Building Peace by Intercultural Dialogue Construction de la Paix par

Transcription

Building Peace
by Intercultural
Dialogue
Construction de la Paix
par le Dialogue
Interculturel
Kirsi Henriksson & Anitta Kynsilehto (eds.)
Building Peace by
Intercultural Dialogue
Construction de la Paix par
le Dialogue Interculturel
Tampere Peace Research Institute
Occasional Paper No. 97, 2008
Building Peace by
Intercultural Dialogue
Essays in Honour of Professor Tuomo Melasuo
on the Occasion of his 60th birthday
Construction de la Paix par
le Dialogue Interculturel
Mélanges en l’honneur de la 60ème
anniversaire du Professeur Tuomo Melasuo
Kirsi Henriksson & Anitta Kynsilehto
(editors éditeurs)
Tampere Peace Research Institute TAPRI
FI-33014 University of Tampere, Finland
www.uta.fi/tapri
© Authors & TAPRI
Layout: Kirsi Henriksson
Cover design: Katri Wallenius
Proofreading: Joan Löfgren, Tiina Kanninen, Kirsi Henriksson & Anitta
Kynsilehto
ISBN: 978–951–706–212–1
ISSN: 0355–5577
Printed by Gummerus Printing
Jyväskylä
2nd edition
Institut de Recherche de la Paix à Tampere TAPRI
FI-33014 Université de Tampere, Finlande
www.uta.fi/tapri
© Auteurs & TAPRI
Mise en page : Kirsi Henriksson
Réalisation de couverture : Katri Wallenius
Révision de langage : Kirsi Henriksson & Anitta Kynsilehto
ISBN: 978–951–706–212–1
ISSN: 0355–5577
Imprimé par Gummerus Printing
Jyväskylä
2ème édition
,6%1SGI
,6617$35,1HW6HULHV
CONTENTS
CONTENU
Tabula Gratulatoria.............................................................................................................9
Introduction (in English & en français)
Kirsi Henriksson & Anitta Kynsilehto................................................................................15
1
Algeria: Past, Present, Future
Algérie: Passé, Présent, Avenir
Algerian women in movement: three waves of feminist activism
Valentine M. Moghadam....................................................................................................21
«Le mal vient de l’extérieur»: les socialistes français et le problème
algérien
Kirsi Henriksson.....................................................................................................................49
La diplomatie algérienne au XXIè siècle
Lotfi Boumghar.....................................................................................................................67
Algeria nuoren silmin
Karim Maiche.........................................................................................................................73
2
Peace Research – Development Studies:
Approaches to Conflicts and Development
Recherche sur la paix – Études du développement :
approches sur conflits et développement
Who is progressive today? Thoughts on sustainable development
in a globalized but unjust economy
Jan Otto Andersson..............................................................................................................83
Quo vadis kehitys(maa)tutkimus?
Pertti Multanen.....................................................................................................................91
Peace and democracy in Wilhelm Bolin’s political philosophy
Jyrki Käkönen.........................................................................................................................99
How many wars, how many dead, how many peace deals?
Unto Vesa.............................................................................................................................115
A troubled relationship: peace research and emancipation
Tarja Väyrynen....................................................................................................................127
Touch and vision
Frank Möller.........................................................................................................................135
3
Cultural and Political Encounters in the Mediterranean
Rencontres culturels et politiques autour de la Méditerranée
Tuomo Melasuo, un finlandese per il Dialogo euro-mediterraneo
Salvatore Bono....................................................................................................................149
Réflexions sur le processus de Barcelone 1995–2008
Paul Balta.............................................................................................................................157
Les deux rives de la Méditerranée : toujours les mêmes asymétries
Ahmed Driss.........................................................................................................................165
Les enjeux méditerranéens de la crise européenne
Jean-Robert Henry.............................................................................................................175
Barcelonan prosessista Välimeren Unioniin – mihin sillä pyritään?
Risto Veltheim.....................................................................................................................183
Cultural cooperation across the Mediterranean: where is the common
ground?
Traugott Schoefthaler.......................................................................................................193
Islamic Cairo imagined: from a historical city slum to a time machine for
tourism?
Susanna Myllylä.................................................................................................................215
Economic challenges facing Jordan within the Euromed context
Seyfeddin Muaz..................................................................................................................235
What kind of security policies between the Maghreb, the US and the EU?
Ulla Holm..............................................................................................................................245
4
Occidentalism – Orientalism: Approaches to Otherness
Orientalisme – Occidentalisme : approches sur l’altérité
From Orientalism to Occidentalism
Hassan Hanafi.....................................................................................................................257
Islam, Europe, Occident : combats pour un humanisme commun
Mohammed Arkoun..........................................................................................................267
The implications of Arab Islamic influence on the Italian Renaissance for
the Europeanization of Europe’s Muslims today
Peter Gran.............................................................................................................................303
Islamism: amity and enmity
Mehdi Mozaffari.................................................................................................................319
The Prophet’s tradition or modernity of the state – the case of Turkish
hadith project
Sylvia Akar............................................................................................................................329
The secularising force of engaged religion: reflections on Iranian and
Egyptian Islamism
Bjørn Olav Utvik..................................................................................................................335
Globalised Islam and the Alliance of Civilizations
Kirsti Westphalen...............................................................................................................349
Authors – Auteurs............................................................................................................357
Tabula Gratulatoria
Esa Aallas
Aulis Aarnio
Sylvia Akar
Matti Alestalo
Jan Otto Andersson
Luigi G. de Anna
Esko Antola
Claude Anttila
Osmo Apunen
Caterina Arcidiacono
Mohammed Arkoun
Saâd Baddou
Paul Balta
Salvatore Bono
Olavi Borg
Anasse Bouhlal
Lotfi Boumghar
Inga Brandell
Michele Brondino
François Burgat
Michele Capasso
Louis Clerc
Ahmed Driss
Sauli Feodorow
Tuomas Forsberg
Yves Gambier
Construction de la Paix par le Dialogue Interculturel
Tabula Gratulatoria
10
Peter Gran
Sinikka Hakala
Hassan Hanafi
Risto Heiskala
Kirsi Henriksson
Jean-Robert Henry
Nils G. Holm
Ulla Holm
Zabrina Holmström
Vesa Jaakkola
May Jayyusi
Pirjo Jukarainen
Martti Julkunen
Pirkko Julkunen
Matti Jutila
Veli-Pekka Järvinen
Jorma Kalela
Nora Kalso
Tiina Kanninen
Kari Karanko
Ari Kerkkänen
Matti Klinge
Jukka Kultalahti
Olli Kultalahti
Anitta Kynsilehto
Christian Krötzl
Jyrki Käkönen
Rilli Lappalainen
Marnia Lazreg
Building Peace by Intercultural Dialogue
Tabula Gratulatoria
11
Marko Lehti
Liisa Liimatainen
Pertti Luntinen
Mikko Lohikoski
Joan Löfgren
Ahmed Mahiou
Karim Maiche
Helena Manninen-Visuri
Tuomas Martikainen
Pekka Masonen
Simon Mercieca
Timo Moberg
Valentine M. Moghadam
Mehdi Mozaffari
Seyfeddin Muaz
Pertti Multanen
Juhani Mylly
Susanna Myllylä
Frank Möller
Anssi Männistö
Arto Nokkala
Kaarle Nordenstreng
Kari Norkonmaa
Jussi Nuorteva
Matti Ojanperä
Jussi Pakkasvirta
Heikki Paloheimo
Samu Pehkonen
Franco Rizzi
Tabula Gratulatoria
12
Allan Rosas
Lars Rudebeck
Antti Rytövuori
Helena Rytövuori-Apunen
M’hammed Sabour
Sylvain Sagne
Traugott Schoefthaler
Tarja Seppä
Jorma Sipilä
Timo Soikkanen
Gianluca Solera
Ilkka Taipale
Maaret Tervonen
Maila-Katriina Tuominen
Rauni Turkia
Klaus Törnudd
Bjørn Olav Utvik
Katri Wallenius
Krista Varantola
Tapio Varis
Olli Vehviläinen
Risto Veltheim
Unto Vesa
Lars Wessman
Kirsti Westphalen
Knut S. Vikør
Keijo Virtanen
Pekka Visuri
Kyösti Vuontela
Tabula Gratulatoria
13
Ulla Vuorela
Tarja Väyrynen
Kaarlo Yrttiaho
Kaj Öhrnberg
Markku Äärimaa
Crisis Management Centre (CMC) Finland
Donnerska Institutet, Stiftelsen för Åbo Akademi
Poliittisen historian laitos, Turun yliopisto
Suomalais-Ranskalainen Teknillistieteellinen Seura
Suomen Lähi-idän instituutin säätiö
Suomen rauhantutkimusyhdistys
Suomen Unesco-toimikunta
Tampereen yliopiston tukisäätiö
Ulkopoliittinen instituutti
Universitá del Mediterraneo
Yhteiskuntatutkimuksen instituutti, Tampereen yliopisto
Introduction
The building of peace through intercultural dialogue is a recurring theme
we have identified in Tuomo’s work. Rather than using “peace-building” in
its conventional form, by our choice of building peace we wish to highlight
the long-term dimensions of evolving peaceful relations. This can hardly be
achieved without intercultural dialogue, understood as open and respectful
engagement in the exchange of views by groups and individuals from
different ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic backgrounds. Intercultural
dialogue is ultimately about people; about persons coming from different
backgrounds who are willing to come together, share ideas and engage
in dialogue with each other in a constructive spirit of mutual respect and
understanding. It thus stands in opposition to rejection and violence.
At the present day of intercultural and intracultural relations, in which peace
is mostly forgotten while trying to achieve “security” in its different forms,
peace research provides critical tools to analyse these complex relations.
As we see it, Tuomo entered peace research via the Third World movement,
tiersmondisme, which was closely connected to the decolonisation process.
From this context raises also Tuomo’s interest towards the development
studies. His approach to formerly colonized countries has always been that
of equal opportunities and respect which, sadly, are still missing in relations
between “North” and “South.”
Algeria is the country that first caught Tuomo’s attention and it is the
country that he has followed closely ever since. Along with his specific
interest in Algeria, North Africa and Middle East have been close to his heart.
Instead of focusing on polarized conflicts, he has always emphasised different
ways of building bridges across the Mediterranean. Indeed, Tuomo has been
the most prominent Finnish personality in advocating the Mediterranean
partnership. The current forms of Euro-Mediterranean partnership or the
Barcelona Process: Union for the Mediterranean as the title for this multilateral
cooperation currently stands is one form of bridge-building across the
Mediterranean. In enhancement of the cultural cooperation in the area, the
Anna Lindh Foundation for the Dialogue between Cultures was established in
2005. Here, Tuomo was selected as a member of the Advisory Council, and
16
he was also nominated as the coordinator for the Finnish National Network
for the Anna Lindh Foundation since the beginning. In addition, Tuomo has
been present in the Euro-Mediterranean Study Commission (EuroMeSCo) and
the FEMISE-network, thus being the person who is perhaps the most familiar
with the different forms of cooperation across the Mediterranean within the
Euro-Mediterranean mega-region.
This Festschrift has been composed with two main intentions: to
thematically handle some of those versatile topics that Tuomo has worked
on during his career; and to reveal the extensive international network that
Tuomo has been knitting during these years, helping also his students to
connect into this network. It is time to acknowledge his work as an “unofficial
diplomat” of Finland especially in the Mediterranean region.
We wish to thank all the people who responded positively to our call and
were willing to contribute to this volume. In fact, there were many more
colleagues of Tuomo who would have liked to contribute, but due to lack of
time were not able to do so. We also thank their support and kind words.
Moreover, we would like to thank those involved in making this publication
real. From the Tampere Peace Research Institute and the Finnish Peace
Research Association we want to thank Frank Möller, Unto Vesa and Samu
Pehkonen. For their patient proof-reading work we thank Joan Löfgren and
Tiina Kanninen and, for the elegant cover design, Katri Wallenius. The biggest
hug goes to Leena, Emilia and Miina Melasuo, however, for their support in
disseminating the information about this Festschrift to Tuomo’s friends and
colleagues all over the world.
Introduction
Construire la paix par le dialogue interculturel est le thème que nous avons
identifié dans l’œuvre de Tuomo. Au lieu d’utiliser la consolidation de la
paix dans son sens conventionnel, par notre choix pour construire la paix
nous voulons souligner les dimensions de long terme dans l’évolution des
relations pacifiques. Cela ne peut se faire que difficilement sans le dialogue
interculturel, c’est-à-dire l’engagement ouvert et respectueux à l’échange
des points de vue par les groupes et les individus des origines ethniques,
culturelles, religieuses et linguistiques différentes. Le dialogue interculturel,
il s’agît tout d’abord des personnes humaines; des personnes humaines qui,
malgré leurs histoires particulières se rencontrent et engagent en dialogue
dans un esprit de respect et compréhension mutuelle. Donc, il s’oppose au
rejet de l’autre et à la violence.
L’heure actuelle des relations interculturelles et intraculturelles qui oublie
souvent la paix en se focalisant sur la « sécurité » dans ses formes différentes,
pourrait profiter des méthodes critiques de la recherche de la paix afin
d’analyser ces relations complexes. Comme nous le voyons, Tuomo entra la
recherche de la paix par le mouvement tiers-mondiste, qui était étroitement
lié au processus de décolonisation. C’est ce contexte qui l’a amené aussi vers
les études de dévéloppement. Son approche sur les pays anciennement
colonisés a toujours été l’une de l’égalité et du respect qu’on ne trouve
malheureusement pas souvent dans les relations entre le « Nord » et le
« Sud ».
Algérie est le pays qui a capturé l’attention de Tuomo au premier, et il ne l’a
quittée depuis. Son intérêt spécial sur l’Algérie est lié à un intérêt plus vaste
à l’Afrique du Nord et au Moyen Orient. Au lieu de se concentrer simplement
sur les conflits divisés, il a beaucoup insisté sur les possibilités de construire
des ponts à travers la mer méditerranéenne. En tant que la personnalité
avec le plus de connaissance ainsi que d’espoir par rapport au Partenariat
Euro-Méditerranéen, Tuomo a été le porte-parole de la coopération transméditerranéenne en Finlande. Il a été nommé au conseil consultatif de
la Fondation Anna Lindh pour le Dialogue entre les Cultures ainsi que le
coordinateur du Réseau National de Finlande de la Fondation Anna Lindh
18
dès la naissance de la Fondation en 2005. En tant que membre des différents
réseaux de coopération tels que Euro-Mediterranean Study Commission
(EuroMeSCo) et le réseau Femise, il est la personne qui est peut-être le plus
au courant de différentes formes de la coopération euro-méditerranéenne
autour la mega-région.
Ce Festschrift a été composé avec deux intentions majeures : afin de
traiter thématiquement une partie de la variété des thèmes sur lesquels
Tuomo a travaillé pendant son carrière ; et afin de rendre visible le réseau
international extensif que Tuomo a soudé pendant son carrière, en aidant
aussi ses étudiants de se lier à ce réseau. Il est temps de rendre hommage à
son travail en tant qu’un « diplomate officieux » de la Finlande spécialement
dans la région méditerranéenne.
Nous voulons remercier chaleureusement toutes les personnes qui ont
répondu positivement à notre appel et qui ont contribué à cet ouvrage. Les
collègues de Tuomo qui auraient voulu contribuer mais qui ne l’ont pas pu
faute du temps sont encore plus nombreux. Nous les remercions aussi pour
leur soutien et gentillesse.
Nous remercions aussi ceux qui ont aidé à faire cette publication une réalité.
De l’Institut de Recherche de la Paix à Tampere et de l’Association Finlandaise
pour la Recherche de la Paix, nous voulons remercier Frank Möller, Unto
Vesa et Samu Pehkonen. De leur patience dans le travail de relecture, nous
remercions Joan Löfgren et Tiina Kanninen, ainsi que Katri Wallenius pour
le design élégant de la couverture. Le plus grand remerciement est destiné
à Leena, Emilia et Miina Melasuo pour leur soutien dans la distribution de
l’information sur ce Festshcrift aux amis et collègues de Tuomo autour du
monde entier.
Algerian women in movement:
three waves of feminist activism
The Middle East and North Africa region is better known for its authoritarian
forms of governance and for Islamist movements than it is for women’s
movements. And yet the region is rife with women’s mobilizations of
various kinds, from development-oriented NGOs and service organizations
to research institutes and women’s rights groups. In keeping with Tuomo
Melasuo’s longstanding interest in Algeria, this paper examines three
waves of Algerian women’s collective action since the 1980s: against the
new family code in the immediate post-Boumedienne period; against
the Islamist movement and le terrorisme of the 1990s; and for gender
justice in the new millennium. Little known outside a relatively restricted
francophone community of scholar-activists, the Algerian women’s
movement not only undermines continued stereotypes about the absence
of independent mobilizations in the Arab region but also confirms the
main postulates of social movement theories. We begin with a conceptual
framework that links demographic changes and the “political opportunity
structure” to the articulation of grievances and the emergence of women’s
mobilizations, a framework that can be used to understand both the rise
of women’s movements on a world scale and the emergence of nationallybased activism such as that in Algeria. This is followed by an overview of
the relevant historical events in Algeria, and a more detailed examination
of the three waves of women’s mobilizations and activism and their broad
social and political implications.
Conceptual framework: structures, grievances, and
mobilizations
In their cross-national and comparative study of women’s movements
during the 20th century, Chafetz and Dworkin situate the impetus for “female
revolt” and opportunities for gender-based mobilization within broad sociodemographic changes. Especially important is female educational attainment
as well as participation in the urban work force, which provides women
with increasing expectations, an emergent gender consciousness, and a
22
clearer understanding of societal constraints, injustices, and opportunities.
Education, employment, and smaller households give “modernizing women”
more time for other public activities and the capacity to make demands
on governments for equality, autonomy, and empowerment. Research has
found that the observation of gaps and disparities among women’s legal
status, social positions, and aspirations leads to the articulation of grievances
and collective action of various types.1
Also helpful in understanding the emergence of the new feminist
movement in Algeria is social movement theorizing. This body of research
has given rise to the concept of the “political opportunity structure,” which
pertains to the broad political (but also economic and social) environment
in which grievances emerge, collective action is possible, and movements
and organizations can take shape. The concept revolves primarily around the
nature of the state and its relations to society, and key questions pertain to
the openness versus closed nature of the state; unity versus cracks within
the political elite; and the presence or absence of elite allies for emerging
movements.2 At the same time, the reality of globalization has compelled
theorists to examine global or transnational opportunities for social movement
organizing, including norm diffusion by international organizations and the
proliferation of all manner of non-governmental organizations in the context
of a changing global political economy.3
Of particular relevance here is the global women’s rights agenda, the
product primarily of advocacy sponsored by the United Nations since the
Decade for Women (1976–1995) and advanced by the four world conferences
on women that took place between 1975 and 1995. Also part of the making
of the global women’s rights agenda was the adoption by governments of
international conventions and norms on women’s equality, human rights,
and empowerment – including the 1979 Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Discrimination against Women, and the 1995 Beijing Declaration
and Platform for Women. Creating a global opportunity conducive to
transnational advocacy of all kinds, including cross-border women’s
1
Chafetz & Dworkin 1986; Rothbard Margolis 1993; Moghadam 1998, esp. ch. 8.
Other key elements within social movement theorizing are mobilizing structures
(the capacity to mobilize financial and human resources and build organizations),
and framing processes (the interpretive, cultural, discursive, and symbolic aspects
of movement-building). See McAdam et al. 1996.
3
See Edwards & Hulme 1992; Smith et al. 1997; Keck & Sikkink 1998; see also Boli
& Thomas 1997.
2
Algerian women in movement
23
organizing and networking, the international agreements and conferences
have provided space, legitimacy, and funding for women’s rights and human
rights organizations, as well as other types of NGOs.4 Thus, when the Collectif
95 Maghreb Egalité was formed by feminists in Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia
in the run-up to the Beijing conference, the group was able to draw on the
emerging global women’s rights agenda, as well as funding from German
foundations, to advance its case for an egalitarian family code. Moreover,
the Collectif relied on the support of other transnational feminist networks,
notably Women Living under Muslim Laws (WLUML), which had formed in 1984
in opposition to Islamic fundamentalism and discriminatory family laws.
The formation of the Collectif took place in the regional context of the
emergence of an array of women’s organizations. In previous work I have
identified seven types of organizing and mobilizing that took place by women
in countries of the Middle East and North Africa. (1) Service organizations are
the oldest type; they include charitable organizations and they have a largely
“welfare” approach; (2) professional associations seek equity for their members
within the profession and the society; many of their members are feminists
who are also members of human rights or women’s rights organizations; (3)
women’s organizations affiliated to political parties are the women’s affiliates
of ruling and non-ruling political parties; (4) worker-based and grassroots
women’s organizations are concerned with the welfare and equity of women
workers and seek to empower women as workers. As such they are oriented
towards meeting the practical needs of women workers rather than any
explicitly feminist goals; (5) development and women-in-development NGOs
provide technical assistance and expertise on issues related to sustainable
development, and implement projects on income-generation and microenterprises for poverty-alleviation, literacy and education, health, family
planning, and community development; in the current lexicon they seek
economic empowerment for women, though not necessarily within a
feminist frame; (6) development research centers and women’s studies institutes
are usually national-based but are increasingly conducting transnational
research activities, especially in North Africa; they sometimes engage in
feminist activism, and feminists may be found among their staff; (7) human
rights/women’s rights organizations have the most transformative potential,
are most likely to experience state harassment, and are the ones where
feminist goals are most explicit.5
4
5
Moghadam 2005.
Moghadam 1998, ch. 8.
24
In understanding the emergence of the Algerian feminist movement and
its various waves since the early 1980s, therefore, we note the relevance of
the political opportunity structure at both national and global levels, the
existence of the global women’s rights agenda, and the capacity for collective
action on the part of a population of educated and employed women. Also
important in shaping the contours of that movement are the evolution of
Algeria’s political culture and the legal status of Algerian women, to which
we now turn.
Historical background: national liberation, patriarchy, and
women
The colonial and anti-colonial experience in Algeria has had a deep and
abiding impact on national identity and on gender relations. For this reason,
and in order to provide a historical background to our examination of the
three waves of women’s activism in Algeria, we begin with the French seizure
of Algeria in 1830.
In contrast to their colonial policy in Morocco after 1912 and Tunisia after
1882, the French in Algeria sought to dismantle Islamic institutions, including
the economic infrastructure and the Islamic cultural network of lodges and
schools. By the turn of the century, there were upwards of half a million
French-speaking settlers in Algeria, and by 1930 European competition had
ruined most of the old artisan class. Small shopkeepers such as grocers and
spice merchants survived, but others suffered severely from the competition
of the petits colons. Industrialization in Algeria was given a low priority by Paris
during the interwar period. Local development and employment-generation
were severely hampered, and there was considerable unemployment and
male migration of the native population. Fierce economic competition,
cultural disrespect, and residential segregation characterized the French
administration.6
In this context, many Algerians regarded Islam and the Muslim family
as sanctuaries from French cultural imperialism. The popular reaction to
the mission civilisatrice was a return to the land, religion, and family, the
foundations of the old community. To many Algerian men in particular, the
unveiled woman represented a capitulation to the European and his culture;
she was a person who had opened herself up to the prurient stares of the
foreigners, a person more vulnerable to (symbolic) rape. The protection and
6
See Metz 1994.
25
seclusion of women were seen by Algerians as a necessary defense against
the French cultural onslaught.7
The anti-colonial movement and its political and military organizations
absorbed some of this thinking. When the Front de Liberation Nationale
(FLN) and the Armée de Liberation Nationale (ALN) were formed, there was no
explicit provision for women to assume political or military responsibilities.
Nonetheless, military exigencies soon forced the officers of the ALN to use
some women combatants. Upwards of 10,000 women participated in the
Algerian revolution. The overwhelming majority of those who served in
the war were nurses, cooks, and laundresses. But many women played in
indispensable role as couriers, and because the French rarely searched them,
women were often used to carry bombs. Among the heroines of the Algerian
revolution were Djamila Bouhired (the first woman sentenced to death),
Djamila Bouazza, Jacqueline Gerroudj, Zahia Khalfallah, Baya Hocine, and
Dkoher Akrour. Women who fought and did not survive the war of liberation
included 20-year-old Hassiba Ben Bouali, killed in the Casbah, and Djennet
Hamidou, who was shot and killed as they tried to escape arrest. She was
seventeen. Yamina Abed, who was wounded in battle, suffered amputation
of both legs.8
One emancipatory development during the national liberation struggle
was the admittance of unmarried women into the ranks of the FLN and ALN
and the emergence by default of voluntary unions unencumbered by family
arrangements, presided over by an FLN officer. (This was poignantly depicted
in a scene in Pontecorvo’s brilliant film Battle of Algiers.) Alya Baffoun notes
that during this “rather exceptional period of struggle for national liberation,”
the marriage of Djamila Bouhired to an “infidel” non-Muslim foreigner was
accepted by her community.9
After independence, the September 1962 constitution made Islam the
official state religion but also guaranteed equality between the sexes and
granted women the right to vote. Ten women were elected deputies of
the new National Assembly and one of them, Fatima Khemisti, drafted
the only significant legislation to affect the status of women passed after
independence. Intended to encourage more education for girls, the Khemisti
law raised the minimum age of marriage for girls to sixteen (though the draft
7
Knauss 1987.
Cherifati-Merabtine 1994.
9
Baffoun 1982, 234. Djamila Bouhired married Jacques Vergès, the French lawyer
who was specialized in political trials.
8
26
bill had originally stipulated age nineteen). In this optimistic time, when
heroines of the revolution were being hailed throughout the country, the
Union Nationale des Femmes Algériennes (UNFA) was formed. Indeed, one
consequence of the Algerian revolution and of women’s role in it was the
emergence of what Cherifa Bouatta and Doria Cherifati-Merabtine call the
“moudjahidate model of womanhood.” The heroic woman fighter was an
inspiration to the 1960s and 1970s generation of Algerians, particularly
Algerian university women.10
But another, more patriarchal tendency was at work during and after the
revolution. One expression of this tendency was the pressure on women
fighters during the liberation struggle to marry and thus prevent gossip
about their behavior. Moreover, despite the incredible sacrifices of Algerian
women, and although the female militants “acceded to the ranks of subjects
of history,” the Algerian revolution was subsequently cast in terms of male
exploits, and the heroic female feats received relatively little attention.11
Following independence, and in a display of authoritarianism, President
Ben Bella proceeded to ban all political parties. The Federation of the FLN
in France, which had advocated a secular state, was dissolved; the new
FLN general secretary, Mohammed Khider, purged the radicals – who had
insisted on the right of workers to strike – from the union’s leadership. And
of women, Khider said: “The way of life of European women is incompatible
with our traditions and our culture … We can only live by the Islamic
morality. European women have no other preoccupations than the twist
and Hollywood stars, and don’t even know the name of the president of
their republic.”12 In a reversal of the political and cultural atmosphere of
the national liberation struggle, patriarchal values became hegemonic
in independent Algeria. In this context, the marriage of another Algerian,
Dalila, to a foreigner was deemed unacceptable. Dalia’s brother abducted
and confined her “with the approving and silent consent of the enlightened
élite and the politically powerful.”13
Patriarchal socialism
Thus, notwithstanding the participation of upwards of 10,000 women in the
Algerian revolution, their future status was already shaped by “the imperative
10
Bouatta 1994, 18–39; See also Cherifati-Merabtine 1994.
Bouatta 1994.
12
Quoted in Knauss 1987, 99.
13
Baffoun 1982, 234.
11
27
needs of the male revolutionaries to restore Arabic as the primary language,
Islam as the religion of the state, Algeria as a fully free and independent
nation, and themselves as sovereigns of the family.”14 In the 1960s, marriage
rates soared for teenaged girls; in 1967 some ten percent of Algerian
girls were married at age fifteen; at age twenty, 73 percent were married.
The crude fertility rate was 6.5 children per woman. The Boumedienne
government’s policy on demographic growth was based on the belief
that a large population was necessary for national power. It was, therefore,
opposed to all forms of birth control unless the mother had already produced
at least four children.15 The government also was confident in the capacity
of its oil-based economy to support a large population. By the end of the
Boumedienne era in 1979, Algeria was home to a huge population of young
people. Some 97 percent of Algerian women were without paid work,
officially regarded as homemakers. While Algeria’s gender ideology favored
domestic roles for women, patriarchal gender relations were reinforced by
the economic situation of high male unemployment and underemployment,
and the absence of a diversified economy or of labor-intensive industries.
By this time, too, the UNFA had become the women’s auxiliary of the FLN,
devoid of feminist objectives.
In the 1970s and the 1980s, some women candidates were elected to
provincial and local assemblies and a few were appointed to ministerial and
sub-ministerial positions, but the Algerian political class was overwhelmingly
male, and women were greatly under-represented in political decisionmaking positions.16 The Algerian professional class included women in such
occupations as doctor, nurse, teacher, university professor, and – significantly
– judge. But most Algerian women were classified as homemakers, did not
take part in gainful employment, and had no access to economic resources
or income. By the 1990s, women aged 15–65 were only 8 percent of the
labor force. Even accounting for underenumeration of women in the rural
sector and in the urban informal sector, this figure was not only extremely
small by international standards, but it also was small by regional standards,
14
Knauss 1987, xiii.
Knauss 1997, 111.
16
In 1987, women were only 3.3 percent of those at the ministerial level of
government, and 0.0 percent at the sub-ministerial level. At the national assembly
they constituted only 2 percent. These figures increased in 1994 but were still low:
7 percent of parliamentarians, 7.7 percent of those at the sub-ministerial level of
government, and 3.6 percent of ministerial level positions. Data from The World’s
Women 1995: Trends and Statistics, Table 14, 172.
15
28
and far below the female share of the labor force in neighboring Tunisia and
Morocco.17 Reasons are to be found in both political economy and culture.
Algeria’s economic concentration in the oil and gas sector – which favored
capital-intensive technologies deployed by men – was a principal reason for
the under-representation of women in the labor force. The very high birth
rate in Algeria tended to reduce the size of the employed population – male
and female alike – while increasing the size of the dependent population.
Finally, as noted, the leaders of post-colonial Algeria saw “the liberation of
women from work” and the expansion of the Muslim family within a Third
World socialistic framework as a symbol of Algeria’s new national identity.
At the same time, state-sponsored education had produced a generation
of Algerian women who would become a restive force for progressive social
change in Algeria and create the new women’s movement. In 1990, 20
percent of the teaching staff and about half the teaching force at lower levels
were women.18 These were the women who loudly and visibly challenged
the Chedli Bendjedid government’s conservative family code in 1981, who
confronted the Islamist movement in the 1990s, and who went on to lead
new mobilizations for gender justice at the start of the 21st century.
The new women’s movement: 1980s and 1990s
The Algerian women’s movement in its first wave emerged in the period
following the December 1978 death of the long-time leader Colonel Houari
Boumedienne. The immediate post-Boumedienne period was marked by a
conservative move at women’s expense, in line with a shift away from Algerian
17
See Moghadam 1998, chapter 3.
Even so, Algerian women’s educational attainment was not significant, given the
country’s wealth. In 1990, nearly 80 percent of women above the age of 25 were
illiterate (compared with 50 percent of the men 25 years and older). At lower age
groups the figures were better, but even so, fully 37.8 percent of young women
aged 15–24 were illiterate in 1990 (compared with only 13.8 for men). See The
World’s Women 1995: Trends and Statistics, Table 7, 100. Khalida Messaoudi, the
Algerian feminist activist and government official, has noted that in post-colonial
Algeria, education was free but not compulsory. See Messaoudi & Schemla 1995,
30. The same book contains a fascinating description of the travails of education in
Algeria during the 1970s, when the program of Arabization was first implemented
through the importation of teachers from Egypt, Syria, and Iraq – not all of whom
were competent in their subject-areas. See the discussions in chapters 4 and 7 in
Messaoudi & Schemla 1995.
18
29
socialism and towards a market economy, and in response to the growing
Islamist tendency in the region. Just two months after Boumedienne’s
death, the Ministry of Justice announced the creation of a commission
to draft a Family Code. On 8 March 1979 some 200 university women
convened an open meeting at the industrial workers’ union headquarters
in Algiers to demand the disclosure of the identity of the members of the
commission, and to express their concerns and demands. Significantly, they
called themselves “the commission of women who work at the university”
and defined themselves as workers rather than as professionals, partly as
a homage to the waning socialist heritage and partly to underscore their
identity as employed women.19 In January 1980 the government of Chadli
Bendjedid handed the embryonic feminist movement a new issue to protest
against, when it abruptly prohibited Algerian women from leaving the
country without guardian permission. According to Khalida Messaoudi, a
math teacher and one of the organizers of the women’s protests, on March 8,
1980: “We organized a huge general assembly and decided to demonstrate
in the streets, demanding that the order which hampered women’s freedom
of movement be definitively lifted. The government retreated: the ministerial
order was cancelled.”20 Messaoudi adds that at this time, when it became
clear that the UNFA could or would do nothing to protest the government,
the first independent women’s collective was formed, consisting of about 50
women.
The introduction of the draft Family Code alarmed many middle-class
Algerian women, who saw it as an attempt to placate a growing Islamist
tendency by institutionalizing second-class citizenship for women. The 1981
proposal offered six grounds for divorce on the part of the wife, allowed a
woman to work outside the home after marriage if specified in the marriage
contract or at the consent of her husband, and imposed some restrictions on
polygyny and the conditions in which the wives of a polygynous husband
were kept. Algerian feminists responded quickly: “They gathered in front of
the parliament building to reject the process of drawing up and adopting laws
without a preliminary consultation of the most concerned.”21 The feminists
joined with the moudjahidates – women veterans of the war of liberation – and
demonstrated together on the 3rd of December 1981. On 21 January 1982, the
group issued a six-point demand, calling for: monogamy; the unconditional
19
Knauss 1987, 130.
Messaoudi & Schemla 1995, 49.
21
Bouatta 1997, 5.
20
30
right of women to seek employment; the equal division of family property;
the same age of majority for women and men; identical conditions of divorce
for men and women; and effective protection of abandoned children.22
The debate over the family code and the presence of the moudjahidates
forced the government to withdraw its proposal, but an even more
conservative revision was presented in 1984 and quickly passed by the
National Assembly before much opposition could resurface.23 In the revised
code, Algerian women lost their right to contract marriage – they now had to
be given in marriage by a wali (guardian). Provisions for divorce initiated by
women were sharply curtailed, as were the restrictions on polygyny; fathers
became the sole guardians of children, and women were given an unequal
share in inheritance. The only positive aspect of the new family code was
that the minimum marriage age was raised for both women and men (to 18
and 21, respectively). Feminists objected that the Family Code contravened
the equality clauses of the Constitution, the Labor Code, and international
conventions to which Algeria was a signatory.24 Protests were again organized,
but given the fact that the bill had already passed, they had little impact.
This first wave of the Algerian feminist movement was preoccupied with
the Family Code. Despite the Islamic Revolution in Iran and the growing
influence of Islamism in Algeria, the new feminist movement did not focus
its energies on fundamentalism until the late 1980s and into the 1990s. Still,
the significance of this first cycle of women’s protests was clear. As Khalida
Messaoudi puts it:
“Apart from the Berber cultural movement, it has been women –
yes, women, and they alone – who have been publicly questioning
the F.L.N. since 1980–81 and demanding that universal principles be
enforced. Do you realize what holding four demonstrations in quick
succession to demand freedom, equality, and citizenship represents in
a country where no one talks about the Algerian personality except as
something forged by Islam and Arabism?”25
Among the new organizations created during the period of the struggle
around the Family Code, l’Association pour l’Egalité des Droits entre les
Femmes et les Hommes (known as Egalité) was established in May 1985, with
22
Bouatta 1997; See also Messaoudi & Schemla 1995, 50.
See the description of these events in Messaoudi & Schemla 1995, 51–52; See
also Entelis & Arone 1994, 173–233.
24
Cherifati-Merabtine 1994; Bouatta 1997.
25
Messaoudi & Schemla 1995, 57.
23
31
Khalida Messaoudi as its first president. Also prominent in the group was
Louisa Hannoun, a Trotskyist and women’s rights activist. Cherifa Bouatta, a
participant in the movement, succinctly summarizes the origins of Algerian
feminism:
“Under the shadow of the one-party system, the political monolith,
some women attempted to create spaces of independent expression
through cultural and trade union groups. Psychology students created a
working group and a cine-club. In Oran, study and reflection workshops
on Algerian women were organized in early 1980, with contributions
from historians, economists, sociologists and psychiatrists. The
proceedings of these workshops were published and the organizers
created a women’s journal ISIS. Other groups were then created, such
as the moudjahidates collective and groups that studied and criticized
official proposals for a new Family Code. This latter effort gave life to
the women’s movement, and is indeed regarded as the spark that led
to the emergence, the objective and the strategies of Algeria’s feminist
movement.”26
Against ”intégrisme”
The Bendjedid government was pursuing market reforms in addition to its
adoption of a conservative family law.27 Austerity measures combined with
political frustration directed at the FLN led to the riots of October 1988, in
which young people played a prominent role. The riots in turn ushered in a brief
period of political liberalization, which saw the increasing popularity of the
Algerian Islamist movement that later called itself the Islamic Salvation Front
(Front Islamique du Salut, FIS). Algerian feminists were alarmed by statements
emanating from Islamist leaders such as Ali Belhadj, who declared that “the
natural place for a woman is at home” and that “the woman is the reproducer
of men. She does not produce material goods, but this essential thing
that is a Muslim.”28 The new feminist groups were opposed to the electoral
reforms that legalized religious-based parties such as the FIS, a legalization
that contravened the constitution. The leadership of the FIS proceeded to
26
Bouatta 1997, 4.
The Bendjedid government also encouraged – or at least, turned a blind eye
to – the participation of young Algerian men in the Mujahideen movement in
Afghanistan, where Islamists were waging a war against the Soviet-backed
government in the 1980s. It is said that many members of the FIS and the GIA
were or went on to become Islamist volunteers in Afghanistan.
28
Cited in Mahl 1998.
27
32
issue statements condemning the anti-fundamentalist women as “one of the
greatest dangers threatening the destiny of Algeria” and branding them “the
avant-garde of colonialism and cultural aggression.”29
Unfortunately, the fundamentalist agenda of the FIS was supported by
a segment of the female population, and in April 1989 a demonstration of
100,000 women in favor of Islamism and sex-segregation shocked the antifundamentalist women. But this display also spawned a network of antifundamentalist feminist groups. When Egalité seemed to equivocate over
the nature of the fundamentalist uprising, Khalida Messaoudi left to form
another organization, l’Association pour le Triomphe des Droits des Femmes. In
this second wave of the Algerian feminist movement, the struggle against
fundamentalism took center stage.
The FIS was committed to introducing Sharia law, which it claimed was
superior to Western-style civil codes. Hijab would be introduced, ostensibly
to free women from the prying eyes of men. According to one FIS leaflet:
“The hijab is a divine obligation for the Muslim woman: It is a simple and
modest way to dress, which she has freely chosen.” How something can be
an obligation and freely chosen is not explained. Other leaflets claimed that
women are under attack from “pernicious Westernization” and that “a woman
is above all a mother, a sister, a wife or a daughter.” Even the participation
of women in sports was seen as immoral and corrupting. When Hassiba
Boulmerka won the 1,500 meters at the World Athletics Championships
in Tokyo in August 1991, becoming only the second Arab woman ever to
receive a major sporting title, she was hailed by the Algerian sports minister,
Leila Aslaouni, by President Chadli Bendjedid and Prime Minister Sid Ahmed
Ghozali, and by many of her compatriots. However, fundamentalist imams
affiliated to the FIS united to pronounce kofr, a public disapproval of her
from the nation’s mosques. The object of their disapproval was the fact that
Boulmerka had run before the world’s eyes “half-naked” – that is, in regulation
running shorts and vest.30
To the government’s consternation the FIS made major electoral gains
during the December 1991 parliamentary elections, and the government
moved to annul the elections and ban the FIS. Chadli Bendjedid – now
reviled by feminists and leftists – was removed in January 1992 and replaced
by Mohamed Boudiaf, who opposed not only the fundamentalists but also
corruption within the FLN. He was assassinated just five months later. In March
29
30
Bennoune 1995, 197.
Moghadam 2003, 170.
33
of that year, when an Algerian court decided to ban the FIS, the court ruling
was read by Judge Ziani, a woman judge who could not have held her position
under a FIS government. The banning of the FIS was supported by many
Algerian feminists, despite their distaste for the authoritarian government.
Launching a second cycle of protests, Algerian feminists held demonstrations
against the FIS and the establishment of an Islamic state. They had been
alarmed when during the latter part of the 1980s the fundamentalists began
to bully and attack women who lived alone or were unveiled. It was as if they
were anticipating the terrorism that was to be carried out by the FIS and the
GIA in the 1990s.
The cancellation of the election results was met with extreme violence,
with much of the terror carried out by the Armed Islamic Group (Groupe
Islamique Armée, GIA). At the height of the political turmoil in the early 1990s
pitting the government and military against Islamist extremists, Algeria’s
economic and political transition appeared uncertain, and the state seemed
on the verge of collapse. Algeria’s feminists were caught between “the devil
and the deep blue sea” – le pouvoir and intégrisme. While highly critical of the
patriarchal and authoritarian state that had introduced the Family Code, they
focused their political energies against misogynist and violent intégrisme,
which they regarded as the harbinger of a fascistic theocracy. As Messaoudi
put it, feminists and democrats reject “a state based on divine law” and desire
“a state based on rights.”31
31
Messaoudi & Schemla 1995, 142. There is no doubt that the Algerian government
carried out its own killings of suspects, real or imagined. But the available evidence
suggests that the terror was initially launched by the FIS. Indeed, the roots of
Islamist terror may be traced back to Mustafa Bouyali’s Armed Islamic Algerian
Movement, which for five years led violent attacks on the representatives of the
state in the first half of the 1980s. See Malley 1996, 245; For details on the misogyny,
anti-semitism, and anti-democratic statements of the FIS, see Messaoudi &
Schemla 1995, chapters 9–11; On the killings, kidnappings, and rapes of women
during the 1990s, see also Flanders 1998, 24–27. Finally, as to whether the FIS was
“forced” into the position it took because its victory had been stolen, it is well to
compare its response to that of Turkey’s Islamist Refah Party years later. When the
Refah Party was declared dissolved by the Turkish military in 1998, the leadership
chose a non-violent and political response: to regroup under another name. In
any event, the vicious verbal and physical attacks on women and girls carried out
by the FIS and GIA – as well as the killings of journalists, foreigners, and priests and
nuns – cannot be justified.
34
Islamist terror
After shooting to death one young woman in April 1993 and decapitating
a mother and a grandmother in separate incidents early the next year, the
GIA issued a statement in March 1994 classifying all unveiled women who
appeared in public as potential military targets – and promptly gunned
down three teenaged girls.32 The violence against women escalated during
that year, and included kidnappings and rapes. Women were denounced in
mosques by imams and fatwas were pronounced against them, condemning
women to death. Lists of women to be killed were pinned up at the entrance
to mosques.33 March 1995 saw an escalating number of deaths of women
and girls. Khalida Messaoudi was officially condemned to death by the
fundamentalists and forced to live underground. Zazi Sadou, who had
founded the Rassemblement Algérien des Femmes Démocrates in 1993 and
took public positions against theocracy and authoritarianism, was similarly
put on an Islamist death list. Nabila Diahnine, an architect and president of
the feminist group Cri de Femmes, was assassinated in February 1996 while
on her way to work in the northern city of Tizi Ouzou.34 Women took to the
streets to protest the sexual violence and the threats against unveiled women,
as well as the military government’s inability to protect women. After one
public protest in the spring of 1994, the independent newspaper Al Watan
wrote: “Tens of thousands of women were out to give an authoritative lesson
on bravery and spirit to men paralyzed by fear, reduced to silence. – – The socalled weaker sex – – refused to be intimidated by the threats advanced by
‘the sect of assassins’ [Islamists].”35
General Liamine Zeroual, the country’s new president, committed himself
to working with the opposition. Berber organizations and new democratic
associations similarly condemned the terror while also protesting the
government’s incapacity. The outcome of the November 1995 elections
showed that the government retained popular support. The government was
again vindicated by the June 1997 general elections, though fewer people
participated in these and there was much criticism of electoral rigging and
government authoritarianism.
Throughout, Algerian feminists remained active and staunch opponents of
Islamism and of terrorism. In a 1995 interview, while still living underground
32
Bennoune 1995.
Mahl 1998.
34
Sherkat 1997, 19–23.
35
World Press Review 1994, 34.
33
35
after her death sentence, Khalida Messaoudi’s courage and political acumen
were in full display:
“More than 80 people a day are being killed by Islamic fundamentalists.
– – Intellectuals, teachers, writers, thinkers – these are the people
killed because it is they who defend traditional notions of liberty.
But sometimes simple citizens are killed, too, randomly, just for the
purpose of terror. One day ordinary people may decide to say ‘No’ to
the fundamentalists’ ambitions and they want to avoid that happening.
They kill women who oppose their views of how we should behave.
They cannot allow difference. That is why they insist on veils to cover
the difference. They are fascists who claim Allah is on their side and
that they are marching under the banner of righteousness. – – The
Islamic movement is not an opposition to the Government; it is in
fact the best way for the one-party state to reconstitute itself. That is
not to say that the fundamentalists don’t have a popular base. After
years of one-party rule people are desperate and many feel the FIS will
make a difference. They [the FIS] just want to be the new dictatorship.
If necessary they will compromise and absorb members of the FLN
Government into their ranks. But it will simply be the old one-party
state with a new face.”36
Mobilizing women and building feminist organizations
The period 1989–1994 saw the formation of a number of active feminist
organizations, including l’Association Indépendante pour le Triomphe des
Droits de la Femme (Triomphe); l’Association pour l’Emancipation des Femmes
(Emancipation); l’Association pour le Défense et Promotion des Femmes (Defense
et Promotion); Rassemblement Algérien des Femmes Démocrates; Cri de
Femmes; Voix des Femmes; El Aurassia; SOS Femmes en Détresse. The objectives
of the Algerian women’s rights organizations included some that are fairly
representative of the Middle East and North Africa region and others that
specific to the Algerian case: the abolition of the Family Code; full citizenship
for women; enactment of civil laws guaranteeing equality between men and
women in areas such as employment and marriage and divorce; abolition
of polygamy and unilateral male divorce, equality in division of marital
property.
During the 1990s Egalité focused on information and awareness campaigns
around the Family Code, with a view to mobilizing support for its abolition.
36
Swift 1995.
36
It organized seminars on such themes as “democracy and the principle of
equality” and campaigned for political parties who defend women’s rights.
It convened annual general assemblies and was said in 1995 to have around
500 members mostly between the ages of 35 and forty.37 Triomphe likewise
organized conferences around the Family Code as well as a series of workshops
and lectures on the situation of women, and it published a legal guide for
women. In 1995 it was said to have about 200 members mostly between
the ages of 25 and 40. Emancipation organized roundtables on subjects
such as women’s employment and representations of women in textbooks;
exhibitions of photographs and paintings; film debates. According to Cherifa
Bouatta, the membership numbered about 150 and consisted largely of the
former members of the women’s cine-club, students, and workers. Defense
et Promotion engaged in activities similar to those of Egalité, Triomphe, and
Emancipation: debates and conferences on the Family Code and campaigns
for women’s legal awareness, cultural activities, workshops on women’s
employment, and the promotion and sale of goods made by women. In 1995
it had about 500 members mostly aged between 30 and 50 years.
Throughout the 1990s, these and other organizations participated in
a variety of national and international independent initiatives on violence
against women, including a March 1994 tribunal in Algeria “to judge
symbolically the responsible Islamists and the former president of the Algeria
Republic for their crimes against humanity.” All the women’s groups built
coalitions to organize street demonstrations in Algeria to defend democracy
and the citizenship of women.38 The Rassemblement Algérien des Femmes
Democrates (RAFD) became active in documenting human rights violations,
particularly those by Islamists against women, and in collecting women’s
testimonies. It produced a publication entitled Algérie réveille-toi, c’est l’an
2000! – a compilation of news articles about the atrocities – and filed a civil
action suit in Washington, D.C. against the FIS and its U.S. representative,
Anwar Haddam. The RAFD was part of the network Women Living Under
Muslim Laws, and its founder, Zazi Sadou, received an award in 1997 from
the U.S.-based network Women, Law and Development International, in
recognition of her work for Algerian women’s human rights. After the onset
of le terrorisme, this and other feminist groups advanced the slogan “No
dialogue with the fundamentalists.”39
37
Bouatta 1997.
Women, Law and Development International Bulletin 1998, 4.
39
Mahl 1998; See also Women, Law & Development International Bulletin 1998, 4.
38
37
Like other organizing women in the Middle East, North Africa, and
elsewhere in the Global South, Algerian feminists are products of the
country’s social development: they are urban employed women, mostly with
higher education, although some working-class women have participated
in the feminist organizations. Many Middle Eastern feminists (e.g., Iranian,
Turkish, Palestinian) began as members of left-wing organizations, but what
is distinctive about the Algerian women’s movement is the extent to which
the feminist movement was dominated by left-wing women – which may
account for its audacity and organizational capability. When Egalité was
formed in 1985, many of its officers and members were associated with the
Socialist Organization of Workers (OST, Trotskyist tendency). Many members
of Emancipation belonged to the PST (Socialist Workers Party), and those of
Défense et Promotion belonged largely to the PAGS (Parti de l’Avant-Garde
Socialiste, or the Communist Party). As Bouatta explains:
“The founding members of the women’s movement are, in their
majority, influenced by the ideology of the Left. They all come from
socialist parties. They are mostly academics, students, workers, and
union representatives. They convey a message of an emancipatory
project based on the equality of the sexes, employment and education,
which are considered as the main criteria of women’s promotion and
socialization. They matured under the shadow of the one-party system
in its socialist phase. They are women of the post-independence who
were fortunate to have access to education and training. They do
not consider the day of liberation as very distant. They identify with
the moudjahidates whom they see as the first to have cracked the
patriarchal system.”40
Algerian women activists became known for their trenchant critiques
of both the state and fundamentalism. At the height of the Islamist terror,
Saida Ben Habylas, a teacher and official Algerian representative to a UNsponsored regional meeting that took place in Amman in November 1994,
gave an impassioned speech denouncing the violence against women.41 In a
newspaper interview, she boldly emphasized the complicity of both the state
and the FIS:
“The history of the FIS and other terrorist groups is a series of alliances
with a corrupt “politico-financial mafia” that helped bring about the
economic and social inequalities in Algeria during the 1970s and 1980s.
40
41
Bouatta 1997, 15.
My observation at the pre-Beijing Amman meeting, November 1994.
38
– – Political pluralism and democracy could have meant exposure of
corruption of the old order. This old order allied themselves with the
FIS in the 1980s and agreed to ‘share power’. There was a deal.”42
Notwithstanding its disruptive nature, Algeria’s economic and political
crisis, along with the constitutional reforms of 1989, opened the gateways
to an incipient civil society and saw a large number of independent
interest groups emerging as political parties.43 Henceforth the government
would have to tolerate, respond to, and interact with non-governmental
organizations. The conciliatory stance of the state and cracks in the
unity of the political elite favored the proliferation of non-governmental
organizations. Azzedine Layachi describes how interaction between the state
and elements of the nascent civil society intensified after 1993, and he lists
those non-government organizations, professional associations and parties
that were represented in meetings with the High State Council.44 Missing
from the list, however, is the array of women’s organizations that emerged
in Algeria during the 1980s and 1990s. According to Bouatta, there were 20
women’s associations in the first national meeting of the women in late 1989
and in 1993 perhaps as many as 24, according to the author of a document
published by the United Nations Fund for Population Activities that year.
These included women’s studies and research associations such as Aicha,
Dafatir Nissaiya, and Fondation Nyssa; feminist organizations such as those
mentioned above; women-in-development organizations such as Femmes,
Environment, Développement; social-professional associations such as SEVE
which sought to promote and assist women in business, and a number of
service and delivery organizations.
Not only was the new women’s movement among the principal social
movements of 1990s Algeria, but Algerian feminists became more visible and
more prominent in the established political structures. One outcome of the
1997 municipal and parliamentary elections was the election of 11 women
to the National Assembly, among them several well-known activists and
feminists. The emergence of a feminist politics critical of both fundamentalism
and the state shaped the composition and orientation of the newly-elected
women. Among them were Louisa Hannoun, leader of the Workers Party,
Khalida Messaoudi, who joined the Rally for Culture and Democracy, and
42
Cited in Bennoune 1995, 194.
Entelis & Arone 1994, 211.
44
Layachi 1995.
43
39
Dalia Taleb of the Socialist Forces Front.45 All three women were known for
their radicalism. Indeed, Hannoun was dubbed “Algeria’s shining star” by
the Algerian press, which also deemed her one of the only “two real men”
in Algeria – the other being the recently-released former leader of the FIS,
Abassi Madani.46 Alongside Algeria’s political tragedies in this period were
the paradoxes and ironies of gendered politics, including the designation of
activist women as “men.”
During its first and second waves, Algeria’s new feminist movement was
unified in its condemnation of the family code and of fundamentalists, and
effective links were developed with international feminists, transnational
feminist networks, and European foundations. The movement was active
within the Collectif 95 Maghreb Egalité, and took part in the research that
led to the publication of books on the legal status of women in North Africa,
issued by the Morocco-based Editions le Fennec. WLUML and the Center for
Women’s Global Leadership, a feminist think tank at Rutgers University in
the United States, sponsored the participation of Khalida Messaoudi at the
UN’s World Conference on Human Rights, which took place in Vienna in June
1993, where she testified on Islamist terrorism before the Women’s Tribunal.
Two years later, the Collectif 95 Maghreb Egalité was the major organizer
behind the “Muslim Women’s Parliament” at the NGO Forum which preceded
the Beijing Conference.47 Their participation at the Beijing conference, as well
as the preparation and translation of several books, were made possible by
funding from German foundations.48 In 1997, Rhonda Copelon, director of
the International Human Rights Law Clinic at the City University of New York
and a well-known international women’s rights activist lawyer, filed a suit in
the U.S. on behalf of RAFD and Algerian women victims of terror, with the
participation of WLUML. The defendants were the FIS and Anwar Haddam,
45
The Workers Party is Trotskyist. The RCD’s goals are “secularism, citizenship, a
state based on rights, the repeal of the Family Code, recognition of Algeria’s Berber
dimension, social justice, educational reform, etc.” (Messaoudi & Schemla 1995,
94); Likewise, the Socialist Forces Front stands for democracy and Berber rights.
46
Danesh 1997, 10.
47
My observations at the NGO Forum in Huairou and discussions with participants.
See also their documents: Women in the Maghreb: Change and Resistance; One
Hundred Measures and Provisions for a Maghrebian Egalitarian Codification of the
Personal Statute and Family Law [sic].
48
Personal communication, Emil Lieser of the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, Cairo, 7
July 2008.
40
the so-called “representative-in-exile” of the FIS in the United States.49 These
are but some examples of how Algerian feminists collaborated with other
North African feminists and with international feminist groups; and they
made effective use of the global women’s rights agenda in condemnations of
patriarchal laws and political Islam.
Cracks in the movement appeared in the new century, however, in the
context of post-conflict “normalization” during the presidency of Abdelazziz
Bouteflika. Louisa Hannoun’s tendency to placate the Islamic opposition
irked many Algerian feminists, as did Khalida Messaoudi’s assumption to the
position first of advisor to the president and then as cabinet minister, which
was seen as compromising her independence.50
Toward gender justice: third wave priorities
The new century brought with it a certain normalization of the political scene
in Algeria, along with efforts by the political authorities to bring about an
end to the intense political and ideological schisms that had developed in
the 1980s and 1990s. President Bouteflika made several moves to change
directions in Algeria: in addition to seeking greater integration in the world
economy and – after 11 September 2001 – participation in the global “war on
terror,” he promised to reward women for their sacrifices and collective action
in the previous decade, and he sought to “close the chapter” on Algeria’s
violent past through a peace charter, an amnesty, and a referendum. Thus
in the summer of 2002, he appointed an unprecedented five women to his
cabinet (including Khalida Messaoudi) and put in place mechanisms for an
evaluation of the family code with a view toward reform. Whereas feminists
had fervently demanded “no dialogue with the terrorists,” the government
of President Bouteflika desired national reconciliation, even if it meant an
amnesty for the armed militants of the past. These developments brought
with them new priorities for the women’s movement. The third wave of the
Algerian feminist movement has been characterized by a demand for gender
justice in the form of (1) protests against the referendum and amnesty, (2)
a new mobilization for an egalitarian family code, and (3) attention toward
ending violence against women and sexual harassment at the workplace. We
consider each in turn.
49
Flanders 1998, 27; and Kirshenbaum 1998, 25. Disclosure: I wrote an affidavit on
behalf of the suit. The plaintiffs did not win the case but felt that the experience
had been important politically.
50
Personal communications from two Algerian women’s rights activists, Limassol,
Cyprus, July 2000 and Vienna, Austria, October 2000.
41
In addition to the continuing work of the Collectif, new organizations have
become prominent, such as CIDDEF (Centre d’Information et de Documentation
sur les Droits de l’Enfant et de la Femme). The Wassila network began in 2000
and consists of women’s NGOs (including SOS Femmes en Détresse) and
individual professionals, many of whom are psychologists addressing
post-conflict traumas (such as Cherifa Bouatta and her Societé pour l’Aide
Psychologique, la Recherche et la Formation). Le Centre d’Ecoute et d’Assistance
aux Femmes Victimes d’Harcèlement Sexuel is a counseling service hosted by
the country’s main trade union, the UGTA. The network and campaign 20 Ans
Barakat (20 Years Is Enough) is a coalition of Algerian women’s organizations
calling for the abrogation of the old family code and its replacement with an
egalitarian law. Most of these organizations also are opposed to the outcome
of the civil war of the 1990s – or le terrorisme – and to the way the government
has handled it.
President Bouteflika’s civil harmony law in July 1999 offered immunity or
reduced sentences to members of armed groups who gave up their arms
and disclosed their actions, but it soon became a blanket amnesty for crimes
by all who declared they had repented. This came to be opposed by feminist
groups and families of the disappeared. While most of the 200,000 dead
and 8,000 disappeared of Algeria’s civil war were men, it was women who
formed new organizations dedicated to opposing the blanket amnesty. In
his 2005 charter for peace and reconciliation, President Abdelaziz Bouteflika
sought to “close the chapter” on Algeria’s violent past. The referendum of 29
September 2005 was based on a simple proposition – were people for or
against peace?51 There were Algerians within the country and in the diaspora
who found the wording deceptive enough to boycott the referendum, but it
won the majority of votes cast.52
Many Algerians remain embittered by the experience and perhaps
none more so than feminists who were on death lists or forced to live
underground in the 1990s. Some wished for a South Africa-like Truth
and Reconciliation process; others felt it would amount to impunity for
murderers. One published account includes the following sentiments:
“Truth and reconciliation on the South African model wouldn’t work here:
we Algerians aren’t made like that.” And: “I want peace, but not this peace
with impunity that the charter is forcing on us. In South Africa it wasn’t like
51
Kristianasen 2006.
While employed at UNESCO in 2005, I spoke with approximately 15 Algerians
who were opposed to the referendum.
52
42
this.”53 It is clear that feelings remain strong concerning the events of the
1990s.
Turning now to the campaign against the family law, which feminists
have referred to as un text infamant et dégradant, it will be recalled that
President Bouteflika promised to reform it. In order to accelerate the reform,
the coalition 20 Ans Barakat was formed on 8 March 2003, almost twenty
years after the passing into law of the Family Code. One of the founders is
Akila Ouared, a well-known moudjahidate, who has called the Family Code
“Algeria’s dishonor, an insult to women.” Some of the coalition members
have been present on the political scene since 1984, such as Triomphe, SOS
Femmes en Détresse, Défense et Promotion, and Pluri-elles Algeria. Framed
in the language of international women’s rights and secular feminism,
the coalition’s petition asserts that “la question du statut égalitaire des
femmes en Algérie, et au delà, celle de leur reconnaissance pleine et
entière en tant que citoyennes, est une question essentielle et urgente de
l’Algérie d’aujourd’hui et de demain” and notes that Tunisia and Morocco
have introduced reforms for gender equality.54 The coalition helped effect
amendments to the family code in February 2005, and included a change to
the nationality law to allow Algerian women married to foreigners to pass
on their nationality to their children. With the amendments, marriage is now
consensual; relations between spouses are equal; in a divorce whichever
parent has care and control becomes the guardian; and the father must
provide a decent home for the mother and child.
At this writing, however, activists object to the retention of guardianship
(wali) over women, polygamy, and unequal family inheritance, which remains
two-thirds to sons and one-third to daughters. One argument is that such
clauses are insulting to women’s dignity. Another is that they are irrelevant
and at odds with the social reality, given that women are increasingly helping
to support their families. Polygamy, moreover, is rare – although at 5.5
percent of the population, more prevalent in Algeria than in Morocco.55 Nadia
53
Kristianasen 2006. I have also discussed the matter with four Algerian feminist
activists, none of whom felt that truth and reconciliation were feasible or
desirable.
54
See http://20ansbarakat.free.fr/petition.htm; See also http://famalgeriennes.
free.fr/declarations/APEL_decl_111203.html and http://20ansbarakat.free.fr/, last
accessed 25 July 2008.
55
See Guide to Equality in the Family and in the Maghreb, by Collectif 95 MaghrebEgalité 2005, 66. This is an authorized translation of Dalil pour l’égalité dans la
famille au Maghreb (Collectif, 2003).
43
Aït-Zaï, a lawyer and professor of law at Algiers University and a director at
CIDDEF, is quoted as saying of the family code: “It could have been abolished.
– – Parliament was supposed to vote on the amendment. Instead, Bouteflika
had it quietly passed as a presidential decree. As a jurist, I find the reform
incoherent: it’s got one foot in modernity, the other in the past.”56
Another set of priorities for the women’s movement in its third wave pertains
to domestic violence, family abuse, and workplace harassment. Early in the
new century, the Collectif 95 conducted a survey on violence against women,
and publicized its disturbing findings on the extent of the problem and the
persistence of anachronistic ideas concerning husbands’ privileges. Algerian
President Bouteflika referred to the survey in his International Women’s Day
address of 2002. Shortly thereafter, work began on establishing the country’s
first counseling center, and several others were subsequently set up.
Le Centre d’Ecoute et d’Assistance aux Femmes Victimes d’Harcèlement
Sexuel is housed at the UGTA and financed by the trade union. The Centre was
born following a consciousness-raising campaign of the National Commission
of Women Workers and of human rights groups, and in December 2003 the
Center’s director Soumia Salhi also started a hotline for women victims of
sexual harassment. At the same time, Algeria passed a law against workplace
sexual harassment.57 Since the Center’s opening, there have been thousands
of calls from women victims and supporters, though critics say that the
majority of calls from victims have no follow-up: “The bravest women register
a complaint but don’t follow through. They prefer a change of work.”58
IDDEF, SOS Femmes en Détresse and other women’s NGOs that are part of
the Wassila network address an array of issues related to women’s rights to
dignity and a life free of sexual and family violence. Incest and the problems
of unwed mothers are also taken up. One account notes that CIDDEF works on
“abortion, a taboo subject. At present only therapeutic abortion is permitted.
One of the problems is that contraception is available to married women
but not to the unmarried, widows or divorcees, who deal with these issues
illegally, often abroad.” The Wassila network holds workshops on the above
topics, convenes a weekly clinic for children, and publishes papers. In an
interview with Le Monde Diplomatique, Louisa Aït Hamou, a lecturer at Algiers
56
Cited in Kristianasen 2006.
See her interview on http://www.categorynet.com/v2/index.php/content/
view/4518/400, last accessed 12 February 2007. See also http://www.afrol.com/
articles/15853, accessed June 2008.
58
http://www.algeria-watch.org/fr/article/femmes/harcelement_sexuel.htm.
57
44
University, explains that the network provides professional help, engages in
reflection about the country and its future, and takes action:
“We are breaking the silence on taboo subjects: sexual aggression
against women and children, family violence, rape, battered women,
economic violence. Take Hassi Messaoud, a new oil-rich city: 30
women went to work there, where working women are unusual. The
local imams accused them of being prostitutes and, in 2001, they were
raped and knifed. One was buried alive. Wassila, with other NGOs,
ended the long silence over this and supported the women in their
search for justice, though only three of the 30 dared attend the appeal
court on 3 January 2005.”59
In October 2004, the National Popular Assembly adopted an amendment
to the Algerian penal code; it condemns men guilty of sexual harassment to a
prison sentence. Sexual harassment is now an offence; it is defined as abusing
the authority conferred by one’s function or profession in order to give orders
to, threaten, impose constraints or exercise pressure on another person for
the purpose of obtaining sexual favors. A person convicted of this offence is
subject to imprisonment of two months to one year and a fine of 50,000 to
100,000 dinars.60 But, according to the chairperson of the Algerian League
of the Human Rights Boudjemâa Ghechir, “les mentalités restent le principal
obstacle qui continue d’empécher les victimes de harcelement sexuel de
se plaindre.”61 Thus a challenge is to encourage women to break the wall of
silence as well as to ensure enforcement of the law. This is the new phase of
the campaign by the UGTA’s Women’s Commission, the Wassila network and
other advocates for women’s rights and gender justice.
Conclusions
Among the countries of the Middle East and North Africa, Algeria is one
of the most instructive case studies of feminist activism. Although women
played prominent roles in the national liberation movement of the late 1950s
and early 1960s, the rise of a radical women’s movement and of feminist
organizations was a feature of the 1980s and 1990s. Whereas Algerian
women were once intimately connected to the project of national liberation
59
Cited in Kristianasen 2006.
http://www.unfpa.org/parliamentarians/news/newsletters/issue59.htm.
61
http://www.wluml.org/french/newsfulltxt.shtml?cmd%5B157%5D=x-157347521. “attitudes remain the main obstacle preventing complaints by sexual
harassment victims.”
60
45
and post-colonial state-building through a version of Arab socialism, the new
women’s movement extricated itself from those projects to demand rights,
equality, and security – and all in the language of secular feminism. However,
they never separated themselves from the project of building a modern and
progressive Algerian polity; rather, they have insisted that women’s rights are
necessary for the achievement of democracy and modernity.
The new women’s movement in Algeria emerged in the context of a
growing international women’s movement, economic crisis and restructuring,
the rise of Islamic fundamentalism, and the weakness of the state. It has been
sustained by a population of educated and employed Algerian women with
social and gender consciousness. The attack on women’s legal status in the
immediate post-Boumedienne period triggered the initial mobilizations,
which have been sustained over time in the form of various organizations,
coalitions, and campaigns. Coalition-building with other progressive civil
society organizations, as well as alliances with political elites, have helped the
women’s movement grow and achieve policy successes. The global women’s
rights agenda has provided additional legitimacy, while transnational feminist
networks and European foundations have offered resources necessary for the
movement’s wider reach.
