Abyei (FISNUA) et aux populations du territoire;
Exprime sa profonde déception et son regret de n’avoir pu entreprendre sa visite à
Abyei comme prévu, les 26 et 27 octobre 2013, en raison de l’insistance mise par le
Soudan en vue du report de la visite pour des motifs sécuritaires non fortuits, notant, à cet égard, les divergences d’analyses, entre les Parties, sur la situation qui
prévaut à Abyei. Le Conseil considère qu’il s’agit là d’une obstruction à l’accomplissement de ses responsabilités, et rappelle que sa visite à Abyei, initialement
prévue les 22 et 23 octobre 2013, avait été reportée par respect au Président Omar
Hassan Al Bashir du Soudan et au Président Salva Kiir Mayardit du Soudan du Sud,
qui devaient se rencontrer à Juba le 22 octobre 2013, ainsi que pour permettre aux
dirigeants de la communauté Misseriya, qui n’étaient pas à Abyei à ces dates, d’être présents pour la visite;
Réitére sa profonde préoccupation face à la situation qui prévaut actuellement à
Abyei, et souligne la nécessité d'une implication africaine active et continue aux fins
de soutenir les efforts visant à répondre aux défis de l’heure à Abyei. Le Conseil réitère en outre que sa visite à Abyei a pour objectif de désamorcer la tension sur le
terrain, y compris en évitant toutes actions unilatérales, et de créer un environnement propice pour le règlement pacifique du statut final d’Abyei. Le Conseil
souligne que ceux qui ont fait obstacle à sa visite dans le territoire doivent assumer
la pleine responsabilité de toute évolution négative qui en découlerait dans le territoire;
Se félicite de l’entière coopération apportée par le Gouvernement du Soudan du
Sud et de la compréhension qu’il a démontrée face aux reports répétés de la visite
à Abyei. Le Conseil exhorte le Gouvernent du Soudan du Sud à continuer à faire
preuve de la plus grande retenue, et note avec satisfaction son appel à la communauté Ngok Dinka pour qu’elle s’abstienne de toutes actions unilatérales à Abyei;
Reconnaît les frustrations résultant du retard accusé dans l’organisation du referendum à Abyei qui devait se tenir en même temps que le referendum d’auto détermination au Soudan du Sud, conformément au Protocole sur Abyei de l’Accord de
paix global (CPA) de 2005. À cet égard, le Conseil réitère ses décisions antérieures
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sur la question d'Abyei, en particulier sa pleine acceptation de, et son soutien à, la
Proposition soumise par le Groupe de mise en œuvre de haut niveau de l’UA, le 21
septembre 2012. Le Conseil salue de nouveau l'acceptation de la Proposition par
le Soudan du Sud, et note que le Soudan ne l’a pas encore acceptée. Le Conseil
demande instamment aux deux pays d’intensifier leurs efforts en vue de parvenir à
un accord sur le statut final du territoire de l'Abyei, sur la base de la Proposition du
Groupe de haut niveau et avec le soutien du Groupe. Le Conseil exhorte le Conseil
de sécurité des Nations unies à apporter son plein soutien à la Proposition du
Groupe de haut niveau, qui constitue la meilleure voie à suivre pour relever les défis de l’heure;
Demande aux deux pays de mettre rapidement en œuvre l'Accord du 20 juin 2011
sur les arrangements administratifs et de sécurité temporaires pour le territoire de
l'Abyei, y compris la mise en place immédiate des organes en charge de la gestion
du territoire. À cet égard, le Conseil se félicite de la décision prise par les deux Présidents lors de leur sommet du 22 octobre 2013. Le Conseil réitère qu’Abyei doit
être une zone exempte d'armes, ainsi que sa demande de retrait sans autre délai
supplémentaire des forces de police soudanaises stationnées à Diffra. Le Conseil
demande en outre la mise en œuvre d’un programme de désarmement dans le
territoire;
Lance un avertissement à toutes les parties prenantes à Abyei pour qu’elles s’abstiennent de toute action unilatérale de nature à compliquer la situation et, à cet
égard, appelle à la plus grande retenue;
Se félicite des résultats de la réunion au sommet entre les Présidents du Soudan et
du Soudan du Sud, le 22 octobre 2013, à Juba, et souligne que ces résultats contribueront au renforcement de la normalisation des relations entre le Soudan et le
Soudan du Sud, conformément à l'Accord de coopération historique du 27 septembre 2012;
Souligne que l'UA a fait preuve de la plus grande solidarité envers le Soudan et le
Soudan du Sud, depuis l’indépendance de ce dernier pays. Le Conseil souligne en
outre que, dans toutes ses actions, il a pris en compte les défis auxquels le Soudan
est confronté. À cet égard, le Conseil réaffirme son engagement à rechercher des
solutions africaines aux problèmes africains;
Rappelle son mandat tel que prévu par le Protocole relatif au Conseil de paix et de
sécurité, et décide d’entreprendre sa visite à Abyei, du 5 au 6 novembre 2013;
Exige du Soudan qu’il s’abstienne de faire obstacle au travail du Conseil et apporte
sa pleine coopération en appui aux efforts de l’UA visant à gérer et à régler la situation à Abyei. À cet égard, le Conseil rappelle au Soudan ses obligations au terme
du Protocole relatif au Conseil de paix et de sécurité, notamment en son article 7
(alinéas 3 et 4);
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Félicite la FISNUA pour son travail louable dans le maintien de la sécurité à Abyei
et exprime sa profonde appréciation à la Force pour son soutien à l’organisation
de sa visite de terrain à Abyei;
Décide de rester activement saisi de la situation.
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AU Peace and Security Council in historic visit to Mogadishu
Mogadishu - 25nd, October 2013: The Special Representative of the Chairperson of
the African Union Commission (SRCC) for Somalia, Ambassador Mahamat Saleh Annadif today hosted African Union’s Peace and Security Council (PSC) on
a historic first field visit to Mogadishu.
The PSC is the AU’s standing decision-making body responsible for the maintenance
of continental peace and security. It has 15 members, elected by the AU Assembly
of Heads of State and Government.
The delegation was led by Djibouti's Ambassador to Ethiopia, who is also the Permanent Representative to the AU and Chair of the PSC for the month of October,
H.E. Mohamed Idriss Farah.
On arrival at the Aden Adde International Airport, the delegation was met by Ambassador Annadif as well as Somali government officials. They then proceeded to
Villa Somalia where they were received in audience by Somali President, H.E. Hassan Sheikh Mohamoud.
During the meeting, they discussed the progress that Somalia has made in recovering from decades of anarchy. Ambassador Farah expressed the AU’s full support for
the efforts of the Somali government in pursuing peace and reconciliation and
thanked AMISOM for the sacrifices the mission has made for the sake of peace in
Somalia.
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On his part, President Mohamoud also expressed his government’s appreciation for
the support the country had received from the AU, saying that the Somali problem
was an African problem to be dealt with by all Africans.
“Somalia is hugely indebted to AU for helping us emerge from war and for the relative stability the country is experiencing,” he said. He also welcomed the PSC’s recent endorsement of the recommendations of a joint AU-UN assessment mission,
key among them being increased support to the Somali National Security Forces
and a reinforcement of AMISOM to aid in the fight against extremism in Somalia.
Specifically, the PSC has called for the provision of logistical support to the SNSF
including food, petrol and medical evacuation. It also called for an extra 6300
troops and police for AMISOM as well as enhanced engineering capabilities and
much needed equipment including military utility helicopters and armoured personnel carriers.
Ambassador Annadif said the visit was a demonstration of the commitment of the
AU to the peace process in Somalia. “It is a sign of the importance the continent
attaches to the fight against extremism and to supporting the efforts of the people
of Somalia to re-establish security, stability and the rule of law,” he said.
He also urged the UN Security Council to quickly act on the PSC’s requests, saying
that the window of opportunity for cementing the gains in Somalia must not be
missed. “AMISOM is continuing to train and build up the capacities of the Somali
forces to eventually take over responsibility for securing the nation. The support of
the international community is crucial in this effort and in denying Al Qaeda affiliated terrorist group to plan and plot attacks on innocent civilians in Somalia and beyond,” he added.
The PSC delegation also toured the AMISOM Hospital located at the Halane base in
the southern part of Mogadishu.
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401ème réunion du Conseil de paix et de sécurité de l'Union africaine
sur la situation dans le territoire de l’Abyei
Le Conseil de paix et de sécurité de l'Union africaine (UA), en sa 401ème réunion tenue le 21 octobre 2013, a procédé à un échange de vues sur la situation dans le territoire de l’Abyei.
Le Conseil a exprimé sa profonde préoccupation face à la situation qui prévaut
dans le territoire de l’Abyei. Le Conseil s'est félicité de la rencontre prévue entre le
Président Omar Hassan Al Bashir de la République du Soudan et le Président Salva
Kiir Mayardit de la République du Soudan du Sud, à Juba, le 22 octobre 2013, dans
le cadre des efforts continus visant à consolider les progrès accomplis dans la normalisation des relations entre les deux pays et à régler les questions en suspens
dans leurs relations. Le Conseil a lancé un appel pressant aux deux chefs d'État
pour qu’ils saisissent l'occasion de leur réunion au Sommet afin de prendre des
mesures concrètes pour faire face aux défis de l’heure à Abyei, conformément au
communiqué PSC/AHG/COMM/2.(CCCXCVII) adopté lors de sa 397ème réunion tenue au niveau des chefs d'État et de Gouvernement, à New York, le 23 septembre
2013.
Le Conseil a réitéré ses communiqués et communiqués de presse antérieurs sur la
question d'Abyei, y compris son acceptation de la Proposition faite par le Groupe
de mise en œuvre de haut niveau de l’UA, le 21 septembre 2012, comme
représentant une solution juste, équitable et viable au différend entre les deux
pays, qui tient compte des Accords existants conclus par les Parties, ainsi que des
besoins et intérêts des communautés sur le terrain. Le Conseil a appelé les deux
pays à reprendre leurs discussions sur le statut final d'Abyei, sur la base de la Proposition du Groupe de haut niveau, en gardant à l' esprit la nécessité de veiller à ce
qu’Abyei serve de pont entre le Soudan et le Soudan du Sud, comme stipulé dans le
Protocole d'Abyei de l’Accord de paix global (CPA).
Le Conseil a également réaffirmé la nécessité de la mise en œuvre rapide de
l'Accord sur les arrangements provisoires pour la sécurité et l'administration
d'Abyei du 20 juin 2011; la facilitation du retour rapide et en toute sécurité des réfugiés et des personnes déplacées et la transhumance pacifique des pasteurs nomades au cours de la prochaine saison sèche; la démilitarisation complète du territoire de l’Abyei, y compris le retrait de la force de police stationnée à Diffra et son
remplacement par le Service de police du territoire de l’Abyei ; ainsi que la mobilisation d’une assistance pour Abyei et la mise en œuvre de l'engagement à affecter
2% des revenus pétroliers provenant d'Abyei pour le développement du territoire.
Le Conseil a également souligné l'urgence que revêt la mise en place la Commission
du référendum pour le territoire de l'Abyei, y compris l'examen et l'adoption d'une
loi référendaire révisée conforme à la Proposition de Groupe de haut niveau et la
soumission, au Groupe de haut niveau, par les deux pays, de la liste de leurs
représentants à la Commission. Le Conseil a, une fois encore, lancé un appel aux
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Parties pour qu'elles s'abstiennent de toute action unilatérale ou déclaration de
nature à entraver le recherche d’une solution durable.
Le Conseil a convenu de réexaminer la situation à la lumière des résultats de la réunion au Sommet entre les deux chefs d'État et de finaliser les modalités de sa prochaine visite à Abyei, telle que décidée dans le communique PSC/MIN/COMM.1
(CCCLXXXVII) Rev.1, adopté lors de sa 387ème réunion tenue le 29 juillet 2013.
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400ème réunion du Conseil de Paix et de Sécurité de l'Union africaine
(UA), sur la situation au Darfour, Soudan
The Peace and Security Council of the African Union (AU), at its 400th meeting held
on 17 October 2013, adopted the following decision on the situation
in Darfur, Sudan:
Council,
1. Takes note of the briefing provided by the Joint Special Representative for the
AU-United Nations Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) and Joint Chief Mediator
(JCM), Dr. Mohamed Ibn Chambas, on the activities of UNAMID and his mediation
efforts. Council further takes note of the statements made by the representative of
the Republic of Sudan, as well as by the representatives of France, United Kingdom,
United States and Rwanda, as members of the UN Security Council;
2. Expresses its deep concern at the deteriorating security situation in Darfur,
marked by an upsurge of inter-tribal clashes and repeated attacks against UNAMID
and killings of peacekeepers in Darfur, which to date stand at 13 for the year 2013.
Council stresses that this unacceptable situation and its attendant humanitarian
consequences have the potential to seriously undermine the search for a lasting
solution to the conflict in Darfur, including the implementation of the Doha Document for Peace in Darfur (DDPD);
3.
Condemns, in the strongest possible terms, the attacks perpetrated against
UNAMID personnel, including those that led to the killing of a Zambian Military Observer, in North Darfur, and three Senegalese police personnel, in West Darfur, on
11 and 13 October 2013, respectively. Council underscores that the killing of
peacekeepers constitutes a war crime;
4. Strongly calls on the Government of Sudan to demonstrate good faith by taking all necessary measures in order to urgently identify and bring to justice the perpetrators of those cowardly and criminal attacks against UNAMID personnel and
earlier attacks against the Mission. Council underlines that the decision to deploy
UNAMID constitutes an act of solidarity with the people of Sudan and support to
the search for peace. Council looks forward to an update by the Government of
Sudan on the steps taken to identify and bring to justice the perpetrators of these
grave crimes, as well as to ensure the protection of UNAMID personnel, bearing in
mind its obligations;
5.
Reiterates its strong support to UNAMID, emphasizes the critical importance of the efforts of the Mission in support of the search for a lasting solution
to the situation in Darfur and the protection of the civilian population,
and encourages UNAMID to take all necessary steps to protect its personnel;
6. Requests the AU Commission and the UN Secretariat to take advantage of the
upcoming UNAMID review, as mandated by UN Security Council resolution 2113
(2013), to consider in-depth the challenges facing the Mission and the ways in
17
which these could be overcome, with a view to enhancing the effectiveness of UNAMID, including the steps to be taken by all stakeholders to ensure the safety of its
personnel and support to early recovery and development;
7.
Welcomes the outcome of the 16th meeting of the Tripartite Mechanism for
UNAMID, held in New York, on 28 September 2013. Council stresses the need to
ensure the effective implementation of the conclusions reached,
and underscores the critical importance of unfettered access and freedom of
movement for UNAMID and timely issuance of visas to its personnel, to enable it to
fulfill its mandate effectively;
8.
Notes with satisfaction the steps taken towards the implementation of the
DDPD, notably the launching of a matrix for reconstruction and development projects in Darfur, following the Doha Donors’ Conference of April 2013. Council calls
on the parties to redouble their efforts and work towards the provision of peace
dividends, so as to meet the expectations raised by the signature of the Agreement
among the local population;
9.
Notes with appreciation the efforts undertaken by the JCM to facilitate an
inclusive peace process in Darfur, notably the consultations with the leaders of the
Justice and Equality Movement – Gibril (JEM – Gibril) and the Sudan Liberation Army – Minni Minawi (SLA/Minni Minawi), held in Arusha, Tanzania, from 22 to 27
August, 2013. Council notes with concern that some of the armed groups have
consistently rejected peace efforts and agreements with impunity and total disregard for the fate of the people they claim to be representing and the efforts of the
international community;
10.
Reiterates its call to the holdout groups to join the peace process without
any further delay and without preconditions. Council stresses that the negotiation
process cannot remain open-ended, and expresses its intention to take measures
and recommend to the UN Security Council to do the same against those impeding
the search for peace in Darfur. Council encourages the JCM to pursue his efforts to
promote an inclusive peace process in Darfur, in close consultation with the AU
High-Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP) and within the framework of the comprehensive approach to the challenges facing Sudan Council had consistently advocated for;
11. Agrees to review the situation within a month, with the view specifically to
receiving an update on steps taken to identify and bring to justice the perpetrators
of attacks against UNAMID personnel and the efforts to bring on board the holdout
armed groups, in order to take the decisions that may be required;
12.
Decides to remain actively seized of the matter.
18
400ème réunion du Conseil de Paix et de Sécurité de l'Union africaine
(UA), sur la situation au Darfour, Soudan
Le Conseil de paix et de sécurité de l’Union africaine (UA), en sa 400ème réunion
tenue le 17 octobre 2013, a pris la décision qui suit sur la situation au Darfour, au
Soudan:
Le Conseil,
1. Prend note de la communication faite par le Représentant spécial conjoint pour
l'Opération hybride Union africaine – Nations unies au Darfour (MINUAD) et Médiateur en chef conjoint, Dr Mohamed Ibn Chambas, sur les activités de la MINUAD
et ses efforts de médiation. Le Conseil prend également note de la déclaration faite
par le représentant de la République du Soudan, ainsi que de celles faites par les
représentants des États-Unis, de la France, du Royaume-Uni et du Rwanda, en leur
qualité de pays membres du Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies;
2.
Exprime sa profonde préoccupation face à la détérioration de la situation
sécuritaire au Darfour, marquée par une recrudescence des affrontements intertribaux, ainsi que par des attaques répétées contre la MINUAD et des assassinats
de soldats de maintien de la paix, qui, à ce jour, s’élèvent à treize pour l’année
2013. Le Conseil souligne que cette situation inacceptable et les conséquences humanitaires qui en découlent pourraient gravement compromettre la recherche d'une solution durable au conflit du Darfour, y compris la mise en œuvre du Document
de Doha pour la Paix au Darfour (DDPD);
3. Condamne, dans les termes les plus fermes possibles, les attaques perpétrées
contre le personnel de la MINUAD, y compris celles qui ont conduit à la mort d'un
observateur militaire zambien, dans le nord du Darfour, et de trois gendarmes sénégalais, dans l'ouest du Darfour, les 11 et 13 octobre 2013, respectivement. Le
Conseil souligne que l’assassinat de soldats de la paix constitue un crime de guerre;
4. Demande instamment au Gouvernement du Soudan de faire preuve de bonne
foi en prenant d'urgence toutes les mesures nécessaires pour identifier et traduire
en justice les auteurs de ces attaques lâches et criminelles contre le personnel de la
MINUAD et d’autres attaques antérieures contre la Mission. Le Conseil souligne que la décision de déployer la MINUAD est à la fois un acte de solidarité avec le peuple du Soudan et de soutien à la recherche de la paix. Le Conseil attend avec intérêt une mise à jour par le Gouvernement du Soudan sur les
mesures prises, conformément à ses obligations, pour identifier et traduire en justice les auteurs de ces graves crimes, ainsi que sur celles visant à assurer la protection du personnel de la MINUAD;
5.
Réitère son plein appui à la MINUAD, souligne l'importance cruciale des
efforts de la Mission dans la recherche d'une solution durable à la situation au Dar-
19
four, ainsi que pour la protection des populations civiles, et encourage la MINUAD
à prendre toutes les dispositions nécessaires pour protéger son personnel;
6. Demande à la Commission et au Secrétariat des Nations unies de saisir l’occasion qu’offre la prochaine revue de la MINUAD, telle que prescrite par la résolution
2113 (2013) du Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies, pour examiner de manière
approfondie les défis auxquels la Mission est confrontée et identifier les voies et
moyens de les surmonter, en vue de renforcer son efficacité, y compris les mesures
à prendre par toutes les parties prenantes pour assurer la sécurité de son personnel et l’appui au relèvement économique rapide et au développement;
7. Se félicite des conclusions de la 16ème réunion du Mécanisme Tripartite pour la
MINUAD, tenue à New York, le 28 septembre 2013. Le Conseil souligne la nécessité d'assurer la mise en œuvre effective des conclusions de cette réunion et l'importance cruciale que revêtent un accès sans entrave et la liberté de mouvement
pour la MINUAD, ainsi que celle d’une délivrance diligente de visas à son personnel,
afin de permettre à la Mission de s'acquitter efficacement de son mandat;
8. Prend note avec satisfaction des mesures arrêtées pour la mise en œuvre du
DDPD, notamment le lancement d'une matrice de projets de reconstruction et de
développement au Darfour, dans le prolongement de la conférence des donateurs
tenue à Doha, en avril 2013. Le Conseil appelle les parties soudanaises à redoubler
d'efforts et à travailler à la concrétisation des dividendes de la paix, afin de répondre aux attentes suscitées par l'Accord au sein de la population locale;
9. Note avec satisfaction les efforts déployés par le Médiateur en chef conjoint,
en vue de faciliter un processus de paix inclusif au Darfour, notamment les consultations qu’il a eues avec les dirigeants du Mouvement Justice et Égalité – Gibril
(JEM – Gibril) et de l'Armée de Libération du Soudan – Minni Minawi (SLA/Minni
Minawi), à Arusha, en Tanzanie, du 22 au 27 août 2013. Le Conseil note avec préoccupation que certains des groupes armés ont, avec impunité et au mépris du sort
des populations qu'ils prétendent représenter et des efforts de la communauté internationale, systématiquement rejeté les efforts et accords de paix;
10. Réitère son appel aux groupes qui sont encore en dehors du processus de
paix pour qu’ils se joignent, sans tarder et sans conditions préalables, audit processus. Le Conseil souligne que le processus de négociation ne peut rester indéfiniment ouvert, et exprime son intention de prendre des mesures contre les individus
et les mouvements qui font entrave à la recherche de la paix et de recommander
au Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies d’en faire autant. Le Conseil encourage le
Médiateur en chef conjoint à poursuivre ses efforts visant à promouvoir un processus de paix inclusif au Darfour, en étroite consultation avec le Groupe de mise en
œuvre de haut niveau de l'UA et dans le cadre de l'approche globale des défis
20
auxquels le Soudan est confronté que le Conseil a toujours préconisée;
11. Convient d'examiner à nouveau la situation au Darfour dans un délai d’un
mois, notamment pour recevoir une mise à jour sur les mesures prises pour identifier et traduire en justice les auteurs d'attaques contre le personnel de la MINUAD,
ainsi que sur les efforts visant à amener les groupes armés récalcitrants à se joindre
le processus de paix, et ce afin de prendre les décisions qui seraient requises;
12. Décide de rester activement saisi de la question.
21
401st meeting of the Peace and Security Council of the African Union
on the situation in the Abyei Area
The Peace and Security Council of the African Union (AU), at its 401st meeting held
on 21 October 2013, exchanged views on the situation in the Abyei Area.
