Euren - Industry in Europe final - Coe

Transcription

EUREN Studies
N° 2
Industry
An ambition for Europe
European Day of Industry
On the occasion of the French Presidency of the EU
Edited by Alain Henriot
July 2008
www.euren-network.eu
EUREN (for EURopean Economic Network) is a network of European
economic Institutes. The creation of this network in 1999 aimed to improve
the analysis of the European economy, in a context characterised by major
institutional changes, especially the setting-up of the euro currency.
Institutes members of EUREN are :
- Coe-Rexecode, Paris
- Centro de Prediccion Economica (CEPREDE), Madrid
- KEPE - Centre of Planning and Economic Research, Athens
- Kopint-datorg, Budapest
- Oxford Economic Forecasting (OEF), Oxford
- Ref., Ricerche per l'economia e la finanza, Milano
- Rheinisch-Westfälischens Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung (RWI), Essen
The main aims of this cooperation are:
- to take a stance on economic topics of common interests, through specific
publications. The existence of a network enables the results to be widely
circulated ;
- to facilitate the exchange of expertise within the network by organising
conferences and by publishing the studies on each institution's website,
while reinforcing interaction between those websites ;
- to initiate common research studies, or to take part in bids from large
international organisations.
Until 2006, Euren published a report on the economic outlook in Europe
twice a year. From 2007, the Euren network has produced a bimonthly
newsletter on the economic situation in Europe. Euren initiated a structural
studies series in April 2008.
This report has been prepared for the European Industry Day under the
French Presidency of the European Union. It has been written by Euren
teams and coordinated by Alain Henriot.
Content
Introduction .................................................................................3
Industry in Europe: main trends and challenges.....................5
1. Industry in Europe: facts and figures .......................................................6
2. Main challenges for the future ...............................................................20
Conclusion .................................................................................................26
On the export performance of German industry:
What lessons for the Euro area ?.............................................29
1. Regional and product specialisation.....................................................31
2. Real effective exchange rate and price competitiveness ......................34
3. How companies react?..........................................................................37
4. Conclusion: What lessons for the Euro area?.......................................39
The effects of globalisation on the European Industry:
measurement attempts and policy implications.....................41
1. Globalisation: general remarks.............................................................41
2. EU restructuring effects........................................................................46
3. Strategic and policy implications .........................................................53
European enlargement:
a challenge for the Greek industry ..........................................61
1. Manufacturing industry in Greece: recent trends .................................62
2. The manufacturing structure reflected in the structure of trade ...........63
Conclusion................................................................................................73
1
2
Introduction
Alain Henriot1
Coe-Rexecode, Paris
During the last decades, the European manufacturing industry has
faced several shocks. In early seventies and eighties, oil shocks have
taken their toll on global economic growth and have led to rethink the
production process in order to be less intensive in energy. Midnineties have been characterised by the information and
communication technology revolution that has had among other
consequences a positive impulse in productivity gains (even if it was
more pronounced in the U.S. than in Europe) and a higher facility to
diversify the locations of production. Associated to the deregulation of
domestic markets and liberalisation of international capital flows, it
has given birth to what is commonly named globalisation. Finally,
since the beginning of the century, tougher environmental constraints
and a strong rise in raw material prices have been new challenges for
the European industry.
Because of all those changes, the European manufacturing industry
has had to adapt to a changing world. In particular, the emergence of
new competitors, like China, has redistributed cards among the
industrial world. New comers have challenged traditional
manufacturing specialisation of historic European countries.
Therefore, European manufacturing companies have had to adapt their
products and their process of production continuously, as historical
comparative advantages cannot be considered anymore as a guaranty
of success for the future.
As manufacturing companies were more and more under competitive
pressure, the role of industry has a key driver of global economy has
been questioned. True, the increasing share of services in Western
economies has mechanically reduced the share in industry. In the
European Union (EU), just one fifth of value-added is generated by
industry, and this sector employs around 17% of the total persons
employed.
However, industry remains a key sector for productivity and
innovation, with spill-over effects on the rest of the economy: 80% of
EU private sector research and development expenditures are spent in
1
[email protected]
3
Introduction
the manufacturing industry. In the last ten years2, gross value-added
per hour worked has increased by 33% in the manufacturing industry,
compared to 18% for the whole economy. Of course, this spread in
productivity gains can be partly explained by the externalisation of
some activities from manufacturing companies to contractors in the
services sector (e.g. accounting, cleaning or computers maintenance).
But as a major driver of productivity, industry appears as a key driver
of potential output. Therefore, it will be a mistake to think that Europe
can continue to thrive without a strong industry.
In this context, this report focuses first on main trends and challenges
for the European industry. This overview is then illustrated by more
specific considerations on crucial factors for the future of the
European industry, partly inspired by national experiences.
2
1995-2005, EU-25, source EU KLEMS database.
4
Industry in Europe: main trends and challenges
Alain Henriot3
Coe-Rexecode, Paris
Even though the service sector represents a growing and dominant
share in the European economy, manufacturing industry remains of
major importance. It remains an essential pillar for innovation and
productivity growth, therefore a key element of the competitiveness of
European economy.
The Lisbon agenda has identified three top priorities to strengthen
economic growth and increase employment (European Commission,
2005):
-
Making Europe a more attractive place to invest and work;
Putting knowledge and innovation at the heart of European
growth;
Shaping policies to allow businesses to create more and better
jobs.
It is clear that manufacturing industry plays a key role in reaching
those goals. In the communication of the Commission mentioned
above it is clearly indicated that “the main role of industrial policy is
to provide the right framework conditions for enterprise development
and innovation in order to make the EU an attractive place for
industrial investment and job creation.”
In the context of globalisation, Europe is increasingly facing
competition as a location for production, employment, investment and
even research-development. Moreover, rapid changes in technology
require a higher flexibility of EU manufacturing companies to offer
new products and to adapt their production processes.
In the first part of this paper, we give a picture of main stylised facts
of the European industry. Then, the question of challenges ahead is
addressed.
3
[email protected]
5
1. Industry in Europe: facts and figures
Main trends in the European industry are described, before identifying
strengths and weaknesses of the European industry on world markets.
1.1. Main trends in the European industry
1.1.1. Is Europe suffering from a disindustrialisation?
It is often mentioned that Europe is facing a risk of
disindustrialisation, notably because of a relocation of industrial
activities in low wages emerging countries. We are wondering here if
hard figures confirm those fears.
Actually, during the last decades, three main trends characterised the
European industry4.
Graph 1
EU-15 Share of manufacturing industries in the total economy
30
%
26
VA (current euros)
VA (1995 euros)
Total of persons engaged
Hours worked
22
18
14
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
Sources: EU Klems, Eurostat, author's calculations
First, the share of manufacturing industry in the total economy in
terms of value added expressed in current euros is declining. While
the share of manufacturing industry in total value added reached 25%
in early 1970’s, it dropped to 16.5% in 2007.
4
In this part, we focus on figures regarding EU-15. A wider definition of Europe, EU-27
for example, raises the question of long-term comparison.
6
However, a more favourable view is given when the weight of
industry is measured in constant prices or in other words in volume
terms5. If it reached 23.5% in early 1970’s, it was just one-fifth
(19.5%) in 2007, and this share was almost constant in the last ten
years. This means that the relative price of manufactured goods
declined markedly during this period.
A third element that characterised the European manufacturing
industry over the last years is the reduction of the share of
manufacturing industry in total employment. It was nearly halved in
the last thirty years, from 28% in 1970 to 15% in 2007. One
explanation could be the increasing number of part time jobs in the
service sector, but the decline of the share of manufacturing industry
is also observed in terms of hours worked, so that this argument is not
valid for Europe. On the contrary, this argument is probably valid in
the U.S. where a large discrepancy appeared over the years between
the average working time in the manufacturing industry and in the
total economy. Moreover, it can be noticed that the number of hours
worked per person in the manufacturing industry is much higher in the
U.S. than in Europe.
Graph 2
Hours worked by person engaged
2000
1900
EU-15 Total
EU-15 Manufacturing
USA Total
USA Manufacturing
1800
1700
1600
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
Sources: EU Klems, Eurostat, author's calculations
5
By construction, the relative share of manufacturing industry in the total economy is the
same in current value or in constant price the base year, here 1995. Therefore, the analysis
must not be focused on the level itself of the share of manufacturing industry in the total
economy, but on its trend over the time period.
7
Of course, the downward trend in the share of manufacturing industry
in total employment is partly explained by the externalisation of
activities by manufacturing companies, like cleaning or accountancy.
This translated into a contraction of employment in manufacturing
companies compensated by an increase in the services sector. But the
decline of the number of employees in the manufacturing industry
reflects also productivity gains. On average, productivity gains have
been much stronger in manufacturing industries than in the rest of the
economy. For EU-15, the long-term average (1970-2007) of the
annual growth rate of productivity (value-added in volume terms per
hour worked) reached 3.4% in the manufacturing industries compared
to 2.3% for the total economy. Productivity growth has been globally
maintained over the years, and has even accelerated since 2000, while
on the opposite it has slowed down markedly in the rest of the
economy (3.5% between 2000 and 2007 in manufacturing activities
against 1.3% for the total economy).
Graph 3
EU-15 Value-added per hour worked (in volume terms)
Total
160
Manufacturing industries
1995=100
140
Annual growth rate (%)
8
7
120
6
100
5
80
4
3
60
2
1
40
0
70 75 80 85 90 95 00 05 10
70
75
80
85
90
95
00
05
10
Source: EU Klems, Eurostat, author's calculations
This gap can be explained by two elements. Firstly, the externalisation
of some activities by manufacturing companies is a source of
discrepancy in productivity gains between manufacturing industries
and the services sector. Secondly, the acceleration in productivity
gains in the manufacturing industries is also the consequence of a
more intensive use of information and telecommunications
8
technologies. However, those changes were less favourable than in the
U.S., where the acceleration was much more pronounced in the mid1990’s, while productivity growth in manufacturing industries grew
almost at the same rate in the U.S. and in Europe in the 1970’s and in
the 1980’s.
Graph 4
Value-added per hour worked (in volume terms)
190
1995=100
160
140
120
100
EU-15 Total
EU-15 Manufacturing
USA Total
USA Manufacturing
80
60
40
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
In turn, those productivity gains explain the reduction of the relative
prices in manufacturing products, compared to the rest of the
economy.
Graph 5
EU-15 Manufacturing industries: value added relative price
115
1995=100
110
105
100
95
90
85
80
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
9
1.1.2. The European manufacturing industry and its competitors
As mentioned above, the share of manufacturing industry in the total
economy was almost stable in the last ten years when it is measured in
constant prices. In other words, the value added generated by the
manufacturing industry grew at the same rate than GDP. Between
1970 and 2007, total economy value added for EU-15 increased on
average by 2.5% annually, including a 2% growth for manufacturing
industry. On the most recent period (1995-2007), total economy
annual growth rate was a bit lower (2.3%), and almost stable in the
manufacturing industry (2.1%).
How the European performance can be compared to other countries?
Naturally, one of the most striking stylised facts of the last decade is
the emergence of new competitors producing and exporting
manufactured goods. Therefore, European manufacturing production6
has grown at a lower rate than world industrial production since the
beginning of the 1990’s. However, the gap between Europe on the one
brand and Japan or the U.S. on the other hand has been offset in recent
years. If in the 1990’s, U.S. manufacturing production grew faster
than European production, it has not been the case anymore since the
beginning of the 2000’s.
Graph 6
Industrial production
10
y-o-y %
5
0
USA
EU-27
Japan
World
-5
-10
-15
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
00
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
Source: Global insight
6
Here, we refer to EU-27.
10
Graph 7
Industrial production
20
y-o-y %
10
0
World
Emerging Asia
Eastern Europe
Latin America
Emerging countries
-10
-20
-30
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
00
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
Across the European Union (EU), some differences can be noticed
considering the trend growth of manufacturing production since the
beginning of the 1990’s. Manufacturing production has slightly
decreased in the U.K. since 2000. On the opposite, after an initial
downward adjustment, the integration of new member states (NM) in
the EU has been characterised by a strong acceleration of
manufacturing production. Manufacturing production in the Euro area
grew over the last two decades at the same rate than EU-27
manufacturing production, but at a lower rate than new Member States
(NM). This can be interpreted by a catching-up process of new
Member States, whose on average GDP per capita reached only in
1990 47.1 % of the Euro area. It also means that the localisation of
manufacturing activities has gradually moved eastward with the
enlargement process, attracted by expanding markets and attractive
labour costs.
Across Euro area countries, the growth trends of manufacturing
production have also differed in recent years. After lagging behind
other countries all along the 1990’s, a sharp recovery of German
manufacturing production occurred in the 2000’s. On the opposite,
Italian manufacturing production has almost stagnated in recent years,
while France underperformed relative to the Euro area average. This
gap can be partly explained by discrepancies in the development of
unit labour costs. Some studies have also mentioned the fact that the
11
adoption of the Euro as a single currency might have led to a
concentration of some activities in the geographic centre of the
European Monetary Union, in order to benefit from economies of
scale. Germany would have therefore taken advantage of its
geographic position (de Nardis, de Santis and Vicarelli, 2008).
Graph 8
European Union - industrial production
180
1990=100
160
Euro area
EU-27
UK
NM
140
120
100
80
90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09
Graph 9
Euro area - industrial production
140
1990=100
130
120
110
France
Germany
Italy
Spain
100
90
80
90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09
12
Additionally, it is worth to measure the share of Europe in world
manufacturing industries. This can be done through two main
approaches, relying firstly on exports and secondly on value-added.
The following table describes main trends in manufacturing activities
over the last ten years. Regarding exports, Europe has succeeded in
the most recent period to consolidate its market shares. It is true when
EU-15 is considered as well as EU-27, and it is also true when intraregional trade is excluded. This is essentially due to the sharp
improvement in German export performance7. Considering valueadded, things are a bit different. The share of Europe decreased in the
first half of the 2000’s, mainly because an impressive increase of the
share of China in word manufacturing value-added that doubled in the
last ten years. Interestingly, it must also be noticed that the share of
Europe fell below the U.S. share, while it was above in mid-1990’s. A
specific country approach also shows that it terms of value-added, the
German performance is less impressive then in terms of exports. This
supports the idea that Germany sells the world products that are not
fully produced in the country, what Sinn (2003) described as the
bazaar economy.
Table 1
Share in world manufacturing exports and value-added
GROUP COUNTRY
Manufactured Exports
(share in %)
1995
2000
2006
MVA (share in %) in
constant 2000 US$
1995
2000
2006
EU-15
43.9
38.9
40.4
25.9
24.2
21.8
EU-15 (excluding intra-EU 15 trade)
23.3
20.9
22.3
-
-
-
France
6.0
5.3
4.8
3.4
3.3
3.0
Germany
12.2
10.2
12.0
7.4
6.8
6.3
of which
Italy
5.6
4.6
4.4
4.2
3.6
2.9
Spain
2.0
2.0
2.1
1.7
1.7
1.6
United Kingdom
5.2
4.8
4.2
4.5
4.0
3.3
45.8
41.3
44.1
27.1
25.6
23.4
EU-27
EU-27 (excluding intra-EU 27 trade)
22.6
19.8
21.0
-
-
-
China
3.6
5.7
11.7
5.1
6.7
10.6
USA
11.9
13.1
9.3
24.5
26.7
25.1
Japan
11.7
Sources: Cepii-Chelem database and UNIDO
10.0