In examining the evolution of the Algerian feminist movement, this paper
has identified three waves: the struggle against the new Family Code in the
early 1980s; the struggle against fundamentalism and Islamist terror in the
1990s; and a multi-pronged struggle for gender justice in the new century.
Characteristics of the women’s movement include a propensity to build and
sustain organizations and networks; effective coalition-building, both within
Algeria and transnationally (especially within the Maghreb); engagement
with government, domestic policies and laws, and the global women’s rights
agenda; and a rather remarkable fearlessness. In all three waves, feminists
have advanced powerful critiques of patriarchy and authoritarianism,
whether of the state or of Islamic fundamentalism, and have drawn attention
to the importance of rights and equality to democratization and national
advancement. As such, Algerian feminism and the new women’s organizations
can only be regarded as key players in the country’s democratic transition.
They constitute a significant part of the emergent civil society, and they
give new meaning to concepts of citizenship, human rights, and political
participation.
46
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« Le mal vient de l’extérieur » : les socialistes
français et le problème algérien
Kirsi Henriksson
La politique du Parti socialiste français vis-à-vis la question algérienne entre
1945 et 1957 révèle des discours parallèles qui s’expliquent par le contexte
colonial, par l’exercice du pouvoir ainsi que par l’héritage idéologique
de la France de 1789. D’une part les socialistes voulaient avancer les
valeurs de l’émancipation parmi leurs camarades algériens, mais d’autre
part ils pratiquaient une politique socialiste coloniale pour faire étape au
nationalisme parmi ces mêmes camarades « musulmans ». Pour donner un
exemple des discours parallèles chez les socialistes français, nous allons
analyser brièvement comment les socialistes ont saisi les causes derrière « le
problème algérien ». Il paru d’être plus facile de s’expliquer que le mal venait
de l’extérieur que constater la culpabilité de la realité coloniale inégalitaire
étant la cause véritable de la guerre d’Algérie.
Sétif sonne l’alarme mais la Toussaint surprend
En mai 1945, des nouvelles inquiétantes parviennent de la région de
Constantine. Les manifestations du 1er mai 1945, organisées par la
Confédération générale du travail, la CGT, tourneraient à la confrontation
violente entre manifestants algériens et population européenne.
L’affrontement culmina lors de la révolte qui commença à Sétif le 8 mai
1945, jour de la signature de l’Armistice. Les jours suivants, le mouvement
insurrectionnel s’étendit aux campagnes et aux villes de la région : Bône,
Guelma, Batna. Une centaine d’Européens furent tués ce qui entraîna une
répression très violente. Les troupes françaises sous le commendement
du général Duval, épaulées par l’aviation et la marine, firent officiellement
1165 victimes algériennes, mais, d’après différentes sources, le nombre des
Algériens tués oscille entre 6 000 et 80 000.1 A la suite des événements, le
leader du Parti du Peuple Algérien (PPA) Messali Hadj fut exilé à Brazzaville et
1
Melasuo 1999, 365 ; Pervillé 2002, 112. Les nationalistes parlent de 45 000 morts,
les oulémas de 80 000 à 85 000 morts, la presse française de gauche estime d’abord
entre 6 000 et 8 000 le nombre des victimes, puis de 15 000 à 20 000.
50
Kirsi Henriksson
Ferhat Abbas des Amis du Manifeste et de la Liberté, l’AML, détenu jusqu’au 16
mars 1946.2
Pour les Français de la métropole, la « révolte » de Sétif en 1945 est
incompréhensible au moment même où la France fête sa libération. André
Mandouze, historien, chrétien de gauche et militant actif, raconte un souvenir
personnel sur Sétif :
« Quand, rédacteur en chef de Témoignage chrétien, j’ai consacré alors
tout un numéro à la Victoire, il m’était nullement venu à l’idée que la fin
de la guerre mondiale célébrée par la France coïncidait jour pour jour
avec ce qui, en fait, était le premier signe (pratiquement passé sous
silence) du déclenchement assez prochain d’une autre guerre d’un
autre genre ; celle très précisément d’Algérie. »3
Pourtant, le climat d’allégresse après la Libération fut justement à l’origine
des sentiments d’enthousiasme parmi les Algériens. On alla même jusqu’à
encourager les Algériens à espérer une libération prochaine dans les pages du
Populaire, le journal principal du Parti socialiste français (SFIO). Les promesses
d’une liberté n’était pas du verbiage pour la SFIO qui bâtit la Quatrième
République avec le plus grand sérieux. Par exemple, à la première page du
Populaire en septembre 1944, Pierre Bloch avertit les pétainistes d’Alger que
l’Algérie était considérée comme le prolongement de la France et qu’ainsi
les musulmans n’étaient pas en dehors du grand courant de liberté qui avait
soulevé la France.4
La soif de liberté n’est pourtant pas considérée comme la cause principale
des « incidents de Sétif ». En général, la presse propose des explications telles
que la situation matérielle, les difficultés de ravitaillement et les prélèvements
alliés5. Dans le Populaire du 12 mai 1945 on veut résoudre le problème par
l’envoi de blé en Algérie6. Un seul journal, Combat, publie à partir du 13 mai
1945 six articles d’Albert Camus qui mettent l’accent sur les causes sociales et
politiques mais avec prudence, sans prendre parti :
« Devant les événements qui agitent aujourd’hui l’Afrique du Nord, il
convient d’éviter deux attitudes extrêmes. L’une consisterait à présenter
2
Fauvet 1959, 155.
Mandouze 1998, 176.
4
Pierre Bloch: « Regards sur l’Algérie », Le Populaire du 10 septembre 1944, 1.
5
Ageron 1984, 33.
6
J. M. : « Sauvons l’Afrique du Nord. Du blé aux populations affamées », Le
Populaire du 12 mai 1945, 1.
3
Les socialistes français et le problème algérien
51
comme tragique une situation qui est seulement sérieuse. L’autre
reviendrait à ignorer les graves difficultés où se débat aujourd’hui
l’Algérie. »7
La revue trotskiste, Quatrième Internationale est encore plus franche en
condamnant la « sanglante répression qui a suivi les événements du 8 mai
1945 et qui a coûté la vie à plus de 15 000 indigènes »8.
A la recherche des coupables, les socialistes algériens tinrent plusieurs
réunions pour discuter de la responsabilité des promoteurs du mouvement.
Le plus étonnant est que les socialistes adoptèrent sans critique la version
communiste du « complot fasciste » comme facteur explicatif des événements
du Constantinois.9 Même la présence sur place du gouverneur général
Yves Chataigneau (septembre 1944–février 1948), un socialiste, ne garantit
pas une connaissance « objective » de la situation. Mostefa Benbahmed,
le député socialiste de Constantine, dénonce pour sa part les agissements
dangereux des oulémas et du PPA, et les méfaits de ces groupements au
sein du scoutisme musulman et parmi les modérés réformistes.10 Le journal
Fraternité, organe de la SFIO en Algérie, déplore l’action de « certaines élites »
sur les masses musulmanes et reconnaît la cruauté des émeutiers. Il souhaite
que l’on sache « différencier la grande majorité des masses indigènes, avec
les mauvais bergers qui les ont guidées un moment ».11
Les socialistes en métropole suivaient le débat des socialistes en Algérie.
Le lien est visible dans la position adoptée par le Populaire à la fin mai 1945 : il
y a quelques « mauvais bergers » dont la création, « le nationalisme algérien »
est encore « factice » et ne s’impose pas à l’idéal des masses misérables et
incultes. Il valait mieux pourtant réagir ; l’accent est mis sur la rapidité des
réformes matérielles et culturelles: « il n’y a plus un mois à perdre ».12
7
Camus dans Todd 1996, 378–380.
Quatrième Internationale, septembre 1945, cité dans Ageron 1990, 425–426.
9
Ageron 1984, 30.
10
« Les partis européens », Rapport mensuel d’information sur l’activité dans
le Département de Constantine du 22 mai au 22 juin 1945, CIE, préfecture de
Constantine, F/60/871, CARAN.
11
« Les Partis européens : Fraternité », Rapport mensuel d’information sur l’activité
dans le Département de Constantine du 22 mai au 22 juin 1945, CIE, préfecture de
Constantine, F/60/871, CARAN.
12
J. M. : « Les troubles d’Algérie, II: Les agitations du Monde Arabe », Le Populaire du
29 mai 1945, 1–2.
8
52
Kirsi Henriksson
Les réformes rapides sont bien au centre de l’attention lors du premier
débat du comité directeur de la SFIO sur le problème algérien qui eut lieu le
18 décembre 1945, après l’élection de la première Assemblée constituante.
Dans son exposé, André Philip, président de la commission de la Constitution,
s’interroge sur la place de l’Algérie au sein de la communauté française. Le
problème algérien est donc traité dans le contexte du passage de l’Empire
vers l’Union française. Après la discussion, le comité directeur conclut qu’il y
aura pour l’Algérie le même régime que pour les autres régions françaises.13
Pourtant, en ce qui concerne Sétif, le comité directeur n’en parle la première
fois qu’en juillet 1946, après le rapport de Robert Verdier sur le congrès
interfédéral socialiste SFIO de l’Afrique du Nord, tenu à Alger les 13 et 14
juillet 1946.14
La réaction des socialistes au lendemain de Sétif fut donc modérée. Une
fois qu’ils commencèrent à réaliser l’ampleur de la situation, ils se tournèrent
vers des réformes plutôt assimilationnistes pour améliorer et résoudre le
problème algérien ; la France de 1945 n’était pas prête à renouveler son
régime colonial avec la même vitesse que, par exemple, les Anglais. Selon
Roger Quilliot
« – – les Français, à quelque formation politique qu’ils appartiennent,
n’imaginent pas un instant qu’ils pourraient suivre la voie britannique,
celle qui mène à l’indépendance des Indes. Et les représentants des
territoires d’outre-mer n’osent pas, pour leur part, porter aussi loin le
regard – – ».15
En février 1946, le groupe parlementaire socialiste à l’Assemblée
constituante est prêt à absoudre les mauvais bergers algériens, et à suivre
le conseil de Charles-André Julien : « Messali Hadj, Ferhat Abbas et le cheikh
Brahimi seront moins dangereux comme délégué, place de Beauvau, que
comme martyrs de la cause nationaliste »16. Les députés socialistes algériens,
Raoul Borra, Maurice Rabier et Abderrahmane Bouthiba déposent un projet
d’amnistie générale à l’Assemblée nationale. Au cours du débat parlementaire
sur l’amnistie, Rabier affirme que ce projet mettra « fin aux malentendus » et
effacera « les rancœurs dangereuses qui ne pourraient que compromettre
13
Le débat est cité dans Pervillé 198, 447–448.
Réunion du Comité directeur le 17 juillet 1946, cité dans Pervillé 1987, 448.
15
Quilliot 1972, 149–150.
16
Charles-André Julien : « C’est à Paris qu’il faut résoudre les problèmes nord–
africains », Le Populaire du 7 juin 1945, 1–2.
14
53
gravement l’union plus que jamais nécessaire des populations françaises et
algériennes ». Abderrahmane Bouthiba fait confiance au ministre de l’intérieur
socialiste, André Le Troqueur, pour faire accepter sans restrictions les mesures
d’amnistie politique, générale, « pour faire régner en AFN un climat de justice
et pour montrer à l’Algérie le vrai visage de France ».17
Dans les motifs de l’amnistie on essaie de comprendre les causes des
« malentendus » même si on répète les mêmes arguments présentés un an
avant. Maurice Rabier rappelle « la propagande suspecte » des ennemis de
l’Ordonnance de mars 194418 qui avait crée une psychose de peur en Afrique
du Nord et qui fut à l’origine des événements de mai 1945. Cette campagne
inhumaine et aveugle avait produit le « débordement de haine subite et
terrible des événements tragiques de mai 1945 ». Outre cette propagande,
Rabier allègue que derrière la souffrance, la détresse physique et morale, la
rancœur et le mécontentement se trouvent « la misère et l’exploitation des
indigènes par les gros colons, la famine, le mauvais outillage, et surtout le
racisme qui ne nous fait pas honneur ». L’amnistie fut votée le 1er mars 1946,
après un long discours d’André Le Troquer qui évoque le double souci du
gouvernement : assurer l’ordre et la protection des biens légitimes, mais,
en même temps, faire confiance à la compréhension et à la solidarité des
indigènes.19
La conséquence principale de Sétif était donc une approche réformatrice,
mais on était alarmé du fait que la frustration grandissait même au sein des
Algériens modérés, prêts à verser dans l’action violente des nationalistes les
plus radicaux. Le débat, même très faible, parmi les socialistes en France et en
Algérie fait croire qu’il exista une capacité d’être au fait des réalités coloniales.
Pourtant, presque 10 ans après, les bombes du premier novembre 1954 sur
la région de l’Aurès constituent encore une surprise pour les socialistes,
sans parler de l’administration française de l’Algérie ou du renseignement
17
« Compte rendu d’activité du groupe parlementaire socialiste à l’Assemblée
nationale constituante, février 1946 : Séances du 28 février et du 1 mars 1946 »,
Bulletin intérieur SFIO, No. 11, Février–Mars 1946.
18
L’Ordonnance du 7 mars 1944 régla le statut des « Français musulmans d’Algérie ».
Environ 85 000–90 000 Algériens musulmans recevaient la citoyenneté française à
part entière. (Ageron 1984, 25–26)
19
« Compte rendu d’activité du groupe parlementaire socialiste à l’Assemblée
nationale constituante, février 1946 : Séances du 28 février et du 1 mars 1946 »,
Bulletin intérieur SFIO, No. 11, Février–Mars 1946.
54
Kirsi Henriksson
militaire20. La situation au Maroc et en Tunisie semble alors plus préoccupante
et ce n’est qu’au mois de décembre 1954 que les chefs militaires et les
services de renseignement commencèrent à envisager la possibilité d’une
insurrection gagnant peu à peu toute l’Algérie.21
La surprise socialiste en face de l’insurrection peut être expliquée en
partie par un silence qui avait précédé les événements algériens. Au début
des années 1950, l’Algérie n’occupe plus les débats des socialistes, après
l’intervalle chaud autour du Statut de l’Algérie de 1946 à 1949 et, surtout, après
la démission du gouverneur général socialiste, Marcel-Edmond Naegelen
en 1951. La gestion de l’Algérie passe sous le contrôle des radicaux avec les
gouverneurs généraux Roger Léonard et Jacques Soustelle. Pierre Commin
et Edouard Depreux avaient pourtant proposé en juin 1949 que le Comité
directeur de la SFIO consacrât une séance à l’étude du problème algérien et
à la situation du Parti en Algérie,22 mais le débat se fit attendre jusqu’au 8
décembre 1954. Entre temps, l’Algérie ne fut mentionnée qu’à l’occasion de
problèmes ponctuels.23 La faiblesse de la SFIO après la défaite électorale de
1951 préoccupait les militants socialistes plus que la situation algérienne. Un
bref débat sur les travailleurs immigrés eut pourtant lieu après les incidents
du 14 juillet 1953 à Paris où 6 travailleurs algériens avaient été tués pendant
la commémoration de la Révolution française.24
En Algérie, les socialistes prétendaient bien connaître les sentiments de la
population algérienne. Un an avant la Toussaint, Maurice Rabier, le député
socialiste d’Oran, fait l’éloge de la vigilance socialiste en constatant qu’au
moins le parti socialiste a eu « le mérite de suivre depuis longtemps, en
analysant sainement l’évolution de la situation coloniale, les revendications
des musulmans algériens ».25 Nous n’avons pas trouvé de témoignages de
cette vigilance dans le discours socialiste en Algérie ; on n’y trouve aucune
analyse profonde sur la détérioration de la situation intérieure. Pourtant, en
20
Yves Courrier dans son ouvrage Les fils de Toussaint (1969) décrit bien la surprise
totale causée par le 1er novembre 1954.
21
Jauffret dans SHAT 1998, 668–669.
22
« Réunion du 22 juin 1949 », Compte rendu des réunions du Comité directeur
SFIO, OURS.
23
Pervillé 1987, 455.
24
Réunion du Comité directeur SFIO le 22 juillet 1953, cité dans Pervillé 1987,
456.
25
Maurice Rabier: « L’Algérie, son statut, son avenir », Revue socialiste, no. 69,
juillet 1953, 138–145.
55
novembre 1954, au cours du débat sur la fixation de la date d’interpellation
du gouvernement sur sa politique en Afrique du Nord, Rabier constate que
« la flambée nationaliste et xénophobe que vient de connaître l’Algérie ne
nous a point surpris ».26
Plus d’un mois avant le début de l’insurrection algérienne, Mostefa
Benbahmed constate devant l’Assemblée nationale pendant le débat sur la
situation au Maroc et en Tunisie que « jamais l’Algérie a été aussi calme ».
Il fait référence à l’éclatement du Mouvement pour le triomphe des libertés
démocratiques, le MTLD en été 1954, qui, croyait-il, allait mettre fin à l’activité
radicale en Algérie. Même s’il exista un « drame tunisien » ou un « drame
marocain », Benbahmed ne veut pas parler de « drame nord-africain » qui
pourrait inclure aussi l’Algérie.
« Les problèmes de l’Algérie sont absolument autres: l’Algérie est
française, l’Algérie constitue trois départements français, et j’en veux
un peu, non pas à mes collègues d’origine européenne, mais à mes
collègues du premier collège – puisque nous avons deux collèges en
Algérie – d’avoir osé, pour les besoins de leur thèse, parler de crainte
en ce qui concerne la santé morale de cette Algérie. »27
Les socialistes en Algérie ne saisissent pas l’ampleur et la profondeur du
mécontentement algérien même après l’insurrection. Le Congrès fédéral
socialiste d’Alger le 7 novembre 1954 constate qu’il s’agit « des remous
politiques qui agitent à nouveau l’Algérie ». L’allusion à Sétif est donc faite. Le
secrétaire général algérois Briffa ne veut pas culpabiliser toute la population
algérienne et il réclame un « châtiment impitoyable des auteurs et des
responsables des actes de terrorisme, mais des seuls coupables ».28 Maurice
Rabier affirme à ses co-députés à l’Assemblée nationale que « c’est facile dans
un pays où on peut circuler librement, d’établir un ensemble léger d’une ou
deux centaines d’hommes ».29 En général, les événements sont considérés
26
« Interpellation de Maurice Rabier, séance du 12 novembre 1954 », AAN,
4959–4960.
27
« Interpellation de Mostefa Benbahmed, 1ère séance du 27 août 1954 », AAN,
4332.
28
« Renseignement par le commissaire divisionnaire, chef de la police des
renseignements généraux du district d’Alger (A. Touron), au sujet de l’activité
de la SFIO, le 8 novembre 1954 », Dossier 155: Partis et mouvements, SFIO, 10 Cab
Léonard, GGA, CAOM.
29
« Interpellation de Maurice Rabier, séance du 12 novembre 1954 », AAN,
4959–4960.
56
Kirsi Henriksson
comme des actes relevant du terrorisme et le coupable encore en décembre
1954 est le MTLD30.
Le Comité directeur de la SFIO attendit jusqu’au 8 décembre 1954 pour
ouvrir son premier débat sur l’Algérie troublée. L’Oranais Joseph Begarra y
exposa clairement les origines des attentats. A son avis, il s’agissait d’une
question politique derrière le « gros malaise » algérien.
« Plus sérieux [que la non-application du Statut] est le retournement de
l’opinion publique algérienne qui se trouve attirée vers une politique
d’intégration de l’Algérie à la Métropole avec suppression de tout ce
qui différencie l’Algérie de la Métropole. Les Algériens tiennent à être
des citoyens français, sans restriction de droits ni de devoirs. »
Les remèdes que Begarra propose, c’est de suivre la situation de très près et,
en attendant, de prendre sur le plan économique et social, les mesures les
plus urgentes.31
Ces remèdes montrent bien que le problème algérien fut considéré
comme un problème intérieur dont la solution se trouvait dans les réformes
intérieures. Pourtant, plus la situation s’aggravait, et surtout après la reprise
du pouvoir par les socialistes en janvier 1956, plus on commençait à chercher
des causes extérieures à ce malaise. Et le processus de la décolonisation à
grande vitesse servait d’excuse pour un complot étranger.
Déjà en mai 1954 les socialistes s’inquiétèrent de l’effet Diên Biên Phu,
c’est-à-dire des conséquences de la défaite militaire française en Indochine
au prestige de la France. Au cours d’une réunion algéroise le 10 mai 1954,
Briffa craignit que « l’affaire Diên Biên Phu soit exploitée par certains partis
pour stimuler un réveil du sentiment national dans le but de créer un climat
politique propre à leurs desseins ». Il redoute aussi que l’affaire ait de graves
conséquences pour l’Algérie où ces événements sont ressentis avec plus
d’acuité que dans la Métropole.32
30
« Rapport à M. le commissaire principal, chef de la police des renseignements
généraux du district de Constantine le 4 décembre 1954: réunion privée de la
section de Bône le 3 décembre 1954 », Dossier 155: Partis et mouvements, SFIO, 10
Cab Léonard, GGA, CAOM.
31
« Begarra dans la réunion du Comité directeur le 8 décembre 1954 », Compte
rendu des réunions du Comité directeur SFIO, OURS.
32
« Renseignement par le commissaire Divisionnaire, chef de la police des
renseignements généraux du district d’Alger, au sujet de l’activité de la SFIO, 12
mai 1954 », Dossier 155: Partis et mouvements, SFIO, 10 Cab Léonard, GGA, CAOM.
57
La thèse d’une menace extérieure est persistante aussi bien chez les
modérés, les radicaux, les républicains sociaux, les gaullistes que parmi les
socialistes : le problème algérien relève donc de l’ordre public33. Les camps
antagonistes de la guerre froide dictaient l’attitude des socialistes vis-à-vis du
mouvement de libération coloniale en Afrique et en Asie. Mais en Algérie, il y
avait un autre mal extérieur qui menaçait l’Algérie française: le nationalisme
arabe.
Les échos de la décolonisation dans le monde arabe
Pendant le processus de la décolonisation, jusqu’à l’indépendance de l’Algérie
en 1962, la France reste plus ou moins suspecte pour le monde arabe. Même
si les indépendances du Maroc et de la Tunisie en 1956 montrent la volonté
de la France de reconnaître la souveraineté des pays arabes, la longue guerre
d’Algérie maintient les relations dans un mauvais état jusqu’à sa fin. Aussi les
positions favorables des socialistes français envers Israël ne concilient-elles
pas la critique du monde arabe avec la politique française.34 Par exemple,
pour Jules Moch, Israël était le modèle d’un socialisme incarnant les progrès
techniques et politiques dans une région dominée par le fanatisme.35
La véritable menace extérieure était Gamal Abd el-Nasser et le rôle central
de l’Egypte dans le monde arabe. L’administration politique et militaire en
Algérie ainsi que les gouvernements français étaient convaincus que l’Egypte
avait participé activement à la préparation de l’insurrection algérienne. Le fait
que la proclamation du Front de libération nationale (FLN) pour l’indépendance
nationale est transmise le 31 octobre 1954 à partir du Caire ne dissipe pas les
doutes. L’envoi plus ou moins régulier des armes aux rebelles ainsi que l’asile
donné au Caire aux chefs nationalistes algériens irritent aussi les socialistes
français.36
Aussi le personnage de Nasser soulevait-il des passions insoupçonnées
parmi les leaders socialistes, hantés par ce nouveau « Hitler ». Le Ministre
résidant en Algérie, Robert Lacoste explique le danger présenté par Nasser
au Conseil national de la SFIO en juin 1956 :
« Les fellaghas [algériens] sont au service d’un idéal qui nous déroute :
un idéal d’asservissement, car il s’agit de la conquête arabe, sous
33
Harbi 1998, 25–29.
Buffotot 1987, 505, 508; Voir sur ce sujet Balta & Rulleau 1973.
35
Mechoulan 1999, 404–405.
36
Philip 1957, 149; Quilliot 1972, 641–643.
34
58
Kirsi Henriksson
le drapeau égyptien, du monde musulman en Afrique. Il s’agit de
quelque chose qui ressemble vraiment à un nouvel hitlérisme. Ce qui
est en vue, ce n’est pas en effet la création de démocraties nouvelles
indépendantes, c’est la création de sortes de sultanats arabes fondés
sur une société théocratique, autoritaire, communautaire, fondée aussi
sur la haine des races. »37
La nationalisation de la Compagnie du Canal de Suez par le gouvernement
égyptien le 26 juillet 1956 afin de financer la construction du barrage
d’Assouan, ne diminue pas les tensions franco-égyptiennes. Au contraire,
le gouvernement français durcit sa position pour empêcher un « nouveau
Munich ». Surtout le secrétaire général de la SFIO et le président du Conseil de
1956 à 1957, Guy Mollet – qui considérait l’ouvrage de Nasser, La Philosophie
de la révolution, comme l’héritier de Mein Kampf de Hitler – ne voulait aucun
« compromis avec l’expansionnisme d’un dictateur ».38 En coopérant avec
les Anglais, Mollet voulait éviter le précédent consentement humiliant qui
avait eu lieu en 1939 à Munich devant Hitler. Les troupes franco-anglaises
avec le soutien d’Israël, malgré l’opposition des Américains, commencèrent
l’invasion de l’Egypte à la fin d’octobre 1956. L’hostilité des USA et de l’Union
soviétique porta pourtant ses fruits et la dernière expédition de l’hégémonie
européenne au Moyen Orient est rapidement stoppée par une résolution de
l’ONU le 6 novembre 1956.39
Par l’expédition de Suez, l’Angleterre et la France perdirent définitivement
leur prestige devant le monde arabe. Nasser devint un héros, un symbole
de l’émancipation des peuples arabes. André Philip regrette qu’on ait « fait
une réalité d’un pan-arabisme qui, jusqu’ici, n’existait que dans l’esprit de
quelques intellectuels extrémistes. » En Afrique et en Asie eut lieu « l’explosion
d’un mouvement nationaliste, exprimant avec Le Caire une solidarité totale.
Partout, les peuples ont eu le sentiment que le colonialisme occidental était
leur seul ennemi. »40 Deux ans plus tard, Mollet, humilié, prend « toute la
responsabilité de l’opération de Suez ». Il pense pourtant « avoir rempli son
devoir international » en envoyant les troupes françaises en Egypte pour
37
« Le discours de Robert Lacoste sur la politique de pacification en Algérie,
Conseil national SFIO de Puteaux les 9 et 10 juin 1956 », Les Cahiers du propagande
socialiste, No. 21, 1956.
38
Mollet 1958, 31–34.
39
Oikarinen 1999, 174–175, 182–183; Ferro 1994, 401–409.
40
Philip 1957, 159–161.
59
confronter « le racisme pan-arabe, la haine de l’Occident et le fanatisme
religieux ».41
Ce qui avait été dangereux dans l’action de Nasser, c’était donc sa position
nationaliste arabe. L’analyse d’André Philip exprime bien la complexité du
nationalisme dans la pensée socialiste :
« Ce nationalisme [de Nasser], qui était au début le réflexe sain d’un
peuple cherchant à conquérir son indépendance, a pris de plus en plus
la forme d’une mystique réactionnaire, militariste – –. Ce nationalisme
exacerbé a conduit ainsi à un détournement des maigres ressources
disponibles vers des buts non économiques. »42
Pour avoir une perception plus profonde de ce mal qui vient de l’extérieur,
il faut analyser le discours socialiste sur le nationalisme arabe en Algérie ainsi
que ses rapports à la situation algérienne.
La hantise du nationalisme arabe en Algérie
Un mois avant le début de l’insurrection algérienne, les militaires français en
Algérie considéraient l’Association des ‘Ulamā’ Musulmans Algériens, l’AUMA,
comme représentante d’un nationalisme arabe dangereux en l’accusant de
faire « une vive propagande en faveur de l’Arabisme et de l’Indépendance du
Peuple algérien ». En fait, la surprise du 1er novembre était en partie possible
puisque l’administration porta son regard de surveillance sur les oulémas :
« L’Association des Oulémas, par l’action de ses professeurs sur les
jeunes, par sa propagande à base de religion effectuée devant de
larges auditoires à l’occasion des nombreuses manifestations qu’elle
organise, contribue plus encore que le PPA-MTLD à développer au
sein de la population musulmane d’Algérie, l’idée de l’Indépendance
Nationale. »43
La surveillance s’explique aussi par le fait que la doctrine de l’AUMA était
liée à l’évolution du réformisme musulman dans le monde arabe ; l’idéologie
des oulémas comportait donc des caractères externes, analysés par les
contemporains comme un « panislamisme » et un « panarabisme ».
41
Mollet 1958, 31–34.
Philip 1957, 142.
43
« Synthèse de renseignements, mois d’août 1954 », EMI, 2e bureau, dans SHAT
1998, 502.
42
Kirsi Henriksson
60
Les échos de la décolonisation du monde arabe inquiètent certains
socialistes. Raoul Borra intervient à l’Assemblée constituante en août
1946 et met en garde les députés sur le panarabisme, ce faux guide vers
l’émancipation. A son avis, c’est la France de 1789 qui est le véritable guide
vers l’émancipation, pas le panarabisme qui séduit « les mystiques qui
confondent trop souvent la politique avec la religion ».44 Il existe aussi des
voix divergentes sur ce sujet. Le socialiste Arrès-Lapoque, en analysant
la situation au Maroc, ne voit pas en 1947 que l’islam pourrait éveiller le
sentiment nationaliste en Afrique du Nord. Il écrit dans le journal Masses
que « – – l’islam pas plus que la chrétienté au Moyen-Age n’est capable de
provoquer l’éveil d’une conscience nationale. » A son avis, le Monde Arabe
est « un mythe inventé par la diplomatie britannique depuis trente ans ».45
Malgré la surveillance, les nationalistes algériens continuent à manifester
leur attachement au nationalisme arabe. Par exemple, les députés du groupe
parlementaire du MTLD, Ahmed Mezerna, Mohammed Khider et Haouès
Boukkaddoum déclarent en février 1950 dans une lettre au président du
conseil, Georges Bidault, que :
« La nation algérienne est sœur de la nation égyptienne. Elle l’est au
même titre que les autres pays arabes et musulmans. Des liens puissants
et indissolubles l’unissent aux héritiers de cette incomparable culture,
mère de la civilisation occidentale, qu’est la culture arabe – –. »46
Au vu de cette déclaration, il est donc assez compréhensible que des
policiers et militaires français aient eu plus tard, pendant la guerre, une
attitude réservée devant les liaisons entre les nationalistes algériens et
l’Egypte de Nasser.
Cependant la caractéristique du nationalisme arabe en Algérie est qu’il
ne constituera jamais qu’une source supplémentaire d’inspiration pour un
nationalisme typiquement algérien.47 Le journal Algérie Libre affirme l’identité
algérienne des militants du MTLD en septembre 1953, en opérant un choix
entre les camps de la guerre froide:
44
« Interpellation de Raoul Borra, 1ère séance du 23 août 1946 », AN constituante,
3273–3275.
45
Arrès-Lapoque: « Le problème marocain », Masses, Nos. 9–10, Juin–Juillet 1947.
46
« A la lettre des parlementaires français adressée à M. Bidault, les députés
MTLD répondent : La Nation algérienne est soeur de la Nation égyptienne, lettre
à Georges Bidault le 13 février 1950 », Algérie libre, No. 9, le 15 février 1950, 4.
47
Remaoun 1991, 5.
61
« Ce dont nous sommes certains, c’est que les Algériens, avant de tourner
leurs regards vers l’Est ou vers l’Ouest, pensent tout d’abord et avant
tout à l’Algérie, à leur pays. Et s’il arrive aux Algériens de s’intéresser
à l’extérieur, avant de porter leurs yeux sur l’URSS ou la Chine, il les
porte sur les pays frères d’Egypte, du Pakistan, d’Indonésie ou de l’Inde
beaucoup plus proches et plus solidaires d’eux que d’autres pays. »48
Avec la montée de la violence en Algérie, le discours des hommes de
gauche vise de plus en plus le nationalisme arabe comme étant la cause
principale de la situation algérienne. Georges Combault, vice-président de
la Ligue des droits de l’homme écrit en mai 1955 que « notre démocratie
ne saurait céder au fanatisme arabe qui organise le terrorisme, ni tolérer le
contre-terrorisme »49. La résolution sur l’Afrique du Nord par le Comité central
de la Ligue des droits de l’homme, réuni le 3 octobre 1955, poursuit dans la
même voie:
« – – la Ligue met en garde: les Français d’origine métropolitaine contre
la politique de la force, désormais impuissante à rien résoudre – la
population musulmane, contre les fureurs aveugles d’un soi-disant
« nationalisme arabe », déguisement d’un fanatisme inspiré du dehors,
intolérant et rétrograde. »50
Les socialistes français discutent beaucoup sur le nationalisme arabe
pendant le Congrès national de la SFIO à Lille, l’été 1956. Max Lejeune est très
sévère à l’endroit du nationalisme arabe qui a un rapport étroit avec l’islam
politique. Il légitime l’activité de l’armée française en Algérie en attaquant
le « panarabisme » qui « soulève dans l’Algérie tout le vieux fanatisme de
l’Islam. » Pour lui, l’Algérie n’est pas une partie du monde arabe et il défend la
nature kabyle du pays : « Le monde arabe est un conquérant, c’est le nomade
qui a détruit la forêt ».51
Tous les socialistes ne sont pas prêts à accepter le fait qu’il existe un
acteur étranger derrière le problème algérien. Par exemple, le député
48
« Réponse à Liberté », Algérie libre, No. 78, le 4 septembre 1953.
Georges Combault: « En Algérie », Les Cahiers des droits de l’homme, Nos. 6–7,
Juin–Juillet 1955, p. 78. Cet article a paru la première fois dans Droit de Vivre, le 31
mai 1955.
50
« Résolution sur l’Afrique du Nord par le Comité central de la Ligue des droits
de l’homme, 3 octobre 1955 », Les Cahiers des droits de l’homme, Nos. 8–10,
Septembre–Octobre–Novembre 1955, 88–89.
51
« Intervention de Max Lejeune, séance du 29 juin 1956 », Compte rendu du 48e
Congrès national SFIO, du 28 juin au 1 juillet 1956, Lille, OURS.
49
Kirsi Henriksson
62
socialiste Maurice Rabier trouve qu’il y a bien des causes intérieures et
extérieures derrière le problème algérien : « – – On dit des événements
d’Algérie: C’est l’étranger qui les conduit. – – L’étranger n’aurait jamais pu se
mêler de nos affaires en Algérie si un état de fait propice à l’immixtion n’y
avait existé. »52 Au cours du débat en octobre 1955 sur la prolongation de
l’état d’urgence en Algérie, Rabier définit le « caractère interne du mal » qui est
composé par le mécontentement sur le plan politique (inapplication du statut
de l’Algérie); sur le plan social (salaires bas, chômage, non-emploi provenant
à la fois de la poussée démographique et d’un manque d’industries locales);
et sur le plan économique avec le maintien du pacte colonial.53 Par sa critique
Maurice Rabier vise la politique du gouvernement Faure – les socialistes sont
alors dans l’opposition.
Au cours du débat à l’Assemblée nationale sur « Programme de réformes et
mesures de sauvegarde en Algérie », en mars 1956, Jean Montalat, socialiste
et rapporteur de la Commission de l’intérieur, constate que l’Algérie est un
« problème intérieur, mais également [un] problème international puisque
nous avons à faire face à un mouvement panarabe, panislamique dirigé du
Caire par Nasser et ses amis.»54 Le ton a changé dû au fait que les socialistes
participent au pouvoir ministériel.
Robert Lacoste, le ministre résidant en Algérie, intervient dans le même
débat qui finira par le vote des pouvoirs spéciaux en Algérie. Lui n’accepte pas
l’argument que le problème algérien soit seulement une question interne: « –
– La rébellion algérienne ne peut cependant être considérée du seul point de
vue de l’intérieur. – – Instrument mal conscient d’un nouvel impérialisme qui
vise le monde arabe, le nationalisme algérien est déjà sous tutelle. »55
Malgré la critique au sein du Parti socialiste après l’expédition douteuse de
Suez ne fait pas changer l’avis du secrétaire général et le président du conseil.
En répondant à la critique devant le tribunal de l’Assemblée nationale le 20
décembre 1956, Guy Mollet avoue que « les origines du drame algérien se
trouvent en Algérie même » mais il ne nie pourtant pas les liens entre les
52
« Interpellation de Maurice Rabier, 2e séance du 28 juillet 1955 », AAN, 4438–
4440.
53
« Interpellation de Maurice Rabier, 1ère séance du 13 octobre 1955 », AAN,
5083–5084.
54
« Interpellation de Jean Montalat, 1ère séance du 8 mars 1956 », AAN, 746–747.
55
« Interpellation de Robert Lacoste, 1ère séance du 8 mars 1956 », AAN, 759–763.
63
problèmes égyptien et algérien. A son avis l’attitude de l’Egypte avait
compliqué le problème algérien.56
Le véritable caractère du problème algérien continue de préoccuper les
socialistes français jusqu’à l’indépendance de l’Algérie. L’explication des
discours parallèles se trouve en partie dans l’exercice du pouvoir qui produit
des discours contradictoires. Même si « la trahison de la gauche française
a fait couler beaucoup d’encre »,57 l’histoire franco-algérienne nous offre
plusieurs exemples sur la difficulté de faire avancer « la démocratie » ou
« l’émancipation » universelle en exerçant en même temps le pouvoir suivant
son propre modèle.
Références
Archives et sources diverses
AAN : Annales de l’Assemblée Constituante 1946 et Annales de l’Assemblée
Nationale, Débats parlementaires 1946−1962.
Bulletins intérieur de la SFIO, 1945−1957.
CAOM: Centre des Archives d’Outre-mer, Aix-en-Provence:
Gouvernement Général de l’Algérie GGA: 10 Cab, Cabinet Roger Léonard
(avril 1951−janvier 1955).
CARAN: Centre des Archives Nationales, Paris:
F/60/871 Algerie: situation politique generale, nationalisme,
neonationalisme, Comité de l’Afrique du Nord.
Compte rendus des Congrès nationaux SFIO, 1944−1957.
Compte rendus des réunions du Comité directeur de la Parti socialiste SFIO,
1946−1957.
56
« Discours du Président du Conseil Guy Mollet, séance du 20 décembre 1956 »,
AAN, 6174–6175.
57
Jean-Claude Vatin a constaté ce fait déjà en 1972. (Vatin 1972, 899)
Kirsi Henriksson
64
SHAT (1998) : La Guerre d’Algérie par les documents, Tome 2, Les portes de la
guerre: des occasions manquées à l’insurrection, 10 mars 1946−31 décembre
1954. Documentation établie sous la direction de Jean-Claude Jauffret, avec
la collaboration de Henri Baudoin, Jean Roucaud, Alain Porchet. S.H.A.T.,
Service Historique de l’Armée de Terre.
Journeaux
Algérie libre : « Par le peuple et pour le peuple », journal clandestin du PPA,
directeur Messali Hadj, 1949−1954.
Cahiers des droits de l’homme, Revue mensuelle, directeur Emile Kahn,
1955−1958.
Cahiers du propagande socialiste. Supplément à la Documentation socialiste,
1955−1956.
Masses, Revue mensuelle d’action prolétarienne par le Mouvement
International socialisme et libérté, secrétaire général Marceau Pivert,
directeur René Lefeuvre, 1946−1947.
Le Populaire de Paris, Organe sociale du Parti socialiste SFIO, 1935−1958.
La Revue socialiste, Revue de culture politique et sociale, publiée par le Parti
socialiste et le Cercle d’Etudes Socialistes Jean Jaurès, directeur Albert
Thomas, 1946−1959.
Bibliographie
Ageron, Charles-Robert (1984) : « Les troubles du Nord-Constantinois en mai
1945: une tentative insurrectionnelle? », Vingtième siècle, revue d’histoire, no.
4, octobre.
Ageron, Charles-Robert (1990) : « De l’Empire à la dislocation de l’Union
française (1939–1956) », Histoire de la France coloniale 1914–1990. Paris:
Armand Colin.
Balta, Paul & Claudine Rulleau (1973) : La politique arabe de la France de Gaulle à
Pompidou. Paris: Editions Sindbad.
Buffotot, Patrice (1987) : « Guy Mollet et la défense. Du socialisme patriotique au
socialisme atlantique », dans B. Ménagér et al. (éds.) Guy Mollet, un camarade
en république. Presses Universitaires de Lille.
Fauvet, Jacques (1959) : La IVe République. Paris: Librairie Arthème Fayard.
Ferro, Marc (1994) : Histoire des colonisations des conquêtes aux indépendances,
XIIIe-XXe siècle. Paris: Editions du Seuil.
65
Harbi, Mohammed (1998 [1984]) : 1954, la guerre commence en Algérie. Editions
Complexe.
Mandouze, André (1998) : Mémoires d’outre-siècle, tome 1: d’une résistance à
l’autre. Editions Viviane Hamy.
Mechoulan, Eric (1999) : Jules Moch, Un socialiste dérangeant. Bruxelles:
Bruylant.
Melasuo, Tuomo (1999) : Algerian poliittinen kehitys 1800-luvulta vapautussotaan
1954 (L’évolution politique de l’Algérie du 19ème siècle au début de la
guerre de libération 1954), Research Report No. 85. Tampere: Tampere Peace
Research Insitute.
Mollet, Guy (1958) : Bilan et perspectives socialistes. Librairie Plon.
Oikarinen, Jarmo (1999): The Middle East in the American Quest for World Order.
Ideas of Power, Economics, and Social Development in United States Foreign
Policy, 1953−1961. Helsinki: SKS, Bibliotheca Historica 47.
Pervillé, Guy (1987) : « La SFIO, Guy Mollet et l’Algérie de 1945 à 1955 », dans
B. Ménagér et al. (éds.) Guy Mollet, un camarade en république. Presses
Universitaires de Lille.
Pervillé, Guy (2002) : Pour une histoire de la guerre d’Algérie 1954−1962. Paris:
Editions A. et J. Picard.
Philip, André (1957) : Le Socialisme trahi. Paris: Librairie Plon.
Quilliot, Roger (1972) : La S.F.I.O. et l’exercice du pouvoir 1944-1958. Paris: Librairie
Arthème Fayard, Collection ’Les Grandes Etudes Contemporaines’.
Remaoun, Hassan (1991) : Du mouvement national à l’état indépendant: le couple
unité maghrébine-unité arabe dans le discours politique algérien. URASC,
Université d’Oran.
Todd, Olivier (1996): Albert Camus, une vie. Paris : Editions Gallimard.
Vatin, Jean-Claude (1972) : « Conditions et formes de la domination coloniale en
Algérie (1919−1945) », Revue algérienne des sciences juridiques, économiques
et politiques RASJEP, Vol. IX, No. 4, Décembre 1972, 873−906.
La diplomatie algérienne au XXIè siècle1
Lotfi Boumghar
« Dire de Tuomo qu’il est le plus Méditerranéen des Nordiques serait une
lapalissade, aussi à travers cette modeste contribution, c’est au plus
méditerranéen d’entre nous que je souhaite rendre hommage ».
Depuis l’accession à son indépendance en 1962, l’Algérie a connu de
profondes mutations, certaines ont même occasionné des ruptures, voire des
fractures dont les blessures ne se sont pas à ce jour totalement cicatrisées.
Dans ce contexte, il est important de relever que la diplomatie algérienne
est restée attachée à certains principes fondamentaux au-delà des nécessaires
repositionnements dictés par les grands bouleversements qu’a connu et que
connaît encore la scène géostratégique mondiale.
Pour comprendre l’attachement de l’Algérie à ces principes dans son action
internationale, il est nécessaire d’opérer un retour aux sources pour montrer
comment la diplomatie algérienne moderne est née dans le sillage de la lutte
contre la colonisation.
Aux sources de la diplomatie algérienne moderne
Comme tout appareil voué à l’action internationale, la diplomatie algérienne
est déterminée par un certain nombre de facteurs d’ordre géographique et
géopolitique sur lesquels nous reviendrons ultérieurement.
Au-delà de cette donnée, le fait que la diplomatie algérienne dans son
acception contemporaine soit née et se soit développée dans le cadre de la
lutte armée de libération nationale a profondément marqué les options de la
politique étrangère algérienne après l’indépendance.
En effet, comment comprendre l’importance de l’attachement de l’Algérie
aux principes du droit des peuples à disposer d’eux-mêmes, si on ignore
que la diplomatie algérienne a forgé son identité dans le combat pour la
reconnaissance de ce droit au peuple algérien lui-même ?
1
Les idées développées dans la présente contribution n’engagent que leur
auteur.
Lofti Boumghar
68
Par ailleurs, l’attachement quasi viscéral de l’Algérie au respect de la légalité
internationale trouve son fondement dans le même contexte historique.
Toute une génération de diplomates algériens a été nourrie à ces principes
et à ces valeurs, des principes et des valeurs, qui ont été transmis aux nouvelles
générations, à qui incombe aujourd’hui la responsabilité de concevoir et de
mettre en œuvre l’action internationale de l’Algérie.
Une politique étrangère constante malgré un environnement
en pleine recomposition
Depuis l’indépendance, l’Etat et la société en Algérie sont passés par deux
phases principales :
1. une première phase de 1962 à 1988 marquée par une omniprésence
de l’Etat et une gestion centralisée de l’économie ;
2. de 1988 à nos jours, avec l’entame d’une transition duale vers la
démocratie et vers l’économie de marché.
Cette deuxième phase a vu la survenance dans la violence terroriste qui a
ébranlé les fondements de l’Etat républicain et constitué une grave menace
à sa pérennité.
Au-delà des transformations internes propres à l’Algérie, la diplomatie
algérienne s’est également adaptée aux changements majeurs enregistrés
sur la scène géostratégique mondiale depuis la chute du Mur de Berlin jusqu’à
l’apparition des prémices d’un monde à nouveau multipolaire en passant par
le règne de l’hyperpuissance américaine.
Face à tous ces facteurs endogènes et exogènes, la diplomatie algérienne
s’est adaptée, s’est redéployée sans jamais s’éloigner des principes qui
constituent la substance même de son action tant au plan régional
qu’international.
Il nous paraît hautement significatif que malgré tous les changements
et les turbulences qu’a connus l’Algérie dans un passé récent, la diplomatie
algérienne s’est singularisée par une constance dans le choix et les actions.
Une des raisons qui peuvent expliquer cet état de fait est que la politique
étrangère fait l’objet d’une approche consensuelle de la part d’une grande
majorité d’acteurs et de citoyens algériens.
Si un tel constat s’avère juste, il mériterait d’être souligné en raison de
l’absence en Algérie d’un réel débat sur les options fondamentales de la
politique étrangère, ce qui pourrait laisser penser que, instinctivement, la
69
diplomatie algérienne a fait sienne la conception que se fait l’imaginaire
populaire de l’action extérieure de son pays.
Une dimension arabe, méditerranéenne et africaine affirmée
De par sa position stratégique au carrefour de l’Europe, de l’Afrique et du
monde arabe, la diplomatie algérienne doit s’assumer des responsabilités
régionales importantes et entretenir des relations de confiance, qui lui
aménagent des marges de manœuvre et des capacités d’influence dans le
contexte régional et sous régional.
Dans ce cadre, l’Algérie a développé des relations multiformes avec le
monde arabe caractérisées ces dernières années par une forte connotation
économique comme en témoigne le volume important des investissements
arabes en Algérie.
La Méditerranée a toujours constitué un centre d’intérêt essentiel pour
l’Algérie au regard des liens historiques, culturels et humains qui unissent
l’Algérie à nombre d’Etats méditerranéens, au Nord comme au Sud.
Depuis avril 2002, l’Algérie est liée à l’Union européenne par un accord
d’association qui est entré en vigueur le 1er septembre 2005.
Attachée au renforcement des liens entre les deux rives de la Méditerranée,
l’Algérie a été représentée au plus haut niveau à la réunion marquant
l’avènement de l’Union pour la Méditerranée, tout en soulevant certaines
interrogations concernant notamment le mode de financement des projets
qui seront retenus dans ce cadre.
Par ailleurs, l’Algérie entretient des rapports continus avec l’OTAN dans le
cadre du dialogue méditerranéen initié par cette organisation.
Ce dialogue a permis la mise en œuvre de nombreuses actions communes
aussi bien militaires que civiles.
Le dialogue informel dans le cadre des 5 + 5 a toujours suscité un intérêt
particulier chez les autorités algériennes, qui ne manquent pas une occasion
pour souhaiter son développement.
En effet, nombre d’observateurs considèrent que l’espace géopolitique
que constitue la Méditerranée occidentale présente une homogénéité de
nature à permettre la mise en place de partenariat avancé entre les pays
concernés.
L’Afrique constitue une autre dimension importante de l’action de la
diplomatie algérienne, et cela sous différents prismes :
70
Lofti Boumghar
t l’Afrique en tant que continent recélant d’importantes potentialités
à explorer et à développer, et l’initiative du partenariat pour le
développement de l’Afrique (NEPAD), dont l’Algérie est l’un des pays
promoteurs, qui soulève beaucoup d’espoir, malgré un manque de
visibilité sur les projets concrets et surtout le manque d’engagement
des bailleurs de fonds extra-africains ;
t l’Afrique en tant que zone de vulnérabilité avec la multiplication
des conflits de basse intensité, la prolifération du trafic d’armes et
l’apparition du terrorisme comme menace majeure contre les peuples
de la région.
Dans ce cadre, la diplomatie algérienne s’est évertuée à réunir les conditions
du retour de la sécurité et de la paix sur le continent et notamment dans la
zone sahélienne, comme en témoignent les efforts inlassables déployés en
vue de régler des différends internes notamment dans les pays voisins du
Mali et du Niger.
L’Algérie œuvre à ce que l’Afrique puisse prendre en charge sa
sécurité, et réunir par elle-même les conditions de sa stabilité et de son
développement.
Un souci permanent de diversification
Les observateurs et les analystes tentent régulièrement d’inscrire l’Algérie
dans un jeu d’alliances et leurs conclusions sont souvent démenties par les
faits.
Une des constantes de la diplomatie algérienne réside dans sa quête de
garder une indépendance, malgré les contraintes qu’imposent les nouveaux
facteurs intervenus au plan international.
Pour comprendre ce souci d’indépendance, il faut remonter à la tradition
de non-alignement qui a constitué au temps de la guerre froide un pilier
fondateur de la politique étrangère de l’Algérie.
Au nom de ce principe de non-alignement, l’Algérie a refusé hier
comme aujourd’hui d’accueillir des bases étrangères sur son sol et a veillé
à diversifier ses relations politiques, économiques et militaires sur une base
pragmatique.
Cette référence historique permet de comprendre pourquoi l’Algérie veille
à ne pas s’enfermer dans une relation exclusive, et développe une action
de dialogue politique et de coopération envers les différents centres de
rayonnement de par le monde.
71
Une attention particulière semble être accordée aux Etats émergents et
notamment aux Etats continents, tels la Chine, l’Inde ou le Brésil, résultat
probablement d’une analyse stratégique et prospective, qui veut que le
centre de gravité du monde se déplacera dans un futur proche vers ces
pays.
Ce choix qui nous paraît très visible renvoie également à une référence
historique représentée par l’importance de la coopération Sud–Sud, ellemême, résultante de l’appui et du soutien affirmés de nombreux pays du Sud
à la Révolution algérienne.
L’action économique ou le défi futur pour la diplomatie
algérienne
S’il est possible de soutenir que l’action politique de la diplomatie algérienne
offre des garanties de visibilité et de continuité de nature à rassurer ses
partenaires, cette diplomatie forgée dans un contexte de lutte politique,
éprouve des difficultés à assumer la dimension économique de sa mission,
qui revêt aujourd’hui une importance croissante.
Il est convenu que l’une des principales vulnérabilités de l’Algérie réside
dans sa dépendance quasi-totale vis-à-vis des hydrocarbures. Sur cette base,
la promotion des exportations hors hydrocarbures constitue depuis plus
de deux décennies une préoccupation majeure des pouvoirs publics en
Algérie.
C’est ainsi que l’appareil diplomatique algérien s’est vu assigné une mission
de promotion de la production algérienne et de la destination « Algérie » en
matière d’investissement et de tourisme.
Force est de constater que jusqu’à ce jour, cette mission n’est pas totalement
assumée et ce, de notre point de vue, pour deux raisons principales :
1. une raison psychologique qui fait que l’action économique est
considérée comme moins noble et moins importante que l’action
politique ;
2. un manque de professionnalisme en la matière en raison d’un profil
inadapté à cette mission du personnel diplomatique.
Il y a lieu de souligner à cet effet, qu’un effort salutaire de diversification des
profils en matière de recrutement du personnel diplomatique a été entrepris
ces dernières années. Il pourrait produire des résultats positifs si les moyens
adéquats sont mis à la disposition des personnels affectés à cette mission.
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Lofti Boumghar
En conclusion, il est possible de soutenir que le défi, qui attend la diplomatie
algérienne à l’orée de ce XXIè siècle, se résume à développer ses capacités à
s’adapter aux mutations rapides que connaît le monde, et surtout à renforcer
le segment économique de son action au service du développement
économique de l’Algérie.
Karim Maiche
Kysyin Tuomo Melasuolta kerran, mikä sai nuoren suomalaismiehen
kiinnostumaan juuri Algeriasta. Hän kertoi matkustelleensa nuorempana
Ranskassa ja törmänneensä ensimmäistä kertaa junassa maassa asuviin
pohjoisafrikkalaisiin siirtolaisiin. Heidän kauttaan hän sai kipinän Välimeren
eteläpuoleiseen alueeseen. Halu laajentaa maailmankuvaa ja näkökulmaa
vallitsevan angloamerikkalaisen buumin keskellä herätti kiinnostuksen
kolmansien maiden asioihin.
Opiskellessaan 1970-luvun alussa Uppsalan yliopistossa eteen avautui
mahdollisuus lentää 400 kruunulla viikoksi Algeriaan. Ennen matkaansa
hän kertoi kahlanneensa yli 10 000 sivua Algerian historiaa kolonialismin
aikakaudesta maan itsenäistymistaisteluihin. Paluulippu jäi lopulta
käyttämättä, kun matka venähti viikon sijasta kolmeen kuukauteen. Suomeen
paluu onnistui kätevästi liftaamalla.
Väitöskirjansa Algerian poliittinen kehitys 1800-luvulta vapautussotaan 1954
esipuheessa Melasuo kirjoittaa, kuinka matkan aikana syntyi rakkaussuhde
tähän Pohjois-Afrikan valtioon, joka on jatkunut tähän päivään asti. Toisaalta,
jos rajoittaa Melasuon lämpimän suhteen Välimeren alueella pelkästään
Algeriaan, ei tee oikeutta hänen koko tuotannolleen ja pyrkimyksilleen.
Tuotantoa ei voi myöskään rajoittaa pelkästään suomenkieliseen
julkaisutoimintaan. Keskityn artikkelissani kuitenkin vain lähinnä hänen
Algeriaa koskevaan tutkimukseensa.
Tämän artikkelin välityksellä kiitän Tuomo Melasuota valtavasta
työstä ja panoksesta, jonka hän on suomenkieliselle Välimeren alueen ja
etenkin Algerian tutkimukselle antanut. Hänen työllään on ollut minulle
suomalaisalgerialaisena opiskelijana valtavasti iloa ja hyötyä.
Algeriasta Suomeen
Minulta on kysytty Suomessa tuhansia kertoja, mistä olen alun perin kotoisin.
Vastaan aina syntyneeni ja kasvaneeni Suomessa. Useimmiten vastaus ei riitä
ja sama kysymys toistetaan kunnes kerron, että äitini on suomalainen ja isäni
74
Karim Maiche
on syntynyt Algeriassa. Seuraavaksi minulta kysytään, ovatko vanhempani
vielä yhdessä, asuuko isäni Suomessa ja olenko muslimi.
Algerian itsenäisyyssodan keskellä varttunut isäni pääsi 1960-luvun lopulla
Leningradiin opiskelemaan. Siellä hän tapasi isoäitini mukaan työmatkalle
lähteneen äitini. Siskoni synnyttyä he muuttivat ensin Algeriaan ja päätyivät
vuonna 1977 Suomeen. Synnyin kaksi vuotta myöhemmin enkä usko, että
olen ollut kovin vanha ymmärtäessäni, että isäni on eronnut joissain kohdin
valtaväestöstä. Olen myös itse joutunut tummien piirteideni johdosta
silmätikuksi vaaleiden suomalaisten keskellä.
Usein ihmiset määrittelevät kansalaisuuteni omien näkemystensä
pohjalta: joidenkin mielestä olen isäni syntyperän johdosta algerialainen,
toiset taas määrittelevät minut suomalaiseksi. Jos minulta kysytään, koen
kai tässä kontekstissa olevani suomalaisalgerialainen. Isäni synnyinmaassa
olen vieraillut säännöllisesti nuoresta asti. Olen vertaillut Suomea ja Algeriaa,
suomalaisia ja algerialaisia, islamia ja kristinuskoa toisiinsa. Tähän mennessä ei
vastaani ole tullut sellaisia ylitsepääsemättömiä kulttuurisia tai uskonnollisia
eroja, jotka tekisivät näiden yhdessäelon mahdottomaksi.
Kerran jouduimme 1990-luvun alussa kuvaamataidon tunnilla tekemään
työn, jossa Saddam Husseinin kasvot asetettiin keskelle maalitaulua. Koin
aiheen erittäin kiusalliseksi ja ihmettelin, miksi isäni kehysti tekeleeni. Se
roikkuu yhä hänen seinällään. Isäni historiankäsitys erosi usein siitä, mitä
meille suomalaisessa koulussa kerrottiin. Olen myös ihmetellyt, miksi
kouluhistoriamme alkaa usein Kreikasta ja jatkuu Roomaan. Se hyppää
arabien imperiumin yli käsitteellä “pimeä keski-aika” ja jatkuu renessanssina
löytöretkiin kolonialismin ja imperialismin käsitteiden sijaan päättyen lopulta
maailmansotien jälkeen Neuvostoliiton hajoamiseen ja Euroopan unionin
syntyyn. Mielestäni tällainen Eurooppa-keskeinen näkökulma historiaan
ei tee oikeutta maailmanhistorian ymmärtämiselle, Välimeren kansoista
puhumattakaan.
Välimeren alueen väestöt ja kulttuurit ovat muovautuneet ajan kuluessa ja
jatkuvassa vuorovaikutuksessa keskenään. Algerian välimerellinen sijainti on
tehnyt siitä osan maailman vanhimpia kulttuureja. Pitkän historiansa aikana
se on kuulunut useaan eri kulttuurialueeseen. Algeria on ollut osa Karthagoa,
Numidiaa ja Roomaa. Myös kristinusko sai jalansijaa maassa. Kristinuskon yksi
merkittävimmistä teologeista, kirkkoisä Augustinus, syntyi nykyisen Algerian
alueella. Rooman valtakunnan, vandaalien ja Bysantin jälkeen maahan
saapuivat arabit erikokoisina aaltoina ja toivat mukanaan islamin.
75
Algeriasta puhuttaessa useimmiten esiin nousee 132 vuotta kestänyt
kolonialismin aikakausi osana Ranskan siirtomaaimperiumia, joka
huipentui itsenäisyystaisteluun vuonna 1954. Itsenäisyys kahdeksan
vuotta myöhemmin jätti maahan yksipuoluejärjestelmän. Tätä poliittista ja
kulttuurista kehitystä Melasuo kuvaa yksityiskohtaisesti väitöskirjassaan.
Demokraattiset uudistukset, jotka aloitettiin 20 vuotta sitten, ajoivat maan
1990-luvulla veriseen sisällissotaan. Arviolta 150 000 ihmisen arvellaan
menettäneen henkensä. Ranskan miehityksestä vapautunut uusi eliitti ei
ollut valmis luopumaan saavuttamistaan etuoikeuksista.
Algeriasta Suomessa tiedetään yleensä maan ensimmäinen presidentti
Ahmed Ben Bella, algerialainen punaviini, kestävyysjuoksija Noureddin
Morceli ja islamistien väkivallanteot. 1990-luvulla suomalainen media uutisoi
Algerian väkivaltaisuuksista. Muutamia pitempiä, usein ranskan kielestä
käännettyjä artikkeleita lukuun ottamatta, tapahtumista jäi mielikuva
muslimien tekemistä raaoista murhista, joita maan hallitus pyrki estämään
“kovalla kädellä”.
Syyskuun 11. päivän iskujen jälkeen maailma heräsi käsittelemään
islamilaisten maiden nuorison radikalisoitumista globaalimmin ja syvemmin
analysoiden. Usein väkivallan uskottiin kumpuavan islamista. Tapahtumia
alettiin tarkastella sillä seurauksella, että muutamat muslimiystäväni katsoivat
parhaaksi ajaa partansa välttääkseen ylimääräiset huomionosoitukset
kadulla liikkuessaan. Algerian hallituksesta tuli merkittävä liittolainen USA:n
johtamassa terrorisminvastaisessa sodassa “pahaa” vastaan, eikä sen kovia
otteita enää arvosteltu. Ääri-islamilainen terrorismi nähtiin entistä laajemmin
uhkana, jonka kukistamiseen oli käytettävä humanitääristen toimien sijaan
sotilaallista voimaa.
Islam on melko väärinymmärretty uskonto myös Suomessa. Vielä 1970luvun lopulla maahanmuuttajia oli maassa vain kourallinen ja yleistäen
voisi todeta, että kaikki tunsivat toisensa. Heihin suhtauduttiin usein
kunnioittavammin kuin 2000-luvulla. Nykyään tilanne on muuttunut, kun
maahanmuuttajien määrä on ajan myötä kasvanut. Ennen lamaa Suomeen
saapuneet somalit ja 1980-luvulla tulleet vietnamilaiset ovat vähitellen
muiden maahanmuuttajien ohella muuttaneet suomalaisten asenteita
ulkomaalaisiin: alettiin puhua “mokkanaamoista” ja “venepakolaisista”.
Etenkin syyskuun 11. päivän tapahtumat ovat tehneet “hyvästä” paremman
ja “pahasta” pahemman. Media käsittelee jatkuvalla syötöllä islamia omasta
diskurssistaan. Islam rauhanuskontona nähdään usein vain ironisesti
“rauhanuskontona” eikä esimerkiksi välineenä, jota kukin helposti käyttää
76
Karim Maiche
omiin tarkoituksiinsa. Niin sanottujen länsimaiden terrorismin vastainen sota
nähdään välttämättömänä toimenpiteenä maailmanrauhan edistämiseksi ja
“oikeiden” arvojen säilyttämiseksi.
Olen huomannut, että minusta tulee usein Suomessa “suuri islamin
puolustaja”. Algeriassa puolestaan löydän itseni puolustamassa kristinuskoa.
En ymmärrä, mitä eroa on sillä, pääseekö Suomen isoäitini taivaaseen tai
Algerian isoäitini paratiisiin. Olen kuullut tarinoita siitä, kuinka Suomen vaarini
taisteli 50 asteen pakkasessa Karjalan kannaksella ja että yksi suomalainen
vastaa kymmentä “ryssää”. Algeriassa puolestaan kerrotaan, kuinka vaarini
taisteli 50 asteen helteessä ranskalaisia vastaan ja yksi algerialainen vastaa
kymmentä ranskalaista. Kansat pyrkivät aina rakentamaan myyttejä
historiallisista vaiheistaan.
Jos kysymys on kansakuntien identiteettien yhteen hiomisesta valtion
tai liittovaltioiden turvallisuusintressien pohjalta, historian tutkimuksen
kannalta asetelma on vähintäänkin harmillinen. Nykyinen trendi, joka pyrkii
jakamaan Välimeren alueen keinotekoisesti keskeltä kahtia, ei tee oikeutta
alueen historialle, nykytilanteen hahmottamisesta puhumattakaan. Melasuo
kuvasi Välimeren etelä- ja pohjoispuolta joskus osuvasti saman kolikon
kahdeksi eri puoleksi.
Vertaan usein elämääni ja suomalaista kasvuympäristöä ikäisteni serkkujen ja
ystävien elämään Algeriassa. Koen tilanteeni etuoikeutetuksi heihin verrattuna
useilla eri elämän osa-alueilla. Suomen koulutusjärjestelmä ja rauhallinen
kasvuympäristö takaavat puutteineenkin paremmat mahdollisuudet itsensä
toteuttamiselle ja kehittämiselle. Minulla on ollut etuoikeus matkustella,
syödä terveellisesti ja kouluttaa itseäni. Entä jos olisin syntynyt ja kasvanut
Algeriassa?
Algerialaisten nuorten tulevaisuuden toiveet ovat hyvin samanlaisia
kuin nuorilla yleensä: työpaikka, matkustaminen, perheen perustaminen
ja turvallisen tulevaisuuden tavoitteleminen kuuluvat algerialaisten
nuorten haaveisiin. Hallitus ja imaamit eivät useinkaan pysty vastaamaan
näihin toiveisiin. Työttömyysaste nousee Algeriassa lähes 14 prosenttiin,
eli kaksinkertaiseksi Suomeen verrattuna. Neljäsosa maan väestöstä elää
köyhyysrajan alapuolella. Työttömistä 72 prosenttia on alle 30-vuotiaita ja
85 prosenttia alle 35-vuotiaita. Monet nuoret kokevat, ettei Algeria hyväksy
heitä ja ovat valmiita jättämään kotimaansa hinnalla millä hyvänsä. Tietoisina
77
riskeistä, epävarmuudesta ja kärsimyksistä nämä immigraation kandidaatit,
harragat, vaarantavat henkensä ylittäen Välimeren rantautuakseen
Eurooppaan; Eldoradoon, jossa he uskovat pääsevänsä kiinni parempaan
elämään. Nämä yritykset ovat 2000-luvulla yleistyneet1.
Varakkaiden elämä on tietenkin hyvin erilaista. Sidi Fedjin ja Tipazan
hiekkarannat todistavat toisenlaisen Algerian puolesta. Maan pääkaupungissa
kymmenet yöklubit kukoistavat islamistien iskujen pelosta huolimatta. Algeria
on valtavien luonnonvarojensa ansiosta yksi Afrikan vauraimmista valtioista.
Korkeiden öljyn ja kaasun hintojen seurauksena maahan on virrannut
miljardeja dollareita. Käytetäänkö nämä rikkaudet valtion rakentamiseen
ja tavallisten kansalaisten hyväksi, vai päätyvätkö ne maata hallitsevalle
yläluokalle? Algerian tulevaisuus on monella tapaa epäselvä.
Algerian nykytilanteesta on vaikea saada kokonaiskuvaa tarkastelematta
sen vaiherikasta historiaa. Etenkin kolonialismin vaikutus ja perintö puhuttaa
yhä ja vaikuttaa vielä tänä päivänä esimerkiksi Ranskan ja Algerian suhteisiin.