Council expressed deep concern at the prevailing situation in the Abyei Area. Council welcomed the planned meeting between President Omar Hassan Al Bashir of the
Republic of Sudan and President Salva Kiir Mayardit of the Republic of South Sudan,
in Juba, on 22 October 2013, as part of the ongoing efforts to consolidate the progress made in the normalization of relations between the two countries and to address outstanding issues in their relations. Council strongly appealed to the two
Heads of State to seize the opportunity of their Summit meeting to take concrete
steps to address the challenges at hand in Abyei, as outlined in communiqué PSC/
AHG/COMM/2.(CCCXCVII) adopted at its 397th meeting held at the level of the
Heads of State and Government, in New York, on 23 September 2013.
Council reiterated its earlier communiqués and press statements on the issue of
Abyei, including its acceptance of the Proposal submitted by the AU High-Level Implementation Panel (AUHIP), on 21 September 2012, as representing a fair, equitable and workable solution to the dispute between the two countries, which takes
into account existing Agreements entered into by the Parties, as well as the needs
and interests of the communities on the ground. Council called on the two countries to resume their discussions on the final status of Abyei on the basis of the AUHIP Proposal, bearing in mind the need to ensure that Abyei serves as a bridge between Sudan and South Sudan, as envisaged in the Abyei Protocol of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA).
Council further reiterated the need for the expeditious implementation of the
Agreement on the Temporary Administrative and Security Arrangements for the
Abyei Area of 20 June 2011; the facilitation of the rapid and safe return of refugees
and displaced persons and the peaceful migration of nomadic pastoralists during
the coming dry season; the full demilitarization of the Abyei Area, including the
withdrawal of the police force stationed in Diffra and its replacement by the Abyei
Area Police Service; as well as the mobilization of assistance for Abyei and the implementation of the commitment to provide 2% of oil revenue originating from
Abyei for the development of the Area. Council also stressed the urgency of establishing the Abyei Area Referendum Commission, including the review and adoption
of a revised referendum law in line with the AUHIP Proposal and the submission by
the two countries of the list of their nominees to the AUHIP. Council, once again,
made an urgent appeal to the Parties to refrain from any unilateral action and
statement that may impede progress towards the search for a lasting solution.
Council agreed to review the situation in Abyei in light of the outcome of the Summit meeting between the two Heads of State, and to finalize the arrangements for
its impending visit to Abyei, as decided in communiqué PSC/MIN/COMM.1
(CCCLXXXVII) Rev.1, adopted at its 387th meeting held on 29 July 2013.
22
AMISOM head of Mission visits Beledweyne
The Special Representative of the chairperson of the African Union Commission for
Somalia (SRCC), Ambassador Mahamat Saleh Annadif accompanied by Senior
AMISOM leadership in Somalia visited AU forces stationed in Beledweyne’s Hiraan
region.
The delegation was received by AMISOM’s Sector 4 Contingent Commander Colonel Osman Dubad, Colonel Tawane Ahmed the Commander of the Somali National
Army and Colonel Isaaq Ali Abdulle the Police Commissioner both from Hiraan
region, among other officers.
The SRCC ‘s visit coincided with Eidul Aldha celebrations and its main purpose was
to visit the AMISOM’s Djiboutian Contingent and get first-hand information on the
overall progress of the forces role in the region. He commended the troops for
their relentless effort in mobilising support during flooding, the subsequent cholera outbreak, clan mediation efforts and securing of key facilities in the region.
Amb. Annadif also held meetings with Hiiran women representatives, local administration and some members of the Federal Government.
“I appreciate the invaluable support accorded to AMISOM forces, the resilience of
the people of Beledweyne is wonderful and as AMISOM we will work with the Federal Government to make sure civilians in Beledweyne are protected.
The delegation also had an opportunity to tour the Lamagalaay military training
camp located inside the Beledweyne police headquarters where the recently deployed AMISOM police have been conducting training session for Somali Police
Force.
The Sector 4 contingent Commander Col. Osman Dubad reassured the Special Representative that AMISOM forces will continue to serve as this is their moral responsibility towards the stability and prosperity of the region.
Concluding his first visit in the region, Ambassador Annadif who was accompanied
by the Force Commander, Lt General Andrew Gutti, AMISOM police commissioner
Benson Oyo Nyeko and AMISOM Chief Of Staff Major General Osman-Noor Subagle expressed his appreciation to the AMISOM forces for training a strong Somali
National army and local Police force.
23
L'Union africaine condamne fermement l'assassinat de soldats de
maintien de la paix au Darfour (Soudan)
Addis Abéba, le 14 octobre 2013: La Présidente de la Commission de l'Union africaine (UA), Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, a appris, avec une profonde tristesse, la
mort de 3 officiers sénégalais d'une unité de police constituée de l’Opération hybride Union africaine – Nations unies au Darfour (MINUAD), à la suite d’une embuscade tendue par des assaillants armés non identifiés dans l'ouest du Darfour, le 13
octobre 2013. Une semaine plus tôt, un observateur militaire zambien avait été
poignardé à son domicile, avant de décéder plus tard, lors d’un vol de voiture
perpétré par des hommes armés.
La Présidente de la Commission condamne fermement ces actes odieux et
criminels contre les soldats de la MINUAD, qui paient de leur vie la quête de la paix
au Darfour. Elle souligne l’impératif et l’urgence que revêtent l'identification et la
traduction en justice des auteurs de ces actes criminels.
La Présidente de la Commission exprime les condoléances les plus attristées de l'UA
aux familles des soldats tombés sur le champ de bataille, ainsi qu’aux Gouvernements et aux peuples du Sénégal et de la Zambie.
24
The African Union strongly condemns the killing of Peacekeepers in
Darfur, Sudan
Addis-Ababa, 14 October 2013: The Chairperson of the Commission of the African
Union (AU), H.E. Dr. Nkosazana Dlamini-Zuma, is deeply saddened by the killing of 3
Senegalese officers of a Formed Police Unit of the African Union – United Nations
Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) in an attack by unidentified armed assailants
in West Darfur, on Sunday, 13 October 2013. A week earlier, a Zambian Military
Observer was stabbed at his residence in a car-jacking incident perpetrated by
armed men - the officer later died.
The Chairperson of the Commission strongly condemns these cowardly and criminal acts against UNAMID peacekeepers who are paying the ultimate price to bring
peace to Darfur. She stresses the urgent need to identify and bring the perpetrators of these criminal acts to justice.
The Chairperson of the Commission expresses AU's deepest condolences to the
families of the fallen peacekeepers, as well as to the Governments and peoples
of Senegal and Zambia.
25
Terrorism in Africa
ICC: Does politics win over ustice
-
-
CCThe fact remains that African nations, which are now unhappy with the International Criminal Court, voluntarily accepted the ICC jurisdiction by ratifying the
Rome Statute. And it is not true that the court is targeting Africa. But, yes, it has
political weaknesses that need addressing.
As a result of years of diplomacy and pressure by human rights organisations, the
jurisdiction of the International Criminal Court (ICC) finally came alive on 1 July
2002. Created by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), the Court is a permanent institution that investigates and prosecutes the authors of serious crimes
committed a er the entry into force of the Rome Statute and within the scope of
its jurisdiction, regardless of the official and hierarchical quality of the person
charged.
This article discusses the interactions between the political and the judicial aspects
of the ICC, which is alleged to focus on crimes in Africa and ignore atrocities in other parts of the world. In addition, fearing the instrumentalisation of the Court for
political purposes and the spread of complaints against their leaders or military
personnel, some states such as the U.S., China and Russia refused to ratify the
Rome Statute. Yet these countries are permanent members of the Security Council
which has a power of referral and blocking of cases on the ICC, a power that opens
a door to interference in the affairs of another state. So far the cases handled by
the ICC show that the issue of the exploitation of international justice, for political
reasons, is still a major weakness.
Overall, it seems the Court’s actions in general and in Africa in particular are being
hindered by political factors. With the recent vote by parliament to push withdrawal of Kenya from the Court, or the Sudanese president’s stalled prosecution (which
country is not member of the Rome statute), the perception of the Court as a western instrument discriminately targeting Africans has been reinforced. In this context the African Union (AU) called an extraordinary session 11-12 October 2013 to
address an eventual massive pull-out from the ICC by the 34 African member states
1 . But is it because other suspected criminals are not being prosecuted that the
ICC should not look at African cases? Or is this a problem of impartiality? This article will present some of the ICC rules in order to re-focus the debate, discuss the
supposed “Africanisation of the Court” and ways forward to bolster its action.
ICC RULES
To understand the perceived Africanisation of the Court, below are some quick pro-
26
cedures. To initiate a trial, the ICC can be moved into action by a State which has
ratified the Rome Statute, the UNSC or by the prosecutor‘s office. However, under
the principle of complementarity, States retain principally the responsibility to
prosecute suspects for the most serious crimes in their own courts. The ICC has jurisdiction:
jurisdiction;
of the Court;
jurisdiction and
and security. In the latter case, the Security Council may refer a case to the Court
under Chapter VII of the UN Charter;
The ICC Statute cedes to the Security Council a dual role: the power of referral, giving the Court increased competence in these cases, and the suspension of investigations and prosecutions that the Court could be carrying. The UNSC may only refer a matter to the Court in the context of Chapter VII of the UN Charter, that is to
say when there is “determined existence of a threat against the peace, breach of
the peace and acts of aggression”. This possibility of referral to the Court by the
Council has two characteristics: the randomness of its implementation and expansion of powers of the Court to States non-party to the Treaty. But it is true that the
referral by the UNSC expands the powers of the Court insofar as it gives it the opportunity to pursue States not part to the Treaty. Indeed, the other modes of referral to the ICC (the self referral by prosecutor of the Court or by a State Party) assume States are party to the Treaty. Through the power of the UNSC, the power of
the Court is significant because it provides an opportunity to tackle serious crimes
in countries within and outside the Rome Statute within the meaning of Chapter
VII.
Another serious point to look at in those rules is the self-referral power given to the
prosecutor. That power could be used to target countries of choice, which is one of
the reasons why powerful countries did not come on board. They feared the independence of a prosecutor who could almost single-handedly decide to open an investigation on the basis of politicised complaints. The U.S. was mostly of this opinion. But although the prosecutor can search, gather information and, if there is a
reasonable basis to initiate an investigation, request for authorisation of investiga-
27
tion from the Pre-Trial Chamber together with any supporting material collected
(article 15, Rome statute), the Pre-trial chamber has the power to authorise or reject an investigation. So the fear that the prosecutor could be the most powerful
man on earth by prosecuting whomsoever they want is unjustified.
It is worth recalling that according to Article 1 of the Rome Statute, the ICC is complementary to national criminal jurisdictions. It is true that the Court has universal
jurisdiction but all of the domestic means must have been exhausted before referring a matter to the ICC. The jurisdiction of the Court could be activated in case of
incapacity or unwillingness of a State to address the problem. Paragraph 2 of Article 17 of the Statute provides the basis on which the Court may determine the existence of this unwillingness. This could be the manifest purpose of shielding the
person concerned from criminal responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of
the Court or undue delay denying intent to bring the person concerned to justice,
the lack of independence or impartiality. Regarding the inability of the State concerned, Paragraph 3 refers in particular to the collapse of the whole or a substantial
part of the state judiciary system.
As mentioned before, some permanent members of the UNSC have not ratified the
Rome Statute but may refer a situation involving another State not party to the
Statute while those members are themselves immune 2 . Nonetheless, the prosecutor still has to examine the admissibility of the case referred to them according
to the principle of complementarity (like it has been done for the Sudanese case)
and thus protect the Court from any political influence one would think. Therefore
this establishes that, despite the influence of the UNSC, if the case referred to the
Court by the latter is not eligible, it will not be processed.
A TALE OF AFRICANISATION
The ICC is competent for cases with a strong political component as demonstrated
by the recent AU meeting calling for withdrawal of African states. As earlier mentioned, ICC will not prosecute cases when the State itself can do it. Moreover, out
of the 18 cases currently handled by the ICC, 12 were initiated upon the request of
countries concerned, while 6 were referred to by the UN Security Council 3 .
For example, Uganda, in 2003 requested that the ICC look into crimes committed
by Joseph Kony and the Lord’s Resistance Army in Northern Uganda. Cote D’Ivoire,
which did not ratify (but signed) the Statute, accepted the Court’s jurisdiction over
war crimes committed during the 2011 civil war. Mali’s government in 2012 asked
the court to investigate crimes committed during the armed conflict in northern
Mali in 2012. So, whether African leaders want to acknowledge it or not, they invited the ICC into Africa. It is then hard to understand that feeling of African states
who were the first to call in the ICC to prosecute cases.
The office of the prosecutor has made public that it is examining at least eight situ-
28
ations on four continents, including Afghanistan, Colombia, the Comoros, Georgia,
Guinea, Honduras and South Korea 4 . The situation in Kenya is the International
Criminal Court’s (ICC) fi h investigation. On 31 March 2010, ICC Pre-Trial Chamber
(PTC) II authorized the ICC prosecutor to open an investigation into crimes against
humanity allegedly committed in Kenya in relation to the post-election violence of
2007-2008. It was the first time that the prosecutor used his “proprio motu” powers to initiate an investigation without first having received a referral from a state
party or the UNSC 5 .
For instance, at the recent African Union summit held on May 26-27, the AU's Assembly adopted a decision requesting the ICC to refer back to Kenya its cases
against Kenyan President Uhuru Kenyatta and Vice President William Ruto. But it is
to be recalled that ICC came in because Kenya failed to put in place a special tribunal to prosecute the cases. In fact, The Waki 6 Commission recommended that a
local tribunal investigate and prosecute those suspected of criminal conduct. The
Kenyan parliament voted against such a tribunal 7 . Despite being given nearly 18
months to do so, Kenyan authorities declined to initiate any proceedings against
the alleged perpetrators of the violence. Special envoy Kofi Annan then handed
over a list of six suspects’ names to the ICC.
Understanding the way the court works, it seems that there are other motives behind the discourse of victimisation of African states. As Simon Allison says, African
leaders are interested in immunity 8 more than anything else. The argument of
the Court only prosecuting Africans cannot be valid even if that is a fact. The presidents are just protecting themselves but it should not be forgotten that crimes
were actually committed in the prosecuted cases.
AN EFFICIENT AFRICAN COURT
It is now established that African countries are no longer happy with the ICC even if
they invited ICC in first place. But let us remember that the Court exists in the principle of complementarity of national jurisdictions and the Rome Statute has been
ratified by 34 of the 54 African countries.
It is important to think about the Court not in a way of having “negative complementarity”. Indeed, as Max Duplessis (2012) explains, negative complementarity
can be understood as “an attempt to undermine the existing work of the ICC
through a commitment to an alternative mechanism for dispensing international
criminal justice but which stands no realistic chance of providing such justice” 9 .
Then, the existence of an effective African Court of Justice and Human rights will
help the African continent deal with its matters. In fact, there have been efforts to
gra an international criminal chamber to the body of the African Court 10 . In
February 2010, the AU Commission began a process to amend the protocol on the
Statute of the African Court of Justice and Human Rights to expand this court’s jurisdiction to include international and transnational crimes.
29
The resultant dra protocol adds criminal jurisdiction over the international crimes
of genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity, as well as several other
crimes such as terrorism, piracy and corruption. This is an ideal goal for the continent which could even fill the impunity gap in some states. Given the fact that only
34 states ratified the Rome statute, an African jurisdiction would have competence
over the whole continent. This court would be able to fulfil its obligations and be
independently financed so as to prosecute cases and bear the whole implied charges. Though an African court may even less solve than raise issues: effectiveness,
fiscal implications, independence, impartiality and competence between that court
and the ICC. Max Duplessis’ analysis shows for instance that the ICC’s budget is
more than 14 times that of the African Court without a criminal component; and is
just about double the entire budget of the AU 11 . So it is likely that many concerns exist about that African Court.
WAY FORWARD
There is no doubt that the ICC justice has a politicised nature and, as Phil Clark noted in an interview given to RFI, in some cases, the selective cooperation of some
African governments to the ICC is the problem. There are three African governments (Côte d’Ivoire, Uganda and Congo) who used the Court against their opposition. Is it possible that the Court became a political tool used by some governments
in Africa to attack opponents and protect their officers 12 ? This dimension shows
that the ICC is not just a western tool for dominating Africans.
So the ICC should just pursue the crimes committed by rebels against a government
but not those crimes committed by a government. The ICC falls into that political
trap of being used to just prosecute rebels. Now the AU seems to protest every
time it does not agree with the court. For instance, the AU’s decision not to cooperate with the ICC stems from the UN Security Council’s refusal to defer proceedings
in Darfur for the period of one year 13 , and now the AU is planning massive withdrawal from the court because of the Kenyan case. Following the recent AU extraordinary summit, there is the need to emphasise that African member states
have been using that organisation as a shield not to collaborate fully with the
court.
In fact, on one hand State parties are obliged under the Rome Statute to cooperate
fully with the ICC in its investigation and prosecution of crimes within the court’s
jurisdiction. On the other, the AU’s Constitutive Act warns that the failure of a
member state to comply with its decisions may result in sanctions. Hence, Kenya
welcomed the President Bashir in 2010 for the country’s new constitution on the
basis of respecting AU’s non-cooperation decision 14 .
By prosecuting perpetrators of crimes, as some states have all the means to do,
they prevent the activation of the jurisdiction of the Court. Moreover, the prosecu-
30
tor’s powers are limited by the need to submit an application for authorisation to
investigate to the Pre-Trial Chamber.
The Court needs to look at the right of veto of the permanent members of the
UNSC which can be an obstacle to the referral procedure. Indeed, if one of the "Big
Five" decides to protect a country where serious crimes are taking place, the veto
could make any referral impossible as it is witnessed in Syria. The UNSC may decide
to pass a resolution to freeze the activities of the Court for a period of twelve
months, renewable. Cases may be suspended by the UNSC regardless of the methods of referral. In addition, to function fully and effectively, the Court depends on
the willingness of states resulting in confidence in this institution, signature and
ratification of the Convention.
It is the Rome Statute itself that gives to the UNSC the power it has. According to
Nabil Elaraby (2001), the general umbrella of the council will always go over the
cases before the ICC 15 because the crimes falling under the court’s jurisdiction
are serious crimes that threaten world peace and security, the area of jurisdiction
of the UNSC under Chapter VII of the UN Charter. The independence of the Court
will actually be guaranteed when its procedures will be free from the political influence of the Security Council, but also be aware of its political instrumentalisation
by African governments.
It should no longer be permitted to use the veto in Security Council on international
crimes cases. Though UNSC members really cherish it, the power of the veto should
be reduced concerning ICC cases. The case in Syria is not actually prosecuted because of the veto of Russia while human rights violations are being committed. And
if the powerful states still fear the court action, they can still argue that their judicial system is still working and that they can take care of their own cases.
With the growing perception of the court targeting Africa, it is important that the
UNSC refers the Syrian case to the court as they did with Sudan. Sudan has not
signed the Rome Treaty but President Bashir actually has an international warrant
arrest on his head.
In any case the Court should review its way of functioning because the international community is not ready yet to deal without that court. The only way politics
seems to play over the judiciary is through the Security Council’s referral power.
Gino Vlavonou is Junior Fellow, Institute for Security Studies (ISS), Nairobi Office.
ENDNOTES
1 BBC (2013), African Union summit on ICC pullout over Ruto trial,http://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-africa-24173557, accessed 24 September 2013
31
2 Bourguiba, L. (2008) La Cour pénale internationale: modèles de saisine et limites, Confluences méditerranée, Justice pénale et politique internationale (64),
194 pages.
3 Solomon Dersso (2013), The International Criminal Court's Africa problem,
http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/
opinion/2013/06/201369851918549.html,accessed
24
September2013
4 Coalition for the International Criminal Court (2013), Court Developments in
Relation
to
Other
Countries
http://www.iccnow.org/?
mod developments
accessed
24
September
2013
5 Coalition for the International Criminal Court, Kenya, http://
www.iccnow.org/?mod kenya
accessed
24
September
2013
6 Kenyatta and Ruto’s roles in the post-election violence were confirmed by an
independent Kenyan investigation led by Kenyan Judge Philip Waki
7 Sivu Maqungo (2013), Kenya and the ICC: A tale of three mistakes and the cruellest gamble, ISS today, http://tinyurl.com/ozsa63v, accessed 25 September
2013
8 Simon Allison (2013), Daily Maverick, Analysis: In protecting Kenyatta and Ruto, the AU betrays us all, http://tinyurl.com/kyq29oz, accessed 24 September
2013
9 Du plessis, M., Louw, A., and Maunganidze, O. (2012), African efforts to close
the impunity gap, Lessons for complementarity from national and regional actions, ISS Paper 241 November 2012, available at http://tinyurl.com/
lp4gwp9,
accessed
24
September
2013
10 Ibid
11 Du plessis, M. (2012), Implications of the AU Decision to Give the African
Court Jurisdiction Over International Crimes, ISS Paper 235 June 2012, available
athttp://tinyurl.com/n4hpde4,
accessed
24
September
2013
12 RFI (2013), Rogez, O., Phil Clark: «la CPI a une certaine naïveté politique»,http://tinyurl.com/k5b7da2
accessed
25/09/2013
13 Du plessis, M. and Gevers, C., (2011), Balancing competing obligations: The
Rome Statute and AU decisions, ISS Paper 225, October 2011, available athttp://
tinyurl.com/mu2qdat,
accessed
24
September
2013
14 Ibid
15 Elaraby, N. (2001). The role of the Security Council and the independence of
the international criminal court: some reflections In M. POLITI G. NESI (Eds.),
The rome statute of the international criminal court: a challenge to impunity, Italy.