7.5
20.4
17.9
15.8
7
See Roland Döhrn and Torsten Schmidt’s paper in this report.
13
1.2 Strengths and weaknesses of the European manufacturing
industry on world markets
1.2.1. Is there a relocation of manufacturing activities outside
Europe?
Strengths and weaknesses of the European manufacturing industry on
world markets can be examined through the trade channel. This
approach does not give an assessment of the competitiveness of
European manufacturing companies but rather an assessment of the
competiveness of Europe as a place to produce manufactured goods
and employ people.
One fear often mentioned is that Europe becomes less and less
competitive to locate industrial activities, compared to alternative
places especially in emerging countries. If the argument was right, we
should observe a decline in European exports of manufactured goods
and an increase in imports, stemmed by affiliates of European
companies established in emerging markets.
As it can be seen with the series of the graphs below, European
manufacturing imports didn’t grow much faster than exports over the
last fifteen years. The trade surplus measured in dollar terms even
increased. Of course, national stories differ, Germany benefiting since
the beginning of the decade from a large trade surplus while Spain has
suffered from a sharp deterioration of its trade balance, but those data
do not show a global relocation of industrial activities outside Europe.
Graph 10
EU-15 Manufacturing industries - exports and imports
4000000
million of US dollars
2000000
1000000
Exports
Imports
400000
200000
100000
50000
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
Source: Cepii-chelem database
14
Graph 11
EU-15 Manufacturing industries - Trade balance
350000
million of US dollars
300000
250000
200000
150000
100000
50000
0
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
Graph 12
EU-15 Manufacturing industries ratio between exports and imports
1.4
1.3
1.2
1.1
1.0
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
1.2.2. What are the main comparative advantages of Europe?
To analyse more in details trade data and its implications on the
assessment of the competitiveness of European manufacturing
industry, the concept of revealed comparative advantage (RCA) is
15
traditionally used. To explain trends in trade balance for a given
activity, this type of indicator allows to discriminate between the
consequences of macro-economic factors (global activity, exchange
rates …) and specific factors. It can be interpreted as the contribution
of each sector to the global trade balance8. A positive value shows that
the trade balance of a given industry is better than total trade balance,
while a negative value indicates that trade balance is worst for this
industry than for total trade. Therefore, those indicators must be
understood as highlighting relative positions and not absolute
situations.
Those indicators give a view of the international specialisation of
Europe at an aggregated level. Mechanical engineering and chemical
industries are in a position of comparative advantage. Textiles, nonferrous metals and electronics are below the average.
Graph 13
EU-15 Revealed Comparative advantages - °/oo GDP
15
°/oo
15
°/oo
Chemicals
Machinery
10
10
5
5
0
0
-5
Textiles
Wood paper
Iron & steel
Non ferrous
-10
-5
Vehicles
Electrical
Electronic
-10
65 70 75 80 85 90 95 00 05 10
65 70 75 80 85 90 95 00 05 10
On a more detailed basis, various types of products can be classified
according to their level of comparative advantage revealed by the
observation. By construction, the average for all industries is null, so
that there are necessary some industries in positive situation and
others in negative situation. Specialised machines, pharmaceutical
products, engines and cars in a position of comparative advantage.
8
For a detailed presentation, see http://www.cepii.fr/francgraph/bdd/chelem.htm.
16
Textiles, computers, consumer electronics goods are in a negative
situation.
Table 2
Comparative advantages of Europe (EU-15) by products (2006, °/oo of GDP)
Comparative advantages above the
average
Specialised machines
Pharmaceuticals
Engines
Cars and cycles
Plastic articles
Miscellaneous hardware
Toiletries
Commercial vehicles
Construction equipment
Precision instruments
All industries
Source: Cepii-Chelem database
3.95
3.60
2.73
2.48
2.03
2.00
1.78
1.75
1.72
1.46
0
Comparative advantages below the
average
Clockmaking
Ships
Carpets
Miscellaneous manuf. articles
Leather
Non ferrous metals
Consumer electronics
Knitwear
Clothing
Computer equipment
-0.21
-0.27
-0.37
-0.60
-0.76
-1.76
-1.82
-1.89
-1.91
-3.19
The table above allows to identify main industrial activities in which
Europe has a comparative advantage in world competition. For the
future, it should also lead to raise two series of questions. Firstly, what
kind of changes those industries are going to know in the coming
years in terms of competitors, product mix and process of production?
Subsequently, this should lead to ask what kind of advantages can
offer Europe to attract world investors in those industries?
It must be mentioned that international specialisation must not be
appreciated only by industries, but also by stages of production. This
division of labour is therefore organised using the main assets of the
different countries: products are assembled in countries where labour
costs are low, while more developed economies focus on activities
with higher content in high skill labour. Secondly, the countries or
regions specialisation must not be considered only across products or
across industries, but also across varieties. Recent studies on very
detailed databases show that Europe9 is specialised on up-range
markets and has succeeded in recent years to keep its market shares in
the upper market (Fontagné, Gaulier and Zignago, 2008).
9
In this study, Europe refers to EU-25.
17
Graph 14
World market shares (intra-EU excluded) for standard manufactured goods,
by market segment (1995 and 2004, percent)
Source: Fontagné, Gaulier, Zignago, 2008
1.2.3. Exchange rate and competitive position of Europe
Competitiveness can be assessed either by the results (market shares)
or by underlying factors. Price competitiveness in the short run can be
strongly affected by exchange rates movements.
Graph 15
Exchange rates
1.6
1 € = ... $
1.4
350
300
1 € = ... ¥
250
1.2
200
1.0
150
0.8
0.7
100
79 81 83 85 87 89 91 93 95 97 99 01 03 05 07 09
13
1 € = ... yuan
79 81 83 85 87 89 91 93 95 97 99 01 03 05 07 09
0.85
1 € = ... £
0.75
7
5
0.65
3
2
0.55
1
0.50
79 81 83 85 87 89 91 93 95 97 99 01 03 05 07 09
79 81 83 85 87 89 91 93 95 97 99 01 03 05 07 09
18
Over the last years, the appreciation of the Euro has constituted a
brake in export developments of the Euro area members, although
some countries have succeeding in counterbalancing this disadvantage
by other factors, especially Germany.
Graph 16
Export performances *
130
Volume index, 2005=100
125
120
USA
Japan
Euro area
115
110
105
100
95
95
96
97
98
99
00
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
Source: Coe-Rexecode
* Exports / world demand
Regarding hourly labour costs in the manufacturing sectors, the
position of the Euro area has recently substantially worsened in the
wake of the appreciation of the Euro.
Graph 17
Hourly labour costs
Manufacturing industries
120
Euro area=100
100
80
USA
Japan
UK
60
40
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Source: Eurostat
19
The same trend appears when unit labour costs are considered
although at a lower extent, the efforts made by Euro area countries to
control unit labour costs having been offset by exchange rates
changes.
Graph 18
Unit labour costs (in dollar terms)
140
1990=100
120
100
80
USA
Japan
Korea
Taiwan
EU *
60
40
20
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
Source: BLS
* EU=Belgium, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Netherlands, Spain, U.K.
2. Main challenges for the future
If the European industry has given signs of resilience in recent years,
it faces many challenges ahead. According to a recent UNCTAD
survey, transnational corporations FDI are very attracted by Asia for
their foreign direct investment (FDI) in manufacturing industries, due
to expanding markets and competitive labour costs. Europe suffers
from a low ranking. By comparison, Western Europe benefit from a
better ranking in the services sector, in line with the necessity to be
close to markets for many of those activities.
20
Table 3
Attractiveness of regions for FDI
in the manufacturing and services sector 2007-2009
(percent of responses)
Host region
Manufacturing
Services
50
4
10
12
3
10
2
3
5
100
28
7
2
11
7
12
4
3
26
100
South, East and South-East Asia
New EU-12
Latin America
North America
Other developed countries
South-East Europe and CIS
Sub-Saharian Africa
West Asia
Western Europe
World
Source : UNCTAD
Of course, this kind of survey must be taken cautiously. It would be
necessary to confront it with hard data. However, it is well known that
in balance of payment statistics a large part of FDI is made by
holdings. This is why sectoral comparisons of FDI are not reliable, as
this leads to underestimate the weight of FDI in the manufacturing and
services sector.
Higher transportation costs in the wake of energy price hike or an
economic downturn in emerging countries might alleviate the
competitive pressure for Europe. However, this kind of prospects
highlights clearly a threat for the European manufacturing industry,
implying clearly joint reactions of public authorities and of the private
sector.
Four main future challenges are mentioned hereafter: business
environment, education, research-development and environmental
policy.
2.1. A friendly environment for business
Business environment does not concern of course only manufacturing
industry. Nevertheless, facing many changes in terms of markets,
competitors, regulations, European manufacturing companies have to
adapt quickly to this changing environment. Indeed, reactivity can be
considered as a key of success in a changing world.
This raises the question of the aim of industrial policies. In the 1970’s,
this concept was understood as the responsibility of public
administrations to identify strategic activities and to undertake
medium term programs to encourage the development of those
21
activities as well as to provide aid and protection for industries
regarding as strategic. Nowadays, industrial policy has probably to be
rethought. Its role might be to provide the appropriate framework for
enterprises in order to make Europe an attractive location for
manufacturing activities in terms of investment and job creations. A
clear distinction can be made between sector-specific industrial
policies and horizontal industrial policies (EEAG, 2008).
This can include several intermediate goals, both at the national and at
the European level. For instance, over the last years, several European
countries have undertaken structural reforms to make more flexible
their labour markets. Another key element regarding the location of
industrial activities inside Europe is to maintain a fair competition
between countries and to avoid any kind of distortions (tax system,
trade barriers …) that can prevent an optimal distribution of resources.
This is clearly a condition of the sustainability of the existence of the
European single market. A typical topic to be discussed at the
European level regards foreign commercial policy. It must be oriented
towards a clear strategy of reciprocity of openness of third markets. If
accessibility by non EU companies to the European market must be
encouraged, it must be balanced by an easy access to third markets for
European companies. Another crucial issue to be debated at the
European concerns intellectual property rights, which are a factor of
competitiveness.
It is also vital for European companies to have a visibility of the
business conditions in the medium term. For instance, if new
environmental rules have to be implemented, the time schedule of
those changes has to be well known. It can be very costly and
counterproductive for European firms to have to adapt to ever
changing rules of the games.
2.2 Education: a key of success
In the current context, it appears clearly that Europe cannot compete
with other places for job creations in some industrial activities because
of the gap of labour costs. What is true today for historic European
industrial countries can also become rapidly true for new Member
States as their labour market is often rather tight and as immigration
has increased the scarcity of labour force for some specific skills.
In order to remain competitive, Europe has therefore to build other
assets. Education is naturally a key element. Because of the financial
bubble on the first half of the 2000’s, many young students have been
22
attracted by financial industries. It has contributed to the difficulty for
manufacturing companies to hire young talented engineers.
More generally, industrial European companies need skilled workers
at all levels –workers, supervisors, engineers- to answer to the creation
of ever more complex and innovative products. This is also a
fundamental element to help European industrial companies to
increase service offering and to offer customised solutions. It can be a
key of success to resist to the waves of mass products provided by
emerging countries.
Indeed, the main risk for Europe would be to become non competitive
compared to low labour costs countries, but not to be able to meet
technical requirements coming from the most developed competitors
(the U.S. and Japan).
2.3. Boosting research and innovation
In the context of the emergence of new competitors, it is widely
admitted that research and innovation can allow to keep the
technological leadership and thus to compensate costs handicaps of
companies operating in Europe. The question is how to favour
research activity, especially in manufacturing industry that
concentrates 80% of EU private sector R&D expenditures. In 2007,
EU-27 gross domestic expenditure on R&D performed by industry
totalled U.S. $ 167 billions on PPP basis against 61.7 billions in China
and 107.2 billions in Japan, but compared to 240.9 billions in the U.S.
Moreover, EU-27 accounted for 29% in triadic patent families in
200510, a bit less than the U.S. (31.4%) and Japan (29.8%).
For some activities, differentiation of products, supplying of niches
are crucial for business and competitiveness. In this context,
innovation of products and processes are as important as fundamental
researches to remain a key player. R&D activities have therefore to be
oriented towards applied researches, even though fundamental and
academic research remains key elements for the future. It means that
enterprises have to be considered as key players for innovation.
For some activities, economies of scale require probably to foster
European enterprises co-operation in order to meet global
requirements. In the past, aeronautics and spatial activities have given
a good example of such co-operation. It does not mean than it should
10
This statistic Includes only OECD countries.
23
translate into mergers of European companies but this type of cooperation should be rather based on alliances. For instance, some car
producers have already co-operated on the development of engines,
without capitalistic linkages.
In this context, public-private partnership must be encouraged. Of
course, it can take the form of tax incentives. In order to encourage
transnational co-operation, it could be also implemented at a European
level. Public-private partnership can also take the form of deeper cooperation between universities and enterprises. Fundamental research
undertaken should also be followed by innovation of private
enterprises in order to meet demand criteria.
2.4. Threats and opportunities due to the environmental policy
Environmental issues have been placed at the heart of political and
societal preoccupation in recent years. It covers a wide range of
aspects like global warming and more widely durable development.
Regarding, the greenhouse gas emissions Europe can be classified as
the good student compared to other regions. In 2005, EU-27
represented 12% of world emissions, less than China. Moreover,
European emissions were lower in 2005 than in 1990, although it
slightly increased in the first half of the decade. This can be compared
to a strong increase in BRIC’s11.
Table 4
Greenhouse gas emissions (Gt eq. CO2)
France
EU27
USA
Canada
Japan
China
India
Brazil
Russia
World
1990
1995
2000
2005
0.5
5.4
6.3
0.6
1.2
3.9
1.6
1.2
3.1
34.4
0.5
5.1
6.6
0.7
1.3
5.0
1.8
1.2
2.2
35.3
0.5
5.0
7.2
0.7
1.4
5.2
2.2
1.8
2.2
39.0
0.6
5.2
7.3
0.7
1.4
7.5
2.4
1.9
2.2
43.3
Source: IEA
European environmental policy aims therefore at being exemplar in
order to encourage other countries to adopt a comparable
11
Brazil, Russia, India and China.
24
environmental regulation. If it remains an isolated policy, it will not
have a strong impact on global environmental conditions and could
also be a source of weaker competitiveness of Europe as a location for
manufacturing activities.
This gives some guides for environmental and industrial European
policies. The additional cost derived from environmental constraints
and regulations must be shared at the world level. Otherwise, it could
lead to a relocation of activities in places where environmental
regulations are weaker than in Europe. It also raised a very tough
question which is the control of environmental labels for products
consumed in Europe. For finished goods, the question can be solved
rather easily. But when environmental constraints concern the
production process and not the finished product itself (for instance in
chemical industries), this raises the question of how controlling the
compatibility of the process used outside the Union? Otherwise, goods
might be imported from countries with a low level of environmental
regulation that are translated into lower production costs.
On the other hand, environmental constraints can also be an
opportunity for European companies. It will imply the apparition of
new technologies, in which Europe must get a comparative advantage
to be a key player on those markets. In this way, it can transform a
constraint into an opportunity. Of course, in a world characterised by a
relative scarcity of raw material, and consequently by higher prices,
the use of technologies less intensive in energy can also be a source of
competitiveness.
Graph 19
Raw material prices *
650
1973=100
400
200
Brent
Industrial raw materials
100
60
40
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
Source: IMF et Global insight
* deflated by French consumer prices
25
Conclusion
Several scenarios can be imaged for the future of the European
manufacturing industry.
In a gloomy scenario, competition of emerging economies (China,
India, Brazil, …) leads to a shrinking of industrial activities in Europe.
In this scenario, GDP growth would be probably substantially reduced
as business services activities would also diminished and more
generally the purchasing power of European people because of spill
over and multiplier effects on employment. Some countries have
succeeding in keeping honourable economic growth despite difficulty
in the industry sector. But they have benefited from the emergence of
other activities (financial industry in the U.K., oil industry in Norway)