Ranskan valloitukset Algeriassa 1800-luvun alussa voidaan liittää laajempaan
historialliseen kokonaisuuteen: kolonialismin ja imperialismin aikakauteen.
Algerian väestötappio 40 valloitusvuoden kuluessa arvioidaan useaksi
sadaksituhanneksi hengeksi. Hävinneen algerialaisen eliitin tilalle alkoi
vähitellen muuttaa eurooppalaisia siirtolaisia, eikä algerialaista eliittiä haluttu
kilpailemaan eurooppalaisten kanssa ja hidastamaan siirtokunnan kehitystä.
Ranska otti parhaat viljelysalueet käyttöönsä ja algerialaiset joutuivat
usein muuttamaan kurjiin saviasumuksiin. Maan kulttuuritaso laski jyrkästi,
kun uskonnollisten instituutioiden ja veljeskuntaliittoutumien zaouiat ja
koraanikoulut hävisivät.2
Algerian taloudellinen ja sosiaalinen kehitys ennen Ranskan miehitystä oli
melko samanlainen kuin muuallakin Välimeren alueella: maan taloudellinen
rakenne ja kansan enemmistön elintaso kestivät hyvin vertailun muiden
Välimeren yhteiskuntien kanssa. Algerialaisten talonpoikien arvioidaan
olleen samalla sivistystasolla kuin heidän maataan asuttamaan tulleiden
ranskalaisten ja myöhemmin italialaisten, maltalaisten sekä espanjalaisten
siirtolaisten. Sisäisesti maa oli vakaa ja yhteenotot olivat pikemmin
heimojen sisäisiä kuin sosiaalisten luokkien välisiä, toisin kuin vaikkapa
vallankumouksellisessa Ranskassa.3
1
http://www.ons.dz/index.htm.
Melasuo 1999, 120–127.
3
Lorcin 1999, 246, 249; Melasuo 1999, 61, 94–95.
2
78
Karim Maiche
Melasuo kuvaa väitöskirjassaan Algerian itsenäistymispyrkimyksiä
ja Ranskan tukahduttavia vastatoimia, jotka lopulta johtivat Algerian
yksipuoluejärjestelmän syntyyn. Ranskan toimet vähitellen tuhosivat kansan
sisäisen poliittisen pluralismin, ja jättivät ainoaksi vaihtoehdoksi aseelliseen
vallankumouksen kautta itsenäisyyttä tavoittelevan liikkeen: Front de
Libération nationale, FLN. Algerian itsenäistyessä maa oli suurten haasteiden
edessä. Sen perinteinen koulutusjärjestelmä oli tuhoutunut. Miehistä
lukutaidottomia oli 85 ja naisista 95 prosenttia4. Nopea väestönkasvu, sisäiset
etniset kiistat ja rajariidat naapurivaltioiden kanssa ovat olleet vaikuttamassa
Algerian nykyiseen tilanteeseen. Algerian viimeisimmät väkivaltaisuudet
ovat paljolti myös pitkittyneen yksipuoluejärjestelmän seuraus.
Vierailu Tampereen rauhan- ja konfliktintutkimuslaitoksella
Vuonna 2003 olin työharjoittelussa suomalaisessa kansalaisjärjestössä, jossa
järjestin erilaisia tiedotustilaisuuksia itsenäiseksi valtioksi pyrkivän LänsiSaharan tilanteesta. Marokko on miehittänyt Afrikan luoteisosassa sijaitsevaa
Länsi-Saharaa espanjalaisten aloitettua alueelta vetäytymisen vuonna 1975.
Algeria puolestaan on alueen itsenäisyysliike Polisarion suurin tukija ja näkee
konfliktin osana dekolonisaatioprosessia. Konflikti on ajanut naapurusten
suhteet koetukselle. Ystäväni Henri Onodera oli ennen muuttoaan Lontooseen
sopinut Tuomo Melasuon kanssa, että Saharan konfliktista voisi järjestää
keskustelutilaisuuden Taprin Välimeri-projektin tiimoilta. Suomeen saapui
Polisarion Pohjoismaiden edustaja Lamine Yahiaoui sekä Länsi-Saharan
naisjärjestön NUSW:in edustaja Mansoura Babouzid.
Soitin Tapriin Melasuolle, jonka olin aiemmin nähnyt puhumassa Algerian
tapahtumista televisiossa. Hän alkoi välittömästi keskustella kanssani
Algerian tilanteesta. Muistan, kuinka minua ärsytti, sillä olen yleensä tottunut
kertomaan “tosiasioita” Algeriasta suomalaisille; Algeria ja siitä kertominen
ovat osa identiteettiäni. Nyt keskustelu olikin hankalaa ja jouduin monella
tapaa vastaanottajan roolin. Aiheista keskusteltiin muutenkin liian
yksityiskohtaisesti. En ymmärtänyt, kuinka aihealueet joista puhuttiin, olisivat
jotenkin mielenkiintoisia tai oleellisia Algerian kannalta. Toisaalta ajatusten
vaihtaminen oli myös antoisaa, sillä hän tunsi niin hyvin molemmat minulle
tärkeät kulttuurit. Näin ei ole tapahtunut elämäni aikana kovinkaan usein.
Lopuksi Melasuo lupasi lähettää minulle väitöskirjansa Algerian poliittinen
kehitys 1800-luvulta vapautussotaan 1954. Mietin, kuinka joku on voinut tehdä
4
Ageron 1979, 531.
79
väitöskirjan noin tylsästä aiheesta. Eikö olisi ollut paljon mielenkiintoisempaa
perehtyä Algerian vapautussotaan kuin sitä edeltäneeseen aikaan? Sovimme
joka tapauksessa Länsi-Saharan tilaisuuden järjestämisestä, ja kirja sai jäädä
odottamaan vähäksi aikaa.
Tilaisuus onnistui hyvin. Paikalle saapui runsas joukko kiinnostuneita
ja erilaisia mielipiteitä esitettiin hyvässä hengessä. Myös Marokon kanta
sai luonnollisesti ymmärrystä. On muutenkin sääli, jos veljeskansat Algeria
ja Marokko jatkavat kiistelyä Länsi-Saharasta, sillä nämä Pohjois-Afrikan
amazighit on usein alistettu eri aikakausina alueen kansojen eripuraisuuksia
hyväksi käyttäen. 1900-luvun alussa Ranskan miehittäessä Pohjois-Afrikkaa,
Ranska mobilisoi algerialaisia kukistamaan Abd el-Krimin johtaman vastarintaliikkeen vuonna 1925. Taisteluihin lähetetty Algerian vaarini on
kertonut, kuinka algerialaiset makasivat vallihaudoissa jalat pystyssä toivoen
haavoittuvansa, ettei heidän tarvitsisi sotia marokkolaisia veljiään vastaan.
Harvemmin olen nähnyt Suomessa asuvien pohjoisafrikkalaisten kiistelevän
Länsi-Saharan tilanteesta. Sen sijaan he arvostelevat aika yksissä tuumin
tasapuolisesti kotimaidensa poliittisia päättäjiä.
Muutaman vuoden kuluttua tilaisuuden järjestämisestä kiinnostuin
orientalismista ja sitä ympäröivästä keskustelusta. Löysin sattumalta
helsinkiläisestä antikvariaatista Melasuon vuonna 1984 toimittaman teoksen
Wallinista Wideriin, jossa oli hyviä artikkeleita aiheesta. Ajattelin, että jos kerran
hän on ollut mukana käsittelemässä orientalistista diskurssia jo 1980-luvun
alussa, niin voisin ehkä sittenkin vilkaista hänen lähettämäänsä väitöskirjaa.
Teos olikin täynnä mielenkiintoisia lähteitä ja haastatteluita Algerian
tutkimuksen huippunimistä ja poliittisista vaikuttajista lähtien. Sain myös
vastauksia moniin minua aiemmin mietityttäneihin kysymyksiin. Kaiken
lisäksi Algeriaa käsiteltiin jotenkin myös suomalaisesta lähtökohdista, joka
sopi minulle hyvin. Toisaalta se tapaili hyvin niitä kansainvälisiä ja algerialaisia
diskursseja, joiden kautta maasta usein kirjoitetaan. Aiheen valintakin
osoittautui lopulta aika oleelliseksi nyky-Algerian ymmärtämisen kannalta.
Ennen kaikkea kirjan alaviitteet toimivat hyvänä lähtökohtana jokaiselle, joka
on kiinnostunut Algeriaa koskevasta tutkimuksesta.
Monella tapaa Algeria tarjoaa erinomaisen esimerkin monista Välimeren
alueen historiallisista vaiheista. Maan väestön lukuisat identiteetit tarjoavat
monta mielenkiintoista seikkaa pohdittavaksi ja sen historiallisia vaiheita
voi heijastella myös muiden kolmansien maiden kehitykseen. Onkin
ymmärrettävää, miksi nuori Melasuo aikoinaan aloitti Välimeren eteläpuolisten maiden tutkimusmatkansa juuri Algeriasta.
Karim Maiche
80
Lähteet
Ageron, Charles Robert (1979): Histoire de l’Algérie contemporaine. Tome II: De
l’insurrection de 1871 au déclenchement de la guerre de libération (1954). Paris:
Presses Universitaires de France.
Lorcin, M. E. Patricia (1999). Imperial identities: Stereotyping, Prejudice and Race in
Colonial Algeria. London: Tauris.
Melasuo, Tuomo (1999): Algerian poliittinen kehitys 1800-luvulta vapautussotaan
1954. Tampere: Rauhan- ja konfliktintutkimuskeskus.
L’Office National des Statistiques est l’Institution Centrale des Statistiques de
l’Algérie. http://www.ons.dz/index.htm, May 2008.
Who is progressive today?
Thoughts on sustainable development in a
globalized but unjust economy
Jan Otto Andersson
My cooperation with Tuomo Melasuo goes back to the 1970s. At that time
the future of the oppressed of the world fascinated and encouraged us. It
was a time of progressive movements and experiments and of real hopes
for a New International Economic Order. Tuomo, Jyrki Käkönen and I took
interest in the activities of the Third World Economists, an organization that
had held its first congress in Algiers, and was brought to Finland by Tuomo.
The three of us participated in the second congress organized in Havana. The
mood has changed a lot since then. The Third World does not exist anymore,
neither does the organization, and few remember that the New International
Economic Order once was a serious global issue that was killed by the
monetarist and neoliberal counterrevolution in the early 1980s.
In honor of Tuomo, this essay takes a look at the idea of progress
yesterday and today. What does progress mean thirty years after the
crumbling of the hopes of the 1970s?
My intention is to sketch the zeitgeist of three “centuries” by looking at
the progressive and future oriented sides of each, especially that of our own:
the century that started approximately 200 years after the French revolution.
The account is limited to that part of the zeitgeist that characterizes the “Left”
at each epoch.
The century following the French and American revolutions was an epoch
of republicanism and liberalism. The Left was inspired by the idea of free
and equal citizens who could arrange their personal lives as they wished.
For progressives the market was a sphere of freedom and equal opportunity
unfettered by monarchy, church, estates or guilds. The 19th century was also
the Age of Industrialism and Capital depicted by Eric Hobsbawm. It ended
with the imperial first wave of globalization. As described by Karl Polanyi, the
liberal order had conjured up its own counter forces: cartels, trade unions,
84
Jan Otto Andersson
agricultural protectionism, chauvinistic nationalism, and a strong socialist
movement.1
The following century was marked by the Left of the worker’s movement,
social democrats and communists, but also by social liberals, who were not
afraid of using the state to ensure rising living standards for the masses.
Economic growth, full employment and social justice were key elements in
the pursuit of welfare for all, and the state was seen as the main guarantor for
achieving these goals. The short 20th century from 1917 to 1989 was indeed
an Age of Extremes (Hobsbawm again), but its driving ethos was economic
growth, social security and democracy. It ended with the neoliberal second
wave of globalization.
Today, both the liberal capitalism of the first Left and the socialist statism
of the second, have become difficult to associate with progress. As ideologies
for the Left they have lost most of their appeal. The breakdown of the Soviet
system on the one hand, and the growing discontent with the neoliberal
Washington consensus on the other, has made the luster of both systems fade
away. Even though the Scandinavian social democratic welfare regimes have
succeeded astonishingly well in combining adaption to a global economy
with strong welfare states, they have not become models for new progressive
movements. They are still under pressure to remake or remove central parts
of their social and economic institutions.2
One concept that has marked the progressive thinking of the present
“third” century, in a way that would have been alien to the earlier two, is
“sustainable development”. It was launched by the Brundtland-report Our
Common Future in 1987. The new dimension is that the ecological limits
must be taken into consideration when we look at the future of not only our
different national societies, but of the globe as a whole. To the progressives
of the first and the second centuries ecological considerations were with few
exceptions peripheral. The republican liberals were convinced that they had
proved Malthus wrong. Idealistic socialists as well as pragmatic trade unionists
wanted to convince their followers that it was possible to provide decent jobs,
proper wages and material security for all without having to bother about
ecological limits; to do that was often considered to be reactionary.
1
There is a peculiar leftover from this original Left: “Venstre” – “Left” in English –
is the leading Danish right-wing party today. It was founded in 1870. Another
Danish party is “Radikale Venstre”, a social liberal party founded in 1905.
2
Andersen et al. 2007.
Thoughts on sustainable development
85
However, the precise sense of “sustainable development” is by no means
clear. It came to be seen as a combination of economic, social and ecological
sustainability. As “sustainability” was transposed from its ecological domain
to include the economic and social spheres it turned too encompassing and
vague – and therefore generally acceptable and toothless. What does the often
used term “sustainable growth” really imply? Is social sustainability always a
good thing, and if so, can it be treated as a synonym for social justice?
When trying to come to grips with the implications of sustainable
development on a global level, we find it quite difficult to pursue all three
goals simultaneously. We seem to be constrained to choose between three
competing “progressive” alternatives, each of which combine two of the three
dimensions, but ignores or downgrades the third one. I have called this “the
global ethical trilemma.”3
The global ethical trilemma: Pick two – ignore the third
Mass consumption prosperity
Global
socialdemocracy
Eco-efficient
capitalism
Global justice
Ecological
sustainability
Red-green planetarism
The three corners of the triangle represent the three dimensions of
sustainable development. A “sustainable economy” (at the top of triangle)
is a prosperous economy, with growing opportunities and incomes. It
endorses the “Western” consumerist way of life that has been held up as
a model for poor “underdeveloped” countries, and also for not so poor,
formerly “socialist”, countries. Global justice or “social sustainability” (at the
south-west corner) implies a dramatic equalization of the living conditions
between, as well as within, different parts of the world.
3
Andersson 2003.
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Jan Otto Andersson
Some say that we already live in a “flat” world, implying that globalization
has leveled the field of opportunities. However, the gaps are tremendous,
and the “flatter” the world the less acceptable these gaps become. If we are
to live peacefully in a world that is integrated through money, internet and
other means of communication, the richest fifth cannot earn 70 times more
than the poorest quintile. In terms of the prevailing market exchange rates
this is the situation today.
The income differences are considerably reduced when we take into
consideration the lower costs of living in the poor countries. However, even
when calculated in terms of exchange rates that are adjusted according to
local purchasing power, the gaps are formidable. The richest quintile gets
15 times more than the poorest. Such income gaps would not be tolerable,
and do not exist in any single country. The flatter the world becomes the
more important will the market exchange rates be, especially for the wealthy.
Those who afford it can buy whatever they like from wherever they want.
You can enjoy exotic adventures, fascinating foods, exclusive services, lush
environments and promising investments far away from your home country.
If you are moneyless you cannot even have a cup of rice at sale next door.
Ecological sustainability (the south-east corner) implies that the natural
capital is regenerated. Ecological economists insist that the natural capital
should be fully sustained; they call it “strong sustainability.” Environmental
economists, who apply traditional economic methods to environmental
problems, are less stringent and accept that natural capital can be consumed
if there are man-made substitutes for it. For example, the concept of “genuine
national savings” calculated by the World Bank, consider a loss of natural
wealth to be sustainable if it is matched by investments in physical or human
capital. This the ecological economists call “weak sustainability,” implying
that in the long run the ecological limits must be respected, however much
we build roads and factories, or however much we invest in education and
health.
Practically all serious books and reports that treat the global situation
today tend to fall into one of the three categories I have sketched out at the
sides of the triangle. There are works that want to make globalization fair
and that stress the justice and equity aspects in today’s world economy, but
that only marginally reflect on the ecological limits to a prosperous and just
world. Good examples of this “global social-democratic” approach are the ILO
report A Fair Globalization and the World Bank development report Equity
and Development.
87
When our global ecological footprint exceeds the global biocapacity,
indicating that we already consume too much of Earth’s renewable
resources4, any serious study of world poverty and development should take
this growing ecological deficit into account. The global social democratic
agenda, as expressed for instance in the UN millennium development goals,
is seriously threatened due to the high prices for food and oil.
Environmental economists stress the necessity to “internalize” the
environmental costs; to put the “right price” on the environmental services5.
Therefore clear property or user rights should be assigned, taxes be imposed,
and markets be constituted that make consumers and polluters pay for the
environmental damages they cause. This approach – if rigorously pursued –
could maintain, and even improve, existing prosperity without threatening
ecological sustainability. However, it would not solve the problems of global
justice. Even if there were to be an initial equal distribution of the rights to
consume and pollute, the danger that the poor would have to sell their rights
to those who are richer is obvious. Thus the efforts to create an eco-efficient
capitalism are progressive in relation to the current situation, but they might
even worsen the injustice associated with the huge income gaps as the prices
for water, food, energy and other necessities rise to their “right” levels.
The practical and ethical problems related to the build up of functioning
and fair markets are legion. Authors such as Robert Kuttner, Frank Ackerman
and Lisa Heinzerling, have shown how limited our means are to create
markets that take health, nature and coming generations into account6.
That a free market for food can lead to catastrophic famines when world
production is affected by changing weather conditions, such as El Niño, is
well documented7.
The third possibility – combining global justice and ecological sustainability
– I have labeled red-green planetarism. The term planetarism I have borrowed
from Ele Alenius, a modest but courageous former political leader on the left,
who in his old days has written two books in Finnish on the topic. Alenius is
looking for a new civilization that would encompass the whole humanity and
that would organize society in accordance with solidaristic and ecological
principles8.
4
Global Footprint Network 2008.
E.g. Arrow et al. 2004.
6
Kuttner 1997; Ackerman & Heinzerling 2004.
7
Davis 2001.
8
Alenius 2000; 2005.
5
88
Jan Otto Andersson
Alenius is not alone in this search. A stream of books and articles is enriching
the red-green approach. This literature is overtly critical of conventional
economic growth and consumerism, but sometimes of capitalism as a system
guided by the logic of accumulation and expansion. According to Joel Kovel
“capitalism and its by-products – imperialism, war, neoliberal globalization,
racism, poverty, and the destruction of community – are all playing a part in
the destruction of our ecosystem.”9
Another planetarist critic of existing capitalism is James Gustave Speth, a
longstanding leader of the American environmental movement. He quotes
Paul Raskin, an initiator of the Great Transition Initiative.
“The emergence of a new suite of values is the foundation of the entire
edifice of our planetary society. Consumerism, individualism, and
domination of nature – the dominant values of yesteryear – have given
way to a new triad: quality of life, human solidarity and ecological
sensibility.”10
I find this value-triad to be in line with the global ethical trilemma presented
here. If we put “quality of life” at the top corner, “human solidarity” at the
south-west and “ecological sensibility” at the south-east corner, the trilemma
appears much less threatening – even solvable.
Speth outlines the contours of a “post-scarcity planetary civilization” in
which fulfillment, not wealth, would become the primary measure of success
and well-being. Sustainability would become a core part of the worldview.
He sets a broad, almost revolutionary, agenda for the environmentalist
movement.
“[T]he environmental agenda should expand to embrace a profound
challenge to consumerism and commercialism and the lifestyles they
offer, a healthy skepticism of growthmania and a sharp focus on what
society should actually be striving to grow, a challenge to corporate
dominance and a redefinition of the corporation and its goals, a
commitment to deep change in both the reach and the functioning of
the market, and a commitment to building what Alperovitz calls “the
democratization of wealth” and Barnes calls ‘capitalism 3.0’.”11
Alenius, Kovel and Speth have interesting precursors. We can find religious
founders such as Buddha, political leaders such as Mahatma Gandhi, socialists
9
Kovel 2007, back cover.
Raskin quoted in Speth 2008, 205.
11
Speth 2008, 225.
10
89
such as William Morris, anarchists such as Pyotr Kropotkin, and philosophers
such as Arne Naess. In a lecture called “The society of the future” delivered
on the evening of the Bloody Sunday, November 13th 1887, William Morris
expressed his views in an unswerving manner:
When our opponents say, as they sometimes do, How should we be able
to procure the luxuries of life in a Socialist society? Answer boldly, We could
not do so, and we don’t care, for we don’t want them and won’t have them;
and indeed, I feel sure that we cannot if we are all free men together.
So, then, my ideal is first unconstrained life, and next simple and natural
life. First you must be free; and next you must learn to take pleasure in all the
details of life: which indeed will be necessary for you, because, since others
will be free, you will have to do your own work.12
Of the three progressive alternatives outlined above – global social
democracy, eco-efficient capitalism, and red-green planetarism – only the
last satisfies the conditions for a new “third” Left. Its political future still looks
rather slim – progressives in power positions tend to extol global socialdemocracy or eco-efficient capitalism – but it is the most honest alternative,
since it takes the global ethical trilemma into account and openly asks for
solutions that require deep changes in “Western” values and lifestyles.
References
Ackerman, Frank & Lisa Heinzerling (2004): Priceless. On Knowing the Price of
Everything and the Value of Nothing. The New Press.
Alenius, Ele (2000): Että olisimme humaanin sivilisaation planeetta. Edita
Alenius, Ele (2005): Planetarismi maailmankehityksen rationaalisena perustana.
Edita.
12
Morris 1979, 194.
90
Jan Otto Andersson
Andersen, Torben M. et al. (2007): The Nordic Model - Embracing globalization
and sharing risks. The Research Institute of the Finnish Economy (ETLA).
Andersson, Jan Otto (2003): ”Världsekonomins etiska trilemma”, in V.-M.
Ritakallio (ed.) Riskit, instituutiot ja tuotokset. Esseitä hyvinvointitutkimuksen
professori Olli Kankaan täyttäessä 50 vuotta. Sosiaalipoliittisen yhdistyksen
tutkimus, nro 59, TCWR tutkimuksia nro 1, 1–17.
Andersson, Jan Otto (forthcoming): “International trade in a full but unequal
world”, in A. Hornborg & A. Jorgenson (eds.) Global trade and environmental
justice: New approaches to political ecology.
Arrow, Kenneth & al. (2004): “Are we consuming too much?” Journal of Economic
Perspectives, 18(3), 147–172.
Davis, Mike (2001): Late Victorian Holocausts: El Niño Famines and the Making of
the Third World. Verso Books
Global Footprint Network. http://www.footprintnetwork.org/index.php, June
2008.
ILO (2004): A Fair Globalization: Creating Opportunities for All. Report of the
World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization.
Jomo, K. S. & Jaques Baudot (2007): Flat World, Big Gaps. Economic Liberalization,
Globalization, Poverty and Inequality. Orient Longman, Zed Books, Third World
Network.
Kovel, Joel (2007): The Enemy of Nature. The End of Capitalism or the End of the
World? Zed Books, Fernwood Publishing.
Kuttner, Robert (1997): Everything for Sale. The Virtues and Limits of Markets.
Alfred A. Knopf
Morris, William (1979): Political Writings edited by A. L. Morton, Lawrence and
Wishart.
Polanyi, Karl (1944): The Great Transformation. Beacon Press.
Speth, James Gustave (2008): The Bridge at the Edge of the World. Capitalism, the
Environment, and Crossing from Crisis to Sustainability. Yale University Press
UN (1987): Our Common Future. Report of the World Commission on
Environment and Development. Oxford University Press.
World Development Report 2006: Equity and Development.
Pertti Multanen
Suomalaisella kehitysmaa- tai kehitystutkimuksella ja rauhan- ja
konfliktintutkimuksella on varmasti paljonkin yhteisiä juuria. Muutama
vuosikymmen sitten syntyneinä tutkimusaloina molemmat nousivat uusina
akateemisen tutkimuksen suuntauksina osin haastamaan perinteisiä
akateemisen tutkimuksen aloja. Molemmat korostivat tutkimusotteensa
monitieteistä luonnetta. Rajat ovat olleet joustavat myös siinä suhteessa,
että samat tutkijat ovat uransa eri vaiheissa vaikuttaneet molempien
tutkimusalojen piirissä.
Alojen vakiintuminen perinteisen akateemisen yhteisön kiinteiksi
osiksi on ollut hidas, vuosikymmeniä kestänyt prosessi. Tutkimusalojen
organisoituminen tapahtui pitkän aikaa yliopistojen normaalien
tiedekuntarakenteiden ulkopuolelle sijoittuneissa erillislaitoksissa. Helsingin
yliopistossa 1960-luvun loppupuolella ja 1970-luvun alussa ensin Interkont
-ryhmän nimellä ja sitten virallisesti vuoden 1973 alusta konsistorin
alaisena yksikkönä toimi Kehitysmaainstituutti -niminen erillislaitos. Tämä
yksikkö siirrettiin vuoden 1992 alusta Helsingin yliopiston valtiotieteellisen
tiedekunnan alaisuuteen ja vuoden 1997 alusta siitä muodostettiin
tiedekunnan yksi ainelaitos. Saman vuoden 1997 alusta laitokselle perustettiin
professorin virka, opetusalana kehitysmaatutkimus.1
Rauhan- ja konfliktintutkimus organisoitiin opetusministeriön
alaiseksi erillislaitokseksi, kunnes senkin tie vei kiinteämmäksi osaksi
yliopistorakennetta Rauhan- ja konfliktintutkimuskeskukseksi Tampereen
yliopistoon. Rauhan- ja konfliktintutkimuksen professuurin perustaminen on
omiaan vakiinnuttamaan tätä tutkimusalaa osaksi suomalaista akateemista
rakennetta. Institutionaaliset ratkaisut eivät kuitenkaan merkitse sitä,
että keskustelu tutkimusalan suunnasta ja painopisteistä, tai edes niiden
oikeudesta olla olemassa itsenäisinä tutkimusaloinaan, olisi käyty loppuun.
Suomen Akatemiassa toimi ensimmäisen kerran vuonna 1974
määräaikainen kehitysmaatutkimuksen jaosto tieteen keskustoimikunnan
alaisuudessa. Päivämäärällä 4.3.1975 tieteen keskustoimikunta julkaisi
1
Tarkemmin alkuvaiheista ks. Jerman 2001.
92
Pertti Multanen
muistion Kehitysmaatutkimuksen suuntaviivoja. Muistiossa viitataan
muun muassa valtion tiedeneuvoston ohjelmaan Suomen tiedepolitiikan
suuntaviivoja 1970-luvulla ja siteerataan sitä muun muassa seuraavasti:
”Erityisinä tavoitteina tulee olla, että yhteistyö edistää kehittyneiden ja
kehittyvien maiden välisen eriarvoisuuden poistamista ja kansainvälisen
jännityksen lieventämistä”.2
Muistiossa todetaan edelleen Suomen Akatemian tehtävinä seuraavaa:
”Tieteen
keskustoimikunta
katsoo,
että
kehitysmaatutkimuksen
perustavoitteena tulisi olla kehittyneiden ja kehitysmaiden eriarvoisuuden
poistaminen erityisesti niin, että se palvelee kehitysmaiden omia
kehityspoliittisia päämääriä”. Jo tuolloin viitattiin siihen, että
”Keskustoimikunnan käsityksen mukaan Suomessa suoritettavan
tulisi
liittyä
maamme
harjoittamaan
kehitysyhteistyöhön, joskaan ei voida sulkea pois mahdollisuutta harjoittaa
tutkimusyhteistyötä myös sellaisten maiden kanssa, jotka eivät kuulu
maamme virallisen kehitysyhteistyön piiriin”.3
Samassa muistiossa ehdotetaan, että ”Tieteen keskustoimikunnan
mielestä saattaisi olla tarpeellista perustaa keskustoimikunnan alaisuuteen
pysyvä kehitysmaatutkimuksen jaosto tutkimus-, yhteydenpito- ja
koordinointitehtäviin”4.
Kehitysmaatutkimus/kehitystutkimus
Kirjoitin lähes kaksi vuosikymmentä sitten opetusministeriön korkeakouluja tiedeosaston julkaisemaan Korkeakoulutieto -lehteen artikkelin, jonka
otsikkona oli ”Kehitysmaa- vai kehitysyhteistyötutkimusta”5. Tämän artikkelin
ajatus oli pohtia kriittisesti suomalaisen kehitysmaatutkimuksen suuntaa.
Vaikka aikaa on kulunut pari vuosikymmentä, on edelleenkin syytä kysellä
mihin kehitysmaatutkimus on kulkemassa?
Perustavampi kysymys, joka tutkimusalan kasvun vuosikymmeninä on
useasti esitetty, on, tarvitaanko yleensä erillistä kehitysmaatutkimusta – tässä
paino termissä on sanalla ”maa”. Professori Marja-Liisa Swantz, joka vuonna
1981, tuolloin dosenttina, nimitettiin perustetun Kehitysmaainstituutin
johtajan virkaan, totesi jo silloin mielipiteenään, että ”Kehitysmaainstituutin
2
Suomen Akatemia 1975, 1.
Mt, 1–2.
4
Mt., 13.
5
Multanen 1990, 21–23.
3
93
nimenä pitäisi itse asiassa olla kehitysinstituutti6 ja alan tutkimusta ja opetusta
kutsua kehitystutkimukseksi ja -opetukseksi”.7
Tämä pohdinta on kulkenut mukana kaikki menneet alan muotoutumisen
vuosikymmenet ja professori Marja-Liisa Swantz on palannut teemaan
useita kertoja viime vuosienkin aikana, muun muassa kehitysmaatiedon
opiskelijoiden, KEHO ry:n, vuosijuhlassa marraskuussa 2006 pitämässään
puheessa sekä kehitysmaatutkijoita yhdistävän tieteellisen seuran,
Kehitysmaatutkimuksen seura ry:n, järjestämillä Kehitystutkimuksen päivillä
keväällä 2007.
Kuten edellä olevassa kappaleessa esiin tulleista seurojen ja tapahtumien
nimistä näkyy, termejä kehitysmaatutkimus ja kehitystutkimus käytetään sekä
sekaisin että rinnan, pysähtymättä tarkemmin miettimään niiden eroja tai
yhtäläisyyksiä. Myös Suomen Akatemian termistössä kehitysmaatutkimuksen
jaosto on rahoittanut ja rahoittaa kehitystutkimusta. Onko kysymys vain
semanttisesta epäselvyydestä?
Olen sitä mieltä, että tarkempi termien määrittely ja pohdinta olisi tarpeen
ja varsin perusteltua. Yleinen ”kehitystutkimus” liittää alan tutkimuksen
selkeämmin tieteenalakohtaiseen perustaan, toisen maailmansodan
jälkeen lähinnä eurooppalaisissa maissa nousseeseen Development
Studies -perinteeseen. Tässä on ja on ollut kysymys uuden tieteenalan
noususta maailman muuttumisen myötä murtamaan vanhoja yliopistojen
tieteenalarajoja.
Kehitysmaatutkimus viittaa rajauksensa mukaisesti vaihtuvaan ja
muuttuvaan alueelliseen, kehitysmaiksi määriteltyihin maihin kohdistuvaan
tutkimukseen ja on näin perusluonteeltaan monitieteistä tutkimusta, siis
tutkimusala – ei tieteenala. Saattaa olla että aluetutkimuksen ajoittainen
huono kaiku on vaikuttanut myös kehitysmaatutkimusta koskevassa
keskustelussa ja saanut torjumaan tähän viittaavat määritelmät. Onko tämä
samalla myös muodostanut esteen riittävän tutkimusmassan kokoamiselle
monitieteiseen tutkimus- ja opetusyksikköön, onkin jo paljon perustavampi
kysymys.
Laitoksen ja sen edustaman tutkimusalan nimeksi on kuitenkin
vakiintunut termi kehitysmaatutkimus. Tällaisenaan ala on edelleenkin sekä
ongelmakeskeinen että monitieteinen huolimatta siitä, että akateeminen
tiedekunta- ja laitosrakenne onkin kasannut vahvoja paineita myös
6
7
Vrt. tutkimusalan englanninkielinen nimitys Development Studies.
Swantz teoksessa Jerman 2001, 49.
94
Pertti Multanen
tieteenalan rakentamiseen nykyisen Helsingin yliopiston valtiotieteellisen
tiedekunnan kehitysmaatutkimuksen laitoksen ympärille.
Kehitysmaatutkimuksen kasvukivut
Kehitysmaatutkimuksen alan kehittymisen pullonkaulat ovat vuosien varrella
tulleet selvästi esille, tosin ajan mukana vaihtelevin painoarvoin. Näitä ovat
olleet muun muassa jo aiemmin mainittu rakenteellisen vakiintumisen tai
akateemisen toiminta- ja organisaatiomuodon löytämisen hitaus. Hitaus
ei suinkaan ole johtunut niinkään alasta itsestään, vaan enemmänkin
suomalaisen yliopistorakenteen jäykkyydestä korkeine tiedekunta- ja
laitosrajoineen. Juuri näiden rajojen ylittämisen vaikeus estää edelleenkin
monitieteisen tutkimusalan kasvun ja resurssien kokoamisen.
Tutkimusrahoituksen saaminen alalle on kautta vuosien ollut enemmän
tai vähemmän ongelmallista. Kehitysmaatutkimuksen alalla ei koskaan ole
ollut yksikköä, jonka virkarakenteessa olisi ollut pysyviä tutkijanvirkoja tai
-toimia. Tutkimusrahoitus on aina pitänyt kerätä ulkopuolisista lähteistä.
Tärkein ulkopuolinen rahoittaja on ollut Suomen Akatemia. Akatemian
kehitysmaatutkimuksen rahoitus on keskitetty kehitysmaatutkimuksen
jaostolle. Ennen jaoston perustamista rahoitus kulki tieteellisten toimikuntien
kautta. Jo vuonna 1974 lyhyen aikaa määräaikaisena toimineena ja 1980luvun alkupuolelta lähtien ensin väliaikaisena ja sittemmin vakinaisena on
tieteen keskustoimikunnan alaisuudessa toiminut kehitysmaatutkimuksen
jaosto.
Toinen keskeinen rahoittaja on ollut ulkoasiainministeriön kehitysyhteistyöosasto, jonka organisaatio on myös vuosikymmenten mukana muuttunut
useaan kertaan.
Myöhemmin mukaan kuvaan ovat tulleet vähäisemmässä määrin
yksityiset säätiöt, EU:n sekä muun muassa YK:n alaisten kansainvälisten
järjestöjen tarjoamat rahoituskanavat. Suomen Akatemia on kuitenkin
säilyttänyt asemansa tärkeimpänä kehitysmaatutkimuksen alan rahoittajana.
Viime vuosina opetusministeriön rahoittamat tutkijakoulut, jollainen
toimii myös kehitysmaatutkimuksen laitoksella, ovat toki rahoittaneet alan
jatkokoulutusta.
Ovatko hallinnolliset ratkaisut olleet oikeita?
Alan kokonaiskehityksen kannalta kriittinen tarkastelu paljastaa rahoituksen
ongelmakohtia. Edelleenkin pidän ongelmallisena sitä, että varsinaisen
95
akateemisen tutkimuksen ja vaikkapa kehitysyhteistyötä suoraan palvelevan
tilaustutkimuksen, tai tilauspohjalla toteutettavien selvitysten, raja
hämärrettiin aikanaan päätymällä edelleen käytössä olevaan ratkaisuun, jolla
ulkoasiainministeriön kehitysyhteistyöosaston tutkimusrahoitus siirrettiin
Suomen Akatemian hallinnoitavaksi.
Tämä ajatus esitettiin tiettävästi ensimmäisen kerran ulkoasiainministeriön päivämäärällä 23.5.1984 nimittämän Kehitysmaatutkimuksen
työryhmän mietinnössä, jonka se jätti ministeriölle tammikuussa 1985.
Siteeraan mietintöä: ”Työryhmä esittää, että kehitysmaatutkimuksen
koordinaation parantamiseen pyrittäisiin siten, että Suomen Akatemian
kehitysmaatutkimuksen jaoston toimintaedellytyksiä parannettaisiin
ja toimintaa kehitettäisiin. Aluksi jaoston kokoonpanoa esitetään
laajennettavaksi lisäämällä ulkoasiainministeriön edustusta sekä
nimittämällä edustajia muualtakin kuin Suomen Akatemian tieteellisistä
toimikunnista sekä nimittämällä tarpeellista päätoimista henkilöstöä
asioiden valmisteluun.”8
Suomen Akatemian ja ulkoasiainministeriön 1.7.1990 voimaan tulleella
toimeksiantosopimuksella työryhmän ehdotukset pantiin käytäntöön.
Suomen Akatemian kehitysmaatutkimuksen jaosto sai päätösvallan
ulkoasiainministeriön tutkimukseen osoittamiin varoihin, ja vastapainoksi
kehitysmaaosaston edustajat saivat edustuksen Akatemian jaostoon.9
Kehitysmaatutkimuksen jaoston julkaisemasta Kehitysmaatutkimuksen
strategiasta käy ilmi, että strategiaa muotoiltaessa vuonna 1995 oli Suomen
Akatemian hallinnoima kehitysmaatutkimuksen määräraha yhteensä noin 8
miljoonaa markkaa, josta viisi miljoonaa oli UM:n kehitysyhteistyövaroja ja
noin kolme miljoonaa Akatemian määrärahaa.10
Voi vaikuttaa, ja monesta varmasti vaikuttikin siltä, että tässä oli kysymys
käytännön työnjakoon liittyvästä rationaalisesta ratkaisusta. Mielestäni
kysymys oli paljon suuremmasta tiedepoliittisesta ratkaisusta. Ratkaisulla
sidottiin kehitysmaatutkimuksen rahoitus sekä kehitysyhteistyön tarpeisiin
että tavoitteisiin ja samalla käytännössä rajoitettiin tutkimuksen kohdemaiden
määrää.
Tiedepoliittisesti tämä ratkaisu merkitsi sitä, että suurin osa suomalaiseen
kehitysmaatutkimukseen kanavoiduista varoista tuli kehitysmaiden
8
Ulkoasiainministeriö 1985, 13.
Suomen Akatemia 1995, liite A/9.
10
Mt, 4.
9
96
Pertti Multanen
auttamiseen ja globaalin eriarvoisuuden vähentämiseen tarkoitetuista
kehitysyhteistyövaroista. Tässä voidaan kysellä jo ratkaisujen eettisyyden
kestävyyttä. Tiedepoliittisesti ratkaisu oli epäilyttävä monestakin syystä.
Tutkimuksen sitominen kehitysyhteistyöhön kavensi vahvasti tutkimuksen
kenttää ja suuntasi sitä nimenomaan kehitysyhteistyötä palvelevaan
soveltavaan tutkimukseen.
Ratkaisu toi politiikan vahvasti mukaan tutkimusmäärärahojen jakoon.
Vaikka noina vuosina, kylmän sodan kaudella, asiaa ei mielellään myönnettykään
on nyt maailman muututtua helppo nähdä, että kehitysyhteistyö politisoitui
voimakkaasti kahtia jaetussa maailmassa. Kehitysyhteistyön politisoituminen
toi samoja paineita myös tutkimuslaitosten sisään, Kehitysmaainstituutti ei
tässä suhteessa ollut suinkaan poikkeus.
Suomen Akatemian kehitysmaatutkimuksen jaosto erotti jo vuonna
1981 julkaisemassaan muistiossa kehitysmaatutkimuksen kolme osaaluetta: 1) Kehitysteoreettinen tutkimus, jonka keskeisiä tehtäviä on
kehityksen yhteiskunnallisten ehtojen selvittäminen, alikehityksen luonteen
ja syiden tutkiminen sekä vaihtoehtoisten kehitysmallien kehittäminen;
2) Kehitysyhteistyötä palveleva tutkimus, joka tukee kehitysmaiden
yhteiskunnalliseen ja teknis-taloudelliseen kehitykseen tähtäävää
suunnittelua ja toteutustyötä ja 3) Kehitysmaita koskeva aluetutkimus,
joka lisää näitä maita koskevaa tietoa – niiden tarpeiden, voimavarojen ja
ongelmien tuntemusta.11
Myöhemmät hallinnolliset ratkaisut tarkoittivat sitä, että ilman suurempaa
pohdintaa siirrettiin kehitysmaatutkimuksen rahoituksen pääpaino sektorille
2, eli kehitysyhteistyötä palvelevaan tutkimukseen ja sekä kehitysteoreettinen
että kehitysmaita koskeva aluetutkimus joutuivat huutolaispojan asemaan.
Nyt ajan kuluttua voi mielestäni pohtia sitä, mikä osuus kaikilla näillä edellä
käsitellyillä ratkaisuilla on ollut siihen, että Suomesta edelleenkin puuttuu
kriittiseltä massaltaan tarpeeksi suuri kehitysmaatutkimukseen keskittyvä
laitos. Nykyisellään Kehitysmaainstituutti yhden professorin ja muutaman
opettajan laitoksena ei vielä voi varmistaa alan kehitystä tulevaisuudessa.
Miten varmistaa alan kehitys?
Alan ulkopuoliset paineet yliopistojen laitoskoon kasvattamiseen ovat
ajamassa kehitysmaatutkimuksen ja -opetuksen jälleen kerran hankalaan
tilanteeseen. Lieneekö korrektia lainata omaa artikkeliaan, mutta mainitussa
11
Suomen Akatemia 1981, 2–3.
97
Korkeakoulutieto -lehdessä julkaisemassani artikkelissa esitin vuonna 1990
muun muassa seuraavaa: ”Tekisi mieli jälleen kerran heittää keskusteluun
väite, että esimerkiksi Helsingin yliopistossa olisi varmasti mahdollisuuksia
luoda hyvinkin vahva kehitysmaatutkimuksen laitos yhdistämällä
hallinnollisesti samaan yksikköön nyt hajallaan eri puolilla yliopistoa ja
monissa tiedekunnissa olevat kehitysmaita tutkivat ja kehitysmaaopetusta
antavat yksiköt.”12
Nyt vaatimukset kasvattaa laitoskokoa useamman professorin
yksiköiksi ovat pakottamassa ravistelemaan totuttuja rakenteita, laitos- ja
tiedekuntarajat mukaan lukien. Vahvan kehitysmaatutkimuksen yksikön
kokoaminen tuskin kuitenkaan onnistuu nykyisin omaksi tieteenalakseen
määritellyn ja nykytilanteessa yhteiskuntatieteisiin sidotun rajauksen pohjalta.
Kehitysteorioiden vaihtuvat muodit ja vallitseva kirjo eivät myöskään anna
nykytilanteessa tukea vahvalle tieteenalan teoria- ja metodipohjalle.
Jättääkö tulevaisuuteen suuntautuva katse muuta vaihtoehtoa kuin palata
alan organisoitumisessa ajatukseen monitieteisestä ja ongelmakeskeisestä
tutkimusalasta, jonka sateenvarjon alle sopii monia eri tieteenaloja. Jo
vuosikymmeniä sitten kehitysmaatutkimukselle asetettu tehtävä globaalin
eriarvoisuuden vähentämisestä ei ole ainakaan tullut ratkaistuksi nykyisellä
pohjalla, tilastojen valossa eriarvoisuus on päinvastoin lisääntynyt.
Jotta voitaisiin edes vakavasti pyrkiä globaalin eriarvoisuuden
vähentämiseen, sen poistamisesta puhumattakaan niin väitän, että tarvitaan
useiden eri tieteenalojen kiinteätä yhteistyötä. Yhteisesti määritellyn
hyväksytyn tutkimusongelman ratkaisuun pyrkivä toiminta yhdistää nämä
tieteenalat. Ja tällöin tarvitaan monitieteinen tutkimusala.
Tässä
hahmotellussa
monitieteisessä
kokonaisuudessa on rauhan- ja konfliktintutkimuksella tulevaisuudessakin
tärkeä paikka. Rauha ja kehitys kulkevat edelleenkin käsi kädessä.
12
Multanen 1990, 22.
Lähteet
Jerman, Helena (2001): Kehitysmaatiedon kolme vuosikymmentä. Raportti
Helsingin yliopiston kehitysmaatutkimuksen laitoksen vaiheista. Helsinki.
Multanen, Pertti (1990):”Kehitysmaa- vai kehitysyhteistyötutkimusta”,
Korkeakoulutieto, no. 4. Opetusministeriö: Korkeakoulu- ja tiedeosasto.
Suomen Akatemia (1975): Kehitysmaatutkimuksen suuntaviivoja. Tieteen
keskustoimikunta. Muistio, 4.3.1975.
Suomen Akatemia (1981): Tieteen keskustoimikunnan asettaman
kehitysmaatutkimuksen jaoston muistio. Suomen Akatemian julkaisuja 8.
Suomen Akatemia (1995): Kehitysmaatutkimuksen strategia.
Kehitysmaatutkimuksen jaosto.
Ulkoasiainministeriö (1985): Kehitysmaatutkimuksen työryhmän mietintö.
Helsinki.
Peace and democracy in
Wilhelm Bolin’s political philosophy
Jyrki Käkönen
War and peace attracted academic discourse in Finland in the 1870s: at
least three studies were published, lectures were delivered, and books were
written on the topic. There were basically two attitudes to war and peace in
the debate, which may be termed Hegelian and Kantian. The direct influence
of these traditions on later research remained modest. This essay is a brief
introduction to the Kantian tradition. In particular, I introduce the ideas of
Wilhelm Bolin (1835–1924), a Finnish philosopher in the materialist tradition
and whose concept of peace closely reflects Kant’s pamphlet on perpetual
peace.
Wilhelm Bolin has remained a relatively unknown philosopher in the
shadow of the Finnish national philosopher Johan Wilhelm Snellman. In the
1970s a few young Finnish philosophers reinvented the almost forgotten
Wilhelm Bolin1. The reading of Bolin’s production gives the impression
that Bolin has remained unknown not because of the low quality of his
philosophical thinking but rather for political reasons.
Although in his own lifetime, Bolin’s understanding of social reality did not
represent the mainstream thinking, he has not been a totally forgotten figure.
As a young scholar, Mikko Juva, who later became the archbishop of Finland,
dealt with some of Bolin’s ideas first in his dissertation and later in 1950 in an
article partly devoted to Bolin’s materialism2. Outside the academic world,
a Finnish communist intellectual, Tuure Lehén, has also discussed Bolin’s
philosophy in his book on materialists and idealists. Lehén refers to Bolin as
a Finnish materialist whose thinking should be studied also in the academic
world. Lehén was aware of Juva’s Bolin analysis. However, Lehén found Bolin
first in Lenin’s philosophical notebook. In his notes, Lenin mentions Wilhelm
Bolin as a Feuerbachian materialist and as a person who edited Feuerbach’s
collected works.3
1
See Manninen 1976; Uusitalo 1977; Manninen & Uusitalo 1979.
Juva 1950.
3
Lehén 1964.
2
100
Jyrki Käkönen
When Bolin presented his master’s thesis at the University of Helsinki in
1856, the chair of philosophy had just been reestablished after its closing
in 18524. Johan Wilhelm Snellman had been appointed to the professorship
and in this sense Bolin became his student. Bolin was also the only student
who presented his doctoral thesis to Snellman in 1860. However, Bolin never
became a Hegelian philosopher neither a real student of Snellman. As a young
master, Bolin studied in Germany, where he listened to Feuerbach’s lectures
and became a friend of Feuerbach.5 Most likely it is just the Feuerbachianism
which is the reason for forgetting Bolin in the Hegelian context which also
was an ideological space for Finnish nationhood.
After Snellman became a senator and he left the University, Wilhelm Bolin
acted for a while as a professor but he lost the permanent position in 1869
to his competitor Thiodolf Rein. This meant that both Finnish philosophy and
political studies lost an interesting scholar. In the competition between Bolin
and Rein, the question was about the choice between two different scientific
approaches and worldviews. This is clear in Snellman’s own evaluation of
the applicants. Snellman says about Bolin that he had not chosen the most
successful scientific approach; i.e. the Hegelian one6. The choice was between
two different orientations.
Bolin’s loss in the nomination process made him into an unknown and
forgotten scholar. This is a very common destiny for scholars who have
not been in the mainstream of academic research. Bolin got a personal
professorship in 1870 as a complementary. However, Bolin never enjoyed
his position as an extraordinary professor since students could not use his
lectures in their studies. Therefore Bolin did not have any students and he
quit after three years and left the academic world. This soft academic killing
made an end of Bolin’s creative scientific carrier.
After Bolin left the faculty he became the chief librarian at the University
of Helsinki library. The new position never did compensate for what Bolin
lost in the academic world. Bolin was depressed about how he was received
in the Finnish academic world. According to him, the nomination process
reflected the spiritually closed and narrow-minded Finnish intellectual world.
4
The professorship in philosophy had been closed due to conservative Russian
politics. The re-establishment of the chair in philosophy was one of the first signs
of the liberalization of the Russian politics in Finland.
5
See Manninen & Uusitalo 1979, 234–236; Manninen 1980, 186–187.
6
See Manninen & Uusitalo 1979, 232; Manninen 1980, 188–189.
101
Therefore Bolin was planning to move into the United States, as he wrote to
Feuerbach. This reaction supports the argument that Bolin lost his interest in
research.
This is even more explicit since as a librarian Bolin had good opportunities
to go on in his research at least until he retired in 1912. In a way Bolin used
his new position for academic work. In 1903–1911, together with an Austrian,
Friedlich Jodl, Bolin edited Feuerbach’s collected works. During the same
period Bolin edited Feuerbach’s letters for publication. And already in 1891 he
published a study on Feuerbach and his influence on modern philosophy.
According to academic disciplines, Bolin’s works belong in philosophy.
But all his studies deal with problems relevant to the social sciences from
methodological and theoretical perspectives. Bolin’s first dissertation as well
as his first major work deals with the problem of family as a social construction7.
Although the first study is a conceptual analysis, Bolin’s methodology is
explicit already in this work; the concepts he uses reflect the existing reality.
The next two of Bolin’s studies8 address some basic philosophical issues
and they reflect the relation between the theory and praxis. In both of these
studies freedom of the human will is an important aspect. This is also a central
problem in Bolin’s more political major study. Bolin’s both mere philosophical
studies have a methodological relation to his major work. According to Bolin,
an important aspect of all social studies is to understand the totality first.
Secondly, he stresses that practical reality is an essential aspect of all scientific
thinking and studies. According to him, all philosophical or theoretical
thinking has to reflect the practical reality or the social praxis9.
Bolin is important for political science since his major work Europas statslif
och filosofins politiska läror (Political History of Europe and the History of
Political Ideas). The work has altogether 800 pages. And it is the last innovative
study Bolin carried out in his academic years. Bolin himself defined the work
as a study of the historical reality of political life and how this reality has
been interpreted in philosophical theories in different times10. This duality
7
These two works are Familjebegreppets utveckling ända till reformationen and
Familjen (The Development of the Concept of Family until the Reformation, and
The Family).
8
Leibnitz ett förebud till Kant and Problemet om viljans frihet, kritiskt och logiskt
undersökt (Leibnitz a forerunner to Kant, and The Problem of the Freedom of the
Will, a critical and logical study).
9
Manninen & Uusitalo 1979, 233, 254; Manninen 1980, 1889.
10
Bolin 1870, iii.
102
Jyrki Käkönen
is expressed in the title of the work. The time span of the work goes from
Machiavelli to the 1860s.
Kant on war and peace
Although Bolin was a materialist philosopher, he adapted an important
element also from Kant’s philosophy. For Bolin, freedom of will was an
important imperative. Freedom of will is also an important element in
Kant’s understanding of the possibility of perpetual peace. Therefore, a brief
excursion into Kant is in order also in this essay. To begin with, I should point
out that my main sources in the following understanding of the Kantian
tradition in Finland are not the original writings of Kant. Instead, I have mostly
relied on a detailed and well-arranged analysis by the Finnish scholar Mauri
Noro11.
Freedom of will is a central element in Kant’s philosophy, so much so
that the only way to understand his idea of eternal peace is through an
understanding of what he means by freedom of will. Kant was convinced that
there is no determinism in man’s social activity, but that it is man’s own will
that determines his destiny12 and Bolin shared this understanding13.
Moral judgments in politics are possible only insofar as there is freedom
of will. Otherwise all that would happen in human social life, including war,
would only be a deterministic phenomenon. Kant makes it plain that he does
not accept these views; therefore, active and conscious man plays a central
part in his social theories.14 Freedom of the human will is also closely bound
up with another important element of Kant’s philosophy: the categorical
imperative.
Peace is in a way one of Kant’s categorical imperatives15; it is a maxim that
man has to make a universal law by his everyday praxis.16 The categorical
imperative also leads to the conclusion that war means destruction. Man
does not, according to Kant, have the right to act destructively since it is
11
Noro 1979.
Noro 1979, 53.
13
See Manninen 1980, 189.
14
Noro 1979, 51.
15
In his Perpetual Peace Kant does not refer directly to peace as a categorical
imperative. But peace is discussed in terms of a maxim that could become a
universal law. And in Kant’s philosophy a maxim and a categorical imperative are
connected.
16
Noro 1979, 93.
12
103
in violation of the laws of nature.17 The only way that conscious man can
overcome his destiny is to work actively for peace. Applying Kant’s logic to
security problems, we see the utter absurdity of armaments. While armaments
no doubt enhance one’s own security, it undermines the security of others
and therefore destabilizes the international system. So according to Kant’s
logic, security can be guaranteed by disarmament18.
Freedom of will is a necessary precondition for politics as well. Politics,
Kant said, is impossible without freedom of will. For Kant, too, peace is
a state created by politics, which in turn suggests that the problem of the
free human will is inseparable from the problem of peace. Also, peace is not
possible without politics.19 Finally, it is important to realize that even for Kant
peace is very definitely a utopian state20, but nevertheless a utopia that can
be reached through human action. Perpetual peace is an end that has to be
realized little by little.21 Kant did not believe that war was impossible, but quite
the contrary that it was an inevitable and natural part of the development of
the early international system.22 War is by no means a must in the advanced
international system. Although Kant was not a pacifist, he thought that peace
could be realized by praxis.23
Bolin as a scholar on politics and democracy
In order to understand Bolin’s concepts of peace and war, we have to make
an excursion into his understanding of politics and democracy. According to
Bolin, the function of political science is to find out the general regularities in
social development and the causes of social phenomena. And this is his own
goal in studying the political history of Europe. Bolin divides his work into
two parts. The first one he calls the period of force and power and it stretches
from Machiavelli to Spinoza. The second period begins with Milton and Bolin
17
Noro 1979, 79–80.
Here I have to refer to the English School in international studies. This school
has introduced three different international societies. One of them is the Kantian
international society. Kantian society is revolutionary and based on solidarity
instead of power provided by means of violence. See, for instance, Dunne 1998,
138–139; Noro 1979, 79–80.
19
Noro 1979, 109–111.
20
According to Kant, philosophers blissfully dream of perpetual peace (Kant 1991,
93).
21
Noro 1979, 123.
22
Noro 1979, 122–123.
23
Parkinson 1977, 77–80.
18
104
Jyrki Käkönen
calls this period an epoch of strengthening justice and human freedom.24
The political philosophy of the epoch of force and power reflect the historical
period in which absolute sovereigns united people into nations and modern
states often by force25.
Bolin’s own understanding of the relation between philosophical
thinking and political praxis defines his approach in the whole study.
Throughout his work Bolin stresses the unity of the development of
political systems and the development of political philosophy. Another
basic idea in Bolin’s study is that the historical essence of the modern
state is defined by the relation between the rulers and ruled. A change
in this relation is the perspective Bolin is interested in the development
of political systems. In Machiavellism and in the period when the modern
state was being born the essence of a state was equal to the sovereign
ruler and to his absolute power. From Machiavelli until Spinoza the state
was impossible to understand without a ruler with absolute power. This
sovereign kept the state together26.
The elements of the sovereign and the ruled changed radically both in
praxis and in political philosophy during the period Bolin analyzed in his
work. Already in Machiavellism and during the period of absolute power
the essence of the state was closely connected to the relation between the
rulers and the ruled. In this respect the state was not possible to equate
with the prince27. And although Spinoza according to Bolin still represents
the Machiavellian tradition, Spinoza already gives to people a legitimate
right to rebel against a ruler who does not respect constitutional norms
in the relation between the rulers and ruled. In this respect people are not
only ruled objects but they become subjects in politics28. Finally, Humboldt
in Bolin’s study equates civil society with the state and therefore people’s
political actions make up the essence of the state.
According to Bolin the political elements as well as the state are socially
constructed. They get their shape by people’s actions and they do not have
any divine origin. This Kantian idea is explicit already in Bolin’s analysis of
24
Bolin 1971, 3–16; see also Uusitalo 1977, 332–335.
See Bolin 1871, 10.
26
Bolin 1870, 404.
27
See Bolin 1870, 242.
28
Bolin 1870, 397–398.
25
105
Machiavelli. In Bolin’s understanding, Machiavelli was the first modern political
philosopher who analyzed political and public action as they appeared in
praxis without any reference to nonhuman powers.29
Above I have argued that the development of the people’s element – the
political role of people – within the context of the development of modern
state is in a central position in Bolin’s analysis. It is evident that this reflects
Bolin’s own understanding of the development of politics and political
systems. The development process of the practical and theoretical people’s
element leads to a political system that is idealistic for Bolin. This system has
allowed people to rule themselves and to define their destiny every day.
According to Bolin, Machiavelli begins the period during which the
concept of the state essentially expanded from the sovereign to mean people
within the state. Throughout his study Bolin stresses the strengthening of
the element of the people, the political power of the people. In the historical
process people became the subject of politics and finally the essence of
the state30. Every citizen had to have his share in the power of the state but
according to the capability of each person31. Simultaneously, as the people
become the essence of the state, the state loses its original purpose, it withers
away and people’s self-management realizes a complete political life32.
During the Reformation and in the political struggles connected to it
the people’s element became an important aspect of political philosophy.
This theoretical emancipation was explained by Bolin by pointing to the
fact that in the Reformation and Counter-Reformation people really acted
as subjects and rulers needed people’s involvement in the political struggle
for power33. Therefore Bolin connects the idea of people’s sovereignty to the
Reformation34.
However, in its essence the concept of people’s sovereignty remained
Machiavellian through the Reformation period. By this, Bolin means that
also the power of the people was based on force and power. But even
this increased the role of the people in the development of the modern
29
Bolin 1870, 139.
See Uusitalo 1977, 332; Manninen & Uusitalo 1979, 255.
31
Bolin 1871, 381.
32
Bolin 1871, 390.
33
Bolin 1870, 174–178.
34
Bolin 1870, 181, 184–185, 195; Manninen & Uusitalo 1979, 260.
30
106
Jyrki Käkönen
state35. Spinoza, as the last Machiavellian according to Bolin, represents
a real breakthrough in the doctrine of people’s sovereignty. According to
Bolin, Spinoza understood that the ruler does not have any other force and
power than that given by people and people constantly watch how the ruler
realizes the rights of the people36.
In connecting the historical roots of modern people’s sovereignty to the
Reformation and Spinoza, Bolin leans strongly on his own ideas about the
relationship between the social sciences and practical political life. In Bolin’s
understanding, the historical basis for the concept of the people’s sovereignty
was in the people’s revolts against their rulers37. Especially Spinoza was
influenced by the liberation struggle of the people of the Netherlands.
After the liberation struggle in the Netherlands people’s historical role was
imminent in the English Revolution as well as in the French Revolution. And
especially the latter case stressed people’s political role in the modern state38.
People’s own political activity both expressed and strengthened their social
and political consciousness. Simultaneously people raised themselves into
being a subject of politics.
What has been said above is possible to understand in a way that, according
to Bolin, in the 17th and 18th centuries it was not theoretically possible to
develop any final concept of people’s sovereignty and the modern state
since the objects of both of the concepts had just come into being. And in
Bolin’s understanding, the great philosophers of the Enlightenment, who
have been taken as fathers of bourgeois political thinking, represented only
the breakthrough of the modern. For Bolin, Montesquieu’s doctrine on the
separation of powers was just a compromise between the feudal regime and
the modern political regime that was just emerging39.
Even Rousseau does not, according to Bolin, represent a modern approach
to political regimes. Although Rousseau’s democracy model for the first time
stressed the necessity of the participation of all people in governance, he
represented for Bolin the idea of the ancient polis from Greece and not a
modern political system with modern institutions that made it possible
35
Bolin 1870, 223, 225, 228, 240.
Bolin 1870, 394, 399–400.
37
Bolin 1870, 232–234.
38
Bolin 1871, 315–316.
39
See Manninen & Uusitalo 1979, 263.
36
107
for people to participate in politics and the use of power. However, Bolin
himself stressed local people’s self-governance since that made it possible
for everyone to participate in decision-making40.
People’s liberation struggles throughout history demonstrate for Bolin
that people’s sovereignty and social liberties are never guaranteed just by
institutions. On the contrary, people’s sovereignty will be a reality only in case
democracy and liberties will be fought for and won in everyday praxis41. The
rising up of people as political subjects was a necessary precondition for the
development of the concept of the political element of people. According to
Bolin, Hegel already defines people as a nation to be a subject of the state
but the final will and power is still in the ruler’s hands42. In Bolin’s analysis it is
Carl Wilhelm von Humboldt who was the first one who understood people
as the natural substance and subject in modern states43. That means that
the dividing line between the rulers and ruled will disappear and people
will rule themselves by themselves. And especially the development of
local self-management gives people the possibility to realize their rights by
themselves44.
As a general and maybe even universal social tendency, Bolin stressed
the disappearance of force as one characteristic of the state and the
democratization of social life45. But it was not a deterministic process; it was a
result of people’s struggle for self-management. Democratization is a central
idea also in Bolin’s study of the history of the family and the development of
the concept of the family. According to Bolin, even in the family, equality and
democracy have been increasing46. Democratization and the development
of people into a political subject and into the essence of the state imply the
marginalization of the role of the state. The role of the state will be limited to
a narrow field of truly public and common issues and to the maintaining of
a legal order47.
On a more general level, it is possible to say that for Bolin human history
is people’s struggle for the subject and substance of political power. The
40
Bolin 1871, 350, 384.
Bolin 1871, 349–351.
42
Bolin 1871, 354.
43
Bolin 1871, 391–393.
44
Bolin 1871, 348.
45
Bolin 1871, 375, 381.
46
Bolin 1860, 85.
47
Bolin 1871, 353, 414; Manninen & Uusitalo 1979, 273.
41
108
Jyrki Käkönen
development of political philosophy is just a part of this struggle. This
struggle will end only when the dividing line between the rulers and ruled
disappears, since that would make power needless. According to Bolin,
people will never, and in fact cannot, give up their sovereignty. Real political
power is undivided and belongs to the people48.
To conclude this discussion of some of Bolin’s ideas, it is possible to say
that people as political actors always construct their social reality. And this is
possible only in case we understand that the human will is free. This means
that nothing is deterministic – even peace is possible. It is also good to insist
that Bolin does not respect institutions or legal systems as such. They both
are socially constructed and can be changed by people in case there is a need
to do so. In this sense, Bolin represents radical democracy, which has to be
won again day by day. It is the same with peace. It is not in institutions; it has
to be made a reality again and again in everyday praxis. It is also possible to
argue that when democracy as people’s self-management increases, there is
less need for force and violence.
Peace in Bolin’s politics
Like Kant, Bolin49 carried out a separate study of peace. He starts his essay
with a direct attack against traditional studies of history: he declares that
when historical studies make war heroes their central figures, written history
is actually supporting human sacrifice.50 Above it has been shown that Bolin
himself demonstrates in his main work that history is created by the masses/
people. Bolin’s work is mainly concerned with different peace plans, plans
that, as he says, are part of human history. Having introduced and analyzed
some of these plans, Bolin formulates his own idea of peace by integrating
various elements from different plans and from his own philosophical
understanding of the problem. It is important to note that the three main
subjects that Bolin was concerned with as discussed above were the general
development of human freedom through human praxis; the problem of
the freedom of will and democracy as a system for controlling the world of
people.
Bolin starts his essay on peace by discussing a plan proposed by Abbé
de Saint-Pierre in 1718, a plan that had provided a starting point for several
scholars interested in the organizing of peace. Bolin does not accept Saint48
Bolin 1871, 371.
Bolin 1889. This study was first published in 1870.
50
Bolin 1870a, 249–250.
49
109
Pierre’s plan as it stands, but there are at least two points that Bolin borrows
from Saint-Pierre:
1. Bolin makes a clear distinction between the concepts of power and
greatness. For Bolin, the use of power in war for destructive purposes
is not something that deserves to be called “great”; the use of power
for purposes of peace is.51 Here, Bolin leans on Saint-Pierre and takes
distance from the Hegelian tradition.
2. Real history has been the history of wars; peace has only been a ceasefire between wars. However, this is not an imperative. Wars have been
part of real history because in the international system there are
no such institutions that would safeguard the interests of states, a
sovereign institution that civil society does have: the state.52
Bolin’s acceptance of these elements from Saint-Pierre means at least
three things. First, Bolin has two different concepts of peace: the concept
of negative peace, i.e. peace as a transient stage in between two wars, and
the concept of positive peace, a lasting state in the international system53.
Second, Bolin shares at least in part the realistic idea that the international
system is anarchic by nature. And in anarchic systems wars are inevitable.
However, the internal logic of the international system may also change;
anarchy is not a permanent state, but belongs to a given stage of human and
social development. Third, since anarchy can be overcome, perpetual peace
is possible, but only through the institutions that safeguard the interests
of individual states. The latter point connects Bolin to a wider tradition of
federalism, and in a sense to functionalism. Connecting Bolin to federalism
is justified in light of fact that Bolin accepts Saint-Pierre’s idea of state
confederations that guarantee peace.54 Bolin also finds more arguments in
support of federations from both Kant and Bentham further on in his study.
The other major plan that Bolin examines is Kant’s Zum ewigen Frieden,
a work from which Bolin borrows above all Kant’s principle of justice.
51
Bolin 1889, 235. Bolin takes a position against the use of force already in his
study of the history of European political ideas. According to him, democracy as
the power of people brings an end to the use of force as an ultimate means of
order.
52
Bolin 1889, 255.
53
In modern peace research, negative peace means the absence of war and
positive peace harmonious relations within and between societies. Already in
1942 Quincy Wright used these concepts. See Wiberg 1983, 16–17.
54
Bolin 1889, 256.