Source: Allafrica.com
32
Afrique : hausse du trafic de drogue alimentant le terrorisme,
nouvelle menace pour la sécurité (REPORTAGE)
le 28-10-2013
Certaines parties de l'Afrique de l'Ouest et de l'Est ont émergé comme de nouveaux points de transit pour les trafiquants de drogue, qui utilisent des navires
marchands ou des bateaux plus discrets pour le trafic de leur produits en provenance d'Amérique latine ou d'Asie centrale et à destination des marchés de consommation. Pire encore, le problème de la drogue est lié à d'autres formes de
crime organisé tels que le terrorisme, a averti un responsable de la Commission de
l'Union africaine (CUA).
Les frontières poreuses et les centaines de kilomètres de côtes non surveillées, les
Etats fragiles et criblés de conflits, les systèmes judiciaires affaiblis, la corruption,
le taux élevé de chômage chez les jeunes, et d'autres défis sociaux ont rendu le
continent vulnérable au trafic de drogue, a indiqué Olawale Maiyegun, directeur
du Département des Affaires sociales de la CUA.
HAUSSE SPECTACULAIRE DU TRAFIC DE DROGUE
Selon l'Office des Nations Unies contre la drogue et le crime (ONUDC), les saisies
d'héroïne ces dernières années ont été particulièrement élevées au Nigeria, au
Bénin, au Togo sur la côte ouest, et en Tanzanie sur la côte est de l'Afrique.
Lors d'une réunion récemment organisée à Harare, au Zimbabwe, des experts africains en matière de lutte contre la drogue affirment que l'Afrique de l'Ouest est
devenue une voie de transit majeure pour le trafic de cocaïne entre l'Amérique du
Sud et l'Europe, et que l'Afrique de l'Est a servi de point de transit pour le trafic
d'héroïne en provenance de l'Asie de l'Ouest, y compris l'Afghanistan et le Pakistan.
En Afrique de l'Est, les saisies de drogue ont été pratiquement multipliées par 10
depuis 2009.
Les systèmes de sécurité sont souvent assez insuffisants en Afrique, et la région
située près de la péninsule arabique facilite également les financements provenant d'un certain nombre de sponsors des réseaux terroristes, analyse Li Wei, directeur du Centre de la recherche antiterroriste à l'Institut chinois des relations
internationales contemporaines.
Ces dernières années, la région connaît également une hausse d'autres formes de
criminalité, telle que le trafic de drogue et la corruption, ce dernier constituant un
élément indispensable au financement du terrorisme, de ses relais et de ses complices, a-t-il ajouté.
UNE TENDANCE PREOCCUPANTE
Il est préoccupant de constater que les liens entre les organisations terroristes et
les réseaux mafieux impliqués dans le trafic de drogue sont de plus en plus
33
étroits .
L'organisation terroriste Al-Qaïda au Maghreb islamique (AQMI) comporte trois
branches chargées du transport de drogue de l'Afrique du Nord vers l'Europe destiné à financer ces activités terroristes.
Les recettes du trafic de drogue sont susceptibles d'être utilisées par des groupes
extrémistes en Afrique de l'Est et de l'Ouest pour financer leurs activités terroristes dans cette région de plus en plus vulnérable, selon Olawale Maiyegun, qui a
indiqué à l'agence Xinhua en marge d'une réunion d'experts sur la lutte contre le
trafic de drogues récemment tenue à Harare que le problème de la drogue est
étroitement lié à d'autres formes de crime organisé telles que le terrorisme et le
trafic des armes légères.
"Dans le cas du Mali, les revenus du trafic de drogue ont été utilisés pour financer
la déstabilisation dans la partie nord du pays", a-t-il indiqué avant d'ajouter que le
lien est aussi évident dans certains cas. Le Kenya souffre encore plus du crime organisé, notamment la piraterie, le trafic de drogue et le terrorisme.
Au Nigeria, où le trafic de drogue est devenu un sérieux problème, les autorités
luttent contre le groupe extrémiste islamiste Boko Haram qui est également impliqué dans le trafic de drogue, et dont les activités visent à créer un Etat islamique.
En proie à une instabilité chronique, la Guinée Bissau en Afrique de l'Ouest est
devenue un paradis de la drogue. Les trafiquants de drogue utilisent des navires
marchands transportant des conteneurs ou des bateaux plus discrets pour faire de
la contrebande de cocaïne pure en provenance du Brésil. La drogue est ensuite
acheminée en Guinée Bissau, avant de partir pour l'Europe et les Etats-Unis. Le
trafic de drogue constitue un facteur important d'instabilité sociale dans le pays.
EFFORTS REGIONAUX ET INTERNATIONAUX INDISPENSABLES
L'Afrique a actuellement besoin de réponses solides pour contrer le crime organisé, qui devient de plus en plus "sophistiqué".
JIN Can Rong, directeur-adjoint de l'Institut des relations internationales de l'Université du peuple de Chine, a fait savoir ses points de vues pour contrecarrer l'association du trafic de drogue avec le terrorisme:
Tout d'abord, pour réagir aux fléaux transnationaux, une coopération régionale
semble indispensable. Les gouvernements du continent devraient commencer par
le renforcement des échanges d'informations et la coopération en matière de surveillance des frontières et dans la lutte contre le trafic de drogue.
Deuxièmement, pour s'attaquer au fond du problème, le développement
économique est une tâche importante pour les pays africains. Le développement
socio-économique permettrait notamment de créer des emplois et de s'attaquer
aux racines sociales du terrorisme, mais aussi de renforcer l'Etat dans la lutte contre le crime organisé.
34
Troisièmement, il n'existe pas de modèle démocratique prêt à l'emploi qui puisse
être appliqué de façon aveugle, les pays africains devraient adapter leur système
de gouvernance conformément à leurs propres situations.
Quatrièmement, compte tenu de la provenance et la destination de la drogue, ainsi que la menace que représente l'association entre trafic de drogue et terrorisme
pour le monde entier, une coopération internationale est plus que nécessaire. Le
monde a la responsabilité d'aider les Africains dans leur lutte contre la drogue et le
terrorisme, deux fléaux " importés" malgré eux sur leur continent.
Source: Agence de presse Xinhua
35
International Analysis: Resurgent Regional Terrorism — A Sinister
Threat
OCTOBER 26, 2013
The global significance and relevance of Al Qaeda has been questioned since the
death of Osama bin Laden. Former director of the CIA’s Political Islam Strategic
Analysis Program Emile Nakhleh argues that “Al Qaeda central” has numerous regional affiliates across Africa and the Middle East of which the world should be
wary.
Governments around the world have been lulled by the diminishing significance
and reach of Al Qaeda central, especially since the death of Osama bin Laden and
the capturing and killing of numerous senior Al Qaeda leaders. The threat from regional terrorist organizations connected to Al Qaeda, however, has grown significantly.
A terrorist crescent is casting its shadow across Africa and the Middle East, from
Syria to Bahrain. This is due in large part to autocratic rule across the region, the
repression of human rights, the suppression of political activity, and the promotion
of sectarianism. Ignoring this threat would be detrimental to regional and global
security and stability.
The seizure of the oil facility in Algeria earlier this year, the bloody conflict in Mali,
and Al Shabab’s recent attack on the Nairobi mall demonstrate the regional reach
of some of these groups.
The resurgence of groups such as Al Shabab in Somalia and Al Qaeda in the Arabian
Peninsula (AQAP) in Yemen is aided by their ability to recruit youth from abroad –
o en from Western countries – as well as by a lack of government accountability
and political stability in the areas in which they thrive.
Drone strikes in Yemen, Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Somalia have successfully targeted terrorist leaders, but have also engendered fear, anger, and resentment
among large segments of Muslim societies. Affected communities in some of these
areas view the civilian deaths that have resulted from drone strikes as evidence of
U.S. callousness toward the Muslim world.
Some interpret these “signature” and “targeted” strikes as a war on Islam. In their
view, the now-defunct “Global War on Terror” has devolved into a bloody war
against specific Muslim communities in areas like Yemen and Somalia. Government
authority is practically non-existent in many of these tribal areas, making it impossible for civilians to turn to officials for help.
The fact that governments in Yemen, Somalia, and Pakistan deny having any prior
knowledge of these drone or missile strikes has only fuelled Muslim anger toward
the United States. SM1 Perceptions of these American-led “dirty wars” against
parts of the Muslim world make it difficult to engage mainstream Muslim communities, groups, NGOs, and political parties.
36
Regional terrorism has developed in North and West Africa and the Sahel countries
through to East Africa, the Arabian Peninsula, and the Levant. In Africa’s Sahel, regional groups include Boko Haram in Nigeria, Ansar Dine in Mali, Harakat al Tawhid
wa al Jihad in Niger, and Katibat al-Mulathameen in Chad. Of course, Al Shabab has
operated for years in Somalia. In North Africa, groups include Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), Ansar al-Sharia, and the Libyan Islamic Fighting Group.
Groups like AQAP in Yemen, Al Qaeda in Iraq, and Jabhat al-Nusra in Syria now
thrive in the Middle East.
Outside the Muslim heartland, bin Laden’s message continues to lure vulnerable
youth in Western societies into terrorism. Many of these angry, alienated, gullible,
unemployed or underemployed youth are first- or second-generation Muslim immigrants or asylum seekers. Others are converts to Islam.
These “lone wolf” recruits have not integrated well into Western societies. They
are not well versed in the Koran or Islamic theology, however, and tend to accept
the questionable religious justification of violent jihad. Some are driven by personal
experiences, such as having a close friend or relative who was killed by a drone
strike, or by the security services in their home countries, which they accuse of collusion with the United States. These young recruits begin to feel like part of a virtual community, orummah, regardless of whether or not they or their families have
had any connections to jihadist groups or causes.
These regional terrorist groups are not under the command and control of the original Al Qaeda group, and are o en focused on local or regional agendas. But they
do support bin Laden’s message of global jihad and its perennial battle with the
West and mainstream Muslim governments, and some have declared allegiance to
Al Qaeda central.
With Al Qaeda central’s approval, Al Qaeda in Iraq and Jabhat al-Nusra (and other
jihadist groups) in Syria seem to be merging, with an eye toward setting up an umbrella group known as Al Qaeda in the Levant.
What is most worrisome is that a younger and more violent generation of leaders is
emerging in the post-bin Laden era. It’s as if the “old guard” has passed on the
mantle to a new set of fighters and ideologues. Nasser al-Wuhayshi, the leader of
AQAP, is one example.
It’s vital that terrorism analysts know whether or not Al Qaeda central is devolving
into a loosely connected network of regional terror organizations operating out of
different areas around the world.
Emile Nakhleh is former dire tor of the Politi al slam Strategi Analysis Program at
C A and author of A Necessary Engagement: Reinventing America’s Relations with
the Muslim World.
http://www.peruviantimes.com/
37
Is Al-Qaeda a Threat to Moroccan Stability
OCTOBER 17, 2013
The recent video released by Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb is less a threat to
Moroccan stability than the return of hundreds of battle-hardened fighters from
Syria.
Despite the scathing criticism of the Moroccan regime by Al-Qaeda in the Islamic
Maghreb (AQIM) in itsrecording released on September 12, this rhetoric does not
present a threat to Moroccan political stability in the near term. Rather, the video
seems designed to recruit youth eager to join al-Qaeda’s regional affiliate and to
focus on local rather than international jihad, while also indirectly pressuring the
regime to resolve the ongoing issue of terrorism—particularly the issue of Salafi
jihadi detainees in Moroccan jails.
There is little question as to the video’s authenticity, particularly because AQIM
itself has not denied it—as it has always been quick to deny responsibility for
events not of its doing, including the Marrakesh bombing of April 2011. Particularly noteworthy in the 41-minute-long video, titled “Morocco: Kingdom of Corruption and Despotism,” is the high technical and production quality, as well as
the sophistication of the content itself—aspects that apply to several recent alQaeda productions. This video includes careful political analysis drawing on Wikileaks documents, selections from the book Le Roi Prédateur (The Predator King)
which depicts rampant corruption within the palace, clips from Al-Jazeera and
other news outlets on the same topic, as well as statements by pro-Muslim
Brotherhood intellectuals such as the Kuwaiti Abdallah al-Nafisi (at minute 14)
criticizing the concentration of power and wealth in the hands of the few. In a
break from tradition, the video carefully highlights figures from North African and
38
Andalusian history, such as Youssef ben Tachfine and Tareq ben Ziyad, instead of
those from the eastern Arab world, showing AQIM’s focus on local issues rather
than the traditional international or regional issues on which it has previously
sought to focus: the Arab-Israeli conflict and the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq.
In March 2013, another document was issued by AQIM along the same lines, discussing the need to recruit youth in Tunisia, Algeria, and Morocco to do battle in
northern Mali and southern Algeria and to challenge French influence as well as
the Algerian government. This signals a shi toward localization of jihad instead of
its internationalization, which means a more local focus for AQIM, which recommends that its members stay in North Africa to recruit more followers instead of
going to conflict zones like Syria, arguing that the local governments were trying to
be rid of fighters by facilitating their travel abroad, thereby limiting the potential
of action in their own countries.
In the video, AQIM refrained from calling for attacks within Morocco, with its emir,
Abdelmalek Droudkel (also known as Abu Musab Abdel Wadoud) calling on youth
to “migrate to God and His Prophet instead of migrating by boat” (at minute 39),
which appears to encourage youth to join AQIM instead of heading to Syria for
jihad or even to Europe for jobs and better lives. Recent instructions from the central al-Qaeda organization and its decentralized affiliates urge supporters not to
target or clash with Arab regimes, especially those in which Islamists have come to
power via elections, further suggesting that this video does not threaten Moroccan stability directly. Al-Qaeda sees such attacks as not being productive at this
stage; rather, it has encouraged its members to join street protests in 2011 and to
utilize the margin of freedom being created, either to topple regimes or to pressure them to offer genuine reforms. Although street protests have abated some,
al-Qaeda's strategy remains the same, as evidenced by the fatwa issued by Abu
Munthir Shenkiti on Tawhid wal-Jihad’s website.
The idea of avoiding confrontation with regimes where Islamists came to power
via elections is a proof of this shi in strategy; the group's reasoning is not to enter
in conflict with governments chosen by people. They also appear concerned with
gaining more social support a er the damage incurred by the 2005 and 2006
attacks on civilians in Iraq. This shows—beyond the concern to rehabilitate their
public image—their pragmatism in choosing to adapt to changing circumstances.
To that end, al-Qaeda’s leader, Ayman al-Zawahiri, has argued that the group
should exploit the Arab Spring to expand its recruiting by creating a civilian wing
concentrating on religious propagation. This has subsequently led to the creation
of Ansar al-Sharia within the Arab Spring countries—namely those with security
vacuums, such as Tunisia, Libya, and Yemen. Civilians within Ansar al-Sharia are
conducting a “hearts-and-minds”campaign based on charitable and religious work
particularly on the outskirts of cities and towns.
Tunisia provides an example of the strategy of non-confrontation with governments where Islamists came to power through elections. Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia
39
(AST), which is ideologically affiliated with al-Qaeda, under the leadership of Seifallah Ben Hassine (known also as Abu Iyad al-Tunisi), first tried to provoke the Ennahda-led government and draw it into a fight—such as by attacking the U.S. Embassy in September 2012. This move drew a stern rebuke from the central and regional al-Qaeda leaderships. Then, when the Tunisian Ministry of Interior decided
to ban the AST annual congress that had been scheduled to take place in Kairouan
in May 2013, a bloody confrontation seemed likely, but a mediation effort by leaders in Ennahda and AST managed to prevent anger from getting out of hand; the
two parties reached an agreement to postpone the conference instead. Since then,
the level of escalation between the Ennahda government and AST has decreased:
when the Tunisian Ministry of the Interior added AST to its list of terrorist organizations in August there was barely any action taken by the latter; instead they called
for patience and avoiding confrontation with the government.
These pieces of evidence indicate that the latest video is more of a tool for AQIM’s
local recruiting than a warning of impending attacks against the Moroccan regime,
particularly since Morocco continues to be fertile ground for enlisting fighters. Estimates put the number of Moroccans fighting with the Syrian rebels between 200
and 700, including most prominently the leader of the Sham al-Islam movement,
Brahim Benchekroun, who had been detained first in Guantanamo from 2002 until
2004 and later in Morocco from 2005 until 2011. Sham al-Islam, which rejects democracy and prioritizes fighting against the far enemy (the West) over the near enemy (Arab regimes), operates independently from al-Qaeda and Jabhat al-Nusra,
and it consists mainly of Moroccan militants. This is the real future threat to Moroccan stability. An estimated 30 percent of the Moroccans fighting in Syria served
time in jail under the Anti-Terrorism Law, and so have transformed from being
purely ideological jihadists into actual combatants. Those who survive the civil war
in Syria will return home with a wealth of combat expertise.
It’s no surprise that young ex-convicts who served time under the Anti-Terrorism
Law are joining the jihad in Syria. Further radicalization in jails—from exposure to
older leaders who had taken part in the Afghan and Chechen jihads—is one of the
byproducts of the crackdown on suspected terrorists. Social and economic vulnerability—and the lack of support networks capable of providing post-prison rehabilitation—increase their feelings of exclusion and the appeal of joining the fight
abroad.
The state's heavy-handed approach to Salafi-jihadis further complicates the issue
and overlooks the real threat. Morocco needs a comprehensive policy—that prioritizes preventing further radicalization through promoting the teaching of moderate
Islamic concepts, engaging in dialogue with the Salafi-jihadis, and showing good
faith by releasing detainees who did not commit felonies and show a desire to renounce violence—to address the eminent threat of returning jihadis. Yet such a
policy will not succeed without a parallel long-term plan to address the country’s
fundamental economic and political issues that remain at the root of popular disil-
40
lusionment and disenfranchisement.
Mohammed Masbah is a fellow at the German nstitute for nternational and Se urity Affairs in Berlin and a regular ontributor to Sada.
http://carnegieendowment.org/
41
L'Afrique au défi de la démocratie
Publication: 15/10/2013 07
Aujourd'hui, "l'émergence" économique de l'Afrique fait la une des journaux mais
on ne peut comprendre la performance économique d'un pays indépendamment
des mouvements sociaux et politiques qui l'animent. Alors que l'Europe est à la
peine, et malgré un contexte international déprimé, le rapport Perspectives
Économiques en Afrique 2013 prévoit cette année une croissance supérieure à 7%
pour 12 des 54 économies africaines... Cette trajectoire économique positive en
cache une autre, moins médiatisée: les dix dernières années ont aussi été celles
d'une transformation remarquable des relations entre gouvernements et citoyens
en Afrique. Terrorisme au Kenya, guerre au Mali, troubles en Égypte..., le flux de
l'actualité complique l'analyse des tendances longues sur un continent qui compte
des pays très différents. C'est pourquoi, en plus de suivre les variations des agrégats économiques, nos Perspectives mesurent depuis des années, pays par pays,
l'intensité des tensions civiles sur la base d'une analyse des dépêches quotidiennes
vérifiées de l'AFP et Reuters, en distinguant les violences commises par des acteurs
non gouvernementaux et les protestations comme les grèves et manifestations,
qu'elles soient motivées par des raisons politiques, économiques ou sociales
(Figure 1). La méthodologie et l'analyse complètes sont disponibles ici.
Figure 1. Indices des protestations et des violences civiles, 1996-2012 (base 1996
= 100)
Sour e: Centre de développement de l'OCDE (d'après des informations AFP)
Que nous apprend l'analyse de ces évolutions? Depuis la fin des années 1990,
42
l'intensité des protestations a connu trois mouvements successifs: une réduction
de moitié jusqu'en 2005; une remontée suite à la flambée des prix alimentaires et
des carburants en 2006-09; puis une augmentation forte à la suite des révolutions
des "printemps arabes". Cette augmentation des manifestations et grèves peut
être lue comme l'affirmation politique progressive des citoyens africains.
Ces manifestations se font par ailleurs moins violentes, de nombreux groupes
d'acteurs civils se convertissant à des modes de revendication politiques, sociaux
ou économiques plus pacifiques. Autre fait notable : si certains gouvernements ont
recouru à la violence pour disperser les manifestants, la plupart ont fait preuve d'une ouverture croissante et autorisé une liberté d'expression accrue face à ces protestations. Quant aux revendications des manifestants, l'analyse des dépêches
montre qu'en 2012, 35% d'entre elles étaient d'ordre économique, les revendications salariales étant les plus fréquentes (23%). Le manque d'emplois décents et le
partage insuffisant des fruits de la croissance de la décennie écoulée sont sources
de frustration et d'instabilité. Les "émeutes de la faim" qui ont éclaté notamment
en 2006/07 dans plusieurs pays en sont une illustration marquante. Dans le cas des
révolutions d'Afrique du Nord en 2011, les frustrations engendrées par des décennies de privation des droits civils ont été amplifiées par le manque d'opportunités
et de perspectives, notamment pour les jeunes.
Deuxième tendance, plus préoccupante: alors que l'indicateur moyen des violences
civiles avait baissé pour atteindre en 2009 un indice quatre fois inférieur à sa valeur
de référence en 1996, elle a rebondi suite aux printemps arabes, pour revenir en
2010 à son niveau de 1996 (alors que dans le même temps l'intensité des manifestations, elle, a doublé par rapport à 1996). Ainsi, en parallèle du recours plus
fréquent aux moyens de revendication démocratiques, la période récente voit
également une recrudescence des violences civiles, et l'émergence de tensions entre groupes sociaux, notamment lors des périodes électorales. Depuis les années
1990, un nombre sans cesse croissant de pays africains ont en effet organisé des
élections, légalisé le multipartisme et fixé des limites temporelles aux mandats
électoraux de leurs dirigeants. Tous les citoyens africains -à l'exception des ressortissants de l'Érythrée et de la Somalie- peuvent désormais désigner leurs dirigeants
par l'intermédiaire d'un processus électoral. Mais ces élections sont souvent des
périodes de tension, voire d'instabilité. Même des pays à longue tradition démocratique, comme le Sénégal ou le Ghana, en ont fait récemment l'expérience. Entre
2000 et 2012, un quart au moins des scrutins ont été marqués par des troubles. La
marginalisation ethnique ou les tensions liées à la propriété foncière posent un
risque à ce que des dirigeants, s'accrochant au pouvoir, attisent des rivalités entre
différentes factions. La démocratie reste ainsi un acquis fragile en Afrique. Le coup
d'État militaire au Mali et l'empêchement des scrutins en Guinée, en GuinéeBissau, en Mauritanie et au Togo nous le rappellent.