that cannot be replicate at the level of a region like Europe.
However, Europe has in hands the tools to avoid this gloomy scenario.
Risks and constraints rising from past trends developments have been
clearly identified in the first part of the paper. The comparative
advantages of Europe are going to be more and more challenged in the
future, in upper markets by the U.S. and Japan and in lower markets
by emerging countries. However, Europe can face this intensifying
competition through different channels:
-
Answering to niche markets in advanced industrial activities
(mechanical engineering, up range textiles, pharmaceutical
products …);
-
Focusing in high value added activities in which Europe has or
can develop a technological leadership (energy saving engines
for cars and aircrafts, chemical products …);
-
Developing a fruitful co-operation between European historic
industrial countries and new EU members by extending what has
been done by German companies (outsourcing of input) at the
image of Japan with other Asian countries.
It should be the main goal for a European industrial policy to give
opportunities for enterprises to face those new challenges in order to
keep a competitive European manufacturing industry in the coming
years.
26
References
De Nardis S., R. De Santis and C. Vicarelli (2008), “The Single Currency’s Effects
on Eurozone Sectoral Trade: Winners and Losers?”, Economics Discussion
Papers,
No
2008-1
http://www.economicsejournal.org/economics/discussionpapers/2008-1.
EEAG (2008), Europe in A Globalised World.
European Commission (2005), Implementing the Community Lisbon Programme:
A policy framework to strengthen EU manufacturing – towards a more
integrated approach for industrial policy?, COM (2005) 474, October.
Fontagné L., G. Gaulier and S. Zignago (2008), “Specialisation across
varieties and North-South competition", Economic Policy 23(53),
pp51-91.
Sinn H.W. (2003), “4,5 Millionen Verlierer", Die Zeit, December 28.
27
28
On the export performance of German
industry: What lessons for the Euro area ?
Roland Döhrn and Torsten Schmidt12
RWI Essen
Since 2001, when its exchange rate reached a historic low, the Euro
appreciated considerably against the Dollar. It is plausible that this
had a dampening effect on Euro area exports. However, despite of the
fact that the exchange rate is the same for all Euro area members,
some countries seem have done better than others. This is particularly
true for Germany. Whereas in 2007 total exports of the Euro area to
the rest of the world were 50% above their 2000 level, German
shipments to countries outside the Euro area surpassed it by almost
70% up (graph 1). This implies that non-German exports increased by
only 40% between 2000 and 2007. Of course, exchange rates also left
their trace in the German export performance. In 2003 as well as in
2007, when the appreciation of the Euro has been particularly strong,
German exports stagnated more or less. In the U.S. market even a fall
in exports was recorded. Nevertheless, Germany seems to have
suffered less from the Euro appreciation than other Euro area
countries did.
Graph 1
Extra-Euro area exports
180
2000=100, seasonally adjusted
160
Germany
Euro area excluding Germany
140
120
100
80
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
Source: Eurostat, Deutsche Bundesbank
12
[email protected], [email protected]
29
What lessons for the Euro erea ?
In the following, we try to explain why German exports have been so
robust compared to the rest of the Euro area. To do so, several factors
have to be taken into consideration. First of all, the composition of
world trade growth might have favoured German exporters. In this
context, regional factors as well as the product structure may have
played a role. A positive regional effect means that markets to which
German linkages traditionally are particularly close grew faster than
other markets. A product structure effect would come into play, if the
demand for goods which Germany is specialised on has grown faster
than the demand for other products. We will come to these factors in
the first section of our paper.
Secondly, the price competitiveness has to be considered. It could
have increased in Germany compared to other Euro area countries.
Companies may take several measures to enhance their
competitiveness. Raising labour productivity – e.g. by intensifying
capital intensity – is one option, reducing labour shares another;
streamlining the entire value added chain – e.g. by increasing supplies
from low cost countries – a third one. Whatever measure is taken, if
companies are more successful in doing so than their competitors, it is
aimed to bring about a real depreciation which can – at least partially
– compensate a nominal appreciation, or amplify a nominal
depreciation. Price competitiveness and its sources are in the focus of
the second part of this paper.
As a third reason, the reaction of companies to exchange rate changes
must be considered. Of course, their possibilities to react are linked to
the products they exports as well as to their technological capabilities.
However, reactions will differ. Whereas medium sized companies, for
which market entry costs are high often, are inclined to defend their
market position abroad by lowering their export price or offering
additional benefits to their customers, large multinational companies
might switch their production between locations to circumvent the
consequences of exchange rate variations. Skill intensity of production
can also make a difference. Exporters needing highly qualified
personnel will take all measures to hold their staff to avoid future
hiring and qualification costs when the export conditions will have
improved. Our third section will focus on the behaviour of German
exporters and their competitors in other Euro area countries.
30
1. Regional and product specialisation
As a first aspect, the regional specialisation of exports will be
examined. Comparing the directions of extra-Euro area trade between
Germany and the other Euro area countries, some clear differences
appear. Firstly, German exporters concentrate more on Eastern
Europe, where economies grow stronger. In 2000, which serves as a
starting point of the further calculations, the new member states had a
share of 13.8% in Germany non-Euro area exports compared to 7.6%
in the rest of the Euro area. Also Russia received a higher share (2.0%
vs. 1.6%). Secondly, also in the fast growing Asian countries, German
exporters were more active, although the picture is somewhat more
mixed. China attracted 2.8% of German exports, but only 1.7% of the
other Euro area member’s shipments. For the other Asian countries,
the differences are less pronounced, and in India Germany even is an
underperformer. On the other hand, also the United States’ importance
as an export destination is greater Germany than in the Euro area.
Hence, it is not quite clear whether differences in the regional export
patterns were beneficial for Germany. Therefore, we try to isolate the
regional factor, by weighting the import development of the main
trading partners by their share in the German respectively in the Euro
area (less Germany) exports in the year 2000. The figures thus
calculated can be interpreted as hypothetical trade which would have
been realised if only the regional structure of global trade had changed
and the market shares would have been remained the same between
2000 and 2006. They show that Germany indeed benefitted somewhat
from the shifts in global trade, but the total effect was rather small
(graph 2).
31
Graph 2
Regional factor in exports *
150
2000=100
140
130
Germany
Euro area except Germany
120
110
100
90
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
Source: Authors' calculations.
* Growth in the most important export markets weighted with the share
of the markets in total exports in 2000
As a next step, the product pattern of trade is considered. Two
indicators calculated by UNCTAD may shed some light on the
differences in the composition of exports between Germany and other
Euro area members. The first is a diversification index measuring how
strong the export pattern of a country on the product level deviates
from the global pattern. The second is a specialisation index
measuring the width of the export pattern, i.e. how many products
contribute to total exports.
Table 1
Diversification and specialisation of the exports of Euro area countries
Diversification index1
Specialisation index2
1995
2000
2006
1995
2000
2006
Germany
0.273
0.282
0.285
0.077
0.096
0.089
France
0.257
0.279
0.300
0.059
0.076
0.079
Italy
0.348
0.375
0.385
0.055
0.055
0.054
Spain
0.358
0.361
0.362
0,142
0.132
0.106
Netherlands
0.345
0.348
0.378
0.058
0.083
0.088
Belgium
0.370
0.350
0.372
0.102
0.088
0.105
Austria
0.378
0.361
0.337
0.078
0.065
0.072
Portugal
0.489
0.449
0.426
0.105
0.106
0.088
Finland
0.526
0.539
0.455
0.204
0.240
0.175
Ireland
0.561
0.583
0.673
0.170
0.239
0.233
Greece
0.606
0.545
0.509
0.108
0.123
0.120
Source: UNCTAD – 1The diversification index measures, how strong the countries export pattern
deviates from the global export patter. It may take values between 0 and 1. The lower the index is, the
higher is the similarity in patterns. – 2The specialisation index measures the scope of the export
pattern: it is standardized between 0 and 1. The lower the index is, the more products are exported by
a country.
32
As table 1 indicates, Germany export pattern shows the smallest
deviation from the global pattern among the Euro area countries,
except of France, which showed a lower indicator in the 1990s.
However, whereas the French pattern exhibited an increasing
dissimilarity with the global pattern, the index for Germany changed
only a little. At the same time the specialisation is relatively low,
although not as low as in Italy and France. Taking the two indicators
together we conclude that Germany seems to offer a relatively broader
scope of products which match quite well the pattern of global
demand.
Furthermore, it is worthwhile looking at the technology content of
German exports as an additional indicator for the strengths of the
German export relative to the Euro area. It is often argued that
Germany’s record in the field of high-tech products is rather poor.
Indeed, competitiveness in the international trade – measured by the
revealed comparative advantage (RCA index) – in this field is worse
for Germany than for the U.S. and the UK, but among the Euro area
members also in France (table 2). But at the same time Germany
shows an excellent performance in the field of high-standard applied
technology. Among the countries considered here, only Japan displays
better data.
Table 2
Competitiveness in the international trade with R&D-intensive products (RCA index)
Top-level technology
2000
Germany
-30
France
18
Italy
-73
UK
13
USA
39
Japan
-38
OECD import share
21,8%
Source: Döhrn, Engel, Stiebale, 2008.
2005
-37
4
-75
30
46
-43
17,8%
High standard applied
technology
2000
2005
29
27
13
6
-30
-27
10
7
-4
2
69
63
36,1%
38,9%
The bottom line of table 2 indicates the importance of the two
segments of R&D-intensive products for total OECD imports.
Whereas top level technology goods make up the smaller part of the
OECD market, with their market share decreasing over time, applied
technology goods form the more important segment, the importance of
which is on the rise.
In a recent study, Danninger and Joutz (2007) identified export market
growth as the most important driving force of German exports,
whereas they found no impact of the product specialisation in
investment goods. However, they focused solely in German exports.
33
Our comparative analyses give some indication that Germany at least
in comparison with its European partners could have benefitted from
the changing products pattern in international markets. However, this
effect should not be over-estimated, as the differences between the
Euro area countries seem to be not too strong.
2. Real effective exchange rate and price
competitiveness
As a second aspect explaining German export success
Danninger/Joutz (2007) identify price competitiveness, which can be
measured by the real effective exchange rate (REER). Since 1999,
when the Euro was introduced, differences in the REER between the
Euro area members can only be explained by two factors: firstly, the
regional pattern of external trade may differ; secondly, inflation has
not been the same in all countries. Concerning the first point,
Germany seems to be even in a worse position compared to other Euro
area countries, because the U.S. and the Asian countries belonging to
the Dollar sphere are more important as export destinations. As far as
the second explanation for differences in the REER is concerned,
Germany gained competitiveness due to its low inflation. However,
REERs may differ quite substantially depending on the price index
used as a deflator.
Graph 3
Index of price competitiveness in selected Euro area countries
120
1999Q1=100
115
110
France
Germany
Italy
Spain
105
100
95
90
85
99
00
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
Source: ECB
34
Looking at consumer prices, inflation in Germany was among the
lowest in the Euro area members ever since 1999. The indicator of
price competitiveness, which is calculated by the ECB (2007), also
includes changes in relative prices between the Euro area countries. It
shows its lowest values in Germany (together with Finland which is
not displayed in the graph), indicating high price competitiveness
(graph 3). On the upper end of the graph, Spain can be found, where
inflation was highest. Only Ireland experienced a stronger loss of
competitiveness.
Table 4
Labour cost indicators for the Euro area and for Germany
2001-2007, yoy increase in %
2001
2002
2003
Germany
Euro area
2.0
2.6
2.8
2.7
2.0
2.4
Germany
Euro area
2.4
3.7
2.1
3.5
Germany
0.6
0.6
Euro area
2.3
2.3
Sources: Bundesbank, ECB, Destatis
2004
2005
2006
2007
Negotiated wages
1,2
0,9
2.1
2.1
1,1
2.3
1.2
2.2
2.0
3.2
Hourly labour costs
0.2
0.6
2.5
2.7
1.3
2.5
0.9
2.6
0.8
2.0
Unit labour cost
-0.4
-0.7
1.0
1.0
-1,1
0.8
0.2
1.4
However, consumer prices may be a poor indicator of price
competitiveness in foreign trade. As an alternative, unit labour costs
can be used for calculating REERs. There has been a remarkable wage
moderation in the Euro area as a whole. However, table 4 makes
evident that in Germany wages as well as hourly labour costs
increased at a considerably lower rate. As a consequence, unit labour
costs developed very moderately in the most recent years. Between
2004 and 2006 they even declined.
Unit labour costs are not only influenced by the level of wages, but
also by the amount of labour necessary to produce a good and the cost
structure of the producer. Before the fall of the iron curtain, the local
content of goods produced in the Western Europe was quite high
compared to Japan and the U.S. The latter benefited from low cost
locations in Asia respectively in Central America. In Western Europe,
a comparable hinterland was missing. This situation changed
dramatically when the transformation in Eastern Europe started.
Western European companies established subsidiaries in these
countries with low labour costs and changed their supply chains
accordingly. However, producers in the individual countries reacted
quite differently. In particular in the 1990s, when the new division of
35
labour was developed between the old EU members and the today’s
new members, German investors played the most active role. Between
1995 and 1997, when foreign direct investment (FDI) showed its
strongest increase, about half of the investment originated from
Germany putting the Netherlands in the second and France in the third
place (Döhrn et al. 2001). Hence German companies seem have taken
the opportunity to relocate labour intensive production to Eastern
Europe. Many observers have been very sceptical about investments
in Eastern Europe arguing that workplaces were relocated at the
detriment of Western Europe. Considering the entire value added
chain, also the opposite could be true. Combining cheap labour in a
low wage country with skills in high wage countries may be a way to
maintain the competitiveness of a producer, which otherwise would
have been forced to go out of operation. Micro studies for German
companies show that employment in foreign affiliates and at home are
correlated positively. This suggests that foreign direct investment in
the end may have had a positive impact on home country employment
(Döhrn 2003).
Whatever channel may have worked, REER deflated with unit labour
costs show a very different profile in the large Euro area countries
(graph 4). In Germany, the appreciation of Euro against the dollar
shows no obvious impact on the REER. Between 1999 and 2008 the
relative competitiveness in unit labour cost terms was improved by
15 percentage points. For France, the REER remained more or less
unchanged. Italy and Spain, where unit labour costs increased more
than in the EU average, the competitiveness deteriorated considerably,
even if not as far as the change of the Dollar/Euro rate would have
suggested.
36
Graph 4
Real effective exchange rates in selected Euro area countries
deflated with relative unit labour costs *
110
1999=100
France
Germany
Italy
Spain
105
100
95
90
85
80
99
00
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
Source: Eurostat
* Against 27 countries
3. How companies react?
Even if the factors discussed hitherto would have been equal among
all Euro area countries, export performance could have differed
because exporting companies may have reacted with unlike strategies
to the challenge of an appreciating currency. Such differences may
reflect differences in the commitment to foreign markets. Some have
made investments in a sales network abroad, which as a rule is
associated with high sunk costs. These exporters will make use of any
option to defend their market share abroad. Others, which employ
sales agents or wholesale traders as partners, may stop exporting if the
appreciation smelts down the profits achievable. Of course, also the
technological standard and the quality of the product play a role.
Companies which are market leaders in their segment often are in a
position in which they can sell their products at almost any price. On
the other hand, those providing highly standardised products may
already face strong reaction to small variations in the exchange rate.
Furthermore, size and the extent of globalisation of companies are
important factors. Multinational firms can react to exchange rate
fluctuations by relocating production inside their companies. Small
enterprises mostly have not the choice between different location, and
there have to adjust to an appreciation of the currency by other means.
37
In this context it is worth noting the high importance of small
companies for German exports. The latest Observatory of European
SMEs confirms that the share of exporting manufacturing companies
is quite high in Germany compared to other countries of a comparable
size13. In particular, more companies do relatively high exports. Of
course, in most small countries the export share is even higher. But
these economies are more open in general. However, here “small”
must not only be understood as SMEs, which are defined as
companies with less than 250 employees, but in a global sense. Many