110
Jyrki Käkönen
According to Bolin, justice is a necessary condition for any kind of peace. If
we add the principle of justice into the concept of peace, we would have
the basic elements of Galtung’s concept of positive peace55. For Bolin, the
principle of justice is not only a concept that would specify the essence of
peace, but above all a contradiction to anarchy in the international system.
This means that by establishing a just world order, the anarchic nature of the
international system can be overcome. We must realize in this connection
that justice in general does not equal a legal international system. By justice
Bolin also means an equal world system.56
Bolin also extends the core of Kant’s concept of justice to the area of increasing interaction between states, and places special emphasis on the role
of trade.57 Commercial interaction could be organized on a mutual basis.
Otherwise, the situation would differ little from complete anarchy. This, then,
is why justice also means equality in Bolin’s worldview. In addition to the
principle of justice, Bolin borrows from Kant the idea of a common cultural
heritage of mankind. All of these elements will guarantee peace. And it was
with these elements that Bolin constructed a concept of positive peace.
Besides this modern element, Bolin also worked with ideas that are at the
heart of present theories of integration and interdependence.
The third major plan that Bolin introduces is Jeremy Bentham’s Principles of
International Law from 1789. Bentham, Bolin argues, lends support to SaintPierre’s and Kant’s idea of state federations as safeguards of peace. From
Bentham, Bolin borrows the idea of a federative Parliament that is assigned the
task of managing all kinds of conflicting interests between states.58 This idea
of a federative Parliament is an institutional form of conflict resolution, and
the function of this institution is to replace wars in an organized international
system. It is also an institution that should provide people and communities
with other means than pure force and warfare for settling disputes. A suitable
sanction for states that fail to abide by the norms of the system, Bolin says,
would be to expel such states from the community and deprive them of their
rights as members of the community. The advantages of being a member
in the community would be so notable that every state would abide by the
norms of the Parliament.59
55
Galtung 1964.
Bolin 1889, 259.
57
Bolin 1889, 261.
58
Bolin 1889, 261-262.
59
Bolin 1889, 262.
56
111
Having presented these idealistic plans, Bolin moves on to discuss the
historical events of the 19th century. Here again he points out that wars have
been part of historical reality, but says that it would be impossible to conclude
that eternal peace is a utopian state.60 The existing interaction between states
is according to Bolin evidence that wars can be avoided, but unfortunately he
fails to specify his argument at this point.61 Instead, he moves on to discuss
human cultures. According to Bolin, peace depends largely on people’s
way of thinking, an argument that from the point of view of modern peace
research is again very interesting and important.62 One of the main concerns
of current research has been precisely the roles of culture and the structure
of human language, since it is believed that these might have been the key
factors in getting people to accept armament and war.
Bolin believes that culture is a bridge to eternal peace, a point where he
approximates Hegelian concepts. He assumes that the process of civilization
will eventually bring about peace in the world. Bolin also stresses the role
of education, which could and should be used for making wars impossible.
Through education it should be made clear to people that the most important
human and social value is the right to live. Any kind of war destroys this
value.63
Finally, we return briefly to the concept of positive peace in Bolin’s study.
I stated earlier that one of the elements Bolin incorporated in this concept
was equality. To my mind there is no other way to interpret his arguments.
Perpetual peace, he says, can only be possible if the living standards of all
people can be promoted,64 which also means that Bolin puts his faith not
only in a high level of morality; the material preconditions for peace are as
equally valuable as the ideological preconditions.
Bolin’s understanding of peace or the possibility of perpetual peace reflects
his understanding of politics or political life in general. First precondition
is that even in the international system people will govern themselves by
themselves. In this respect he overcomes at least partially the state-centric
approach. In governing themselves, people have to make peace day by day.
In this sense peace is a political act by people. Therefore it is possible to say
60
Bolin 1889, 264.
Bolin 1889, 266.
62
Bolin 1889, 267–268.
63
Bolin 1889, 268.
64
Bolin 1889, 272.
61
112
Jyrki Käkönen
that in Bolin’s thinking there are the roots for something that has recently
been called cosmopolitan democracy65.
Concluding remarks
It seems to be possible to conclude by saying that Bolin was a Feuerbachian
materialist and a neo-Kantian in his political thinking. For Bolin praxis comes
before any theory. It is praxis that scholars can theorize and theory does not
exist without praxis but praxis lives also without theory. This aspect in any
case is in a central position in his plan for perpetual peace. It is also likely that
Bolin had many ideas that seem to be fresh in a situation where the modern
system is in crisis and is likely in the process of reconstruction66. This is maybe
explained by the fact that Bolin in his studies reflected the coming of the
modern but at the same time he was a critic of the modern. This is the aspect
which makes Bolin an interesting scholar even today although he has been
an almost a forgotten scholar more than 100 years.
Bolin is interesting also in the sense that his social philosophy reflects a
constructivist approach. While doing politics (i.e., in everyday social praxis)
people construct social institutions. That has to be understood in a way that
human institutions are socially constructed. Even peace can be understood
as a system established in institutions for realizing and maintaining peace
in the international system. Those institutions are supposed to provide
three essential aspects of peace for people: justice, human freedom and
democracy. Simultaneously the system had to safeguard the interests
of individual states. In this sense Bolin did not go beyond a state-centric
approach although he brought the civil society to a position that was as
central as that of states.
According to the English school’s three versions of international society,
Bolin stands finally somewhere between the Grotian rationalist and Kantian
revolutionist approach67. But maybe he is closer to the Kantian tradition. As an
institution for peace, the European Union can be understood in the context
of Bolin’s theoretical approach. The EU is an institution that has organized
relations between member states, peacefully providing similar human rights
65
See for instance Archibugi & Held 1995, 1–16.
Several IR scholars have understood the current historical situation as a global
transition period. However, in this connection I refer as an example only to
Ferguson & Mansbach 2004.
67
Dunne 1998, 139.
66
113
for all the citizens of the Union. For maintaining its institutions, the EU does
not need coercive force. Gains in being a member are a big enough incentive
for being inside rather than being excluded from the community or the new
society in construction.
Finnish peace research has been largely influenced by American scientific
traditions; Johan Galtung’s major influence does not change the matter at all.
However, this is apparently a problem for the whole academic community in
Finland. The national scientific traditions were completely neglected in mid20th century Finland, and suppressed by everything that came from the USA.
But as I have demonstrated here, the old Finnish traditions contain a number
of “modern” points of view that have survived until today. To my mind, the
case of Bolin demonstrates that a closer study of some early traditions would
make possible a true emancipation of our scientific knowledge, and also
provide the means for overcoming the obvious restrictions of the American
scientific traditions.
References
Archibugi, Daniele & David Held (1995): “Editor’s Introduction”, in D. Archibugi
& D. Held (eds.) Cosmopolitan Democracy. An Agenda for a New World Order.
Cambridge: Polity Press.
Bolin, Wilhelm (1860): Familjebegreppets utveckling ända till reformationen.
Helsingfors.
Bolin, Wilhelm (1864): Familjen. Helsingfors.
Bolin, Wilhelm (1864): Leibniz ett förebud till Kant. Helsingfors.
Bolin, Wilhelm (1868): Problemet om viljans frihet, kritiskt och logiskt undersökt.
Helsingfors.
Bolin, Wilhelm (1870–1871): Europas statslif och filosofins politiska läror, 1 och 2.
Helsingfors.
Bolin, Wilhelm (1889): “Den eviga freden”, in W. Bolin Studier och föredrag I.
Helsingfors.
Bolin, Wilhelm (1891): Ludwig Feuerbach, sein Wirken und seine Zeitgenossen.
Stuttgart.
114
Jyrki Käkönen
Bolin, Wilhelm (1904): Ausgewählte Briefe von und an Ludwig Feuerbach. Vol. I
und II. Leipzig.
Bolin, Wilhelm & Friedlich Jodl (Hrsg.) (1903–1911): Ludwig Feuerbachs Sämtliche
Werke I—X. Stuttgart.
Dunne, Tim (1998): Inventing International Society. A History of the English School.
London: Palgrave Macmillan.
Ferguson, Yale H. & Richard W. Mansbach (2004): Remapping Global Politics.
History’s Revenge and Future Shock. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Galtung, Johan (1864): “An Editorial”, Journal of Peace Research, 1(1).
Juva, Mikko (1950): “Wilhelm Bolin ja Ludvig Feuerbach”, Historiallinen
Aikakauskirja, 48.
Kant, Immanuel (1999): Political Writings. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Lehén, Tuure (1964): Materialisteja ja idealisteja. Helsinki: Kansankulttuuri.
Manninen, J. (1976): ”Ihmisen vapauden ja solidaarisuuden aatteet Vilhelm I.
Bolinilla”, Psykologia, 11.
Manninen, J. (1980): “Wilhelm Bolin, Feuerbachin ystävä. Appendix II”, in B.
Byhovski Ludwig Feuerbach. Helsinki: Kansankulttuuri.
Manninen, J. & Jyrki Uusitalo (1979): ”Vapausaate ja demokraattisen valtion
teoria Wilhelm Bolinilla”, in S. Knuuttila, J. Manninen & I. Niiniluoto (eds.) Aate
ja maailmankuva. Juva.
Noro, Mauri (1979): Etiikka ja politiikka Kantin ja Hegelin ajattelussa
rauhankysymyksen näkökulmasta. Suomalaisen teologian kirjallisuusseuran
julkaisuja, 115. Helsinki.
Parkinson, F. (1977): The Philosophy of International Relations: A Study in the
History of Thought. Beverly Hills: Sage.
Uusitalo, Jyrki (1977): ”Wilhelm Bolin ja modernin valtion teoria”, Politiikka, 4.
Wiberg, Håkan (1983): Rauhantutkimus ja konfliktiteoria. Helsinki: Tammi.
How many wars, how many dead,
how many peace deals?
Unto Vesa
How many wars?
Peace researchers are frequently approached with questions of how many wars
there are going on, how many people have lost their lives in them, and how
many of these have been civilian. Related to these questions about quantities
are inquiries into the changed character of wars. All these are legitimate
and important questions addressed to peace research, the normative goal
of which is to promote the building of a warless and non-violent world by
means of scholarly research. Such inquiries have a long tradition. Already
in 1817–1819 the Massachusetts Peace Society tried to estimate the total
number of war victims “ever since Adam and Eve.” Similarly, at the end of the
19th century and the beginning of the 20th several studies were carried out
about the number of wars and about the human and material destruction
caused by them throughout history.1 Quincy Wright’s monumental classic
work A Study of War, which as a systematic and comprehensive study of the
causes and character of war can be regarded as a predecessor and an inspirer
of modern peace research, gathers under its analytic focus all statistical and
qualitative data on wars available at that time.2
In spite of such a long tradition, it is not easy to provide clear-cut,
unequivocal answers to the questions referred to above. With regard to the
statistics of both past and ongoing wars, several problems are encountered
and, depending on their methodological solutions, it is possible to arrive
at different – and yet well-argued – answers. I try to discuss some of these
problems here, also illustrating them with empirical examples.
The first, and a very basic, problem is related to the very definition of war.
In the Clausewitzian tradition war has been characterized as the continuation
of politics by other means, and in the international legal literature it has
1
Wiberg 1983 and Vesa 1995, 80. Wright (1942) provides data e.g. from Thomas B.
Harbottle, Dictionary of Battles from the Earliest Date to the Present Time, London
1904.
2
Wright 1942.
116
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been emphasized that, although wars are organized violence, they are
legally regulated violence. In the history of inter-state wars, of course, there
have been periods when wars have been officially declared and their goals
formally announced. But nowadays this feature cannot be considered
decisive, because wars are initiated without any declaration and finished
without formal peace agreements. For that reason, the international relations
literature today attempts to define war through certain criteria for organized
violence and, especially within the international law discourse, the concept of
“armed conflict” is increasingly being used instead of the term of war. Among
the criteria for armed conflict is the use of organized violence by at least two
conflict parties. An armed battle between the armies of two or more states
is of course a clear case; so is a battle between the army of a state and a
resistance movement that follows the rules of military order; likewise a fight
between competing militarily organized resistance movements in a region. It
is worth noting, however, that such a definition also excludes various forms of
political and armed violence. Thereby genocide organized by a government
against a civilian population is not covered by the definition of the concept
of war, or armed conflict3; neither are single cases of politically motivated
terrorist acts; nor “non-political” violence between organized crime groups.
What is also significant is that the use of force, the demonstration of force,
or the threat of the use of force, are not defined as war or armed conflict if
certain additional criteria are not fulfilled.
This takes us to the second problem, the quantitative threshold of violence.
In order to have organized political violence classified as a war, usually a
certain number of fatalities is “required”. The occupation of Czechoslovakia
in 1968 is, of course, an example of the use of force, but it is not counted
among the wars in Europe. On the other hand, it is to be remembered that
some historical war statistics include cases where wars have been declared
and the state of war has thus prevailed, but with very few – or even no –
casualties. That the “certain number” of deaths varies from one researcher
and one set of war statistics to another implies that the threshold is a kind
of “contractual” definition issue, and it is difficult to argue for any universal
threshold agreed upon by all researchers. As is well known, the Stockholm
Peace Research Institute’s SIPRI Yearbooks provide annual data on “major
armed conflicts” and in that data the threshold has been 1,000 battle-related
3
Because such a definition excludes e.g. genocides like Rwanda, some researchers
prefer to add together all fatalities due to wars and political conflicts regardless of
whether they are battle-related deaths or not; see, for example, Leitenberg 2006,
especially p. 6.
117
deaths during the whole duration of the conflict.4 This choice does not, of
course, imply in any way that researchers would consider minor amounts
of violence less significant. For instance, the Uppsala University Department
of Peace and Conflict Research collects and publishes statistical data also on
quantitatively minor armed conflicts, defining all those conflicts with “at least
25 battle-related deaths per calendar year” as active armed conflicts.5 It is
self-evident that the figure given for ongoing armed conflicts indicates the
chosen threshold. Thus, if the threshold is at one thousand battle deaths,
then we usually arrive nowadays at 20–30 “major armed conflicts” each year.
If, however, the threshold is lower, and the definition for inclusion thereby
more sensitive, the number of active armed conflicts can be manifold.
As a consequence of the threshold issue, even a protracted armed conflict
can remain outside war statistics, until one day its total battle deaths exceed
the quantitative threshold set by the researcher. The Northern Ireland conflict
is an illustrative case, with its annual fatalities for a long time remaining at
relatively low levels, only accumulating over years.
The next problem, which is relevant both with regard to historical cases
and present wars, is the question which armed conflicts are added together
and which are disaggregated. If we think of some past wars, we may ask, for
instance, if the Thirty Years’ War was one war, or in fact consisted of several
separate wars during that period. The same question can be raised with
regard to the Napoleonic wars, or the Second World War, or the long Algerian
resistance and armed struggle.6 As regards the armed conflicts of today, the
disintegration of Yugoslavia is an illustrative example: is it a series of four or
five separate wars, or shall the future historians deal with the whole series as
a single Yugoslavian dissolution war?
Part of the same problem is the task of defining when a given armed
conflict is finished. Namely, if there is break of even a few years between
battles, perhaps due to an armistice, is the re-eruption of violence counted
as a continuation of the old war, or as a new war altogether? Both alternatives
are used in the literature.
4
SIPRI Yearbooks: http://www.sipri.org; Harbom & Wallensteen 2007.
See the data bank of the Uppsala department: http://www.pcr.uu.se/
basicSearch/index.php; the respective PRIO databank: http://www.prio.no/cwp/
ArmedConflict/; and the guide of the Uppsala department to various conflict
data sources: http://www.prc.uu.se/research/UCDP/conflictdatasetcatalog.pdf.
6
Melasuo 1999, especially 97–118.
5
118
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And finally, even nowadays there is the issue of getting information about
some armed conflicts. When an armed conflict flares up in the Middle East or
Northern Ireland, it is always, of course, immediately known and reported.
But what about the continuation of armed struggles, perhaps sporadically,
in some faraway corners of Burma, or Colombia, or north-eastern India, such
as the Manipur region? The continuation of such armed conflicts, especially
when of small scale, can remain outside the horizons of media and researchers
even for longer periods.
For a long time, a dominant trend has been – for instance according to SIPRI
Yearbooks – the decreasing proportion of international wars, while an everincreasing share of ongoing wars have been ostensibly “internal” wars, that
is, armed struggles within the borders of a state, either about government or
territory. Examples of the former, traditional inter-state wars have included
the wars between India and Pakistan as well as between Ethiopia and Eritrea.
The long armed struggle in Nepal has been about government, whereas
territorial claims and identities have been dominant issues in all those
conflicts where the goal of a guerrilla movement has been the achievement of
regional autonomy, or independence. It is worth stressing that the borderline
between inter-state and internal wars is very fluid, because foreign powers
have very often and in different ways interfered in armed conflicts that are
internal in terms of their appearance or origins. Today’s Iraq, Afghanistan
and the Democratic Republic of Congo serve as dramatic examples of this
phenomenon.7 A totally new and different problem is today posed by the
“war on terror” launched by the Bush administration. Its representatives
have used that term to lump together several ongoing armed conflicts in
various parts of the world; wherever one party to the conflict is a movement,
or organization classified as terrorist by the US government. Many of these
conflicts have originally had internal domestic roots – and have often as
such been historically protracted – where a guerrilla or resistance movement
has by armed means attempted to achieve its goal, be it independence or
bringing down a government.
How many deaths?
To estimate the amount of human losses in wars is at least as difficult as
estimating the number of wars, and this issue is relevant both with regard to
past and present wars. Again, there are many difficulties.
7
See e.g. Kende 1971; 1977; and 1978; and Gleditsch 2007.
119
According to an old wisdom, the first casualty of war is the truth, and this
immediately leads us to a basic problem: It is in the interest of parties to a
conflict to provide purposive and misleading information about both their
own losses as well as those of their adversary, at least as long as the armed
conflict goes on. Their own losses are downplayed, while those inflicted on
the enemy are exaggerated. If the scale of the enemy losses – and especially
of its civilian population – seem to grow very high so that the numbers begin
to appear bad in the public eye, it is possible nowadays also to either totally
ignore the deaths on the enemy side, or present these figures as misleadingly
low. Regarding ongoing wars, the case in point is again Iraq, where the United
States counts the casualties of its own forces as accurately as possible –
although even their number is not very openly reported, due to the criticism
of the war – but has declined to comment on the battle deaths on the Iraqi
side, especially the number of civilian deaths. For this reason, it has been left
to research centres, mass media and non-governmental organizations to
attempt to estimate the total number of war casualties.
The statistics of the Vietnam War are equally illustrative. The total number
of Americans who lost their lives in the war is estimated at 58,1938, or 58,2269,
and about 350,000 have been counted as wounded. Simultaneously, the
losses of the Vietnamese are estimated to be between one and two million.
In other words, the losses of one party are known with a high level of
accuracy, whereas the much greater number of casualties of the other side –
the weaker one – is not known even at a tolerable accuracy so that even the
range between estimates is perhaps one million dead. However, even the
official figure regarding the American casualties may be too low. The figure
58,000 includes the battle deaths, but what about those who were wounded
and died later on? Moreover, the calculation does not include, or take note
of, those who committed suicide after the war, although it is widely reported
that the suicide rate among war veterans has been higher than among the
rest of the population.10
War casualty statistics may also in other cases exclude those victims who
did not die immediately on the battlefield, but after a time lag. The number
of atomic bomb victims of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, for example, continued
to increase years after the war, due to burns and radio-active radiation. By
8
The National Archives.
Vietnam War casualties.
10
See e.g. Willson 1999.
9
120
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the end of 1945, when the acute phase of radiation was over, the number of
deaths due to the Hiroshima atomic bomb is estimated to have been 140,000
– the figure usually given for those who died immediately is 70,000 – but the
number grew in the following years and decades.11
An even greater problem in estimating war casualties derives from the
habit of calculating only battle-related deaths, although it is known that, both
in the past and today, a large share of total human losses in wars is caused by
war-related misery, famine and diseases. Wright refers to estimates according
to which in the Napoleonic wars about 80–90 per cent of the total losses of
armies were from disease and in the nineteenth century this proportion
averaged 65 per cent.12 Thus, the damage caused by these is often larger
than the direct impact of the fighting. Moreover, the indirect consequences
of misery and diseases hit mostly the civilian population, and particularly the
weakest among it.
From the historical perspective, terror intentionally targeted at civilian
populations is nothing new, although there have also been wars where the
principles of international law have been somewhat better respected than
today. As an example of a very cruel war in this respect, Quincy Wright refers
to the Thirty Years’ War, in the context of which the whole population of some
besieged towns was killed. Because modern air warfare is especially thought
to risk civilian populations, Wright notes that, in the First World War air raids,
1,117 British civilians died, whereas during the Thirty Years’ War, 30,000
civilians of the town of Magdeburg were massacred. That war is estimated
to have reduced the population of Bohemia from four million to 800,000,
and that of Germany as a whole from 16.5 to four million.13 Since the Second
World War, the number and share of civilian casualties has increased. Some
modes of warfare, like area bombings, are considered to have contributed to
this trend, as well as the general cruelty of civil wars and the lack of respect in
them for the prescriptions of international law.
The total population losses are not limited to the aggregate amounts
of direct and indirect casualties, however. Because major wars have their
impact on population structures, and thereby for instance on the birth-rate,
their overall impact on the size of populations can be noted only afterwards,
by studying the number of the unborn. The studies by the famous Soviet
11
Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum.
Wright 1942, Vol. I, 242–243.
13
Ibid., 244.
12
121
scientist B. Urlanis on the impact on populations of the wars waged between
1600 and 1945 also take into account this population deficit, adding it to the
total of human losses.14
In addition to all the issues discussed above there have been occasional
random mistakes by researchers in their estimates. These include cases in
which, for instance, the original estimate of the total number of “dead and
wounded” – or casualties – has later mistakenly been interpreted as meaning
that all were dead.15 Urlanis provides several examples of how a mistake
in a source is subsequently repeated in the scientific literature, and rightly
emphasizes that researchers should always, even when making use of existing
literature, attempt to find themselves the original sources and use them also
with caution and a critical eye.16
If and when the number of war casualties for some reason has been either
exaggerated or downplayed, later inquiries can respectively either decrease
or increase the estimates. In the case of the Finnish Civil War (1918), for
example, a recent comprehensive and detailed inquiry – carried out more
than eighty years after the war – found the number of deaths to be greater
than in any of the earlier studies.17
At present it seems to be commonplace that the mass media, in often rather
early phases of conflicts, reports on the numbers of casualties, speaking of as
high numbers as hundreds of thousands, even though the reliability of the
data may be quite questionable. In such cases, the downscaling of estimates
during the conflict is not easy, because it may look like an effort to downplay
the severity of the conflict. But is it not in fact perverted, if the prevailing
view is that only large casualty figures can contribute to an anti-war opinion?
The alternative is to consider any amount of destruction and suffering as
condemnable; for those who lose their lives the loss is total.
The UN Secretary-General has conveyed an estimate that 100 million
people lost their lives in the wars of the twentieth century, and an additional
170 million in other types of political violence. Obviously, higher estimates
are arrived at when the calculations include cases of genocide, as well as
famines caused by political conflicts.18 Even since 1990, in other words after
14
Urlanis 1976, 227–279.
Urlanis (1976, 42–43) informs about several such examples in the literature.
16
Urlanis 1976, 43.
17
Suomen sotasurmat 1914–1922.
18
See Leitenberg 2006.
15
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the Cold War, wars and violence are estimated to have claimed more than five
million lives.19
In general, most studies caution about the uncertainty of quantitative data,
and with good reason. The mere range of estimates – for instance between
50,000 – 100,000 or from 1 to 2 million – in either one source or between
different sources, serves as an indication of this problem.20
And what about peace?
What does it matter from the perspective of peace research if, at a given time,
there are either ten or forty ongoing wars; if one or two million people have
lost their lives in them; and if the share of civilian casualties has been either
ten or ninety per cent? At least it is possible to argue that, on the basis of such
figures, the dominant trends of the international system can be evaluated.
This includes questions such as whether the movement is towards a more
peaceful or more bellicose world; whether the norms of international law
are followed more or less duly than before; whether war can be considered
to have a decreasing role as a means of resolving conflicts, or is it perhaps
resorted to more easily than before? Briefly, such analysis concerns the
prospects of peace.
The work of the famous French polemologist Gaston Bouthoul refers to
8,000 peace treaties during the past few millennia.21 Anthony Stevens states
that each one of them was meant to remain in force forever – which may not
necessarily be quite correct – and notes that, on average, they lasted for two
years.22 This type of discussion of the history of war and peace easily leads to
the often-repeated slogan that “there have always been wars and there will
always be”. That, however, is questionable reasoning both with regard to the
past as well as the future. Especially concerning the latter part of the claim,
the analysis of trends is relevant.
In his book Maailmanpolitiikka tekniikan aikakaudella (1964) Göran
von Bonsdorff classified wars, according to their magnitude in two main
categories, as world wars and local wars; and the latter group again into two
sub-categories, wars in which great powers had interfered, and those where
they had not. He argued that this typology was relevant particularly from
19
Millennium Report of the Secretary-General.
See e.g. Military Balance 2007; SIPRI Yearbook 2007; and White 2005.
21
Bouthoul 1948.
22
Stevens 2007, 3.
20
123
the perspective of prevention. In his view, the prospects for the preventive
action of the international community and organizations had improved also
in armed conflicts where some great powers had intervened, like in the Suez
crisis of 1956.23 Such surveys and arguments are nowadays often found in the
IR literature.
It is self-evident that historical trend analyses do not warrant too hasty
conclusions about long-term trends. This is because the same statistical
data also inform us about notable wave-like movements as regards both the
frequency and the intensity of wars. These indicate that, even in the past,
more peaceful and more war-like periods have followed each other.24
Similar wave-like patterns can be observed for the period after the Second
World War.25 An especially noteworthy optimism-raiser for the post-Cold War
period was the finding that the number of ongoing major armed conflicts
decreased year after year, as did their intensity. It was possible to reason that
this trend was due to the collapse of the Cold War structures and the decrease
of political conflicts related to that. It was also thought that, in the new political
atmosphere, the opportunities available to the international community, and
especially to the United Nations, for preventive and early action in conflict
situations had improved. The drastic increase of peacekeeping operations in
the 1990s was taken as a valid indicator of this trend.26
Today, this positive trend seems to have halted, at least for the time being.
According to a recent report by Peter Wallensteen and Lotta Harbom, for a
period of ten years beginning in 1991/1992, the incidence of ongoing major
armed conflicts was in continuous decline. Now, however, the level seems
to remain around 30 active armed conflicts each year, and these “appear to
be protracted and difficult to solve.” Therefore, Peter Wallensteen and Lotta
Harbom suggest that “the peace strategies of the 1990s have to be improved
in order for them to yield success today.” Nevertheless, even at present they
observe some parallel positive tendencies as well, such as negotiations and
peace agreements in some protracted conflicts like Nepal and Aceh.27
All armed conflicts end one way or another. The durability of peace
depends on the degree to which it is considered just or otherwise legitimate
by the parties of the conflict. If a peace deal is perceived as unjust, the seed of
23
von Bonsdorff 1964.
See Wright 1942, 218–248.
25
Kende 1971; 1977; and 1978; Gantzel & Schwinghammer 2000.
26
Ks. Human Security Report 2005; Harbom & Wallensteen 2007.
27
Uppsala Universitet Press release 2007.
24
124
Unto Vesa
a new conflict remains – which explains why new armed conflicts often flare
up again in conflict-prone regions. Thus, a conflict cycle without a solution
that would be recognized as legitimate by all conflict parties easily leads to
an ever-continuing and deepening vicious circle.28 On the other hand, the
European integration after the Second World War – the overcoming of old
animosities and the build-up of new cooperation patterns on the foundation
of common values and shared interests – is an encouraging example of the
possibility for peaceful change in an international sub-system. If and when
it is possible to find pathways of unification on a continent like Europe, the
history of which is so full of war and violence, to a level where no one can
regard war as probable in any imaginable future, it will be possible to get rid
of the scourge of war elsewhere and universally as well.
References
von Bonsdorff, Göran (1964): Maailmanpolitiikka tekniikan aikakaudella.
Hämeenlinna: Karisto.
Bouthoul, Gaston (1948): 8000 traités de paix. Paris: Julliard.
Gantzel, Klaus Jürgen & Torsten Schwinghammer (2000): Warfare Since the Second
World War. New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers.
Gleditsch, Kristian Skrede (2007): “Transnational Dimensions of Civil War”, Journal of
Peace Research, 44(3), 293–309.
Harbom, Lotta & Peter Wallensteen (2007): “Armed Conflict, 1989–2006,” Journal of
Peace Research, 44(5), 623–634.
Hiroshima Peace Memorial Museum. http://www.pcf.city.hiroshima.jp/peacesite/.
The Human Security Report 2005. War and Peace in the 21st Century. Human Security
Centre/Oxford University Press.
Kende, Istvan (1971): “Twenty-five Years of Local Wars”, Journal of Peace Research, VIII
(1), 5–22.
Kende, István (1977): “Dynamics of Wars, of Arms Trade and of Military Expenditure
in the “Third World”, 1945–1976”, Instant Research on Peace and Violence, 7(2),
59–67.
Kende, István (1978): “Wars of Ten Years (1967–76)”, Journal of Peace Research, XV(3),
227–241.
28
Ks. Pfetsch & Rohloff 2000.
125
Leitenberg, Milton (2006): Deaths in Wars and Conflicts in the 20th Century. Cornell
University Peace Studies Program. Occasional Paper 29, 3. ed. http://www.
clingendael.nl/publications/2006/20060800_cdsp_occ_leitenberg.pdf.
Melasuo, Tuomo (1999): Algerian poliittinen kehitys 1800-luvulta vapautussotaan
1954. Tampere: Rauhan- ja konfliktintutkimuskeskus. Tutkimuksia No. 85.
The Military Balance 2007. The International Institute for Strategic Studies. London:
Routledge.
Millennium Report of the Secretary-General [A/54/2000]. Also http://www.un.org/
millennium/sg/report, “We the peoples” The Role of the United Nations in the
21st Century.
The National Archives (s.a.): http://www.archives.gov/research/vietnam-war/
casualty-statistics.html.
Pfetsch, Frank R. & Christoph Rohloff (2000): “KOSIMO: A Databank on Political
Conflict”, Journal of Peace Research, 37(3), 379–389
SIPRI Yearbook 2007. Armaments, Disarmament and International Security (2007).
Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Suomen sotasurmat 1914–1922-projekti. http://vesta.narc.fi/cgi-in/db2www/
sotasurmaetusivu/ stat2.
Stevens, Anthony (2007): “What is war and why do we do it?” Lecture given at the
Durrell School, Corfu, on July 4th. http://www.anthonystevens.co.uk/what_is_war.
htm, 2.1.2008.
Uppsala Universitet Press Release (2007): “The general decline in armed conflicts
has now clearly ceased”.
Urlanis, B. (1976): Sodat ja väestö. Helsinki: Tammi. (Original in Russian: Voiny i
narodonaselenie; engl. Wars and Population).
Vesa, Unto (1995): Miten rauhantutkimus tuli Suomeen. TAPRI tutkimuksia No. 69.
Tampere: Rauhan- ja konfliktintutkimuskeskus.
Vietnam War casualties. Http://www.vietnam-war.info/casualties.
White, Matthew (2005): “National Death Tolls for the Second World War”. http://
users.erols.com/mwhite28/ww2stats.htm, 10.1.2008.
Wiberg, Håkan (1983): “The peace research movement”. A paper presented at the
conference of the International Peace Research Association in Györ.
Willson, S. Brian (1999): “Memorandum: Accelerated Mortality Rates of Vietnam
Veterans”. Http://www.brianwillson.com/awolvetmemo.html.
Wright, Quincy (1942): A Study of War, Vol. I-II. Chicago: The University of Illinois
Press.
A troubled relationship:
peace research and emancipation
Tarja Väyrynen
Such a man will leave the gold in the mountain
and the pearls to lie in the deep.
He does not view money and goods as true profit,
nor is he attached to fame and fortune,
nor by enjoyment of long life,
nor sadness at an early death;
he does not value wealth as a blessing,
nor is he ashamed by poverty.
He will not lust for the wealth of a generation to have as his
own;
he has no wish to rule the whole world as his private domain.
His honour is clarity of understanding that all life are part of one
treasury
and that death and birth are united.
Chuang Tzu
In the quote above, emancipation means spiritual development and freedom
from attachment and from worldly concerns. In the Western tradition,
however, emancipation refers to something else. It indicates personal or
collective freedom, political and economic rights as well as improvement of
the position of a disenfranchised group. Western theorising on emancipation
is strongly embedded in the Marxist tradition of the social sciences, and the
most prominent thinking on the issue can be found in the Frankfurt School.
Peace research has not been immune to the theorising on emancipation.
On the contrary, there is a profound connection between the idea of
emancipation and peace research. In this short essay, I will examine
the relationship through four examples, namely, peace research as an
emancipatory project in itself, peace researchers as emancipators, conflict
resolution as a form of emancipation and gender and emancipation. I will
argue that the relationship between emancipation and peace research has
128
Tarja Väyrynen
not been unproblematic and it has always created lively debates among
peace researchers.
The Frankfurt School and peace research
The Frankfurt School sought to bring about emancipation from ideological
blinders and increase our awareness of the conditions of our own knowledge
of the world. According to Max Horkheimer, the social world lacks the given
character of the natural world and should be seen as our construction. The
political implication of this is that the social world could be otherwise. This is
something that traditional social sciences have tended to obscure, according
to Horkheimer, and thereby they perpetuate the status quo under capitalism.
Therefore, a form of reflective social science is needed. Reflective social
science implies theoretical reflection in the ordinary self-understanding of
participants in the social world. In short, the guiding concern of the original,
first generation Frankfurt School was with emancipation through reflective
social science.1
For Jürgen Habermas, on the other hand, the normative foundations
of critical social theory are to be found in the proper understanding of
communicative action and, in particular, in the ideal speech situation that
must be undertaken by anyone trying to come to an understanding with
someone about something. According to Habermas, every communicative
act carries with it claims to validity (truth, rightness, and sincerity). In ideal
speech situations all participants must have equal opportunity to participate.
The participants must also be motivated by the desire to reach a consensus,
and in order to do this they must also have communicative competence
which involves communicating in accordance with the fundamental system
of linguistic rules. In the Habermasian view, what makes it possible to
coordinate action is our ability to come to an understanding with each other
about something. Emancipation can be measured by the progress toward
the realization of the ideal speech situation.2
For Habermas too, our knowledge is constituted through our being in the
social world and is tied to knowledge-constitutive interests. These are, first,
the technical cognitive interest which is associated with instrumental reason
and positivism and arises from the interest in shaping and controlling the
natural environment. Second, the hermeneutic or interpretive disciplines
are guided by the practical cognitive interest and aim at reaching an inter1
2
Anderson 2000; Habermas 1992, 401.
Habermas 1985.
129
subjective understanding rather than control. Third, the emancipatory
cognitive interest seeks to secure freedom from distorted communication
and ideology. It implies self-reflection, human autonomy, self-understanding
and self-formation. Critical social sciences are guided, according to Habermas,
by the emancipatory interest.
Emancipatory interest has guided a part of peace research and its
development. Particularly the Scandinavian tradition of peace research
allies itself with critical social theory suggested by the Frankfurt School3.
Johan Galtung defined peace research as applied science that would lead
to positive peace and structural change. Through structural change the
actors can be freed from the burden of repression and false ideology. Peace
research itself can be seen, thus, in this definition, as an emancipatory project
that connects research with action, theory with praxis and knowledge with
policy-making.4
A harsh criticism of the Galtungian view and the conservative nature of
peace researchers was presented by Herman Schmid already in the late 1960s.
In his article “Politics and Peace Research”, Schmid accused peace researchers
of remaining within the confines of the status quo and being afraid of
promoting profound structural changes. For him, working with structural
change – that will bring forth positive peace – means polarizing a conflict to
the extent that the conflict becomes manifest and clear for the groups under
structural violence. Through polarization the “struggle escalates either to a
point where the power relations between the conflict actors have changed
so much that a structural change can be negotiated or to a point where the
system breaks down and is rebuilt with a new structure.”5 Although Schmid
himself does not raise the question of emancipation, his view on conflict
polarization can be interpreted to imply it. A peace researcher is able to
diagnose conflict situations better than the actors in a conflict themselves
in order to promote polarization. The task of the researcher is to participate
in the emancipatory reform that is oriented towards structural change and
ultimately positive peace.
3
On the peace research tradition see e.g. Rytövuori-Apunen 1990; Jutila et al.
2008.
4
Galtung 1969.
5
Schmid 1968, 227.
130
Tarja Väyrynen
Conflict resolution as a form of emancipation
In the Anglo-American tradition of peace research, conflict resolution is
often connected with empowerment, not emancipation as such. It is argued
that through the commitment to ensure that people retain ownership of
their destructive conflict during the conflict resolution process, there is a
greater opportunity for the empowerment of those involved to create new
ways of communicating and resolving their conflict. According to a broad
definition, empowerment is the process of obtaining basic opportunities for
marginalized people, either directly by those people, or through the help of
non-marginalized others who share their own access to these opportunities.
Empowerment includes encouraging and developing the skills for selfsufficiency.
Particularly the so-called problem-solving conflict resolution approach
has theorized empowerment in conflict resolution situations6. Since many
conflicts are embedded in asymmetrical power structures, the parties to
a conflict do not have equal resources, capacities and skills to negotiate
a resolution to the conflict. A.J.R. Groom and Keith Webb argue that in
asymmetrical conflict resolution situations empowerment of the weaker
party is needed7. In problem-solving conflict resolution the third party should
remain neutral during the process, thus, anything that would question the
neutrality of the facilitator is left out of the empowerment process. A way
to empower the weaker party, according to Groom and Webb, is to teach
the communication skills that are needed in problem-solving workshops.
A workshop facilitator can engage in this type of teaching activity without
sacrificing the principles of neutrality and non-partisanship. Communication
skills are of vital importance in conflict resolution workshops, since conflict
resolution requires improved communication patterns and dialogue in the
Habermasian sense of an ideal speech situation.
The view on empowerment suggested by the problem-solving school
of conflict resolution comes, thus, close to the definition of emancipation.
The conflict resolution workshop participants are freed from the inadequate
means of communicating that entitle them, among other things, remain in
an underprivileged position, e.g. under the condition of structural violence.
The role of the facilitator is important, because she can act as a catalyst for
learning, self-improvement and self-sufficiency. The type of emancipation
promoted does not bear similarities with the Schmidian approach described
6
7
On problem-solving conflict resolution, see Väyrynen 2001.
Groom & Webb 1987.
131
above since it does not require profound structural changes. Emancipation
relates to a group’s capacities and skills rather than the polarization of a
struggle and the breakdown of old structures.
Emancipating women in peacebuilding
A very recent expression for the desire for emancipation in peace research
and in conflict resolution practices can be found in the quest to include local
women in conflict resolution and peacebuilding. “Including local voices”
has become a slogan of peacebuilding theorists and practitioners. The UN
discourse as well as the mainstream writing on gender and peacebuilding
insists on including local women in peacebuilding. The inclusion of local
women is seen to offer a voice for marginalized groups that are seen to
be a key to self-sustaining peace. As I have demonstrated elsewhere in a
more detailed manner,8 the programme of including local women implies
emancipation and is highly problematic. It needs to be considered, who are
these “local women” who should be included, whose emancipation is needed
and whose voice is more authentic than the voice of women representing
the “international community”?
For me, Gayatri Spivak’s question “can the subaltern speak?” offers a starting
point for examining this troubled relationship between peace, gender and
emancipation. In her essay “Can the Subaltern Speak?” Spivak examines the
possibility of speaking of and for subaltern women as well as the question of
representation. For Spivak, subaltern refers to a colonial subject who is cast
aside to the margins and whom the Western epistemic violence constitutes as
Other. She argues that the “ideological construction of gender keeps the male
dominant” and that “in the context of colonial production, the subaltern has
no history and cannot speak, the subaltern as female is even more deeply in
the shadow.”9 It is exactly these subaltern subjects that Western peacebuilding
interventions try to deal with when insisting on including local women.
Spivak warns us strongly against solutions that assume a monolithic
collectivity of the oppressed who can speak for themselves in the way we
in the West understand speech and who can be included in emancipatory
political dialogue and peacebuilding. She considers it to be a dangerous
path to take where the First World intellectual (or policy-maker, activist, etc.)
masquerades as an absent nonrepresenter who lets the oppressed speak
for themselves. For Spivak, the colonized subaltern subject is irretrievably
8
9
Väyrynen 2008.
Spivak 1988, 287.
132
Tarja Väyrynen
heterogeneous and cannot speak. I argue that “local women” and their
emancipation serve the construction of Western agency in peacebuilding as
protector, human and ethically active. The wish to hear the voices of “local
women” is distinctly problematic and opens up a critical research agenda
for peace research that should examine the role of colonial and subaltern
subjects in the construction of First World agency.
Concluding remarks
In this short essay I have tried to show how the idea of emancipation and peace
research are closely connected. Both in the Scandinavian and Anglo-American
traditions, there is theorizing on conflict resolution practices that would lead
to emancipation. Furthermore, peace research itself can be seen to be an
emancipatory project. The connection is not, however, an unproblematic one.
The views on emancipation are always challenged in peace research and the
challenges point towards two directions: emancipation is not radical enough
(Schmid) or emancipation as such is a problematic notion and relates mainly
to Western self-understanding (Väyrynen).
133
References
Anderson, Joel (2000): “The ‘Third Generation’ of the Frankfurt School”,
Intellectual History Newsletter, 22.
Chuang, Tzu (1996): The Book of Chuang Tzu. London & New York: Arkana.
Galtung, Johan (1969): Rauhantutkimus. Helsinki: Weilin+Göös.
Groom, A. J. R. & Keith Webb (1987): “Injustice, Empowerment and Facilitation in
Conflict”, International Interactions, 13(3), 77–86.
Habermas, Jürgen (1971): Knowledge and Human Interest. Boston: Beacon.
Habermas, Jürgen (1985): The Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 1. Boston,
MA: Beacon Press.
Habermas, Jürgen (1992): The Theory of Communicative Action, vol. 2.
Cambridge: Polity Press.
Jutila, Matti, Samu Pehkonen & Tarja Väyrynen (2008): “Resuscitating a
Discipline: An Agenda for Critical Peace Research”, Millennium: Journal of
International Studies, 36(3), 623–640.
Rytövuori-Apunen, Helena (1990): Barefoot Research and Tribune of Reason. An
Analysis of the Textual Corpus of Peace Research in Scandinavia, 1959–1986.
Tampere: Department of Political Science and International Relations,
University of Tampere.
Schmid, Herman (1968): “Politics and Peace Research”, Journal of Peace Research,
3, 218–232.
Spivak, Gayatri (1988): “Can the Subaltern Speak?” in G. Nelson & L. Grossberg
(eds.) Marxism and the Interpretation. Basingstoke: Macmillan.
Väyrynen, Tarja (2001): Culture and International Conflict Resolution. Manchester
& New York: Manchester University Press.
Väyrynen, Tarja (2008): “Gender and Peacebuilding”, in O. Richmond (ed.)
Advances in Peace Studies. Houndsmill, Basingstoke & New York: Palgrave.
Touch and vision
Frank Möller
What is that? It could be old memories of other times and other places, stamped
in the skin memory. – – Something we run after but never catch – always
escaping from the chains or labels, always running away from being classified,
always evading from the drawers of the definitive things.
Rosa Matos Bento
from the liner notes to
Maria João and Mário Laginha, Danças (Verve World)
In the theory and practice of international relations the basic attitude to
difference still seems to be one of understanding difference as a problem.1
The first encounters between Europeans and indigenous peoples in South
America may paradigmatically illustrate Western approaches to encounters
with other people. These encounters regularly resulted in the elimination
of the latter by the former, albeit on the basis of two opposing logics that,
however, joined hands in evaluating other cultures in terms other than
their own thus inevitably misunderstanding them, misrepresenting them,
and justifying their elimination: either unalterable difference and inferiority
were stressed and depicted as a potential or actual threat that had to be
countered, or sameness and commonality were emphasized and translated
into demands for total assimilation. Either way, these encounters resulted
in the elimination of difference. Curiously little seems to have changed
since then although the need to accept and capitalize on difference has
been acknowledged in a huge number of academic writings in the social
sciences. The need to live with difference is as strong today as it was then
but international politics in the light of regime change, the liberal peace
proposition, increasingly illiberal practices home and abroad of allegedly
liberal democracies and exaggerated self/other rhetoric point in a different
direction. The designations of other people have changed – “wild men,”
“infidels” and “primitives” then, “terrorists,” “insurgents” and “Taliban” today
– but the politics towards them are depressingly similar including the selfauthorization to kill with impunity.
1
For a profound critique, see Inayatullah & Blaney 2004.
136
Frank Möller
Pictures, it is argued in this essay, are important vehicles for peace-building
because they show, without ignoring difference, the commonalities of being
human2 – the not-so-otherness of other people and the not-so-sameness of
the self – and help people to identify partially with one another. The surplus
of meaning that pictures inevitably carry with them means that pictures,
precisely by co-representing similarities and differences, the general and the
particular, the central and the peripheral, can help their readers to live with
difference rather than by reducing difference. Understanding the visual might
thus pave the way to live with difference without neglecting sameness and
to live with sameness without neglecting difference; others “are (complex,
fractured, contradictory) selves”3 and we are others, too.
It does not really matter in this context that we still do not know what
pictures are: a picture, says the photographer William Eggleston, “is what it
is”; pictures are “right there, whatever they are” and this is a very adequate
approach indeed because it emphasizes pictures’ non-reducibility to a specific
meaning: not only “would [it] not make any sense to explain” pictures,4 it
would also violate their very nature, their surplus of meaning, and deprive
them of one of their most important potentialities, namely, to tell different
and equally valuable stories at the same time. Thus, in the center of this
essay is the nature of images rather than the question of “right” or “wrong”
interpretations of images – a question that ultimately cannot be answered
anyway.
From this it follows that the combination of words and images, while
undoubtedly powerful and to some extent unavoidable and emphasized
in numerous criticisms of photography – Walter Benjamin speculated that
the caption might become the most important ingredient of a photograph;
Susan Sontag wrote that “all photographs wait to be explained or falsified
by their captions”; and John Szarkowski, commenting on the photographic
works from the American Civil War and the Second World War, emphasized
that “neither explained, without extensive captioning, what was happening”5
– is also problematic precisely because it fixes a picture’s multiple meanings
and often supports photography’s tendency to “reproduce and reinforce
the already-in-place ideological discourses vindicating entrenched systems
2
See MacDougall 1998.
Couldry 2000, 120.
4
All quotations are from O’Hagan 2004.
5
Benjamin 1963, p. 64; Sontag 2003, 10; Szarkowski 2007, unpaginated.
3
Touch and vision
137
of power and authority.”6 Thus, Brazilian songwriter Caetano Veloso,
remembering his encounter with Andy Warhol’s Marilyn, might be more to
the point by saying that he saw “how raw images would become comments
on the world if only we would abstain from commenting upon them.”7
Regarding the word-image relationship, what is the evidence that Jacquet
Callot’s etchings titled Les Misères et les Malheurs de la Guerre depicting the
invasion and occupation of Lorraine by French troops in the early 1630s need
captions in order for them to communicate to the beholder the indiscriminate
cruelty of war? Do we have reason to believe that the “devastating”8 effect of
Goya’s print series Los Desastres de la Guerra depicting “with no distinction
between winners and losers, right or wrong, or often even dead or alive”9 the
invasion of Spain by Napoleon’s troops in 1808 results from the combination
of words and images? Would Goya’s Desastres not be equally poignant
without captions? What is the evidence that Flavio de Barros’s photographs
of Brazilian troops’ crusade against and slaughter of crowds gathered by
Antônio Vicente Mendes Maciel (Antônio Conselheiro) in Canudos, Sertão,
in September 1897 – some of “the great images of the horrors of modern
war”10 – require bylines in order for them to affect the viewers? The viewers
do not have to understand the pictures in their historical context or political
ramifications in order to be appalled by them and by that what they depict.
Consider in this context Edouard Manet’s paintings of the execution
of Emperor Maximilian in Querétaro, Mexico, in June 1867,11 some of the
greatest examples of both 19th century art and of political art although – or
because – their political message is far from clear. Manet did not make a clear
political statement either for or against the execution; he abstained from
an evaluation of Maximilian’s installation as emperor; and he refrained from
making a clear political assessment for or against the role of France in the
whole débâcle. Manet used only some parts of the available information on
the execution and ignored others. He inter-visually applied, and altered, the
rules governing the painting of current and historical events established by
such artists as Francisco de Goya.
6
Shapiro 1988, 126.
Veloso 2002, 18.
8
Sontag 2003, 44.
9
Eisenman 2007, 86.
10
Robb, 2005, 206; Some of the photographs can be seen on a website maintained
by Fondacão Joaquim Nabuco at http://www.fundaj.gov.br/docs/canud/fotos.
htm.
11
See Elderfield 2006.
7
138
Frank Möller
Manet’s works speak to the viewer, not because Manet imposed a specific
interpretation of the paintings on the viewers or because he realistically
depicted what actually had taken place in Querétaro. Rather, the paintings
affect the viewer because they maintain their autonomy as works of art,
because they complicate and do not simplify, and because they put the
viewers in a very awkward subject position, thereby involving them in both
the depicted scene and the execution. This is true especially with respect to
the painting that is currently owned by Städtische Kunsthalle Mannheim.
Here, the viewer sees his or her own shadow in front of the non-commissioned
officer preparing the coup de grâce and this shadow involves the viewer
directly in the execution scene.12
What are we doing there? Are we only observers of the execution or are we
participant observers, that is to say, do we participate in the execution simply
by being there, by observing the execution, by not intervening to prevent it?
Is there anything we could possibly have done to prevent the execution? Do
we actually look at the execution, our gaze directed by the gaze of the group
of people peeping over the wall, or do we focus our attention on the noncommissioned officer and his nonchalant non-involvement, or do we turn
our back to the execution scene, perhaps appalled at what happens, aware
of our own failure to prevent it, averting our eyes, insisting on our right not
to look? Our shadow does not answer this question. And do we actually have
the right not to look, to close our eyes to the pain of others?
Writing about the notorious photographs taken in the Abu Ghraib prison,
art historian Stephen Eisenman would seem to deny the right not to look. He
claims that “there is simply no alternative” to carefully paying attention to the
photographs if one wishes to undermine what he calls the Abu Ghraib effect:
“a kind of moral blindness – – that allows [the US public and the amateur
photographers at Abu Ghraib] to ignore, or even to justify, however partially
or provisionally, the facts of degradation and brutality manifest in the
pictures.”13 Thus, we have to look; we cannot not look if we wish to undermine
the Abu Ghraib effect.
Art historian Horst Bredekamp would probably disagree. He argues
that deliberately to watch an image of a crime is an act of complicity if the
crime had been committed in the first place in order to produce images
of it; by watching these images, the viewer becomes an accomplice of the
12
13
Möller 2008, 25–29.
Eisenman 2007, 9.
Touch and vision
139
perpetrators.14 The Abu Ghraib photographs were intended to be shown to
friends and loved ones at home, and they were disseminated world-wide,
unaffected by censorship, uncontrolled and uncontrollable. Thus, if there is
no alternative to regarding the Abu Ghraib images (Eisenman) then there
also would not seem to be an alternative to becoming involved, as a viewer,
in the crimes committed at Abu Ghraib (Bredekamp). Thus, looking is not an
option but not looking is not an option, either. This is a real dilemma in the
sense that it offers the viewer only equally unfavorable options.
In this connection it may also be suggested that simply by watching the
photographs or the video footage of the attacks on the two towers of the
World Trade Center and the people caught in them on 11 September 2001,
the viewers inadvertently join hands with Al Qaeda. After all, the perpetrators
could almost take for granted that someone would produce images of the
attacks and that these images would then be disseminated worldwide; the
attack “was clearly planned and executed to maximize imaging.”15
Another question to be asked in connection with the Abu Ghraib and the
9/11 photographs is the following: Did they move us? And if so, what does it
mean to be moved by photographs? After all, “as soon as we are moved by [a
photograph] we are ready to move on.”16 Being moved by a photograph would
then seem to be the condition for the impossibility of critically engaging
both with the photograph and with the conditions that produced it. Even if
we move on, however, photographs may haunt us, engrave themselves on
our pictorial memory; we might not be able to forget them. Thus, even if we
move on, we do not let the photographs that moved us behind us. We are
carrying them with us as memories but it is difficult to say what exactly they
do to us and what we do with or about them or about the conditions that
produced them.
Eisenman writes that “the one who watches is stronger than the one who is
watched.”17 While this is certainly true on one level we should also think about
the power of the one who is watched – or the power of the image of the one
who is watched – over the one who watches (although power is perhaps not
really the right word for the haunting effect of images that I am addressing
here). “Old memories of other times and other places” are not only “stamped
in the skin memory” (Rosa Matos Bento) but also indelibly engraved on our
14
Bredekamp 2004.
Levi Strauss 2003, 182.
16
Dyer 2006, 31.
17
Eisenman 2007, 99.
15
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Frank Möller
pictorial memory. Thus, when we speak about images we also speak about
the images that we already carry with us as memories serving as the standard
against which newly incoming information, including visual information, is
being evaluated.
Thus two notoriously unreliable sources of making sense of the world,
images and memories, join hands – and both are used as sources of making
sense of the world although it is well known that they are unreliable and
that there is no necessary and direct connection between a photograph and
“any prior reality.”18 Indeed, the truth-value of photographic representations
is routinely overestimated reflecting photography’s seeming documentary
potentialities, its mechanical way of reproduction and the long history of
the use of photographs as evidence in a variety of circumstances, but this
overestimation tells us perhaps less about photography than about our
longing for some degree of certainty, assurance and non-arbitrariness.
Not least, photography is, as Diana Taylor has argued with respect to the
photographs taken in connection with the 11 September 2001 attacks,
“evidence – – of our own existence.”19
Many authors have written about the effects photographs of human
suffering can have on their viewers. Most of them emphasized what Arthur
Danto has called photography’s “dulling, if not desensitizing” effect or what
Barbie Zelizer has referred to as habituation in the course of which that what
moved the viewers when seen for the first time increasingly fails to move
them when seen again and again and again. Susan Sontag, however, called
into question her earlier assessment that photographs “shrivel sympathy” and
asked: “What is the evidence that photographs have a diminishing impact,
that our culture of spectatorship neutralizes the moral force of photographs
of atrocities?”20
The history of photo-journalism is a history of pushing the boundaries
of that what can be shown further and further often resulting in “picture[s]
that shouldn’t be shown of an event that shouldn’t have happened.”21
Recent approaches to the depiction of human suffering in the visual arts,
however, make the viewers acknowledge their implication in that what is
being shown in the images precisely by not showing human suffering or by
showing human suffering only by implication. For example, in “The Eyes of
18
Tagg 1988, 2.
Taylor 2003, 255.
20
Danto 2006; Zelizer 1998; Sontag 2003, 105.
21
Hariman & Lucaites 2003, 41.
19
Touch and vision
141
Gutete Emerita,” part of The Rwanda Project, Chilean artist Alfredo Jaar does
not show human suffering but only eyes that have seen such suffering. By so
doing, Jaar “engages the limits of representation in situations of extremity –
and not as an abstract philosophical question but as one in which viewers
of the work are implicated.”22 Canadian visual artist Jeff Wall, in his staged,
near-documentary photograph “Dead Troops Talk (A vision after the ambush
of a Red Army patrol, near Moqor, Afghanistan), winter 1986,” re-enacted in
the studio with the help of actors, uses black humor and irony to engage
what Reinhardt calls the limits of representation. As Wall says, at the time
when he started the project (1990) the Afghan war “had just simply dropped
out of the public eye. That meant it had become sort of immovable. And that
seemed sort of right for the hallucinatory image I wanted to make.”23 Again,
the viewers do not have to understand the historical context within which
these images are located in order to be affected by them and motivated to
think.24
It would then seem that some photographs have a dulling effect while
others have not. Some photographs have a dulling effect on some observers
but not on others. Some photographs, seen for hundreds of times, still move
us – or at least some of us. Thus photography is not as limited as it is often
accused of being. And the limits of sight and vision are not the limits of
photography. And “the limits of photography are not the limits of art.”25
Responding to the Abu Ghraib photographs, Colombian artist Fernando
Botero decided to paint Abu Ghraib.26 One of the paintings’ most striking
features is the almost total absence of the perpetrators from most of the
paintings and the strong focus on the victims and their pain. In the few
paintings where the perpetrators are being depicted, they are neither smiling
nor grinning, and they are certainly not giving thumbs-up behind a pyramid
of naked Iraqi bodies as can be seen in the photographs. In other paintings,
their faces are off the canvas, their heads are painted from behind or hidden
behind arms raised in order to beat a prisoner.
For the viewers, it is not possible to avoid the victims’ pain by focusing their
attention on the jailors: we are compelled to face the victims and their pain.
22
Reinhardt 2007, 33.
Jeff Wall in Lederman 2008.
24
For the relationship between affect and critique, see Bennett 2005, especially
46–69.
25
Danto 2006.
26
Botero 2006.
23
142
Frank Möller
In the large body of scholarly and journalistic comment revolving around
what happened at Abu Ghraib, the focus was “on ourselves.”27 Regarding
Botero’s paintings, however, we cannot hide behind a discussion of the role
of the perpetrators and the society from which they emerged and which they
represent. Thus, Botero’s works make us realize both the inadequateness of
the photographs as evidence for what actually happened in Abu Ghraib and
the immorality of the self-centered discussion following the publication of
the photographs.
Thus the limits of photography are not the limits of art. But the limits of
sight and visions are not the limits of photography, either.
In her work on photographic family snapshots and portraits, Marianne
Hirsch describes the photographic family album as a vehicle for the
construction, justification and maintenance of often idealized family
relationships, rules of appropriate behaviour and family traditions. The family
album is one of the everyday places where identities are constructed, notions
of self and others are developed, feelings of belonging are articulated and
collective memories are formed. It is a place of intimacy, meaningful only
for those who are aware of the tacit assumptions and implicit relationships
that can be felt rather than seen in the photographs. “Feeling photographs”
was accordingly the title of Elizabeth Edwards’s key note speech at the 2006
conference of the Nordic Network of Visual Social Science. And concerning
photographs of musicians, Geoff Dyer writes that “the better the photograph,
the more there is to hear.”28
Here, I want to emphasize the notion of touching photographs: photographs
not only touch us, but we can touch them with the sensitive tips of our fingers,
we can cry over them and kiss them. By replacing a disembodied relationship
with an embodied one we can relate to the photographs and to that what
they depict better, more directly and more intimately than by simply looking
because “by virtue of physical contact with the object, touch – – produces a
much less dramatic transubstantiation of the object’s material substance and
form into a spiritual expression of boundless significance than do seeing or
hearing.”29
Can it then also be argued that touch, by virtue of physical contact
with a photograph, produces a more dramatic sense of connection with,
27
Simpson 2006, 107.
Hirsch 1997; Edwards 2006; Dyer 1998, xii.
29
Gilgen 2003, 54.
28
Touch and vision
143
involvement in and responsibility for that what a photograph conveys than
does looking? Does touch undermine the dulling and desensitizing effect
that photography is often accused of generating? Does touch make it more
difficult for the viewers to escape from their responsibility for the conditions
under which photographs are being taken? Does it help undermine the
notion of privileged spectatorship – privileged in the sense of not being
responsible for that what a given photograph communicates – turning
seemingly privileged spectators into implicated spectators?
Touch would then appear to have an important role to play in many conflict
and peace-building situations in international relations and elsewhere
including truth-telling as performed in truth and reconciliation commissions.
This is not to say that truth-telling should be abandoned but it is to suggest
that it should be accompanied by truth-showing and truth-touching.
The “Western valuation of seeing and hearing as primary senses for the
production of rational knowledge is as fundamental to the Western sensory
schema” as is the understanding of touch, smell and taste as lower and
irrational.30 Preference given to sight and vision would then seem to be
fundamental to the endurance of Western domination over non-Western
ways of making sense of the world. Post-colonial and other variants of critique
of this very domination should therefore include in their critique the Western
focus on sight and vision.
This raises important questions about the recent attention directed to
visual culture in peace research and international studies. Indeed, exclusive
attention on sight and vision might actually support and strengthen that
what visual analysis is often meant to criticize. However, preference given
to sight and vision would also seem to prevent complete understanding of
Western cultures. Let me return, for a last time in this essay, to the attacks of
11 September 2001. In addition to being visually assaulted by the repetitive
display of the images of the attack and its aftermath while herself contributing
to the production of such images, Diana Taylor writes that “we inhaled the
Towers, smelled them, tasted them in our mouths, rubbed them from our
teary eyes, crunched them with our feet as we walked through the streets.”31
It is adequate to conclude this essay by returning to Fernando Botero,
not to his Abu Ghraib paintings but his earlier animal sculptures. Situated
in urban landscapes, these sculptures are meant to be touched and to be
30
31
Edwards et al. 2006, 7.
Taylor 2003, 243.
144
Frank Möller
changed by being touched. This is one of the reasons why people love them.
They are sculptures made for the streets, not for the art galleries. Likewise,
Eisenman reminds us that Jacques-Louis David’s paintings of French
revolutionaries in 1793 and 1794 – “token[s] of emancipation” rather than
“sign[s] of subservience to autocratic power” – were paintings “made for the
streets, not for the court.”32 Perhaps we should also think about photographs
for the streets, not for the museums where such signs as “Don’t touch the
objects” deprive these very objects of many of their potentialities.
32
Eisenman 2007, 84.
Touch and vision
145
References
Benjamin, Walter (1963): Das Kunstwerk im Zeitalter seiner technischen
Reproduzierbarkeit. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.
Bennett, Jill (2005): Empathic Vision: Affect, Trauma, and Contemporary Art.
Stanford: Stanford University Press.
Botero, Fernando (2006): Botero Abu Ghraib. Munich: Prestel.
Bredekamp, Horst (2004): “Wir sind befremdete Komplizen”, Süddeutsche
Zeitung, 28 May 2004.
Couldry, Nick (2000): Inside Culture: Re-imagining the Method of Cultural Studies.
London: Sage.
Danto, Arthur C. (2006): “The Body in Pain”, The Nation, 27 November 2006.
Dyer, Geoff (1998): But Beautiful: A Book about Jazz. London: Abacus.
Dyer, Geoff (2006): The Ongoing Moment. London: Abacus.
Edwards, Elisabeth (2006): “Feeling Photographs”, keynote speech at the
meeting of the Nordic Network for Visual Social Science A Closer Look:
Knowing Through Images, Roskilde University, 23–24 November 2006.
Edwards, Elisabeth, Chris Gosden & Ruth B. Phillips (2006): “Introduction”, in
E. Edwards, C. Gosden & R.B. Phillips (eds.) Sensible Objects: Colonialism,
Museums and Material Culture. Oxford & New York: Berg.
Eisenman, Stephen F. (2007): The Abu Ghraib Effect. London: Reaktion Books.
Elderfield, John (2006): Manet and the Execution of Maximilian. New York: The
Museum of Modern Art.
Gilgen, Peter (2003): “History after Film”, in H.U. Gumbrecht & M. Marrinan (eds.)
Mapping Benjamin: The Work of Art in the Digital Age. Stanford: Stanford
University Press.
Hariman, Robert & John Louis Lucaites (2003): “Public Identity and Collective
Memory in U.S. Iconic Photography: The Image of ‘Accidental Napalm’”,
Critical Studies in Media Communication, 20(1), March.
Hirsch, Marianne (1997): Family Frames: Photography, Narrative and Postmemory.
Cambridge & London: Harvard University Press.
Inayatullah, Naeem & David L. Blaney (2004): International Relations and the
Problem of Difference. New York & London: Routledge.
Lederman, Marsha (2008): “The master of ‘blatant artifice’ speaks”, The Globe and
Mail, 24 May 2008.
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Levi Strauss, Daniel (2003): Between the Eyes: Essays on Photography and Politics.
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Simpson, David (2006): 9/11: The Culture of Commemoration. Chicago & London:
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Veloso, Caetano (2002): Tropical Truth: A Story of Music & Revolution in Brazil. New
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Camera’s Eye. Chicago & London: The University of Chicago Press.
Tuomo Melasuo, un finlandese per il
Dialogo euro-mediterraneo
Salvatore Bono
In queste pagine, volte a festeggiare l’amico Tuomo, ricorderò le occasioni
di comune impegno nella prospettiva del dialogo e della comprensione nel
mondo mediterraneo, al tempo stesso richiamando convinzioni e prospettive
derivate anche dalla esperienza che ci ha accomunato. In particolare farò
cenno della fondazione e della storia della SIHMED, la Sociéte internationale des
historiens de la Méditerranée, vicende condivise appunto con Tuomo, e della
presenza insieme nel Comitato consultivo della Fondazione euro-mediterranea
per il dialogo delle culture Anna Lindh (FAL).
Ci siamo conosciuti nel marzo 1986, alla riunione a Parigi del Conseil
Européen des Études Africaines (CEEA) sulla documentazione africanistica in
Europa (vi esposi il rapporto concernente l’Italia1). Constatammo allora,
Tuomo ed io, una comune preoccupazione per i problemi dell’organizzazione
degli studi – sull’Africa, sul mondo arabo islamico, sui paesi emergenti
– da condurre su una base scientifica rigorosa e allo stesso tempo nella
consapevolezza di dover indirizzare il proprio impegno verso le esigenze
della società, nei nostri due paesi rispettivamente, e nel quadro della politica
della Comunità europea. Fin da quella prima conoscenza nacque fra noi un
sentimento di simpatia, oltre che di stima, dovuto da parte mia anche al fatto
che la Finlandia era un paese al quale mi sentivo legato, in modo indiretto e
tuttavia significativo, e per il quale provavo molta ammirazione insieme a un
forte desiderio di visitarlo2.
Il CEEA era stato creato nel 1963, per iniziativa della Agence de Coopération
Culturelle et Techinique (ACCT). L’Agence aveva pubblicato due grossi volumi sulle
Études africaines en Europe, Paris, Karthala, 1981. I rapporti sulla documentazione
vennero riuniti nel volume La documentation africaniste en Europe, CEEA-ACCT, Paris
1987.
2
Nel 1983–1984 mia figlia Laura (allora 16 anni) frequentò per un intero anno
scolastico il liceo scientifico a Tampere, ospite della famiglia Liisa e Reino KurkiSuonio, professori della Università di Tampere, ai quali mi piacere rinnovare
qui l’espressione della mia gratitudine. Dal 1986 mio figlio Francesco (ora
professore associato di Storia e critica del cinema) cominciò ad interessarsi della
1
150
Salvatore Bono
Un po’di anni dopo l’avvio del mio rapporto di amicizia con Tuomo, uniti
dall’interesse per il mondo mediterraneo e da una particolare attenzione
verso l’Algeria, la politica mediterranea della Unione Europea diede vita al
Partenariato (Barcellona, novembre 1995). Mi sembrò allora – e l’impressione
era confermata da altri osservatori – che il terzo volet, quello sociale, culturale
e umano, fosse stato inserito nella Dichiarazione di Barcellona, che dava
vita appunto al Partenariato, più che altro come un «fiore all’occhiello».