La bonne performance économique de l'Afrique des dix dernières années s'accompagne ainsi d'une relation complexe entre citoyens et gouvernements : d'une part,
les premiers hésitent de moins en moins à exprimer leurs doléances de manière
43
pacifique, en dehors des processus électoraux, encouragés par une baisse tendancielle de la répression par les gouvernements ; d'autre part, les élections polarisent une partie de la violence entre groupes sociaux, qui redouble sur la période récente. On peut en tirer deux conclusions : premièrement, la bonne performance
des économies africaines condamne en quelque sorte leurs gouvernements à la
réussite: à défaut de progrès rapides vers une croissance plus inclusive -création
massive d'emplois décents, amélioration des services publics, etc.-- ils devront faire
face à un accroissement des revendications citoyennes pour plus d'opportunités
économiques et sociales d'autant plus rapide que l'Afrique continue de connaître
une poussée démographique forte; de 200 millions aujourd'hui, la jeunesse africaine (les 15 à 24 ans) passera à 400 millions en 2035. Deuxièmement, au-delà de
la tenue d'élections, il faut décupler efforts pour asseoir la démocratie sur des bases institutionnelles transparentes, respectueuses des droits sociaux et politiques
des citoyens.
http://www.huffingtonpost.fr/
44
Egypt
Opinion: The Battle for Hearts and Minds
26 October 2013
The first thing that we must realize is that the war on terrorism and extremism is a
regional one. This is a war that has extended across the Middle East, while it also
represents a threat to regional states, not just in terms of violence, but also division,
fragmentation, and civil war. This war is placing the Arabs on one side, and the rest
of the world on the other. The second fact is that we are facing a proliferation of
terrorist organizations, radical militias, and extremist ideology, and this includes the
Takfirist ideology of Sayyid Qutb promoted by the Muslim Brotherhood. These organizations are leading a battle for hearts and minds; a process through which they
recruit their followers, distorting a tolerant and moderate religion.
This issue is our topic for today, and this is something that is not new to the Arab
and Islamic world; we have known this phenomenon since the emergence of
the Kharijites. Following this, we saw the rise of Islamic extremism and extremists. It
was only a er people resorted to the sword that we saw the rise of groups fighting
the entire world in the name of Islam.
In Egypt, we saw the rise of terrorism in the 1990s until we witnessed the Luxor
Massacre, the brutal slaying of 58 tourists. Years later, we have witnessed the coldblooded murder of unarmed Egyptian soldiers in Sinai. Terrorism has not le any
Arab state untouched, and this is something that can be clearly seen in Palestine,
Sudan, Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere. In some cases, this phenomenon has led
to social fragmentation and division. When this reached New York, London, Madrid,
Paris, and Moscow, the watching world failed to distinguish between those who follow a tolerant and humane religion, and the misguided few who have distorted our
faith and been led astray.
The story of terrorism is well known and has now entered its fi h decade. During
this period, there has been much talk among Arab and Muslim intellectuals across
the world about extremist groups hijacking Islam and interpreting and understanding its provisions according to their own desires and interests. This hijacking of our
religion took place when the world began to view these extremists and radicals as
representatives of Islam, not to mention our own Sunni Muslim youth.
Major Islamic institutions in different Arab states were ineffective in their confrontation of extremist ideology and groups, either out of weak capabilities, an inability
to deal with the challenges of the time, or because these institutions found it useful
to go even further than these radicals in terms of espousing extremist views. Islam
appears vulnerable to attack in the current global clash of civilizations. We are witnessing a stage of escalation and aggravation; however the price for this confrontation is being paid by the Arabs and Muslims, who are also its primary victims.
The essence of the battle for hearts and minds is the process to “renew” religion.
45
This does not mean promoting heresy, but rather promoting a different reading of
Islam. Islam would not have been able to spread across the globe and survive until
today if it did not have the capacity to absorb and contain different readings and
understandings.
As we move deeper into the twenty-first century, issues such as globalization, participation in decision-making, equality, and partnership, in a world that contains
different doctrines and ideologies, has become the main task of this Islamic
“renewal.” The Muslim Brotherhood successfully dominated the post-Arab Spring
political arena by pulling off a major trick, namely putting on the mask of democracy, modernity, and the ballot box. However when the Brotherhood did indeed
come to power, they took off the mask to reveal their true despotic face. What
happened in Egypt was an important lesson for everyone, namely that such deceptions cannot last forever. As for now, we must ensure that this scenario is not repeated, while such deceptions must be exposed wherever they are. This cannot
happen unless we understand the requirements of the age, and this is not just the
task of religious scholars, but everybody. If we are wise, we will ensure that we
spread knowledge and understanding throughout the Arab and Muslim world.
Here, the “renewal” of Islam will be a message of civilization, promoting knowledge
and understanding, particularly regarding the modern world and what is required
today.
If it is true that this “renewal” of Islam is our priority, then promoting development
and growth is not far behind. This is because religious extremism thrives amongst
ignorance, poverty, and social inequality—not just between different social classes,
but also geographic regions.
I do not know much about the social and economic conditions in other Arab states,
yet the reality in Egypt is glaringly clear. During the major wave of terrorism that
beset the country throughout the 1990s, 97 percent of those responsible for this
came from Upper Egypt. Of this figure, 77 percent came from a single governorate,
Minya governorate—the most underdeveloped of all Egypt’s provinces.
As for today, the situation remains largely the same. Two-thirds of those who took
part in the pro-Mursi Rabaa Al-Adawiya sit-ins came from three southern governorates: Minya, Beni Suef, and Fayoum. While the majority of those who voted for
Mursi in the Egyptian presidential elections also came from Upper Egypt. As for the
rest of those who voted for him, they simply did not want to see a return of Mubarak’s National Democratic Party.
The bitter fact of the matter is that 62 percent of Egypt’s poor live in the country’s
southern governorates.
Therefore, there is a clear link between vulnerability to futile extremist ideology
and economic and social conditions. In any case, there is a dire need for more studies to be carried out regarding the geographic areas where extremism and violent
ideologies thrive. If results back up the analysis from Egypt, then we are at least
46
halfway towards a cure.
There is another approach to handling this battle for hearts and minds—a er we
have “renewed” religion and sought to secure development and growth— namely
to think of the future. The world has been turned upside down in the past few
years, and we are still witnessing the repercussions of this upheaval. The world is
not as it was before, when changes took place gradually over centuries. Now, the
status quo can change several times within an individual’s lifetime. Indeed, phenomenon such as the Arab Spring are now a part of our past as much as our future;
the well-known proverb that the future starts now is not an exaggeration. Perhaps
one of the dilemmas facing youth today is that they have to deal with the future
while they are still living in the present, or indeed the distant past. This is precisely
what the Muslim Brotherhood is trying to impose, namely for our present to be
controlled and defined by our past. However what we want is for the present to
live in our hearts and minds, and our consciences.
http://www.aawsat.net/
47
Kenya
Al-Shabaab’s Savage Coming Of Age: How To Respond – Analysis
October 22, 2013
A deeper look at what the Westgate attack tells us about al-Shabaab–and how to
respond.
By Francis Njubi Nesbitt
September 21 began like any other Saturday morning at the upscale Westgate Mall
in Nairobi, Kenya. Parents brought their excited youngsters to a children’s party;
Kenyan elites patronized the gourmet restaurants; customers perused the merchandise in the mall’s expensive boutiques; and tourists and expatriates soaked in
the international ambiance.
Then at 11:30 am, havoc broke out. Ten to 15 heavily armed militants stormed the
mall through multiple entrances, throwing grenades and opening fire on security
guards and shoppers alike. The siege created a bloodbath that killed over 60 people
and le the building littered with mutilated bodies. The gunmen took hostages,
shot women and children point-blank, cut off body parts, and tortured and executed those they considered non-Muslims and infidels. Thus began a four-day siege.
It was a far cry from other al-Shabaab attacks in Kenya, which have generally consisted of drive-by shootings, small arms fire, or the lobbing of grenades at civilian
and security targets. Although such attacks have become increasingly frequent
48
since 2011, nothing of this magnitude was imaginable just weeks ago.
The massacre accordingly represents al-Shabaab’s savage coming of age as an international terrorist organization. Kenya and its allies must respond by strengthening regional security operations, reaching out to moderates, and cutting off the
group’s sources of funds.
Messages of the Massacre
Far from a straightforward crime scene, the massacre at Westgate Mall sent several
symbolic messages. Westgate Mall is located in Westlands, a diverse upper-middle
class neighborhood that is home to a large expatriate community. The mall is partly
owned by an Israeli and has many Israeli-owned stores, such as the popular Art
Cafe, where many were killed during the raid.
Terrorist activities in Kenya o en target institutions connected to Israel due to their
symbolic value. In 2002, for instance, militants launched two simultaneous attacks
on Israeli targets, including a car bomb at the Israeli-owned Paradise Hotel in Mombasa that killed 15 people, including three Israelis. Such attacks act as a tool of mobilization and garner Western media attention.
However, the over-riding message of the Westgate attack, launched by the Somalia
-based al-Qaeda affiliate al-Shabaab, was retaliation for Kenya’s 2011 invasion of
Somalia.
Kenya sent troops into Somalia a er a series of cross-border attacks by al-Shabaab
militants. The goal was to expel the militants from the border region and create a
buffer zone between the militants’ strongholds in southern Somalia and Kenya. The
Kenya Defense Forces successfully pushed the militants out of the border region
and now control a swath of territory inside Somalia.
The Westgate attack, therefore, was designed to send a message that al-Shabaab
was still alive and deadly despite the setbacks of the last two years.
During the siege, the group taunted Kenyan authorities in frequent social media
messages. Those messages also warned the West to expect similar attacks if it did
not withdraw support for the African Union’s (AU) military operation in Somalia,
where it has already expelled the militants from major cities such as Mogadishu
and their southern stronghold Kismayo.
Kenyan president Uhuru Kenyatta, who lost a nephew in the massacre, said that
Kenya remained resolute and would not pull its troops out of Somalia, where they
are participating in the AU mission. During a Mashujaa Day celebration on October
20th, he reiterated his government’s right to intervene abroad. “From time to
time,” he argued, “we may be required to intervene externally to keep our country,
and our neighbors safe.”
Going International
In turn, the well-planned and well-funded Westgate attack indicates that al-
49
Shabaab has set its sights on international targets. This is telling, because it means
that the internationalist faction has won the power struggle within al-Shabaab. Led
by Moktar Ali Zubeyr, also known as Ahmed Godane, this faction has marginalized
the nationalist wing that preferred to focus on overthrowing the government of
Somalia rather than engaging in international terrorism.
Godane, who is thought to be in his thirties, consolidated his power within alShabaab a er the killing of the al-Qaeda militant leader Aden Hashi Farah in a 2008
U.S. airstrike on Somalia. Under Godane’s direction, al-Shabaab imposed a brutal
Sharia regime marked by beheadings, stonings, and amputations for minor infractions.
In 2012, Godane pledged allegiance to al-Qaeda’s leader Ayman al-Zawahiri and
ruthlessly eliminated his rivals in the organization. The latest casualty in the power
struggle within al-Shabaab is the American-born Omar Al-Hammami, sometimes
known as al-Ameriki. Hammami was one of al Shabaab’s most prominent foreignborn leaders. He was expelled from the organization a er some disagreements
with the leadership over issues related to Godane’s extreme implementation of
Sharia law. His execution was part of a clean-up operation that consolidated Godane’s rule.
In July, the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea warned that although alShabaab had lost ground militarily, it had “shi ed its posture to asymmetrical warfare” in urban and rural areas. The monitoring group’s report warned that the
group had maintained its core military strength by avoiding direct confrontations
with the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) and government forces. Its
5,000-strong force remained intact in terms of “operational readiness, chain of
command, discipline and communication capabilities.”
The UN report also noted that Ahmed Godane’s leadership has gone unchallenged
despite internal dissent. Godane has maintained an iron grip on the organization
through his ruthless “secret service,” Amniyat. The report concluded that alShabaab continues to pose a regional and international threat through affiliates
such as al-Hijra, an offshoot of the Muslim Youth Center—a terror group that had
been disrupted by local and international security operations. Al-Hijra is regaining
strength partly by sending its recruits for training in Somalia, a er which they return to conduct operations in Kenya.
Al-Shabaab’s new internationalist political ideology has also attracted jihadists from
abroad who are interested in attacking Western targets in the region. The group
boasts that it has recruited over 100 Britons and 40 Americans into its ranks—and
indeed Kenyan government officials have suggested that several Americans and
possibly a Briton were among the terrorists attacking the mall. There are also reports of al-Shabaab’s collaboration with other al-Qaeda affiliates, including those in
Yemen and North Africa.
The massacre at Westgate is particularly revealing because many prominent Soma-
50
lis with ties to al-Shabaab have extensive investments and properties in Kenya.
They live and run lucrative businesses in Nairobi and other major cities.
These business ties between prominent Somalis and Kenyans have deterred major attacks within Kenya for years. The fact that al-Shabaab chose to launch a major attack in Nairobi means that the organization no longer feels beholden to
these businessmen and has found new sources of funding, weapons, and logistical support.
Mumbai Model
The spread to new countries in part reflects al-Shabaab’s growing weakness within Somalia, where it has lost considerable ground since 2010. Yet it also shows
that the group still has the ability to conduct deadly attacks abroad by using small
bands of highly trained and motivated militants. This is the approach that was
deployed successfully by groups staging terror attacks in Mumbai, London,
and Madrid, and has come to be known as “the Mumbai model.” In Mumbai in
2008, a handful of lightly armed militants attacked several landmark sites, a er
which they stormed a popular international hotel where they slaughtered dozens
and held the building for days before Indian security forces could retake control.
The Mumbai model involves a direct threat to so targets such as malls, schools,
hospitals, and other lightly guarded public facilities. In late September, for example, Nigeria’s Boko Haram, a terrorist group that shares al-Shabaab’s Islamist ideology, slaughtered over 30 sleeping students in a college dormitory. As far back as
January 2013, Kenyan intelligence had warned that al-Shabaab was planning
a “Mumbai-style” operation targeting landmarks such as Westgate Mall and Holy
Family Basilica, a Roman Catholic cathedral in Nairobi.
The Boko Haram raid and the Westgate Mall attack have eerie similarities. In
both, a small group of militants wielding small arms and grenades stormed a public facility, took hostages, and massacred civilians. This model could easily be exported to the West. The frequent mass killings by individuals in the United States
demonstrate the ease with which a group of dedicated militants could cause
mayhem.
Statement of intent
The fact that the terrorists spared Muslims (or tried to) at the Westgate Mall suggests that their intention was to destabilize Kenya. They aimed to provoke the
Kenyan government to overreact by indiscriminately targeting and humiliating
Muslims, who constitute about 10 percent of the population. Kenya has a history
of cracking down on Muslims generally, and Somalis in particular, a er such incidents. In al-Shabaab’s logic, such a crackdown could potentially turn Muslims
against the government and radicalize a significant portion of the population.
There is some evidence to support that conclusion. For example, just days a er
the Westgate Mall massacre, youth in the coastal city of Mombasa rioted for days
in response to the drive-by shooting of a popular Muslim cleric associated with al-
51
Shabaab, Sheikh Ibrahim Ismail. He had become the most prominent radical
preacher a er the killing of his mentor Aboud Rogo Mohammed in a similar driveby shooting in 2012. Mohammed’s killing also sparked riots in Mombasa. The youth
blamed both murders on police. Although so far there is no credible evidence that
the police were involved, al-Shabaab will no doubt exploit such incidents for propaganda purposes to radicalize and mobilize Muslims.
By all accounts, however, the effort to turn Kenyans against each other has backfired. Prominent Somali leaders in Kenya, Somalia, and elsewhere have condemned
the attack in no uncertain terms. President Kenyatta called on Kenyans to remain
calm and united in the face of the tragedy. And indeed, Kenyans have come together in a spectacular show of unity and resilience. A er the massacre, thousands of
ordinary citizens traveled to hospitals and makeshi clinics and waited for hours to
give blood. Others cooked and delivered hot meals to first responders. Tens of millions of dollars were raised for the victims’ families.
The international community has also responded handsomely to the tragedy. Soon
a er the raid, Prime Minister David Cameron of the United Kingdom offered the
Kenyan government Britain’s support. U.S. president Barack Obama also called to
express his support. Other world leaders, in Israel and the European Union, similarly reached out to Kenya. Britain’s metropolitan police, the International Criminal
Police Organization (INTERPOL), and the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation have
been deeply involved in forensic and cleanup operations.
The Need for a Resolute Response
Terrorism thrives on financial support, and therefore curtailing access to funding is
a key approach to weakening the organization. However, the unintended consequences of depriving the organization of funding must also be monitored carefully.
In 2010, the UN Monitoring Group in Somalia estimated that al-Shabaab was earning over $50 million a year from smuggling and extortion at the port of Kismayo.
The group lost this lucrative port last year when Kenyan troops led a successful
offensive that expelled the militants. The loss of its major source of funding played
no small part in the transformation of al-Shabaab from a local to a global terrorist
organization. Such globalization serves in effect as a fundraising campaign designed
to mobilize support from international jihadists who are interested in attacking
western targets in the region.
In response, the international community must come together to ensure that alShabaab does not metastasize into an even greater global terrorist threat. It has
already demonstrated its ability to recruit fighters from Europe and the United
States. The potential danger is that these EU and U.S. passport holders will return
to the region and use their training to attack so targets.
The international community should work to deny the terrorists access to funding.
Since much of the money comes from abroad, international research could uncover
and block such financial transactions. Somali businessmen in Kenya, the United
52
Kingdom, and the United States should be encouraged to participate in this process. Cutting the terrorists off from their donors would deal a crippling blow to
their capacity to launch meaningful operations.
Al-Shabaab has been weakened militarily and can be marginalized further. But it
will take an international effort to curb the organization’s reach. The African Union
Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) has successfully confronted and defeated al-Shabaab
in Mogadishu, and has expelled militants from the port of Kismayo. But
AMISOM’s commander General Katumba Wamala has warned that his resources
are overstretched and that he needs more troops to put pressure on al-Shabaab.
The United States, United Kingdom, and other supporters of AMISOM should seriously consider General Wamala’s suggestion that the operation’s strength be increased from the current 17,000 troops. Currently, the operation also lacks basic
resources such as helicopters, which are critical for the pacification of a vast and
hostile territory. The United States could provide basic intelligence and logistical
support to move AMISOM to the next level (although this strategy is not without its
risks).
On the broader level, the international community should work with moderates in
Somalia and abroad to rebuild the Somali state. This does not mean a centralized
parliamentary democracy such as those that exist in Europe. The people of Somalia
are diverse and famously independent within their tribal (or clan) units. A federation of independent and semi-independent states could work well. The alreadyexisting semi-independent states of Somaliland and Puntland could provide a blueprint for a future federation of Somali states. It is notable that Somaliland, for example, remained relatively stable for two decades while things have fallen apart in
the rest of Somalia. At the same time, however, steps must be taken to ensure that
the larger clans do not dominate the process at the expense of minority groups.
Any settlement must ensure equal treatment for minorities such as the Zigwa people (the so-called Somali Bantu) who continue to face racial discrimination and dispossession in southern Somalia.
Finally, it is imperative that Kenya take pains to integrate Muslims, including Somalis, into its general population. The terrorists will continue to find fertile ground for
radicalization so long as Muslims in Kenya are estranged from the broader nation.
Efforts such as President Uhuru Kenyatta’s recent distribution of title deeds to socalled squatters at the coast are commendable. These reforms were due 50 years
ago. Kenya’s allies can participate by supporting development projects (for such
things as electricity and water) to depressed areas in the northeastern and coastal
provinces.
Only through a multi-pronged strategy including security, development, and financial controls can the terrorist menace be managed.
The vicious attack on the Westgate Mall is a challenge that Kenya and its allies must
meet without hesitation. But it is also a challenge that must be met without falling
into the trap of indicting all Muslims for the atrocity. That would only serve the in-
53
terests of the terrorists, whose ultimate goal is to radicalize Muslims in Kenya, and
perhaps the world.
Francis Njubi Nesbitt is an asso iate professor of Afri ana Studies at San Diego
State University and is urrently a visiting professor at the United States nternational University in Nairobi, Kenya. His publi ations in lude Race for Sanctions (
4) and Politics of African Diasporas (
).
http://www.eurasiareview.com/
54
Kenya Seeks Delay To ICC Trials – Analysis
October 21, 2013
By Bernard Momanyi and SimonJennings
Kenya’s deputy president William Ruto has confirmed that his government has
asked the United Nations Security Council to postpone the cases against him and
President Uhuru Kenyatta at theInternational Criminal Court (ICC).
The request follows a resolution issued by the African Union (AU) during an October 11-12 emergency meeting in which member states called for the Kenyatta and
Ruto trials to be suspended until the two men step down from office.
Under the ICC’s founding Rome Statute, the Security Council can ask the court to
halt a case if doing so is deemed to be in the interests of national or international
security. The maximum deferral period allowed is one year, although this can be
renewed a year at a time.
NATIONAL SECURITY VS. INTERNATIONAL TRIALS
Moves to get the two Kenya trials at the ICC deferred gained traction a er the
attack on a Nairobi shopping mall in September that le 67 people dead and 300
injured.
Speaking to journalists in The Hague on October 15, Ruto said the government’s
request for a deferral was designed to ensure that he and Kenyatta could remain in
Kenya to focus on the security issues facing their country and the wider East Africa
region in the a ermath of the attack, carried out by the Somali Islamist group alShabab.
“We believe there are legitimate reasons for the deferral of this case to give Kenya
the best possible chance to handle the serious challenges that exist in our region, in
our country, on a matter that is of global concern,” Ruto said.
Kenyatta and Ruto are charged in two separate cases relating to the violence that
rocked Kenya in late 2007 and early 2008. A former broadcaster, Joshua Arap Sang,
is also charged in Ruto’s case.
The violence followed a disputed presidential poll in December 2007 and resulted
in over 1,100 deaths, with 650,000 people forced from their homes.
The ICC charged the suspects in December 2010. In March 2013, Kenyatta was
elected president with Ruto as his deputy.