successful exporters in Germany are small in a global perspective.
Table 5
Exporting SMEs in the manufacturing sector
2005, in %
Companies
with exports
Of which export value 1
under 1 mill €
1 - 2 mill €
2 – 5 mill €
Above 5 mill €
Germany
41,2
74.9
7.5
14.2
3.4
France
33.4
92.5
1.3
4.2
2.0
Italy
21.1
82.5
3.3
11.9
2.6
Spain
39.0
90.8
3.4
1.2
4.6
Netherlands
36.6
47.2
12.1
28.4
12.3
Belgium
52.4
31.2
3.1
58.0
7.7
Austria
46.2
67.4
2.0
12.0
8.5
Source: Gallup Organisation. 1In % of the companies reporting exports. Difference to 100% because
of companies not reporting the magnitude of exports
All in all there is some indication that exports are somewhat deeper
rooted in Germany than in other – in particular large – Euro area
countries in the sense that more companies contribute to foreign sales.
This also might have consequences for the way, companies react to
exchange rate changes. In general, they have two options. Firstly, they
may adjust product prices in the export market by the same amount,
i.e. they pass through the exchange rate variation to their customers. In
this case it is likely that higher prices lead to a reduction of demand
and hence to a loss of the market share. Secondly, firms may try to
hold prices in the export markets constant by reducing export prices
denominated in Euro, i.e. they follow a pricing to market strategy.
Which strategy is feasible depends heavily on the intensity of
competition in the export markets, but also, as mentioned above, on
company specific factors.
Empirical studies suggest that German firms neither pass through the
entire exchange rate risk nor do they all follow the pricing-to-market
strategy. However, pricing to market plays an important role (Döhrn
13
In some countries, e.g. in France, the share of total exporting SMEs is higher than in
Germany due to a larger number of exporters in the service sector.
38
and Milton 1999, Stahn 2008). This is in line with recent analyses of
the consequences of exchange rate shocks on the German economy.
They show that after an appreciation of the Euro the export price falls
significantly while no reaction of real exports can be observed. This
result suggests that German firms managed to defend their market
shares. With regard to the discussion above is likely that the ability to
lower export prices was improved by the reduction of unit labour
costs. In particular the wage moderation and shifts of production to
low wage countries during recent years enforced the price
competitiveness of German companies.
4. Conclusion: what lessons for the Euro area?
Contrary to other countries in the Euro area, the German economy
seems to have digested the continued appreciation of the Euro against
the U.S. dollar quite well. This paper suggests that three factors have
contributed to this. Firstly, Germany to some extent was favoured by
the regional profile and the product pattern of the global demand.
However, this effect seems have been not too strong. Secondly, and
more important, German producers obviously were able to improve
their price competitiveness despite of the dollar devaluation. Wage
moderation, which led in some of the recent years even to a decline in
unit labour costs, was one of the driving forces. Another was that
German companies seem to have utilised the chances to establish a
new division of labour with Eastern Europe more offensively than
their competitors in other Euro area countries. Thus, shifting parts of
the product to low wage locations in the end did not cause severe
problems to the German economy but made the value added chain
more profitable and, by that, helped to create workplaces in Germany,
too. A third factor is the pricing behaviour of companies, which here
was touched only cursory in this paper and should be analysed in more
detail. In Germany, exchange rate shocks lead to reactions rather in
export prices than in export quantities. This behaviour is compatible
with the observation that the German export sector is broader based
than in the other large Euro area countries. In particular for smaller
companies, which contribute substantially to German exports, entry
costs are high so that they tend to stabilize their export market share
when exchange rates fluctuate.
What are the lessons for other countries in the Euro area? The most
important message seems to be that in the absence of exchange rates
as an adjustment mechanism, unit labour costs are the decisive factor
for price competitiveness abroad. A second message is, that a broad
based export sector could help to stabilise exports when exchange
39
rates alter. This seems to be true with respect to the range of products
traded as well as concerning the number of companies being active as
exporters. Of course, changing the structure of the export sector is no
policy option for the short run. However, an industrial policy
concentrating on large firms and trying to pick the winners may in the
long run be counterproductive. This is particularly true because
delocalisation of production is for large firms a more realistic option
than for small ones.
References
Danninger S. and F. Joutz (2007), “What Explains Germany’s Rebounding Export
Market Share?”, IMF Working Paper, 07/24.
Döhrn R. (2003), “Investment Abroad and Home Employment in the German
Manufacturing Sector”, In: M. Frenkel and G. Stadtmann (eds,), “Foreign
Direct Investment, Theory, Empirical Evidence and Policy Implications”,
INFER Studies 9. VWF: Berlin, 1-16.
Döhrn R. and A.-R. Milton (1998), “Marktpreise, reale Wechselkurse und
internationale Wettbewerbsfähigkeit”, Untersuchungen des RWI, 24, RWI,
Essen.
Döhrn R., A.-R. Milton and N.A. Radmacher-Nottelmann (2001), “The Impact of
Trade and FDI on Cohesion”, RWI Papiere, 76, RWI, Essen.
ECB (2007), “The introduction of harmonised competitiveness indicators for the
euro area countries”, Monthly Bulletin Feb. 2007, 53-55.
Gallup Organisation (2008), “Observatory of European SMEs. Analytical report”,
Flash Eurobarometer 196.
Stahn K. (2008), “Has the export pricing behaviour of German companies
changed? Empirical evidence from German sectoral export prices”,
Jahrbücher für Nationalökonomie und Statistik 228.
40
The effects of globalisation on the European
Industry: measurement attempts and policy
implications
Julián Pérez
CEPREDE, Madrid
1. Globalisation: general remarks
Economic textbooks define globalisation as a progressive process of
economic integration among countries that is fuelled by growing
movements of production factors (capital and labour) across the
world.
The term “Globalisation” was firstly introduced by Theodore Levitt in
The Globalisation of Markets to describe the transformations that
were observed in the world economy since mid-sixties, so that we
should not refer it as a “new phenomenon”.
Nevertheless, the growing integration process leading by multinational
organisations (IMF, UN, WTO, …) joint with ITC development and
dissemination have accelerated the effects of globalisation and have
brought it into media and stakeholders agenda, generating both
favourable and unfavourable feelings against globalisation.
For a better understanding of globalisation process it is necessary to
look at the huge gaps in per capita income between developed and
developing countries.
According to IMF figures, as they are shown in graph 1, in 2005
average per capita income in developed countries was around
20.000 € while developing countries averages were under 5.000€ for
the same period.
41
Measurement attempts and policy implications
Graph 1
GDP per capita
25000
€ per person
20000
15000
10000
5000
0
GDP per capita
United
States
Eurozone
Japan
Rest
Industriliz
ed
Africa
Eastern
Europe
Middle
East
Latiameri
ca
China
India
Other
asian
countries
Word
average
22971
16129
17821
15720
1364
5026
3616
4558
3294
1793
1971
5166
Source: Own estimation from IMF data.
Looking at figures showed in previous graph it is easy to guess that
these income differences would tend to reduce when interactions
among economies increase, as it happens in communicating vessels
experiments.
Globalisation can be seen as a process where different economies
increase their linkages narrowing their incomes gap.
These linkages between economies, which ease the mobility of
production factors (capital and labour), can be summarized as follows:
-
Transports development easing physic movements of people
and merchandises;
Information networks allowing knowledge shared and remote
working;
Trade agreements, which reduce custom taxes and increase
foreign trade;
Integration process that homogenises regulations and increase
flows of goods, services, capital and labour force.
It is true that none of these elements are new, but it is also true that
some of them (information networks, trade agreements, or integration
process) have experienced relevant advances over last years and this is
one of the reasons behind the recent rise of globalisation.
Additionally it is worth to note that the enter of new big partners in the
world scenario, the so-called “BRICs” (Brazil, Russia, India, China),
has also contributed to accelerate the globalisation process.
42
If we look at the globalisation process as an increasing flow of
production factors between developed and developing economies, the
more visible effects can be summarized in two main concepts:
delocalisation and immigration.
Figure 1
Developed economies
Delocalisation
Developing economies
Capital
Tradable
Goods & Services
No-Tradable Services
and other activities
Goods & services
Industrial
sector
Labor force
Incomes
Services
sector
Immigration
As it is shown in figure 1, delocalisation concept includes capital
flows going from developed economies to industrial activities in
developing economies and flows of goods and services produced in
developing countries that are bought by developing customers.
On the contrary, immigration includes flows of people from
developing countries that offers labour force in non tradable activities
(construction, personal services, …) in developed countries, and flows
of incomes returned to native countries.
Macroeconomic, or aggregated, effects of these two main
consequences of globalisation are quite different in both group of
countries (developed and developing) and while delocalisation process
tend to narrow income gaps, immigration would keep, or even
enlarge, this income spreads.
Tables 1 and 2 summarise the main macroeconomic effects of these
two phenomena.
43
Table 1
Macroeconomic Effects of Delocalisation
Developed countries
Developing countries
Tertiartisation
Industrialisation.
Increasing external financial assets. FDI outflows
Increasing financial liabilities. FDI Inflows
Worsening of trade balance and improvement of
income balance. Exchange rate depreciation.
Improvement of trade balance and worsening of
income balance. Exchange rate appreciation.
Reduction of costs and inflationary pressures.
Increase of wages and inflationary pressures
Employment looses
Employment gains.
Table 2
Macroeconomic Effects of Immigration
Developed countries
Developing countries
Labor force increases
Labor force reduces
Unemployment rates rises
Unemployment rate comes down
Wages remain stable
Wage pressure increases
Potential growth increases
Potential growth reduces
Deterioration in incomes external balance
Improvement in incomes external balance
As it is shown in previous tables, delocalisation as well as
immigration would generate positive and negative effects, both in
developed and developing countries, so the right management of
globalisation should try to minimise the negative impacts and
maximise the positive ones.
Focusing on delocalisation process, as the main subject of the present
paper, there are some features that should be pointed out.
A general view of delocalisation includes all kind of total or partial
displacements of production activities from one region to other
looking for higher profitability, so it is a broader concept than the
offshoring one.
Although massive production displacements started in early sixties,
jointly with firm internationalisation process, movements to less
developed countries are relatively new (late 1980’s and early 1990’s)
so the worrying about damaged effects in developed countries is quite
recent.
Delocalisation flows are not restricted to North-South (developed to
developing) movements and it exists significant flows between
developed economies (North-North).
44
Historically, delocalisation was mainly an industrial phenomenon but
last years it has been extended to service activities impelled by ICT
technologies’ development.
Looking at the factors that favour the activities’ localisation, i.e. the
foreign direct investment (FDI), we can observe some recent changes
in investors’ behaviour. Even though receptor economies should still
present an adequate trade-off between supply (production) and
demand factors (local market size, regulation, etc.) some recent
studies have shown that basic supply factors (labour costs, nearness to
commodities, etc.) have become less valuable in favour to supply
advanced factors (labour qualification, technology availability, etc.).
The following table summarises the FDI location factors grouped in
five main categories.
Table 3
FDI Localisation Factors
Groups
Social environment
Factors
Language
Live style and quality
Entrepreneurial culture
Countries historical links
Social sensibility to foreign investor
Supply factor
(basic and advanced)
Physical and environmental factors
Labor force
Infrastructures
Technology availability
Market factors
Local market size
Local market growth
Accessibility to local or neighbor markets
Political and economic
system
Economic stability
Political stability
Trade barriers
Exchange rates
Supra-national integration
Economic Policy
Fiscal policy
Labor market regulations
Source: Muñoz and Guarasa (2002).
All in all, the main forces driven these FDI flows nowadays are an
adequate wage to productivity ratio, agglomeration advantages,
closeness to emerging markets, labour qualification and regulatory
environment.
45
2. EU restructuring effects
After having presented the main outlines about globalisation process
we have tried to collect some empirical evidences on the quantitative
effects of this process in the European Union.
It is worth to note that the analysis of the up cited effects of
globalisation can be rightly performed using aggregate or
macroeconomic data and we should look at microeconomic (firm
level) numbers.
In this point, the European Foundation for the Improvement of Living
Conditions (http://www.eurofound.europa.eu) launched in 2001 an
information resource named European Monitoring Centre on Change
(EMCC) to promote an understanding of how to anticipate and
manage change in the European economy.
One of the objectives of this EMCC is to provide up-to-date news and
analysis on company restructuring in Europe through its European
Restructuring Monitor (ERM)
(http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/emcc/erm/index.php).
As it is stated in its webpage, the European Restructuring Monitor
(ERM) has been monitoring the extent of restructuring activities in
Europe and their employment consequences since 2002. Its
geographic coverage was extended in May 2005 to cover the 27 EU
Member States, plus Norway, and to date 7809 restructuring cases
have been collected.
Supported by an extensive network of correspondents who gather data
through a daily review of national newspapers and specialised
economic press, the ERM is a unique collection of mini-caseexamples (fact sheets) which grows at a rate of approximately 30 new
entries per week and includes all industrial restructuring cases that:
-
affect at least one EU country;
-
entail an announced or actual reduction of at least 100 jobs;
-
or involve sites employing more than 250 people and affecting at
least 10% of workforce;
-
create at least 100 jobs.
46
The ERM allows for the compilation of statistics comparing countries,
sectors and types of restructuring and the identification of relevant
company cases. Drawing on the data collected through the ERM over
the previous three months, an overview report (ERM quarterly)
outlines major European trends in restructuring.
The ERM is also an early warning mechanism for all actors involved
in the process of anticipating and managing change by identifying
sectors and countries that are likely to undergo a phase of severe
restructuring in the short to medium term.
Although we cannot use these numbers as hard statistics because of
collection methodology, in our view they are quite interesting to
analyse the main underlying trends in the restructuring process that we
can link to the effects of globalisation.
A first approach to the ERM statistics show us that the main types of
restructuring that have affected European countries have been
business expansion and internal restructuring, which sum more than
one third of cases each one (table 4).
Table 4
Breakdown of employment effect by type of restructuring
Type of restructuring
Business expansion
Internal restructuring
Bankruptcy / closure
Offshoring /
Delocalisation
Merger / acquisition
Relocation
Outsourcing
Other
Total
# Planned
job
reductions
650
1.920.101
367.914
146.879
109.228
42.484
29.187
9.657
2.626.100
% Planned
# planned
% planned
job reductions job creation job creation
#
Cases
%
Cases
0.02
73.12
14.01
5.59
1.512.711
57.549
1.425
331
91.32
3.47
0.09
0.02
2.721
2.622
1.128
438
36.84
35.50
15.27
5.93
4.16
1.62
1.11
0.37
100
75.513
5.920
395
2.590
1.656.434
4.56
0.36
0.02
0.16
100
235
165
47
29
7.385
3.18
2.23
0.64
0.39
100
Source: ERM. June 2008.
If we look at the employment effects showed in table 4, we could
advance that almost 1 million of jobs would have been lost in the
European Union since 2002 because of this restructuring process,
what means less than 0.5% of average total employment. Obviously,
the main source of job losses is the internal restructuring process,
followed by direct closure and offshoring activities.
47
Going into country specific level, we can analyse the employment
effects of this restructuring process related to total employment level
as it is shown in graph 2.
Graph 2
Employment effects of Restructuring 2002-2008
(% total employment)
6%
5%
4%
3%
2%
1%
0%
-1%
Job reductions
Job creation
Slovakia
Malta
Poland
Czech Republic
Bulgaria
Estonia
Lithuania
Romania
Slovenia
Greece
Cyprus
Latvia
France
Portugal
Spain
Italy
EU-27
Hungary
Austria
Germany
Denmark
Belgium
Ireland
U. Kingdom
Netherlands
Finland
-3%
Sweden
Luxembourg
-2%
Net effect
Source: Own estimation from ERM and Eurostat Data. June 2008.
Looking at the figures showed in graph 2 we can identify at least three
groups of countries with different employment effects:
-
Most affected countries, which includes these countries where
net employment effect is under -0.5% of total employment;
Less affected countries, where net effects are negative but less
than -0.5% of total employment;
Benefited countries, where net employment effects are positive.
The first group is mostly constituted by high-income countries with
the remarkable exception of Hungary where the job expansion effects
have been significantly lower than those registered in the rest of new
members.
In the second group we can find mid-income countries from former
EU-15 like Portugal, Greece or Spain, plus Italy and France, that is, in
fact, one of the EU-15 members with higher job creation effects (just