La formulazione degli intenti di quel terzo settore – mirante a «sviluppare
le risorse umane, favorire la comprensione fra le culture e gli scambi fra
le società civili» – parve invero molto generica, mentre per i primi due, e
in particolare per il cesto che definiva gli intenti economico-finanziari, le
indicazioni programmatiche e i percorsi da seguire erano indicati in modo
molto più preciso e in qualche misura cogente. Il primo volet, politico e di
sicurezza, mirava a «definire uno spazio comune di pace e di stabilità», il
secondo prevedeva di «costruire una zona di prosperità condivisa», anzitutto
attraverso la creazione entro il 2010 di una zona di libero scambio3.
In particolare riguardo al «dialogo», la Dichiarazione di Barcellona nel
suo punto terzo riconosceva che «le tradizioni di cultura e di civiltà da una
parte e dall’altra del Mediterraneo» e il loro dialogo, nonché gli scambi, non
solo «umani» (dizione peraltro troppo generica), ma anche quelli scientifici e
tecnologici, «costituiscono una componente essenziale del riavvicinamento e
della comprensione fra i popoli e di miglioramento della reciproca percezione»,
ma non faceva alcun cenno al fatto che quelle culture e civiltà avessero valori
comuni o comunque avessero interagito in una vicenda storica condivisa4.
Nessun particolare riferimento si faceva alla storia, che invece agli storici, e in
generale a tutti gli studiosi del Mediterraneo, sembra costituisca il primo, più
consistente e duraturo, patrimonio comune, e non solo dei popoli rivieraschi.
L’affacciarsi infatti di un territorio sul mare interno è invero una caratteristica
meramente geografica, che ha senza dubbio rilievo per determinati specifici
problemi attuali, ma che costituisce per diversi paesi un dato contingente
cinematografia finlandese, sino a pubblicare il volume Cinema Finlandia (Roma,
Aiace, 1989).
3
I documenti costitutivi del Partenariato sono pubblicati da B. Khader, Le parténariat
euro-méditerranéen après la conférence de Barcelone, Paris, L’Harmattan, 1997. Una
aggiornata bibliografia sul Partenariato e i suoi sviluppi nel volume citato nella
nota successiva.
4
Riprendo in questo passo, in qualche misura letteralmente, le osservazioni
sviluppate nel mio recente volume Un altro Mediterraneo. Una storia comune fra
scontri e integrazioni, Roma, Salerno Editrice, 2008, 169–180.
Tuomo Melasuo, Un finlandese per il Dialogo euro-mediterraneo
151
se si considerava la loro identità in una prospettiva storica più profonda
anche soltanto di decenni o di un secolo o poco più. Si pensi, per esempio, ai
paesi eredi della ex Federazione iugoslava, all’Austria e all’Ungheria, per non
dire della Giordania e del Portogallo, che infatti per convenzione vengono
considerati mediterranei e sono stati tra i firmatari della dichiarazione di
Barcellona.
Il patrimonio storico-culturale «mediterraneo» a parer nostro appartiene
ed è un dato costitutivo essenziale per un insieme di paesi, potremmo dire
per tutti quelli del «mondo mediterraneo», inteso in senso storico e di civiltà.
Questa comunanza di esperienza storica e di eredità di patrimonio di civiltà,
al di là delle certo significative e innegabili specificità di singoli paesi o di
gruppi, riguarda dunque altrettanto, e unitariamente, tutti paesi d’Europa e
del mondo arabo, oltre che la Turchia e Israele. Questa prospettiva, ideale
prima che politica, la indichiamo senza certo ignorare le circostanze e le
vicende storico-politiche che hanno visto entrare nell’Unione Europea prima
i paesi dell’Europa carolingia e più tardi altri, mediterranei per eccellenza
(Grecia, Spagna, Portogallo), mentre ne tenevano assenti alcuni, sia europei
che arabi, coma la Slovenia e la Croazia, la Polonia e la Romania, la Libia e
l’Iraq, i quali per la loro identità storico-culturale non differivano da altri già
presenti. Ciò che a noi studiosi appariva ben chiaro era il fatto che le mete,
auspicate nella Dichiarazione di Barcellona sul piano culturale e spirituale,
di superamento di risentimenti, pregiudizi, persino radicate inimicizie, e
di apertura invece verso comprensione e apprezzamento reciproci, non
potevano, come non possono, essere conseguite se non rifacendosi alla
storia, ripensandola e ‘riscrivendola’. Vi era perciò la necessità di richiamare gli
studiosi, l’intera società civile, i responsabili politici verso la consapevolezza
di un patrimonio storico comune nel mondo mediterraneo e dell’altrettanto
comune conseguente responsabilità di tutti i paesi europei – dall’ Italia,
così vicina anche geograficamente alla riva sud, alla Finlandia, soltanto
geograficamente lontana – di promuovere e gestire il Dialogo. In questo
quadro la convergenza di convincimenti e d’intenti fra Tuomo e me, rafforzava
il nostro personale legame di amicizia e ci conduceva a una ulteriore più
stretta collaborazione.
Per sottolineare questi convincimenti e questa prospettiva, proprio mentre
il processo di Barcellona si avviava con molte speranze e buone volontà – ma
non con la piena necessaria chiarezza di idee, sul piano umano e culturale
– alcuni studiosi, più vicini nello spirito e nell’impegno mediterranei, e fra
questi Tuomo, dopo aver sentito colleghi ed amici, lanciavano l’idea di
costituire una rete di storici del Mediterraneo, quella che è poi divenuta la
152
Salvatore Bono
SIHMED. I promotori della Société degli storici del Mediterraneo nel novembre
1995 non vollero formalizzare subito la Société stessa ma invece attendere
prima l’ampliarsi del consenso intorno alla iniziativa. Una occasione rilevante
per questa verifica venne offerta molto gentilmente nell’ambito della X
riunione ad Aix-en-Provence (4–7 luglio 1996) dell’Association française pour
l’étude du monde arabe et musulman (AFEMAM); Tuomo Melasuo ed io potemmo
presentare intenti e caratteristiche della nascente associazione5. A Tampere,
un anno dopo, l’impegno organizzativo e scientifico di Melasuo convocò un
workshop su New Trends of Mediterranean History, al quale la SIHMED – prima
occasione di sua manifestazione pubblica – prestò la sua collaborazione6.
Questa volontà di considerare il Mediterraneo – sia come campo di
ricerche e di studi, sia come spazio d’azione – una responsabilità comune dei
paesi europei (tanto più se già inseriti nella nascente Unione Europea) trovò
espressione concreta nella elezione di Tuomo Melasuo quale membro del
primo Consiglio direttivo (maggio 2000); accanto a lui, sempre confermato
nelle successive elezioni, vi sono stati e vi sono altri componenti provenienti
anche essi da paesi non rivieraschi (Ungheria, Austria, Serbia)7.
Dopo il primo biennio di avvio del Partenariato euro-mediterraneo, la
stessa Commissione europea ritenne necessario impegnarsi con più vigore
nell’aspetto culturale e in particolare nel Dialogo da rendere direttamente
funzionale allo sviluppo dell’intero Processo di Barcellona. Una concreta
iniziativa partì nell’autunno 1997 dal governo svedese ed un apposito workshop
si svolse infatti a Stoccolma il 23–24 aprile 1998. Fra i progetti presentati in
quella sede ed approvati poi in maggio dal Comitato euro-mediterraneo fu
presente anche HISTMED (Histoire de la Méditerranée), formulato dalla SIHMED.
5
Melasuo, io e Daniel Panzac eravamo presenti come membri del comitato
direttivo provvisorio della SIHMED.
6
Il convegno si svolse l’ 8 agosto 1997, nell’ambito della XXIII conferenza degli
storici nordici (7–12 agosto); gli atti sono apparsi sotto il titolo Individuals,
Ideologies and Society. Tracing the Mosaic of Mediterranean History, a cura di K.
Virtanen, Tampere, Tapri, 2001. La SIHMED venne formalmente costituita con atto
notarile del 31 ottobre 1997; fu allora costituito un consiglio direttivo provvisorio;
la prima assemblea dei soci con le elezioni del consiglio direttivo si tenne a Grasse
il 30 maggio 2000.
7
La vita sociale e le attività della SIHMED sono documentate dalla serie di «Lettre de
liaison», giunte al numero 13 (1997–2006); la serie sarà prossimamente proseguita
a cura della Segreteria generale della Société diretta dal prof. Luigi Mascilli
Migliorini.
153
Si trattava della definizione di un progetto di Storia del Mediterraneo, al
quale solo più tardi sarebbe seguita la effettiva realizzazione dell’opera. A un
decennio di distanza posso far sapere che il collega Melasuo – che sin da
allora godeva di molto credito presso i governi degli stati scandinavi – ebbe
un ruolo essenziale nell’accreditare favorevolmente il progetto stesso8.
Successivamente il progetto HISTMED entrò in un programma più ampio
detto EuroMed Sciences Humaines, promosso e coordinato dalla Maison
Méditerranéene des Sciences de l’Homme di Aix-en-Provence, nelle persone
di Robert Ilbert e Thierry Fabre. Dopo un anno di lavoro, EuroMed Sciences
Humaines – al quale partecipavano anche istituzioni di Germania, Turchia,
Marocco e Tunisia – presentò alla Commissione un Étude de préfiguration
concernente sette progetti fra i quali HISTMED. Per ragioni non del tutto chiarite,
la Commissione Europea non mandò avanti EuroMed Sciences Humaines,
che pur venne più volte esplicitamente ricordato, come nel Plan d’Action
approvato a Valencia nell’aprile 2003 e infine nel documento costitutivo della
Fondazione euro-mediterranea per il dialogo delle culture Anna Lindh (FAL)9.
Dalla istituzione del Partenariato si sono di anno in anno moltiplicati
incontri di lavoro, seminari, convegni, diversi per caratteri e impostazioni,
volti a discutere e valutare realtà e prospettive del Processo di Barcellona,
come è stata chiamata la progressiva attuazione del Partenariato, giudicata
più o meno favorevolmente dopo un decennio10. In queste iniziative Tuomo
Melasuo è stato fra gli studiosi presenti più assiduamente, riscuotendo
8
Il Workshop sul Dialogo, proposto con una fiche presentata il 23 ottobre 1997,
d’intesa fra il governo svedese e quello egiziano, si svolse a Stoccolma il 23–24
aprile 1998.I partecipanti furono invitati a fornire informazioni su «progetti in
corso o redatti» attinenti alla questione (memorandum svedese del 19 febbraio
1998). Il progetto HISTMED fu presentato congiuntamente dai governi italiano e
algerino (fra l’altro il vicepresidente della SIHMED era lo storico algerino Moulay
Belhamissi). Il Programma EuroMed Sciences Humaines fu approvato dal Comitato
euromediterraneo nel maggio 1998 e confermato dai ministri degli Esteri a
Palermo nel giugno seguente.
9
L’ Etude de préfiguration, concernente sette programmi (HISTMED al primo posto)
venne presentato alla Commissione (Gg IB) nell’aprile 1999; nell’agosto 2000
sembrava avesse superato la revisione critica operata nel settore dalla Commissione
europea (vd. nota del 2 agosto della DG Relazioni esterne alla Rappresentanza
italiana presso l’Unione) ma sopravvenne un ulteriore stallo.
10
Sulle valutazioni dei risultati conseguiti dal Partenariato, in particolare nella
politica del Dialogo, attraverso la FAL, si può vedere Bono, Un altro Mediterraneo,
cit., pp. 166–183 (Fra Partenariato e Politica di vicinato).
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Salvatore Bono
simpatia e apprezzamento crescenti; ci siamo incontrati così molte volte, ad
Aix en-Provence, a Barcellona, a L’Aja, altrove, nonché nei Forum civili euromediterranei di Napoli (1997) e di Marsiglia (2000).
L’interesse per un altro paese mediterraneo, la Libia – a me caro poiché
vi sono nato e in esso era radicato dal XIX secolo il ramo materno, maltese e
siciliano, della mia famiglia – mi ha fatto incontrare Melasuo anche nel quadro
del Primo WOCMES (World Congress for Middle Eastern Studies) tenuto presso
l’Università di Mainz, dove uno dei numerosi workshop riguardò Modern and
Contemporary Libya: Sources and Historiographies11; successivamente Tuomo
partecipò attivamente al convegno internazionale – con studiosi di quindici
diversi paesi – su “La Libia nella storia del Mediterraneo”; la sua relazione
riguardò la Libia e il partenariato euromediterraneo12.
Nell’ambito della partecipazione italiana alla FAL – della quale torneremo
a dire più avanti – una riflessione sul progetto HISTMED fu riattivata, tramite la
diretta sponsorizzazione del progetto da parte del Ministero degli Affari Esteri,
grazie soprattutto al personale convincimento della validità dell’iniziativa da
parte dell’ ambasciatore Riccardo Sessa, Direttore generale per il Mediterraneo
e il Medio Oriente (ora ambasciatore d’Italia a Pechino), coadiuvato dal
consigliere Elio d’Auria (ora ambasciatore in Arabia saudita). Nel ristretto
gruppo di studiosi, riunitisi a Roma nell’ottobre 2005 per delineare un primo
tracciato del percorso da seguire, vi fu naturalmente Tuomo Melasuo, che
portava la sua esperienza e la sua rete personale di contatti in campo politicoculturale nel quadro mediterraneo contemporaneo. Seguì in dicembre a
Roma una presentazione alla stampa e al pubblico del progetto HistMed. Le
successive difficoltà del bilancio statale italiano e i drastici tagli ai capitoli di
spesa dei diversi ministeri, così quello degli Affari Esteri, fermarono il corso
del progetto nelle sue forme organizzative e nelle espressioni pubbliche
più impegnative. Gli studiosi però continuarono la loro riflessione in diverse
occasioni di confronto e di dibattito13.
11
Il workshop, svoltosi il 12 settembre 2003, venne organizzato nel quadro di un
programma italo-libico di ricerca storica, concordato fra i governi dei due paesi
nell’ambito di una intesa siglata nel giugno 1998 e poi svoltosi fra il 2000 e il
2005. Gli atti del workshop sono stati editi a cura dell’IsIAO e del Libyan Studies
Centre, responsabili del programma: Modern and Contemporary Libya: Sources and
Historiographies, a cura di A. Baldinetti, Roma, ISIAO, 2003.
12
Il convegno si svolse a Roma, nella sede dell’Isiao dal 10 al 12 maggio 2003, gli
atti del convegno sono apparsi come numero speciale, a cura di S. Bono e H. Sury,
della rivista «Africa», LXIII, 2008, no. 2.
13
Chi scrive – responsabile scientifico del progetto HistMed – nel recente volume
155
L’auspicato sviluppo di una rinnovata storiografia mediterranea dovrà
tener conto con la maggior apertura e simpatia possibile di come ogni
diverso attore del processo storico abbia vissuto ed abbia conservato
memoria di determinate vicende storiche. Nell’affrontare fenomeni, periodi
ed episodi storici occasione di confronto e di scontro fra due o più parti, si
impiegheranno ancor più cautela e sforzo di comprensione. Nella varietà e
complessità della storia del Mediterraneo tutto ciò ricorre con accentuata
frequenza. Nell’impegno di una ricostruzione storica volta a promuovere
rapporti pacifici di collaborazione, la narrazione equilibrerà opportunamente
vicende e aspetti di contrasto e di ostilità con modi e tempi invece di
convivenza, di contatti, di scambi. All’interno inoltre di uno stesso fronte,
per così dire – l’europeo-cristiano e quello islamico sono i due solitamente
richiamati – si potranno mostrare varietà di posizioni e di atteggiamenti,
persino connivenze e complicità fra una parte e l’altra. Apparirà dunque
sempre più discutibile la visione manichea di mondi compatti e irriducibili
nell’ostilità e nel conflitto.
Torniamo alla FAL e ai suoi primi difficili anni di vita14. Nel Comitato
consultivo, che affiancava il direttore generale nella struttura della nuova
istituzione, così come delineata dallo Statuto, alcuni specialisti del mondo
mediterraneo si ritrovarono insieme nel Comitato consultivo; fra di loro
Melasuo e Bono15. Il Comitato in alcune rapide riunioni fu invitato a dare
valutazioni relative a singole iniziative e il previsto obbligatorio parere sul
bilancio annuale della FAL; non gli fu invece offerta la possibilità di suggerire
al direttore prospettive e orientamenti di azione a lungo termine, sulla base
di una visione mediterranea discussa e definita attraverso singoli apporti e
un dibattito collegiale.
Alcuni membri del Comitato, fra i quali chi scrive, assunsero ben presto
consapevolezza del rischio che la FAL, priva di una visione e di una strategia
Un altro Mediterraneo, cit. ha sintetizzato alcuni orientamenti in merito. Si veda in
particolare il par. 3 (Per una nuova storia) del cap. VII, pp. 253–272.
14
La Fondazione, nata da una delibera del Comitato euromediterraneo, in data 26
ottobre 2004, è stata affidata per la gestione alla Svezia in tandem con l’Egitto; la
sede è stata fissata ad Alessandria presso la Biblioteca Alexandrina.
15
Il Comitato consultivo era composto da 12 membri, sei provenienti da paesi
membri dell’Unione Europea, sei da Paesi partners mediterranei (PPM). Fra gli altri
componenti del Comitato vi era Malek Chebel, già membro del Groupe des Sages
istituito dalla Commissione europea nel dicembre 2002; i Saggi presentarono un
rapporto conclusivo nel quale suggerirono la creazione di una Fondazione ad hoc
per il dialogo.
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d’insieme, operasse attraverso singole iniziative pur in sé apprezzabili ma
senza raggiungere risultati efficaci e rilevanti; per tutto ciò persero fiducia
ed entusiasmo. Altri membri del Comitato, come Melasuo, pur altrettanto
consapevoli dei problemi e dei rischi in atto, proseguirono sino all’ultimo
la loro partecipazione alle riunioni del Comitato, cercando con impegno di
operare per il meglio; ne diamo atto con apprezzamento. Ad un certo punto,
nei primi mesi del 2007, le difficoltà della FAL e le crescenti riserve sui risultati
effettivi hanno condotto alle dimissioni del direttore Traugott Schoefthaler.
Nella delicata fase successiva, il nuovo direttore, ambasciatore Lucio
Guerrato ha risolto molti problemi pendenti e ha studiato rilevanti modifiche
alla struttura della FAL in vista di un suo rilancio. Secondo il nuovo statuto al
vertice si colloca un presidente prescelto dal Comitato euromediterraneo della
Unione Europea; nel marzo 2008 è stato designato André Azoulay, consigliere
dei sovrani del Marocco Hasan II e Mohammed VI, e alto esponente della
Fondazione delle Tre Culture di Siviglia nonché della Alleanza delle Civiltà;
quale nuovo direttore con la stessa procedura è stato nominato il dott. Andreu
Claret, spagnolo, già direttore con grande successo dell’Instituto Europeo
del Mediterraneo (IEMED), con sede a Barcellona; queste due scelte lasciano
bene sperare in un rilancio della Fondazione e del suo altissimo compito16.
Nel Consiglio scientifico, composto da 18 membri, secondo le indicazioni del
rinnovato statuto della Fondazione, è di nuovo presente Tuomo Melasuo.
Con queste annotazioni, a volte di semplice cronaca, e con le brevi riflessioni
su Mediterraneo, storia, dialogo, sono stato lieto di attestare la mia amicizia e
stima per Tuomo. Nel concludere vorrei ora aggiungere che la sua presenza
fra i fondatori e gli animatori della SIHMED e poi del progetto HISTMED ha avuto
ai miei occhi un forte significato: Tuomo dall’estremo nord d’Europa ed io,
nato sulle rive libiche, ci siamo incontrati nello studio del Mediterraneo e nella
promozione del dialogo fra popoli e civiltà di un vasto mondo che ha come
centro ideale il mare Mediterraneo ma si estende molto ampiamente sino
alla misura, come ci ha insegnato Braudel, del Mediterraneo della storia; un
passo promettente verso la realizzazione di questo più grande Mediterraneo
sarà forse intrapreso dalla annunciata Unione Mediterranea.
16
Il nuovo direttore, dott. Andreu Claret, per molti anni attivo come giornalista, ha
diretta conoscenza della realtà mediterranea in tutti i suoi aspetti ed una solida
esperienza di manager culturale e di comunicatore.
Réflexions sur le processus de Barcelone
1995–2008
Paul Balta
Né à Alexandrie, je précise d’emblée que le Méditerranéen que je suis par mes
racines dédie ce texte à Tuomo Melasuo pour le remercier et le féliciter des
initiatives qu’il a prises à l’Université de Tampere parce qu’elles ont notamment
favorisé un dialogue inédit et fructueux entre la Baltique et la Méditerranée.
L’acte fondateur de la Méditerranée du XXIè siècle
À mes yeux, la Déclaration de Barcelone est l’acte fondateur de la Méditerranée
du XXIè siècle, comme je l’avais dit au Forum culture que j’avais contribué à
préparer dans le cadre du premier Forum Civil Euromed organisé à Barcelone
du 29 novembre au 1er décembre 1995 par l’Institut Catalan de la Méditerranée,
devenu l’IEMED, Institut Européen de la Méditerranée.
La Déclaration a en effet proposé un « partenariat » afin de créer en
Méditerranée « une zone de paix, de stabilité, de sécurité – – et de prospérité
partagée ». C’est une importante innovation ! La Déclaration comporte
trois volets : 1) Partenariat politique et de sécurité : définir un espace de paix
et de stabilité ; 2) Partenariat économique et financier : construire une zone
de prospérité partagée ; 3) Partenariat dans les domaines social, culturel et
humain : développer les ressources humaines, favoriser la compréhension entre
les cultures et les échanges entre les sociétés civiles. Elle a été adoptée par les
15 de l’Union européenne1 et les 12 PPM, Pays partenaires méditerranéens2
réunis à Barcelone les 27 et 28 novembre 1995.
1
Allemagne, Autriche, Belgique, Danemark, Espagne, Finlande, France, Grèce,
Irlande, Italie, Luxembourg, Pays-Bas, Portugal, Royaume-Uni, Suède. En 2004 :
Chypre et Malte (ex-PPM), Estonie, Hongrie, Lettonie, Lituanie, Pologne, République
tchèque, Slovaquie, Slovénie. En 2007 : Bulgarie, Roumanie.
2
Algérie, Chypre, Égypte, Israël, Jordanie, Liban, Malte, Maroc, Autorité
palestinienne, Syrie, Tunisie, Turquie. Libye et Mauritanie ont le statut
d’observateurs. Avant la signature de la Déclaration, les PPM étaient appelés PTM,
Pays tiers méditerranéens.
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Paul Balta
Avant d’analyser les principaux aspects du PEM, il me paraît indispensable
d’expliquer les innovations du Volet 3 par rapport à sa première version.
En effet, le Rapport de synthèse du 10 avril 1995, élaboré par Bruxelles pour
servir de base à la future Déclaration de Barcelone, occultait pratiquement la
culture. Intitulé simplement, « Partenariat dans le domaine social et humain »,
il se préoccupait en priorité des migrations, du trafic des stupéfiants, du
terrorisme, de la criminalité internationale avant de consacrer un petit
paragraphe d’une dizaine de lignes à « Culture et médias ». Quant aux religions,
composantes importantes des civilisations et des sociétés méditerranéennes,
elles n’étaient même pas mentionnées ! Roland Dubertrand, alors directeur
du CAP, Centre d’analyse et de prospective du ministère français des Affaires
étrangères, avait organisé une journée de travail, le 23 mai 1995, avec cinq
spécialistes de la Méditerranée3 et des diplomates de la Commission de
Bruxelles, responsables du projet.
Nombre de critiques et de suggestions avaient été formulées. Pour ma
part, j’avais fait observer qu’il n’y avait pas un paragraphe ou même une ligne
pour rappeler que, depuis 10 000 ans et malgré les guerres, le flambeau de
la civilisation n’avait cessé de circuler d’une rive à l’autre. En outre, c’est la
Méditerranée qui a inventé la notion de société civile, dès l’Antiquité, même
si elle ne portait pas ce nom avant l’expression latine societa civilis. Elle
concernait la façon dont la société s’organisait face à l’État et à son chef. Ainsi,
les communautés avaient-elles leurs règles de solidarité s’ajoutant à celles
liant les membres de la famille, du clan et de la tribu et aussi des réseaux de
villes, de couvents, de confréries, de marchands.
Les diplomates présents ont tenu compte des critiques et des suggestions
comme le prouve l’intitulé final du Volet 3 et son contenu, cités plus haut.
Il souligne aussi la « contribution essentielle » qu’elle peut apporter « dans le
processus de développement du PEM ». Les actes du premier Forum civil euroméditerranéen en sont une excellente illustration4.
La Déclaration de Barcelone avait suscité d’immenses espoirs, surtout sur
les rives Sud et Est, et amorcé de nombreuses initiatives souvent financées
par l’Union Européenne. Les lourdeurs bureaucratiques de la Commission de
Bruxelles, l’élaboration de l’Euro et sa mise en place définitive le 1er janvier
2002, puis la préparation de l’élargissement à 25 et sa réalisation en 2004,
3
Michel Chatelus, Thierry Fabre, Xavier Gizard, Mohamed Sid Ahmed et moimême.
4
Forum civil euromed 1995. Les actes ont été traduits en six langues : anglais, arabe,
catalan, espagnol, français, italien.
159
ont malheureusement contribué à reléguer la Méditerranée et le Partenariat
euro-méditerranéen au second plan.
Certains PPM ont aussi leur part de responsabilité. Exemple: Barcelone 1
avait décidé que les Conférences des ministres des Affaires étrangères du
PEM auraient lieu tous les deux ans, alternativement au Nord et au Sud. Rabat
s’étant désisté en faveur de Tunis, Barcelone 2 devait s’y tenir en 1997, mais la
Syrie avait alors opposé son veto en refusant que les Arabes s’assoient à côté
des Israéliens sur une terre arabe. Elle s’est donc tenue à Malte.
Il en fut de même pour le Forum Civil Euro-med qui suit ou précède la
conférence ministérielle. On peut d’autant plus le regretter que, tant chez
les Israéliens que chez les Palestiniens, des ONG et des associations luttent
courageusement pour le dialogue et la paix. Le résultat c’est que le PEM
n’est guère connu des opinions publiques des PPM. Un des objectifs de
Barcelone 10 aurait dû être d’appliquer ce principe de l’alternance ; ce ne
fut pas le cas. Je souligne quand même que le Partenariat est la seule
instance méditerranéenne qui réunit autour d’une même table Israéliens et
Palestiniens, même s’il arrive aux uns ou aux autres de la bouder. Retards et
déceptions ne doivent cependant pas masquer les acquis.
Pour le Volet 1, « Politique et sécurité », le PEM, n’a certes pas ramené la paix
dans le bassin, mais, alors que la plupart des PPM ont des régimes autoritaires,
voire dictatoriaux, on assiste à une timide démocratisation, à un rôle croissant
des femmes et de la société civile dans plusieurs pays, à une coopération
entre le Nord et le Sud dans la lutte contre le terrorisme et Al Qaida.
Innovation importante : l’Assemblée parlementaire euro-méditerranéenne,
l’APEM, qui a tenu sa session inaugurale le 22 mars 2004 à Athènes. Elle
est composée de 240 membres : d’une part, 120 Européens dont 75
parlementaires nationaux et 45 du Parlement européen, d’autre part, 120
des PPM. L’APEM, assure notamment le suivi des accords d’association dans
le cadre du Partenariat, favorise le dialogue et une meilleure connaissance
réciproque.
Pour le Volet 2, « Économique et financier », on est très loin de l’objectif
fixé : la prospérité partagée. L’apport de l’UE devait être très important. Le
programme MEDA, principal instrument de coopération financière, avait pour
objectif de faciliter la mise à niveau des économies des PPM et accélérer la
privatisation des entreprises nationalisées, souvent déficitaires. Il a consacré
une enveloppe de 3,4 millions d’euros pour la période 1995–1999 et de 5,3
millions pour 2000–2006. Les PPM avaient cependant fait observer, en 1996,
que la somme attribuée aux Pays d’Europe centrale et orientale était trois fois
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Paul Balta
plus importante par habitant. À quoi Bruxelles avait rétorqué qu’il convenait
d’ajouter les prêts de la BEI, la Banque européenne d’investissement, qui
a engagé 4,8 M d’euro pour 1995–1999 et 6,4 millions pour 2000–2007.
Pourtant un constat s’impose : les fonds MEDA n’ont été déboursés qu’à
hauteur de 26% ! Une formule lapidaire de Jean-Yves Moisseron, alors
directeur de l’IRD, l’Institut Recherche et Développement (ex-ORSTOM), au
Caire, résume la situation « Les fonds MEDA I : 1/4 de réalité, 3/4 de virtualité ».
C’est la conséquence d’une réglementation trop complexe et des lourdeurs
de la bureaucratie de la Commission de Bruxelles. La zone de libre-échange
demeure un objectif, mais ne semble ni réalisable, ni souhaitable pour
certains, à l’horizon 2010.
Pour le Volet 3, « Social, culturel et humain », les résultats sont complexes.
Alors qu’elle est essentielle, la culture a été longtemps le « parent pauvre »5.
En outre, à chacun des Forums Civils Euromed, les participants demandaient
que les représentants de la société civile (associations, ONG, universités,
etc.) soient considérés comme des interlocuteurs de la Commission
européenne. Finalement, il a fallu attendre la Conférence ministérielle
de 2005, à Luxembourg, pour que la Plateforme Non-gouvernementale
Euromed, formée de nombreux réseaux méditerranéens du Nord et du Sud,
devienne l’interlocuteur qui sera consulté et informé régulièrement. Grâce
à lui, le premier Forum civil du Sud s’est tenu au Maroc, à Marrakech, du 4
au 7 novembre 2006. Le prochain est prévu à Marseille du 31 octobre au 2
novembre 2008, alors que la France présidera l’Union européenne.
Plusieurs programmes importants ont été lancés dans la cadre du
Volet 3 : Euromed Héritage, Euromed Audiovisuel, Euromed Jeunesse et
Eumedis qui signifie « Développer la société de l’information dans la région
méditerranéenne ». Toutefois, ils ont un caractère trop institutionnel. Le
PEM a également favorisé la réalisation de nombre de projets de la société
civile. Citons notamment le CICM, le Conservatoire international des
cuisines méditerranéennes, créé à Marseille en 1998. Son riche site6, mérite
d’être consulté car il permet de comprendre combien il est utile, comme je
l’explique dans un de mes livres7. N’oublions pas, en effet, que très pauvre
à l’origine, la Méditerranée est devenue, dès l’Antiquité le principal berceau
de la gastronomie et de l’art de vivre. La mondialisation a porté atteinte à ce
patrimoine. Le CICM contribue à le sauvegarder.
5
Balta 2000.
http://cuisinesmed.lafriche.org.
7
Balta 2004.
6
161
Dernière initiative : la création de la Fondation Euro-Méditerranéenne Anna
Lindh pour le Dialogue entre les Cultures, la FAL, qui comble un vide, en particulier
en direction des jeunes. Son siège a été inauguré en 2005 à Alexandrie, ce
dont on ne peut que se féliciter. Sans doublonner avec les programmes que
j’ai cités, elle a notamment pour objectif de définir, développer et promouvoir
des zones de convergence culturelle entre les jeunes de la Méditerranée tout
en combattant les stéréotypes.
Barcelone 10 : bilan et perspectives
Le Sommet du dixième anniversaire du PEM s’est tenu à Barcelone, les 27
et 28 novembre 2005, dans un contexte régional et international difficile :
processus de paix israélo-palestinien bloqué, montée de l’islamisme, attentats
terroristes, forte immigration clandestine en Europe, retombées négatives de
l’intervention américaine en Irak depuis 2003. Ses résultats sont mitigés. Pour
les uns c’est un échec, pour d’autres, un demi succès. Qu’en est-il ?
Ce sommet était co-organisé par l’Espagne, pays hôte, et la GrandeBretagne, présidente en exercice de l’UE, dont 22 chefs d’État ou de
gouvernement sur 25 étaient présents. En revanche, les chefs d’État turc et
arabes étaient absents, à l’exception du Palestinien Abou Mazen. Ils ont ainsi
boudé la rencontre pour manifester leur déception quant aux résultats du
PEM. Ils se sont fait représenter par leurs Premiers ministres ou leurs ministres
des Affaires étrangères. Sur le fond, les États et la société civile espéraient une
relance spectaculaire pour donner plus d’efficacité et une meilleure visibilité
au PEM. Cela n’a pas été le cas. Les tensions entre Israéliens et Arabes ont
bloqué l’adoption d’une déclaration commune. C’est le discours du président
Tony Blair qui a fait la synthèse des travaux et des décisions prises.
Les participants ont réaffirmé fortement les principes et les objectifs de
la Déclaration de Barcelone. Toutefois, l’élargissement de l’UE de 15 à 25
a rendu la situation plus complexe à gérer. À son initiative, le Sommet a
entériné la Politique européenne de voisinage, PEV, conçue prioritairement
pour les pays de l’Est et fondée sur la coopération bilatérale, alors que le
PEM l’est sur la coopération multilatérale. En 2007, l’Instrument européen
de Partenariat et de Voisinage a remplacé les fonds MEDA. Le sommet a
adopté un plan d’action prioritaire et sécuritaire : « Code de conduite euroméditerranéen de lutte contre le terrorisme » et un Volet 4, « Justice, sécurité et
migrations », qui se veut novateur sur les flux migratoires. De même, il a défini
un programme quinquennal ambitieux pour les trois Volets. Néanmoins, on
craignait qu’en raison des ambiguïtés de ce Sommet, le PEM soit en péril. La
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Paul Balta
réalisation de l’ensemble euro-méditerranéen exigera un renforcement de
l’UE et sans doute beaucoup de temps. La Déclaration de Barcelone demeure
certes l’acte fondateur de la Méditerranée du XXIè siècle, mais pour le réaliser
concrètement il faut qu’existent les volontés politiques de la respecter et de
se donner les moyens de la mettre en œuvre.
C’est dans ce contexte que le président Nicolas Sarkozy a lancé, dans un
discours prononcé à Toulon le 17 février 2007, l’idée d’Union méditerranéenne
puis l’a confirmée à Tanger le 20 octobre. Elle est devenue depuis l’UPM,
l’Union pour la Méditerranée. En avril 2008, l’ambassadeur Alain Le Roy,
principal responsable du projet a apporté les précisions suivantes concernant
le PEM et l’UPM :
« Nous allons prendre « Barcelone » pour le transformer puis le
développer en changeant les méthodes de gouvernance. Tout le
monde disait que « Barcelone » était un partenariat déséquilibré. Les
pays du Sud avaient le sentiment que l’Europe est trop forte avec 27
pays membres qui imposaient ses conditions. Cette transformation va
se faire avec une coprésidence paritaire, de nouvelles méthodes de
gouvernance, la création d’un secrétariat indépendant des instances
européennes, avec deux codirecteurs, un pour le Nord et un autre pour
le Sud. »
Il a précisé aussi que lors du sommet des chefs d’État le 13 juillet, à Paris, une
déclaration pérennisant l’Union pour la Méditerranée doit être signée.
Dans mon exposé, j’ai exprimé des voeux et des critiques, mais le
« méditerranéiste » que je suis par vocation reste malgré tout optimiste.
« Méditerranéiste », est un néologisme que j’ai forgé, à partir du catalan et
de l’espagnol, pour désigner les spécialistes de la Méditerranée, et aussi les
militants, en espérant qu’il figurera enfin dans les dictionnaires français, à
l’instar d’africaniste et d’américaniste.
En conclusion, je voudrais formuler, une fois de plus, un voeu qui m’est cher :
qu’Ulysse et Sindbad, les deux grands marins qui parlent à nos imaginaires
apprennent enfin à naviguer ensemble afin que mare nostrum devienne un
jour mater nostra8. Ce voeu a commencé à être exaucé grâce au Processus de
Barcelone qui les a réunis sur le même bateau. Mais il reste encore beaucoup
à faire pour qu’ils naviguent vraiment ensemble afin que la Méditerranée
devienne un lac de paix et de prospérité partagée. Face à la mondialisation et
à la théorie du « choc des civilisations » de Samuel Huntington, qui est aussi
8
Balta 1992.
163
celle de Ben Laden, il importe d’opposer et de faire prévaloir la philosophie
du dialogue des civilisations et des cultures, qui a généralement prévalu
en Méditerranée. Il faut donc qu’elle devienne le berceau de l’avenir9 d’une
Méditerranée réconciliée avec elle-même et à nouveau novatrice.
Références
Balta, Paul (sous la direction de) (1992) : La Méditerranée réinventée. Réalités et
espoirs de la coopération. Paris : La Découverte, Fondation René Seydoux pour
le monde méditerranéen, Paris.
Balta, Paul (2000) : Méditerranée, défis et enjeux. Paris : L’Harmattan.
Balta, Paul (2004) : Boire et manger en Méditerranée. Arles : Actes Sud, Collection
L’Orient gourmand.
Balta, Paul & Claudine Rulleau (2006) : La Méditerranée, berceau de l’avenir.
Toulouse : Les Essentiels Milan.
Forum Civil Euromed 1996 (1996) : Vers un nouveau scénario de partenariat euroméditerranéen. Barcelone : Institut Català de la Mediterrània.
9
Balta & Rulleau 2006.
Les deux rives de la Méditerranée :
toujours les mêmes asymétries
Ahmed Driss
Tout d’abord, qu’entendons nous par « asymétrie »? Aucun de nous n’ignore
que le terme désigne la différence, contrairement à la symétrie qui signifie
la parfaite concordance, « l’harmonie résultant de la disposition régulière,
équilibrée des éléments d’un même ensemble ».
Appliquer ce terme à la situation des deux rives de la Méditerranée,
signifie que celle-ci ne serait pas un ensemble harmonieux, qu’il n’y a aucune
concordance entre ses riverains et que ses éléments constitutifs ne peuvent
avoir de disposition équilibrée. Les deux rives sont donc asymétriques,
différents, l’ensemble est souvent qualifié d’hétérogène.
Plusieurs aspects montrent cette asymétrie dans son sens le plus large et
j’essayerai dans cette introduction, et avant d’entamer l’aspect institutionnel,
d’en faire l’état et de rappeler quelques propositions tendant à atténuer leur
gravité.
L’aspect le plus important reste sans doute l’aspect économique. Plusieurs
auteurs ont déjà montré que durant les trois décennies qui viennent de
s’écouler, l’écart entre les deux rives de la Méditerranée n’a cessé de s’aggraver,
à la fois quant au poids de chacune des deux rives par rapport à l’économie
internationale que du poids de l’une par rapport à l’autre. Cette asymétrie ne
peut rester sans conséquences fâcheuses sur l’équilibre de la région et de sa
sécurité. Le nombre des « candidats tentés par une immigration malheureuse »
vers les pays du Nord de la Méditerranée ne cesse d’augmenter, immigration
qui est considérer comme une source majeure d’insécurité en Europe,
d’autant plus que le thème est en train de provoquer des remous sinon des
bouleversements politiques importants avec la montée de l’extrême droite et
l’accroissement de son électorat. La solution, selon un bon nombre d’experts,
serait de créer de l’emploi sur la rive Sud; autrement dit, en y investissant et
en y soutenant le développement. Il serait opportun à cet égard de travailler
sur les moyens qui peuvent convaincre les décideurs à opter pour cette
solution plutôt que de se renfermer derrière un mur qu’on croit étanche mais
qui pourrait souffrir d’infiltrations.
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Ahmed Driss
Un autre aspect, qui n’est pas moins important, et qui est étroitement
lié au premier, c’est l’aspect social et culturel. L’analphabétisme, dont
souffre la société Sud méditerranéenne, fait des populations de cette rive,
des populations très vulnérables, à la fois très ambivalentes, facilement
influençables, donc très instables et imprévisibles ainsi que très partagées
entre un discours traditionaliste et un discours moderniste, avec parfois une
nette sensibilité pour le premier. Il serait bénéfique dans ce cadre de se pencher
sur ces discours traditionalistes et de voir jusqu’à quel point contribuent-ils à
ancrer l’hétérogénéité entre les deux rives de la Méditerranée.
Un troisième aspect, c’est celui qui se rattache au cadre politico-juridique;
à cet égard et depuis que le terme gouvernance a fait son apparition dans
les rapports et les analyses, les pays de la rive Sud de la Méditerranée se sont
distingués par leur manière d’appliquer ce processus et qui est loin d’être
la bonne, absence de transparence dans la gestion des affaires publiques,
absence de responsabilité, dépendance du pouvoir judiciaire, médias à la
solde du pouvoir ou marginalisés, absence de démocratie et de la primauté
du droit, les textes les plus progressistes ne font pourtant pas défaut, mais
qui restent souvent sans application.
Cette situation ne peut avoir que des effets pervers et elle ne peut créer
que du malaise chez les populations des pays concernés. Ceci n’est pas sans
danger, bien que pour certains, ce malaise ne concerne que quelques esprits
éclairés et que chez la masse c’est généralement le règne de l’indifférence.
L’absence d’espaces libres d’expression, l’absence de soupapes de sécurité
que peuvent former les ONG et toutes les organisations de la société civile,
l’absence de structures qui soient à l’écoute de ces populations ne peut
que générer des situations explosives susceptibles de favoriser l’instabilité
de toute la région. D’où l’urgence de se pencher sur la question de savoir
comment favoriser et renforcer l’action et le rôle de cette société civile dans
les pays de la rive Sud de la Méditerranée, à la fois en tant qu’élément de
stabilité interne en agissant comme catalyseur ou comme « canalisateur » et
aussi en tant qu’élément d’homogénéisation et de concordance dans toute
la région méditerranéenne. L’absence de pratique démocratique au niveau
de la gestion de la chose publique pourrait être partiellement compensée
par l’action d’une société civile qui disposerait des moyens nécessaires à son
émancipation.
Un autre aspect qui mérite d’être évoqué, celui qui se rattache à
l’environnement de paix et de stabilité dans lequel devrait vivre tous les
riverains de la Méditerranée; un environnement qui est malheureusement
Les deux rives de la Méditerranée
167
loin d’être assuré et il se trouve que c’est la rive Sud qui est inéluctablement
un espace de conflit. Le conflit au Moyen-Orient, bien qu’il ne soit pas le seul
conflit dans la région, reste la plus grande source de violence, mais aussi de
discorde, à la fois au niveau des pays de la rive Sud qu’au niveau de tous
les riverains partenaires. La définition de la nature des violences reste parmi
les points les plus controversée, violence justifiée pour les uns, injustifiée et
condamnable pour les autres. D’où la nécessité de travailler sur la recherche
d’un terrain d’entente afin de redonner la chance à un véritable dialogue; car
il est toujours bénéfique d’approfondir la recherche de part et d’autre, sur
les perceptions relatives à certaines définitions susceptibles de soulever des
controverses.
Dans un souci de changer cette situation qui prévaut en Méditerranée,
les riverains ont décidé de s’inscrire dans un processus ambitieux afin de
faire de cette mer un bassin « de dialogue, d’échanges et de coopération qui
garantissent la paix, la stabilité et une prospérité partagée » tel que cela a été
traduit dans les termes de la Déclaration de Barcelone, adoptée en novembre
1995.
Toutefois, après plus d’une décennie de l’adoption de la Déclaration qui
donna naissance à ce processus global, le Partenariat euro-méditerranéen
n’a pas pu atteindre tous ses objectifs, souffrant d’un certain nombre de
problèmes, dont une forme d’asymétrie qui n’a pas été évoqué plus haut;
une asymétrie institutionnelle qui touche surtout le Sud, incapable d’assurer
son intégration.
Un Sud désintégré
Aucun doute que face aux pays du sud de la Méditerranée, s’est érigée
une Europe fortement unie et institutionnalisée, issue d’un processus
d’intégration commencé il y’a presque une cinquantaine d’année et qui n’est
pas encore achevé. L’Europe, en effet, connaîtra encore plus d’institution qui
la rendra encore plus forte et unie.
Les pays de la rive sud n’ont pas pu, quant à eux et malgré plusieurs
tentatives, achever les processus d’intégration qu’ils ont essayé de mettre
en place. Toutes les expériences d’intégration ou même de coopération
régionale ou sous-régionale ont connues plus ou moins l’échec.
Au niveau sous-régional l’expérience qui à souffert le plus de l’échec reste
assurément l’expérience maghrébine, bien que l’idée d’un Maghreb uni
est une idée dont les origines remontent aux toutes premières années de
l’indépendance des trois pays du Maghreb central, puisque c’est en 1957
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Ahmed Driss
que les représentants des formations politiques dominantes à cette époque
dans la région, ont proclamé leur intention de construire un Grand Maghreb
uni, par la mise en œuvre dans le cadre d’une approche globale, d’un grand
projet de coopération inter-maghrébine.
Le grand projet n’a en fait jamais abouti. Entre le début des années
soixante et jusqu’à 1989, date de la création de l’Union Maghreb Arabe,
l’UMA, les tentatives n’ont pas manqué, la plus sérieuse c’est celle de 1964
lorsque les dirigeants des pays du Maghreb ont décidé de commencer par
une coopération économique et ont créé le Comité permanent Consultatif
du Maghreb, expérience qui n’a pas pu résister après la défection de la Libye
trop préoccupée à cette époque par ses projets d’unité arabe.
La politique des axes qui a commencé juste après cette expérience, une
série de propositions et de traités d’union bipartite ou parfois tri-partite1,
n’a fait que confirmer les désaccords, les malentendus et les conflits entre
les voisins maghrébins et n’a jamais constitué une base sérieuse pour la
construction d’une union plus globale.
Décidant de mettre entre parenthèses les problèmes qui les séparent, les
chefs d’Etat maghrébins créent en 1989 l’UMA, une structure qui couvre la
totalité du Maghreb, avec des mécanismes et des institutions communes très
ambitieuses pour une démarche d’intégration.
Presque douze ans après, on en est toujours au point mort, la vitesse
n’a jamais été enclenchée. Les projets et les recommandations, présentés
les premières années, sont restés sans suite, et depuis décembre 1995, les
instances de l’union ne fonctionnent plus, ses institutions sont gelées à la
demande du Maroc mécontent de l’attitude algérienne sur le Sahara.
Le problème le plus crucial que les fondateurs de l’UMA ont voulu mettre à
l’écart continu à envenimer les relations inter-maghrébines. Aucun Conseil de
la Présidence ne s’est réuni depuis le Sommet de Tunis de 1994, les Sommets
qui ont été prévu par la suite ont tous été « reportés ».
Sachant, d’après les termes du Traité de Marrakech, que le Conseil de la
Présidence est le seul organe décisionnel dans le cadre de l’UMA, sachant aussi
que les décisions de ce Conseil ne peuvent être adoptées qu’à l’unanimité, les
1
La proposition algérienne d’union avec la Tunisie, en 1973; la proposition
libyenne d’union avec le même pays, en 1974; l’accord de Hassi-Messaoud entre
l’Algérie et la Libye, en 1975; le traité de fraternité et de concorde de 1983 entre la
Tunisie, l’Algérie et rejoint par la Mauritanie; l’Union Arabo-Africaine de 1984 entre
le Maroc et la Libye.
169
défections répétées d’un ou plusieurs Chefs d’Etat ou le report des Sommets
prévus, ne peuvent avoir que des répercussions graves et négatives sur le
fonctionnement de toutes les instances de l’Union ainsi que sur l’Union ellemême.
L’UMA a souffert dés sa création d’un handicap de base, celui de vouloir
faire de cette structure, une « Organisation internationale » sans objectifs
propres, dotée d’un Secrétariat Général qui n’intervient que dans la gestion
administrative et d’institutions excessivement politisées, dont on n’a pas
pris en considération lors de leur mise en place, les différences des régimes
politiques, trop peu compatible pour former un ensemble homogène,
ni même les différences des politiques économiques, sociales et aussi
sécuritaires, caractérisées par l’absence d’une vision communautaire
commune.
Au niveau régional, l’expérience des pays arabes reste aussi très décevante.
Ceux-ci ayant plus ou moins définitivement écarté les projets d’unification
globale à caractère politique, ont opté pour des projets de coopération
économique et ils ont visé trop grand puisque dés 1964 ils ont créé le Conseil
de l’unité économique arabe et le marché commun arabe. L’objectif était la
réalisation progressive de l’unification économique complète entre les pays
arabes et assurant la libre circulation des personnes et des biens en considérant
l’ensemble du territoire arabe comme un territoire douanier unifié; les
contractants ont convenu d’harmoniser leur politiques économiques et de
coordonner les législations fiscales, financières et monétaires. Les résultas se
sont avérées cependant loin d’atteindre les espérances. Un indice peu à lui
seul démontrer l’échec : depuis 1980, le commerce inter-arabe ne dépasse pas
un milliard de dollars, ce qui constitue un rapport insignifiant de l’ensemble
du commerce extérieur de ces pays.
Plusieurs éléments peuvent expliquer cet échec, les causes sont en effet
multiples. Elles tiennent en premier lieu à des facteurs politiques et aux
nombreux conflits qui opposent les régimes en place et dont la solution
constitue une condition indispensable à la mise en place de tout processus
d’intégration que l’on veut viable. Il est certainement illusoire d’envisager
la création d’institutions économiques commune tant que persisteront les
conflits qui divisent les pays arabes.
En deuxième lieu, les causes tiennent à des facteurs économiques
et sociaux. Un projet d’intégration économique trop ambitieux, qui ne
prend pas en considération les réalités nationales, produit des effets de
distorsion très graves dans des économies déjà malades de nationalisme,
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Ahmed Driss
de protectionnisme, de développement sectoriel inégal, de faiblesse de la
capacité d’épargne et d’investissement et de déséquilibre démographique et
qui les rendent incapable de s’adapter rapidement à la logique de l’intégration
économique.
Tirant les conclusions de cet état des choses, certains pays arabes, profitant
d’une certaine homogénéité tant politique qu’économique ont créé un
ensemble sous-régional qui est le Conseil de Coopération des pays du Golfe.
Mais bien évidement il n’y a pas lieu de s’arrêter ici sur ce model d’intégration
qui a tendance à bien fonctionner et qui pourrait servir d’exemple à d’autres
expériences.
Il faut noter en outre que le lancement du Processus de Barcelone a
été l’occasion pour les pays arabes de s’engager de nouveau sur la voie de
la coopération économique, prenant conscience de l’importance d’une
démarche commune, nécessaire pour faire face aux exigences du marché
gigantesque d’une Europe unie ayant pour seul devise le libre échangisme.
Dés 1995, lors de la session du Conseil Economique et Social de la Ligue
des Etats arabes, ces derniers décident de réactiver un accord de 1981 sur le
marché inter-arabe, pour relancer une coopération basée sur la compétitivité
et la complémentarité. L’accord qui est entré en vigueur en janvier 1998
prévoit un régime de libre échange entre les contractants, qui soit à la fois
ouvert sur le marché commun.
Or, il se trouve que les clauses concernant l’unification des tarifs douaniers
restèrent lettre morte et tout le système de libre échange inter-arabe s’est
trouvé largement inopérant par un jeu de dispositions unilatérales, chaque
pays s’est vu réduire de son côté la gamme des produits échangés.
Certains pays arabo-méditerranéens ont cru bon s’engager dans un
processus de partenariat Sud–Sud, pensant qu’en dépit de la faiblesse des
échanges intra-régionaux au sein de la zone arabe, il existe bien un potentiel
de régionalisation. Quatre pays bien engagés dans le processus euroméditerranéen (Tunisie, Maroc, Egypte et Jordanie) ont décidé à Agadir le 8
mai 2001 de mettre les jalons de la Zone de Libre-échange entre les pays arabes
méditerranéens (ZLEA).
Cette initiative qui « va dans le droit fil » du Processus de Barcelone,
dont l’un des objectifs est de favorisé un partenariat Sud–Sud a soulever
l’enthousiasme de plus d’un responsable européen mais moins d’optimisme
chez quelques experts notamment arabes, qui voient que malgré la
proximité géographique, linguistique et culturelle, les conditions politiques
171
et réglementaires ne sont pas, dans l’état ou ils sont, favorables à un tel
processus, et que le potentiel d’intégration régional reste encore très
limité, en raison du niveau insuffisant de développement des pays arabes
méditerranées et du caractère similaire de certaines économies qui forme un
obstacle devant la réalisation d’un niveau d’échange plus élevé.
A partir de ce constat, il est donc évident que durant les cinquante
dernières années, au Sud et à l’Est de la Méditerranée on a toujours cherché
à prendre des initiatives visant l’unification ou l’intégration, parfois politique
et d’autres fois seulement économique. Mais à chaque fois la mise en œuvre
de ces initiatives se trouve bloquée pour les raisons déjà citées.
Il est à l’évidence aussi que le processus de partenariat euro-méditerranéen
cherche à favoriser un régime d’intégration entre les pays du Sud eux-mêmes;
reste que cette volonté n’est pas soutenue par des instruments juridiques
capable d’imposer ce choix. L’instrument fondamental sur lequel se base
ce processus reste, faut-il le rappeler, l’Accord d’association que l’Union
européenne contracte d’une manière bilatérale avec chaque partenaire
du Sud, d’une manière qui ne permet aucune inter-connexion entre les
contractants sud-méditerranéens, c’est un peu comme les rayons d’un
cercle, qui convergent tous vers le centre, qui se croisent peut-être mais sans
jamais se mêler. Il est vrai que ces accords d’association font référence à la
coopération régionale, tel est le cas des accords conclus avec la Tunisie, le
Maroc et récemment l’Algérie, dans lesquels le Maghreb est expressément
mentionné. Mais ceci est-il pour autant suffisant pour assurer une mise en
œuvre réelle de l’intégration Sud–Sud?
Un Sud incapable d’accéder à un statut d’égalité
Comme il est évident de l’indiquer, le partenariat suppose l’existence de
partenaires, assimilés à des associés qui ont décidé de mettre en concert
leurs efforts afin d’atteindre un but. Or, comme dans toute société ce sont
toujours les sociétaires qui détiennent la majorité des parts qui déterminent
aux autres les conduites à suivre.
Dans le cadre du partenariat, les partenaires sont d’une part des pays
développés et riches et de l’autre des pays en développement et parfois
pauvres. Les pays riches se sont trop longtemps considéres comme des pays
donateurs en terme d’aide économique. Ce sont eux qui déterminent le flux
des échanges entre eux et les autres et ce sont eux qui posent les conditions
relatives à cet échange.
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Ahmed Driss
En effet, pour s’engager dans un partenariat essentiellement économique,
malgré la volonté de le rendre global, l’Europe conditionne cet engagement
par des considérations autres qu’économiques. L’Europe se dresse en
défenseur du model de la Démocratie occidentale et exige de ses partenaires
ou les incite à asseoir un régime démocratique basé sur le respect des
droits de l’homme et la garantie des libertés fondamentales, comme de sa
coopération.
Cette exigence a été transposée dans le cadre des Accords de partenariat
euro-méditerranéen, appelée par certains la clause démocratique, elle
est jugée tellement importante pour qu’elle soit inscrite à l’article 2 de ces
Accords dans lequel on peu lire que « les relations entre les parties, de même
que toutes les dispositions du présent accord se fondent sur le respect
des principes démocratiques et des droits de l’Homme qui inspirent leurs
politiques internes et internationales et qui constituent un élément essentiel
de l’accord. » Cet article traduit donc parfaitement la politique européenne
en matière de partenariat qui fait de l’adoption d’un régime démocratique
« la condition » pour engager sa coopération « afin de créer une cohérence
entre la démocratie, l’Etat de droit et l’économie de marché ». Certains
trouvent que ce principe s’insère convenablement dans la logique du
Partenariat qui transforme une structure d’affrontement en une structure de
co-responsabilité qui justifie un certain droit de regard entre les partenaires.
Cependant, en dépit de l’aspect technique de la conditionnalité et de
ses finalités théoriques, il serait vain de nier que la politique européenne
en la matière est assez ambiguë pour ne pas en douter de la sincérité de
la démarche. Souvent un double langage est remarqué vis-à-vis des
agissements des gouvernements du Sud en matière de démocratie et des
droits de l’homme, favorisant parfois la stabilité qui est plus productive qu’un
changement incertain.
D’autre part les partenaires arabes méditerranéens souffrent d’un
déséquilibre en faveur d’Israël qui concerne toute la structure de coopération
issue de l’Accord d’Association de 1995, suite auquel Israël acquière désormais
le statut de partenaire privilégié, aussi bien en matière économique, qu’en
matière scientifique et technologique; les dispositions relatives à ces matières
sont sensiblement différentes de celles qui sont incluses dans les Accords
avec les autres partenaires. Comme le note le Professeur Bichara Khader2,
il n’y a aucun doute qu’Israël est un partenaire particulièrement utile pour
l’Union européenne, pour qui il représente près du 1/5 du total des échanges
2
L’article de Bichara Khader dans Etudes Internationales, No. 61, 116.
173
avec l’ensemble des douze partenaires; mais que cela ne saurai justifier, sur
le plan éthique, l’octroi à celui-ci d’un statut particulier alors qu’il continu à
dénier au peuple palestinien ses droits politiques et territoriaux.
Beaucoup de chemin reste donc à faire avant que le partenariat euroméditerranéen puisse résorber les asymétries qui existent en son sein; mais
le Partenariat tel que défini dans la Déclaration de Barcelone est bien une
œuvre de construction d’un espace commun de paix, de stabilité et de
prospérité. Les moyens prévus à cet égard prouvent que la logique suivie est
une logique d’intégration, peut-être pas au sens stricte du terme, une logique
dont la base est une approche globale pour la région et qui nécessite, à cet
effet, un grand effort d’harmonisation des législations applicable de part et
d’autre de la Méditerranée.
Cette entreprise implique nécessairement un changement de nature dans
les relations entre les Etats membres. Un changement qui semble aujourd’hui
se dessiner dans le cadre de la nouvelle approche introduite dans le processus
de Barcelone par le projet « Union pour la Méditerranée » Un changement
dans lequel l’égalité et la souveraineté des Etats reste respectée mais qui
permet aussi la mise en place d’une institution commune qui disposerait
de suffisamment de pouvoir qui lui permettrait de jouer le rôle du moteur
de l’intégration. Une institution à caractère politico-technique, capable de
balancer efficacement les problèmes politiques sans les ignorés, qui aurai
une vue d’ensemble des intérêts de la région et pourrait ainsi remplir une
fonction dynamique dans la négociation en dégageant avec objectivité et
impartialité le dénominateur commun entre les intérêts nationaux et l’intérêt
régional.
Les sud-méditerranéens sauront-ils intégrer la logique de l’œuvre, accepter
ses règles, dépasser leur immobilisme et sortir de l’inefficacité?
L’Europe saura-t-elle trouver la volonté ou le courage de faire des
concessions sur son leadership, d’être moins dirigiste et d’accepter plus que
de simples retouches institutionnelles insignifiantes?
C’est en trouvant les bonnes réponses à ces questions que les
partenaires pourront aller de l’avant et résoudre les problèmes d’asymétries
institutionnelles qui entravent le Processus.
Les enjeux méditerranéens
de la crise européenne
Jean-Robert Henry
A l’occasion de la présidence finlandaise de l’Europe au deuxième semestre
2006, Tuomo Melasuo a été étroitement associé par son gouvernement
à la gestion du volet méditerranéen de cette présidence. Beaucoup
d’observateurs ont constaté qu’il s’agit d’un domaine où les choses avaient
progressé de façon relativement inattendue en compensant la mauvaise
impression laissée par l’échec un an plutôt du sommet euro-méditerranéen
de Barcelone. La conférence euro-méditerranéenne de Tampere en novembre
2006 s’est bien déroulée et ses conclusions ont été adoptées à l’unanimité
après que le Forum civil, tenu pour la première fois au Sud, à Marrakech, ait
abordé de front le problème des migrations et de la mobilité des personnes
en Méditerranée.
S’il est vrai que dans un « petit » pays comme la Finlande, il est plus facile
pour les chercheurs d’établir le dialogue avec les acteurs politiques, il faut
reconnaître à Tuomo Melasuo un mérite propre qui est d’avoir mis au service
des dossiers euro-méditerranéens sa compétence et ses convictions. Il a
notamment contribué à remettre la dimension humaine du processus de
Barcelone au premier plan en obtenant que la conférence Euromesco de
Tampere en juillet 2006 s’interroge sur « l’espace humain méditerranéen ».
De façon générale, Tuomo Melasuo, qui connaît bien les pays du sud de la
Méditerranée, mais qui est également très attentif aux préoccupations des
pays européens riverains de cette mer, s’est toujours montré sensible aux
enjeux méditerranéens du projet européen. C’est sur cette question que je
voudrais faire porter les quelques réflexions qui suivent, en sachant, pour
avoir eu avec lui d’innombrables échanges, qu’elles sont pour une large part
partagées par Tuomo.
« L’avenir de l’Europe est en Méditerranée », proclamait N. Sarkozy au soir de
son élection le 6 mai 2007. On peut souscrire à cette affirmation de principe,
même si on est en désaccord sur la plupart des idées qui l’accompagnent
(« défi » de la confrontation entre Islam et Occident, caractère non-européen
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de la Turquie) et sur les modalités de mise en œuvre par le nouveau président
français de son projet méditerranéen. L’initiative française, qui a perturbé la
routine des relations euro-méditerranéennes depuis plus d’un an, a suscité
comme on sait beaucoup de critiques et une grande perplexité chez les
partenaires européens de la France, sans entraîner l’enthousiasme des pays
du sud. Le succès de la conférence du 13 juillet 2008 à Paris n’a été que la
consécration du médiocre compromis élaboré en mars 2008 par le Conseil
européen, un compromis qui a davantage consisté à prolonger un statu quo
qu’à renouveler les rapports entre l’Europe et son sud.
Sur un sujet qui colle autant à l’actualité, il importe cependant de faire
la part entre l’écume des choses et les tendances de fond. La surface des
choses, c’est le résultat global modeste de cette agitation méditerranéenne
: on a tenté de réanimer un processus de Barcelone chancelant, sur lequel
étaient portés des diagnostics sévères, en le renforçant par l’instauration
(sous quelle forme et avec quelles attributions ?) de L’Union pour la
Méditerranée. La surface des choses, ce sont aussi bien sûr les avatars de la
politique méditerranéenne de la France qui a multiplié les maladresses dans
la promotion de son initiative : au final, il y a très loin entre les ambitions
politiques du projet initial et ce qu’il est devenu en regagnant le bercail du
partenariat euro-méditerranéen.
Cependant la tendance de fond révélée par cet épisode, plus significative
sans doute que ses vicissitudes, c’est la redécouverte de la place que tient
l’enjeu méditerranéen pour l’Europe. Au cours des derniers mois, le rapport
de l’Europe à la Méditerranée s’est imposé sur l’agenda européen bien plus
que comme une simple question de politique étrangère commune. Il apparaît
comme constructeur du projet européen, révélateur de ses crises et de ses
doutes, miroir de l’image que les Européens se font d’eux-mêmes. On peut
dire qu’à bien des égards, l’enjeu méditerranéen habite le projet européen ;
c’est un aiguillon qui invite l’Europe à mieux formuler sa vision d’elle-même
et à mieux assumer son rapport au monde.
« Crise européenne » et défis méditerranéens
Ce qu’on appelle aujourd’hui la crise européenne est multiple. Mais chacun
de ses aspects est souligné par le rapport à la Méditerranée. Trois points me
semblent majeurs.
1. Il y a d’abord une crise identitaire de l’Europe par rapport à elle-même,
une crise complexe à cerner car il y a plusieurs façons de répondre à la
question « qu’est-ce que l’Europe ? ».
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Est-ce une perspective supranationale (le projet de Fédération européenne de
la Déclaration Schuman), ou l’utopie d’une nouvelle patrie commune ; est-ce
un espace déterminé par la géographie ou bien une communauté humaine
(le « peuple européen ») ou civilisationnelle à base plus ou moins religieuse;
ou encore, est-ce d’abord un espace de paix, de tolérance, de prospérité, de
bonne gouvernance et de vouloir-vivre ensemble, devenu exemplaire et
attractif à l’échelle mondiale?
Dans cette incertitude sur la nature de l’Europe, et dans un contexte de
très grande prudence politique des gouvernants à l’égard de l’opinion, il peut
être est tentant de laisser l’identité européenne se définir par rapport à un
monde islamo-méditerranéen perçu comme une altérité privilégiée, externe
et interne, de l’Europe. Face à ce monde différent, nous serions d’abord
chrétiens ou judéo-chrétiens, ou bien « occidentaux » et « atlantiques » dans
une version plus politique des choses. Le débat actuel sur l’identité chrétienne
de l’Europe ne semble pas avoir d’autre origine que cette dialectique
identitaire, qui tend à fabriquer une identité antimusulmane de l’Europe (et
réciproquement). De même, la politique de voisinage laisse entendre que
l’Europe est une « famille » qui se définit par rapport à des voisins. Or il est
très risqué de laisser le discours identitaire envahir et gouverner la maison
Europe. C’est une folle du logis qui peut exercer, demain comme hier, des
dégâts considérables. L’évolution du débat sur l’Islam et sur l’immigration
pose problème dans de nombreux pays, notamment en France avec la
création d’un ministère de l’identité nationale et de l’immigration. De même,
la chasse aux « roms » en Italie et dans plusieurs pays européens a pris une
tournure inquiétante. Et même en Belgique, au cœur de l’espace européen, la
résurgence – jusqu’ici pacifique – de l’antagonisme entre flamands et wallons
ne témoigne pas d’un bon fonctionnement de l’idée européenne.
2. Cette crise identitaire est aussi une crise du rapport de l’Europe au
monde.
La question des frontières ou des « limites » de l’Europe est posée aujourd’hui
de façon insistante et défensive par de nombreux hommes politiques, dans
une perspective de clôture de l’espace européen. En août 2007, le président
Sarkozy exigeait une réflexion européenne (et une prise de position) sur le
sujet pour avancer sur la question de l’adhésion de la Turquie.