The latest Kenyan government initiative is only the latest in a series of attempts to
alter the course of the ICC cases.
The AU has previously written to the Hague court asking for the cases to be referred to Kenya’s national courts so that the suspects can be tried there. The court
responded that a request of this kind should be made to the judges handling the
two separate cases.
55
Previous efforts by the Kenyan government to get the cases returned to national
jurisdiction failed on the grounds that the authorities had not undertaken genuine
investigations into the crimes charged.
In 2011, Kenya asked the Security Council to defer the ICC’s ongoing investigations,
but that bid was rejected. In May this year, Kenya’s ambassador to the UN made an
unsuccessful attempt to get the Security Council to drop the ICC cases altogether.
As recently as October 9, Kenyan foreign minister Amina Mohammed said her government had not yet considered re-applying for a deferral.
Meeting in the Ethiopian capital Addis Ababa, AU leaders approved the creation of
a contact group consisting of the bloc’s chairman and five members representing
each of its regions. Its task is to engage with the Security Council, particularly the
five permanent members, and impress on them the need to postpone the cases
against Kenyatta and Ruto.
Ruto’s trial got under way last month and Kenyatta’s is due to start on November
12.
AU leaders agreed that Kenyatta should not go to The Hague until the Security
Council reaches a decision.
“If that is not met, what the summit decided is that President Kenyatta should not
appear until the request we have made is actually answered,” Ethiopian foreign
minister Tedros Adhanom told journalists in Addis Ababa following the meeting.
KENYAN LEADERS HAVE WESTERN SUPPORT
IWPR understands that many key Western states would be sympathetic to a postponement of the cases. Some have strong economic interests in Kenya and the
wider region which could be threatened by pushing for Kenyatta and Ruto to face
trial. They are also acutely aware of the security issues facing Kenya and its neighbour Somalia, and their implications for the wider region and global terrorism.
Ahead of the presidential election this March, Western diplomats warned of the
potential repercussions of electing candidates who had been charged by the ICC.
The UK said it would only have “essential contact” with the leaders if they were
elected. However, analysts say those warnings have not been followed up. Days
a er Kenyatta was confirmed as president, he was invited to London for a conference on security in Somalia.
According to an article in London’s Daily Telegraph newspaper on October 14, European diplomats have already dra ed a resolution on a deferral of the Kenya cases.
Analysts say, however, that Western governments would be reluctant to embark
on a path that would have grave consequences for international justice generally
and the standing of the ICC.
Phil Clark, an expert in international justice at London University’s School of Oriental and African studies, notes that Western countries have largely kept quiet about
56
the Kenyan cases since Kenyatta and Ruto came to power. But he says that key
states like Britain and the United States – both permanent members of the Security
Council – are broadly supportive of international justice and will be very reluctant
to make any decision that would be seen to undermine the ICC.
“The UN Security Council will take quite a conservative line on this,” Clark said. “In
New York there is a real reluctance to be seen to be meddling in these cases.”
Clark and other experts point out that the fact that the Security Council has rejected moves by other states to postpone ICC cases will make it difficult to support
Kenya’s request. It did not agree to postpone ICC investigations in Darfur, as requested by the AU and the Organisation of the Islamic Conference in 2008.
Even if governments are sympathetic to a request to defer the Kenyan cases, they
will be wary of setting a precedent which would affect the ongoing case against Sudanese president Omar al-Bashir.
“There is no chance of success for Kenya’s request ,” said Nicholas Cheeseman,
director of the African Studies Centre at Oxford University. “Because the basic
bottom line is they the Security Council would have to change their entire policy
on Sudan.”
Asked whether Britain would oppose Kenya’s request for a deferral, the Foreign
Office said only that “the UK is a strong supporter of the International Criminal
Court”.
AFRICAN UNION NOT UNANIMOUS ON ICC WITHDRAWAL
While the AU meeting set a course of action on the Kenya cases, little progress was
made on calls by some member states for a mass withdrawal from the ICC – the
reason the emergency meeting was convened. (For more on this issue, see African
Bloc “Unlikely” to Leave ICC .)
The bid to withdraw is being led by Ethiopia, Sudan, Kenya and Zimbabwe, with
support from others in East Africa. Last month, Kenya’s upper and lower houses of
parliament endorsed a move for the country to withdraw.
The AU meeting showed that support for the idea was not universal among member states.
Clark said the meeting was an “anti-climax”, in that many African governments appeared reluctant to pull out of the court.
“The AU has been shown up as quite a divided and discordant entity,” he said,
noting that some states did not want to be seen to be endorsing impunity for
crimes.
Speaking to journalists in The Hague on October 16, Ruto said that he would continue to cooperate with the ICC despite the political efforts going on around his
case. He said that rather than having proceedings postponed, he would prefer the
case against him to continue, as long as judges granted him leave to miss hearings.
57
That would enable him to remain in Nairobi to attend to his official duties and the
security situation. Ruto said Kenya would withdraw the deferral request to the Security Council if he and Kenyatta are excused from continuous attendance by the
court.
ICC trial judges have already ruled that Ruto can miss sections of the proceedings,
but the prosecution has challenged that decision and the matter is currently before
the appeals chamber.
Kenyatta has made a similar request, proposing that he follow proceedings via video link from Nairobi.
A final ruling on whether the two leaders can remain in Kenya for much of their trials could affect the proposal to defer the cases, since if this was approved, the
“national security” argument would lose some of its weight. Critics say that the ICC
has been slow in reaching a decision that could have wider ramifications, and that
it should have been more prepared for such a scenario given that it was set up to
put senior state officials on trial.
“The court needed to look into this from the outset,” Clark said. “If it was serious
about dealing with serious suspects, that was probably always going to be something that would come up. We’ve seen it fumble along and almost make the rules
up as it goes along.”
Bernard Momanyi is a reporter for ReportingKenya.net and News Editor at Capital
FM in Nairobi. Simon Jennings is WPR’s Afri a Editor.
This arti le was produ ed as part of a media development programme by WPR and
Wayamo Communi ation Foundation in partnership with Capital FM, and was published at WPR’s ACR ssue 66.
58
Libya
Militia feuds threaten new war in post-revolt Libya
October 19, 2013
Libya’s central government exercises little control over militias and has been forced to try to
co-opt them into semi-official security services.
TRIPOLI: When gunmen snatched Libyan Prime Minister Ali Zeidan from
his Tripoli hotel last week, it was a rival armed militia he thanked for his rescue
hours later. Even for Libyans accustomed to their democracy’s unruly beginnings,
the drama at the Corinthia Hotel was a startling reminder of the power former
fighters wield two years a er they ousted Moammar Gadhafi, and the dangers of
their rivalry.
Police and troops from Libya’s nascent army were at the scene, but the former militiamen showed they were the arbiters in a struggle between rival tribal and Islamist
leaders over the post-revolution spoils of the North African oil producer.
Between them, they have edged Libya close to a new war that threatens the democratic gains of the NATO-backed revolt.
Too weak to take back control of a country awash with Gadhafi-era weapons, Libya’s central government has been forced to try to co-opt militias into semi-official
security services over which it exercises little control.
“We want to build a state with an army, police and institutions, but there are some
59
people who want to obstruct this,” Zeidan, still in his pajamas, told reporters a er
his release, referring to critics in parliament who had been planning a vote of no
confidence, accusing him of failing on security.
Tripoli has been spared the major militia clashes seen in the eastern city of Benghazi. But the standoff is evident; gunmen from two rival groups sit in pickup
trucks mounted with anti-aircra cannons in different parts of the capital.
In the east, the Libya Shield Force and Islamist militias drawn from anti-Gadhafi
fighters based in the country’s fertile coastal areas and their commanders from
Misrata city are entrenched at the Mittiga air base.
Across the city, the powerful tribal Zintan militia, part of a loose alliance of mostly
secular Bedouin groups from the desert interior, once recruited into Gadhafi’s security forces, control an area around Tripoli’s international airport.
The militia rivalries mirror a struggle within Libya’s fragile government, where the
secular tribal alliance controls the Defense Ministry and the Islamist-leaning Libya
Shield Force works under the Interior Ministry.
Parliament is split on similar lines, with a secular National Forces Alliance at loggerheads with the political wing of the Islamist Muslim Brotherhood over Libya’s future.
Zeidan’s captors, allied to the Shield Force, said they were motivated by anger over
a U.S. raid to capture a top Al-Qaeda suspect in Tripoli. The premier, freed by a Defense Ministry-allied militia, called his abduction an attempted coup.
Tensions with the Islamists have risen since the premier’s September visit to Egypt,
where they accused him of endorsing the military’s ouster of Islamist President Mohammad Morsi.
“The political outcome of the revolution hasn’t been finalized and people still think
there are things to be won and things to be lost,” a Libya-based Western diplomat
said.
Zeidan had been held in a government office by gunmen from an Islamist militia allied to the Shield Force. Details of his release are still hazy, but a loyal militia
fired rocket-propelled grenades outside the office just beforehand.
Riccardo Fabiani, a North Africa analyst with Eurasia Group said militias appeared
to be using their muscle for specific demands. But that might spin out of control if
accusations Zeidan’s political foes orchestrated his abduction prove true.
“That would significantly alter the outlook and could plunge Libya into chaos, as
other groups would have a reason to rise up against an attempted coup,” Fabiani
said.
In Benghazi, regional capital of the oil-rich eastern Libya, where Islamist militants
attacked the U.S. Embassy a year ago, militiamen backed by the army clashed earlier this year with the Libya Shields Force. More than 30 people were killed.
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For months, militiamen commanded by a former security chief have held key ports
in the east, halving the oil exports of the OPEC member, Africa’s third-largest producer and a key supplier to Europe. A powerful western tribal militia has kept
Gadhafi’s captive son in its desert stronghold.
Even before the premier’s abduction, the fight had come to Tripoli when Zintan
fighters went on a rampage of looting in July in Abu Salim, a residential area, to
avenge the death of several of their men by their Islamist leaning rivals.
The Zintans brought out heavy armored vehicles looted from Gadhafi’s bases and
burned down the Islamist office. Only intervention by tribal elders averted a wider
militia war.
More than 225,000 Libyans are registered in dozens of militias under nominal state
control. They receive government salaries but act autonomously, taking orders
from local commanders or their affiliated political leaders and have resisted campaigns to recruit them into the security forces.
Libya is still negotiating with Britain, Turkey and Italy over training for its nascent
armed forces, but NATO said last week it was still considering how the security situation on the ground might affect its assistance.
U.S. military training is in the planning stages, and Britain has said its main training
may start early next year.
Western powers worry that the vast uncontrolled regions of southern Libya have
already become a haven for Islamist militants with links to local Al-Qaeda branch. A
weak state also gives militiamen little incentive to hand over their weapons.
“Some militias have started engaging in smuggling of weapons, drugs and refugees.
They are unlikely to give up that business,” said another Western diplomat in Tripoli. “And they won’t run out of weapons or ammunition any time soon.”
The Libya Shield Force was set up last year by a parliament fed up with the government’s repeated failure to control tribal militias. Assembly members approved millions of dollars of budget allocations to re-equip it as a reserve army.
“With their arrival a balance of power returned to Tripoli,” said Ahmeida Dali, a
GNC member who lobbied for the Shields Force to come into the capital.
Its arrival upset tribal Arab Bedouin militias, including the Warfalla, the country’s
largest tribe, and the powerful Zintans, but was welcomed by many Tripoli residents fed up with unruly elements among the Zintans who ransacked Gadhafi’s palaces and seized weapons and funds before his final fall.
“We need them badly to prevent the city from being held hostage by these tribal
Bedouin gangsters,” said Yousef Ashour, sipping Italian cappuccino in a cafe in the
Qaraqesh upscale neighborhood of Tripoli.
Anti-Islamist leader Mahmoud Jibril, from the Warfalla tribe, has been promoting a
revival of tribal alliances and his National Forces Alliance is unlikely to give up its
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state-funded militias to a national military under control of a rival.
Some tribal militias appear to be preparing for a possible showdown with their
Islamist rivals over Tripoli.
“Al-Qaeda, the Salafists and the Shields are all the same,” said one tribal militia
commander named Ali. “They should be wiped out. We won’t let them take over
Libya.”
http://www.dailystar.com.lb)
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Libya: Terrorists Hi ack Revolution
October 19, 2013
Two years a er Moamer
Kadhafi’s overthrow, militants roam the streetsand
desert of Libya as they try
to build an Islamic emirate
and promote their longheld hard-line ideology.
The country has seen a series of escalating attacks,
bombings and assassinations in recent months. Earlier this month, 17 soldiers were killed on the road between Tarhuna and Bani
Walid in a single incident.
In Benghazi, the daily bloodshed did not stop, even for Eid al-Adha. Two soldiers
were slain on Tuesday (October 15th), according to Libya Herald. In a separate Eid
attack, a bomb blast blew out the windows of the Marwa Hospital.
“The killings in Benghazi are no longer seen as revenge attacks on former regime
supporters – rather an attempt by militants to destroy the post-revolution state
with the aim of taking over,” according to the paper.
The open border enabled terrorists to position themselves in eastern Libya, allowing them to smuggle arms to other extremists’ strongholds around the world.
“Today, Libya is an open country penetrated by al-Qaeda,” said Saleh Mohamed
Me ah, a 35-year-old chemical engineer. “In the area where I live, extremists teach
children at mosques, brainwash them and feed them with extremist ideology,
which is dangerous.”
Fateh Mansour, a 42-year-old accountant, said: “In view of what’s going on in Libyan cities, especially Benghazi, and the many assassinations… we have to admit that
there must be an organised, large network working comfortably in the absence of
Libyan intelligence agencies and other security agencies.”
“What’s happening around us makes it certain that al-Qaeda has its own long arms
in Libya, and that such arms are moving freely, drawing up plans and implementing
them without deterrence. They won’t stop until their deadly goals have been
achieved,” Mansour added.
Hafed Abdel Jawad told Magharebia that he “wouldn’t be surprised if Mokhtar Belmokhtar himself was in Libya”.
He added that the country has become “a hotbed for everything,” including
“organised crime gangs, terrorist organisations, thieves, and illegal immigration”.
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“Libya has become like a link between the world and organised crime. We won’t
say that this was because of Kadhafi’s overthrow; rather, it’s because our rulers
don’t want to control security for the time being,” he said.
“As to Belmokhtar’s search for weapons, I think he won’t be looking for long;
Jenehein market is enough to meet his needs, and the former camps of the former
Soviet Union, which are spread across Libya … and are still unguarded until now!”
Abdel Jawad concluded.
“There are also … some Islamic groups in eastern Libya that are sympathetic with
al-Qaeda, especially in Benghazi and Derna,” Journalist Redha Barakat said. “All
these factors show that he Belmokhtar may be in Libya, especially as Tunisian media talked about the escape of Ansar al-Sharia leaders.”
The deteriorating situation and the government’s inability to rein in the violence
have given jihadists groups an undeniable advantage, Libyans say.
Mohammed al-Marjaoui, a 60-year-old government employee, said that al-Qaeda
had “a real presence” in Libya.
“I’m not surprised with that, especially a er criminal investigation police in al-Marj
identified the criminals who confessed that they were behind bombings and assassinations in Benghazi, and that they were operating under the command of Sufian
al-Quma, a prominent al-Qaeda leader in Derna,” he said.
In his turn, Jabir Labaidi, a writer, said: “Due to the absence of state authority and
the state’s inability to impose its security presence even in the streets of main
cities, Libya has become like a goldmine and a main source for supplying weapons
to neighbouring countries”.
Labaidi added, “I have indications that show it might be true as long as al-Qaeda
leaders have found a safe haven in southern Libya away from the blows that the
organisation had been dealt in In Amenas and northern Mali.”
“The security vacuum in Libya is one of the biggest problems in North Africa,” said
Abdul Raouf Omar, a 28-year-old private sector employee.
Omar blamed the government, noting ” The GNC General National Congress and
Zidan’s government have a responsibility to collect arms and pay attention to the
security situation; otherwise, this will lead to fatal consequences in the future, including western intervention and Libya turning into a new Afghanistan.”
So far, the government’s plans, implemented by the interior and defence ministries, have failed to curb the violence.
On September 29th, unknown gunmen carried out several assassinations in Benghazi.
“The three officers were killed in separate attacks carried out by unknown assailants in town,” said Benghazi Joint Security Room spokesperson Colonel Abdullah
Zaidi.
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Col. Abdul Kader Mohamed al-Madani from the intelligence agency was shot dead
with seven bullets fired by unknown gunmen opposite his home in al-Laithi area in
Benghazi.
At noon the same day, a bomb went off beneath the car of Lt. Col. Ali al-Darghari in
Ardh al-Sharif, near Zamzam market. Zaidi added that a military vehicle carrying
Najib Belhasan, an officer of the chief of staffs’ preventive security agency, was
blown up just meters away from the place where Col. Ali al-Darghari was targeted.
Col. Saleh Elhadiri, a coast guard commander in Benghazi, was killed on October
2nd in al-Fuwaihat area, next to al-Arab Medical University. Gunmen opened fire
on him while he was driving his car. His eight-year-old son Firas was seriously injured in the attack.
The boy later died of his wounds at an intensive care unit and was buried with his
father, a security source in Benghazi said.
As with many of the Benghazi killings, the perpetrators remain unidentified and at
large.
“A er Tripoli was liberated, security was much better than now,” Haifa Beshir, a
music teacher in Tripoli, said. “We were expecting to see state-run security institutions, including army and police. However, the state has failed to realise that.”
“Benghazi is suffering and is in pain; there are assassinations and murders every
day, and we’re not seeing any security presence,” said Leila al-Barassi, a 29-yearold teacher. “There must be a plan for that.”
http://www.eurasiareview.com/19102013-libya-terrorists-hijack-revolution/
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Al Libi trial, Libya and al Qaeda: What you won't hear in court
16/10/2013
(CNN) -- Alleged al Qaeda operative Abu Anas al Libi, accused of playing a role in
the deadly bombings of the embassies in Kenya and Tanzania in 1998, denied terrorism charges when he appeared in federal court in New York Tuesday.
He told the judge he played no role in al Qaeda's 1998 attacks.
We can expect the prosecution to lay out his alleged involvement in detail, provide
evidence of his close ties to Osama Bin Laden, detail his computer skills and, crucially, present information about photographs of the U.S. embassy in Nairobi he is
alleged to have taken before the attack.
What we won't hear is how his trial may benefit al Qaeda today.
Libya has oil and is one of Africa's richest nations. In the two years since dictator
Moammar Gadhafi was overthrown, Al Qaeda and its Islamist allies have become
stronger there.
U.S. Army Delta Force soldiers seized al Libi on October 5 from outside his house in
the Libyan capital Tripoli.
His arrest was followed by the kidnapping and subsequent release of Libya's Prime
Minister Ali Zeidan -- an incident he called an attempted coup. The country, according to the justice minister, is on the edge of becoming a failed state. There is no national army or police. Militias like the one that took the prime minister hold sway.
Who calls the shots
Who has the real power? It appears that is being determined not through politics
but by confrontation; and right now in some parts of the country the Islamists have
a strong hand.
Al Libi's trial in New York will influence events inside Libya and may provide ammunition to the Islamists.
Libya's Justice Minister Salah Marghani says he trusts the U.S. justice system, that
al Libi is innocent until proven guilty. But that's the rub. Such a statement angers
Libya's Islamists, who are implacably hostile to the U.S. and will use the Libyan government's relationship with Washington as a stick with which to beat it.
Most Libyans like the United States and are grateful to it and NATO for help in overthrowing Gadhafi. But in today's increasingly lawless Libya, they are o en powerless to speak up.
And what does that lawlessness in Libya look like
I found out first hand a few days ago. Filming a huge fire at Libya's foreign ministry,
yards from my hotel, we were surrounded by thuggish vigilantes. The man with the
longest beard, whom they called "Sheikh", was in charge. They had no uniforms or
IDs and tried to take us away, even wrestling the car keys from the ignition as we
66
tried to drive away. For a while it felt like a kidnapping.
Bergen: Good thing U.S. terrorist hunters weren't furloughed
Eventually an educated passer-by stepped in. A few hours later my camera was
returned by the man I'd interviewed the night before. He controls Tripoli's militias
and freed the prime minister from his kidnapping just a few days earlier.
Within sight of my hotel we'd almost been hauled off and it was a militia, not the
government, that had the power to save us. That same militia, I later learned, had
a representative in an office at our hotel, a young man with a wispy beard called
Sheikh Hamza, who kept a pump action shotgun under his desk.
So how does al Libi's New York trial play in to this mess
When al Libi was captured, al Qaeda threatened to kidnap Americans in Libya and
target western interests. In the east of the country around Benghazi, where al
Qaeda and the Islamists are strongest, and where U.S. ambassador Chris Stevens
was killed last year, security for westerners has deteriorated.
In the past week the Swedish consulate in Benghazi has been attacked and Malta's
diplomat, one of the last in the city, has been forced to leave. Al Qaeda is doing
everything it can to use al Libi's case to leverage support. They will be watching his
trial intently.
What do Libyans think about al Libi? Most Libyans I met can't understand why
America picked up al Libi when they did. They know just how fragile security is in
the country and fear the repercussions. Most assume his arrest had more to do
with U.S. politics than benefiting Libya.
They've heard what his family has said -- that he was out of al Qaeda and living an
open life in the capital. Short of evidence to contrary, they will believe that for
now. They want him to get a fair trial. But if he is guilty they want him punished -and they certainly don't want him back if he is still with al Qaeda. They fear the
growth of the Islamist factions and frankly wish America would do more to help on
that count.
What is Al Qaeda's game plan
Judging by past performance, al Qaeda will try to use al Libi's trial to convince as
many Libyans as possible that America is interfering in their country. Both al Libi's
son and Libya's justice minister have said he should have a Libyan lawyer on his
defense team. Such public pronouncements potentially set themselves up for failure that al Qaeda will gleefully exploit.
Al Qaeda and its supporters have been establishing training camps in the east of
the country for the past two years. They want to turn Libya into an Islamic state
and have threatened to destroy European and American interests in Libya as well
as develop it as a base for terrorist attacks in Europe.
According to one official, such is al Qaeda's ease of operations in eastern Libya,
67
that hundreds of Islamists from neighboring north African nations are gravitating
to the area.