Ireland shows higher effects).
The third group includes, as we could expect, new members but not in
a homogeneous intensity. In fact, there are quantitative differences
between one group with Malta, Poland, Czech Republic and
48
Slovaquia, where job creation effects are higher that 3% of total
employment, and a second group where positive job effects are more
limited (less than 2%).
Turning to sectoral analysis we can see that the most affected
activities in absolute terms are post and communication, public sector,
and financial services, that sums more than one million of jobs lost.
(see graph 3).
Graph 3
(Total Jobs)
400 000
300 000
200 000
100 000
0
-100 000
-200 000
-300 000
Job reductions
Job creation
Commerce
Information
Consultancy business
Energy
Hotel, restaurant
Electrical
Hair and beauty care
Education
Maintenance and
Construction and
Health and social
Motor
Agriculture and
Pulp and paper
Performing arts
Glass and cement
Chemical
Publishing and media
Textiles and leather
Extractive industries
Metal and
Food, beverage and
Transport and
Financial services
Post and
-500 000
Public Sector
-400 000
Net effect
Source: Own estimation from ERM data. June 2008
On the positive side in net effects terms we find some high-skills
services like ICT activities, consultancy and business service joint
with commerce.
It is interesting to note that motor is, after retail trade, the second
sector in terms of new jobs created, but it is also one that shows high
job reduction effects, what means, at the end, a slight negative net
effect. Looking at these figures, we could guess that motor activities
have moved form EU-15 to new members without significant losses of
total employment.
In order to analyse the relative sectoral employment effects we have
grouped the ERM sectoral classification into Eurostat standard, and
we have estimated the relative effects related to total employment by
activity.
49
Figures presented in graph 4 show us that the most affected sector has
been mining and quarrying, with almost 7% of employment being
destroyed by restructuring procedures, followed by financial services
and transports and communications, with around 4% of total
employment affected.
Graph 4
Job reductions
Job creation
Energy
Commerce
Other Business
servicies
Hotels and
restaurants
Other social &
personal ser.
Education
Health
Construction
Agriculture
Total
Manufacturing
Public services
Transport and
communication
Mining
5%
4%
3%
2%
1%
0%
-1%
-2%
-3%
-4%
-5%
-6%
-7%
-8%
-9%
Financial
services
(% sector employment)
Net Effect
On the positive side, we can observe that in the energy sector
restructuring operations have created new jobs that represent almost
4% of total sectoral employment.
To finalise this quantitative revision of restructuring operations in the
European Union we have performed some kind of time trend analysis
to investigate their recent evolution.
Graph 5 shows the evolution of employment effects of restructuring
operations as a share of total employment, both in former EU-15 and
the 12 New Members14, as well as EU-27 totals.
14
ERM started to collect information for new members in 2005.
50
Graph 5
Trends in restructuring employment effect
(% total employment)
0.8%
EU-27
0.6%
EU-15
NM-12
0.4%
EU-27 (+)
0.2%
EU-15 (+)
NM-12 (+)
0.0%
EU-27 (-)
EU-15 (-)
-0.2%
NM-12 (-)
-0.4%
-0.6%
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
(Jun.)
The analysis of time evolution showed in previous graph offers us the
following facts:
-
The negative effects on employment have been growing in EU15 since 2002 until 2005, when trends seem to have been
changed, and during 2007 the net effect was slightly positive.
-
On the contrary net employment effects in NM-12 has been
positive since 2005 and has shown upward trend (apart form
uncompleted figures for 2008).
-
At the full UE-27 level, restructuring effects on employment
turned positive last year because of a progressive reduction on
negative effects.
We will finalise this analysis showing some time trend graphs where
sectoral level effects have been represented, grouped into five main
sectors: agriculture and mining, energy, manufacturing, construction
and services.
As it is shown in graph 6, time trends are quite similar among sectors,
with growing negative effects until 2005, a turning point in 2006, and
a small recovery since then, while the positive effects shows a
symmetric evolution, with an upward trend until 2005/2006 and a
turning point afterwards.
51
Focusing on manufacturing activities, we can observe that net effects
were quite negative (-0.2% of total employment) during the first three
years, slightly negative between 2005 and 2006, and marginally
positive in 2007 and during the first months of 2008.
Graph 6
Restructuring employment effect
(% sector employment)
Manufacturing
0.5%
0.4%
0.3%
0.2%
0.1%
0.0%
-0.1%
-0.2%
-0.3%
-0.4%
-0.5%
-0.6%
2002
2003
2004
2005
Net Effect
2006
2007
Job destrution
2008 (Jun.)
Job creation
A g ri c ul t ure & M ini ni g
Ene rg y
0.10%
4.0%
0.05%
3.0%
0.00%
2.0%
- 0.05%
1.0%
-0.10%
0.0%
-0.15%
- 0.20%
-1.0%
- 0.25%
-2.0%
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2002
2008
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
Net Effect
J o b d es t rutio n
2008
(J un.)
( J un.)
Net Effect
J o b creatio n
J o b d es t rutio n
J o b creat io n
Se rvices
Construction
0.15%
0.3%
0.10%
0.2%
0.05%
0.1%
0.00%
0.0%
-0.05%
-0.1%
-0.10%
-0.2%
-0.15%
-0.3%
2002
2003
Net Effect
2004
2005
Job destrution
2006
2007
2008
(Jun.)
Job creation
2002
2003
Net Effect
2004
2005
Job destrution
2006
2007
2008
(Jun.)
Job creation
Source: Own estimation from ERM and Eurostat Data. June 2008
52
3. Strategic and policy implications
In this third section, we will present a set of alternative strategies and
policy actions to tackle globalisation effects that have been extracted
from different academic papers and professional reports.
As a starting point it is useful to remark that as it was shown in the
first section, globalisation process yields both risks to be minimised
and opportunities to be taken in a framework of full cooperation
between developed and developing economies.
Without this global cooperation, developed economies, as the
European one, could face these globalisation effects in two different
ways which are subject to the perception about the net balance
between positive and negative effects (see figure 2).
Figure 2
Negative effects are higher than
potential benefits
Benefits are higher than
negative effects
DEFENSIVE
(reduce effects)
PROACTIVE
(increase benefits)
If developed economies feel that negative effects are higher that
potential benefits they should adopt some defensive strategies in order
to reduce these negative effects. On the contrary, if they look at the
globalisation process as an opportunity to be taken even with some
damaged effects, they should adopt a more proactive position to
maximise the potential benefits.
None of these strategic approaches are free of problems and are fully
effective for all situations and time terms, and there are some cautions
that should be considered.
Defensive strategies are not effective in the medium term so they just
solve short-term problems. Usually they fight against “symptom” not
the “core illness” so the problem is not solved at all. Sometimes they
are not fully compatible with national or supranational regulation. (i.e.
European regulation) and they would need new agreements among
53
partners to be implemented. Additionally, economic costs associated
with these strategies are bigger as globalisation advances and they
could become unaffordable in a short period of time.
As the proactive strategies are concerned it is relevant to note that
they should be effective in a medium or long term, but they are
consuming resources since the beginning. On the other hand, they are
quite easy to formulate but it is more difficult to specify in policy
actions, and finally, this kind of strategies are affected by the
competence against other developed economies, so the intensity of
specific policies should be higher than those of competitors to be
effective.
In order to illustrate the kind of policies that can be taken under the
two alternative approaches we have collected a list of examples that
have been either implemented somewhere or suggested by somebody
(academic, professional or political).
List of examples has been grouped in seven different groups or
mainlines in each one of the two alternatives approaches as it is shown
in following table.
Table 5
Mainlines in Policy Actions
Defensive strategy
Workers involvement in management
Increase restrictions for delocalisation
process.
Proactive Strategy
Develop high Value Added and Hi-Tech
activities
Facilitate new business environment
Facilitate return of delocalisated companies
Promote human capital
Promote employability of dismissed
workers
Increase R&D
Increase social cohesion
Prevent delocalisation of risk activities and
sectors
Reinforce agglomeration economies
Promote non-delocalisable activities.
Attract foreign direct investment
Reduce delocalisation benefits.
Source: Author’s elaboration. June 2008.
Tables 6 and 7 resume the main specific policies that we have found
through a literature revision’s work, classified into the seven main
lines showed in table 5.
54
Table 6
Policy Actions for Defensive Strategies
Policy Description
Establish worker controls in subsidized companies
Restructuring plans should be approved by Workers Councils
Establish commitments of permanence for the subsidized
companies
Reduce government contracts in companies with delocalisation
process.
Demand the return of the received subsidies
Forbid closure of profitability firms
Increase labor guaranties
Strategic Line
Worker involvement in
management
Increase restrictions for
delocalisation process
Subsidise returned companies
Facilitate return of
delocalised companies
Promote training and recycling of workers with employability
difficulties
Establish workers “by-passes” during closures process
Promote employability of
dismissed workers
Subsidise less qualified employment
Promote “social” and “environmental” labelling
Increase social cohesion
Boycott of delocalized products
Increase trade union coordination between headquarter and
branches
Develop sector observatories
Establish fiscal benefits to delocalisation risky activities or
Prevent delocalisation of
regions
Promote practices of preventive reindustrialisation and industrial risk activities and sectors
diversification
Establish a compulsory wage insurance
Fiscal harmonisation among countries
Increase dismissal costs
Impose higher taxes on re-imported products
Impose taxes on transport and environmental taxes
Reduce delocalisation
Establish fiscal benefits for outside EU exports.
benefits
Replace social contributions with indirect taxes on imports
Create a wage guaranty fund with delocalisation savings
Promote regional labelling
Extend quality and environmental certifications
Source: Author’s elaboration. June 2008
55
Table 7
Policy Actions for Proactive Strategies
Policy Description
Subsidize Biotechnological and Nanotechnologist companies
Reduce administrative issues to launch a new business.
Reduce profit taxes
Liberalize labor market
Increase subsidies to SME’s
Promote venture capital funds
Develop new business and prospective observatories
Establish public agencies to offer specialized advice for new
business creation.
Establish systems for tracking and promoting workers’ skills.
Increase public funding to continuous and employability
training
Promote a closeness relationship between firms and
universities
Increase R&D public funding
Fiscal benefits for private companies R&D activities
Develop “competitiveness poles”
Clonation of technological parks
Reduce social contributions to less skilled jobs and nondelocalizable activities.
Strategic Line
Develop high Value Added
and Hi-Tech activities
Facilitate new business
environment
Promote human capital
Increase R&D
Reinforce agglomeration
economies
Promote non-delocalizable
activities.
Fiscal benefits for foreign firms managers.
Fiscal benefits for foreign companies headquarter
establishment
Reinforce guaranties to industrial and intellectual property
rights.
Increase private and public infrastructures.
Attract foreign direct
investment
Source: Author’s elaboration. June 2008.
In our view, it should be necessary to establish an adequate policy mix
of short-term defensive policies, preventing medium term damaging
effects, which could ease the transition and implementation process of
the longer term pro-active actions.
As an example, some protectionist measures without medium term
damaged effects could be the implementation of quality standards and
labelling, environmental certifications, or some measures of labour
force protection.
Additionally, the development of some temporary subsidies could be
useful with predefined deadlines that could help to the necessary
transformation and adaptation of the production system, similar to the
well-known Common Agricultural Policy, what would means
somewhat like a new Common Industrial Policy.
56
These short term measures should be implemented jointly with long
term strategic actions, preferred those based on R&D activities or,
even more interesting, those actions that promotes the innovation
activities, because innovation plays a key role in putting into value all
R&D activities by making new products and process.
Any case, all those strategies and actions should be taken in a
framework of social stakeholders’ general agreement, as it is stated in
a recent report of the European Restructuring Monitor: “The current
question is no longer one of ‘whether’ to restructure or not, but rather
‘how’ to restructure, so that negative social and economic costs are
minimised.” (Support Measures For Business Creation Following
Restructuring, 2005).
This new concept of ‘socially responsible restructuring’ can be
defined as the use of one or more approaches to consciously take into
account the interests of all the organization's stakeholders – managers,
owners/shareholders, workers as well as the larger community. So,
“socially responsible restructuring” should include elements like an
anticipatory or forward-looking approach; timely information and
continuous social dialogue with all actors concerned and negotiations
with workforce representatives on how to prevent the adverse effects
of restructuring.
Some examples of this kind of restructuring could be:
-
Internal and/or external outplacement services;
SME creation unit;
Mobility support, both geographic and job mobility;
Early retirement;
Part-time jobs;
Flexible leave;
Sub-contracted workers.
At the end, developed countries should adapt their economies to the
new paradigms of Globalisation and Knowledge economy, trying to
promote those activities than cannot be relocated or those linked to
fields that show higher potential growth.
The following table summarises those activities grouped in three
different fields of action:
57
Table 8
Activities to be promoted in developed countries to face globalisation
Field of action
Examples of industries
R&D and top-end high-tech in general
Expert services: business and personal
Education for the knowledge society (recognising the end of the
“education once-and-for-all” and “job for life” models)
Capabilities and
Highly efficient physical distribution services to complement erequirements of the
commerce
Knowledge Society
Intelligent buildings and living spaces
Special financial services geared to the new conditions: venture
capital as a “normal” service; recognizing the value of
intangible products and assets, catering to highly irregular
incomes and to the proliferation of micro and mini firms, etc.
Entertainment industries
Environment industry: clean air and water, safer waste disposal
systems, alternative energies, etc.
Creative industries
Health industries and services: orthodox and alternative;
Quality of life as defined
preventive and curing.
by national culture and
Beauty, body care, sports and healthy living
values.
Habitat: Architecture, landscaping, interior design the spread of
good taste (fashion, home and office decoration, etc.)
Specialized tourism: for locals and foreigner
Food: convenience and gourmet foods (in-restaurant, in-store,
home delivery, made-to-order, etc.)
Old age care and leisure time use
Personal services
Economic Growth and
Business services for the self-employed, micro and mini firms
demographic trends.
Construction and urban renewal
Infrastructure (new and old) extension, improvement and
maintenance
References
Baldwin R. E. and F. Robert-Nicoud (2000), “Free trade agreements without
delocalisation”, Canadian Journal of Economics, vol. 33, nº 3, pp. 766-786.
Corral A., I. Isusi and J. Stack (2005), “Support Measures For Business Creation
Following Restructuring.”, European Foundation for the Improvement of
Living and Working Conditions.
Dunning J. H. (1977), “Trade, location of economic activity and the MNE: A
search for an eclectic approach”, in Ohlin B., Hesselborn P. and P. Wiskman
(Eds.), The International Allocation of Economic Activity, Macmillam,
London, pp. 395-419.
Esser D. and P. Ozoux (2003), Restructuring with workforce reduction: How to
manage the process in a socially sensitive manner, International Labour
Organisation (ILO), Geneva.
58
Fernandez-Otheo C. M., D. Martin Barroso D. and R. Myro (2005), “Desinversión
y deslocalización de capital extranjero en España”, Ekonomiaz, nº 55, pp.
107 – 127.
Grossman G.M. and E. Rossi-Hansberg (2006), The rise of offshoring, Princeton
University.
Mouhoud E. M. (1989), “Les stratégies de relocalisation des firmes
multinationales”, Revue d’économie politique, 99, (1) Janvier – Février,
pp. 96 - 122.
Munoz Guarasa M. (2002), “Deslocalización sectorial de la inversión directa
Extranjera en España”, Boletín Económico de ICE, nº 2744, pp. 19 – 30.
Munoz Guarasa M. (2002a), “Factores de localización de la inversión directa
extranjera en Andalucía”, Revista de Estudios Regionales, nº 62, pp. 171 –
187.
Myro R. and C.M. Fernandez-Otheo (2004), “La deslocalización de empresas en
España. La atracción del Este Europeo”, Información Comercial Española,
nº 818, pp. 185 – 201.
Pérez C. (2006), “Re-specialisation and the Development of the ICT Paradigm- An
Essay on the Present Challenges of Globalisation”, in The Future of the
Information Society in Europe: Contributions to the Debate, IPTS Technical
Report Series.
Starcher G. (2003), The role of large companies in SME creation and development,
European Bahá’í Business Forum (EBBF).
59
60
European enlargement: a challenge for the
Greek industry
Stella Balfoussias15
KEPE, Athens
Greece is a country in which traditionally comparative advantage lies
in the service sector while at the same time overall external balance
has been continually in deficit, largely due to the dependence on
industrial imports.
Economic policy in Greece has always emphasised the importance of
a healthy, internationally active, manufacturing industry that would
contribute to the reduction of external imbalances and promote
productivity growth in the economy as a whole.
The Greek industrial base has been concentrated in traditional sectors;
as a result it has faced increasing competition in the context of
European integration and globalisation. At the same time the industry
has not benefited from foreign direct investment as this was directed
to low cost countries in Europe and Asia.