En se fixant de façon exemplaire sur la peur d’intégrer la Turquie, le débat
sur l’élargissement a renforcé les termes du dilemme européen : repli sur
soi ou ouverture universaliste dans le sens de « l’Europe sans rivages » que
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proposait il y a cinquante ans François Perroux. L’évolution du conflit du
Moyen-Orient n’a fait qu’accentuer la tentation du repli, tout en soulignant
l’absence d’une politique étrangère européenne. Face à l’omniprésence
américaine sur la scène méditerranéenne, l’impuissance européenne
dans la région interroge le rôle de l’Union européenne comme acteur de
la scène internationale : y a-t-il place pour une Europe-puissance face à la
puissance américaine et quelle serait la nature de cette puissance : militaire
ou d’influence ? Faut-il se résigner à une Europe atlantique (Communauté
atlantique) dont la frontière serait la Méditerranée face au monde arabomusulman, ou l’Europe peut-elle inventer un modèle alternatif de gestion
pacifiée des relations internationales impliquant un recentrage sur la
Méditerranée? Quelles leçons pratiques tirer de l’opération libanaise et des
initiatives sur l’Iran ?
3. Le crise européenne est enfin une crise des ressorts du projet
européen.
Le projet européen parait aujourd’hui moins ambitieux, moins porteur que
lorsque l’Europe était modeste ; l’utopie européenne fait moins sens que
quand elle était un objectif lointain.
Ce sont en réalité les ressorts du projet qui ont changé depuis Maastricht :
le but n’est plus d’instaurer durablement la paix dans une Europe ruinée
par l’affrontement des nationalismes et le mépris des Droits de l’homme,
mais tourne à la construction d’une identité commune. D’universaliste et
humaniste, le ressort du projet européen tend à devenir identitaire face à
d’autres identités, toutes essentialisées.
Ce changement de projet affecte le rapport de l’Union européenne à son
voisinage méridional, le rend beaucoup plus contradictoire. Aujourd’hui,
la Méditerranée constitue pour l’Europe à la fois une région périphérique,
qu’elle considère comme son prolongement économique naturel, et une
frontière identitaire, humaine et culturelle. En consacrant cette contradiction
ainsi que le divorce entre espace économique et espace humain, le Processus
de Barcelone n’a pas réussi ni cherché à faire de la Méditerranée un espace
humain commun, sur le modèle européen. Au contraire, la philosophie
implicite promue par Barcelone est celle d’un apartheid tempéré par le recours
au « dialogue » des cultures. La politique de voisinage n’a fait qu’accentuer
cette contradiction en opposant la « famille » européenne aux « voisins ». Un
mérite des débats des derniers mois est d’avoir relativisé et disqualifié cette
idée de voisinage, sans cependant réussir à construire une nouvelle vision du
rapport euro-méditerranéen.
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Dans un espace méditerranéen et eurafricain caractérisé depuis
longtemps par des flux et des échanges intenses, et bousculé aujourd’hui
par les stratégies des « migrants », la fermeture de l’espace humain
européen vers le sud depuis 1996 a eu, pour le sud comme pour le nord, des
conséquences nuisibles dont les effets n’ont jamais été mesurés. La frontière
méditerranéenne de l’Europe tranche de façon absurde dans un tissu humain,
culturel et social très dense, notamment en Méditerranée occidentale. Les
obstacles grandissants mis à la libre circulation des personnes contrarient
l’exercice d’un droit de l’homme élémentaire comme le rappelait le Forum
civil de Marrakech. Ils ne répondent ni aux besoins démographiques de
l’Europe, ni à « l’envie d’Europe » qui ne cesse de croître au Sud mais pourrait
se retourner en haine d’une Europe inaccessible. Enfin cette politique engage
les Européens dans une vision exclusivement sécuritaire de leur rapport au
monde extérieur.
D’autres aspects moins centraux de la crise européenne sont également
questionnés par le rapport à la Méditerranée.
t La crise institutionnelle que représentent les « non » successifs à la
Constitution a son pendant dans la difficulté de reformuler les rapports avec le Sud.
Pour réanimer les rapports euro-méditerranéens, on a mis en avant
depuis quatre décennies des formules institutionnelles qui mobilisent
un vocabulaire et des objectifs ambigus : partenariat, dialogue,
voisinage…, peu susceptibles de répondre aux attentes des Etats et
sociétés du sud. Aujourd’hui, l’Union pour la Méditerranée ne continue
à leur offrir que l’appartenance à une euro-périphérie, à une banlieue
de l’Europe.
t La crise institutionnelle de l’Europe est aggravée par une crise de pilotage des instances communautaires et par une crise de gouvernance.
A la perte de visibilité des responsables communautaires, correspond
un surcroît de visibilité de certains leaders et intérêts nationaux. Depuis
un an, la question de l’Union de la Méditerranée n’a cessé d’opposer, de
façon presque caricaturale, sur la scène européenne le couple SarkozyMerkel, alors qu’en 2003 le « couple fondateur » franco-allemand se
trouvait réuni sur l’enjeu international majeur qu’était la guerre d’Irak.
A côté de cette dérive nationaliste permise par une certaine vacuité
du pouvoir politique européen, l’Europe souffre plus largement d’une
crise de gouvernance : la pesanteur caricaturale de la bureaucratie
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Jean-Robert Henry
européenne amène à s’interroger sur la place de la société civile dans le
système européen, dès lors qu’on sort de la pratique institutionnalisée
du lobbying.
La situation est encore moins enviable dans les instances euroméditerranéennes. La représentativité de la société civile y laisse
souvent à désirer, quand elle n’est pas tournée en dérision comme
dans la formule « organisation intergouvernementale de la société
civile » dont on avait cru devoir affubler la Fondation Anna Lindh. Mais
une remobilisation de la société civile se fait jour au sud comme au
nord : le Forum civil euro-méditerranéen interpelle les responsables
politiques avec moins de conformisme qu’autrefois, et reflète en
partie les débats non domestiqués des Forums sociaux mondiaux,
régionaux ou nationaux. Des acteurs civils contestataires apparaissent
qui imposent leurs revendications aux acteurs politiques, par exemple
en ce qui concerne le soutien aux migrants clandestins.
t La « crise culturelle » en Europe et en Méditerranée
La gestion de la diversité culturelle en Europe et en Méditerranée
appelle une réflexion comparée approfondie sur deux points:
1. Sous prétexte de faciliter la communication, le principe de diversité
culturelle est battu en brèche dans l’espace européen au profit d’un
langage commun réducteur qui coupe l’expression politique et savante des sociétés de leur expression culturelle.
2. Alors que les différences culturelles tendent à être gommées dans
l’espace européen, elles sont surestimées et essentialisées dans l’espace euro-méditerranéen, comme l’a rappelé le Rapport des Sages
(2004) sur le dialogue des peuples et des cultures en Méditerranée.
La nécessité d’une utopie refondatrice
L’inventaire des aspects de la « crise européenne » révélés par le rapport à
la Méditerranée pourrait être poursuivi sur de longues pages. Si beaucoup
d’analystes et d’acteurs politiques considèrent – à l’instar de N. Sarkozy –
que ce rapport est crucial pour l’avenir de l’Europe, les solutions apportées,
y compris par le dernier sommet de Paris, pour métamorphoser la relation
euro-méditerranéenne restent décevantes, à l’image du paysage sans relief
et sans perspective qu’est devenu le projet européen. Il serait au contraire
nécessaire de sortir des ballets diplomatiques et des discours culturalistes
et de faire preuve d’audace conceptuelle pour tenter de répondre aux défis
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que la Méditerranée pose à l’Europe et que l’Europe pose à la Méditerranée.
Or, le principal de ces défis est la gestion de l’espace humain méditerranéen
comme un espace commun.
Leur proximité humaine et culturelle constitue pour les habitants du
nord et du sud de la Méditerranée un défi et un atout qui les distinguent
des autres acteurs présents sur la scène méditerranéenne. L’audace et le
réalisme consisteraient donc à remettre la dimension humaine au centre de
la problématique euro-méditerranéenne, soit en réinventant un scénario
ambitieux de type euro-arabe soit en élargissant vers le sud le « cercle
vertueux » européen. La perspective d’un élargissement euro-méditerranéen
mérite d’être explorée dans le contexte actuel pour tenter de mieux penser et
gérer notre appartenance à un espace humain commun et solidaire ouvert aux
sociétés européennes et méditerranéennes. Bien plus que d’ « européaniser »
le Sud, le problème serait de « reméditerraniser » l’Europe, c’est-à-dire de
la réconcilier avec ses racines méditerranéennes, en cessant de voir chez
les Arabes ou les Musulmans des usurpateurs de l’héritage antique des
Européens, et de la recentrer sur la Méditerranée, en abandonnant l’illusion
d’une Communauté atlantique tournée contre le monde arabo-musulman.
Cette perspective peut concerner tous les Européens, comme le suggérait
la proposition de M. Moratinos, il y a quelques mois, de raisonner en termes
d’Union euro-méditerranéenne, plutôt que de s’enfermer dans une Union
méditerranéenne réservée aux riverains. Il reprenait ainsi une proposition de
D. Strauss-Kahn en 2004, qui faisait écho elle-même à une réflexion formulée
à l’intérieur du Club de Marseille dès 2001.
Le concept d’Union euro-méditerranéenne présente l’avantage de réunir
autour d’un même mot d’ordre deux scénarios possibles : l’un maximaliste
(élargissement de l’Union européenne vers le sud), l’autre minimaliste
(création d’une structure confédérale autour de l’Union européenne); c’est
souvent à travers des consensus ambigus que progressent les relations
internationales. Ce concept a surtout le mérite de refonder l’ensemble
euro-méditerranéen sur une utopie commune plus mobilisatrice que le
partenariat au rabais de Barcelone ou l’apartheid implicite de la politique de
voisinage. L’appartenance des sociétés européennes et méditerranéennes à
un espace commun de paix et de solidarité offrirait également un cadre plus
favorable à la résolution du conflit israélo-palestinien et au dépassement des
malentendus bilatéraux hérités de l’histoire coloniale. Enfin, la perspective
d’Union euro-méditerranéenne serait capable d’assumer les attentes du
projet d’Union méditerranéenne sans entrer en contradiction avec l’Union
européenne.
Barcelonan prosessista Välimeren Unioniin
– mihin sillä pyritään?
Risto Veltheim
Kylmän sodan päättyminen merkitsi Euroopassa monenlaisia muutoksia,
joista EU:n nopeasti alkanut itälaajentuminen oli yksi keskeisiä ja näkyvimpiä.
Tämä oli omiaan jopa siirtämään integroituvan Euroopan painopistettä
Atlantilta kohti Keski- ja Itä-Eurooppaa, mikä ei voinut jäädä EU:n läntisimmiltä
jäsenilta huomaamatta.
Osittain kompensoidakseen tätä muutosta päätettiin eteläisten jäsenten
aloitteesta luoda vuonna 1995 erityinen foorumi Välimeren asioiden
käsittelylle, joka sai perustamispaikkansa mukaan nimen Barcelonan prosessi.
Virallinen nimi on kuitenkin Euro-Välimeri-kumppanuus, vaikka syntypaikasta
muistuttava lempinimi on jäänyt jokapäiväiseen käyttöön. Prosessi, jota myös
Oslon sopimuksen luoma suotuisa poliittinen ilmapiiri Lähi-idässä vauhditti,
hahmoteltiin kehittämään kokonaisvaltaisesti EU:n suhteita Välimeren
eteläpuolisiin rantavaltioihin. Yhteistyön piiriin tulivat poliittiset, taloudelliset
ja niin sanottuun inhimilliseen ulottuvuuteen liittyvät kysymykset.
Monia muutoksia on tapahtunut perustamisen jälkeen, sekä yhteistyön
sisältöön että muotoihin. Osallistujia on jo kaikkiaan 39. Nykyisin Välimeren
kumppanimaista yhdeksän on arabimaita (Algeria, Egypti, Jordania, Libanon,
Marokko, Mauritania, Syyria, Tunisia, palestiinalaishallinto) kun taas muut
EU:n ulkopuoliset osallistujat ovat Israel, Albania ja Turkki. Libya on edelleen
mukana tarkkailijana, eikä tähän ole näköpiirissä muutosta.
Prosessin vahvuutena on alusta lähtien ollut, että sen piiriin tulivat
käytännössä kaikki Välimeren alueen maat, arabimaiden ohella myös Israel,
johon toistaiseksi vain Egyptillä ja Jordanialla on toimivat diplomaattisuhteet.
Mitään laajempaa normalisoitumista Israelin ja arabimaiden kesken ei siis ole
prosessin avulla saatu aikaan.
Kyseessä on silti ainutlaatuinen yhteistyöjärjestely, jossa nämä valtiot
keskustelevat muun muassa taloudellisen yhteistyön, kaupan, kulttuurin,
ympäristönsuojelun ja vaikkapa liikenneolojen kehittämisestä. Myös
poliittiseen tilanteeseen ja suoraan turvallisuuteen liittyvät asiat ovat esillä.
On kuitenkin muistettava, että Barcelonan prosessin puitteissa ei haeta
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Risto Veltheim
alueen varsinaisten konfliktien ratkaisua, ei Lähi-idässä sen enempää kuin
esimerkiksi Länsi-Saharan tai Kyproksen ongelmassa.
Jugoslavian hajoamisen jälkeen Balkanille syntyneet uudet valtiot jäivät
aluksi prosessin ulkopuolelle, sillä itse asiassa alue oli 1990-luvun puolivälissä
vielä varsin levotonta ja valtiolliset olot vailla lopullista vakiintumistaan. Nyt
ovat myös ex-Jugoslavian pohjalta syntyneet uudet valtiot kiinnostuneita
Euro-Välimeri-yhteistyöstä. Muun muassa Kroatia ja Montenegro haluavat
mukaan, vaikka niiden lopulliset tavoitteet EU:n suunnalla tähtäävätkin
jäsenyyteen. Välimeren pohjoispuolelta on taas Monaco katsonut ajan
olevan kypsä omalle mukaantulolle täysjäsenenä, mikä myös lähiaikoina
hyväksyttäneen.
Ajankohtaisuuttaan prosessi ei siten ole menettänyt yhtään, pikemminkin
siihen on kohdistunut yhä uusia odotuksia ja haasteita. Tämä on taustalla myös
Ranskan tulevan presidentin Nicholas Sarkozyn jo vaalikamppailun aikana
keväällä 2007 tekemään esitykseen uuden Välimeren Unionin luomisesta
meren pohjois- ja etelärannan kesken. Sarkozyn kunnianhimoisessa
aloitteessa nähtiin montakin tavoitetta. Näkyvin oli nostaa yhteistyön taso
poliittisesti korkeammalle, luoda valtionpäämiesten kesken foorumi, jossa
voitaisiin säännöllisesti keskustella sekä politiikan että yhteistyön keskeisistä
kysymyksistä. Tätä korkean tason yhteydenpitoa avustaisi vain suppea
läheisten neuvonantajien eli ”sherpojen” ryhmä. Niinpä Sarkozyn aloitetta
verrattiin eräänlaisen Välimeren alueen oman ”G-8 huippukokouksen”
luomiseen.
Toisena tavoitteena nähtiin Ranskan oman johtoaseman palauttaminen
Välimeren politiikassa ja tämä taas heijastui muun muassa haluna pitää
yhteistyön piiri vain Välimeren rantavaltioiden keskeisenä. Kolmantena
tavoitteena nähtiin halu löytää jonkinlainen korvaava ratkaisu Turkin
pyrkimyksille päästä EU:n täysjäseneksi: Välimeren pohjoisen ja eteläisen
rannan yhteisöhän voisi tarjota islamilaiselle Turkille luontevimman pohjan
myös EU-suhteille.
Ranskan kovan ja korkealla tasolla vedetyn diplomatiankaan avulla ei
näissä tavoitteissa lopulta täysin onnistuttu, vaikka Välimeren Unioni lopulta
saatiin luoduksi. Ensinnäkin sen osallistujapiirin suhteen, Välimeren EU-maat
versus kaikki EU-maat, Ranskalla oli periaatteessa kaksi mahdollisuutta.
Ensimmäinen oli tehdä tästä kokonaan Ranskan kansallinen ja EUyhteistyöstä irrallinen hanke, vähän niin kuin brittiläinen kansainyhteisö tai
vaikka Pohjolassa edelleen toimiva Pohjoismaiden neuvosto. Ranskalla olisi
silloin ollut vapaat kädet antaa sille muoto ja sisältö, jotka vastaavat Ranskan
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omia kansallisia tavoitteita eikä rahoituksesta tai muista institutionaalisista
seikoista olisi tarvinnut kiistellä.
Toisin kuitenkin kävi. Epäily riittävien resurssien saamisesta näin laajan
ja suuria odotuksia herättävän hankkeen tueksi ja muun muassa myös
pohjoisafrikkalaisten maiden epäluulo sen kantovoimaan saivat Ranskan
kallistumaan siihen, että se tehtäisiin osana EU:n ulkosuhdetoimintaa. EU:n
instituutiot ja etupäässä komissio, mutta myös Euroopan kehityspankki EIB
haluttiin mukaan paitsi niiden merkittävien taloudellisten resurssien myös
niiden teknisen osaamisen ja kokemuksen vuoksi.
Kuitenkin kesti vielä kauan ennen kuin Ranska luopui perusvaatimuksestaan
siinä, että kaikki EU:n jäsenvaltiot tulisivat olemaan Unionissa tasavertaisina
osallistujina. Tähän se taipui Saksan ja Ranskan välisissä konsultaatioissa
maaliskuussa 2008. Eurooppa-neuvoston päätöksellä 13.3.2008 ajatus
uudesta Unionista periaatetasolla hyväksyttiin ja samalla siitä tehtiin koko
EU:n politiikkaa. Näin haluttiin taata ennen kaikkea se, ettei EU:n ulkosuhteet
lähialueille pirstoutudu erilaisiin naapurustopiireihin.
Vaikka Suomi on jo usean vuoden ajan ajanut voimakkaasti pohjoisten
alueiden merkitystä EU:ssa etenkin Pohjoisen ulottuvuuden (PU) hankkeen
kautta, oli tämä päätös täysin myös Suomen etujen mukainen. Aivan kuin
Pohjoinen ulottuvuus, olisi myös Välimeren Unioni koko EU:n yhteistä
ulkosuhdepolitiikkaa, johon periaatteessa kaikki osallistuvat – vaikka
sinänsä kiinnostus ja intensiteetti saattavat vaihdella suurestikin. Muu
olisikin saattanut johtaa jatkossa yhä suurempaan pirstoutumiseen paitsi
ulkosuhdepolitiikan myös politiikka-alueiden osalta, varsinkin jos esimerkiksi
energia-, ympäristö-, maahanmuutto- ja vaikkapa turvallisuuspolitiikkaa
käsiteltäisiin eri kokoonpanoilla eri foorumeilla.
Myös Turkin tilanteen osalta voi todeta, että jos tavoitteena oli luoda
paremmin houkutteleva odotushuone Turkin EU-jäsenyydelle, siinä ei
onnistuttu. Turkki on kyllä tulossa mukaan Välimeren Unioniin, mutta on
tehnyt täysin selväksi, ettei tämä vaikuta mitenkään sen jo pitkäaikaisiin EUjäsenyystavoitteisiin.
Välimeren Unioni perustetaan Pariisissa
Välimeren Unionin perustava huippukokous pidettiin Ranskan kutsusta
Pariisissa 13.7.2008. Suomea tässä historiallisessa ja poliittisesti onnistuneessa
kokouksessa edustivat presidentti Tarja Halonen ja pääministeri Matti
Vanhanen. Koska uusi, vahvennettu yhteistyö rakentuu jo toimivan
Barcelonan prosessin pohjalle, on sen virallisena nimenä Barcelonan prosessi:
186
Risto Veltheim
Välimeren Unioni. Pariisin julistuksen mukaan se rakentuu kaikessa oleellisessa
jo tutuksi tulleen ja toimintakykynsä osoittaneen Barcelonan prosessin, eli
Euro-Välimeri-kumppanuuden pohjalle.
Näin ollen yhteistyön pilareina ovat edelleen poliittinen dialogi,
taloudellinen yhteistyö ja kulttuurien välinen kohtaaminen eli niin sanottu
inhimillinen ulottuvuus. Kuten Barcelonan julistuksessa jo todettiin, nämä
kaikki muodostavat yhden, samaan päämäärään tähtäävän kokonaisuuden.
Siitä ei voida valita osia tai hylätä toisia kansallisten preferenssien
mukaan. Niinpä poliittinen kehitys ja dialogi vaikkapa ihmisoikeuksien ja
demokratiakehityksen aloilla ovat edellytys myös lisääntyvälle taloudelliselle
yhteistyölle. Kulttuurien kohtaaminen ja ihmisten välisen kanssakäymisen
vahvistuminen taas antaa koko Välimeri-yhteisölle sen todellisen ja kadun
tasolle ulottuvan legitimiteetin.
Välimeren Unionin institutionaalisista ratkaisuista merkittävin oli se, että
sen johtoon tulee kaksi yhteispuheenjohtajaa: yksi EU:sta ja yksi Välimeren
partnerimaasta. Ensivaiheessa puheenjohtajina toimivat Ranska ja Egypti.
Koska ratkaisuun pääsy partnerimaita edustavasta puheenjohtajasta
edellytti yksimielisyyttä koko ryhmältä, jossa ovat siis mukana Israel, Turkki
ja arabimaat, oli se todellinen viesti Välimeren eteläpuoleisille valtioille ja
niiden yhteistyökyvylle.
Muina instituutioina toimii yhteinen sihteeristö, joka koostuu kaikkien
halukkaiden jäsenmaiden siihen lähettämistä virkamiehistä. Kustannukset
jaetaan osin sihteeristön isäntä- ja sijoitusmaan ja prosessiin osallistuvien
kesken. Tämä kustannusvarovaisuus on hyvin ymmärrettävää, sillä onhan
tosiasia, että miltei jokainen uusi kansainvälinen kokous poikii nykyisin jonkun
uuden seurantaelimen ja byrokratian vaara on todellinen. Monilla hallituksilla
on lähes pysyväisohjeina, ettei uusia instituutioita tulisi ilman vahvoja
perusteluja perustaa. Myös Välimeren Unionin sihteeristöstä toivotaan siten
pientä ja vain projektien valmistelu- ja seuraantotehtäviin keskittyvää.
Välimeren Unionin rahoituksen osalta tullaan käyttämään luovasti
kaikkia mahdollisia lähteitä. EU:n budjetti, josta Euro-Välimeri-yhteistyöhön
kanavoituu rahaa naapuruusinstrumentin (ENPI) kautta, on yksi rahoituslähde
mutta sitä ei ole tarkoitus ainakaan merkittävästi lisätä siitä, mitä jo tehdyt
budjettiratkaisut edellyttävät. Välimeren Unionin lisäarvo tuleekin hyvin
suurelta osin siitä, että kyetään identifioimaan kaupallisesti kiinnostavia
ja luototuskelpoisia projekteja. Mahdollisuuksia tähän kyllä muun muassa
energian tuotannon, infrastruktuurikehityksen ja ympäristönsuojelun aloilla
varmasti onkin.
187
Barcelonan prosessin verkostot jäävät elämään
Barcelonan prosessiin kuuluu myös inhimillistä ulottuvuutta ja muun muassa
kulttuuriyhteistyötä koskeva pilari, poliittisen dialogin ja taloudellisen
yhteistyön ohella. Tämä on varsin laaja toiminta-alue, jolla kansalaisjärjestöt
ovat aktiivisesti mukana ja joka on jo luonut runsaan ja kattavan
yhteysverkoston. Tämä onkin nähtävä yhtenä Barcelonan prosessin ilmeisenä
menestyksenä ja suurena rikkautena, sillä on muistettava että suuressa osassa
jäsenistöä ei tällaiselle vapaalle kansalaistoiminnalle ole omaa perinnettä.
Samalla kun kansalaisyhteiskunta tukee ja kannustaa hallitusten välistä työtä,
se vaatii usein myös enemmän tehokkuutta ja tuloksia. Kansalaisjärjestöjen
kritiikiltä ei ole säästynyt yksikään tämän yhteistyön osapuoli, varsinkin jos
yhteistyön jarruina tai rasitteina nähdään kapeat kansalliset edut tai vaikkapa
epäaito, omia poliittisia tarkoitusperiä palveleva argumentointi.
Kansalaisjärjestöjen verkoista ehkä ensimmäisenä on mainittava EuroVälimeri Civil Society Platform, joka toimii Pariisissa, ja kerää piiriinsä
satoja kansalaisjärjestöä kaikista Euromed-maista. Tutkijapiirit taas ovat
yhdistyneet EUROMESCO-nimiseksi (Euromed Study Commitee) verkostoksi,
jonka keskuspaikka on Lissabonissa. Taloustutkijoiden verkostoa vedetään
Marseillesta, missä se toimii FEMISE-nimisenä. Ihmisoikeusverkostoa
(EMHRN) pidetään yllä Kööpenhaminasta, ja sen verkostot keräävät yhteen
ihmisoikeusaktivisteja kaikista osallistuvista maista. Yhdessä nämä järjestöt
ylläpitävät vilkasta ja hallituksista riippumatonta keskustelua muun muassa
monista herkistä ja aroista kysymyksistä ja pyrkivät ohjaamaan lisää huomiota
sellaisiin kysymyksiin kuten ihmisoikeudet, demokratia, kansainvälinen
solidaarisuus ja hyvä hallinto.
Parlamenttien välisenä yhteistyöelimenä toimii EMPA – Euro-Mediterranean
Parliamentary Assembly, jolla on useita alakomiteoita ja joka kokoontuu
vuosittain. Viimeksi yleiskokous pidettiin Ateenassa maaliskuussa 2008,
jolloin keskustelua sävytti paitsi Libanonin akuutti kriisi myös EU:n julistaman
kulttuurien välisen teemavuoden asiat. Myös Euroopan Parlamentti seuraa
tarkasti Euro-Välimeri-yhteistyötä. Vuonna 2006 yhteistyön raportoijana
toimi ensimmäistä kertaa pohjoismainen edustaja, Anneli Jäätteenmäki
(Keskusta).
Kulttuurien välistä dialogia edistämään on perustettu vuonna 2003 Anna
Lindhin nimeä kantava säätiö (Anna Lindh-säätiö kulttuurien välisen dialogin
edistämiseksi, ALF). Tämä instituutio toimii Aleksandriassa, Egyptissä. Sen
käytössä on tilat Aleksandrian kuuluisassa kirjastossa (joka nyt on täysin
modernisoitu) ja Ruotsin Aleksandria-instituutissa. Vuonna 2007 tehdyn
188
Risto Veltheim
organisaatiomuutoksen jälkeen sen johtoon ovat asettuneet marokkolainen
André Azoulay säätiön presidenttinä ja espanjalainen Andreu Claret säätiön
toiminnasta vastaavana johtajana.
Suomi Euro-Välimeri-yhteistyössä
Kun Suomen silloinen ulkoministeri Tarja Halonen osallistui vuonna 1995
Barcelonan ulkoministerikokoukseen, kyseessä oli ensimmäisiä kertoja kun
Euroopan unioniin liittynyt Suomi oli täysivaltaisena mukana luomassa ja
kehittämässä sen ulkosuhteita. Pohjois-Afrikka tai Lähi-itä eivät suinkaan
olleet Suomelle uusia kohdealueita ulko- tai kauppapolitiikassa, mutta
uutta oli se yhteistyön kehikko ja yhteisvastuullisuuden velvoite, jonka EuroVälimeri-kumppanuuden synnyttäminen loi. Suomi halusi alusta alkaen olla
tässä työssä täyspainoisesti mukana ja näin se on myös tehnyt.
Yhdeksi Suomelle läheiseksi alueeksi muodostui ympäristönsuojelu,
jonka alalta sillä oli runsaasti omaakin kokemusta Itämeren piiristä.
Niinpä Suomi jo vuonna 1997 isännöi Barcelonan prosessin ensimmäisen
ympäristönsuojeluministereiden konferenssin. Näin alkoi yhteistyö, joka on
jatkuvasti lisääntynyt ja tiivistynyt, siitäkin huolimatta että haasteet tuntuvat
vain kasvavan.
Suomen toisella puheenjohtajuuskaudella vuonna 2006 (ensimmäinen
pj-kausi oli vuonna 1999) järjestettiin jo toinen ministeritason
ympäristönsuojelukokous, tällä kertaa Kairossa ministeri Jan-Erik Enestamin
toimiessa kokouksen puheenjohtajana. Tässä kokouksessa hyväksyttiin
Horizon 2020-nimellä kulkeva kokonaisvaltainen ympäristöohjelma. Silti
olisi liioiteltua sanoa, että Välimeren suojelu olisi nyt turvattu. Aivan kuten
muillakin merialueilla, kasvavan liikenteen, matkailun, rannikkoseutujen
asutusten ja myös maanviljelyn aiheuttamat kuormitukset ja lisäongelmat
tuntuvat juoksevan hallitusten ponnisteluja nopeammin.
Suomen toinen puheenjohtajakausi Barcelonan prosessissa oli aktiivinen
ja tuloksekas myös monilla muilla aloilla. Kreikassa syyskuussa pidetyssä
teollisuusministerikokouksessa, jossa puheenjohtajana toimi Suomen
kauppa- ja teollisuusministeri Mauri Pekkarinen, keskusteltiin muun muassa
pk-yritysten yhteistyökanavien vahvistamisesta Välimeren molemmin puolin.
Taloudellis-teknologisen kehityksen hitaus Pohjois-Afrikassa verrattuna
globalisaation menestyjiin on tosiasia ja Välimeren eteläpuolisten maiden
osuus maailman kaupasta ja investoinneista on ollut taantumassa.
Tämä on alueelle keskeinen ongelma ja se heijastuu monilla tavoin
yhteiskunnassa. Tuottavien investointien jarruna on usein nähty
189
muun muassa suljetut talousjärjestelmät, ylikorostunut valtion osuus
talouselämässä ja toiminnan läpinäkyvyyden puute. Nämä aiheet ja
taloudellisten reformien jouduttaminen ovat EU:n ja kumppanimaiden
teollisuusministerien keskusteluissa jatkuvasti esillä.
Marraskuussa
Istanbulissa
tasa-arvoministeri Tuula
Haataisen
puheenjohdolla pidetty ministerikokous käsitteli naisen asemaa EuroVälimeri-yhteisössä. YK:n kehitysohjelman UNDP:n raportti kuvaa osuvasti,
että sukupuolten välisen tasa-arvon puute arabimaissa ei ole ainoastaan
naisten ongelma vaan ilmeisestikin hidastaa koko alueen kehitystä. Raportin
mukaan naisten koulutusmahdollisuuksien samoin kuin taloudellisten ja
sosiaalisten oikeuksien rajoitukset ovat yksi merkittävä tekijä, joka vaikeuttaa
maiden nousua maailman kärkijoukkoon muun muassa talouden, teknologian
ja kulttuurin aloilla.
Istanbulin konferenssi oli ensimmäinen naisen asemaa ja tasa-arvoa
käsitellyt kokous Barcelonan prosessin puitteissa ja kokouksessa sovittiin
muun muassa laajasta työohjelmasta, joka tulee toteutettavaksi seuraavan
kolmen vuoden aikana asianomaisten maiden kanssa sovittavissa
kahdenkeskisissä toimintasuunnitelmissa. Teema on arkaluontoinen
perinteisille muslimiyhteiskunnille, ja yhtälailla myös uusille, niin sanottua
fundamentaalista islamismia edustaville liikkeille, mutta sen merkitys
arabiyhteiskunnissa on silti kaikille selvä.
Suomen puheenjohtajuuskauden keskeinen tapahtuma oli kuitenkin
Barcelonan prosessin ulkoministerikokous marraskuussa 2006 Tampereella.
Kokous ajoittui kansainvälispoliittisesti mielenkiintoiseen vaiheeseen sillä
se oli ensimmäinen kerta Etelä-Libanonin veristen yhteenottojen jälkeen
(elokuussa 2006), kun Euro-Välimeri-alueen ulkoministereillä oli tilaisuus
tavata toisensa. Barcelonan prosessi ei sinänsä ole rauhanprosessi tai luotu
konfliktien ratkaisemiseksi, mutta kuten tässäkin tapauksessa, se antoi
erinomaisen foorumin suoraan ja tiiviiseen ajatustenvaihtoon vallitsevasta
tilanteesta. Käytännössä katsoen kaikki alueen ulkoministerit, muutamaa
poikkeusta lukuun ottamatta, tulivatkin tähän tapaamiseen, jossa puhetta
johti Suomen ulkoministeri Erkki Tuomioja.
Tampereen ulkoministerikokous oli sekä osallistujien että ulkopuolistenkin
tarkkailijoiden mukaan menestys. Vaikeissakin olosuhteissa ja aivan loppuun
saakka jatkuneiden neuvottelujen päätteeksi kokous onnistui saamaan
aikaan yhteisen alueen poliittista tilannetta koskevan julkilausuman sekä
myös laajan yhteisen toimintaohjelman vuodelle 2007. Kun sekä Israelin
ulkoministeri Tzipi Livni että monet arabiulkoministerit poistuivat TampereConstruction de la Paix par le Dialogue Interculturel
190
Risto Veltheim
talolta 8.11.2006 iltapäivällä jo aikaisin pimenevään yöhön ilmeisen
tyytyväisinä tapaamisesta, saatettiin jonkin aikaa puhua jopa ”Tampereen
hengestä” Lähi-idässä – kunnes uudet ongelmat ja väkivaltaisuudet peittivät
sen alleen.
Tampereen
kokouksessa,
kuten
yleensäkin
Suomen
puheenjohtajuuskauden yhteydessä, olivat kansalaisjärjestöt näkyvästi esillä.
Näistä ensimmäisenä on mainittava jo edellä esitelty Anna Lindh-säätiö, joka
toimii laajalti eri maissa toimivien kansallisten verkostojen kautta. Suomessa
verkoston ensimmäiseksi vetäjäksi oli valittu Tuomo Melasuo Tampereen
rauhan- ja konfliktintutkimuskeskuksesta TAPRIsta.
Tampereen ulkoministerikokouksen aikana Anna Lindh-säätiö oli
kokemassa ensimmäisiä vaikeuksiaan, joihin kulttuurien väliset ongelmat
ilmeisesti olivat pääsyinä. Henkilöstön vaihtuvuus pienessä Aleksandrian
toimipisteessä oli suurta ja luottamuspula johtoon päin olivat kasvaneet.
Etenkin päärahoittajamaissa lisääntyivät odotukset myös uuden, paremmin
selkeytetyn johtajuuden luomisesta, jotta säätiö selviäisi vaativasta
kulttuuritehtävästään.
Myös Tanskan Muhammed-pilakuvat ja niistä syntynyt kohu olivat omiaan
nostamaan kulttuurien välisen dialogin painoa Euromed-yhteistyössä. Näin
päätettiin Anna Lindh-säätiön kansallisten verkostojen kokous pitää myös
Tampereella samassa yhteydessä ulkoministerikokouksen kanssa. Tuomo
Melasuo tarttui tehtävään aktiivisesti ja taitavasti, minkä seurauksena
vaikeaksi ennustettu kokous onnistui hienosti sekä sisältönsä että käytännön
järjestelyjen osalta. Kokous sai runsaasti huomiota myös lehdistössä, mikä
oli omiaan tuomaan kulttuurien välisen kohtaamisen problematiikkaa
lähemmäksi myös suomalaista kadunmiestä.
Tuomo Melasuo oli jo alusta alkaen lähtenyt aktiivisesti edistämään
Barcelonan prosessin tunnettavuutta Suomessa ja lyhyessä ajassa hänestä
tuli tunnettu vaikuttaja Euro-Välimeri-piirissä. Hänet myös valittiin säätiön
ensimmäiseen neuvoa-antavaan komiteaan (Advisory Board) ja hän tuli
siihen uudelleen valituksi vuoden 2008 keväällä, ollen nyt sen ainoa
pohjoismainen edustaja. Tuomo Melasuo on toiminut aktiivisesti myös EuroVälimeri-alueen kansalaisjärjestöfoorumin piirissä, joka keräsi marraskuussa
2007 Marrakeshiin 450 osallistujaa. Kyseessä oli ensimmäinen kerta kun
tämä kansalaisjärjestöfoorumi järjestettiin Välimeren eteläpuolella, ja sitä
pidettiin merkittävänä tapahtumana liikkeen työn tunnustamiseksi näissä
maissa. Suomen osallistumista koordinoi Kehys ry:n toiminnanjohtaja Rilli
Lappalainen.
191
Miten eteenpäin?
Euroopan turvallisuus on yhä selvemmin kytketty oman naapuruston
tilanteeseen ja mitä suurimmassa määrin myös sen eteläiseen suuntaan,
Välimeren alueeseen. Tämän alueen vaikutus turvallisuuteemme on sitäkin
suurempi, jos laajennamme turvallisuuskäsitettä valtioiden välisestä
turvallisuudesta niin sanottuun inhimilliseen turvallisuuteen eli suoraan
yksilöihin ja kansalaisryhmiin kohdistuviin turvallisuusuhkiin.
Ajankohtaiset kysymykset, kuten ääri-islamilaisten liikkeiden esiinnousu,
kulttuurien välisen dialogin ja yhteisymmärryksen takkuilu, taloudellisen
kehityksen riittämättömyys, siirtolaisuuspaineet sekä yhä kasvava terrorismin
uhka ovat jatkuvasti olemassa. Niin sanottujen kadunmiesten ja etenkin
nuorison kohtaamat ongelmat ja näköalattomuus ajavat usein hyökkäämään
länsimaista elämänmallia vastaan ja hakemaan omaa identiteettiä islamista.
Monissa arabimaissa kytevän ja länteen vihamielisesti suhtautuvan
islamilaisen fundamentalismin iskulause onkin ”Islam on vastaus”! Islamin
pilkaksi koetut ilmiöt toimivat kipinänä ennestään jo varsin ongelmallisen
ja tulenaran tilanteen kärjistymiseksi. Kun myös alueen avoimet poliittiset
kriisit, palestiinalaiskysymys, Irakin sota ja jopa terrorismin vastaisen taistelun
ylilyönnit pitävät jännitystä korkeana, tarttuvat islamilaiset ääriliikkeet
oitis tällaisiin ilmiöihin ja käyttävät niitä hyväkseen pyrkiessään omiin
päämääriinsä. Eräät tutkijat ovatkin korostaneet, että ongelmien ydin on
turhaan nähty uskontojen välisenä konfliktina. Enemmän on kyse siitä, että
poliittiset ongelmat ja kiistat, jotka muutenkin olisivat olemassa, saavat
kärjistyessään päälleen uskonnollisen kaavun.
Euroopan ja Afrikan välinen etäisyys Gibraltarilla, 15 kilometriä, on
samalla yksi maailman suurimmista elintasokuiluista, mikä on johtanut
osin hallitsemattomiin siirtolaisvirtoihin. Vaikka Pohjois-Afrikka toimii usein
läpikulkualueena syvemmältä Afrikasta tulevalle ihmissalakuljetukselle, on
myös tämä asia tärkeä Euro-Välimeri-yhteistyössä.
Nämä kaikki ilmiöt ja tapahtumat tekevät Välimeren asioista myös
meidän suomalaisten asioita, joihin joudumme ottamaan kantaa paitsi
EU:n jäseninä, mutta myös sen vuoksi että ne todella koskettavat myös
meitä joko välittömästi tai välillisesti. Kuten presidentti Tarja Halonen
muistutti Barcelonan huippukokouksessa vuonna 2005, meillä on erityiset
syyt osallistua tähän toimintaan sillä EU:n pitkänä ja ekologisesti herkkänä
etelärajana Välimeri on nykyisin yhä enemmän myös ”meidän meremme” eli
Mare Nostrum.
Cultural cooperation
across the Mediterranean:
where is the common ground?
The global and the European context
From a global perspective, Intercultural Dialogue (ICD) has increasingly been in
focus of international cultural cooperation. The core elements of the emerging
international consensus on ICD as a “fundamental aim of cultural policies”1
have been shaped throughout the last decade. Most of these elements are
assembled in contemporary working definitions of “intercultural dialogue”
as
“an open and respectful exchange of views between individuals
and groups with different ethnic, cultural, religious and linguistic
background and heritage on the basis of mutual understanding and
respect. It operates at all levels – within societies, between the societies
of Europe and between Europe and the wider world.”2
The key factor facilitating international agreements on ICD was a formal
recognition of cultural diversity being “as necessary for humankind as
biodiversity is for nature”3. In particular two reports broke new ground: the
Report by the World Commission on Culture and Development, chaired
by former UN Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuellar, Our Creative
Diversity (1996), and the Report by the European Task Force on Culture and
Development, In from the Margins. A contribution to the debate on Culture and
Development in Europe (1997).
Both reports were welcomed and formally recognized by the World
Conference on Cultural Policies for Development in Stockholm, 1998. The
Stockholm Conference, in declaring cultural diversity“a treasure of humankind”
and “an essential factor of development”, added a dynamic dimension to the
1
UNESCO 1998.
Council of Europe 2008.
3
UNESCO 2001.
2
194
Mexico City Declaration, adopted by the First World Conference on Cultural
Policies in 1982, and stressing “that in its widest sense, culture may now be
said to be the whole complex of distinctive spiritual, material, intellectual
and emotional features that characterize a society or social group. It includes
not only the arts and letters, but also modes of life, the fundamental rights of
the human being, value systems, traditions and beliefs”.
The new common ground was extremely fertile. It brought about new
standards and guidelines for cultural policies at international, regional, and
national levels:
t A series of international Declarations on Cultural Diversity,
t the UNESCO Conventions for the Safeguarding of the Intangible
Cultural Heritage (2003) and on the Protection and Promotion of the
Diversity of Cultural Expressions (2005),
t new formats of cultural reporting, with diversity and ICD monitoring
as essential tools,
t numerous agendas, detailed proposals and strategies for innovative
forms of ICD.
From a Mediterranean perspective, cultural cooperation has started 1995
in Barcelona with high ambitions, followed by two Euro-Mediterranean
Conferences of Ministers of Culture: Bologna 1996 and Rhodes 1998. It
has, however, not kept pace with political and economic developments
in the Euromed Partnership (EMP). It has, in particular, lost direct contact
with achievements at the global level. In the – ritually deplored – absence
of significant cultural cooperation between Southern Mediterranean
countries, Mediterranean cultural cooperation is now almost entirely
managed by bilateral agreements between EU Member States – and to
some extent Turkey and Russia – with Arab countries and Israel. Multilateral
cooperation is almost entirely identical with the Euro-Mediterranean
partnership, with some additions provided by the Council of Europe and
UNESCO and their cooperation with the educational, cultural, and scientific
organizations of the Arab League (ALESCO, Tunis), and of the Organization
of the Islamic Conference (ISESCO, Istanbul), as well as with the Anna Lindh
Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for the Dialogue between Cultures (ALF),
established in April 2005 by the Euromed Partnership in Alexandria, Egypt.
The third Euro-Mediterranean Conference of Ministers of Culture in
Athens, 29–30 May 2008, marked a new phase in the Mediterranean
cultural cooperation. According to its conclusions, this conference was “the
starting point of a fully-fledged Euro-Mediterranean Strategy on Culture,
Cultural cooperation across the Mediterranean
195
encompassing cooperation in both the dialogue between cultures and
cultural policy”. This strategy “should build on the principles stated in the
UNESCO Convention on the Protection and Promotion of Diversity of Cultural
Expressions and the relevant international references”. Is the Mediterranean
cultural cooperation back now on track with international developments?
The new initiative comes at an interesting moment. The French-German
proposal for upgrading the Euromed Partnership into a “Union for the
Mediterranean” to be established in July 2008 could be an impetus for more
cultural cooperation. A closer look at the functioning of cultural cooperation
in the Euromed Partnership, however, nurtures some scepticism concerning
both the political framework and the activities on the ground. The political
framework is EU-centred, qualifying Euromed cultural cooperation as a
“specific context” within EU initiatives. The new strategy approved by the
Athens Conference is hardly more than an aspect of the European Agenda for
Culture presented by the European Commission in May 2007 and approved
by the European Council on 16 November 2007. The new strategy, to be
elaborated by a group of experts before the next culture ministers’ meeting
scheduled for 2010, seems to confine itself to a European agenda “light”. The
strategy, as outlined in Athens, covers only one and a half of the three key
elements of the European agenda: the guidelines for intercultural dialogue are
almost identical; cultural policies are in the European agenda closely linked to
cultural industries whereas this dimension, in the Athens conclusions, seems
to be limited to reconfirming appeals for integrated cultural policies, outlined
in Stockholm 1998. In concrete terms, there is little more than expressions of
intent to follow-up previous projects in the fields of heritage and audiovisual
cooperation. The third pillar of the European agenda, declaring promotion
of culture “as a vital element in the Union’s international relations”, is largely
absent from the Athens conclusions.
The habit of exporting “light” versions of European cultural initiatives to
the EMP was already established with the “European Year of Intercultural
Dialogue 2008”, decided upon with programmes, strategies, and a proper
budget in December 2006. At the very last minute, in November 2007, the
EMP Foreign Ministers decided to add also a Mediterranean aspect to it, with
launching the “2008 Euro-Mediterranean Year of Dialogue between Cultures”,
with no detailed programme and strategy, and without budget. Applicants
from non-EU countries were not admitted to Calls for Proposals under the
European Dialogue Year 2008 – at times when most of the programmes of the
European Commission in Education and Research are now open to applicants
196
from countries covered by the European Neighbourhood and Partnership
Programme (ENP) which includes the Mediterranean neighbours.
The Athens Conference, as much as all other Euromed Ministerial
Conferences before, did not include any possibility for non-EU countries to
participate in financial decisions. Almost all budgets for the EMP are decided
upon within the EU’s structures, and follow its administrative and financial
rules. Everything is ”project”, leaving little space for synergies and strategies,
and not much room for joint decision-making. The language of development
assistance divides partners into “donors” and “beneficiaries”. This applies,
unfortunately, also to the first and only cultural institution jointly established
and jointly financed by the Member States of the EMP, the Anna Lindh EuroMediterranean Foundation for the Dialogue between Cultures (ALF). In the
perspective of the European Commission, this institution established by
intergovernmental agreement is just one among thousands of projects.
Its rules are set by a grant contract awarded by the European Commission,
since this contract has a higher volume than any single government’s
contribution. The ALF receives less than 2 million Euros per year from the
European Commission; the envisaged 50 per cent increase does not alter the
dimensions. In relation to the 16 billion Euros provided for the EMP from the
EC general budget since 1995 – out of which roughly 90 per cent are spent on
bilateral agreements between the EC and individual Mediterranean countries
– such investments are marginal. Expectations at the ALF are in stark contrast
to its human and financial resources. Due to a lack of financial allocations
from both the EC and Member States, the Foundation had to cancel the only
major event planned in the light of the Dialogue Year – holding the BJCEM
Biennale for Young Artists from Europe and the Mediterranean for the first
time in the Southern Mediterranean region, outside Europe. It had to be
relocated to Europe, where governments are more easily inclined to finance
cultural projects on their own territory. The activity mentioned in the Athens
conclusions as “main activity” for the Euro-Mediterranean Dialogue Year
are the “1001 Actions for Dialogue”, with a total financial support from the
ALF of 300,000 Euros, thinly spread among its 39 National Networks which
bear the bulk of resources needed for actions in all countries. The European
Commission provides 10 million Euros for flagship activities organized in its
member countries for the “European” Dialogue Year 2008.
There is an urgent need for re-orienting cultural cooperation across the
Mediterranean within the global context. Adding some more resources –
which is expected after the transformation of the EMP into the “Union for
the Mediterranean” – will not alter the nature of a cultural cooperation across
197
the Mediterranean, caught in the cage of EU-led cultural policies. As long as
cultural cooperation across the Mediterranean is conceived as an “aspect”
of prefabricated EU policies, it will remain “culture light”. The Anna Lindh
Foundation, with its own intergovernmental and civil society structures,
provides important elements for designing Mediterranean cultural
cooperation in its own right, co-owned by Northern and Southern partners.
As soon as decision-making in the new Union for the Mediterranean would
include financial decisions, another important factor for co-ownership would
be established. The missing link would be a direct orientation within the new
global context of cultural policies, thus overcoming the traditional habit of
adapting EU cultural policies to the Mediterranean region as prerequisite for
any new initiative.
Common ground for cultural cooperation
The following summary analysis of selected key documents focuses on
main elements that seem to be widely shared and can thus be considered
as common ground for contemporary cultural cooperation across the
Mediterranean.
International declarations on cultural diversity
The World Conference on Cultural Policies for Development (Stockholm 1998)
endorsed key principles outlined in the “Report by the World Commission on
Culture and Development (1996)”, in particular the appreciation of cultural
diversity and cultural creativity. Cultural policies “should aim to create a
sense of the nation as a multifaceted community – – rooted in values that
can be shared by all men and women and give access, space and voice to all
its members”. In qualifying social integration as a main objective of cultural
policies which should be integrated into development and social policies,
the Conference endorsed also the general thrust of the Report In from the
margins, presented by the Council of Europe’s Task Force.
The Council of Europe’s Declaration on Cultural Diversity (2000) promotes
“the co-existence and exchange of culturally different practices” and “the
provision and consumption of culturally different services and products”.
UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity (2001) recognizes multiple,
overlapping and dynamic cultural identities of individuals and groups in its
definition of cultural pluralism. Cultural diversity is qualified as living treasure
“that must not be perceived as being unchanging heritage but as a process
guaranteeing survival of humanity”.
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The Council of Europe elaborated further its Diversity Declaration
in the context of conflict prevention (Opatija Declaration, 2003), interfaith cooperation (Volga Forum Declaration, 2006) and ICD Strategy (Faro
Declaration, 2005) which marks the framework for formal cooperation with
Southern Mediterranean partners, including Memoranda of Cooperation
with ALECSO and the ALF.
Cultures and civilizations are also understood in plural in ISESCO’s Islamic
Declaration on Cultural Diversity (2004) that acknowledges “the cultural and
civilizational specificities of a nation and a people” and “the right of individuals
and groups alike to preserve their cultures and civilizations”. The Declaration
promotes inter-cultural and inter-religious dialogue “receptive to the plural
cultural convictions and beliefs”, and “cultural exchange and interaction
between innovators in Islamic countries and their counterparts from other
countries, giving impetus to creativity – –.”
The Ministerial Meeting of the Non-Aligned Movement adopted in
September 2007 in Teheran a Declaration and Programme of Action on Human
Rights and Diversity that is very explicit concerning the human right to
cultural self-determination in calling “upon all members of the international
community to guarantee the right of all to have access to a culture of their
own and to develop it creatively, as well as their right and duty to know
and respect other cultures”. Governments are encouraged to promote
“understanding, tolerance and friendship among human beings in all their
diversity of religion, belief, culture and language”.
ALECSO’s Abu Dhabi Declaration on the Arab Position on Dialogue and
Diversity (2006) adds important standards for an intercultural dialogue
about diversity. This Declaration establishes benchmarks for overcoming
traditional forms of sterile “representative” dialogues with participants
mainly propagating their own achievements and cultural backgrounds. The
“principles for dialogue among equals” and the proposed methodology
advocate “development of the spirit of self-criticism in order to eliminate the
inherited and unfortunate tendency to overrate oneself and look down on
the Other”.
International conventions on diversity and human rights
The Report of the World Commission on Culture and Development (1996)
had prepared the ground for the new understanding of cultural diversity as
humanity’s common heritage. Thus enlarging the previous notion of a world
cultural heritage, the Report proposed standard-setting also for the soBuilding Peace by Intercultural Dialogue
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called “intangible heritage”. With reference to safeguarding cultural diversity,
the Universal Declaration (2001) advocates specific standards for intangible
heritage which were outlined two years later in the UNESCO Convention
on this subject (2003). The convention covers five domains: oral traditions
including languages; performing arts; social practices; traditional knowledge,
and traditional craftsmanship. It is the first cultural convention establishing
a “human rights clause” in stating that “consideration will be given solely to
such intangible cultural heritage as is compatible with existing human rights
instruments”.4
This clause was considered necessary in order to prevent possible conflicts
between standards on preservation and promotion of diversity and universal
human rights. It is further developed in UNESCO Convention on the Protection
and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions (2005). Article 2.1 of this
convention states: “Cultural diversity can be protected and promoted only
if human rights and fundamental freedoms, such as freedom of expression,
information and communication, as well as the ability of individuals to choose
cultural expressions, are guaranteed. No one may invoke the provisions of
this Convention in order to infringe human rights and fundamental freedoms
as enshrined in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights or guaranteed by
international law, or to limit the scope thereof.” In this context, it was possible
to agree on the principle of “the recognition of equal dignity of and respect
for all cultures”.
New formats of cultural reporting
The new focus on modernization of cultural policies following the Stockholm
Conference was translated by the Council of Europe in 1998 into an ambitious
programme of reviews in the form of annually updated country profiles. The
Compendium of Cultural Policies and Trends in Europe is an online information
and monitoring system. In 2007, its eighth edition was published, covering
already 41 countries and aiming at servicing all 49 member countries of the
European Cultural Convention. Cultural diversity and intercultural dialogue
are two of several thematic areas in which statistical and other relevant
information are collected and processed. Possibly the most important aspect
for these two areas is the regular selection of good practices. The information
system is open to exchange and cooperation with other regions. It is being
offered as a tool for monitoring the UNESCO Convention on Cultural Diversity at
the European level. The signature of the cooperation memorandum between
4
UNESCO 2003, Art. 2.
200
the Anna Lindh Euro-Mediterranean Foundation and the Council of Europe
in October 2005 was followed by the inclusion of exchange and cooperation
with the Compendium project into the medium-term programme of the
dialogue instrument for the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership 2007–2009.
The Compendium project was also presented to cultural conferences in Latin
America and South-East Asia.
The first World Culture Report of UNESCO (2000) was an experiment in
covering world-wide trends and developments. The sections on cultural
diversity are of particular interest: They include the first attempt at correlating
statistical data on bio-diversity with those on cultural diversity (exemplified
by linguistic diversity).The new Medium-Term Strategy of UNESCO for 2008–
2013 includes the project of further developing reporting and analysis on
this issue.
In recent years, “diversity monitoring” became a new standard for reviewing
the effects of policies aimed at social integration of immigrant populations.
Thousands of public institutions and private companies have added
information on ethnic, linguistic or even religious diversity of their employees
and their customers into their annual reports. Particularly interesting was the
inclusion of diversity monitoring into annual reviews of national media and
international media associations. One of the first studies to apply this tool to
content analysis of broadcasting was the study on Racism and cultural diversity
in the media undertaken in 2000 and 2001 by the European Monitoring
Centre on Racism and Xenophobia (EUMC) in Vienna, Austria. It inspired the
European Broadcasting Union (EBU) and many of its members as well as the
Euro-Mediterranean Association of TV Broadcasters (COPEAM) to adopt such
reporting for their constituencies and to publish guidelines on benchmarks
and good practices in the management of cultural diversity.
The most comprehensive world report on diversity was published by the
United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) as its Human Development
Report 2004 – Cultural liberty in today’s diverse world. This report is a unique
combination of statistical and policy analysis. It has found “little empirical
evidence that cultural differences and clashes over values are in themselves
a cause of violent conflict”. On the contrary, ”it is often the suppression of
culturally identified groups that leads to tensions”. The Report provides ample
evidence for the growing number of international declarations and strategies
opposing any association of cultural or religious groups with violence. It
supports all ambitions for conducting ICD as a dialogue among equals, as
expressed in recent declarations on diversity and ICD.
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Another innovative format of reporting was presented by the World
Economic Forum (WEF) in January 2008 with the first issue on “Islam and the
West” of an Annual Report on the State of Dialogue. The Report relates polls
on public perception of Islam–West encounters in various countries to policy
analysis and to featuring of programmes and projects. It covers international
politics, integration, religion, education and the media. Culture and arts are
not directly the focus of this report which advocates mainly action in the
fields of migration, education and the media as well as in inter-faith dialogue.
Concerning ICD in general, the report provides evidence for the “centrality
of respect” in Islam-West relations, and also for cultural diversity within the
countries covered.
The recent report for the European Commission on national approaches
to ICD in Europe, published in March 2008, has the programmatic title
Sharing Diversity. It proposes a more central role of ICD in a number of EC
programmes and strategies. The report itself relates, somehow similar to
the WEF Report, data on public opinion to an analysis of diversity, mainly
concerning migration, and activities in four selected sectors: education,
culture (arts and heritage), youth and sports. Taking inspiration from the
Council of Europe’s annually updated Compendium exercise, case studies
and good practices are featured throughout the report. The report provides
evidence for both that visible differences play a major role in discrimination,
but also that the majority of EU citizens hold views in support of diversity and
ICD. It covers 34 countries – 27 EU member countries and seven candidate
countries –respective partners in the EEA/EFTA economic associations.
It provides evidence for the argument that ICD has become increasingly
important for national legislation and educational, cultural or social policies
and their relationship with EU policies5.
Novel agendas and strategies for ICD
Ten years ago, the terms “dialogue between cultures” (Stockholm
Conference) or “dialogue among civilizations” (United Nations General
Assembly proclamation of the Dialogue Year 2001, following an initiative
of the Islamic Republic of Iran in 1998) or ”dialogue among cultures and
civilizations” (UNESCO) were predominantly used. Since these terms gave
rise to some misunderstandings, as if such dialogue would be conducted
by “representatives” and not by individuals and associations fully enjoying
their human rights and their “freedom to make choices” (UNDP), the term
5
Eric Arts project group 2008.
202
”intercultural dialogue” is now increasingly used. UNESCO uses, in its
Medium Term Strategy 2008–2013, both terms simultaneously; the European
Commission (with the European Year for ICD 2008) and the Council of Europe
use mainly the term ICD. A closer analysis of selected agendas and strategies
indicates that such terminological differences are not related to substantive
differences, and that the understanding of cultural diversity is shared by the
international community as a feature of relations between as well as within
countries.
Almost all core elements of contemporary ICD strategies are already
provided in the Global Agenda for Dialogue among Civilizations, adopted by the
UN General Assembly on 21 November 2001 at the end of the Dialogue Year.
This agenda defines dialogue as “a process between and within civilizations,
founded on inclusion, and a collective desire to learn, uncover and examine
assumptions, unfold shared meaning and core values and integrate multiple
perspectives through dialogue”. All of the ten elements listed below (in the
conclusion) as shared ingredients of ICD are directly or indirectly covered in
the principles and programme of action of this first Global ICD Agenda.
The following selected agenda and strategies do not differ in substance from
the UN Global Agenda; they focus either on specific regional commitments
and/or on specific fields or actors of ICD.
Dialogue between peoples and cultures in the Euro-Mediterranean Area is the
title of the report by a high level advisory group, Prodi Groupe des Sages,
established at the initiative of the President of the EC and published in
October 2003. This report was the framework for the establishment of the
Anna Lindh Foundation two years later. It provides substantive arguments
for the need of ICD addressing the structural problems of the whole region,
which is rich in diversity but widely lacking mutual respect between
peoples and cultures. The strategy focuses on three priorities: learning
about diversity; promoting mobility and exchanges; and the media as an
instrument of equality and mutual knowledge.
The role of civil society in this region was the focus of a EuroMediterranean conference in February 2006 in Algiers, ending with an
Algiers Declaration for Shared Vision of the Future and an action plan. The
conference was organised by the European Movement together with
its southern partners, including the Anna Lindh Foundation and the
Bibliotheca Alexandrina. The Declaration addresses problems caused
by too much governmental action in the region and leading to a lack of
ownership of the Euro-Mediterranean process among citizens. The action
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plan addresses, therefore, the need to reach out to and involve civil society
as one of three priorities, side by side with ICD through education and
integration of immigrants.
For Europe, more than 200 European and national civil society
organizations have recently established the Rainbow Platform, a civil
society platform for ICD. The Rainbow Paper (2008) focuses on migration,
education and learning in the widest sense, including informal learning
through arts and culture. In a similar vein, the Euro-Mediterranean NonGovernmental Platform, in its “conclusions and recommendations to
the Euro-Med Ministerial Conference on Culture” in Athens, proposes to
“create a regional specific programme of support to contemporary artistic
creation”. The Platform and the Euro-Mediterranean Forum of Cultures
(FEMEC) insist in applying the term “contemporary” – hitherto mainly used
for Western arts and creation – to all cultures.
Widespread frustration about shallow results of so many dialogue
events motivated a number of organizations to convene a conference in
June 2005 in Rabat, Morocco, on ”Fostering Dialogue among Cultures and
Civilizations through Concrete and Sustainable Initiatives”. The convenors
of this meeting and signatories of the Rabat Commitment were ALECSO,
ISESCO, UNESCO, the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC), the
Anna Lindh Foundation, the Danish Centre for Culture and Development
and the Council of Europe. The uniqueness of the Rabat Commitment is
manifested in a joint document presenting pledges of the participating
organizations for close collaboration in concrete action, ranging from
education (with a joint teacher-training programme on cultural diversity
and religious pluralism by ALECSO, the Anna Lindh Foundation and the
Council of Europe) to culture and communication. Cultural projects include
“the power of music and musical creativity”, and the transformation of
museums into multicultural spaces, as well as synergies between bi- and
multilateral cultural agreements.
The UN project of an Alliance of Civilizations results from a joint
initiative by Spain and Turkey. The Report presented by a High Level
Group in November 2006 departs from acknowledging that “the anxiety
and confusion caused by the ‘clash of civilizations’ theory regrettably has
distorted the terms of the discourse on the real nature of the predicament
the world is facing”. Re-asserting that cultural diversity is “a driving force of
human progress”, the Report proposes building bridges through action in
four priority fields: education, youth, migration, and the media. Three of
204
these fields are already translated into projects which are under way, with
a clearing house on learning and teaching about religious pluralism, a
Middle East Fund for youth employment, and a rapid response mechanism
for the media concerning disputes over defamation of religion or other
sensitive issues. The regional focus of the Alliance project is the Middle
East, but the concept is on a world wide scale.
The White Paper on ICD of the Council of Europe entitled Living Together
as Equals in Dignity was adopted by the Ministers’ Committee of the 27
Member States on 8 May 2008. The paper is based on the conviction
that an ICD aiming at reconciling respect for different identities with
the need to strengthen social cohesion must be based on universal
human rights and fundamental freedoms. The strategy sets out what is
needed to promote ICD through five policy approaches: democratic
governance of cultural diversity, democratic citizenship and participation,
learning and teaching intercultural competences, spaces for intercultural
dialogue, intercultural dialogue in international relations. It underlines
the importance of engendering spaces for dialogue that are open to all,
and in this, the specific role of town planning and urban spaces, physical
spaces like streets, markets and shops, schools and universities, cultural
and social centres, youth clubs, churches, synagogues and mosques,
company meeting rooms and workplaces, museums, libraries and other
leisure facilities, but also virtual spaces like the media.
The role and potential of artists and arts, cultural creativity
and heritage
A large number of contemporary strategies for ICD tend to put specific weight
on education, youth, and the media. Although these fields of action are fully
justified, given present needs and the virtues of promoting the enlarged
notion of “culture”, it seems timely to call for renewed attention to the core
elements of cultural expression: creative arts and cultural heritage (tangible
and intangible). Arts and heritage should not be reduced to vehicles of
pedagogical action. In an international context characterized by an increasing
number of verbal dialogue events, the potential of promoting dialogue,
cooperation and understanding through creative arts and co-ownership of
heritage deserves to be more fully developed. Music and creative arts provide
a common language across linguistic, ethnic, or religious frontiers. Nothing
is closer to the appreciation of diversity and mutual enrichment than music,
arts and cultural heritage.
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The European Foundation for the Arts and Heritage (EFAH) and the
European Cultural Foundation (ECF) expressed their “particular interest in
demonstrating that art and culture have a special role in ICD because they
question prejudices and stereotypes, break taboos, trigger curiosity, play
with images and words, inspire and connect. They have the potential to give
an inspirational and educational dimension to political endeavours, and can
provide the spark for citizens to become interested in the challenge of ICD.”6
In a similar vein, the Rabat Commitment (2005) calls upon “all actors engaged
in intercultural and inter-civilizational dialogue to tap the power of music
and musical creativity”.
Cross-Mediterranean cooperation in the arts
The European Cultural Foundation (ECF) published, in February 2008, the
most comprehensive report on critical issues in arts cooperation between
Europe and its Southern neighbours on the other shore of the Mediterranean,
An Alternative Gaze. The Report qualifies most of arts exhibitions and festivals
as “unilateral, not reciprocal”: Art from Europe is brought to other countries,
and art from the Arab States region is brought to Europe, “Otherness” is more
in focus than exchange or cooperation. The report features also an increasing
number of innovative projects, from music to arts festivals which are jointly
organised by partners from North and South and focus on exchange and
joint production. Generally, the report supports some optimism, in reflecting
the growing number of cultural initiatives and operators in the South and
increasing interest of European partners in cooperation among equals. The
report proposes support to more direct cooperation between arts projects in
South-East Europe and in the Arab States region.
Resulting from cooperative research between European and Arab
philosophers and arts specialists, the recent publication The Arts in the
Dialogue between Cultures reflects the multiple perspectives in Europe and
the Arab World on pictures in everyday life, on literature and music7.
Museums
The “Museum With No Frontiers” (MWNF) is one of the few cultural projects
of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership that was able to develop its own
structures and financing. It started with promoting the concept of digital (and
thus widely accessible) museum collections and developed a cooperative
6
7
Rainbow Platform 2008, 3.
Wulf et al. 2007/2008.
206
approach between museum experts and artists from North and South. Two
of the most interesting recent projects are the ”Young MWNF”, bridging
between museum pedagogy and arts education at schools, and “Discover
Islamic Art”, the first project on Islamic Arts jointly undertaken by specialists
from Europe and the Arab States.
Culture and music festivals
The Biennale of Young Artists from Europe and the Mediterranean (BJCEM),
founded in 1985, was the first arts festival organised in cooperation
between local and national arts associations from North and South (today:
75 institutions in 20 countries). The Biennale invites young artists (under 30
years) to present their skills and talent in seven areas, which increasingly
involve everyday culture: visual arts (including performance and other action
in public places), applied arts (including fashion), show, literature, music
(including DJs), gastronomy, and moving images. The project has tried for
many years to hold the Biennale in one of the Southern countries – the last
project in Egypt could not be realised due to lack of both local and European
funding for such unconventional cooperative events outside Europe; the
13th BJCEM Biennale was organised from 22 to 31 May 2008 in Puglia, Italy.
Among the Arts Festivals searching new ground and operating within
an international art discourse are the Istanbul and Sharjah Biennials and
the new Art Dubai. Bringing arts to public spaces is a common feature. The
Istanbul Biennial recently reached out to other cities, with its programme
“culture in action”. It includes art production in public space, and bringing
artists together with visitors of shopping centres.
The European Arts Festivals Association has recently expressed a keen
interest in introducing more cooperation and exchange in European Arts
Festivals. In its Declaration on Intercultural Dialogue (2008) the arts promoters
express their interest in contributing to transforming multicultural into
intercultural societies, to strengthen the coexistence of different cultural
identities and beliefs – – and to look respectfully at the differences of
individual and local experiences”. The Declaration expresses commitment
“to give artists from all over the world the opportunity of increasing and
developing their artistic experience, thus initiating a process of mutual
exchange of artistic excellence among different countries.” In this context, the
Association highlights the importance of artists-in-residence-programmes,
allowing “artists to live and work in new contexts and to combine their own
experience with the local one”.