Libya is unpredictable; anyone who tells you they know what will happen is
wrong. The current trend is towards instability and ultimately a showdown between Islamists and more moderate factions. Al Libi's capture has accelerated
that process; his trial could bring it still closer
http://edition.cnn.com/
68
Mali
Opération de « grande ampleur » au Mali
La France, le Mali et la force de l’ONU au Mali ont lancé eudi 24 octobre l’opération « hydre » contre les mouvements terroristes dans le nord du pays.
24/10/13
Cette opération intervient au lendemain de l’attaque terroriste contre l’armée
tchadienne à Tessalit qui a fait trois morts.
Amnesty International dénonce de son côté « une purge » menée au sein de l’armée malienne contre des soldats qui ont pris part à une mutinerie le mois dernier.
Plusieurs centaines de soldats français sont impliqués dans l’opération « Hydre » a
fait savoir jeudi 24 octobre le colonel Gilles Jaron, porte-parole de l’état-major des
armées françaises. Cette opération de « grande ampleur » associe la France,
les forces armées maliennes et la Minusma (Force de l’ONU au Mali).
Hydre vise à « faire pression sur les mouvements terroristes éventuels pour éviter
leur résurgen e (…) Cela fait partie de es opérations qui sont régulièrement
menées (…) pour parti iper à la stabilité du pays », a précisé le colonel Jaron. qui a
précisé que cette opération n’était pas une riposte aux attaques djihadistes.
TRIOS MORTS À TESSALIT
La veille un groupe djihadiste lié à Al-Qaida au Maghreb islamique (Aqmi) a
revendiqué l’attaque à la voiture piégée et aux tirs à l’arme lourde contre le contingent de l’armée tchadienne de la Minusma à Tessalit dans le nord-est du pays. Le
ministre malien de la Défense Soumeylou Boubèye Maïga a fait état de deux morts
et six blessés dont deux graves parmi le contingent tchadien, et d’un enfant tué.
À propos des attaques terroristes qui ont eu lieu ces derniers temps, le colonel
Jaron a dit ne pas être surpris de « voir ponctuellement de tels groupuscules se
mettre en œuvre », surtout dans la période précédent les élections législatives
fixées au 24 novembre prochain.
« Nous savons que la totalité des groupes terroristes présents (…) au Malin’ont pas
été éliminés », a reconnu le colonel en précisant « À haque fois, il s’agit d’opérations très on entrées géographiquement, qui ne s’ins rivent pas dans la durée et
qui reposent sur un mode d’a tion de terroristes », en voulant « frapper les esprits
sans avoir for ément une apa ité à engager un ombat dans le temps ».
UNE PURGE AU SEIN DE L’ARMÉE MALIENNE
Du côté des forces maliennes, Amnesty International craint qu’une purge n’ait
lieu au sein de l’armée à l’encontre des soldats qui ont pris part à une mutinerie le
30 septembre dernier dans la caserne de Kati près de Bamako. « Les orps des quatre soldats ont été dé ouverts au début du mois d’o tobre près de la apitale et
69
plusieurs autres, y ompris un olonel, sont portés disparus. Ces exé utions extrajudi iaires et disparitions for ées apparentes font raindre que les soldats fidèles
au général Amadou Haya Sanogo , qui a organisé un oup d’État en mars
,
ne soient en train de mener une purge dans leurs rangs pour étouffer toute dissiden e »,rapporte l’ONG qui réclame l’ouverture d’une enquête indépendante et
impartiale sur ces événements.
De graves violations des droits humains ont été perpétrées depuis le coup d’État
par les soldats qui ont mené le putsch sans qu’ils n’aient eu à en rendre compte
depuis lors rappelle Amnesty. L’ONG a ainsi recensé les cas de 21 soldats victimes
de disparitions forcées, accusés d’être des partisans de l’ancien président Touré
et d’avoir organisé un contrecoup d’État.
http://allafrica.com/stories/201310241420.html?viewall 1
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Mali: "Des cellules terroristes tentent de se réorganiser"
17/10/2013 à
Le nord du Mali reste menacé par l'insécurité et l'instabilité politique, analyse
Mathieu Pellerin, spécialiste du Sahel, neuf mois après l'opération Serval, lï'intervention militaire franco-africaine.
Bien que l'opération Serval ait démantelé la plupart des unités djihadistes au Mali,
le pays doit toujours faire face à un "terrorisme résiduel", d'après Mathieu
Pellerin, spécialiste du Sahel et directeur de la société Cisca (Centre d'intelligence
stratégique sur le continent africain).
afp.com/Pascal Guyot
Neuf mois après le début de l'intervention militaire fran o-afri aine, le nord
du Mali reste mena é par l'insé urité et l'instabilité politique: attentats djihadistes,
tensions entre les autorités et les groupes armés touareg, diffi ultés de retour pour
les réfugiés... Spé ialiste du Sahel et dire teur de la so iété Cis a (Centre d'intelligen e stratégique sur le ontinent afri ain), Mathieu Pellerinlivre son analyse de la
situation.
Des groupes d ihadistes ont perpétré plusieurs attaques terroristes au nord du
Mali ces dernières semaines. Quel danger représentent-ils
La menace a considérablement diminué, mais la région doit faire face à
un terrorisme résiduel. L'opération Serval a anéanti ou démantelé la plupart des
unités djihadistes. D'autres ont fui, notamment vers le sud de la Libye. Cependant,
certaines cellules ont réussi à survivre, depuis le mois de janvier, en se terrant
dans des zones reculées.
Avec les effectifs déployés, il est impossible de contrôler la totalité du nord Mali
Par exemple, au nord de Tombouctou, pour des groupes liés à Al-Qaïda au Maghreb islamique (Aqmi) ou dans la région de Ménaka, pour des combattants du
71
Mouvement pour l'unicité et le djihad en Afrique de l'Ouest (Mujao). Les islamistes armés peuvent y profiter de complicités locales, parfois de liens familiaux ou
tribaux, pour se ravitailler et se cacher. Ils tentent de se fondre au sein de la population et de se faire oublier, tout en essayant de se réorganiser. Ils profitent aussi de la présence d'autres groupes armés dans le nord: les djihadistes peuvent
arborer le drapeau du Mouvement national de libération de l'Azawad (rebelles
touareg) sur leur véhicule pour circuler plus librement dans la région de Kidal.
Du coup, la présence de ces groupes armés complexifie la lutte antiterroriste.
Avec les effectifs actuellement déployés, il est impossible de contrôler la totalité
de l'immensité désertique du grand nord malien. Or, tout relâchement ou
allègement du dispositif militaire français et de la Mission multidimensionnelle
intégrée des Nations Unies pour la stabilisation au Mali (Minusma) peut donner
l'occasion aux djihadistes de frapper pour montrer qu'ils sont toujours présents...
Dans la région de Kidal, la tension reste vive entre les militaires maliens et les
groupes armés touareg et arabe. Les négociations sur le futur statut administratif des régions du nord semblent bloquées...
Le nouveau président élu ne se sent pas lié à des accords conclus par le président de transition
avec les Touareg
Au mois de juin, un accord préliminaire a été signé par le gouvernement malien
de transition et les groupes armés, touareg et arabe. Cet accord prévoit, entre
autres, l'ouverture de négociations sur l'avenir du nord. Mais la donne politique a
changé entretemps, en premier lieu parce qu'Ibrahim Boubacar Keïta, le nouveau
président élu, ne se sent pas lié à des accords conclus par un président de transition. Il se montre très ferme vis-à-vis des revendications des mouvements
touareg: hors de question de toucher à l'intégrité territoriale du Mali, pas d'autonomie régionale, ni de statut particulier. Au mieux, une décentralisation accrue.
Du coup, le MNLA, le Haut conseil pour l'unité de l'Azawad (ex-Ansar Dine,
mouvement islamiste allié à Aqmi) et le Mouvement arabe de l'Azawad (MAA) se
braquent. Mais leur unité de façade cache de sérieuses divergences. Le MNLA
qui avait déclenché la rébellion en janvier 2012, puis proclamé l'indépendance
du nord, avant d'y renoncer est divisé en plusieurs courants, dont deux principaux. Le premier campe sur une revendication autonomiste, le second est plus
enclin à négocier rapidement avec Bamako. Le MNLA incarne aujourd'hui un label
de défense de la "cause touarègue", mais beaucoup de ses dirigeants sont discrédités. De son côté, le HCUA tente de gommer sa coloration islamiste, héritée
d'Ansar Dine puis du MIA, pour regagner en respectabilité et se placer dans le cycle des négociations.
Les autorités maliennes ont tout intérêt à tester la cohésion interne de ces
groupes, à appuyer sur les fractures existantes en leur sein afin de les fragiliser et
de rester en position de force dans le cadre des négociations.
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L'insécurité et la confusion qui règnent au nord du Mali empêchent par ailleurs le
retour d'environ 170 000 réfugiés qui ont fui la région dès le début de la crise...
Ces populations hésitent à revenir tant qu'on ne leur offre pas des garanties de
sécurité satisfaisantes pour se réinstaller. En attendant, elles vivent de manière très
précaire dans des camps de réfugiés ou aux abords des frontières avec les pays
voisins (Mauritanie, Algérie, Niger, Burkina Faso). Plus le temps passe et plus elles
auront de difficultés pour se réintégrer. La Minusma, qui favorise l'acheminement
de l'aide humanitaire, pourrait contribuer à accélérer leur retour. En dehors du
drame humain, ces dizaines de milliers de réfugiés vont poser un problème politique. Les élections législatives sont prévues les 24 novembre et 15 décembre prochains. En l'absence d'une part importante des votants, quelle légitimité auront les
députés élus au nord du pays?
http://www.lexpress.fr/
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Nigeria
Iran extends reach into Nigeria, working with militants to undermine
West
October 24, 2013
Residents watch as two men walk amidst rubble a er Boko Haram militants raided
the town of Benisheik in Nigeria. (Reuters)
Iran's influence is increasingly extending into western Africa, where its operatives
in Nigeria are gathering intelligence on U.S. and European targets, according to a
new analysis exclusively previewed by Fox News.
The troubling development was highlighted in the CTC Sentinel , a journal published by the Combating Terrorism Center at West Point, and set for release Thursday. Oil-rich Nigeria is host to many Western-based companies, and has been the
scene of ongoing violence between Muslims and Christians. But word that Iran is
working with Muslim militants to undermine the interests of the U.S. and its allies
comes even as the Obama administration has sought a thawing in relations with
Tehran.
"In recent years, Iran's Quds Force and Lebanese Hezbollah have coordinated intelligence gathering on U.S. and Israeli targets in Nigeria," Jacob Zenn wrote in an
article titled, "The Islamic Movement and Iranian Intelligence Activities in Nigeria."
" n re ent years, ran's Quds For e and Lebanese [Hezbollah] have oordinated intelligen e gathering on U.S. and sraeli targets in Nigeria."
- New intelligen e report
Zenn, whose research is noteworthy because little study has been done on Tehran's
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strategy to spread "Khomeinism" in West Africa, states there is now "no region outside of theMiddle East where Iran's ideology has a greater impact than in northern
Nigeria."
The six-page analysis investigates how Iran is expanding its base of followers in
West Africa, citing several high-profile cases since October 2010, when their activities were publicly exposed. At that time, Zenn writes that Nigerian customs officials
in Lagos intercepted "13 containers of weapons from a ship operated by the same
French-Lebanese businessman's company that in March 2012 sent a ship, via Syria,
to Egypt's lawless Sinai region to get weapons to Gaza-based Hamas militants.
http://www.foxnews.com/
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Tunisia
Crise tunisienne: «Echec de l’islam politique ou de l'économie, peu
importe»
23 octobre 2013
Manifestation anti-gouvernementale à Sfax en Tunisie, le 26 septembre 2013.
REUTERS/Anis Mili
Par Alexandra Cagnard
C’est en principe ce mercredi après-midi que devait commencer en Tunisie le dialogue national entre l’opposition et le parti islamiste au pouvoir, Ennahda. L'objectif est de mettre fin à la crise politique qui paralyse le pays depuis des mois. Kader
Abderrahim, chercheur associé à l’IRIS, analyse la crise tunisienne sur RFI.
RFI : Il y a exactement deux ans au ourd’hui, Ennahda remportait les élections
après des années de répression sous Ben Ali. Deux ans après, les islamistes se
voient contraints à négocier avec l’opposition, qui réclame leur départ du pouvoir. Comment expliquez-vous cet échec d’Ennahda
Kader Abderrahim : C’est un échec qui était un peu inscrit, je dirais dans la mesure
où Ennahda n’avait absolument pas préparé cette victoire, et donc n’était pas
préparée à assumer l’exercice du pouvoir avec toutes les charges qu’elle constitue.
C'est-à-dire mettre en place des personnes capables de gérer l’administration, de
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gérer l’Etat. Et on a vu très très vite qu'Ennahda ne s’était pas préparée à ça. Elle
avait des cadres politiques, avait vécu très longtemps dans la clandestinité ou en
exil, mais n’avait pas formé cette génération, cette élite de techniciens, de technocrates capables de gérer un Etat. Et très vite, on a vu les limites de l’exercice.
Pour vous, c’est davantage un échec économique qu’un échec de l’Islam politique
Je ne sais pas s’il faut associer l’un à l’autre, mais quelle que soit la voie qu’on
choisit ou l’analyse qu’on voudra préférer, c’est un échec. Pour les Tunisiens, ça ne
change pas grand-chose de savoir que ce sont des islamistes, je crois. Ils attendaient des réponses claires, des réponses précises, à toutes les questions sociales.
On a découvert, après des décennies de mensonges à la fois en Tunisie mais également des partenaires de la Tunisie, que l’économie du pays était quand même dans
un état de délabrement très avancé. Et c’était là-dessus que les Tunisiens attendaient Ennahda. Il y avait aussi une volonté de moralisation de la vie publique.
Là aussi, c’est un échec. Et par conséquent, pour les Tunisiens, savoir si c’est un
échec de l’Islam politique ou de l’économie, ça ne change pas grand chose parce
que l’échec est d’abord celui du pays, de la Nation. Et puis, aujourd’hui, les Tunisiens paient cet échec de manière extrêmement difficile et parfois un peu violente sur le plan social. Donc, il faut très, très vite parvenir à redresser la barre avant
que le pays ne sombre vraiment dans une crise qui serait encore plus difficile que
celle qu’ils vivent actuellement.
A l’origine de la crise politique qui paralyse le pays, il y a l’assassinat de deux opposants, Chokri Belaïd en février, et Mohamed Brahimi en uillet. Assassinat que
leurs proches attribuent, indirectement au moins, au pouvoir en place. Est-ce
que, selon vous, Ennahda a été dépassée par les plus radicaux des islamistes
Je ne sais pas. C’est difficile, parce que pour le moment, on n’a absolument aucune
certitude sur les commanditaires et sur les exécutants, même si des personnes ont
été arrêtées, les enquêtes sont toujours en cours. Et donc c’est difficile de se prononcer sur la réalité de ce qui s’est passé. Moi, je n’ai pas d’informations particulières à vous livrer. Par conséquent, je voudrais quand même rester prudent.
Mais en tout cas, quoi qu’il en soit, c’est aussi un échec pour le gouvernement islamiste de ne pas être parvenu à protéger des personnalités politiques, des élus de
la Nation, d’assassinat politique. Et puis c’est aussi une manière de ne pas protéger
le pays, donc c’est aussi de toutes manières, ce qui restera dans l’histoire, un échec
pour le parti Ennahda.
Il faut rappeler quand même, qu’il y a une montée de ihadistes en Tunisie, ces
derniers mois. Les forces de l’ordre se sont retrouvées confrontées dans le désert
à des groupes ihadistes
Oui, c’est vrai que, au moins depuis le mois d’avril dernier, avec tout ce qui se passe
autour du Mont Chaambi, le long de la frontière au sud-ouest de l’Algérie, il y a des
groupes terroristes qui sont maintenant apparemment bien implantés et que l’ar-
77
mée tunisienne ne parvient pas à déloger.
C’est un vrai souci, c’est une très grosse inquiétude, parce que ça risque de
provoquer une fixation durable, qui risque de devenir chronique et qui va s’installer
probablement si les forces de sécurité tunisiennes ne parviennent pas définitivement à déloger ces groupes terroristes dans ces montagnes extrêmement boisées,
extrêmement escarpées et très difficiles d’accès. Elles n’ont visiblement pas la technicité, la compétence et les troupes ne sont pas formées pour lutter contre ce genre de situation. Donc, c’est aujourd’hui quelque chose qui est extrêmement inquiétant pour la stabilité même des institutions tunisiennes.
Selon vous, qu’est-ce que la nouvelle Constitution, qui est en préparation, va
changer ou devrait changer dans la vie politique en Tunisie
Alors ça, c’est un serpent de mer, parce que c’est vrai qu’au moins depuis le début
de l’année, on nous annonce qu’on pourrait avoir accès à un brouillon de Constitution, alors qu’on n’a rien vu pour le moment. Il y a eu des batailles politiques
idéologiques oniriques entre l’opposition et l’actuelle majorité, la Troïka, sur un
certain nombre de thématiques comme celle du statut des femmes ou de l’introduction de la charia. Et puis, tout a été bloqué après les assassinats politiques de
Chokri Belaïd et de Mohamed Brahimi le 25 juillet dernier.
Donc, les choses n’avancent pas beaucoup puisqu’on est plutôt dans une bataille,
un acharnement politique de l’opposition contre Ennahda, qui veut absolument
qu’elle parte. Ce qui, de mon point de vue, peut constituer aussi un danger pour les
institutions tunisiennes. Parce qu’après le départ d’Ennahda, qu’est-ce qu’on fait ?
Quelle légitimité institutionnelle pourraient avoir d’autres partis qui souhaitent accéder au pourvoir ? Aujourd’hui, malheureusement, la question de la Constitution
est devenue tout à fait secondaire, parce que ce qui se joue aujourd’hui, c'est vraiment l’avenir de la Tunisie et sa stabilité à très court terme.
Si de nouvelles élections ont lieu, qu’est-ce qui en sortira selon vous Est-ce
qu’on a une idée au ourd’hui du rapport de force entre les partis d’opposition et
Ennahda
Tous les observateurs pensent que, quoi qu’il arrive, Ennahda restera le premier
parti du pays, même s’il n’est pas majoritaire, il restera le premier parti du pays.
Après, ce sera la manière dont les différents partis, dont certains n’existaient pas
d’ailleurs au moment des élections il y a deux ans - je pense notamment à Nidaa
Tounès -, ça dépendra de la manière dont cette opposition parvient ou pas à
mettre en place une plateforme commune pour éventuellement tenter de présenter des listes communes.
Mais dans ce domaine, on est loin, loin d’avoir partie gagnée. Donc, quoi qu’il arrive, tous les observateurs sont absolument certains que Ennahda restera le premier parti du pays, même s’il n’a pas de majorité au Parlement.
http://www.rfi.fr/
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Comprendre la crise en Tunisie
24/10/2013
La tension ne cesse de monter à Tunis où le gouvernement et l'opposition, empêtrés depuis trois mois dans une profonde crise politique, doivent, avec 48h de retard, entamer le dialogue national vendredi. Explications.
L'opposition réclame que le gouvernement d'Ali Larayedh s'engage à démissionner
dans les trois semaines suivant le lancement des négociations pour laisser la place à
un cabinet d'indépendants.
Reuters/Zoubeir Souissi
La tension ne cesse de monter en Tunisie. Censé démarrer mercredi, le "dialogue
national" destiné à trouver une issue à la crise politique a été reporté à vendredi.
Faisant monter la pression d'un cran, le parti d'opposition Nidaa Tounès, a exclu, ce
jeudi, le lancement des négociations vendredi sans un engagement écrit du gouvernement à démissionner. Quelles sont les raisons de cet imbroglio?
Aux origines de la crise: les assassinats politiques
L'assassinat du député d'opposition, Mohamed Brahmi, attribué à la mouvance djihadiste, est à l'origine de la grave crise politique qui paralyse aujourd'hui la Tunisie.
L'opposition accuse le gouvernement dominé par les islamistes d'Ennahda d'avoir
fait preuve de faiblesse vis-à-vis des extrémistes. Un premier gouvernement dirigé
par Ennahda avait déjà été poussé à la démission après l'assassinat de l'opposant Chokri Belaïd en février.
Les opposants reprochent surtout aux autorités, plus de deux ans après la chute de
l'ancien despote Zine el Abidine Ben Ali, l'impasse dans laquelle se trouve la Tunisie: impasse politique et institutionnelle et marasme économique.
L'imbroglio de la constitution
Le processus de transition lancé après le renversement de Ben Aliprévoyait l'élec-
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tion d'une Assemblée constituante, en octobre 2011, censée doter, dans un délai
d'un an, le pays d'uneconstitution et préparer des élections législatives et présidentielle. L'opposition estime que l'Assemblée constituante n'est plus légitime puisqu'elle a largement dépassé la durée prévue pour l'élaboration d'une nouvelle
constitution. Après l'assassinat de Mohamed Brahimi en juillet, 60 députés
s'étaient retirés de cette Assemblée.
Un dialogue reporté à plusieurs reprises
Pour tenter de sortir de cette impasse, un "dialogue national" a été lancé sous la
houlette du puissant syndicat UGTT, le 5 octobre. Il a été avalisé par Rached Ghannouchi, le chef du parti islamisteEnnahda, au pouvoir. Mais depuis, les pourparlers
trainent en longueur. Une "feuille de route" rédigée par quatre médiateurs prévoyait quatre semaines de négociations pour former un gouvernement indépendant, après la démission du gouvernement actuel. Un nouveau Premier ministre indépendant doit être désigné par l'ensemble de la classe politique une
semaine après le début du dialogue et un cabinet de technocrates doit être formé
dans les deux semaines qui suivent.
Le désaccord porte notamment sur le moment où la démission du gouvernement
d'Ali Larayedhdoit intervenir. Avant, pendant, ou une fois le "dialogue national"
entamé.