Has the Greek industrial sector managed to acquire the necessary
flexibility and adaptability to survive or even increase its role in the
new global environment?
What are the prospects for a small country with largely traditional
industrial structure in the new global environment?
In the first part of this paper, we present the main trends and structural
characteristics in the Greek industry. Then, the question of
international competitiveness is addressed. In order to assess the
international position of Greek manufacture we identify strengths and
weaknesses of the economic structure as they are reflected in the
structure of the external balance and examine the evolution of market
shares in key areas.
15
[email protected]
61
European enlargement: a challenge for the Greek industry
1. Manufacturing industry in Greece: recent trends
During the last decade, the average annual growth rate of value added
generated by the manufacturing industry, was somewhat lower than
the rate of growth of GDP (3.1% and 3.6% respectively) in volume
terms. The share of manufacturing industry in the total economy,
always in terms of value added, shows no persistent trend but has
declined marginally, between 1995 and 2007. As shown in Graph 1,
while the share of manufacturing industry in total value added was
11.5%, in 1995, it dropped to 10.6% in 2007.
Graph 1
The share of manufacturing industry to total activity
14.0
160
150
13.0
140
130
12.0
120
11.0
110
100
10.0
90
80
9.0
70
8.0
60
1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Employment(%of total)
Labour Productivity (right axis)
2000
2001 2002 2003 2004
Value Added(% of total)
2005
2006
2007
Source: NSSG (National Statistical Service of Greece)
An important structural development during this period is the
reduction of the share of Greek manufacturing industry in total
employment. Measured in terms of full time equivalent persons
employed, the share of manufacturing sector in total employment was
reduced by two percentage points, from 12.4% in 1995 to 10.4% in
2007 (Graph 1). This downward trend may reflect the process of
externalisation of certain activities of industrial companies, like
cleaning or accountancy, so, to some extent, it represents a contraction
of employment in industrial companies that is compensated by an
increase in the service sector. However, the actual scale of
employment reduction suggests that it relates, predominately, to more
fundamental restructuring associated with productivity gains. In fact,
employment in the manufacturing industry declined by 9.5% between
1995 and 2007 and as result labour productivity, in the same period,
62
increased substantially. Labour productivity, also plotted in Graph 1
(right axis, 1995=100), followed an upward trend during this period
and increased by 48% compared to an increase of 33% of the
corresponding measure for total economy.
In short, we observe a substantial increase in productivity, along with
a significant increase in production, while the loss in employment may
be viewed as evidence of substantial restructuring. On the whole,
these trends may be perceived as, however, to relate them to trade
developments in order to fully assess their significance.
2. The manufacturing structure reflected in the
structure of trade
2.1. Openness to trade and international competitiveness
Measures of openness to trade can reveal overall strengths or
weaknesses of the domestic structure in comparison to international
developments. Graph 2 depicts the evolution of two such measures,
Import penetration (IP) and Export share in production (XSP), for the
period under consideration and for the aggregate manufacturing
industry.
Graph 2
Openness of manufacturing sector
60.0
50.0
40.0
30.0
20.0
10.0
0.0
2000
2001
2002
2003
Import penetration
2004
2005
2006
2007
Export share of production
Source: NSSG (National Statistical Service of Greece)
63
As shown in the graph, both measures are relatively stable, during the
recent period, at around 52% and 27% respectively, although, XSP
declined marginally between 2000 and 2002 to recover thereafter.
However, Geek industry is compared unfavourably in relation to EU,
according to both measures, as IP is higher and XSP lower than the
corresponding EU indices (45% and 47% for EU-15 excluding
Greece). Moreover, XSP follows a clearly positive trend in the case of
EU-15.
One interpretation of the evolution of IP and XSP is that the positive
developments in manufacturing production are more related to
domestic demand as they are not clearly reflected in trade
performance.
A measure of trade performance that assesses export specialisation is
the Balassa index of revealed comparative advantage (RCA). This
index compares the share of exports of a given sector in total exports
of the country in question to the corresponding world share. For any
given industry, a value greater than 1 shows export specialisation, or
revealed comparative advantage, whereas a value smaller than 1
comparative disadvantage.
Table 1.
Revealed comparative advantage in manufactured goods
Total trade
EU_15
1991-95
0.70
0.67
1996-2000
0.72
0.67
2001-2005
0.80
0.75
Source: Comtrade, author’s calculations
Table 1 shows the evolution of export specialisation as measured by
the Balassa index for the period 1991-2005. The index refers to total
manufacturing industry and uses both the world trade and the EU-15
trade as a basis for comparison.
Clearly, the revealed comparative disadvantage of Greek
manufactured exports appears to be diminishing in comparison to both
the world manufacturing trade and the EU-15 manufacturing trade.
Interestingly it diminishes more quickly outside the EU-15 area.
Of course a more detailed approach is required to assess the evolution
of comparative advantage. In what follows we examine trade
performance of manufacturing sectors focusing on the contribution of
such sectors to overall trade balance.
A very useful tool to assess the contribution of individual production
sectors to trade balance and, thereby, to assess the impact of
64
production structure to the external balance is the concept of structural
balance.
The notion of structural balance stems from the observation that in the
absence of any comparative advantage, or, disadvantage, in other
words, in the absence of sectoral specialisation, total balance is
distributed in accordance to the share of each sector’s trade, that is the
sum of exports and imports, to total trade. Therefore, if we multiply
the overall trade balance with the share of each sector’s trade to total
trade, we derive a reference balance for each given sector, the
potential or neutral balance, against which we can compare the actual
one:
(X-M)* (Xi+Mi)/ (X+M)
The difference between actual and neutral balance, as a percentage of
total trade, may be used as an index of structural balance. This index
allows for a categorisation of production sectors according to their
contribution to total balance. A positive value of structural balance
signifies strength, or comparative advantage, while a negative value
signifies weakness or comparative disadvantage. Note that the index
captures the relative significance of sectoral trade so that the positive
(negative) sign does not necessarily correspond to a surplus (deficit)
of the actual balance.
In the remainder, we use the concept of structural balance to identify
strengths and weaknesses of Greek manufacturing trade. An
advantage of this approach, in comparison to the Balassa index, is that
it allows decomposition by sector or trading area.
65
Graph 3
Contribution of manufacturing activities to trade balance
5.0
0.0
-5.0
-10.0
-15.0
-20.0
2000
2001
total trade
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
trade of goods
Source: Author's calculations
Graph 3 depicts the contribution of Greek manufacturing trade to the
total balance of goods and services, as well as to the balance of
merchandise trade. As expected, the index of structural trade balance
of manufacturing industries is negative in relation to total trade, since
historically, services constitute the component of external flows that is
in surplus. However, the contribution of manufactured goods in the
balance of merchandise trade is positive and, after 2004, increasing.
This positive value reflects of course, in addition to the increasing
strength of the industrial sector, the increasing weakness of the Greek
primary sector.
2.2. Sectoral contribution to manufacturing trade balance
In Table 2 we present the structural balance of individual
manufacturing sectors. Note that because the index is relative, the sum
of sectoral results is zero.
66
Table 2
Relative Structural balance of manufacturing sectors
coke and refined petroleum products
Food products and beverages
basic metals
wearing and dressing apparel
Textiles
electrical machinery and apparatus
rubber and plastic products
metal products except machinery and equipment
non-metallic mineral products
Tobacco products
Publishing, and printing
furniture
wood products
leather products
pulp, paper and paper products
office machinery and computers
machinery and equipment
medical, precision and optical instruments
radio, television and communication equipment
Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products
other transport equipment
motor vehicles, and trailers
2000
2004
2007
4.0
2.7
1.6
3.9
0.1
-0.1
0.1
-0.4
0.9
0.4
0.3
0.8
0.2
-0.2
-0.8
-1.0
-3.9
-0.8
-0.9
-1.8
-1.8
-3.4
2.9
1.8
2.1
3.1
1.0
-0.1
0.1
0.0
0.3
0.3
0.2
0.1
-0.2
-0.3
-0.5
-0.7
-1.3
-0.7
-0.8
-1.3
-2.7
-3.3
3.2
2.0
1.9
1.3
0.6
0.5
0.4
0.3
0.3
0.3
0.2
-0.2
-0.3
-0.4
-0.5
-0.6
-0.7
-0.8
-1.0
-1.1
-2.2
-3.2
Source: Comtrade, author’s calculations
A number of observations may be derived on the basis of the above
results:
-
Although the contribution of the main traditional sectors (food
products and beverages, basic metals, textiles and dressing
apparel, non-metallic mineral products, Tobacco products)
remains positive, it is gradually diminishing in significance.
-
Certain non traditional sectors (electrical machinery and
apparatus, metal products except machinery and equipment)
appear to gain significance and contribute positively to the
manufacturing trade balance in the recent period.
-
Although the impact of sectors like machinery and equipment
and manufacture of chemicals and chemical products, remains
negative its absolute value gets smaller.
-
Finally, other transport equipment and motor vehicles continue
to exert a significant negative contribution to manufacturing
trade balance.
67
The above results point towards some restructuring of sectoral
contribution to manufacturing trade balance. More importantly,
despite the apparent weakening of the performance of traditional
sectors, it appears that the increasing significance of non traditional
sectors is compensating, so that the overall contribution of
manufacturing industry to merchandise balance is positive and
increasing.
In order to be able to assess more accurately the changes described
above we need to take a closer look to the geographical dimension of
trade developments.
2.3. Structural balance indices by trading area
In Graphs 4 to 5 we present structural balance indices by five trading
areas and by broad categories of manufactured goods. The trading
areas to be considered are: EU-15, New members of EU (the first ten
new members), Balkan countries, Mediterranean countries (Med) and
the rest of the Rest of the World (R.W).
Graph 4
Contribution of main trading areas to manufacturing trade balance
Manufucturing trade: Total
8.0
6.0
4.0
2.0
0.0
-2.0
-4.0
-6.0
-8.0
1995
1998
EU-15
1999
2000
New members
2001
2002
Balkans
2003
2004
2005
Med
R.W
2006
As shown in Graph 4, the structural balance indicator for total
manufacturing trade is significantly negative for the EU-15, even
more so for the rest of the world. It is interesting to underline that
although the negative contribution of the manufacturing trade between
Greece and the Rest of the World is increasing, the corresponding
index with EU-15 is improving as the absolute number is diminishing.
68
On the other hand, the index is positive for New EU member
countries, as well as the Balkan and the Mediterranean countries. Most
striking is the measure of the positive contribution of the Balkan
countries.
Thus, it can be argued that the Greek manufacturing sectors continue
to perform poorly in global markets but they perform relatively well in
the Balkan countries, the new EU member and the Mediterranean
countries. On the other hand, the poor performance in EU-15 is
marginally improving.
Graph 5
Contribution of Manufacturing sectors to trade balance: Main categories
Capital goods and transport equipment
2.0
0.0
-2.0
-4.0
-6.0
-8.0
-10.0
1995
1998
1999
EU-15
2000
2001
2002
New members
2003
2004
Balkans
2005
2006
Med
R.W
Consumer goods
2.0
1.5
1.0
0.5
0.0
-0.5
-1.0
1995
EU-15
1998
1999
2000
2001
New members
Balkans
2002
2003
2004
Med
R.W
2005
2006
69
Other manufucturd goods
5.0
4.0
3.0
2.0
1.0
t
0.0
-1.0
-2.0
1995
1998
1999
EU-15
2000
2001
New members
2002
2003
Balkans
2004
Med
2005
2006
R.W
The structural balance indicator is further disaggregated by broad
categories of manufactured goods and presented in graph 5. The
analysis is based on the BEC categorisation of international trade,
which classifies trade flows in accordance to basic economic activity
and stage of production.
As shown in Graph 5, the trade of capital goods and transport
equipment is characterised by a significant structural deficit,
stemming from the transactions with the EU-15 and the rest of the
world.
On the other hand, the structural balance of consumer goods is
predominantly positive for all trading areas, but shows signs of
weakening in the period after 2003. In particular, the contribution of
the rest of the world in the balance of consumer goods trade turned
negative in 2003, while the traditionally strong positive contribution
of EU-15 turned negative in 2005.
The structural balance indicator for “other manufactured goods” is
positive for all markets in the most recent years, while the contribution
of EU-15 trade exhibits an upward trend. The most significant
contributions relate to the Balkan countries and to a lesser extent to
the rest of the world and the New EU members, while the contribution
of trade with the Mediterranean countries is significantly higher than
that of EU-15. Thus, the category of “other manufactured goods”
appears to have a globally positive contribution to the balance of
manufactured goods.
70
As mentioned already these results can be interpreted as indications
for the evolution of comparative advantage. So, accordingly, we can
conclude that a subset of industrial sectors appears to perform
relatively well in global markets, while an even larger subset performs
well in the New EU members, the Balkan and the Mediterranean
countries. But the area in which the Greek manufacturing industry
performs better is the Balkan.
2.4. Market shares
To gain some further insights on export performance we examine the
evolution of market shares for the main trading areas and main
partners.
In graph 6 we present the shares of total manufacturing exports in the
geographical areas defined above. As shown in the graph, the world
share of Greek manufacturing exports is very low (0.14% in 2006)
while the corresponding share to EU-15 is 0.2. Both shares
deteriorated between 1995 and 2000 but recovered partly between
2000 and 2006. Shares in the new members, the Balkan and the
Mediterranean countries were significantly higher, 0.4%, 1.2% and
0.44% respectively in 2006. Obviously there is a geographical bias of
Greek manufacturing exports mainly to the Balkan countries and to a
lesser extent to the new members, the Mediterranean countries and,
finally, to the EU-15 as opposed to exports to the rest of the world.
Graph 6
Industrial e xports: Marke t Share s
1.8
1.6
1.4
1.2
1.0
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.0
EU_15
New members
Balkans
1995
Med
2000
R.W
World
2006
71
Graph 7 decomposes further the market share in the new member
states and in the Balkan countries in order to identify trading partners
of particular significance.
It is evident from the graph that the success in the new member states
is quite limited as the most important destinations appears to be
Cyprus and Malta, both very small countries. On the other hand,
shares in the Balkan countries are more widely spread. Significant
shares of manufactured goods in Albania, FYROM, Bulgaria,
Romania, Serbia Montenegro and Turkey are worth mentioning.
In relation to the Balkan countries one cannot support that there is
evidence of a pattern of increasing shares. Indeed shares are lower in
2005 than in 2000 for most Balkan countries, a fact that can be
attributed partly to the recent upheavals in the area. However, current
shares are quite significant and well established, so they may support
some optimism for the future of Greek manufacturing, especially in
view of increasing incomes in this area.
Graph 7
Industrial exports: Market S hares, New Members
18.0
15.0
12.0
9.0
6.0
3.0
0.0
Poland
Hungary
M alta
1995
2000
Cyprus
Czech Republic
2005
Industrial exports: Market Shares,Balkans
20
16
12
8
4
0
Turkey
Serbia & Romania
FYR of
Montenegro
Macedonia
1995
2000
Bulgaria
Albania
2005
72
Conclusion
Although the service sector has played, traditionally a dominant role
in Greek economy the industrial sector has assumed a key role in
promoting productivity growth. The Greek manufacturing industry has
performed relatively satisfactory in recent years, in terms of
productivity growth and to a lesser extent in terms of output growth.
As manufacturing output is being concentrated in traditional sectors
the industry has faced intense competition from low cost countries.
The analysis has indicated that the contribution of traditional
industrial sectors in overall trade balance has gradually diminished. At
the same time the industry has shown some signs of resilience in the
face of the challenges of European integration and globalisation,
managing to adapt to some extent to new markets and new sectors.
In terms basic economic activity embodied in trade, the relative
success is based on processed manufacturing products and to a lesser
extent in consumer products, while capital and transport goods remain
areas of absolute and relative comparative disadvantage.
The geographical distribution of comparative advantage points
towards the Balkan countries and to some degree the New EUmember states and Mediterranean countries as the more promising
destination for further improvement of international performance of
Greek industry. In this context, it appears that the country may benefit
from the further EU enlargement in South Eastern Europe and from
closer collaboration with Mediterranean countries.
Still Greek industry faces many challenges ahead. Indeed, the main
risk would be to loose further competitiveness compared to low labour
costs countries in the traditional sectors, and not to be able to increase
or sustain market shares in some currently dynamic sectors. In an
optimistic scenario a number of dynamic sectors (metal products,
chemical products) may increase their market shares and their
contribution to overall trade balance, while some traditional sectors
may benefit from their operations in neighbouring low cost countries.
In a gloomy scenario, competition of emerging economies would lead