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In the field of music, the Marseille-based project Aide aux Musiques
Innovatrices (AMI), founded in 1999, has inspired a new wave of mutual
interest and joint production between creators of contemporary popular
music in Europe and the Arab region. A series of Euro-Mediterranean Music
Festivals, recording of cross-over and joint performances, and a system of
awards for musical exchange has been organised. The most recent example
is the “Monte Carlo–Doualiya Music Award for the Dialogue between
Cultures”, established in 2007 by RFI, with financial support from the ALF, in
partnership with the Festival of Jerash, Jordan; the Palestinian Edward Said
National Conservatory of Music and the Austrian International Music and
Media Centre. The award criteria focus on young performers’ creativity in
using the power of music to build bridges between countries and cultures.
Mobility
Exchange of ideas in word and image, exchange of cultural goods and services,
and exchange of persons are the three classical aspects of mobility which
are reflected in virtually every international cultural agreement concluded
over the last 60 years. Almost every local cultural identity now includes
cultural elements that have found their way into the most remote and closed
communities, thus forming new “transcultural identities” as a key dimension
of cultural diversity in the 21st century8. It seems, however, that mobility of
persons is much more unevenly distributed than mobility of information,
goods and services.
“Free international movement of artists” and their freedom “to practice
their art in the country of their choice” is among the international standards
agreed upon with the UNESCO Recommendation concerning the Status of the
Artist (1980). Artists and other cultural actors from the Arab region, and, to a
lesser extent, artists from non-EU Member States of South-East and Eastern
Europe, are in a particularly difficult situation.
Recent data from the World Observatory on the Status of the Artist and
the recent study on Artistic Mobility in the Mediterranean, undertaken by the
Roberto Cimetta Fund in conjunction with the Council of Europe, ECF and
UNESCO (2007), reveal a number of root causes and obstacles: surprisingly,
it is, in many cases, not the post 9/11 visa regime that is considered the
most important factor. It is the lack of funding opportunities and of relevant
mobility programmes, followed by a lack of information about the few
existing mobility schemes available for artists and other cultural actors. In
8
Robbins 2006.
208
addition, existing funding schemes give support mainly on a case-by-case
and individual basis.
A Comprehensive strategy for mobility in the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership,
presented by the Anna Lindh Foundation and the Robert Cimetta Fund in
autumn 2006 to several civil society and intergovernmental meetings, goes,
therefore, beyond advocating facilitation of visa procedures. It recommends
“a coherent cultural strategy with measures for improving conditions of equal
partnership between North and South”, including “training and provision of
advisory services enabling cultural actors – – in the South to organize a larger
number of exchange and cooperation projects in the South”. The strategy
recommends also to “transform support schemes to individual mobility into
fostering exchanges”. Even grant schemes which are deliberately based on
the principle of equality (such as the Anna Lindh Foundation’s 2+2 formula for
North-South cooperation) noted a significant dominance of project leaders
and coordinators from the North, and have, therefore, included elements for
capacity-building among cultural actors in the South.
The same applies to the European Cultural Foundation (ECF). Concerning
mobility and ICT, the 1997 World Congress on the implementation of the
Recommendation on the Status of the Artist concludes: “the new technologies
cannot be a substitute for direct contact between artists and their public or
for traditional branches of the arts”.
The Report on Dialogue between Peoples and Cultures in the EuroMediterranean Area by Prodi Groupe des Sages in 2003 warns against
restricting exchange and networking to virtual communication, since only
meetings in physical locations, with face-to-face contact, can offer ”experience
of all aspects of dialogue”.
Conclusion
The following core elements, as elaborated in the Declarations, Conventions,
agendas and strategies analyzed above, can be considered common ground
for cultural cooperation in the global context. They could, therefore, directly
be used as shared values of cultural cooperation across the Mediterranean,
and become a toolbox for overcoming the “culture light” syndrome that has
affected cultural relations across the Mediterranean:
t Cultural diversity between and within countries is a common heritage
of humankind,
t cultural diversity and promotion of creativity are essential for
sustainable development, economic development as well as allBuilding Peace by Intercultural Dialogue
209
round personal development,
t a human rights-based understanding of culture as both heritage and
t
t
t
t
t
t
t
space for access and creativity: cultural policies must be based on
universally shared human rights and fundamental freedoms,
the “human rights clause” of international standards concerning
cultural diversity,
recognition of multiple and overlapping cultural identities of persons
and groups,
individuals and associations as actors in ICD; the role of civil society,
equality, dignity and mutual respect as key factors of ICD,
the understanding of ICD as an opportunity for learning,
preservation, development and management of cultural diversity,
respecting identities, fostering pluralism and participation, and
promotion of creativity as objectives of cultural policies in close
interaction with other fields of policy,
priority fields of action are education, culture, media; priority groups
are youth, migrants and women.
These standards invite governments to link international with national and
local cultural policies, and to enhance the contribution of cultural policies
to improving the quality of life of citizens at large. In promoting “dialogue”
as an encounter that “starts with the assumption that the other might (also)
be right” (as outlined in one of the masterpieces of 20th century philosophy,
Hans-Georg Gadamer’s Truth and Method, and reflected in a number of
classical works of Arab philosophy), cultural cooperation and ICD among
equals can transform into action the body of international commitments on
cultural diversity as a common heritage of humankind, which are reflecting
widespread acknowledgment of the constant process of mutual enrichment
of cultures.
It will be interesting to monitor the post-Athens development of cultural
cooperation across the Mediterranean. There will be, among other things
related to the global context, possible synergies with the Council of Europe
which will organize, for the first time, a joint Ministers of Culture Conference
on ICD with ALECSO, ISESCO, and the ALF 2–3 December 2008 in Baku,
Azerbaijan.
210
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World and adapting them to international changes”. Adopted by the 5th
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concrete and sustainable initiatives (ALECSO, ISESCO, OIC, ALF, UNESCO,
Council of Europe, DCCD), 16 June 2005, in UNESCO, Dialogue among
Civilizations, Paris 2007.
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Intercultural Dialogue. Brussels 7 January 2008.
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General Assembly on 9 November 2001. Document A/Res/56/6.
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2006. New York: United Nations.
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World. New York.
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16–20 June 1997.”
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Cultural Expressions.
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Fostering Dialogue among Cultures and Civilizations through Concrete and
Sustainable Initiatives.” Rabat, Morocco, 14–16 June 2005. Paris 2007.
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Dialogue between Cultures. Europe and its Muslim Neighbours. Berlin 2007
(German); Paris 2008 (French); Rabat 2008 (Arabic).
Islamic Cairo imagined: from a historical
city slum to a time machine for tourism?
Susanna Myllylä
Introduction
Whether in Beijing, Tampere, or Cairo, old historical city centres are becoming
silently obsolete, thus losing their traditional identity. It is happening due
to modernization and urban gentrification processes comprising authorities’
neglect, land speculation and demolition, increase in property prices, and
out-migration of low-income population. In many instances, these areas
serve today as so-called historical city slums, and it is rather difficult to trace
the original buildings which have been covered by newer urban fabric. Thus
some cities have awakened to the preservation of their vanishing historical
core areas.
In my essay, I will discuss the situation of Islamic or historic Cairo, and the
contesting images and claims that different interest groups or actors have
about the city. The actors discussed include the Egyptian government, various
international donors and institutions (e.g. United Nations), the Egyptian and
international planners and conservationists and, last but not least, the local
residents. Making an overall plan to develop tourism and to preserve this
national and global cultural heritage domain while, at the same time, meeting
the needs of the residents seems to be a very tricky task. A question arises:
is Islamic Cairo’s upgrading primarily done for global audience, or tourism, at
the expense of the local needs? On the other hand, this case epitomizes the
difficulties that developing countries often face, when receiving international
pressure to both improve and sustain the urban heritage, and simultaneously
to upgrade local peoples’ livelihoods.
Islamic expressions in space
Using the concept Islamic City bears some complex entailments to be
considered. Janet L. Abu-Lughod reminds us that, since Islam has expanded
into wide regions with disparate traditions of urban form, there exists a great
diversity in Islamic architecture, and it is not relevant to discuss a single
Islamic system of city building, or Islamic City. However, she remarks that
Susanna Myllylä
216
there “appear to be certain basic ‘deep structures’ to the language of Islamic
expression in space”, and she also discerns recurring idioms (or colloquial
metaphors) commonly found within Islamic urban patterns. These are: i) sūq
or bazaar; ii) the residential court; iii) the hidden entranceway to individual
quarters; iv) the tri-fold division of space (private, controlled semi-private, and
public); and v) a clear segregation into male and female spheres (presumably
an underlying cause of the previous features).1 The deeper structure, in turn,
was constituted in the legal system, through regulations of property relations
and by legal notions of proper behaviour in space. In addition, the dynamic
between building and context has always been part of the Islamic system
known as waqf.2 This is the case in Cairo’s Fatimid Mosque of Salih Tala’i (1160),
for example, where the rents of the twelve shops built into its façade used to
assist in the costs of the mosque’s upkeep and personnel. Besides mosques,
houses and palaces, the Islamic city also included madrasas (schools),
hammams (public baths), wikalas or caravanserais (khans), and sabil-kuttabs
(covered water fountains combined with school classes upstairs)3. The basic
urban unit was hara, a resident quarter, according to which also various
ethnic groups were segregated in the old city4.
Islamic Cairo comprises a land area of nearly four square kilometres, and
it is located to the east of central Cairo megapolis. The city was built during
numerous dynasties, namely the Fatimids (969–1168), the Ayyubids (1169–
1250), the Mamluks (1250–1348) and the Ottomans (1517–1798), each
leaving their marks in the urban fabric.5 From the steps of the minaret of Ibn
Tulun Mosque, which draws a borderline for the historic area in the south,
one can clearly see Cairo’s division into modern and traditional subcities.
The mosque’s 40 meters tall minaret, resembling a tower of Babel, serves
as a surprisingly tranquil site to watch the busy city; in peace from above
as loud traffic voices become fainted. Its open courtyard represents both
a modern urban anomaly and a peaceful oasis in the midst of horizontally
and vertically growing megacity, where empty space is a scarce and highly
competed commodity. In the west, Port Said Street is the border or bridge
between different worlds. In the horizon of the northern boundary loom Bab
al-Nasr and Bab al-Futuh gates, along with the city wall. In the northeast, one
1
Abu-Lughod 1978.
Pl. awqaf, transfer of money or property donated to an institution. Williams 2002;
Abu-Lughod 1978.
3
See e.g. Raymond 1993.
4
Ibid., 277–278.
5
Raymond 1993; Rodenbeck 1998, 66–71.
2
Islamic Cairo imagined
217
can see Al-Azhar Mosque and University as well as Khan el-Khalili bazaar.
In the south-east, numerous domes and minarets of the largest mosques –
Mohammad ‘Ali, Al-Rifai and Sultan Hassan Mosque – dominate the view, as
well as the entire Citadel of Mohammad ‘Ali.
The major spine of the historic Cairo is the Al-Muizz Street, stretching from
the northern Bab al-Futuh to the southern Bab Zuwayla gate with a distance
of 1.5 km. Continuing southwards from the gate and towards the adjacent
Mosque of Salih Tala’i is the Tentmakers’ market, Radwan Bey Qasaba, which
is an extension of the major spine. The long market avenue, qasaba, is also
situated on the north-south axis between the northern gates and Ibn Tulun
Mosque. Each its section has a different name, like the Tentmakers or the
Brassmakers, and the medieval historian Al-Maqrisi counted a total of 12,000
shops within its area6. This Tentmakers area is also Cairo’s only remaining
covered market, built in the 17th century7. Its roof is dilapidated by time, and
sunlight shines through the wooden ceiling. From the Tentmakers’ area, by
following Darb al-Ahmar Street and towards the Mosque Sultan Hassan,
the route finally leads to the mosque of Ibn Tulun. Furthermore, the whole
Islamic city is divided into two parts by the east-west route, Al-Azhar Road,
and extensive medieval cemeteries, “Cities of the Dead”, surround the entire
area with their important historical monuments.
Unlike in modern city centres, which immediately become empty as
the shops and lights are closed, Cairo seems to raise its stamina and offer
warmth and security when the dark falls. This is a special case of historic
Cairo, which seems to still endorse some of the traditional lifestyles that have
attracted visitors for centuries. For the Cairenes it has remained a place for
social, religious and commercial activities. An Egyptian writer and journalist
describes the core of historic Cairo as follows:
“– – Al Azhar University and the Al Hussein mosque, surrounded by
dozens of other mosques that are lit up and come alive at night, calling
to one another with the ebbing and flowing of the vast Cairo crowd
– – I never tire of weaving my way with friends at night through the
latticework of streets and alleyways in this neighbourhood where
the soul of Cairo never sleeps. Anything can happen on Al Batiniya
Street.”8
6
Rodenbeck 1998, 104.
See Raymond 1993, 236–237.
8
Gharib 2000.
7
Susanna Myllylä
218
When looking at the view from the roof of the Mosque of al-Mu’ayyad,
attached to the Bab Zuwayla gate, one can not only see a large number of
minarets and domes, however. The “second city” phenomenon is related to
the problems of poor housing conditions, as rooftops are used for keeping
livestock and poultry, as well for workshops, and as rubbish dumps9. At the
street level, old buildings disappear behind various everyday activities of the
local people, such as drying of laundries on the old palace walls, or cooking
on the alleys. The character of the old city is imbued in the busy life of the
narrow streets, where the local people express their traditional right for the
use of public space – for family events and the like. Here, the concept of alFina is particularly meaningful, describing the relationship between the inner
space of a building, its frontage, and part of the street pavement10.
Despite its grand architectural and traditional cultural heritage, Islamic
Cairo today thus also represents one of the most densely populated and
poorest parts of the city. However, before going to the historic Cairo’s
contemporary development questions, I would like to bring up its Northern
connections with a short historical view to the images of the early visitors
from the North.
Old Cairo seen by Finnish and other Nordic Orientalists
Cairo’s cosmopolitan city landscapes and lifestyles, especially concerning
its historical quarters, offered an ideal place for escapism and romanticism
from the 18th to early 20th century visitors, and Nordic travellers were not an
exception. Our famous Orientalist, professor G.A. Wallin stayed nearly half a
year in the old quarters of Cairo, where he ended up living in a caravanserai,
or a roadside inn combined with a warehouse. These places, meant for the
reception of merchants and their goods, were built in multi-storey houses
so that camels and other animals could stay in the bottom floor, while the
men and their goods were accommodated in the upper floors. Edward W.
Lane reported that, in the beginning of the 19th century, there were about
200 wikalas in the city area, three-fourths of which were within the part
that constituted the original city11. In 1844, Wallin described his housing
preparations:
“– – I took a room from a big wekâle, where mainly the Greek lived,
but that wing where I settled down, was nearly empty, as there was
9
Myllylä 2001, 78–79; Myllylä 1994.
Antoniou 1998.
11
Lane 1836/1989, 316.
10
219
only a hearty tailor living there. It is located in the busiest part of the
city, Gemelije, close to the large Khan el-khalîli bazaar and quite close
to the largest mosque, Azhar. I must now take care of purchasing the
most necessary furniture there, because the rooms, which are two and
a kitchen, had no more than bare walls and about three inches high
martaba bricked in one wall. This martaba, equipped with mattresses
and cushions, and covered by a cotton quilt, serves a typical divan
here. Fortunately there are windows and glasses here, which are rare
in this city; but many window panes are broken and frames so sparse
that currently starting khamasîn (hot wind) brings flying dust inside.”12
In which one of the many Cairo’s wikalas did Wallin stay then? Although he
did not explicitly name this caravanserai here, by comparing his descriptions to
André Raymond’s work on the Ottoman city structure of Cairo,13 we can assume
that, in Gamaliyya, Wallin most probably stayed in either Musafirkhana, the
“palace of travelers” (built 1779–1788), or – as Wallin’s references to the large
size of the place could suggest – in Wikala Dhulfiqar Katkhuda (1673), one of
Cairo’s greatest caravanserais serving the main centres of coffee trade in the
city and abroad. The latter was a huge building with 35 apartments and 32
warehouses, comprising 2,625 square meters altogether14. Had Wallin arrived
to this caravanserai in our modern times, he unfortunately could not have
entered the building, since its door or entrance is all that is left. Musafirkhana,
in turn, was particularly famous for its wooden ceilings and windows, being
even more splendid than another palace, Bayt al-Suhaymi (1648), one of the
finest examples of the Ottoman domestic architecture. Musafirkhana was
entirely destroyed by fire in 1998. Currently, only 20 wikalas still remain in the
city, and among the best conserved is a wikala called al-Ghouri (1504).
In the late 18th century, a member of the Danish expedition group, the
mathematician Carsten Niebuhr, made detailed notes on Cairo’s urban
structure and trade15. The Swedish explorer Peter Forsskål, born in Helsinki,
was also a member of this group. Besides his botanical and zoological research,
he liked to watch various caravans arriving at Cairo. One caravan could consist
of thousands of camels, and the items they carried ended up to the markets.
Forsskål made note of the contents of the caravans as the tradesmen arrived
12
Aro & Salonen 1989, 48. Translation by the author.
Raymond 1995, 54–57.
14
Raymond 1995, 258–259.
15
Hansen 1963/1996, 94.
13
220
Susanna Myllylä
to market places and caravanserais: from Africa came ivory, speaking parrots,
various ages of slaves and gold sand for alchemists; diamonds were brought
from Mecca, as well as emeralds, pearls, Indian cotton, and musk animals.16
Concerning the local culture, Niebuhr emphasized the importance of
becoming like the Egyptians: for him the “Arab’s rope means same as the
myth’s robe, which makes its carrier invisible”.17 Also Wallin tried to get an
“accurate” habitus when wandering in the streets of Old Cairo:
“– – I had tried to get Oriental apathy and impassivity to my walk and
succeeded in it so well that they considered me a Muslim. – – But I
missed a lot that satisfaction, which can be seen in people’s faces when
they are sitting idle and talking. But now [during the Ramadan], from
where could the contented mind come, when they are not allowed to
enjoy a pipe and coffee?”18
In the late 19th century, due to increasing tourism and also photography,
exotics gave way to new images of poverty and exploitation, which decreased
the Orientalists’ interest to the East19. Exotic views have persisted among the
visitors, and this concerns the observing women as well as men. In the late
1920s, a Finnish traveller, soprano Hjördis Tilgmann alias Pia Ravenna, created
an international career with an Italian opera group around Egypt. She visited
one rich harem in Cairo, and unfolded the local women’s “qualifications” as
follows:
“– – the Egyptian men prefer a plump, if not fat wife. That’s why the
bride is put on fattening diet before the wedding, so that she would
better please the man and also that a better price could be demanded
for her.”20
At about the same time, the Finnish explorer, Professor Arthur Hjelt was
puzzled with another type of local phenomenon while he was looking at the
basic structures of Cairo’s historic buildings:
“Gold treasures did not the pyramids hide in their bosom but rather
limitless amounts of precious building stones. The Arabs benefited
16
Ibid., 91–94.
Ibid., 269.
18
Aro & Salonen 1989, 66, 84. Translation by the author.
19
Öhrnberg 1984.
20
Ravenna 1949, 51. Translation by the author.
17
221
from them diligently when they built mosques to Cairo. Even one of
Egypt’s rulers is said to have ordered the pyramids to be torn down.”21
Today, we can still make similar observations and, indeed, the Egyptians
seem to have well known how to recycle building materials even between the
millenia, including threshold stones for historic Cairo’s mosques and private
houses. In this lengthy process, the Europeans have all too often played the
last part:
“Black granite obelisk of Ramses II [1290–1224 BC], re-used by
Merneptah and Sethos II [1214–1204 BC], perhaps usurped from
Middle Kingdom [2050–1780 BC] – – used as threshold in a house in
Cairo, now in Berlin Museum.”22
Just like the pyramids have had to endure the construction of the historic
Cairo, this previously magnificent urban district faces its own threats in the
modern times. In the following section, I will discuss this and the related
problems.
Threats for the historic district
Unlike other cities, such as Baghdad, the historic Cairo with its monuments in
the walled city of al-Qahira, have never faced a full-on attack from an enemy
force. It is thereby one of the world’s few historic cities left intact. Today, a
visitor can find many of the same monuments and landmarks as those
mentioned in writings by medieval historians, such as Al-Maqrizi and Ibn
Battuta.23 In architectural terms, the historic Cairo is the largest, most complex,
and richest area on the World Heritage list24. Whilst conservative estimates
may state that around 450 monuments should be considered historic and
deserve restoration, according to more liberal views the number is up to 630.
In addition, more than 500 private houses have received a historic status.25
According to the Documentation Centre for Islamic Monuments, in 2000,
there were 175 Islamic monuments in historic Cairo, 138 of which were to
come under the control of the Ministry of Endowment. The Supreme Council
of Antiquities was responsible for another 30, and the remaining seven were
21
Hjelt 1929, 47. Translation by the author.
Rodenbeck 1998, 36–37.
23
Aslan 2006; Raymond 1993.
24
Williams 2002.
25
Aslan 2006.
22
Susanna Myllylä
222
private properties.26 Keith Sutton and Wael Fahmi point out that, while it may
be debatable whether Old Cairo is comparable to other North African medina
cores, there are similarities in their approaches to urban conservation and the
related heritage problems.27
New city quarters were built in the 19th and early 20th centuries, through
indigenous efforts or colonizers, attracting local aristocracy who moved
out from the old city. The places they vacated became filled with a growing
number of working-class and lower-income residents. The implications of
such a demographic change were significant for both social and the physical
conditions in the old area.28
It is estimated that currently more than 300,000 people live in this historical
area, half of whom live below the poverty line29. The previously mentioned
Gamaliyya district is estimated to have 600–800 persons per hectare30.
Cairo, like many other historical city cores, such as Delhi, Dhaka, Karachi and
Istanbul, has its own specific historic city slum. Usually slums are defined
as having high commercial densities and overcrowding, decaying housing
stock, as well as levels of services and infrastructure originally suited for
much smaller populations. The streets are usually too narrow and irregular
to accommodate cars, lorries, and refuse-collection vehicles, and the lack
of public space is very apparent. Dilapidated infrastructure includes leaking
drains and water supply pipes, and electricity and telephone cables – many
of which are unofficial – tend to hang over the streets. Buildings in slums are
often subject to ownership disputes, feuds, claims and counterclaims, all of
which make it difficult for the properties to be redeveloped as, in the mean
time, the buildings go neglected and unmaintained by the authorities. The
economic return is often negated by rent control which, in turn, encourages
owners to withdraw maintenance, hence further accelerating the decline.31
In old areas, there are numerous problems due to neglect and
slummification throughout the system. The overriding problem of Islamic
Cairo is the rising underground water table, most of which is due to the
leaking 19th century pipes and sewers – itself a system overpowered by the
influx of new residents. Old cities often have an underground layer of very
26
El-Aref 2000.
Sutton & Fahmi 2002.
28
Abu-Lughod 1978.
29
Aslan 2006; Antoniou 1998.
30
31
UN-HABITAT 2003, 86–89.
27
223
fine dust (habitation sediment), which creates an artificial water table above
the natural one. Due to the dry conditions of Cairo’s atmosphere, water is
sucked up into the foundations and walls of the monuments. Furthermore
this water, containing sewage and waste, is full of acids that also attack the
stonework of the buildings – a fundamental problem to be dealt with before
any lasting restoration can be done.32
The lack of public services constantly causes irreversible damages to old
buildings. This was the case when the precious Musafirkhana Palace burned
down in 1998: The incident erupted when the residents set fire to piles of refuse
in front of the palace, and its wooden gate caught fire by accident. Flames
quickly spread to the palace itself, and it took five hours for the firefighters
to put out the blaze that devoured the rich woodwork of the palace, leaving
only the walls standing. A fire brigade source blamed the Cairo Governorate’s
poor rubbish collection service for the tragedy.33 Before Musafirkhana’s total
destruction, it was used as an artists’ workshop.
The road tunnel under the busy Al-Azhar district, and other large scale
changes in the use of land have commercialised former residential areas.
This, in turn, has brought in polluting activities, like marble and tinsmith
workshops, that produce waste and noise, thus leading to further degradation
of the area34. However, already medieval Cairo suffered from environmental
conditions we tend to think of as modern phenomena: Air pollution was a
problem even in the 11th century and, the accumulation of waste has been a
side effect of human development throughout the history. Indeed, passing
through Bab Zuwayla gate one walks at the same height as the 11th century
Cairenese rode their camels.35
Dilapidated old buildings and their poor residents are particularly
vulnerable to various natural catastrophes. In 1992, Cairo had a strong
earthquake, which hit the area and further deteriorated the historic buildings.
Within just 20 seconds, over a hundred monuments were affected, and the 14th
and 15th century structures along Shari‘ Saliba (the street from the Mosque of
Ibn Tulun to the Citadel) experienced the worst damage. Minarets and domes
collapsed, and buildings suffered cracks. However, much of the damage was
an exacerbation of conditions resulting from years of neglect and population
32
Williams 2002.
Darwish 1998.
34
35
Rodenbeck 1998, 119, 121.
33
Susanna Myllylä
224
congestion.36 When I visited the historic area a year after the incident, the
impacts were still apparent. The beautiful Turkish blue tiles of the Mosque
of Aqsunqur (or Blue Mosque) had bad looking cracks, and climbing to the
minaret of Al-Hakim Mosque was not recommended as it was partly tilted.
Upgrading efforts – but for whom?
“The conservation of historic Cairo has made the whole area as a
massive construction project. – – These days it seems as if nearly every
historic monument, including mosques, madrasas and old palaces, are
closed to conservation projects. Workers, in their work-worn clothes
and bare feet, can be seen climbing over precarious scaffolding and
sitting on piles of stones sipping tea in front of many monuments in
the area.”37
There are several policy alternatives in the context of historical monument
“preservation/ restoration”: First, in the “Dead Museum” approach, buildings
are reconstructed to some original state, and then guarded against
deterioration. In practice, this implies restrictions in the use of buildings, and
hence the name of the policy. Second, partial restoration of deteriorated
monuments is an approach which “tries to evoke a sense of history rather
than to create a movie set”. Although more authentic than the previous one,
this policy too has a sense of “under glass” preservation of a functionally
vacuous monument. A third alternative is to reconstruct or reconstitute
the original form of a structure, or set of structures, but for a new use via
transformation. Fourth, a monument can be regenerated or revitalized so
that earlier forms and functions are adapted to contemporary needs. It may
include reconstruction or rehabilitation of existing buildings, but “must also
involve continual replenishment of the stock of useful and beautiful elements
in the quarter in a harmonious way”. Abu-Lughod prefers the last approach
since, unlike the others, it emphasizes that the target is to preserve a dynamic
community. As for Cairo, its old, so-called Islamic city has been a living city
that has constantly renewed itself.38
In Cairo, numerous periods and actors can be found in conservation
projects that vary from restoration to rehabilitation:
36
Williams 2002.
Aslan 2006.
38
Abu-Lughod 1978.
37
225
1. Already more than a hundred years ago, the ‘Comité’ by a group of
Egyptians and foreigners (1881) aimed to record and preserve more
than 600 structures. According to Aslan, in spite of some mistakes in
its conservation methodology, the role of the group was essential in
diverting attention to this urban heritage.39
2. The Foreign missions (since the 1970s), consisting of French, Italian,
Danish, German, American and Polish missions have, with their
“purist methodology of conservation”, received much appreciation in
restoration of single buildings. An exception was the so-called Bohra
Mission group, which received strong criticism of their restoration work
from the academic world of conservators and art historians, which
eventually led to the refusal of the Bohras to carry out more projects
in Cairo.40
3. In UNESCO Plan (1980), followed by the declaration of the historic
Cairo as a UNESCO World Heritage Site, 450 monuments were listed
under UNESCO protection. The plan has remained as a “paper project”,
however.41
4. The Greater Cairo Region Master Plan (1988) included historic Cairo as
part of the Homogeneous Sector No. 1. It addressed building control
regulations, infrastructure upgrades and requested more open space.
In addition, it formally acknowledged the area’s value for tourism,
seeking to relocate business activities elsewhere “whilst keeping
retailing and handcraft workshops within the main historical spine”.
Conservation of buildings was prioritized according to their reuse for
various social and cultural activities. The historical city already being
an attraction for tourists, the raising of awareness amongst the local
people, and developing their commercial activities so as to promote
the area’s socio-economic and cultural role were also recognized as
targets in the plan.42
5. From 1988 to 1991, French-Egyptian planning and research body IAURIF/
GOPP aimed to encompass whole districts. It had three schemes of
39
Aslan 2006.
Bohra Mission’s leader is the Imam of a branch of Ismaili Shiism. As the Bohras
claimed descent from the Fatimid dynasty, their representatives traveled to Cairo
to search for their roots and thus also restored several mosques, such as Al-Hakim.
(Aslan 2006)
41
42
Ibid.
40
226
Susanna Myllylä
rehabilitation: (i) in Sayeda Zeinab Quarter in the South, where noisome
tanning and other activities were relocated to less problematic sites
in the periphery of Greater Cairo; (ii) in the Gamaliyya Quarter in the
north, where Bab al-Nasr cemetery squatters were to be relocated so as
to transform the area into a park and tourist site; and (iii) in the Darb alAsfar Quarter in the east (Bayt al-Sihaymi). To sum up, the IAURIF/GOPP
rehabilitation plan aimed at enhancing both the historical buildings
and their urban environment via introduction of new public spaces
that would give more impressive outlook to the monuments. The
Gamaliyya project never realized, however, due to disputes over the
residents’ compensations to cover their evacuation and the demolition
of the tombs.43
6. The UNDP Rehabilitation of Historic Cairo Project (1997) was undertaken
by the United Nations Development Program with the Supreme
Council of Antiquities. Its aim was to preserve the urban heritage and
improve the quality of life of its inhabitants; the two components
were seen as being equal and inseparable. In total, nine specific
development clusters were identified along the main street, from alMuizz to the Mosque of Ibn Tulun, and these formed “the heritage
corridor”. One such cluster was centered on the important Qalawun
complex, for instance. In the east side of the corridor, emphasis was on
the provision of appropriate housing within the context of community
development. The west side, in turn, was marked by “complex
requirements of mixed uses” (commercial, tourism, residential, and
manufacturing). Most of the spine, al-Muizz Street, was planned to
be pedestrianized. According to the plan, the buildings needed to be
restored and enhanced for purposes of reuse, and incorporated into
community development strategies.44 However, as Sutton and Fahmi
note, despite an ambitious rehabilitation plan, several obstacles have
emerged due to organizational deficits, lack of will power and funding.
Thus, the UNDP Rehabilitation scheme has not been implemented
either, but it too remains as a mere paper project with substantial
documentation on guidelines, suggestions and information.45
7. The Al-Azhar–Aga Khan Park (2003–2007) by the Aga Khan Trust
for Culture (as a part of the Historic Cities Support Program) was
43
Ibid.
Antoniou 1998.
45
Sutton & Fahmi 2002; 2008.
44
227
established on the 30-hectare site of what had been a rubbish dump
since the medieval times. The dump had buried the 12th century 1.5
kilometer Ayyubid wall, which was restored. Not only was the park
meant to provide much needed green space for the public, but it was
also assumed to become an economic catalyst for the area. Now, the
park has gardens, a lake, playgrounds, promenades and restaurants
and the project has evolved to include the restoration of the Ayyubid
wall and mosques from the 14th and 15th centuries, as well as some
Ottoman-era houses. Moreover, the project eventually further spread
to the neighboring poor and congested Darb al-Ahmar district, as it
was concluded that its old houses are part of the wall structure, and are
thus not to be detached. Socio-economic initiatives were developed
in Darb al-Ahmar, such as housing rehabilitation, microfinance and
healthcare. One Ottoman house was transformed into a community
center. The aim was to pinpoint spaces where the community could
“rebuild itself, and begin to foster a deeper sense of shared identity”.
In workshops, scattered throughout the neighborhood, the trust has
trained dozens of local masons, stonecutters and carpenters, many of
whom also worked on the restoration of the wall.46
8. The Historic Cairo Restoration Project (1998–2006) by the Supreme
Council of Antiquities and Ministry of Culture involved a total of seven
ministries and the Governor of Cairo. The H.C.R.P project sought to
restore 149 listed historic monuments in eight years.47 The Historic
Cairo Restoration Project has been an official Government project,
involving Mme. Suzanne Mubarak, a staff of 250 people and offices in
the Citadel.48
The above development endeavours to sustain and improve historic Cairo
have been rather controversial, and perhaps the loudest criticism has been
directed at the H.C.R.P. In general, three main fields have been debated:
technical, institutional and residential. The technical considerations concern
the questions as to how the style of the renovations has been carried
out. Concerning the politics of conservation, Caroline Williams, who has
been critical of the previously mentioned project (especially due to the
Bohra Mission project funded by the H.C.R.P), argues that the responsible
companies or contractors tended to renovate rather than preserve, and
46
Aga Khan 2007; Youssef 2007; Ouroussoff 2004.
Williams 2002.
48
47
228
Susanna Myllylä
modern technology was used together with very modest knowledge of the
engineers on medieval architectural principles. As a result, the contractors
showed little sensitivity to the original fabric of the buildings and their
authenticity, replacing original materials with replicas without reintegrating
them in the structure.49 There are several problematic restoration cases –
for instance, the way in which the wooden lattice, or mashrabiyya windows
in the restoration of the Wikala al-Bazar in the Gamaliyya quarter was
carried out. Another case, referred to earlier in the context of the Bohras,
is the failed restoration of the dilapidated Al-Hakim Mosque which was
entirely reconstructed to “a new building” rather than restored50. It has
also been suggested that the Musafirkhana Palace could be restored, but
some conservationists remain skeptical, comparing it to the fate of the
old opera house destroyed in 1972. The modern opera, built in the 1980s,
although practical, has no resemblance to the old one, and is considered
by conservationists to be an eye-soar. They are worried that the restoration
of the Musafirkhana might become but another opera.51 Also Sutton and
Fahmi are aptly stunned that some developers have even suggested the
demolition of a large number of monuments in the area.52
Williams claims that the Minister of Culture’s vision of Old Cairo resembles
an open-air museum, and that the Supreme Council of Antiquities’ budget
was only for the monuments, not for socio-economic and environmental
improvements in the poor neighbourhood.53 In recent years, criticism to
both the Bohra Mission and the Supreme Council of Antiquities has nearly
entirely vanished, however, and most scholars working in the field seem to
be reluctant to criticize the conservation work at all. Here, it is emphasized
that, despite mistakes, it is more important to have these buildings under
attention and serious conservation attempts. Some Egyptian architects also
notice that any restoration work is utmost challenging, and it is difficult to
avoid mistakes. They argue that “while foreign critics sat around and told
Egyptians officials how they were doing everything wrong, the critics weren’t
doing anything themselves to help”.54
49
Williams 2002.
Sutton & Fahmi 2002, referring to Rodenbeck 1983, 25.
51
Darwish 1998.
52
53
Williams 2002.
54
Aslan 2006.
50
229
Secondly, institutional problems are often seen as the main cause for
dysfunctions in various conservation schemes. It is argued by Jim Antoniou
that there has been overlapping responsibilities and confusion between
the various authorities in relation to the monuments, their ownership
and responsibility, and in the entire administration of the historic city.
Moreover, a large part of the demolitions and damage have been permitted
under the rules and regulations in force. For instance, official permits for
manufacturing industries in, or adjacent to old buildings allow for various
types of pollution that affects the monuments. Rent controls discourage
maintenance and, in a similar vein, laws prohibit the renovation of buildings
nearby monuments, which encourages collapse and deterioration. A lack of
urban management easily leads to “institutional paralysis” and an inability to
organize resources.55
The third, residential field of the debate refers to the ambiguity in the
re-use of the restored sites on one hand, the legitimacy of the authorities’
single-handed decisions on the other and, finally, the rights of the local
residents in the midst of it all. Williams claims that the government officials
must find out a common vision for historic Cairo, as to how these buildings
once restored could be adapted for re-use, and who will eventually benefit
from the result. Mosques will continue to be used by their local members,
but there are many secular historic buildings that would need maintenance
and custodians. Furthermore, according to Williams, the purpose of the reuse should be addressed before changes are made, and it should also be kept
in mind that “empty buildings are doomed: to survive they must be rooted
in the socio-economic matrix”. Williams argues that the Ministry of Culture’s
approach continues to be that the restored buildings should not be used
for anything other than cultural activities (art centers, bookstores, libraries,
small museums, and concert venues), implying that they benefit only a tiny
elite and have just little utility to the local population. Moreover, Williams
(like Abu-Lughod) suggests that many of the secular buildings – such as
wikalas, sabil-kuttabs, and residences – could be adaptively reused to serve
some of the area’s housing needs.56 Another complicated problem is that of
authority: as the city is upgraded, the questions of zoning and real-estate
values become critical. The low rent laws in Egypt have enabled the owners
to sell old houses, and the new owners have then let the buildings deteriorate
55
56
Antoniou 1998.
Williams 2002.
Susanna Myllylä
230
while looking into the possibilities of their demolition so as to redevelop the
site.57 The case of the restored 18th century Wikala al-Kharbutli serves as a
good example. This building, formerly located across the street from Sabil
of Mohammad ‘Ali Tusun, though dilapidated, was a registered monument
for many years. However, in late 2000, the protection was removed and the
wikala was bought by a private individual. As a result, the building was torn
down overnight, carted off, and replaced by a concrete building.58
As for the relocation of Bab al-Nasr cemetery squatters for the purpose
of transforming it into a park and tourist site, much resistance was raised
among the residents of the City of the Dead and the tomb owners, as well
as by historians of art and Islam – all whom had their own arguments as to
why the area should be saved from demolition59. Local communities have
been held responsible for the deterioration of the area and, consequently,
the authorities consider it necessary to relocate the poor inhabitants60. On
the contrary to the authorities’ beliefs, however, some residents have in fact
devoted themselves to upkeep and repair some of the buildings – such as
mosques – on a voluntary basis well before the arrival of any conservation
projects in the locality.
According to the study of Sutton and Fahmi, the local residents in the
Old Cairo have felt dissatisfaction because of the lack of proper services and
infrastructure. There has also been absence of security in tenure in cases
where people do not have official documents to prove their ownership of
the buildings. One basic problem has been that decisions in restoration
projects are made hierarchically, or in a top-down manner, and thus changes
have been instituted without a public negotiation. It has lead to situations
where local residents are powerless to act once a decision is made, and the
contracting companies have moved in. A bottom-up NGO is suggested to
be a better option for the management of restoration projects but, in the
Egyptian political context, it is also a less realistic one.61 Through more
credibility and trust in comparison to the government authorities, NGOs – if
not concentrating only on money – could be more efficient in disseminating
awareness, and in helping communities to improve their livelihoods.62
57
Williams 2002.
59
See Nedoroscik 1997, 98–100.
60
Antoniou 1998.
61
62
Aslan 2006; Myllylä 2001.
58
231
As the Al Azhar park and the Darb al-Ahmar case have showed, it is often
not sufficient to concentrate on a single historical monument, but its wider
environment, including other buildings and especially their residents, must
also be addressed and respected. In addition, there are different images
and viewpoints, as to which elements make the “authentic atmosphere” of
Old Cairo – what to preserve, and what to leave out? Is this certain historic
urban atmosphere an intrinsic value that has to be maintained persistently,
for centuries, even in the constantly evolving megapolis? Perhaps this is an
irrelevant question but, there being diverse images, there are also varying
policies and approaches as to what, ultimately, makes the urban heritage of
Cairo.
Bayt al-Suhaymi (five floor domestic building of 2,000 square meters added
with 115 halls and chambers surrounding the main court of 200 square
meters), and the related Darb al-Asfar district case offer an ideal example
to scrutinize this authenticity dilemma. Darb al-Asfar alley connects Mu‘izz
Street and the Gamaliyya in the northern section of the Fatimid city. Here
also emerged endangered foundations due to subsoil water so the project
had to go beyond the palace restoration, and include also the neighboring
monuments in the Darb al-Asfar. This site, in turn, had suffered badly from
overcrowding, pollution, and the 1992 earthquake. Some old houses were
inhabited by people who had moved there after the earthquake, and the
houses were further deteriorated as the families altered the interiors to better
suit for apartments. These families were removed to private apartments
elsewhere, however, and a new drainage system was installed. The first floor
of Bayt al-Suhaymi was planned to be converted into a cultural arts centre,
while the rest of the building was to be left as a museum. This integrated
urban redevelopment project of 1996 is seen as the first of its kind within
historic Cairo, and it was funded by the Arab Fund for Economic and Social
Development. Another part of the project was to develop social awareness
among the district’s inhabitants, “to explain the importance of living beside
a monument like Bayt al-Suhaymi”. Meetings were held regularly during
the restoration process. Although restoration teams sought to retain the
character of the old area, everybody was not satisfied with the look of the
new Darb al-Asfar. Some people, both insiders and outsiders, claimed that the
changes erased the area’s “original flavour” due to certain modern elements.
As one inhabitant described: “When walking around, I feel myself to be in an
imitation studio, like the City of Media Production in 6 October City”.63
63
El-Aref 2000.
Susanna Myllylä
232
Also, an agreement is needed on what kind of tourism is desirable: the
spending of the “Coca-Cola tourists”, or the cultural tourists, who are fewer but
more discerning.64 Sutton and Fahmi note that the Egyptian Government has
favoured the development of tourism (e.g. in the IAURIF/GOPPP Gamaliyya
project) at the cost of neglecting the local residents’ perceptions and attitudes
towards conservation policies – an approach which ultimately could lead to
the “disneyfication” of the Old City.65
Conclusions
Like other old city cores, also Islamic Cairo has gradually deteriorated into a
historical city centre slum district. As a historical slum area, the development
of Old Cairo requires a novel approach, which integrates certain measures
of slum upgrading with urban rehabilitation plans. Such measures could
include, for instance, building of connections between various interest
groups, finding alternatives for informal economy and informal housing,
creating employment and education for the youth, offering affordable
environmental and energy solutions, as well as strategies to encourage the
work of civil society organizations.
Those urban restoration projects that aim to move out large sections
of the local – the poor and their jobs – represents the kind of exclusive, or
“fortress” conservation policies that can be universally observed and, yet,
have a tendency to fail. Thereby, one can only wish that, while attracting
global attention, the developers of Islamic Cairo would not end up riding
the kind of time machine that takes us to a monumentally impressive but
deserted, sterile and thus boring theme park city without an authentic social
life. Elsewhere in Arabia, in Dubai for example, this trip to a spiritless urban
development has unfortunately already been taken.
64
65
Williams 2002.
233
References
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Economic challenges facing Jordan within
the Euromed context
Seyfeddin Muaz
Jordan overview
The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan is a constitutional monarchy, ruled
since 1952 by His Majesty King Hussein. With the passing of the monarch in
February of 1999, the King’s eldest son, His Majesty King Abdullah, ascended
the throne.
Since 1989, all elements of the Jordanian political spectrum have
demonstrated commitment to increased democracy, liberalization and
consensus-building. These reforms, which had been guided by the late King
Hussein, have placed Jordan on an irreversible path toward democratization.
The result has been greater empowerment and the involvement of
everyday citizens in Jordan’s civil life, contributing to increased stability and
institutionalization, which will benefit the country far into the future.
The remarkably stable political and social climate that Jordan has enjoyed
for decades under the Hashemite Dynasty continues to thrive under His
Majesty King Abdullah’s leadership. The new King has undertaken his father’s
legacy of reform, committing Jordan to the goals of privatization, economic
liberalization, and modernization of the law.
Scarce natural resources and reliance on foreign energy sources and foreign
aid are some of the most important challenges that face Jordan. Scarce water
resources are also considered a continuous dilemma for households as well
as the industrial and agriculture sectors.
The geopolitics of the country, at the centre of the Middle East, make it
vulnerable to the perceptions of events in the region.
The governmental budget and the external sector deficits have reached
alarming levels; unemployment remains an economic burden that has been
exacerbated by the fall in tourism receipts due to the Palestinian–Israeli
conflict and the events in neighbouring Iraq.
The human element remains Jordan’s source of national pride. The country
enjoys an educated, highly competitive, young and skilled labour force of
Seyfeddin Muaz
236
1.56 million. In a turbulent region political, legal and social stability remain
priceless assets to the Kingdom.
The international trade agreements with the EU, USA, AFTA, and several Arab
countries are witness to Jordan’s business-friendly and secure environment
and have been a major factor in attracting billions of dollars in foreign direct
investments.
The Jordanian foreign policy has maintained balanced relations on the
regional and international arenas, which has given Jordan a moderate role in
resolving regional conflicts.
Socio-economic development in Jordan
Jordan was heavily impacted by the war in Iraq, the disruption of trade
with Iraq (its main export market) having not only important economic
consequences for the economy but also having an adverse impact on
prospects for development. Furthermore, pressure on the current account
mounted as a result of the rocketing oil prices. Tensions in the region
contributed to a significant drop in foreign investors’ interest in Jordan, in
addition to the marked deterioration of income from tourism.
After a spectacular GDP growth of 7.7 percent in 2004 (up from 4 percent in
2003) largely due to a surge in domestic demand, Jordan’s economic situation
worsened in 2005 because of higher world oil prices and an unexpected drop
in external grants (down from US$ 1.3 billion in 2004 to US$ 700 million in
2005). The GDP growth remained at the same levels throughout 2006 and
2007. Oil price shocks have contributed to a higher budget deficit and the
inflation rate surged from 3.4 to 6 percent. The external current account deficit
has also deteriorated, largely due to a deeper trade deficit; partially offset by
private capital inflows (banking, mining, real estate and telecommunications)
and remittances from Jordanians living abroad. However, the economy
has continued to grow, with real GDP growth reaching 6.3 percent in 2006
according to the International Monetary Bank, reflecting the economy’s
dynamic activity.
The leading sector is services, which account for 64.5 percent of Jordan’s
GDP; the role this sector is playing in supporting production is underlined in
the King’s new economic guidelines. While the agricultural and construction
sectors account for only a small portion of GDP (9.7% of GDP), they employ a
significant percentage of the workforce. The main manufacturing industries
are textiles, mining (potash and phosphates), fertilizers, pharmaceuticals, oil
refining, and cement.
Economic challenges facing Jordan
237
Main economic indicators1
2004
2005
2006
2007
(proj.)
2008
(proj.)
Real GDP growth (% change)
8.4
7.2
6.3
6.0
6.0
Inflation CPI (average)
3.4
3.5
6.3
5.7
GDP, nominal (USD, billion)
11.4
12.7
14.3
16.0
GDP, per-capita (USD)
2131
2317
2544
2778
12.5
14.8
13.9
13.1
Life expectancy (years)
72
72
72
Literacy total (% ages 15 and above)
90
Literacy female (% ages 15 and above)
85
Real sector
17.5
Social indicators
Unemployment (%)
Fiscal sector1
Total revenues (excl. grants, % GDP)
25.7
28.0
30.9
29.9
30.2
Total expenditures ( % GDP)
38.4
38.0
37.9
38.5
34.3
Budget balance (incl. grants, % GDP)
– 1.7
– 5.0
– 3.8
– 2.7
– 2.1
Budget balance (excl. Grants, % GDP)
– 12.7 – 10.0
– 7.1
– 7.8
– 4.1
Net public debt (% GDP)
88.5
82.8
72.4
66.7
62.2
Private sector credit (% change)
17.3
30.3
24.4
16.5
14.6
Private sector credit (% total credit)
79.2
Broad money (M3, %)
11.7
17.0
14.1
10.3
9.4
Degree of monetisation (M3/GDP, %)
130.8
137.2
138.9
136.9
Current account (incl. grants, % GDP)
– 0.1
– 17.8 – 13.6 – 13.4
Trade balance (% GDP)
– 38.6 – 47.0 – 35.0 – 35.0
Monetary sector
External sector
– 13.6
32.9
FDI flows (% GDP)
5.4
10.0
6.8
9.1
8
Import cover (months)²
5.1
4.7
5.6
5.2
4.7
1
Covers the central government and budgetary agencies. Includes non-budget
account net spending.
2
International reserves in terms of months of imports of goods and non-factor
services.
1
IMF; WB.
Seyfeddin Muaz
238
Main economic indicators2 (cont.)
2004
2005
2006
2007
(proj.)
2008
(proj.)
66.2
56.1
49.8
44.2
39.1
Debt service ratio
15.1
12.3
11.2
10.4
8.7
Foreign exchange reserves (USD, billion)
4.7
4.7
6.1
Reserves/M3 (%)
42.8
35.4
40.1
36.4
0.71
0.71
0.71
External vulnerability
External public debt (% GDP)³
4
6.5
Financial sector
Short-term interest rate (average, %)
2.5
Exchange rate (per USD, end of period)
0.71
Exchange rate (per EUR, end of period)
0.96
Real effective exchange rate (eop,
2000 =100)
92.1
0.71
1.11
1.9
97.2
3
Total government external debt including government-guaranteed external
debt.
4
Public external debt service in percentage of exports of goods and non-factor
services.
Jordan–EU relationship
Jordan and the European Economic Community first established diplomatic
relations in 1977. In 1978 their first cooperation agreement came into force.
Jordan was one of the first countries to sign an Association Agreement
(AA) with the EU, and is among the five countries which have expressed an
interest in the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and which adopted
an ENP Action Plan in 2005 covering the next three years. This Action Plan
encompasses a new and ambitious agenda in the political, social and
economic fields, designed to move Jordan closer to a set of shared values
with the EU.
During the first year of implementing the EU-Jordan ENP Action Plan, a
regular dialogue between the EU and Jordan took place through several
subcommittees, involving discussions on the implementation of the different
chapters of the Action Plan, and enabling specific priorities to be identified.
In addition, Jordan has worked on a reform agenda for the next ten years:
the “National Agenda”, completed by the Kulluna al Urdun initiative (“We Are
2
IMF; WB.
239
All Jordan”), which set out detailed priorities and objectives for addressing
national challenges. This reform agenda is fully in line with the Action Plan
and can guide its implementation.
The EU is a long-standing partner of Jordan and aims to build on the
successes of past co-operation to support the implementation of Jordan’s
plans for reforms with a range of relevant instruments, including financial
assistance. These help cover the cost of the reforms, with a strong emphasis
on institution-building.
Four main priority objectives have been defined by the EU and the Jordanian
authorities for this first Country Strategy Paper under the Neighbourhood
Policy:
1. Political reform and good governance.
2. Trade and investment development.
3. Sustainability of the development process.
4. Institution-building, financial stability and support for regulatory
approximation.
A total amount of €265 million was allocated for the first National Indicative
Programme, covering the period 2007–2010, to support these four priorities
with EU financial assistance under the ENPI.
Jordan–EU Association Agreement
Framework
The EU Association Agreement with Jordan was signed in November 1997,
was ratified by the Government of Jordan in September 1999, and came into
force in May 2002. The objectives of the Association Agreement are in line
with the objectives of the Barcelona Process, and the agreement revolves
around three major themes: politics, economics and finance, and society and
culture.
Political and security partnership
This part of the Agreement addresses principles that govern cooperation in
the political field. This initiative involves a dialogue that leads to the adoption
of common principles by the partners, emphasizing the achievement or
movement toward peace, security, democracy, human rights, and regional
development as the engine for change.
Seyfeddin Muaz
240
Economic and financial partnership
This component aims at establishing a Euro-Jordanian Free Trade Area in
progressive steps by the year 2014. The free trade agreement is based on the
provisions of this Agreement as well as the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) and the General Agreement on Services. The provisions of the
agreement cover: trade in agricultural and industrial products, the right of
establishment and services, payments and capital movements, competition,
intellectual property rights, financial cooperation, economic cooperation in
the fields of industry, agriculture, investment, standards and measurements,
transportation, telecommunications, energy, science and technology,
environment, tourism, statistics, and the fight against illegal drugs.
Social, cultural and human partnership
This section addresses principles that govern cooperation in the cultural
and social fields. Emphasis is placed on education, training, youth, culture,
migrant population groups, and health. Greater co-operation in the field of
home affairs and justice is also envisaged, with action in particular against
drug trafficking, terrorism, and international crime.
Implementation
Following the entry into force of the EU-Jordan Association Agreement, the
EU launched in 2002 a programme of support for the Association Agreement
(SAA – Support for the Association Agreement), with the overall objective of
assisting Jordan in following the entry into force of the EU-Jordan Association
Agreement, which will require legislative and regulatory alignment of
policies and regulations in the different fields, as well as the upgrading of
Jordanian institutions to carry out necessary reforms. Several programmes
and initiatives were designed and implemented to help Jordan.
Cultural cooperation
By reviewing the developments in the relationship between Jordan and
the EU countries, especially after the Association Agreement, one can easily
observe good progress in trade, financial, and economic cooperation, but
on the other hand social and cultural cooperation is still under the desired
levels.
The cultural cooperation between Jordan and the EU countries can be seen
in different ways; tourism and the exchange of students is a good indicator
of the interaction of people. In this regard, official figures from 2006 indicate
241
that the number of European tourists in Jordan reached 156,950, the number
of Jordanian students studying in the EU countries reached 3949, or 23% of
the total Jordanian students abroad, while only 32 European students were
at Jordanian universities.
Exchange programs and civil society3
The involvement of civil society organisations and individuals is vital for the
overall success of the ENP. The civil society dimension complements and
depends on the other aspects of the ENP. Jordan is currently engaged in
various exchange programs and initiatives with the EU aimed at strengthening
the involvement of civil society and its institutions in the realization of the
ENP goals:
Jordan has access to several EU educations and training programmes
(TEMPUS and Erasmus Mundus). In this context, we welcome the launching
of the External Cooperation Window of Erasmus Mundus, which will cover
more than 1500 students from the ENP countries during the academic year
2007–2008. We also welcome the EU’s initiative to launch a new scholarship
scheme for the ENP region under the Erasmus Mundus. Moreover, we are
keen to deepen our cooperation in science and technology, not only in the
EU research framework programme, but also in other dimensions of the
European research area.
In December 2006, Jordan and the EU signed the Euro-Med Youth
Program with the overall objective of enhancing the fundamentals of
youth knowledge, experience and participation within a framework of
strategic partnership between State and Society. The programme targets
young people aged 15–25 years, youth leaders, youth workers, youth
organizations and NGOs dealing with youth.
We attach great importance to the Cross-Border Cooperation Programme
within the ENPI. This programme, which involves local actors such as civil
society actors, local and regional authorities, represents an important tool
in promoting and enhancing the civil society dimension within the ENP.
Jordan is an active player in the CBC programme and we have recently
been given the honour of hosting the programme’s Antenna. We aspire
that the active participation of Civil Society Organizations from the various
3
Connecting neighbours, Marwan Al –Refa’I, PAO manager, support for the
Implementation of the EU–Jordan Association Agreement Programme & support
for the Human Rights and Good Governance Programme.
242
Seyfeddin Muaz
partner countries will contribute to the establishment of good neighbourly
relations.
Jordan has welcomed and supported the establishment of the Anna
Lindh Euro-Mediterranean Foundation for Dialogue between Cultures. We
hope that this Foundation will play a more instrumental role in promoting
the dialogue between our peoples and cultures, and in contributing to
our joint efforts to fight xenophobia, intolerance, racial discrimination and
false stereotypes among our nations.
Strengthening the European Neighbourhood Policy4
The premise of the European Neighbourhood Policy is that the EU has a vital
interest in seeing greater economic development and stability and better
governance in its neighborhood. The responsibility for this lies primarily
with the countries themselves, but the EU can substantially encourage and
support their reform efforts. It is therefore in the best mutual interest of both
the EU and its neighbours to build a much stronger and deeper relationship.
Most of the EU’s neighbouring countries have made progress during
recent years in economic and political reforms. Nevertheless, poverty
and unemployment, mixed economic performance, corruption and weak
governance remain major challenges. Citizens of the neighbouring countries,
particularly the young, are often faced with bleak personal prospects. “Frozen
conflicts” and recent events in the Middle East remind us that the conditions
for peaceful coexistence remain to be established, both between some of
the EU’s neighbours and with other key countries. These are not only the EU
neighbours’ problems. They risk producing major spillovers for the EU, such as
illegal immigration, unreliable energy supplies, environmental degradation
and terrorism.
Promoting people-to-people exchanges
Distinct from the mobility issue, the ENP must have a “human face”, and
citizens of the EU and of the neighbouring countries should have more
opportunities to interact, and to learn more about each others’ societies and
understand better each others’ cultures. The ENP cannot only be a matter
for officials and politicians. On both sides of the borders, people should be
4
“Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European
Parliament on strengthening the European neighbourhood policy”.
243
able to see directly the impact of a stronger bond between the Union and its
neighbours.
t Educational and youth exchanges must be a core element of the ENP.
t The mobility of researchers must be an essential part of increasing
research cooperation between the EU and the ENP countries.
t Civil society exchanges should also be strengthened, reaching
beyond governmental contacts to build bridges and contacts among
trade unions, regional and local authorities (including city-twinning
programmes), health practitioners, NGOs, and cultural groups.
t Business-to-business contacts must be enhanced. In particular, small
and medium-sized companies should be actively encouraged to
establish closer links and transfer experience.
t Partner governments must be encouraged to allow appropriate
participation by civil society representatives as stakeholders in the
reform process.
The human dimension of the ENP is as much a matter for the Partner States
as for the Community. Integrating these elements into bilateral programmes,
and sharing information and best practices on people-to-people activities,
will enhance the image of the Union as a whole in the partner countries.
References
IMF (2008): International Monetary Fund: Jordan: 2006 Article IV Consultation
and Fourth Post-Program Monitoring Discussions—Staff Report; and Public
Information Notice on the Executive Board Discussion.
Central Bank of Jordan: http://www.cbj.gov.jo, last consulted in June 2008.
Delegation of the European Commission to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan:
http://ec.europa.eu/delegations/deljor/en/index.htm, last consulted in June
2008.
Department of Statistics: www.dos.gov.jo, last consulted in June 2008.
International Monetary Fund: http://www.IMF.org, last consulted in June 2008.
Ministry of Foreign Affairs: http://www.mfa.gov.jo, last consulted in June 2008.
World Bank: http://www.worldbank.org, last consulted in June 2008.
What kind of security policies between the
Maghreb, the US and the EU?
Ulla Holm
The basic argument advanced in this article, is that the combination of the
“nature” of the Maghreb regimes, the US “war against terrorism,” the European
fight against illegal immigration and “home-grown” Maghreb terrorism,
has resulted in Maghreb, American and European status quo policies that
function as security policies.
Introduction
The Maghreb regimes’ authoritarian policy towards their populations and
the populations’ increasing socio-economic despair has resulted still more
often in desperate riots that are seen as about the only way to channel socioeconomic and political despair. At the same time, there has been a rise in
the attachment to religious identity. Whether this fact is a security problem
depends on how the regimes deal with religion. The Maghreb regimes have
included those Islamists that serve the status quo and repressed those who
are critical to the regimes. The Islamist parties which the regimes allow to
be represented in the parliaments do not challenge the regimes’ nor the
Moroccan monarchy’s hegemony. The parties are dependent on the regimes’
and the monarchy’s patronage, which in turn are dependent on the Islamist
parties in order to be able to continue the status quo.
This mutual dependency has alienated those parts of the Maghreb
populations that take no part in the power-sharing. The consequence
has been that the majority becomes depoliticised – as the Moroccan and
Algerian elections in 2007 demonstrated. Others might take refuge in either
the conservative or the Jihadi version of Salafism1.
1
The conservative version of Salafism is foremost occupied with the social
behaviour of people, and the aim of the movement is to correct behaviour in
order to make it conform to the example of the Prophet and his companions,
the venerable founding fathers (al-salaf al salih) of the faith. The aim of the
“revolutionary” violent Salafism is to install the Caliphate which has to be purified
of all elements that do not fit into what these Salafists consider to be “authentic”
Islam. International Crisis Group 2004; Roy 2002; Kepel, 2000.
Ulla Holm
246
In large sectors of European public opinion there is a general distrust of
religious identity and a threat perception of the “Islamisation” of the Maghreb.
However, the EU member states are supporting the Maghreb regimes that
instrumentalize conservative Islamism in order to remain in power. There
thus exists an “unholy” alliance between the regimes’ and the European threat
perceptions. Both sides prefer the status quo to open discussion as to why
the regimes are becoming still more delegitimized and as to how change can
be brought about.
Export of European and American democracy has therefore become
downgraded in the last few years. Up to the Iraq war in 2003 and some
years after, the concept of “democracy is security” was dominating in the
international discourse on how to bring about change in authoritarian Arab
countries. Changes did not happen. Instead, the lack of “success” in Iraq and
Afghanistan has produced American and European fear of losing power and
influence in the Arab countries. Furthermore, terrorist attacks in Europe and
in Arab countries have resulted in deep suspicion of Islam and Arab ethnicity.
The consequence has been that security has become identical to the political
status quo and not to the export of democracy.
Liberalised autocracy in the Maghreb
By 1999, an air of optimism percolated across the Maghreb. The level of
violence in Algeria – while not resolved – fell substantially and Algeria’s
new President Bouteflika seemed to be talking seriously about national
reconciliation and an amnesty for those rebels in prison, on the run or still
fighting. In the case of Libya, wider international sanctions had been placed
in the wake of the Lockerbie disaster in 1988. Libya decided in 1999 to hand
over the two Lockerbie suspects for trial in the Netherlands, which resulted
in the suspension of United Nations sanctions the same year. There were
signs of movement in the Western Sahara “frozen conflict”. In Morocco, the
new King, Mohammed VI, who came to the throne after his father’s death
in July 1999, brought hope of a more modern (less brutal) and transparent
form of government. However, all the dire circumstances: the lack of popular
legitimacy; strong Islamist opposition movements and smaller groups that
engage in bin Laden-style terrorism; economic systems that have lagged far
behind other regions in the increasingly globalised economy; large youthful
populations clamouring for jobs or visas to the “West”, resulting in migration
– continued in varying degrees in the Maghreb.
However, the Maghreb societal hopes of political and economic changes
have been watered down especially because of the terrorist attack on 9/11
What kind of security policies?
247
on the WTC and of internal terrorism, which have made the regimes intensify
their control over society.
Ever since the independence of the Maghreb states, the Maghreb
populations have been subject to the regimes’ arbitrary policy of either
controlled political openness or of harsh repression of perceived opposition
to the regimes.
Repressive authoritarianism constitutes thus the “deep structure” of the
Maghreb state system. However, repression is selective and inserted into
what Daniel Brumberg calls “liberalised autocracy”. He characterises the Arab
state system
“as a mixture of guided pluralism, controlled elections and selective
repression. It is a type of political system whose institutions, rules and
logic defy any linear model of democratisation. The rulers widen or
narrow the boundaries of participation and expression in response
to what they see as the social, economic, political, and geo-strategic
challenges facing their regimes. To endure, they must implicitly,
or explicitly, allow some opposition forces certain kinds of social,
political, or ideological power – but things must never reach a point
where the regime feels deterred from using force when it deems fit...
They therefore strive to pit one group against another in ways that
maximize the rulers’ room for manoeuvre and restrict the opposition’s
capacity to work together. Consensus politics and state-enforced
power sharing can form an alternative to either full democracy or full
autocracy, particularly when rival social, ethnic, or religious groups fear
that either type of rule will lead to their political failure.”2
Daniel Brumberg’s characterisation of the Arab system as a type of
political system whose institutions, rules and logic defy any linear model of
democratisation is epitomised in the Maghreb. It is the “simultaneous stop
and go” politics that produce popular powerlessness. The regimes can decide
arbitrarily which party is allowed to run for elections. They can forbid all of
a sudden a political party. At the same time, the repression is accompanied
by a certain political openness. The objective of regime-managed politics in
the Maghreb has so far been to give especially Islamist opposition groups
space to let off steam and allow for their political participation. However, this
has remained controlled and limited in order to preclude factors that might
undermine the ultimate power of the ruling elite.
2
Brumberg 2002, 56–57, 67.
248
Ulla Holm
Brutal repression and/or the guided integration of Islamist participation
in the political system mark the regimes’ response to religious opposition.
In Algeria, support for the conservative version of Salafism is increasing.
The ruling elite is sympathetic towards this version of Salafism because it
depoliticises and thereby guarantees the status quo. The Algerian regime
has even appointed conservative Salafist professors and imams, in order to
control mosques and universities3.
Salafist conservatism is no threat to the Algerian (and Moroccan
monarchy) regime because it abstains from violence – being more interested
in the Islamisation of moral behaviour. However, the regime’s backing of
conservative Salafism might turn out to be a double-edged sword because
of the conservative Salafists’ anti-Western discourse. The Algerian regime
is closely linked to the American and European fight against terrorism and
immigration. American and European capital is flowing into Algeria because
of Algerian oil and gas resources. Hence, the regime is balancing on a
tightrope with regard to support for anti-Western Salafist attitudes and its
approach to the “West”.
Islamist terrorism in the Maghreb
Until 1988–1989, Europe and the US did not view the Maghreb as a security
problem. The Maghreb countries were a problem for the region, rather than
for Europe or the US4. However, the outbreak of violence in Algeria in 1992
and the subsequent refugee flow to Europe became a matter of security
concern for Europe, especially for France, which was also hit by Algerian
terrorism. The European threat perception of the Maghreb increased in the
wake of President Bush’s declaration of the war against terrorism.
The Maghreb has seen a rise of terrorism following September 11th and in
the wake of the American–led war against Iraq. Such terrorist attacks have
occurred, for example, in a synagogue on the Tunisian island of Jerba in
2002, in Casablanca, Morocco in 2003, and included the suicide bombings in
Algeria in 2007. The Casablanca May 2003 bombings served as a wakeup call
in Morocco regarding the dangers of home-grown radical Islamist terrorism,
generating harsh measures against Islamist activists.
In Algeria, on April 11th 2007, two explosions set off by suicide bombers
rocked the capital city for the first time in several years. Al-Qaeda in the Islamic
3
4
Amghar 2007.
Holm 2002.
249
Maghreb (AQIM), formerly the Salafist Group for Preaching and Combat (GSPC)
took the responsibility for the 30 killed and 200 wounded. It has continued
killings targeting especially police, security forces and politicians just as the
AIS (Armée Islamique du Salut), the armed branch of FIS, did in the 1990s.
AQIM has declared that it carried out the bombings in defence of Islam and
the Islamic nation, and that it will continue its operations.
The Islamist terrorist attacks put an end to the relative calm that had
prevailed in Algeria over the previous two years. The new attacks raise
concerns whether Algeria might be facing a situation resembling the early
1990s. However, even if these concerns seem overblown there is no doubt
that terrorism is increasing in Algeria. Moreover, it is worrying that the killings
are executed by suicide bombers. This was not the case during the violence in
the 1990s. It might point to cross-fertilisation of an Al-Qaeda tactic to AQIM,
which had never used these methods before they declared their affiliation to
Al-Qaeda. According to some sources, many AQIM have joined the insurgency
in Iraq, thus gaining a high level of expertise in terrorist tactics, lessons which
they have apparently brought back to the Maghreb5.