La menace d ihadiste
Ennahda est accusée d'avoir, volontairement ou non, favorisé l'essor des extrémistes. Le parti islamiste avait fait de choix de ne pas fermer la porte aux
salafistes - de les manipuler disent ses adversaires- afin d' empêcher qu'ils ne sortent du jeu politique et qu'ils ne basculent dans la violence. Cette stratégie semble
avoir échoué. Le désordre qui règne dans l'ensemble du Sahel a permis aux djihadistes de se renforcer. Ils ont créé des bases solides, notamment dans la région
du mont Chaambi, où l'armée ne parvient pas à les déloger.
Le pays a encore été endeuillé mercredi par des combats avec un groupe armé qui
ont coûté la vie à six gendarmes. L'exaspération des forces de l'ordre ne cesse de
croître. Au point que des dizaines de militants de syndicats de policiers ont chassé
le président et le Premier ministre d'une cérémonie à la mémoire de gendarmes
tués, le 18 octobre.
Quelles sont les prochaines étapes pour sortir la Tunisie de la crise
Une fois que les partenaires se seront mis d'accord sur la formation d'un gouvernement de techniciens, l'opposition et Ennahda doivent s'entendre sur le contenu de
la nouvelle Constitution, rédiger une loi électorale, former l'instance chargée d'organiser les élections et fixer le calendrier pour les prochains scrutins. Du pain sur la
planche.
http://www.lexpress.fr/
80
Terrorism in the World
India
Indian Mu ahideen: Evolving Challenge – Analysis
October 28, 2013
Revelations made by Indian Mujahideen
(IM) ‘India operations chief’ Yasin Bhatkal
aka Mohammad Ahmed Siddibappa Zarrar
aka Imran aka Asif aka Shahrukh,
and his associate Asadullah Akhtar alias
Haddi, during their ongoing interrogations
by several agencies have brought to the fore
some new facts. The duo also reconfirmed
much that was already known about IM. The
revelations in their totality outline the emerging challenges that Indian security
agencies are going to face in the foreseeable future. Bhatkal and Haddi were arrested from Indo-Nepal border on August 28, 2013.
In the most startling of revelations so far, Yasin Bhatkal is reported to have told security agencies that the “IM is trying to turn into an al Qaeda-like terrornetwork”.
An unnamed official noted, further, “Two options were on the table – either the IM
would turn an assisting outfit of Qaeda in India or merge with it to work directly
under the command of Zawahiri al Qaeda ‘chief’ Ayman al-Zawahiri .”
Yasin Bhatkal has also claimed that there has been a split within IM ranks. According to interrogation reports, the IM structure changed a er the Batla House (New
Delhi) encounter of September 19, 2008. The entire organization split into two factions — Azamgarh and Bhatkal. While the Azamgarh Unit was led by Amir Reza
Khan, with Shahnawaz Alam as his lieutenant, Riyaz Bhatkal headed the Bhatkal
Unit. Some reports, however, suggest that Yasin Bhatkal has also spoken about another unit led by Mohammad Sajid alias Bada Sajid and Mirza Shadab Beg. Significantly, these names also appeared in the National Investigation Agency’s (NIA) First
Information Report (FIR) on allegations related to terrorist activities of members of
IM and conspiracy for waging war against the Government of India, dated September 10, 2012, along with seven other IM cadres.
Indeed, an unnamed security official observed, “Our initial assessment was that the
group has weakened with (the) arrest of so many cadres and there is division. But
the IM… has grown many folds. Each group has its men and logistics in India.”
These two developments, if found to be correct, are ominous.
The growing links with al Qaeda are a very real threat, suggesting that the global
jihad has started focusing increasingly on India, bringing new and more dangerous
strategies, tactics and resources to this theatre. Indeed, current al Qaeda leader
81
Ayman al-Zawahiri in his first specific jihad guidelines, endorsed the right of Islamist
militants to fight “Indians in Kashmir”, as reported on September 17, 2013. Further,
an al Qaeda statement released on September 30, 2012, indicates that the terror
group is evolving its strategy on the Myanmar-Assam region. In the statement,
Ustad Ahmad Farooq, who was appointed as al Qaeda’s head of the ‘preaching and
media department’ for Pakistan in 2009, warned that the recent killings of Muslims
in Myanmar and Assam “provide impetus for us to hasten our advance towards
Delhi.” June 2013 reports indicated that Maulana Asim Umar, a senior al Qaeda
ideologue, released a video titled “Why There Is No Storm in Your Ocean?”, exhorting Indian Muslims to join the global jihad. IM and al Qaeda are believed to
have discussed attacks on foreign nationals based in India, most notably Jews. Significantly, in September this year, New Delhi asked all Mumbai-based Jewish establishments to step up security measures in the face of an impending terrorist threat.
India’s Union Home Ministry has also briefed Israel about a possible IM attack on
Israeli nationals visiting Rajasthan, especially in the tourist centre of Pushkar,
Jaisalmer and Jodhpur.
In this context, the four individuals of Indian origin, who have participated in global
terror activities, offer a vital pre-text. They are Dhiren Barot (aka Abu Musa alHindi), a British citizen of Indian origin who plotted bomb attacks against the New
York Stock Exchange, International Monetary Fund and World Bank; Haroon Rashid
Aswat, another Indian with a British passport, was a self-proclaimed hitman for
Osama bin Laden and allegedly a key figure in the July 2005 attacks in London; Bangalore-born Kafeel Ahmed, who was involved in the June 2007 attack on Glasgow
International Airport, and a known follower of al Qaeda; and finally, Mohammad
Niaz Raseed, a cadre of the Students’ Islamic Movement of India (SIMI), the parent
organization of the IM, who was recently sentenced to eight years in prison by the
Paris Criminal Court for plotting a series of terrorist attacks. These important examples demonstrate an escalating threat potential not only in India, but of a terrorist
mobilisation within this country that could have international ramifications.
On the home front, IM’s link or efforts to establish linkages with other groups have
also been reconfirmed. Disclosures during interrogations of Yasin Bhatkal and
Asadullah Akhtar indicate that IM was in touch with the Communist Party of IndiaMaoist (CPI-Maoist), discussing a possible tie-up with the outfit to procure explosives and ammunition for use in terror attacks in India. Sources claim IM offered
‘handsome payments’ to the Maoists for supply of weapons and explosives. Yasin
Bhatkal also revealed that he had met CPI-Maoist leaders in Nepal before the serial
blasts that rocked Bodh Gaya in Gaya District of Bihar on July 7, 2013. Bhatkal had
reportedly surveyed the area around the Mahabodhi temple a year before the
blasts took place. The explosive devices used in the blasts resemble the bombs
used by Maoists. Similarly, close connections with the National Development Front
(NDF) in Kerala and the Karnataka Forum for Dignity (KFD) also came to the fore.
Counter-intuitively, the alleged splits within IM may actually result in a deeper per-
82
colation of terrorist networks and activities in India, with multiple and overlapping
structures of operation, and increasing specialization. Indeed, Beg’s Unit, which is
reported to have the backing of al Qaeda and Taliban, is believed to be focusing
only on fidayeen (suicide squad) attacks on prominent people in India. Akhtar revealed that, during an online chat in July 2013, Beg told him that 15 people from
five Indian States had been called to Pakistan earlier in the year, to discuss IM’s future operations in India. Sources indicate that these persons underwent intensive
training in Afghanistan to carry out fidayeen attacks.
Disclosures during interrogations also indicate that IM is planning to target political
leaders. Yasin Bhatkal admitted, “The funds flow from our international sympathisers will increase many times if we manage to reach Narendra Modi. Modi is one to
10 in the list of targets. The rest of the targets figure much below him.”
IM is also planning a series of bomb blasts across the country. Significantly, agencies have recovered a whopping 90 Improvised Explosive Devices (IEDs) from Zephyr Heights in Mangalore and Abdullapur in Hyderabad, among other IM hideouts. In
what can be considered further evidence of the plan, all these devices were almost
ready for use, and had been developed at the instance of Yasin Bhatkal and his
aide, Akhtar. A top intelligence officer disclosed to the media, “Only the circuitry
was not connected to the IEDs, otherwise these bombs were ready to use.” Several
unattached timers, batteries, detonators and shrapnel were also recovered from
various hideouts. Yasin Bhatkal is learnt to have told interrogators that IM was experimenting with the manufacture of hydrogen peroxide-based IEDs. On the
‘ideological’ front, Yasin Bhatkal is reported to have reconfirmed that IM’s main
objective was to establish Shariah in India, as in Afghanistan and Somalia.
IM is clearly undergoing dynamic transformations under the direction and guidance
of the Inter Service Intelligence (ISI) which has provided the top leaders of the
group safe haven and resources in Pakistan, and facilitated deepening linkages with
regional and global jihadi groups. With a progressive international outreach, vertical splits and increasingly specialization, the group and its successors are likely to
evolve more lethal capabilities that would certainly be manifested in India, but are
likely to have reverberations across the world as well.
Sanchita Bhattacharya
Research Associate, Institute for Conflict Management
http://www.eurasiareview.com/
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Syria
Fighting the wrong battles at the wrong time
October 24, 2013
BEIRUT: The war in Syria is poised to become even worse for mainstream rebels if
hard-liners push through with plans to attack controversial targets, as propaganda
and media coverage o en distort what is happening on the ground.
One recent flashpoint has been the southern suburbs of Damascus, where activists
and opposition figures are scathing in their criticism of military tactics by the sometimes-cooperating, sometimes-feuding rebel militias.
A rebel attack on the border between the suburbs of Mliha and Jaramana grabbed
headlines over the weekend, when a suicide bombing operation by the Al-Qaedainspired Nusra Front paved the way for a takeover of a strategically located factory
complex.
Defenders of the rebels’ tactic say it will help them approach and target the Air Defense Administration building nearby, but critics say it brings the fighting directly to
next-door Jaramana, which has a large Druze and Christian population. The suburb
was already teeming with Iraqi refugees who had arrived over the last decade, and
in the last two years it has become home for thousands of displaced Syrians, mainly
from Sunni-majority areas.
A Druze source active in opposition political circles said the Nusra Front had relayed
the message that it would be attacking Jaramana this week, which the source called
a potentially catastrophic move.
“The rebels should be eating up Damascus, starting with Abbassiyin home to army
and intelligence sites instead of hitting Jaramana,” the source said.
He also complained that hard-line rebel militias were arresting civilian activists in
the suburbs of the eastern Ghouta, a method many have criticized as resembling
the regime’s behavior.
The confrontations that pit hard-line Islamists versus secular activists or nonideological FSA units in Greater Damascus are an echo of similar tension and clashes between these groups across areas of the north and northeast.
“All of these militias are working against the revolution, against the drive to topple the regime,” the source said.
The rebel actions, or lack thereof, in Greater Damascus extend to the southwestern
suburb of Moadamieh, which has been in the headlines because of the horrific humanitarian conditions in the rebel-held majority of the town.
Another opposition activist source stressed that the FSA rebels in Moadamieh were
largely locals, without significant political-material support or ties to Al-Qaeda.
In Greater Damascus in general, both sources pointed to the frustrating perfor-
84
mance of the Islam Brigade, which leads a group of some 50 formations and is believed to be awash in weaponry and funding.
One of the main civilian activist networks, the Union of Coordinating Committees of
the Syrian Revolution, has slammed the rebel brigades for their lack of action to
relieve the pressure on Moadamieh.
In a statement issued Friday, the group threatened to expose the militias that have
“used their weapons in a way that doesn’t serve the interest of the revolution and
are in fact carrying out agendas that have nothing to do with the revolution.”
While the Saudi Arabia-backed Islam Brigade, the Salafist Ahrar al-Sham network
and the jihadist Nusra Front have been fighting in various suburbs of the capital,
none has managed to change the equation in Moadamieh.
The sources described the militias’ actions as being a case of doing just enough,
o en by getting on YouTube, to convince backers to continue the flow of money
and weapons.
“Neither the regime nor the hard-line Islamists have an interest in taking each other on directly” in large-scale fashion, one activist said.
“The Nusra Front just wants to get stronger and not lose; it has no intention of really sacrificing” to achieve devastating blows against the regime, he continued. Some
in the opposition accuse the Nusra Front or other Islamist factions of being in
league with the regime, to weaken the nationalist FSA and the small, local forces
with weak outside political connections.
The source described other fronts that have seen activity recently as being complicated to assess.
“In Deir al-Zor, the Nusra Front made a big deal about the attack” last week that
killed intelligence chief Jamaa Jamaa, he said. “In reality, the Deir al-Zor rebels are
overwhelmingly locals, organized along tribal and other local lines.”
However, he continued, the Nusra Front gets the attention in an area he described
as relatively ignored by media coverage.
“And then you have groups like the Tawhid Brigade; it publicizes campaigns in areas
such as the province of Hama, announcing the taking of village a er village, but
without significant military value,” the source argued.
“What do they want with villages in rural Hama?” he asked. “These kinds of groups
just wage ‘battles’ to get support and show that they’re active. The competition
among them is more important than toppling the regime.”
Foreign backers and financiers in the Gulf and elsewhere have their agendas, but
the diversity of players continues to generate a stalemate, with no one apparently
interested in delivering a knockout punch to the regime.
The next “decisive” battle, in the eyes of some analysts and political sources, will be
85
in Qalamoun, an area lying roughly north of Damascus, and adjacent to Lebanon’s
Bekaa Valley.
The regime and its Hezbollah allies, according to some sources, have begun a concerted offensive against the largely rebel-held mountainous area, as government
airstrikes picked up this week.
The Druze source questioned whether the regime’s intent to mount a sustained
campaign was really serious, while noting that the Islam Brigade had already begun
pulling fighters out of Greater Damascus to support the locals in Qalamoun.
“Why advertise a campaign before it happens?” he asked.
Pro-regime media promoted the idea that loyalist forces would go all-out to retake Aleppo a er the fall of the town of Qusair in June, but it didn’t materialize into
a sustained offensive.
“The regime did the same thing with Aleppo, to cover actions elsewhere,” the
source said.
Another disappointment for the mainstream, nationalist opposition will come
when the hard-line rebels end up fighting in Christian-majority villages and towns,
sparking even more criticism of their tactics. As a seeming response to the regime’s
nearby Qalamoun offensive, rebels this week surprised thegovernment forces by
attacking the Christian-majority village of Sadad, east of the DamascusHoms highway.
While Sadad might be a legitimate military target due to its geographic location,
any incidents of Christians losing their lives will be pounced on by the regime and
its supporters as further evidence of the jihadists’ sectarian agenda.
The killing of five people in Sadad, presumably by rebel sniper fire, was reported
Wednesday.
The seemingly haphazard flaring up of fronts is an apt metaphor for the tensions
that dominate inter-rebel relations, with the hardliners increasingly accused of
fighting the wrong battles at the wrong time.
Opposition media have also reported that both FSA and Islamist rebels are moving
their attacks in Hama province closer to the town of Sqailbieh, which has a majority
Christian population.
The moves by rebel militias against areas inhabited by religious minorities infuriate
secular activists and others who would like to see the nerve centers of the regime
targeted instead.
“The rebels hold a lot of territory,” one activist complained. “But the majority of
military facilities they’ve taken are small facilities – stations, mainly, not major bases.”
This tactic does nothing to dislodge regime forces from the inner lines to which
they have retreated, he continued.
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The debate over the priorities continues, based on the slogans of the last two Friday nationwide protests: A call to save Moadamieh from its plight was preceded by
a call to rebel factions to stop fighting each other and instead unite their efforts.
A young demonstrator in the province of Idlib held a sign that urged rebels to head
for Homs, “the heart of the snake,” and Latakia, “the head of the snake,” referring
to the home province of President Bashar Assad.
Homs and Latakia have seen much violence, but little overall change in the military
equation.
The other key front, naturally, is the central part of Damascus itself, but no faction
has shown itself ready or willing to undertake the endeavor.
In recent weeks, with the prospect of Geneva II peace negotiations looming, a series of small groups of rebel battalions have announced their “unification” via
YouTube, but it remains to be seen whether this will have any political or military
impact.
Mainstream rebels blame the jihadists for imposing their agenda and clashing with
the FSA and highlight the opposition National Coalition’s failure to provide sufficient material or other support.
A rebel fighter based in Safira, south of Aleppo, issued a call Tuesday
via YouTube to the various factions to drop their infighting in rebel-held areas, saying they should leave such places to their residents and instead head for Safira.
He also addressed the National Coalition, issuing the usual scathing criticism of its
lack of material support or guidance.
“ The regime is using a scorched-earth policy – what are you using? A policy of tables and dialogue, and negotiations above and below the table” in the run-up to
Geneva II, he alleged.
On Monday, residents of the eastern Damascus suburb of Douma held a short
demonstration to chant “one hand,” a call to the various Islamist militias and mainstream FSA groups to unite.
It would represent a radical change from the current situation.
http://www.dailystar.com.lb)
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Analyse: Al-Qaïda 2.0 en Syrie - recomposition locale de l'islamisme
d ihadiste
O t
Les visages d'al-Qaïda hangent.
De nouvelles générations, au
Moyen-Orient et en Afrique subsaharienne prin ipalement, se
sont emparées du symbole et de
ses méthodes. Mais quelles mutations ette reprise engendre-telle? Laurent Vinatier en analyse
un aspe t, à partir du as syrien.
Les visages d'al-Qaïda changent.
La poignée de survivants parmi
les compagnons d'Oussama Ben
Laden, réfugiés et cachés depuis
plus d'une décennie aux confins du Pakistan ou de l'Afghanistan, n'ont plus le monopole de la violence islamiste internationale. De nouvelles générations d'héritiers,
au Moyen-Orient et en Afrique sub-saharienne principalement, se sont emparées
du symbole et de ses méthodes, le plus souvent terroristes. Ces hommes, reliés ou
formés à la source, ont choisi de revendiquer, chez eux, sur leur terre d'origine, le
message réimplanté de la structure mère, façonnant ainsi les franchises: al-Qaïda
au Maghreb islamique (AQMI), al-Qaïda dans la péninsule arabique (AQAP), alQaïda en Irak (également appelé Etat islamique en Irak ou al-Qaïda en Mésopotamie) ou encore une partie des Shebabs somaliens.
Pétris d'idéologie globale, déracinés pour certains, ces militants sans ancrage ont
cherché à s'allier sur place à des forces locales, salafistes en général, qu'il s'agissait
d'instrumentaliser, de phagocyter en fait, afin de réussir la greffe sur les conflits en
cours et d'absorber les vecteurs traditionnels, politiques et sociaux des révoltes indigènes. Al-Qaïda 2.0, par ses franchises, se nourrit et se développe au contact de
mouvements autochtones; celles-ci profitent des relais et capacités mobilisatrices
préexistantes, à la manière de parasites, relativement bien acceptés cependant par
les hôtes tactiques.
La Syrie n'échappe pas à la règle. Lorsque la rébellion, amorcée au printemps 2011
et sombrant dans la violence dès l'été, a vu sensiblement progresser sa composante islamiste, avec l'apparition et la rapide montée en puissance de groupes
armés djihadistes tout au long de l'année 2012, al-Qaïda en Irak (AQI) a cherché à
s'étendre à l'est pour constituer un Etat islamique d'Irak et du Levant (EIIL). Selon
un processus d'alliance/absorption, similaire à d'autres, l'Etat islamique d'Irak a ain-
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si annoncé en avril 2013 la fusion avec Jabhat al-Nusra (JAN), l'une des structures
armées islamistes les plus radicales sur le terrain syrien d'alors. Sans succès.
Cet article voudrait discuter de cette tentative échouée d'internationalisation islamiste de la guerre en Syrie. La dimension transnationale, irako-syrienne, n'a pas
pris et ne prendra sans doute pas dans un futur proche. Elle apparaît assez révélatrice d'ailleurs d'un phénomène général, partagé à degré divers par toutes
les franchises d'al-Qaïda: la résilience politique du «local», qui aboutit en fait à une
forme de trahison idéologique des franchises à l'égard de la structure «al-Qaïda
mère».
Les éléments d'analyse proposés ici reposent sur des entretiens de terrain menés
pendant quinze jours en septembre 2013 auprès d'une vingtaine d'acteurs, dont
des logisticiens, des journalistes et des docteurs syriens basés et opérant tous à la
frontière turco-syrienne (Gaziantep, Kilis, Reyhanli et Antakya).
Divergence JAN/AQI en Syrie
La fusion en avril est annoncée unilatéralement par l'émir de l'AQI, Abou-Bakr alBagdadi, qui proclame en même temps l'Etat islamique conjoint d'Irak et du Levant
(ou Sham, dans le discours islamiste), intégrant JAN. Quasiment immédiatement, la
démarche est rejetée par le leader de la composante syrienne, Abou-Mohammed
al-Golani qui refuse explicitement de reconnaître la prééminence d'al-Bagdadi. Le
chef d'al-Qaïda-mère, Ayman al-Zawahiri, donne d'ailleurs raison au premier,
suggérant ultérieurement que JAN doit conserver une certaine autonomie. L'effet
sur le terrain est cependant dévastateur pour JAN qui voit partir la plupart des
combattants étrangers, volontaires arrivés au fil des mois précédents en soutien à
l'insurrection: ceux-ci préfèrent le bi- ou trans-nationalisme et rejoignent la
nouvelle structure. Le coup porté est double quand al-Golani, croyant limiter l'effusion, affirme son allégeance à al-Zawahiri: il perd alors ses militants syriens. Tout au
long de l'été 2013, JAN se trouve très affaibli. Il reprend cet automne un peu
d'ampleur, retrouvant certains de ses anciens partisans syriens.
Les motifs profonds de la décision d'al-Golani demeurent encore mystérieux. D'autant que celui-ci a été l'adjoint d'al-Bagdadi lors des troubles en Irak au cours de la
décennie 2000. Parmi certains journalistes syriens, il se dit qu'al-Golani et une
bonne partie de ses amis n'auraient pas voulu s'engager complètement en Irak. Ils
auraient participé comme par défaut à la guerre civile irakienne, simplement parce
qu'il leur était impossible de rester en Syrie, à moins d'accepter l'enfermement et
peut-être les tortures. Quelle que soit la véracité de ces spéculations sur les motivations profondes d'al-Golani en Irak, le fait est, en tout cas, qu'à son retour, il
retrouve aussitôt le chemin de la prison. De même, quelle que soit la justification
de son refus, cet acte démontre qu'il entend se battre exclusivement dans un cadre
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syrien pour des objectifs politiques syriens. La constitution, le 29 septembre dernier
d'un ensemble auto-déclaré «Armée de l'islam», qui associe treize groupes islamistes syriens ne reconnaissant pas l'autorité de l'Armée syrienne de Libération, mais
ne faisant non plus aucune mention de l'EIIL, renforce l'idée d'un islamisme syrien à
vocation essentiellement nationale, tendant à se méfier des tentatives extérieures
de récupération. De manière assez inattendue, la focalisation sur des enjeux locaux
vaut aussi pour la plupart des volontaires internationaux.