to a shrinking of industrial activities in Greece and substantial
reduction in GDP growth.
73
L’industrie : une ambition pour l’Europe
Journée européenne de l’industrie
sous Présidence Française de l’Union Européenne
L’industrie en Europe :
principales tendances et défis pour le futur1
Alain Henriot,
Directeur Délégué de Coe-Rexecode
10 juillet 2008
1
Ce texte reprend, en français, la première partie du document en anglais Industry : an
Ambition for Europe, publié par les instituts du réseau Euren (EURopean Economic
Network), disponible en intégralité sur le site www.euren-network.eu.
L’industrie en Europe : principales tendances et
défis pour le futur
Même si le secteur des services occupe une place croissante et
dominante dans l’économie européenne, l’industrie conserve toute son
importance. Elle demeure un pilier essentiel de l’innovation et génère
une large partie des gains de productivité : 80 % des dépenses de
recherche-développement du secteur privé sont concentrées dans
l’industrie2.
Le traité de Lisbonne a identifié trois priorités pour renforcer la
croissance et l’emploi (Commission européenne, 2005) :
-
Faire de l’Europe un lieu attractif en termes d’investissement et
d’emplois ;
-
Mettre la connaissance et l’innovation au cœur de la croissance
européenne ;
-
Mettre en œuvre des politiques permettant de créer des emplois
plus nombreux et de meilleure qualité.
Il est clair que l’industrie doit jouer un rôle majeur dans l’atteinte de
ces objectifs. Dans la communication de la Commission mentionnée
ci-dessus, il est indiqué explicitement que « la politique industrielle
vise en priorité à créer des conditions favorables au développement
des entreprises et de l’innovation afin de faire de l’UE une zone
attrayante pour les investissements industriels et la création
d’emplois ».
Dans le contexte de la globalisation, l’Europe fait face de plus en plus
à une forte concurrence en tant que lieu de production, d’emplois,
d’investissement et même de recherche-développement. En outre, les
changements rapides en matière de technologie requièrent une grande
flexibilité des entreprises industrielles européennes afin d’offrir de
nouveaux produits et d’adapter les processus de production.
La première partie de ce rapport est consacrée à une description des
principaux traits caractéristiques de l’industrie européenne. Nous
identifions ensuite quelques défis pour l’avenir.
2
Eurostat.
1
L’industrie en Europe : principales tendances et défis pour le futur
1. L’industrie en Europe : faits et chiffres
Les principales tendances caractérisant l’industrie européenne sont
décrites dans la première section, avant de s’intéresser aux principales
forces et faiblesses de l’industrie européenne dans la compétition
mondiale.
1.1. Principales tendances de l’industrie européenne
1.1.1. L’Europe souffre-t-elle de désindustrialisation ?
Il est souvent mentionné que l’Europe doit faire face à un risque de
désindustrialisation, notamment suite à une relocalisation des activités
industrielles dans les pays à bas coûts. Les chiffres confirment-ils
cette idée ?
En fait, trois grandes tendances ont caractérisé l’industrie européenne
au cours des dernières décennies3.
UE-15 : part de l'industrie manufacturière
dans l'ensemble de l'économie
30
%
26
Valeur ajoutée (euros courants)
Valeur ajoutée (euros 1995)
Emploi
Heures travaillées
22
18
14
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
Sources : EU Klems, Eurostat, calculs de l'auteur
Tout d’abord, la part de l’industrie manufacturière dans l’ensemble de
l’économie s’est réduite, lorsque l’on considère les données en euros
courants. Alors qu’elle comptait pour 25 % dans l’ensemble de la
3
Afin d’assurer une comparaison cohérente sur longue période, nous nous référons ici à
l’Union européenne à 15.
2
valeur ajoutée au début des années 1970, la part de l’industrie
manufacturière est tombée à 16,5 % en 2007.
Cependant, une vision plus favorable est donnée par les chiffres en
volume.
Si elle s’élevait à 23,5 % au début des années 1970, elle atteignait
19,5 % en 20074, une part qui est d’ailleurs restée quasiment constante
au cours des dix dernières années. Cela signifie que les prix relatifs
des produits manufacturés ont fortement baissé sur la période.
Un troisième élément qui caractérise l’industrie européenne au cours
des dernières années est la baisse de la part de l’industrie
manufacturière dans l’emploi total. Cette dernière a presque été
divisée par deux en 30 ans, passant de 28 % en 1970 à 15 % en 2007.
Une explication qui pourrait être avancée serait le développement des
emplois à temps partiel dans les services. Mais la baisse de la part de
l’industrie manufacturière s’observe aussi en termes d’heures
travaillées, ce qui ne valide pas cette thèse. Par contre, elle pourrait
s’appliquer aux Etats-Unis où un écart croisant peut être observé entre
la durée moyenne du travail dans l’industrie manufacturière et celle
dans l’ensemble de l’économie. Il faut par ailleurs noter que le nombre
d’heures travaillées par personne employée dans l’industrie
manufacturière est très nettement supérieur aux Etats-Unis
comparativement à l’Europe.
Heures travaillées par personne employée
2000
1900
UE-15 : total
UE-15 : industrie manufacturière
Etats-Unis : total
Etats-Unis : industrie manufacturière
1800
1700
1600
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
4
Par définition, les chiffres en valeur absolue étant exprimés en monnaie constante à partir
d’une année de base n’ont pas de signification particulière (l’année de base, les données en
valeur et en volume sont égales). Seules les évolutions comptent.
3
Naturellement, la tendance à la baisse de la part de l’industrie
manufacturière dans l’emploi total s’explique en partie par
l’externalisation de certaines fonctions par les entreprises industrielles,
telles que le nettoyage ou la comptabilité. Cela s’est traduit par une
contraction de l’emploi dans l’industrie manufacturière, compensée
par des créations dans les services. Mais le recul des effectifs
industriels reflète aussi des gains de productivité. En moyenne, les
gains de productivité sont nettement plus importants dans l’industrie
manufacturière que dans l’ensemble de l’économie. Pour l’UE à 15, la
tendance de long terme (1970-2007) est une croissance des gains de
productivité de 3,4 % par an en moyenne dans l’industrie
manufacturière contre 2,3 % pour l’ensemble de l’économie. Ces
gains de productivité ont globalement été maintenus au fil du temps et
une accélération est même perceptible depuis 2000, tandis qu’au
contraire un net ralentissement a été observé pour le reste de
l’économie.
UE-15 : Valeur ajoutée par heure travaillée (en volume)
Total
160
Industrie manufacturière
1995=100
140
8
Taux de variation anuuel (en %)
7
120
6
100
5
80
4
3
60
2
1
40
0
70 75 80 85 90 95 00 05 10
70
75
80
85
90
95
00
05
10
Cet écart peut être expliqué par deux éléments. Premièrement,
l’externalisation de certaines fonctions est une source de divergence
entre les gains de productivité de l’industrie manufacturière et des
services. Deuxièmement, l’accélération des gains de productivité dans
l’industrie manufacturière est aussi la conséquence d’une utilisation
plus intensive des technologies de l’information et des
télécommunications, bien que la rupture y ait été moins franche
qu’aux Etats-Unis, où l’accélération a été beaucoup plus prononcée au
milieu des années 1990, alors que la croissance de la productivité dans
4
l’industrie manufacturière aux Etats-Unis et en Europe était très
proche dans les années 1980 et 1990.
Valeur ajoutée par heure travaillée (en volume)
1995=100
190
160
140
120
100
EU-15 : total
EU-15 : manufacturier
Etats-Unis : total
Etats-Unis : manufacturier
80
60
40
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
En retour, ces gains de productivité se sont traduits par une forte
baisse des prix relatifs des produits manufacturés vis-à-vis du reste de
l’économie.
UE-15 : prix relatif de la valeur ajoutée
de l'industrie manufacturière
115
1995=100
110
105
100
95
90
85
80
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
Source : :EU
Sources
EUKlems,
Klems,Eurostat,
Eurostat,calculs
calculsde
del'auteur
l'auteur
5
1.1.2 L’industrie manufacturière européenne et ses concurrents
Comme il a été indiqué plus haut, la part de l’industrie manufacturière
dans la valeur ajoutée en volume a été quasiment stable au cours des
dix dernières années. En d’autres termes, la valeur ajoutée dégagée par
l’industrie manufacturière a progressé à peu près au même rythme que
le PIB. Entre 1970 et 2007, la valeur ajoutée en volume pour l’UE-15
a progressé en moyenne de 2,5 % par an et de 2 % pour la seule
industrie manufacturière. Sur la période la plus récente (1995-2007),
la croissance de la valeur ajoutée de l’ensemble de l’économie a un
peu ralenti (2,3 %) et est restée quasiment inchangée pour l’industrie
manufacturière (2,1 %).
Comment la performance européenne se compare-t-elle vis-à-vis des
autres pays ? Naturellement, un des faits les plus marquants des
dernières années a été l’émergence de nouveaux compétiteurs
produisant et exportant des produits manufacturés. Ainsi, la
production manufacturière européenne5 a crû à un rythme inférieur à la
production mondiale depuis le début des années 1990. Cependant,
l’écart entre l’Europe d’un côté, et le Japon et les Etats-Unis de l’autre
a été effacé au cours des dernières années. Si, dans les années 1990, la
production manufacturière américaine progressait plus vite que la
production européenne, cela n’est plus le cas depuis le début des
années 2000.
Production industrielle
10
Glissement annuel en %
5
0
Etats-Unis
UE-27
Japon
Monde
-5
-10
-15
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
00
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
Source : Global insight
5
Nous nous référons ici à l’UE-27.
6
Production industrielle
20
Glissement annuel en %
10
0
Monde
Pays émergents d'Asie
Europe de l'Est
Amérique Latine
Pays émergents
-10
-20
-30
92
93
94
95
96
97
98
99
00
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
09
Parmi les pays membres de l’Union, des différences peuvent être
observées concernant l’évolution de la production manufacturière
depuis le début des années 1990. Ainsi, la production britannique a
légèrement baissé depuis 2000. A l’inverse, après un ajustement initial
à la baisse, l’intégration à l’UE des nouveaux pays membres (NM)
s’est traduite par une forte accélération de leur production
manufacturière. La production manufacturière dans la zone euro a crû
au même rythme que l’UE-27 au cours des deux dernières décennies,
mais à un taux plus faible que les nouveaux pays membres (NM). Ceci
peut s’interpréter comme un processus de rattrapage des nouveaux
pays membres, dont le PIB par tête en 1990 n’atteignait en moyenne
que 47,1 % de celui de la zone euro. Cela signifie aussi que la
localisation des activités manufacturières s’est déplacée vers l’Est de
l’Europe avec le processus d’élargissement, sous l’effet de marchés en
forte croissance et de coûts salariaux attractifs.
Parmi les pays de la zone euro, les rythmes de progression de la
production manufacturière ont aussi différé au cours des dernières
années. Après être resté en retrait des autres pays tout au long des
années 1990, la production manufacturière allemande a vivement
rebondi dans les années 2000. Inversement, la production
manufacturière italienne a quasiment stagné dans les années récentes,
tandis que la France est restée en deçà de la moyenne de la zone euro.
Ces écarts peuvent être attribués en partie au différentiel d’évolution
des coûts salariaux unitaires. Certaines études ont également
7
mentionné le fait que l’adoption de l’euro avait conduit à une
concentration de certaines activités vers le centre géographique de
l’Union monétaire, afin de bénéficier d’économies d’échelle.
L’Allemagne aurait ainsi tiré parti de sa position géographique (de
Nardis, de Santis et Vicarelli, 2008).
Union européenne - production industrielle
180
1990=100
160
Zone euro
UE-27
Royaume-Uni
NM
140
120
100
80
90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09
Zone euro - production industrielle
140
1990=100
130
120
110
France
Allemagne
Italie
Espagne
100
90
80
90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 09
8
En outre, il paraît utile de mesurer la part de l’Europe dans l’industrie
manufacturière mondiale. Cela peut se faire selon deux approches,
l’une s’appuyant sur les exportations, l’autre sur la valeur ajoutée. Le
tableau suivant décrit les principales tendances de l’industrie
manufacturière mondiale au cours des dix dernières années. S’agissant
des exportations, l’Europe a réussi au cours des dernières années à
consolider ses parts de marché. Cela est vrai qu’il s’agisse de l’UE-15
ou de l’UE-27, c’est aussi vrai lorsque le commerce intra-zone est
exclu. Cela s’explique essentiellement par la forte amélioration des
performances allemandes à l’exportation. En ce qui concerne la valeur
ajoutée, les choses sont un peu différentes. La part de l’Europe a décru
dans les années 2000, principalement sous l’effet de la hausse
impressionnante de la part de la Chine, qui a doublé au cours des dix
dernières années. On peut aussi observer que la part de l’Europe est
devenue inférieure à celle des Etats-Unis, alors qu’elle lui était
supérieure au milieu des années 1990. Une approche par pays montre
aussi que la performance de l’Allemagne est moins impressionnante
qu’en termes d’exportations. Cela appuie l’idée que l’Allemagne vend
dans le monde des produits qui ne sont pas totalement fabriqués sur
son territoire, ce que Sinn (2003) a décrit comme l’économie de bazar.
Tableau 1
Part dans les exportations et la valeur ajoutée mondiales de produits facturés
Groupe
Pays
Exportations de produits
manufacturés
(part en %)
1995
2000
2006
VAM (part en %) en US
dollars constants 2000
1995
2000
2006
UE-15
43,9
38,9
40,4
25,9
24,2
21,8
UE-15 (intra-UE 15 exclu)
23,3
20,9
22,3
-
-
-
France
6,0
5,3
4,8
3,4
3,3
3,0
Allemagne
12,2
10,2
12,0
7,4
6,8
6,3
Italie
5,6
4,6
4,4
4,2
3,6
2,9
Espagne
2,0
2,0
2,1
1,7
1,7
1,6
Royaume-Uni
5,2
4,8
4,2
4,5
4,0
3,3
UE-27
45,8
41,3
44,1
27,1
25,6
23,4
UE-27 (intra-UE 27 exclu)
22,6
19,8
21,0
-
-
-
Dont
Chine
3,6
5,7
11,7
5,1
6,7
10,6
Etats-Unis
11,9
13,1
9,3
24,5
26,7
25,1
Japon
11,7
10,0
Sources : Banque de données Cepii-Chelem et ONUDI
7,5
20,4
17,9
15,8
9
1.2 Forces et faiblesses de l’industrie manufacturière européenne sur
les marches mondiaux
1.2.1. Y a-t-il une relocalisaton des activités manufacturières hors
d’Europe ?
Les forces et faiblesses de l’industrie manufacturière sur les marchés
mondiaux peuvent être examinées à travers le canal du commerce
extérieur. Cette approche ne donne pas une évaluation de la
compétitivité des entreprises industrielles mais plutôt une estimation
de la compétitivité de l’Europe, comme un lieu de production de biens
manufacturés et un lieu d’emploi par l’industrie manufacturière.
Une crainte souvent mentionnée est que l’Europe devienne de moins
en moins compétitive pour accueillir les activités industrielles,
comparativement à des localisations alternatives, notamment dans les
pays émergents. Si tel était le cas, on devrait observer un recul des
exportations européennes de produits manufacturés et une hausse des
importations, nourrie par les filiales des entreprises européennes
établies dans les pays émergents.
Comme on peut le voir sur les graphiques ci-dessous, les importations
européennes de produits manufacturés n’ont pas augmenté beaucoup
plus vite que les exportations au cours des quinze dernières années. Le
solde commercial, mesuré en dollar, s’est même accru. Bien sûr, les
histoires nationales diffèrent, l’Allemagne disposant depuis le début
de la décennie d’un large excédent de sa balance commerciale, tandis
que l’Espagne a, au contraire, souffert d’une forte détérioration. Mais
ces données ne valident pas l’idée d’une relocalisation prononcée des
activités industrielles hors d’Europe.
10
UE-15 industrie manufacturière : exportations et importations
4000000
Millions de dollars
2000000
1000000
Exportations
Importations
400000
200000
100000
50000
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
Source : Banque de données Cepii-chelem
UE-15 industrie manufacturière : balance commerciale
350000
Millions de dollars
300000
250000
200000
150000
100000
50000
0
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
11
UE-15 : industrie manufacturière : taux de couverture
(exportations/importations)
1.4
1.3
1.2
1.1
1.0
1965
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
1.2.2. Quels sont les principaux avantages comparatifs de l’Europe?
Pour analyser plus en détail les données de commerce extérieur et
leurs implications sur l’évaluation de la compétitivité de l’industrie
manufacturière européenne, on utilise traditionnellement le concept
d’avantages comparatifs révélés (ACR). Pour expliquer l’évolution de
la balance commerciale pour un secteur donné, ce type d’indicateur
permet de discriminer les facteurs d’origine macro-économique
(développement de l’activité, taux de change …) et les facteurs
spécifiques au secteur. On peut l’interpréter comme la contribution de
chaque secteur à la balance commerciale totale6. Une valeur positive
suggère que la balance commerciale d’un secteur donné est mieux
orientée que pour l’ensemble des secteurs et, inversement, une valeur
négative suggère une balance commerciale du secteur moins favorable
que la moyenne. Il s’agit donc de constater des positions relatives et
non une situation absolue.
Ces indicateurs donnent une vision de la spécialisation de l’Europe par
grandes filières de production. Le textile, les métaux non-ferreux,
l’électronique sont en position inférieure à la moyenne. La mécanique
et la chimie sont en situation d’avantage comparatif positif.
6
Pour une présentation détaillée, voir http://www.cepii.fr/francgraph/bdd/chelem.htm.
12
UE-15 : avantages comparatifs par filières en °/oo du PIB
15
°/oo
15
°/oo
Produits chimiques
Mécanique
10
10
5
5
0
0
-5
Textiles
Papier
Fer et acier
Métaux non ferreux
-10
-5
Automobiles
Electricité
Electronique
-10
65 70 75 80 85 90 95 00 05 10
65 70 75 80 85 90 95 00 05 10
A un niveau plus détaillé, différents types de produits peuvent être
classés en fonction de leur niveau d‘avantages comparatifs révélés par
l’observation. On rappelle que la moyenne étant par construction à
zéro, il y a nécessairement des secteurs en position positive et des
secteurs en position négative. Les machines spécialisées, les produits
pharmaceutiques, les moteurs et l’automobile sont par exemple en
position d’avantage comparatif. Les produits textiles, les ordinateurs
ou les produits électroniques de biens de consommation sont en
position négative.
13
Tableau 2
Avantages comparatifs de l’Union européenne à 15
par produits (2006, °/oo PIB)
Avantages comparatifs supérieurs
à la moyenne
Machines spécialisées
3,95
Produits pharmaceutiques
3,60
Moteurs
2,73
Automobiles et cycles
2,48
Articles en plastique
2,03
Quincaillerie
2,00
Hygiène beauté
1,78
Véhicules utilitaires
1,75
Equipements pour al construction
1,72
Instruments de précision
1,46
Ensemble des secteurs
0
Source : Banque de données Cepii-Chelem
Avantages comparatifs inférieurs à la
moyenne
Montres
Bateaux
Tapis
Articles manufacturés divers.
Articles en cuir
Métaux non ferreux
Biens de consommation électroniques
Bonneterie
Confection
Equipements informatiques
-0,21
-0,27
-0,37
-0,60
-0,76
-1,76
-1,82
-1,89
-1,91
-3,19
Le tableau ci-dessus permet d’identifier les secteurs industriels dans
lesquels l’Europe a un avantage dans la compétition mondiale. Pour le
futur, cela devrait conduire à se poser deux séries de questions.
Premièrement, quels sont les changements qui vont intervenir dans ces
industries, en termes de compétiteurs, de produits et de processus de
production ? Cela doit aussi permettre de s’interroger sur les
avantages que l’Europe peut offrir pour attirer les investisseurs
mondiaux dans ces activités.
Il faut souligner ici que la spécialisation internationale ne doit pas
seulement être appréciée par secteurs, mais aussi par stades de
production. Cette division du travail est ainsi établie afin d’utiliser les
principaux atouts des différents pays : les produits sont assemblés
dans les pays où les coûts de main-d’œuvre sont bas, tandis que les
économies développées se concentrent sur des activités ayant un fort
contenue en travail qualifié. Deuxièmement, la spécialisation des pays
ou des régions ne doit pas être seulement considérée en termes de
produits ou de secteurs, mais aussi par gammes. Des études récentes
établies à partir de bases de données très détaillées montrent que
l’Europe est spécialisée sur les produits haut de gamme et a réussi à
conserver ses parts de marché mondiales sur ce segment (Fontagné,
Gaulier et Zignago, 2008).
14
Part de marché mondiale (hors intra-UE) par gamme
produits manufacturés (1995 et 2004, %)
Source : Fontagné, Gaulier et Zignago, 2008
1.2.3. Taux de change et compétitivité de l’Europe
La compétitivité peut être évaluée soit en termes de performances, soit
en considérant ses principaux déterminants. A court terme, la
compétitivité-prix peut être fortement affectée par les mouvements de
change.
Marché des changes
1.6
1 € = ... $
1.4
350
300
1 € = ... ¥
250
1.2
200
1.0
150
0.8
0.7
100
79 81 83 85 87 89 91 93 95 97 99 01 03 05 07 09
13
1 € = ... yuan
79818385878991939597990103050709
0.85
1 € = ... £
0.75
7
5
0.65
3
2
0.55
1
0.50
79 81 83 85 87 89 91 93 95 97 99 01 03 05 07 09
79818385878991939597990103050709
15
Au cours des dernières années, l’appréciation de l’euro a constitué un
frein au développement des exportations des pays membres de
l’Union économique et monétaire (UEM), même si certains pays ont
réussi à contrebalancer ce désavantage par d’autres facteurs,
notamment l’Allemagne.
Performances à l'exportation *
130
Indice de volume, 2005=100
125
120
Etats-Unis
Japon
Zone euro
115
110
105
100
95
95
96
97
98
99
00
01
02
03
04
05
06
07
08
Source : Coe-Rexecode
* Exportations / demande mondiale
S’agissant des coûts salariaux dans l’industrie manufacturière,
mesurés ici par heure travaillée, la position de la zone euro s’est
récemment détériorée, sous l’effet de l’appréciation de l’euro.
Coûts horaires de la main-d'œuvre
Industrie manufacturière
120
Zone Euro = 100
100
80
Etats-Unis
Japon
Royaume-Uni
60
40
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
Source : Eurostat
16
Une tendance similaire est observée pour les coûts salariaux unitaires,
bien que dans une moindre mesure, les efforts faits par les pays de la
zone euro pour contrôler leurs coûts unitaires ayant été effacés par les
évolutions de change.
Coûts unitaires de la main-d'œuvre (en dollars)
140
1990=100
120
100
80
Etats-Unis
Japon
Corée
Taiwan
UE *
60
40
20
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
Source : BLS
* UE =Belgique, Danemark, France, Allemagne, Itale, Pays-Bas, Espagne, Royaume-Uni
2. Principaux défis pour le futur
Si l’industrie européenne a fait preuve de résilience au cours des
dernières années, elle devra faire face à de nombreux défis pour
l’avenir. Selon une étude récente de la CNUCED, les entreprises
industrielles multinationales privilégient l’Asie pour leurs
investissements directs, en raison de l’expansion de ses marchés et de
sa compétitivité en termes de coûts salariaux. L’Europe est plutôt mal
classée. Par comparaison, l’Europe bénéficie d’un meilleur classement
pour les activités de services, ce qui est lié à la nécessité d’une
implantation proche des marchés pour le développement de ce type
d’activités.
17
Tableau 3
Attractivité des régions pour les IDE
dans l’industrie manufacturière et les services (2007-2009, pourcentage des réponses)
Région d’accueil
Asie du Sud, de l’Est et du Sud-Est
Nouveaux membres UE (12 pays)
Amérique latine
Amérique du Nord
Autres pays développés
Europe du Sud-Est et CEI
Afrique Sub-saharienne
Asie de l’Ouest
Europe de l’Ouest
Monde
Source : CNUCED
Ind. Manuf.
Services
50
4
10
12
3
10
2
3
5
100
28
7
2
11
7
12
4
3
26
100
Naturellement, ce type d’enquête doit être pris avec précaution. Elle
devrait être confrontée à des données statistiques observées.
Cependant, il est bien connu que dans les statistiques de balance des
paiements, une large part des IDE est le fait de holdings. C’est
pourquoi les comparaisons sectorielles ne sont pas fiables, car elles
conduisent à sous-estimer le poids des IDE réalisés dans l’industrie et
les services.
Une augmentation des coûts de transport liée à la hausse des prix de
l’énergie ou un retournement économique dans les pays émergents
pourrait atténuer la pression concurrentielle qui s’exerce sur l’Europe.
Cependant, de telles perspectives mettent clairement en évidence une
menace pour l’industrie manufacturière européenne, impliquant une
réaction à la fois des pouvoirs publics et du secteur privé.
Quatre défis principaux sont analysés ci-après : l’environnement des
affaires, la formation, la recherche-développement et les politiques
environnementales.
2.1 Un environnement propice aux affaires
Bien sûr, l’environnement des affaires ne concerne pas uniquement
l’industrie. Néanmoins, faisant face à de nombreux changements en
termes de marchés, de compétiteurs, de règlementation, les entreprises
industrielles européennes doivent rapidement s’adapter à cet
environnement évolutif.
Cela pose la question de l’objectif des politiques industrielles. Dans
les années 1970, cette notion était comprise comme la responsabilité
18
des administrations publiques d’identifier des activités stratégiques et
d’entreprendre des programmes à moyen terme pour encourager le
développement de ces activités ainsi que procurer une aide et une
protection pour les industries considérées comme stratégiques.
Aujourd’hui, la politique industrielle doit être probablement repensée.
Son rôle pourrait être de procurer un cadre approprié pour les
entreprises afin de faire de l’Europe un lieu attractif pour les activités
industrielles, à la fois en termes d’investissements et d’emplois. Une
distinction claire peut être faite entre des politiques sectorielles et des
politiques industrielles horizontales (EEAG, 2008).
Cela peut inclure de nombreux objectifs intermédiaires, autant sur le
plan national qu’européen. Par exemple, au cours des dernières
années, de nombreux pays européens ont mis en œuvre des mesures
afin de rendre plus flexible leur marché du travail. Un autre élément
clef pour conserver l’attractivité de l’Europe pour les activités
industrielles est de maintenir une compétition loyale entre Etats
Membres et d’éviter tout type de distorsion (fiscalité, barrières
commerciales …) qui pourrait empêcher une allocation optimale des
ressources. C’est clairement une condition de pérennité du marché
unique européen. La politique commerciale est un sujet qui doit être
typiquement discuté au niveau européen. Celle-ci doit être orientée en
direction d’une stratégie claire d’ouverture réciproque des marchés
tiers. Si l’accessibilité au marché européen des entreprises
ressortissantes de pays non-membres de l’UE doit être encouragée,
elle doit être contrebalancée par un accès facilité aux marchés tiers
pour les entreprises européennes. Un autre sujet crucial qui doit être
débattu au niveau européen porte sur les droits de propriété
intellectuelle, qui constituent un facteur de compétitivité.
Il est aussi vital pour les entreprises européennes d’avoir une visibilité
de l’environnement des affaires à moyen terme. Par exemple, si de
nouvelles réglementations environnementales doivent être mises en
œuvre, le calendrier de ces changements doit être connu. Il peut être
couteux et contreproductif pour les entreprises européennes de devoir
toujours s’adapter à des règles du jeu mouvantes.
2.2. La formation : une clef du succès
Dans le contexte actuel, il apparaît clairement que l’Europe ne peut
concurrencer certaines régions en termes de créations d’emplois
industriels, en raison des écarts de coûts salariaux. Ce qui est vrai
aujourd’hui pour les puissances industrielles européennes historiques,
le sera aussi demain pour les nouveaux Etats Membres, leur marché
19
du travail étant souvent étroit et l’émigration ayant accru la rareté de
l’offre de travail pour certaines qualifications.
Afin de rester compétitive, l’Europe doit donc se construire d’autres
atouts. La formation constitue naturellement un élément clef. Suite au
développement de la bulle sur les marchés financiers dans la première
moitié des années 2000, beaucoup d’étudiants ont été attirés par
l’industrie financière. Cela a contribué à renforcer la difficulté pour
les entreprises industrielles pour recruter des jeunes ingénieurs de
talent.
Plus généralement, les entreprises industrielles européennes ont besoin
de personnel qualifié de tout niveau -ouvriers qualifiés, maîtrise,
ingénieurs- pour répondre à la création de produits toujours plus
complexes et innovants. C’est aussi un élément fondamental pour
aider les entreprises industrielles européennes à développer de
nouveaux services et proposer des solutions sur mesure. Cela peut être
une clef du succès pour résister à la vague de produits de masse
émanant des pays émergents.
De fait, le principal risque pour l’Europe serait de ne plus être
compétitive vis-à-vis des pays à bas coûts salariaux et de ne pas être
capable de répondre aux exigences techniques pour faire face à la
concurrence des pays développés (Etats-Unis et Japon).
2.3. Stimuler la recherche et l’innovation
Dans le contexte de l’émergence de nouveaux concurrents, il est
communément admis que la recherche et l’innovation peuvent
permettre de conserver le leadership technologique et donc de
compenser les handicaps de coûts des entreprises opérant en Europe.
La question est donc de savoir comment on peut favoriser la
recherche, notamment dans l’industrie qui concentre 80 % des
dépenses européennes de R&D du secteur privé. En 2007, les
dépenses intérieures de R&D réalisées dans l’industrie pour
l’ensemble de l’UE-27 représentait 167 milliards de dollars à parité de
pouvoir d’achat, contre 61,7 milliards en Chine et 107,2 au Japon,
mais comparés à 240,9 milliards aux Etats-Unis. En outre, la part de
l’UE-27 dans les familles triadiques de brevets7 était de 29 % en 2005,
légèrement inférieure à celle des Etats-Unis (31,4 %) et du Japon
(29,8 %).
7
Seuls les pays de l’OCDE sont pris en compte.
20
Pour certaines activités, la différenciation des produits comme le
développement de niches sont déterminants pour l’activité et la
compétitivité. Dans ce contexte, l’innovation en termes de produits ou
de processus de fabrication sont aussi importants que les recherches
fondamentales pour rester un acteur clef. Les activités de R&D
doivent donc être orientées vers des recherches appliquées, même si la
recherche fondamentale et académique constitue un élément essentiel
pour le futur. Cela signifie que les entreprises doivent être considérées
comme des acteurs majeurs pour l’innovation.
Pour certaines activités, les économies d’échelle nécessitent
probablement d’encourager les entreprises européennes à coopérer
afin d’atteindre le seuil d’exigence demandé au niveau mondial. Dans
le passé, l’aéronautique et l’espace ont fourni une bonne illustration de
ce type de pratique. Cela ne veut pas dire que cela doit entraîner des
fusions et des acquisitions externes, mais cela signifie plutôt que ce
type de coopération doit être basé sur des alliances. Par exemple, les
constructeurs d’automobiles ont d’ores et déjà coopéré sur le
développement de motorisations communes, sans liens capitalistiques
entre les entreprises concernées.
Dans ce contexte, le partenariat public-privé doit être encouragé.
Evidemment, cela peut prendre la forme d’incitations fiscales. Afin
d’encourager la coopération transnationale, de telles mesures
devraient être mises en œuvre au niveau européen. Le partenariat
public-privé peut aussi prendre la forme d’une coopération plus
approfondie entre l’université et les entreprises. Les recherches
fondamentales devraient aussi être suivies par des innovations initiées
dans les entreprises afin de répondre aux besoins de la demande.
2.4. Menaces et opportunités liées aux politiques environnementales
Ces dernières années, les questions environnementales ont été placées
au cœur des préoccupations sociétales et politiques. Cela couvre une
large palette d’aspects comme le réchauffement climatique et plus
largement le développement durable.
S’agissant des émissions de gaz à effet de serre, l’Europe peut plutôt
être rangée du côté des bons élèves, comparativement à d’autres
régions. En 2005, l’UE-27 représentait 12 % des émissions mondiales,
moins que la Chine. En outre, les émissions européennes ont été plus
faibles en 2005 qu’en 1990, malgré une légère hausse sur la première
21
moitié de cette décennie. Cela peut être comparé à une forte
augmentation dans les BRIC8.
Tableau 4
Emissions de CO2 pour quelques pays (1990-2005) – en Gt de CO2
France
UE27
Etats-Unis
Canada
Japon
Chine
Inde
Brésil
Russie
Monde
1990
1995
2000
2005
0,5
5,4
6,3
0,6
1,2
3,9
1,6
1,2
3,1
34,4
0,5
5,1
6,6
0,7
1,3
5,0
1,8
1,2
2,2
35,3
0,5
5,0
7,2
0,7
1,4
5,2
2,2
1,8
2,2
39,0
0,6
5,2
7,3
0,7
1,4
7,5
2,4
1,9
2,2
43,3
Source : AIE
Les politiques environnementales européennes visent donc une
certaine exemplarité afin d’encourager les autres pays à adopter une
réglementation comparable. Si elles restent isolées, cela n’aura pas un
impact très important sur les conditions globales environnementales et
cela sera même une source d’affaiblissement de la compétitivité de
l’Europe comme lieu d’implantation des activités industrielles.
Cela fournit des orientations pour les politiques industrielles et
environnementales européennes. Le coût additionnel des contraintes
environnementales et des réglementations doit être partagé au niveau
mondial. Autrement, cela pourrait conduire à une relocalisation de
certaines activités dans d’autres lieux, où les réglementations sont plus
tolérantes qu’en Europe. Cela pose la question difficile du contrôle
des labels environnementaux pour les produits consommés en Europe.
Pour les produits finis, la question peut être résolue de manière assez
simple. Mais quand les contraintes environnementales portent sur les
processus de production et non pas sur le produit fini (par exemple
dans la chimie), cela pose la question de savoir comment contrôler la
compatibilité des processus de production en dehors de l’Union ?
Autrement, les produits pourraient être importés de pays dotés d’une
règlementation environnementale conciliante se traduisant par des
coûts de production plus faibles.
D’un autre côté, les contraintes environnementales peuvent aussi
constituer une opportunité pour les entreprises européennes. Cela peut
8
Brésil, Russie, Inde et Chine.
22
impliquer l’apparition de nouvelles technologies, sur lesquelles
l’Europe doit bâtir un avantage comparatif afin d’être un acteur de
référence. De cette façon, cela peut transformer une contrainte en une
opportunité. Bien sûr, dans un monde caractérisé par une relative
rareté des matières premières, et donc des prix élevés, l’utilisation de
technologies moins intensives en énergie peut aussi être une source de
compétitivité.
Prix des matières premières *
650
1973=100
400
200
Brent
Matières premières industrielles
100
60
40
1970
1975
1980
1985
1990
1995
2000
2005
2010
Sources : FMI et Global insight
* Déflaté par les prix français à la consommation
Conclusion
Plusieurs scénarii peuvent être imaginés concernant le futur de
l’industrie européenne.
Dans un scénario noir, la concurrence des économies émergentes
(Chine, Inde, Brésil, etc.) conduirait à un rétrécissement de la base
industrielle de l’Europe. Dans ce scénario, la croissance du PIB serait
réduite substantiellement, les activités de services aux entreprises se
contractant et, plus généralement, le pouvoir d’achat des Européens
serait affaibli compte tenu des effets induits et multiplicateurs sur
l’emploi. Certains pays ont réussi à conserver une croissance
économique honorable en dépit des difficultés rencontrées par leur
secteur industriel. Mais elles ont bénéficié de l’émergence d’activités
spécifiques (industrie financière au Royaume-Uni, industrie pétrolière
en Norvège, etc.), qui ne peuvent être répliquées au niveau d’une
région comme l’Europe.
23
Heureusement, l’Europe a entre les mains les outils pour éviter ce
scénario. Les risques et contraintes que l’on peut déduire des
tendances passées ont été identifiés dans la première partie de ce
document. Les avantages comparatifs de l’Europe vont être de plus en
plus discutés dans le futur, sur les marchés haut de gamme par les
Etats-Unis et le Japon et sur les marchés bas de gamme par les pays
émergents. Cependant, l’Europe peut faire face à cette intensification
de la concurrence à travers différents canaux :
- Etre présents sur les marchés de niche dans des activités
industrielles avancées (mécanique, textiles haut de gamme, produits
pharmaceutiques, etc.) ;
- Se focaliser sur les activités à fort contenu en valeur ajoutée dans
lesquelles l’Europe a développé un leadership technologique
(moteurs économes en énergies pour les avions et l’automobile,
produits chimiques, etc.) ;
- Développer une coopération fructueuse entre les Etats-membres
historiques et les nouveaux Etats-membres en prenant appui sur ce
qu’ont fait les entreprises allemandes (externalisation de certains
inputs), à l’image du Japon avec les autres pays asiatiques.
Donner aux entreprises l’opportunité de faire face à ces nouveaux
défis devrait être l’objectif principal d’une politique industrielle
européenne pour les prochaines années.
Références
De Nardis S., R. De Santis, C. Vicarelli (2008), The Single Currency’s
Effects on Eurozone Sectoral Trade: Winners and Losers?,
Economics Discussion Papers, No 2008-1
http://www.economics-ejournal.org/economics/discussionpapers/2008-1.
EEAG (2008), Europe in a Globalised World.
European Commission (2005), Implementing the Community Lisbon
Programme: A policy framework to strengthen EU
manufacturing – towards a more integrated approach for
industrial policy?, COM (2005) 474, October.
Fontagné L., G. Gaulier and S. Zignago (2008), Specialization across
varieties and North-South competition, Economic Policy 23(53),
pp51-91.
Sinn H.W. (2003), “4,5 Millionen Verlierer", Die Zeit, December 28.
24

Euren - Industry in Europe final - Coe

Transcription

Documents pareils

statistiques des ventes dans notre industrie sales statistics in our

Revue de presse ANGLAIS Semaine du 31 octobre au 06 novembre

Mots et expressions anglo-saxons utilisés dans la langue française

Abortion overview - Classes

resume - Global Health Promotion

Inquiry Overview

Revue de presse ANGLAIS Semaine du 03 au 09 octobre 2011

PDF - Occupons Montréal

Toms Cheap Online gives cheaper Toms Campus Classics

Revue de presse ANGLAIS Semaine du 24 au 30 octobre 2011