Politisation back home des combattants internationaux
Au-delà des motivations purement idéologiques, mêlant solidarité musulmane et
lutte contre les injustices qu'un mécréant inflige, la plupart des militants étrangers
venus se battre en Syrie maintiennent un lien politique clair avec les enjeux
spécifiques de leur terre d'origine. Leur mobilisation et déplacement relèvent
d'abord de phénomènes locaux, ba k home, y compris pour l'Etat islamique d'Irak
et du Levant. Le projet irakien a beaucoup profité de l'affaiblissement relatif de
JAN, intégrant en son sein la majorité des étrangers qui quittaient l'organisation
syrienne, les Irakiens en premier lieu bien sûr mais aussi, en particulier, les Saoudiens, les Yéménites et des ressortissants des Etats du Golfe (Koweït, Emirats Arabes
Unis, Qatar). Au fil des ajustements ponctuels et transferts individuels qui ne cessent pratiquement jamais, ce groupe présente en fait actuellement une certaine
homogénéité régionale centrée sur la Péninsule arabique et sur l'Irak. Ces hommes,
qui soutiennent évidemment le projet transnational d'Irak et de Sham, luttent aussi
et surtout contre l'impérialisme chiite dont l'Iran, selon eux, est le vecteur principal. Les Saoudiens, les Irakiens et les autres ont pour objectif en Syrie de contrer au
maximum les velléités d'influence iraniennes, déjà actives et relativement efficaces
au Liban et en Irak et qui pourraient, en cas de victoire, prendre suffisamment d'importance pour gêner les sunnites au cœur même de la Péninsule arabique.
Le phénomène de politisation ba k home est encore plus évident pour les Caucasiens et les Libyens. Ils combattent en général séparément des autres groupes et
ont des références claires, les uns à la Russie, les autres à Kadhafi. Pour les premiers, il s'agit d'être utile là où il est possible de se battre. Face aux conditions trop
difficiles chez eux, beaucoup, y compris des volontaires venus directement des républiques nord-caucasiennes, choisissent de s'engager en Syrie. C'est sans nul
doute une manière de lutter contre la Russie; ils font savoir aussi qu'une fois Assad
renversé, grâce aux contacts établis, ils seront en mesure d'opposer au Kremlin une
force multinationale, motivée et entraînée, qui se déplacera jusque dans le Caucase. Ce raisonnement, du moins dans sa partie première, vaut pour les Centrasiatiques, les Azerbaïdjanais, les Algériens et les Marocains: «puisque chez nous,
il ne fait pas sens (encore) de se rebeller, autant partir». Les Caucasiens, un temps,
par le biais de leur chef, Abou-Oumar al-Chichani, se sont rapprochés de l'EIIL; alChichani a même été nommé commandant de la région nord de l'Etat islamique ;
mais en septembre il semble, selon plusieurs informations concordantes, avoir pris
quelques distances. Pour les Libyens, et cela se vérifie aussi pour les Tunisiens et les
90
Egyptiens, le djihad en Syrie s'inscrit dans la droite ligne des révolutions du
printemps arabe : une victoire islamiste permettra de favoriser à domicile la progression des forces salafistes et, espèrent-ils, de les renforcer dans leur quête du
pouvoir, possiblement violente en dernier ressort.
Les lignes de partage nationales ou régionales entre les unités ne sont évidemment
pas figées. Les passages sont aisés, les groupes sont fluides, même si pour chacun
une origine tend à dominer. Des Caucasiens se battent avec l'EIIL, au même titre
que certains Libyens, Tunisiens, Egyptiens, Algériens, Centrasiatiques, sans compter
les convertis européens, qui ne représentent cependant qu'une petite partie des
combattants. De même peut-on trouver des ressortissants du Golfe et des Irakiens
dans d'autres structures combattantes. Il ne faut simplement pas surestimer le rôle
et la prégnance transnationale du groupe irako-syrien.
Un récit islamiste transnational inabouti
Contre al-Qaïda qui, à ses débuts, se définit comme un mouvement transnational,
supranational, une avant-garde armée de l'oumma, dont les partisans
«dénationalisés», sont capables d'agir n'importe où dans le monde, ses franchises
actuelles à l'inverse tendent à se «re-territorialiser». Prenant corps au gré de problématiques politiques ancrées dans le tissu social d'un lieu, ces structures recomposées se relocalisent. Elles s'autonomisent de la structure-mère [ ] et perdent de ce
fait la dimension transnationale originelle. L'affiliation à al-Qaïda relayée aux confins des montagnes orientales d'Afghanistan existe toujours, mais se révèle assez
théorique sur les divers terrains d'action - Syrie, Irak, Somalie, Yémen. Allégeance
est bien sûr faite à al-Zawahiri, mais celui-ci n'exerce en pratique aucune autorité. Il
est exclu aussi qu'il puisse donner des instructions à ces ensembles armés qui se
réclament pourtant de la marque dont il a hérité. Ceux-ci déterminent eux-mêmes
leurs cibles, leurs modes d'engagement et leur approvisionnement logistique, notamment financier. Certains experts soulignent [ ] que les plus jeunes leaders, au
sein de cette seconde génération «localisée» n'entretiennent avec al-Zawahiri
qu'un lien très superficiel, principalement idéologique, mais à bonne distance. Le
silence d'Al-Bagdadi de l'EIIL, qui a littéralement ignoré la déclaration du leader d'al
-Qaïda au moment du malentendu avec Jabhat al-Nusra, en est un exemple révélateur.
La déconnexion prend une importance marquée sur le plan stratégique, au point de
trahir l'esprit et le projet d'al-Qaïda première version. En effet, les priorités opérationnelles de ces groupes 2.0 n'ont plus rien à voir avec la source. Désormais,
pour toutes les franchises, il s'agit de s'attaquer à l'ennemi de proximité plutôt qu'à
l'ennemi lointain. Agir et frapper au cœur de l'Occident n'est plus un objectif immédiat ; il est vrai aussi que ces groupes, même s'ils gardent cette option à l'esprit,
n'en ont pas vraiment les moyens matériels et humains. Ils visent plutôt les Etats
mécréants, corrompus, qui dans leurs actes dévoient la loi de l'Islam et qui collabo-
91
rent avec les puissances occidentales, se compromettant avec elles et autorisant la
présence de troupes étrangères, «chrétiennes», sur les territoires de l'islam.
Ils visent aussi les chiites: l'Iran, ses alliés et ses milices supplétives, qui, selon eux,
on l'a vu, ont des velléités expansionnistes. La dimension anti-chiite s'avère particulièrement mobilisatrice pour les franchises basées en Irak et dans les Etats du
Golfe. La confessionnalisation intra-islamique, anti-chiite et anti-sunnite modéré,
tend même aujourd'hui, de manière générale, à l'emporter sur la lutte intercivilisationnelle opposant chrétiens (associés aux juifs) et musulmans. Ils rompent
ici clairement avec les préceptes établis par Ben Laden lui-même qui, en aucun cas
auparavant, n'avait stigmatisé les chiites [ ]. Plusieurs cadres d'al-Qaïda, au début
des années 2000, auraient même profité de complicités iraniennes dans les tentatives de réorganisation des réseaux djihadistes [4]. De façon assez paradoxale, dans
un contexte globalisé, le transnationalisme islamiste peine à s'imposer.
Conclusion
La négation transnationale n'est sans doute que momentanée. L'opposition aukâfir,
chiite, chrétien ou sunnite non-pratiquant, est probablement le meilleur vecteur
d'un retour du transnationalisme. Si les mouvements perdurent, tel qu'ils se sont
constitués et se développent actuellement en Syrie, en Irak, en Egypte, en Libye, au
Sahel, en Somalie (et Kenya), des passerelles devraient apparaître, des réseaux
plurinationaux devraient se former. A force de se battre localement, à force parallèlement de tenter des unions transnationales à l'instar de l'Etat islamique d'Irak et
du Levant, des histoires se bâtissent. Au fur et à mesure des circulations individuelles entre fronts de guerre, des liens se tissent et durent. Alors un récit prend
corps. Les volontaires djihadistes se positionnent et s'inscrivent dans un cadre
d'action dont le sens repose sur une profondeur narrative, sur des expériences passées, sur des cas devenus historiques. C'est à cette condition essentielle que le récit
islamiste transnational peut exister et mobiliser. Il était trop tôt du temps d'Oussama Ben Laden. Puis, à la manière d'une dialectique hégélienne, l'islamisme territorialisé, niant le premier mouvement, s'est imposé. Il sera lui-même nié ou plutôt
dépassé et pourrait faire place à un ensemble réellement et effectivement déterritorialisé, islamiste-djihadiste, disposé à ajouter aux chiites les Occidentaux sur la
liste de leurs ennemis.
Laurent Vinatier
Notes
[ ] Idée avancée également par Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou dans
son ouvrage:Understanding Al Qaeda: The Transformation of War, Pluto Press,
2006.
[ ] Information rapportée par The E onomist, “Briefing: The State of Al-Qaeda”, 28
septembre 2013, p. 22.
[ ] Comme le fait remarquer Mohammad-Mahmoud Ould Mohamedou, lors d'un
entretien avec l'auteur, à Genève, au Centre de Politique de Sécurité, 9 septembre
92
USA
U.S. “War On Terror” Has INCREASED Terrorism
Global Research, October 22, 2013
Washington's Blog
Region: USA
Theme: 9/11
'War on Terrorism'
Charts Show that U.S. Policy Has Increased Terror Attacks
The National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and Responses to Terrorism
(START) Global Terrorism Database – part of a joint government-university program
on terrorism - is hosted at the University of Maryland.
START is the most comprehensive open source terrorism database, which can be
viewed by journalists and civilians lacking national security clearance.
A quick review of charts from the START database show that terrorism has increased in the last 9 years since the U.S. started its “war on terror”.
This chart shows the number of terror attacks conducted in Iraq:
Afghanistan:
93
The Middle East:
Asia:
94
Africa:
Indeed, global terrorism had been falling from 1992 until 2004 … but has
95
been skyro keting since 2004:
Our Wars In the Middle East Have Created More Terrorists
Security experts – including both conservatives and liberals – agree that waging
war in the Middle East weakens national security and increases terrorism.
Killing innocent civilians is one of the main things which increases terrorism. As one
of the top counter-terrorism experts (the former number 2 counter-terrorism expert at the State Department)told me, starting wars against states which do not
pose an imminent threat to America’s national security increases the threat of terrorism because:
One of the principal causes of terrorism is injuries to people and families.
The Iraq war wasn’t even fought to combat terrorism.
Qaeda wasn’t even in Iraq until the U.S. invaded that country.
And
Al
And top CIA officers say that drone strikes increase terrorism (and see this).
Furthermore, James K. Feldman – former professor of decision analysis and economics at the Air Force Institute of Technology and the School of Advanced Airpower Studies – and other experts say that foreign occupation is the main ause of terrorism
University of Chicago professor Robert A. Pape – who specializes in international
security affairs –points out:
96
Extensive research into the causes of suicide terrorism proves Islam isn’t to blame
— the root of the problem is foreign military occupations.
Each month, there are more suicide terrorists trying to kill Americans and their allies in Afghanistan, Iraq, and other Muslim countries than in all the years before
2001combined.
New research provides strong evidence that suicide terrorism such as that of 9/11
is particularly sensitive to foreign military occupation, and not Islamic fundamentalism or any ideology independent of this crucial circumstance. Although this
pattern began to emerge in the 1980s and 1990s, a wealth of new data presents a
powerful picture.
More than 95 percent of all suicide attacks are in response to foreign occupation,
according to extensive research co-authored by James K. Feldman - former professor of decision analysis and economics at the Air Force Institute of Technology and
the School of Advanced Airpower Studies that we conducted at the University of
Chicago’s Project on Security and Terrorism, where we examined every one of the
over 2,200 suicide attacks across the world from 1980 to the present day. As the
United States has occupied Afghanistan and Iraq, which have a combined population of about 60 million, total suicide attacks worldwide have risen dramatically —
from about 300 from 1980 to 2003, to 1,800 from 2004 to 2009. Further, over 90
percent of suicide attacks worldwide are now anti-American. The vast majority of
suicide terrorists hail from the local region threatened by foreign troops, which is
why 90 percent of suicide attackers in Afghanistan are Afghans.
Israelis have their own narrative about terrorism, which holds that Arab fanatics
seek to destroy the Jewish state because of what it is, not what it does. But since
Israel withdrew its army from Lebanon in May 2000, there has not been a single
Lebanese suicide attack. Similarly, since Israel withdrew from Gaza and large parts
of the West Bank, Palestinian suicide attacks are down over 90 percent.
The first step is recognizing that occupations in the Muslim world don’t make
Americans any safer — in fact, they are at the heart of the problem.
Our Program of Torture Created Terrorists
In addition, torture creates new terrorists:
A top counter-terrorism expert says torture increases the risk of terrorism (and
see this).
One of the top military interrogators said that torture by Americans of innocent
Iraqis is the main reason that foreign fighters started fighting against Americans in
97
Iraq in the first place (and see this).
Former counter-terrorism czar Richard A. Clarke says that America’s indefinite
detention without trial and abuse of prisoners is a leading Al Qaeda recruiting tool
A former FBI interrogator — who interrogated Al Qaeda suspects — says categorically thattorture actually turns people into terrorists
A 30-year veteran of CIA’s operations directorate who rose to the most senior
managerial ranks, says:
Torture creates more terrorists and fosters more acts of terror than it could possibly neutralize.
A former US Air Force interrogator said that torture just creates more terrorists
A former U.S. interrogator and counterintelligence agent, and Afghanistan veteran said, “Torture puts our troops in danger, torture makes our troops less
safe, torture creates terrorists. It’s used so widely as a propaganda tool now
in Afghanistan. All too o en, detainees have pamphlets on them, depicting
what happened at Guantanamo.”
The Senate Armed Services Committee unanimously stated:
“The administration’s policies concerning torture and the resulting controversies
… strengthened the hand of our enemies.”
Two professors of political science have demonstrated that torture increases,
rather than decreases, terrorism
General Petraeus said that torture hurts our national security
And the reporter who broke Iran-Contra and other stories says that torture actually
helped Al Qaeda, by giving false leads to the U.S. which diverted its military, intelligence and economic resources into wild goose chases
So the widespread program of torture under the Bush administration didn’t help.
Nice Job Creating More Terrorists, You Morons …
Additionally – in the name of fighting our enemies – the U.S. has directly been supporting Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups for the last decade.
See this, this, this, this and this.
Why Have We Given Up Our Rights If the Government Can’t Keep Us Safe?
We have given up the fundamental rights which make us American.
The government insisted that – if we gave up our liberties – it would keep us safe.
It has failed to do so, and has instead squandered our national treasure, our resources and our troops on efforts which have only in reased the risk of terrorism.
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Wasted Defense Spending
A large amount of the homeland security spending has been wasted … producing “a bunch of crap”.
For example, spending money on zombie apocalypse training or other silly programs is a bad investment which led to a false sense of security.
Spending defense money on a workshop called “Did Jesus die for Klingons too?”
and DOD-run microbreweries is probably not helping stop terrorist attacks.
Moreover, using homeland security resources to spy on average Americans or crack
down on peaceful protesters or government critics distracts from getting
the a tual bad guys.
At the same time, both the Bush and Obama administrations have slashed funding
for programs which would actually help prevent terror attacks.
Heck of a job, guys …
The Real Agenda
Regime change was planned throughout the Middle East and North Africa were
planned 20 years ago … long before 9/11.
As just one example, U.S. Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel, 4-Star General (and
CENTCOM commander with responsibility for Iraq) John Abizaid, key war architect
John Bolton, a high-level National Security Council officer, President George W.
Bush, Bush speech writer David Frum, Senator John McCain, Fed boss Alan Greenspan and Sarah Palin all say that the Iraq war was about oil. Documents from Britain show the same thing.
Much of the war on terror is really a fight for natural gas. Or to force the last few
hold-outs into dollars and private central banking.
Senior government officials have described terrorist attacks as a “small price to pay
for being a superpower”. And while politicians talk about ending the war on terror,
endless war is a feature – not a bug – of our foreign policy.
Whatever the real agenda one thing is clear … In the same way that NSA spying
isn’t about preventing terrorism (proof here, here, here and here), the war on terror is cover for other shenanigans.
http://www.globalresearch.ca.
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Yemen
Does America have a “Licence to Kill” US Drone War on Yemen Violates International Law
Global Research, October 26, 2013
Sin e
9, the United States has regularly bombed Yemen.
These aerial atta ks have o urred in almost every provin e of the ountry. n the
past two years, the number of drone strikes has multiplied and the infrastru ture
required for these atta ks have been expanded, not only in Yemen, but also in
neighboring Saudi Arabia and Djibouti.
Sin e the first strikes in November
and until the writing of this report in July
, the United States has arried out between 4 and 4 military operations in
Yemen.
These in lude strikes by air raft and drones as well as missiles laun hed from warships lo ated in the Gulf of Aden. A ording to various sour es, estimates of the
number of people killed range from
to
. However, to this day, neither the
Yemeni nor the Ameri an authorities have put forward offi ial statisti s on the number of asualties.
Alkarama carried out a number of field investigations in Yemen throughout 2012
and 2013, in order to gather witness accounts and victim testimonies about these
attacks, as well as information from their families and lawyers. Interviews were also
held with government officials and members of civil society.
This report presents the results of ourresearch and analysis on the US strategy in its
“war on terror” with respect to international law. It also examines the reactions of
US as well as Yemeni officials and civil society in light of the serious violations committed. Finally, the report sets out recommendations to the Yemeni and US authorities, as well as to the UN, to address these issues.
Yemen/USA: License to Kill. Why the American Drone War on Yemen Violates International Law
Summary of the Report
Since 2009, the United States have regularly bombed Yemen. These aerial attacks
have occurred in almost all of the country’s provinces. More recently, drone strikes
have multiplied, and the infrastructure required for these types of attacks have
been expanded, not only in Yemen, but also in Saudi Arabia and Djibouti. Since the
beginning of strikes in November 2002 to the writing of this report in July 2013, the
United States have carried out between 134 and 234 military operations in Yemen.
This includes strikes carried out by aircra and drones as well as missiles launched
from warships located in the Gulf of Aden. According to various sources, the number of people killed range from 1000 to 2000. However, to this day, neither the
Yemeni or American authorities have put forward official statistics on the number
100
of casualties.
Alkarama carried out a number of visits in Yemen throughout 2012 and 2013, in
order to gather the testimonies of victims and witnesses to these attacks, as well as
from their families and lawyers. Interviews were also held with government officials and members of civil society.
This report aims to present this research and analyze the US’s strategy in its combat against torture in light of relevant international law. It also examines the reactions of US as well as Yemeni officials and civil society in light of these serious violations. Finally, it sets out recommendations addressed to the Yemeni and US authorities, as well as to the U.N to address these issues.
Yemen’s current president, Abd al-Rab Mansour al-Hadi, came to power in February 2012 following a mass revolution by the Yemeni population. He replaced Ali
Abdallah Saleh who had ruled the country for 33 years. Since then, the country is in
transition, with a national dialogue underway since March 2013, encompassing
Yemen’s various political groups. It should result in elections in February 2014.
In the meantime, the current president has reinforced Yemen’s ties with the United
States, placing large regions of Yemen territory at the disposal of the US and encouraging its military intervention in the country, including by attributing the responsibility of attacks to the United States directly. This has increased tensions
within the population which does not support American air strikes.
This way, under the cover of counter-terrorism measures, the American administration has involved itself directly in an multi-dimensional internal conflict taking
place between the central Yemeni authorities and multiple opposition movements
including armed groups of Jihadist tendency – namely al-Qaeda and Ansar al-Sharia
– but also the south separatist movement and different tribes that contest the central government’s authority.
The United States has never declared war on Yemen, and instead refers to the
AUMF (Authorization to Use Military Force) resolution of 14 September 2001 to
justify their intervention in Yemen, despite the fact that the Yemeni government is
considered an ally and does not represent a threat to the US. The AUMF sets out
measures to combat those with ties of any kind to the attacks of 11 September
2001. This has been interpreted to include all those that are considered to be
“associated forces” of al-Qaeda, although this phrase does not appear in the resolution itself. This term in fact first appeared in President Obama’s speeches and
official White House texts and is used to legitimize combat against groups whose
ties with al-Qaeda are not always clearly established.
The question that must be asked is whether the United States are applying the
rules of war, or law enforcement? The official argument put forward by American
officials plays on the confusion between these two notions to justify targeted assassinations. However, the distinction between the two is important, as if it is the
latter, the law of armed conflicts would apply, while in the second case, it would be
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the laws government law enforcement that apply, which must comply with international human rights law.
Regardless of the context in which the American intervention in Yemen takes place,
the American military and C.I.A continue to use drones, other types of military aircra as well as warships to commit targeted assassinations that should be considered, and qualified, as extrajudicial executions.
President Obama himself provided the conditions required for a suspect to be assassinated; namely that the person be designated as being a person of interest under US law, that he or she represent a real, direct and imminent threat to the United States and its interests; that it not be possible to capture the person and that
the operation does not target civilian victims. The administration certifies that only
the leaders of al-Qaeda and “associated forces” are targeted, without clarifying the
criteria required to place individuals on kill lists. What is certain, however, is that
the number of these leaders is very small compared to the hundreds of those who
have been killed during these strikes. In reality, the forces implicated also target
unidentified combatants who do not play a leadership role, who are anonymous
and do not have charges held against them. Civilians also suffer due to the human
and technical errors that American political and military leaders accept as necessary collateral damage in the pursuit of their aims. In fact, Yemen – just like Pakistan – has become a testing ground for revolutionary new methods of warfare, not
only technically, but also on politically and legally.
MAP OF U.S. AIR STRIKES IN YEMEN
http://www.globalresearch.ca/
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