It is a fact that AQIM spreads fear amongst the Algerian population and
constitutes a security problem to individuals. However, it is difficult to
know the extent to which the Algerian regime is boosting the fear in order
to strengthen its own authoritarian regime. Or perhaps the increased fear
is due to a power struggle inside the regime between different factions6.
What one can say is that memory of the violence in the 1990s makes people
and the regime very sensitive to a resurgence of terrorism. This fact might
produce support for the regime’s attempt at tracing down the terrorists, but
on the other hand, the regime might also become deligitimised because the
regimes operate without any restrictions.
The four regimes’ tough anti-terrorist laws might also produce societal
anger. Since the passage of a new anti-terrorist law was rushed through the
Moroccan parliament in 2003 following the Casablanca incidents, thousands
of terrorist suspects have been arrested and sentenced to prison without any
trial. It is reported by eminent jurists that security forces or intelligence services
have been involved in arbitrary and sometimes undisclosed detentions in
Algeria and Morocco since the Casablanca terrorist attack.7 The result of the
terrorist attacks has thus been a return to some of the authoritarian excesses,
5
World Security Institute, 30 April 2007.
Burgat & Gèze 2007.
7
International Commission of Jurists 2006.
6
250
Ulla Holm
including flagrant abuses of human rights, arbitrary arrest, torture, and
unfair trials that have been applied not only against terrorists but also for the
purpose of curtailing political and civil rights in general8.
The fight against terrorism strengthens the authoritarian regimes’ control
of society. It might evolve into pure repressive authoritarianism. If this
happens, the radicalisation of youngsters in the suburbs of the big cities might
expand, particularly in the poor suburbs of big cities where especially poor
youngsters and unemployed, but well educated young men are recruited to
Islamist Jihadism.
The regimes are aware that the more violent the actions of Jihadist groups
are, the more legitimate regime repression against them appears in the eyes
of national and international actors. Actors such as the US and the EU have so
far largely accepted the interpretation of the Maghreb’s authoritarian rulers
– namely that the regimes and societies are equally threatened by Jihadism.
The European and American acceptance of the ruling elite’s interpretation
might lead to a further undermining of the regimes’ legitimacy. If this happens
the elite might further insist on the necessity of “containing” societal protests
resulting in a still further increasing lack of legitimacy. If the regimes silence
opposition to discussion on why Jihadism exists, the human rights situation
in the Maghreb might very well worsen even more, and we will not witness
liberalised authoritarianism, but purely repressive authoritarianism.
The Maghreb, European and American fight against illegal
immigration and terrorism in Sub-Sahara and the Maghreb
Security dynamics have certainly changed since 9/11. The perceived threat
of terrorism and illegal immigration in the Sub-Saharan Area has pushed
Maghreb security concerns to the Sub-Saharan area that comprises – as seen
from the Maghreb – Mali, Senegal, Niger, Chad, Guinea, Bukino Faso and
Mauritania9.
The Sub-Saharan immigration to the Maghreb has provoked racism in
the larger Maghreb towns. For example in Morocco, racism against the SubSaharans is increasing10 and the same applies to Algeria. Police raids in the
8
Entelis 2005.
Mauritania is a member of the UMA (Union du Maghreb Arabe) and as such is
perceived as belonging to the Maghreb area.
10
Aliou 2005, 56. In the wake of the terrorist bombings in Casablanca, Morocco
intensified the fight against illegal immigration. Many Africans were arrested and
escorted to the Moroccan-Algerian frontier. A law on the extradition of illegal
9
251
poor urban suburbs of the big cities where the illegal immigrants are living
are becoming more frequent. Most often, these illegal immigrants are sent to
huge immigration camps in the confines of the Sahara desert, where there
is a lack of water and food. The southern part of the four Maghreb countries
thus produces a new kind of space: a space of relegation which stretches
from the Nigerian to the Libyan border, the Algerian to the Malian border and
the Moroccan to the Mauritanian border11.
The Maghreb fight against sub-Saharan illegal immigrants is complementary
to the EU’s illegal immigration policies. The fight against illegal immigration
from the South is a top priority on the EU security agenda and the EU is
putting pressure upon the Maghreb states to readmit illegal Sub-Saharan
immigrants who have made it to Europe, back to their countries of origin via
the Maghreb. Thus the EU’s claim of re-admittance of illegal immigrants puts
the societal and economic burden on the Maghreb states.
The EU tries thus to externalise the European border by “ordering” the
Maghreb states to closely control their own maritime borders. The EU
considers the Maghreb as an advanced post in its remote control of illegal
immigration. This has in fact resulted in “migration conditionality”12: if the
Maghreb regimes do not comply with the EU’s conditions with regard to
illegal immigration, they will have difficulties in obtaining loans and credits.
Therefore, the Maghreb regimes have entered into bilateral agreements on
illegal immigration with European member states.
The illegal Sub-Saharan immigration has had three important effects: the
borders have been pushed farther down into black Africa; it has strengthened
the regimes’ fear of social unrest and exacerbated the violation of human
rights; and the cooperation on illegal immigration (and also terrorism) has
drawn the Maghreb and the EU closer together than before.
The combination of the European fear of the radicalisation of Muslim
communities in Europe and the increasing Islamisation of Maghreb societies
has made the EU an important outside power in the fight against illegal
immigration and terrorism. However, the EU is not the only outside power
that is penetrating13 the Maghreb and the Sahara and is seen as being an
immigration was passed and the same happened in Algeria and Tunisia. Hence,
a link between Islamist Jihadism and African illegal immigration was constructed
(Perrin 2005).
11
Bensaad 2005, 26–27.
12
Ibid., 23.
13
The verb ”penetrate” refers to Buzan’s and Wæver’s vocabulary with regard to the
Ulla Holm
252
agent in the further blurring of the southern borders of the Maghreb. The US
has penetrated the Maghreb and the Sahara with the goal of tracing terrorists
in the Sahara and the Sahel14.
Until 2001, the Maghreb had only a peripheral status in American eyes.
After September 11th, security and political cooperation with Morocco, Tunisia
and Algeria were strengthened. Morocco, the longstanding ally of the US, was
granted the status of preferential non-NATO ally in 2004, and Algeria is now
regarded as a key regional player15. Algeria is central to the American “war
against terrorism” because the Algerian regime has extensive experience in
combating Islamist Jihadists since the early 1990s.
The US considers the Maghreb as a foothold for penetrating further south,
where – according to the US – yet another area of expanding terrorism is
developing16. The US perceives the Sahel as a vulnerable area because of its
low demographic density and its permeable borders. American decisionmakers state that terrorist groups, local as well as international, devote
themselves to all kinds of smuggling, including weapons, and recruit new
members among the local population17. The Sahel is regarded by the US as
“the new front in the global war against terrorism,” and thus the objective
of the US is “to facilitate cooperation among governments in the region
and strengthen their capacity to combat terrorist organisations” such as the
GSPC.18
The US argues that the Maghreb and the US have common interests in
combating terrorists in the Sahel – maybe even with military means. One
might of course state that this American way of dealing with terrorism is far
from unusual. It is rather the American global standard. What is unusual is
that the US has penetrated an area that until some years ago was considered
to be an area of fragile states that were threats to their own societies but not
to the US. Now, however the threat of terrorism is considered a danger to
regional security complex (RSC) theory. They write that penetration occurs when
outside powers make security alignments within an RSC (Buzan & Wæver 2003,
46). The U.S. is an outside power that makes security alignments with regional
states (Ibid., 46).
14
The word Sahel comes from the Arabic Sahil, meaning shore or coast, and refers
to the lands on the edge of the Sahara desert.
15
Ammour 2006, 5.
16
Zoubir 2006.
17
Rémy 2004.
18
Pope 2005.
253
stability and peace in the whole of Africa and in the Maghreb, and therefore
to the US as a global power.
As long as the US, Maghreb and Sub-Saharan common operations against
terrorists remain “invisible” to the Maghreb populations, the Maghreb regimes
will probably continue to support the US penetration into the Sub-Sahara
and the Maghreb. However, if the regimes allow American military bases in
the big Maghreb cities, they will be met by public anti-Americanism. The
Maghreb regimes are very well aware of the populations’ anti-Americanism.
They thus balance on a tightrope between support for the US “war against
terrorism” and the populations’ resentment at US “neo-imperialism” in the
Maghreb and Sub-Sahara. The fear of terrorism and the subsequent threat to
regime survival make the regimes work together with the US. This is, in part,
balanced out by the societal fear of the loss of Arab and Muslim identity due
to the US penetration into the Maghreb, which in turn, makes the regimes
distance themselves from overt American intervention and involvement.
Conclusion
The “war against terrorism” and Sub-Saharan illegal immigration have
profoundly affected the relationship between the US, the EU and the Maghreb.
It has expanded the borders of the Maghreb into the Sub-Sahara. This change
has had one serious side-effect both in the Maghreb and in the Sub-Sahara:
increasing anti-Americanism. Add to this the conservative Islamists’ general
anti-Western feelings that challenge the regimes’ collaboration with the US
and the EU.
Societal anger against the regimes, Europe (the EU) and the US has
increased. The regimes’ answer to this anger is a mixture of “liberalized
autocracy”, status quo policies and the liberalisation of economics. The EU
reply to this mixture is to give lower priority to the export of its “own model”:
political liberalism. This model has been represented as security policy –
as the export of common security19. However, the European fears over the
destabilization of the Maghreb regimes that might open up for further
terrorism and immigration result in a political conception that dictates that
the status quo is security. The Union for the Mediterranean that was launched
in Paris on the 13th of July 2008 – as the opening of the French EU Presidency
– does not change this conceptualization of security. It underlines the need
for concrete projects in order to stabilize the EU’s near neighbourhood.
The agenda of democratization seems in turn to be downgraded, whereas
19
Holm 2004; Malmvig 2006.
Ulla Holm
254
enhanced cooperation between the EU member states and the regimes with
regard to the fight against terrorism, illegal immigration and border control
is high on the agenda. Stabilization of the fragile regimes is actually what
counts for the EU. The future of the Maghreb societies and their demands for
transparency, justice, and rule of law is gloomy.
References
Alioua, Mehdi (2005): “La migration transnationale des Africains subsahariens
au Maghreb. L’exemple de l’étape marocaine”, Maghreb–Machrek, No. 185,
Automne, 37–59.
Amghar, Samir (2007): “Le salafisme au Maghreb: menace pour la sécurité ou
facteur de stabilité politique?” La revue internationale et stratégique (IRIS),
Automne, 40–51.
Ammour, Laurence (2006): “The Frozen Conflict in Western Sahara: Who
Benefits?” Research Paper. Academic Research Branch – NATO Defense College,
No. 30, November, Rome.
Bensaad, Ali (2005): “Les migrations transsahariennes. Une mondialisation par la
marge”, Maghreb–Machrek, No. 185, 13–36.
Brumberg, Daniel (2002): ”The Trap of Liberalized Autocracy”, Journal of
Democracy, 13(4), 56–68.
Burgat, Francois & François Gèze (2007): “Algeria”, in T. Archer & H. Huuhtanen
(ed.) Islamist Opposition Parties and the Potential for EU Engagement. Helsinki:
The Finnish Institute of International Affairs.
Buzan, Barry & Ole Wæver (2003): Regions and Powers. The Structure of
International Security. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Entelis, John (2005): “The Democratic Imperative vs. the Authoritarian Impulse:
The Maghreb State between Transition and Terrorism”, Strategic Insights, V(6),
June.
Holm, Ulla (2002): The Maghreb: Half-way between Europe and the Middle East.
Roskilde: Fédérico Caffè Centre.
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Holm, Ulla (2004): “The EU’s Security Policy Towards the Mediterranean: An (im)possible Combination of Export of European Political values and anti-Terror
Measures?” DIIS Working Paper 2004.
International Crisis Group (2004): Islamism in North Africa 1: The legacies of
History. Cairo/Brussels, 20 April.
International Crisis Group (2004): Islamism, Violence and Reform in Algeria:
Turning the Page. ICG Middle East and North Africa. Briefing, 20 April.
International Commission of Jurists (2006): Eminent Jurists conclude sub-regional
Hearing on Terrorism and Human Rights in the Maghreb. 7th July. http://www.
ejp.icj.org/hearing2.php3?id_article=56&lang=en.
Kepel, Gilles (2000): Jihad. Expansion et déclin de l’islamisme. Paris: Gallimard.
Malmvig, Helle (2006): “Caught between cooperation and democratization:
The Barcelona process and the EU’s double discursive approach”, Journal of
International Relations and Development, 9(4), 243–270.
Perrin, Delphine (2005): “Le Maghreb sous influence: le nouveau cadre juridique
des migrations transsahariennes”, Maghreb–Machrek, No.185, Automne.
Pope, P. William (2005): “Eliminating Terrorist Sanctuaries: The Role of Security
Assistance”. William P. Pope, Acting Coordinator for Counterterrorism,
Testimony Before the House International Relations Committee,
Subcommittee on International Terrorism and Nonproliferation, Washington
DC, 10 March. http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/ops/tscti.htm.
Rémy, Jean-Philippe (2004): “Les Etats-Unis renforcent leur dispositif
antiterroriste dans plusieurs pays africains”, Le Monde, March 5.
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København: Vandkunsten)
Zoubir, H. Yahia (2006): “American Policy in the Maghreb: The Conquest of a New
Region?” Working Paper, No. 13, 24 July. Real Instituto Elcano.
Hassan Hanafi
Orientalism as a field of research emerged in the West in modern times,
since the Renaissance. It appeared during the second cycle of the history
of the West, after the classical period and the Patristics, the Medieval time
and the Scholastics. It reached its peak in the 19th century, and paralleled
the development of other Western schools of thought such as rationalism,
historicism, and structuralism.
Orientalism has been the Victim of historicism from its formation, via
meticulous and microscopic analysis, indifferent to meaning and significance.
Orientalism expresses the searching subject more than it describes the
object of research. It reveals Western mentality more than intuiting Oriental
Soul. It is motivated by the anguish of gathering the maximum of useful
information about countries, peoples and cultures of the Orient. The West,
in its expansion outside its geographic borders, tried to understand better in
order to dominate better. Knowledge is power. Classical Orientalism belongs
for the most part to similar aspects of colonial culture in the West such as
Imperialism, Racism, Nazism, Fascism – a package of hegemonic ideologies
and European supremacy. It is a Western activity, an expression of Western
élan vital, determining the power relationship between the Self and the
Other; between the West and the non-West; between Europe from one side
and Asia, Africa and Latin America, from the other side; between the New
World and the classical world; between modern times and ancient times.
This brutal judgement, without nuances, is undoubtedly a severe and
painful one, but a real one on the level of historical unconsciousness of
peoples, on the level of images even if it is inaccurate enough on the level
of concepts. On the contrary, Occidentalism is a discipline constituted in
Third World countries in order to complete the process of decolonization.
Military, economic and political decolonization would be incomplete without
scientific and cultural decolonization. Insofar as colonized countries before
or after liberation are objects of study, decolonization will be incomplete.
Decolonization will not be completed until the liberation of the object to
become subject and the transformation of the observed to an observer. The
object of study in Orientalism becomes the studying subject in Occidentalism,
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Hassan Hanafi
and the studying subject in Orientalism becomes an object of study in
Occidentalism. There is no eternal studying subject and no eternal object of
study. It depends on the power relationship between peoples and cultures.
Roles change throughout history. Peoples in the Ancient World, China, India,
Persia, Babylonia, Egypt, were studying subjects. Peoples and Islamic classical
cultures were previously studying subjects and Europeans at the time were
objects of study. The role changed in modern times when Europeans became
the studying subjects and the Muslim world became an object of study. The
end of Orientalism and the beginning of Occidentalism means exchanging
roles for a third time in the subject object relationship between the Self and
the Other. The West ceases to be subject and becomes object, and the Orient
ceases to be object and becomes subject. Subjective idealism switches from
Western colonial modem times to Third World post-colonial new times.
Cogito ergo sum, which declared the West as a knowing subject, becomes in
the Third World studio ergo sum.
Occidentalism is a counter-field of research, which can be developed in
the Orient in order to study the West from a non-Western World point of view.
The Other in the self is always an image. An image is always a caricature, which
helps in shooting at the target. Orientalism drew many images for the Orient.
These included Blacks, Yellows, Oriental despotism, primitive mentality, savage
thought, Semite mind, Arab mind, Violence, fanaticism, underdevelopment,
dependence, sectarianism, traditionalism and conservatism. Once the Other
is caricatured, it is easy to deal with him, justifying any action of the Self. The
image made the Other a target the Self shoots at. Besides, the Self promotes
self-made image to sharpen itself, such as: whites, Western, democracy,
logical mentality, civilization, Aryanism, peace, tolerance, development and
even over development, independence, secularism, modernism, progress.
By the power of mass media and its control by the West, the perpetuation
and the repetition of this double image was made by the self to disarm the
Other and to arm the Self, to create a permanent relation of superiorityinferiority complex between the Occident and the Orient, and a relationship
of inferiority-superiority complex between the Orient and the Occident.
If Orientalism was the creation of the centre, Occidentalism is the creation
of the periphery. The centre was also privileged in history of sciences, arts
and cultures, while the periphery was marginalized. The centre creates and
the periphery consumes, the centre sees and conceptualises. The centre is
the master and in the periphery lays the disciple. The centre is the trainer and
the periphery is the trainee. Occidentalism, as a new science, can exchange
259
this type of relationship, with the fixed roles played by the two, for reverse
relationships and roles.
Orientalism is born in an ethno-racist culture. It expresses Euro-centrism,
based on historical pride and organic superiority. This pits White against
Black, knowledge against ignorance, logic against contradiction, reason
against magic, rationalization against ethico-religious practice, dignity and
human rights against dignity and rights of God or of the king, democracy
versus despotism or in short, life against death, being against nothingness.
Occidentalism corrects this type of relationship between the West as Self and
the Orient as Other to the Orient as self and the West as Other. The relation
between the self and the Other, either way, can be an equal relation, not a
high-low relation, an even and sane inter-subjective relation instead of a
superiority-inferiority complex. Constructive Occidentalism is the substitute
for destructive Orientalism.
The history of the world was written as if the West was the very centre
of the Universe and the end of history. History of ancient civilizations was
reduced to the minimum. History of modern times in the West is blown up
to the maximum. Three thousand years of the Orient are summarized in one
chapter, while five hundred years of history of the modern West is expounded
in several chapters. Orientalism was the victim of Western philosophies of
history, which conceived Europe as the peak of all civilizations, the fruits in
modern times after planting the seeds in ancient times, the accomplishment
of a theological development, the perfection of things after the abrogation
of all previous imperfections, the unique Christ after the prophets of Israel,
repeated in history. Occidentalism aims at evening the balance of world
historiography against this historical injustice in history of world civilization.
Neutrality and objectivity were claimed to be the conditions of Western
science. However, Orientalism is neither neutral nor objective. It is an oriented
and committed discipline, expressing the inclinations and the profound
motivation in European consciousness. It reveals the passions of the subject,
more than it describes the neutral object. It substitutes for the independent
object the mental image of the subject. Neutrality and objectivity appear
to be a cover-up for partiality and subjectivism. Occidentalism is just the
opposite. It is not motivated by rancour or the desire to dominate. It does not
consciously or unconsciously deform the object by stereotyped images, or
make value-judgements on it. It tries to be a vigorous science by its object,
method and purpose. The desire to liberate one’s self from the yoke of the
image imposed on him by the Other is a creative power, unveiling the truth
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Hassan Hanafi
of power relationships between the subject and the object in Orientalism,
controlling the Other by the image, or in Occidentalism, liberating one’s self
from the image imposed on him by the other. Occidentalism may produce
counter-images for the Other, with its desire to dominate, and for the Self,
with a self-producing image of endogenous creativity, as a desire for selfliberation.
The object of Occidentalism is to counterbalance Westernization tendencies
in the Third World. The West became a model of modernization outside itself,
in Africa, Asia and Latin America. Western life style became very common
in non-Western countries, especially in the ruling classes. The imitation
of the West became almost a national behaviour. These westernization
tendencies have generated anti-Western attitudes as they appear in religious
conservatism and fundamentalism. Occidentalism is partly a defence of
national character, national culture and national life-style against alienation
and disloyalty; a popular option against Orientalism as a minority option;
a mass culture against Orientalism as an elite culture; an ideology for the
ruled against Orientalism as an ideology of the ruler; a liberating device like
liberation theology against Orientalism as a dominating device, like church
dogmatics.
National culture everywhere in the Third World is split between two
antagonistic tendencies. Each is presenting itself as the true representative
of the people, the first in the name of Modernity, the second in the name of
Tradition. In the case of the Arab World, the West is a model of modernization in
the three major trends in modern Arabic Thought: Religious Reform founded
by Al-Afghani, Secular Scientism initiated by Shebly Shmayyel, and Political
Liberalism conceived by Al-Tahtawi. In these three trends, the West is a model
of knowledge that is of power, industry, urbanism, democracy, multi-party
system, constitution, freedom of press, human rights. This is the image of
Europe during the enlightenment. The difference between the three trends is
of degree, not of nature. Once national passion calms down, westernization
appears as loyalty to the West and a life style for the ruling class. Cultural
dependence on the West generates a gradual loss of national independence.
Occidentalism as a science gives the priority to the endogenous over the
exogenous, to the interior over the exterior, to the Self over the Other, to
antinomy over heteronomy.
Occidentalism as a cultural movement aims at transforming developing
societies from transfer of knowledge to cultural creativity. Since the national
liberation era, the construction of the Nation State is based on modern sciences
coming from the West. The role of intellectuals and even of scientists was to
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transfer science, art, and literature from the Western to the non-Western World.
The West produces and the non-Western World consumes. The West creates
and the non-Western World transmits. National cultures became conveyers
of foreign systems and ideologies. The Culture of the centre radiates on the
peripheries. The centre profuses and the peripheries diffuse. Occidentalism
can help the Third World in sharing the creation, not just the diffusion, of a
common cultural homeland for all humanity. Science emerges from reality,
not from pre-formulated texts in the ancient tradition or in the modern West.
Conceptualisation is not the monopoly of European consciousness. It is a
human effort, accessible to every human consciousness. The long and painful
work of creativity is preferable to the laziness of consumption and imitation,
to the transfer to one’s self of concepts formulated elsewhere. Peoples in the
Third World can then reach the age of maturity and get rid of western cultural
tutorship.
The scientific data of this new science, Occidentalism, can be drawn from
two sources: First, the criticism of European culture by Third World intellectuals,
based on simple intuitions and existential reactions or on scientific analysis
and demonstrative arguments. Before and after national liberation, national
intellectuals in Africa, Asia and Latin America tried to liberate their national
cultures from the hegemony and supremacy of Western culture. The critic of
the Other and the perception of his limits is the pre-requisite of self-liberation
from the control of the Other. The mentality, the history and the culture of
the Other are distinct from the soul, the history and the culture of the Self.
Indiginismo, liberation theology in Latin America, Conscientism and Negritude
in Africa, base and democratic movements in Asia. All are examples of
national creativity.
The second source of critique of European consciousness is made inside
the West by the Europeans themselves, their thinkers and philosophers.
Rousseau criticizes arts, sciences, literature and their negative influence on
individual and social ethics. Spengler declares the “Decline of the West.” Max
Scheler speaks of the reversal of values. Nietzsche evokes general nihilism
and announces the death of God. Husserl and Bergson deplore the loss of
life, “Erlebnis,” “vecu” in European consciousness, which became bankrupt for
Husserl, and machines creating gods for Bergson. Nietzsche declares “God is
dead”, Derrida and the post-modernists declare “Man is dead,” and Barthes
even declares “The Author is dead!”
This double testimony, external and internal, constitutes the already-existing
data of Occidentalism as science.
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Besides, there is also primary data, the works produced by European
consciousness itself as symptoms of European Lebenswelt, the barometer of
Being and Nothingness, of life and death of cultures and civilizations. This
raw material consists of major philosophical works during the historical
course of European consciousness. Philosophy is a whole worldview
including art and science. It is the mirror, which reflects the development
and the structure of European consciousness. The object of Occidentalism
is European consciousness itself, as the soul of Europe, the condition of its
renaissance or decline, life and death. The concept is not an abstraction, a
hypothesis or a moral one but it refers to “une prise de conscience,” Besinnung,
a self consciousness, a subjectivity, the basis of objectivity studied by most
philosophers of history: Scheler, Spengler, Bergson, Husserl, Ortega, Toynbee,
Hazard. European consciousness has its sources, its beginning and end. It
has a structure coming out of its development. Its future is debated at this
turning point from the 20th to the 21st century.
European consciousness has three sources: Greco-Roman, Judeo-Christian
and the European milieu itself: mentality, temperament, popular culture,
customs, and traditions. The Roman source took over the Greek one, given
the Romanist intensive of Imperial Rome, which was reiterated in modern
European colonialism. The Jewish source took over the Christian one, with
Paul and the Judaisation of Christianity. The European milieu, which was
closer to Romanism and Judaism than to Hellenism and Christianity, took
over two other sources. Realism triumphed over Idealism. Materialism
dominated over Spiritualism and Satan overwhelmed God. The first two
sources, Judeo-Christian and Greco-Roman, changed models from Plato
during the Patristic period to Aristotle during Scholasticism; from Idealism to
Realism; from mind to matter. The European milieu is the material substratum
for Judaism, Romanism and Aristotelianism. Thus the carrier and the carried
are of the same kind.
European consciousness began in modern times, with the Cartesian Cogito,
“Cogito ergo sum.” The subject has an absolute priority over the object. The
Word is a perceived world. Subjective idealism was the point of departure.
Regarding ethics, temporary ethics were proposed, unsubjected to reason.
The will is much wider than reason. Theoretical Truth is guaranteed by Divine
veracity. From this subjectivism, two apparent opposite trends emerged:
Rationalism and Empiricism. Both are subjectivist, the first as an idea, a priori
or deduction; the second as impression, sensation, a posteriori and induction.
The first trend begins from the subject upwards, while the second begins from
the subject downwards. European consciousness became like an open mouth.
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This is the famous Western Dualism which European modern philosophy
began with and suffered from. The Transcendental Idealism of Kant tried to
unify the two trends as form and matter, category and intuition, a priori and a
posteriori, induction and deduction, analysis and synthesis, metaphysics and
physics, philosophy and science. In this famous problematique: how an a
priori synthetic judgment is possible? Organic unity and dialectic movement
were absent. The same dualism continued in ethics. Pure reason is incapable
of knowing right and wrong. Only practical reason can. Pure reason deals
with phenomena, while practical reason deals with noumena. Kant declares
that through this dualism, determining the final purpose of Transcendental
idealism and critical philosophy, he had to destroy knowledge in order to
make room for belief. Later, when efforts were again made through the
absolute Idealism of postkantians, to unify this juxtaposed dualism, it only
became triadism, sensation, understanding, and reason; aesthetics, analytics
and dialectics, in a dialectical process. Fichte conceived practical Idealism
and the subjective dialectic between the Ego and the non-Ego to form the
Absolute Ego. Hegel reiterated Fichte, transforming subjective dialectics to
objective, and going from logic to Being. Schelling preferred a certain kind
of philosophy of Identity between Geist and Natur, to begin with unity as an
axiom, not Cartesian duality. Schopenhauer reiterated the same dualism in
the World as representation and Will, trying to unify the two in the negative
aspect of life. This was already a symptom of the end, in accord with Rousseau’s
critique of modern civilization. The criticism of the Hegelian left, regarding
Hegelian absolute Idealism, is also the beginning of the end. In all efforts to
close down the open mouth of European consciousness, the end appeared in
three ways: first, with Kierkegaard, Nietzsche, Ortega and most existentialists,
the critique of Western rationalism became abstraction and formalism, ending
in a complete destruction of reason and the affirmation of the irrational, the
absurd and the contradictory, in order to bring the upward ascendant line
downwards. Second, with Scheler, Weber and all existentialist philosophers,
the critique of Empiricism as materialism and naive objectivism, brought the
downward descendant line upwards. The two lines meet in the middle in
the new Cogito of Husserl and Bergson, in human existence according to all
existentialist philosophers, and in life with all philosophers of life, thus putting
the third way between the two opposing trends and thereby closing up the
European mouth. The course of European consciousness has its beginnings
and endings. It has a point of departure and a point of arrival, from the Cogito
of Descartes to the Cogitatum of Husserl. The epopee ends.
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Hassan Hanafi
Besides, European consciousness has a structure formed during its
development. It has a Trinitarian structure, expressing itself in a triadic vision
which splits the phenomenon into three parts and reduces the whole to one
of its parts. The question is whether the phenomenon is formal and can be
understood by reason, or material and can be perceived through senses, or
lived and can be felt through human experience. The three visions disputed
among each other in order to have the monopoly of knowledge. Each vision
became unilateral, one-sided and unilinear. European consciousness fell
down into the dichotomy of either/or. European consciousness was not
satisfied with the two alternatives and ended by neither/nor. The oscillation
between all became the only truth. Change took over permanence. European
consciousness lost its focus. It shoots outside the point, in all directions except
in the centre. It goes all the time off to the side in diversion. All alternatives
became equally true and untrue, which led to total scepticism, at the very
basis of contemporary Nihilism.
The question now is what is the future of European consciousness? Has
it accomplished its historical course in the cycle of world history? Which
world-consciousness will take the lead? If Europe in modem times has
inherited historical cultures of Africa, Asia and Latin America, can Third-World
consciousness, the new energized by the upsurge of these historical societies,
take the lead and inherit European consciousness in a new cycle of world history?
Evidence can prove such a historical possibility, given the symptoms of new
existence and optimism in Third World consciousness. Most philosophers of
history in the West declared the birth of world history in the East and its rebirth
and decline in the West. History was accomplished and the final stage was
reached in modem times in the German enlightenment (Herder, Lessing, Kant,
Hegel), in the French enlightenment (Voltaire, Montesquieu, Turgot), in the
Italian enlightenment (Vico), in the Russian enlightenment (The Slavophiles),
or in the American Enlightenment (Thomas Paine). Only Condorcet left one
stage, the tenth, for the future. Rousseau had already declared the beginning
of the end, while Hegel declared the accomplishment of history and the close
of a European historical cycle. Contemporary European philosophers showed
the different manifestations of Nihilism at the final stage of the development
of European consciousness, integral Nihilism, the death of God (Nietzsche),
renversement des valeurs (M. Scheler), Lebeweltverloss (Husserl), Des machines
pour créer des Dieux (Bergson), the decline of the West (Spengler), civilization
on trial (Toynbee), l’Occident n’est pas un accident (Garaudy), la crise de la
conscience européenne (Hazard). The same phenomenon appears in human
and social sciences, launching the question of crisis in Western sociology.
265
It appears also in the general malaise of daily life, the counter-culture, two
World Wars in thirty years, the collapse of the Western project, maximum
of production, for maximum of consumption for maximum of happiness,
the high rate of suicide, organized crime, violence. The last hopeful signs of
returning back to European classical Liberalism in Germany, Eastern Europe
and Russia, the renewal of the capitalist system, the rejuvenation of socialism.
All are temporary and ephemeral signs. On the contrary, other real hopeful
signs began to appear in Third World consciousness: liberation movements,
decolonization, development, mass mobilization, modernization,
building-up modern State, endogenous creativity, a new world value-system
expressing a new world ethical social and political order in international
agencies, a new world consensus against apartheid in South-Africa and
Zionism, a new decolonization regime in Palestine. Set-backs are temporary
counter-revolutions, dictatorships, militarism, new classes. Westernization,
dependence, underdevelopment, violation of human rights. There are moral
and material Potentialities in the Third World. Experiences of trial and error
are fruitful. Historical traditional experiences of the self from the past and
modern European experiences of the other in the present time can be two
signposts for a New World consciousness.
Does Occidentalism as a new science sacrifice the unity of world universal
culture in favour of national particular culture? In fact, World Culture is a myth
created by the Culture of the Centre to dominate the periphery in the name
of acculturation. It has been created thanks to the mass-media monopolized
by the centre. There is no One Culture in capital C. There are only multiple
cultures, in small cs. Each culture has its own autonomous life, an expression
of a people and its history. Cultural interaction throughout history does not
mean acculturation, the absorption of small cultures in the periphery by the big
Culture of the Centre, assimilation, imitation, or modelling. It means an equal
exchange, a give and take, a two-way movement on the levels of language,
concepts, horizons, methods, and values. Is Occidentalism a politicization of
historical sciences? In fact, politicization of science is a common experience,
shared among all peoples and cultures in all times. It appeared not only in
classical Orientalism, but also in European Sciences, human, social and even
natural. It is only when the balance of power changed from Europe to the
Third world, from the centre to the periphery, that politicization of science
became an accusation. The master in the centre was the champion of such
endeavour. Science is Power. The passage from Orientalism to Occidentalism
is in fact a shift in the balance of power.
Islam, Europe, Occident :
combats pour un humanisme commun1
Mohammed Arkoun
A Tuomo, en hommage à ses combats et ses contributions
pour la construction d’une Union méditerranéenne.
Pour un humanisme universalisable
On notera dès le départ le choix du concept universalisable qui permet
de sortir du postulat de l’universel toujours invoqué, surtout par les
religions, mais honoré. Chaque religion disposant d’une longue tradition
d’accumulation d’œuvres et d’enseignements, se veut universelle, alors que
dans l’histoire concrète et les constructions doctrinales, elle unit ses fidèles
tout en les séparant des infidèles impurs. Cela est particulièrement vrai entre
les trois grandes versions du monothéisme et leurs schismes respectifs.
Paradoxalement, c’est quand les travaux critiques sur les religions ont
clairement montré la fermeture des religions sur leurs solidarités exclusives
de l’autre que la revendication de l’universel est devenue obsédante et
arrogante. Mais la raison des Lumières a suivi les mêmes voies et oppose son
universel imparfait à celui insoutenable des religions. Il en va de même pour
la tolérance qui peine à s’imposer même après les efforts modernes pour
différencier les intolérances des religions closes et la tolérance dans la cité
démocratique où la citoyenneté ne retient plus les critères de confession, de
couleur, d’ethnie ou de lieu de naissance.
Tout cela nous renvoie à l’attitude humaniste. Les philosophes et les
théologiens disputent encore de la possibilité d’un humanisme chrétien, juif,
musulman. Dans les années 1930, quand Emmanuel Mounier développait la
vision d’un personnalisme chrétien et Jacques Maritain défendait l’idée que
le catholicisme thomiste est un Humanisme intégral, Emile Bréhier réfutait
ces propositions en soutenant que l’humanisme ne peut prendre son essor
qu’à partir de l’héritage philosophique grecque. La raison philosophique se
distingue de la raison théologique par son indépendance totale de tous les
1
Version inédite d’une conférence donnée à la Mairie de Rennes pour l’inauguration
du Centre culturel Avicenne le 19/9/2006.
Mohammed Arkoun
268
postulats invérifiables de la croyance religieuse. Les disputes actuelles en
France sur la relation entre raison autonome philosophique et scientifique
et raison serve du donné révélé ou d’une sagesse ancienne sacralisé par le
temps (Hindouisme, Bouddhisme, Confucianisme, religions africaines…)
prolongent celles commencées au Moyen Âge entre les philosophes et les
théologiens d’expression arabe (8e–13e siècles).
Aujourd’hui, on réexamine la précipitation idéologique de ceux qui ont
proclamé la mort de Dieu, puis celle de l’homme et du sujet (années 1960–
1970). On a déconstruit la métaphysique classique également présente dans
la raison philosophique et la raison théologique ; on réhabilite le sujet comme
foyer de liberté et aptitude à la créativité ; mais on n’arrive pas à redonner
à l’humanisme des assises doctrinales et des pratiques inscriptibles dans
la marche des hommes vers l’universalisable. Celui-ci est un mouvement
continu et pluriel vers des valeurs partagées, mises à l’épreuve dans la
diversité des parcours historiques concrets. Dans cette perspective, les vastes
flux d’immigration qui inspirent partout tant de peurs, d’angoisse, de mal
vivre, de méfiances et contrôles, deviennent des promesses d’intercréativités
et de communion toujours plus universalisables.
Par delà l’exemple de la France où se vivent ces tensions éducatives même
dans les moments de violence sociale, ces observations s’appliquent à
l’ensemble de l’espace historique européen souvent désigné par le concept
ambigu d’Occident. Nous devons réfléchir ensemble sur les trois concepts
Islam, Europe, Occident trop embrouillés par des conflits récurrents avant et
après 1945. Nous vivons sur des représentations fausses et dangereuses qui
structurent depuis 1945 notamment, les imaginaires sociaux et politiques
tant du côté du monde dit musulman que de celui de l’Europe/Occident.
Rappelons brièvement ces conflits majeurs. La guerre d’Algérie commence
le 8 mai 1945, jour de la victoire des alliés, mais aussi du bombardement
de Sétif pour réprimer un soulèvement local. La guerre de libération dure
de Novembre 1954 aux accords d’Evian en mars 1962. A l’intérieur de ce
conflit qui avait des aspects de guerre civile, s’insère la guerre de Suez pour
punir l’Egypte de Nasser qui venait de nationaliser le canal du même nom.
L’Europe/Occident a un rôle décisif dans la guerre de 1967 dite des six jours,
entre Israël et ce qu’on appelait alors la « Nation » arabe. Guerre dite de
Kippour en Octobre 1973 ; puis première guerre du Golfe en 1990. Le tout
culmine dans la guerre d’éradication du terrorisme international en réponse
aux attentats du 11/9/ 2001. Les développements de la guerre d’Irak depuis
mars 2003 suffiraient à justifier une analyse subversive des « valeurs » au nom
desquelles les protagonistes des guerres antérieures et de la guerre en cours
Combats pour un humanisme commun
269
« légitimes » tant de destructions, de vies humaines supprimées, d’espérances
collectives abolies. C’est en ce sens que j’ai publié en anglais un livre sous le
titre explicite à cet égard : Islam: to Reform or to Subvert?2
Antérieurement, j’ai publié avec Joseph Maïla3, un autre livre où j’ai
esquissé la genèse socio-culturelle et idéologique des mémoires collectives
et des imaginaires d’exclusion réciproque entre les deux polarisations
mythohistoriques et mythoidéologiques développées dans une littérature
pléthorique sur Islam et Occident. Le terme islam renvoie indistinctement
à la religion, à une tradition de pensée, aux cultures propres aux sociétés
nombreuses converties à cette religion depuis le Moyen Âge, à une civilisation
reconnaissable partout à des œuvres et des styles spécifiques de réalisation
de l’existence humaine. Mais depuis la Révolution dite islamique de 1979
en Iran et plus encore après les attentats du 11/9, toute cette diversité
désignée par le même mot est quasi abolie par le terrorisme international
lié au fondamentalisme dit islamiste à distinguer du qualificatif islamique.
Les musulmans n’ont pas su répondre avec pertinence à des amalgames
qu’ils renforcent eux-mêmes lorsqu’ils descendent dans la rue à propos du
voile, des versets sataniques, des caricatures, de tel roman subversif ou d’une
conférence du pape. En outre, ils construisent un imaginaire de l’Occident
aussi arbitraire et polémique que celui de ce même Occident sur l’islam. Au
lieu de faire un retour critique sur les manipulations incessantes que les Etats
et leurs oppositions politiques font subir partout à l’islam comme religion
et tradition de pensée, la majorité des musulmans préfèrent dénoncer le
scandale de l’islamophobie.
On notera que ce jeu de miroirs des deux imaginaires d’exclusion
réciproque, est aussi inégal et scandaleux que les guerres sans merci qui les
opposent depuis longtemps. L’Occident dispose de ressources scientifiques
et technologiques, de puissance militaire, économique et monétaire sans
commune mesure avec les retards historiques, les régressions intellectuelles
et culturelles, les sous-développements économiques et sociaux dont
souffrent toutes les sociétés contemporaines globalement qualifiées de
musulmanes. Et cependant, avec l’attentat du 11/9, l’Occident est devenu
la victime de ce monde éprouvé par tant d’échecs historiques et assigné
soudain à la fonction de bourreau. Les protagonistes de la lutte se livrent à
une surenchère mimétique sur l’accès au statut de victime, seul argument
opératoire pour légitimer les attaques et les ripostes. On sait comment les
2
3
Arkoun 2006a.
Arkoun & Maïla 2003.
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Mohammed Arkoun
instances internationales ont été elles-mêmes réduites à l’incapacité de
mettre un terme à un conflit dont on retrace les origines et les enjeux cachés
en remontant jusqu’aux conquêtes musulmanes aux 7e–8e siècles, réactivées
par les Ottomans du 16e au 17e siècle.
On lira dans le livre sur L’histoire de l’islam et des musulmans en France du
Moyen Age à nos jours des chapitres éclairants sur la genèse et les récurrences
des conflits entre l’Europe chrétienne, puis moderne et les empires musulmans
dont les effritements et les désintégrations ont commencé avec la chute du
Califat de Bagdad en 1258, la fin de l’Andalousie en 1592, le dépouillement
de l’Empire ottoman à partir de 1683. Je recommande particulièrement la
lecture attentive des chapitres consacrés aux Croisades, aux relations avec
l’Empire ottoman et à la politique coloniale. On mesurera à quel point
l’histoire analytique et réflexive apaise les passions et rend plus intelligibles les
événements qui nous déchirent. Il est urgent et nécessaire en effet, de dépasser
les discours de victimisation et les bulletins quotidiens de comptabilité
macabre pour préparer une pensée et une culture de paix dans l’ensemble
de l’espace méditerranéen. En France, en Europe comme dans tout le monde
de l’islam, on vit depuis l’émergence de la dernière version du monothéisme
en Arabie (610–632) sur d’amples mythohistoires et mythoidéologies4. Il est
temps de penser ou repenser les impensés accumulés pendant des siècles
pour dissimuler les ignorances, les omissions, les diabolisations de l’autre qui
continuent de dominer nos discours quotidiens et de faire irruption chez des
écrivains et des professeurs médiatisés.5
Permettez-moi d’apporter un témoignage personnel pour donner des
contenus concrets à toutes les observations précédentes. J’étais étudiant
à Alger, puis à Paris pendant la guerre d’Algérie. Ce qui s’écrivait alors dans
les journaux et se propageait sur les ondes ressemble beaucoup à tout ce
qui continue de circuler de nos jours sur l’Occident en contextes arabomusulmans et inversement sur ces derniers en Europe/Occident. Les
maquisards algériens étaient des fellagas hors-la-loi ; l’Algérie n’a jamais été
ni un Etat, ni une nation dans son histoire indistincte de celle de l’Afrique
du Nord ; la France doit poursuivre sa mission civilisatrice qui légitime la
conquête de 1830… Je percevais déjà que les réfutations opposées à ces
proclamations par le discours nationaliste véhiculaient des ignorances égales
à celles des défenseurs d’un régime colonial sûr de lui, de son bon droit et
4
Sur l’importance explicative de ces deux concepts guère utilisés par les historiens
les plus critiques, je renvoie à mes analyses dans Arkoun & Maïla 2003.
5
Arkoun 2006b.
271
dominateur. Mes maîtres à Alger comme à la Sorbonne, étaient eux-mêmes
incapables de tempérer les fureurs idéologiques par un savoir critique fiable
et scientifiquement contraignant. C’est devant ce vide intellectuel et l’absence
de part et d’autre d’une conscience historique critique consistante qu’est
née en moi la détermination d’orienter mes recherches et mes réflexions
vers un projet de grand envergure dont j’ai donné les premières expressions
dans le recueil d’essais publié en 1982 sous le titre Lectures du Coran, suivi
en 1984 d’une Critique de la Raison islamique. En 2002, j’ai publié en anglais
The Unthought in Contemporain Islamic Thought, repris dans une deuxième
édition en 2005 sous le titre plus explicite déjà cité Islam: to Reform or to
Subvert?
Il m’a été donné de mesurer à plusieurs reprises la surdité des militants
les plus cultivés à l’idée même d’accompagner la lutte armée et la politique
de libération, d’un travail intellectuel et scientifique pour inscrire l’Algérie
libérée du côté des acquits les plus incontournables de la modernité
intellectuelle et institutionnelle. Le mot d’ordre de l’idéologie de combat
dans les cas algériens, palestinien, irakiens, iraniens…, était et demeure de
taire ces « abstractions » intellectuelles pour mettre fin d’abord au régime
colonial. Je pressentais clairement vers quelle tragédie historique quelques
leaders de la lutte entraînaient et continuent d’entraîner des peuples abusés
avant et après la guerre. L’élimination de certaines voix qui osaient s’exprimer
dans le sens d’un consensus national sur le destin moderne ou régressif de
l’Algérie indépendante, m’a conforté dans le choix d’un combat intellectuel,
scientifique et culturel de portée subversive pour l’ensemble de la pensée
d’expression arabe et islamique. Une subversion thérapeutique, positive,
constructive pour réparer des ans et des violences aveugles les irréparables
outrages. Plus de 50 ans de recherche, de publications et d’enseignement ont
clairement établi des constantes communes à l’évolution historique de toutes
les sociétés dont le destin a été lié à ce que j’appelle le fait coranique et le fait
islamique. Depuis la création de l’Etat d’Israël, les Palestiniens vivent dans les
mêmes erreurs stratégiques illustrées dans le parcours algérien. L’islamisme
militant dans les contextes européens contemporains demeure englué dans
la même mythohistoire transformée en mythoidélogie malgré les ressources
de la pensée moderne mises à la portée de tous ceux qui acceptent de s’en
servir.
En plaçant la création de ce centre Avicenne dans cette perspective
d’histoire réflexive, je veux aussi lancer un appel à tous les maires de France
pour suivre l’exemple de leur collègue de Rennes. Pour renforcer le sens de cet
appel, je dois également rendre hommage à l’action de mon ami Jean-Pierre
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Mohammed Arkoun
Brard, député maire de Montreuil, qui a vite compris la haute portée politique
à l’échelle nationale, d’un enseignement public du fait religieux. Nous avons
créé en 2003 ce que nous avons appelé le Centre civique d’enseignement du
fait religieux. Ce centre fonctionne d’une manière exemplaire, donnant la
preuve que l’approche laïque du fait religieux élargit les horizons de sens
de toutes les religions et renforce la pensée laïque qui sait enfin intégrer les
richesses culturelles et intellectuelles des parcours historiques des religions
abandonnées jusqu’ici aux seules initiatives privées des communautés
croyantes.
Le centre Avicenne de Rennes doit d’autant plus d’ouvrir un même espace
civique pour cet enseignement qu’il doit marquer sa fonction propre par
rapport à celle cultuelle de la mosquée. Si la fonction cultuelle l’emporte
sur les tâches civiques laïques de l’expression intellectuelle, scientifique et
culturelle des religions, le pari pour faire bénéficier la vie religieuse des fidèles,
des lumières de la connaissance critique, sera perdu. L’idée de combiner les
deux fonctions dans un même espace bâti, a des antécédents historiques
dans l’islam traditionnel ; on réservait toujours à l’intérieur des mosquées
un espace à l’enseignement, à l’échange scientifique et à la méditation
spirituelle. Cela n’a pas empêché la création de grandes universités ou
médersas qui, avec le temps, se sont laissées gagner par l’emprise de la
religion ritualiste et dogmatique. Est-il besoin de souligner que l’islam en
France et dans l’ensemble de l’Europe est encore loin de disposer d’espaces
scientifiques et culturels comparables à ceux dont disposent les religions
enracinées depuis longtemps dans l’histoire des peuples européens. L’idée
est d’habituer les populations d’origines ethnoculturelles diverses à poser et
résoudre ensemble tous les problèmes liés à la construction d’un espace de
citoyenneté humaniste où chaque mémoire collective se laisse enrichir par les
acquis positifs des autres. Cela implique évidemment que toutes les cultures
vivantes sur le sol français soient également accueillies dans leurs styles et
leurs thématiques propres afin de dynamiser une créativité interculturelle
et intellectuelle enrichissantes pour tous. Je pense au succès des maisons
de la culture lancées par André Malraux pour faire bénéficier les provinces
de manifestations culturelles trop concentrées à Paris. La nécessité politique
d’intégrer tous les nouveaux venus dans une même marche citoyenne
implique la consolidation d’une langue commune et de visions interactives
ouvertes sur le futur immédiat et lointain.
Pour souligner la pertinence de cette politique, il convient de rappeler que
la France a esquissé de timides efforts d’assimilation des « indigènes » en
Algérie. Mais, compte tenu de ce qui a été sur l’épistémè de la pensée française
273
et l’épistémologie de la connaissance, elle ne pouvait se donner ni les outils de
pensée, ni la volonté politique indispensables pour dépasser l’idée simpliste
d’assimilation de sociétés et de modes de pensée décrits comme primitifs
et inscrits dans la magie et les croyances religieuses obsolètes. La critique
nationaliste du colonialisme inspirée de fragments de la pensée protestataire
révolutionnariste était encore plus limitée que celle du colonisateur pour
accéder à l’analyse plus radicale que je suggère ici. C’est ainsi que la guerre
de libération doit être décryptée comme un choc inévitable entre deux
imaginaires à la fois différents dans leurs substrats et identiques en tant que
structures anthropologiques déterminantes dans tous les mécanismes de
production imaginaire des sociétés humaines depuis le stade « sauvage » de
la pensée jusqu’au stade actuel le plus sophistiqué. La guerre d’Irak en cours,
les attentats du 11/9/2001 relèvent de la même analyse.
Précisons que la science positiviste du 19e siècle rejetait dans l’impensable
et l’obsolète ce que les ethnographes d’alors décrivaient sous les appellations
magies, superstitions, croyances archaïques, traditions immobiles, conduites
régressives, etc. Certaines postures laïcistes et militantes d’aujourd’hui en
sont toujours au stade de ce positivisme arrogant et réducteur. C’est dire que
la pensée laïque doit enfin se laisser instruire par les apports nouveaux de
l’investigation pluridisciplinaire. De même que la République a fait attendre
les femmes françaises jusqu’en 1945 pour l’octroi du droit de vote, elle s’est
autorisée, a fortiori, à appliquer parcimonieusement aux départements
d’Algérie, la loi instituant l’école obligatoire, gratuite et laïque. Elle a pensé
encore moins à appliquer la loi de 1905 ou seulement à une politique de
création de centres culturels à vocation éducative et laïque. Cette incurie se
prolonge en métropole à l’égard des immigrés voués aux tâches manuelles et
une existence précaire dans des banlieues ou quartiers réservés. Curieusement
dans les débats actuels sur la violence des banlieues, la dimension culturelle
et éducative telle que je l’évoque ici est rarement prise en compte. Bien
des professeurs d’histoire au niveau secondaire sont encore prisonniers de
l’ancien cadre de pensée se contendant d’opposer deux concepts abstraits
comme tradition et modernité, régime fondamentaliste et régime rationnel
de la pensée, des représentations et des discours, connaissance mythologique
et superstitieuse et connaissance scientifique…
La persistance de ce cadre binaire de la pensée et du poids du logocentrisme
aristotélicien dans la tradition spéculative de la métaphysique classique
permet d’expliquer aujourd’hui la reconduction du choc des imaginaires
et des ignorances mutuelles dans le face à face France/Europe et Islam/
Mohammed Arkoun
274
musulmans. La France reproduit les rhétoriques abstraites et idéalistes du
Moment fondateur de la Révolution, les musulmans régressent de manière
encore plus agressive et antihistorique vers le Moment inaugurateur de la
dernière Révélation de Parole de Dieu à toutes ses créatures. Tous les français
et tous les musulmans ne sont évidemment également enfermés dans ces
représentations mythiques de leurs identités respectives et de leur vision
de l’histoire des sociétés, évolutionnaires de carence révèlent le caractère
prématuré de tous les principes généreux proclamés universels par la raison
des Lumières. Dans cette perspective, on ne peut dire que l’Algérie a tourné
le dos à la modernité ; ni son passé historique, ni sa structure socio-culturelle,
ni sa sociologie linguistique, ni son anthropologie politique, juridique et
sociale ne pouvaient faciliter l’accueil d’une modernité dont l’administration
coloniale elle-même ignorait les enjeux et les principes fondateurs. Quant à
la République gérée de Paris, elle s’est contentée d’une rhétorique ronflante,
mais vide de tout programme émancipateur à l’instar des initiatives
appliquées aux provinces métropolitaines. La preuve est qu’au lendemain
de l’indépendance, la faible minorité convertie aux voies modernes de
la connaissance et de l’action politique, a été vite éliminée par ceux qui
pensaient dans le cadre nationaliste de la Grande Nation arabe que prônaient
le Nassérisme et le ba‘thisme en Proche Orient. C’est un fait historique que
l’Europe colonisatrice en général a introduit des désirs de modernisation
matérielle plus que les conditions scientifiques, culturelles et institutionnelles
d’un passage durable à la modernité intellectuelle. C’est ce qui explique la
récession rapide et massive vers une politique de traditionalisation ouvrant
un boulevard sans obstacle aux postures fondamentalistes de la religiosité
populaire vite dégénérée en mythoidéologie populiste.
Cette évolution n’est pas particulière à l’Algérie. On la retrouve dans
l’ensemble des pays colonisés avec des facteurs aggravants ou atténuants
selon les passés et les conditions d’émergence des premières équipes
dirigeantes. La politique de la recherche scientifique et de l’éducation
imposée par les Partis-Etats et la rapide croissance démographique dès les
années 1960, ont élargi la base sociologique de l’expansion d’une idéologie
de combat dirigée contre les régimes en place et leurs alliés en Occident. On
retiendra la différence entre les options socialistes de l’idéologie de combat
anticolonial et les orientations religieuses des oppositions aux régimes des
Partis-Etats. L’islam étatisé, c’est-à-dire placé sous le contrôle d’Etats plutôt
séculiers, devient la seule source de légitimité et l’objectif premier d’une
restauration systématique pour éclairer et orienter l’avenir des sociétés
authentiquement musulmanes. On voit à quel point la réponse américaine
275
et de certains Etats européens à cette impasse historique aggrave les conflits
au lieu de les apaiser et de leur offrir des solutions viables.
Revenons à ce centre de Rennes. Je tiens à souligner la pertinence du
choix d’Avicenne pour le nommer. Il reste bien d’autres noms comme alKindî, al-Farâbî, al-Birûnî, Jâhiz, Tawhîdî, Miskawayh, Maqdisî, Ibn Batûta, Ibn
Khaldûn… Tahtâwî, Jurjî Zaydân à mêler à ceux des français et européens
pour remembrer les champs de la pensée et des cultures dans l’espace
méditerranéen. Ces noms sont autant de maillons forts dans les chaînes
d’autorités intellectuelles, scientifiques, philosophiques, médicales, et pour
tout dire humanistes qui renforcent le sentiment d’appartenance aux mêmes
origines spirituelles, éthiques, artistiques et intellectuelles. Aucun des noms
cités n’introduit une dissonance quelconque par rapport à ceux que nous lisons
sur les plaques de rues en France, en Angleterre, en Allemagne, en Suède…
Voilà encore une voie trop longtemps ignorée, rejetée dans l’impensable dans
les cultures protégées des Etats-Nations, même à l’intérieur de cet espace
nouveau d’appartenance qu’est l’Union européenne. Les esprits attardés dans
les enfermements de la pensée essentialiste, substantialiste, intégriste de la
religion vraie ou des identités spécifiques, dénonceront le cosmopolitisme,
la dissolution des valeurs et des vérités, les métissages dissolvants… Il faut
méditer sur les facteurs déterminants dans la grandeur et la décadence des
civilisations pour mesurer les richesses potentielles de l’interculturalité et
de l’intercréativité dans tout déploiement optimal des ressources de l’esprit
humain et des sociétés qui rendent possible ce déploiement.
Comme toutes les grandes figures de l’humanisme pensé et vécu, Avicenne
dépasse les limites géopolitiques et culturelles pourtant très étendues de
l’islam de son temps. Il était nourri de tous les grands héritages culturels et
intellectuels de l’Iran ancien, de la Grèce classique et hellénistique et de ce
que son contemporain philosophe et historien Miskawayh a recueilli dans
une anthologie célèbre sous le titre persan ancien Jâvidân Khirad6. En faisant
appel à de grands noms de la pensée et de la culture d’expression arabe,
persane, turque, on contribue au grand travail de réhabilitation de ce Moyen
Âge longtemps méconnu et qualifié d’obscurantiste.
La pensée islamique est entrée dans sa phase historique de régression
quant elle s’est détournée de ces héritages fécondants qualifiés d’intrus (‘ulûm
dakhîla) dès le 9e siècle par le courant traditionaliste qui a fini par dominer
jusqu’à nos jours. Je dois dire un mot de cette longue période dominée par
trois empires musulmans : l’Empire ottoman dans l’espace méditerranéen,
6
Voir Arkoun 2005.
Mohammed Arkoun
276
l’empire safavide en Iran et l’empire Moghol en Asie. On ne peut bien sûr
couvrir des espaces si vastes et si complexes ; on s’en tiendra à quelques
remarques qui éclairent la situation présente.
De l’islam classique a l’islam ritualiste et populiste
L’une des pages les plus éclairantes pour les débats de notre temps sur la
place de l’islam dans nos sociétés modernes est celle qui explique le passage
historique de ce qu’on appelle l’islam classique (750–1358) à l’islam régressif
et scolastique (1406–1830) ; puis de l’intermède libéral (1830–1940) aux
idéologies de combat (1945–2006). Pour les conditions de ces passages, je
renvoie à Dominique Urvoy : Histoire de la pensée arabe et islamique; et à ma
Pensée arabe.7
Benoît XVI vient de nous donner un exemple pour réfléchir sur les
temporalités inversées des parcours historiques de l’Europe chrétienne, puis
sécularisées d’une part et de l’islam d’autre part :
« Tout cela m’est revenu à l’esprit lorsque récemment j’ai lu une partie
du dialogue publié par le professeur Khoury (de Münster) entre
l’empereur byzantin lettré Manuel II Paléologue et un savant persan
dans le camp d’hiver d’Ankara en 1391, sur le christianisme et l’islam,
et sur leur vérité respective. L’empereur a sans doute mis par écrit le
dialogue pendant le siège de Constantinople entre 1394 et 1402… Dans
le 7e dialogue édité par le professeur Khoury (« dialexis », « controverse
»), l’empereur en arrive à parler du thème du djihâd’ (guerre sainte).
L’empereur savait certainement que dans la sourate 2, 256, il est écrit : «
Pas de contrainte en matière de foi » – c’est l’une des sourates primitives
datant de l’époque où Mohammed lui-même était privé de pouvoir et
se trouvait menacé. Mais l’empereur connaissait naturellement aussi
les dispositions inscrites dans le Coran – d’une époque plus tardive –
au sujet de la guerre sainte. Sans s’arrêter aux particularités, comme
la différence de traitement entre « gens du Livre » et « incroyants », il
s’adresse à son interlocuteur d’une manière étonnamment abrupte au
sujet de la question centrale du rapport entre religion et contrainte.
Il déclare : Montre-moi donc ce que Mohammed a apporté de neuf, et
alors tu ne trouveras sans doute rien que de mauvais et d’inhumain, par
exemple le fait qu’il a prescrit que la foi qu’il prêchait, il fallait la répandre
par le glaive. »
7
Urvoy 2006; Arkoun 2003.
277
Ce fragment de la conférence du pape nous renvoie par son style et son
cadre de pensée théologique à l’abondante littérature polémique entre
docteurs chrétiens et musulmans au Moyen Âge. Nous sommes dans
la période d’ascension militaire des turcs ottomans qui allaient prendre
Constantinople en 1453 : une grande date dans l’histoire de la lutte entre
musulmans et chrétiens pour le contrôle de la circulation maritime, l’échange
des marchandises dans ce qui a été avant l’islam la Mare Nostrum romaine.
L’ascension militaire et politique des Ottomans n’a pas empêché la régression
déjà signalée de la pensée islamique et de la langue arabe savante. Si Manuel
II avait lu les grands penseurs mentionnés plus haut dans la période classique
du Califat, il n’aurait pas tenu le même propos sur le glaive pour répandre
la foi. Il est vrai que ce thème de la littérature théologique polémique est
apparu tôt dans les confrontations du Haut Moyen Âge. Faut-il s’étonner que
le pape s’appuie sur ce vieux motif d’une dispute si ancienne et toujours
décontextualisée, pour construire une théorie en elle-même inacceptable
historiquement sur l’intimité intellectuelle et spirituelle du logos grec et de la
foi catholique au cours des siècles ? On lira à ce sujet le riche débat historique
ouvert par Alain de Libéra à l’occasion de la publication de l’encyclique de
Jean-Paul II sur Raison et Foi8.
Du côté musulman, on constate qu’ils s’indignent, exigent des excuses,
manifestent dans les rues, mais n’opposent aucune réfutation historique
et doctrinale scientifiquement contraignante. Le grand penseur Ibn Hazm
de Cordoue (m. 1064) aurait sûrement stigmatisé avec verve et pertinence
l’ignorance évidente de l’empereur. La suite de l’affaire est que le pape
reçoit des ambassadeurs d’Etats musulmans pour leur exprimer son profond
respect pour l’islam. Cela souligne le soutien du pape à l’étatisation totale
de l’islam, alors qu’il s’indignerait qu’un semblable traitement fût infligé
au catholicisme actuel. Ce geste traduit une double ignorance : d’abord
que l’islam est théologiquement protestant et politiquement catholique ; c’est
ce qu’exprime très clairement la citation de Muhammad ‘Abdou placée en
exergue ci-dessus ; ensuite que sa conférence doit donner lieu à l’ouverture
d’un débat entre historiens de la pensée théologique et philosophique et
8
Lire absolument la réfutation de l’encyclique par Alain de Libera 2003. On
comprendra la différence très instructive entre l’histoire archéologie des
épistémès des théologies et comment la théologie retenue comme orthodoxe
par la hiérarchie officielle voue les autres constructions à la marginalité jusqu’à
l’oubli. Cet exemple fouillé par un grand connaisseur s’applique mutatis mutandi
au cas des théologies concurrentes en islam au temps où l’islam avait et lisait et
réfutait ses théologiens ; ce n’est plus le cas depuis le 13e–14e siècle.
278
Mohammed Arkoun
non à des excuses adressées à des représentants qui n’ont ni la compétence
scientifique, ni l’autorité spirituelle, ni aucune autre légitimité pour être
mêlés à une telle affaire. Je n’ai eu connaissance d’aucune protestation d’une
« autorité religieuse indépendante » contre ces deux fautes d’appréciation;
preuve que les ulémas contemporains sont des fonctionnaires stipendiés par
des Etats qui, en saine théologie, n’ont aucun titre pour s’immiscer dans les
débats sur la foi.
Pour la réponse sur le fond du problème des rapports entre raison et foi, je
dirai que nous sommes encore ramenés aux constructions médiévales de la
foi avec les outils du corpus logocentriste aristotélicien largement exploité
tant en contextes islamiques que catholiques. La langue arabe s’est enrichie
des apports du logos entre 700 et 1200 environ ; c’est seulement après la
marginalisation puis la disparition de la philosophie logocentriste en contextes
islamiques qu’un fossé durable se creuse entre le logos et l’expression de la
foi en islam. En chrétienté, il y a continuité, progrès et changements profonds
notamment avec Vatican II en 1962–1965. Si le pape avait formulé les choses
de la sorte, il aurait donné une belle et salutaire leçon d’histoire de la pensée
religieuse depuis le Moyen Âge jusqu’à nos jours. Mais il a préféré s’appuyer
sur un texte polémique pour faire valoir un privilège apologétique de la foi
catholique.
Aujourd’hui, les ulémas musulmans ne maîtrisent ni le corpus théologicophilosophique au niveau où l’avait fait Averroès (m. 1198), ni encore moins
au niveau de la déconstruction de la métaphysique classique et du corpus
aristotélicien initiée depuis les années 1960. Avec tout le respect que je garde
pour la haute fonction du pape, j’oserai dire que le théologien Ratzinger n’est
même pas parvenu à respecter les règles strictes de la disputatio médiévale
à Bologne, à la Sorbonne ou à Rome. Il aurait sûrement rehaussé son
argumentaire s’il avait su souligner que depuis le 13e–14e siècle, le recours au
jihâd – guerre juste plus que sainte dans la construction juridique musulmane
– l’a effectivement emporté de beaucoup sur l’usage critique du logos.
Voilà un exemple de débat fécond qui devrait se reproduire tout au long
de chaque année académique dans ce Centre Avicenne. Les musulmans de
France et d’ailleurs cesseraient alors d’aller crier dans les rues leurs ignorances
anciennes et nouvelles, tandis que la pensée islamique renouerait avec
la pensée exploratrice, interrogative, inventive et émancipatrice. De tels
débats ne doivent pas cibler des élites rivalisant d’érudition ; il s’agit d’offrir
au grand public une série de conférences sur des problèmes d’histoire et
d’anthropologie comparées des religions afin de diffuser les connaissances
279
sans cesse renouvelées par la recherche en sciences de l’homme et de la
société toujours accompagnée par l’interrogation philosophique. Toute
religion qui refuse ce soutien constant de la pensée exploratrice et critique
est vouée à la sclérose des répétitions ritualistes et aux dangers multiples
liés aux croyances fidéistes. Chaque année, on offrirait au grand public les
possibilités d’aborder les religions comme support d’une connaissance
humaniste des cultures et des systèmes de pensée enfin pris en charge dans
des espaces de recherche solidaire.
La thématique de la raison et de la foi permettrait d’explorer des domaines
nouveaux, jamais visités encore dans l’espace historique méditerranéen
depuis les temps lointains de la Figure prophétique d’Abraham d’un côté, et
de l’autre, depuis la mise en place en Grèce ancienne du couple inépuisable
du logos/muthos. En insistant sur cette dimension de la connaissance, je ne
ressasse pas un rêve de spécialiste ; pendant plus de 35 ans d’enseignement
à la Sorbonne, j’ai testé la fécondité intellectuelle et humaniste de ces deux
grands axes de la pensée qui alimentent toutes les cultures et les modes de
pensée dans l’espace méditerranéen avant de traverser toutes les frontières
ethnoculturelles avec l’expansion du christianisme et de l’islam d’une part, de
la raison des Lumières (malgré ses omissions, ses catégorisations arbitraires et
ses échecs) à partir des révolutions européennes d’autre part. A l’omnipotence
du logos opposé au muthos depuis Platon et Aristote, il convient d’ajouter
celle concurrente et révélante de la Parole telle qu’elle est articulée dans le
discours prophétique depuis la Genèse, première livre de la Bible hébraïque
devenu l’Ancien Testament, dans les Evangiles et le Coran.
Pour mesurer la nouveauté du programme de recherche, de transmission,
d’instruction et d’éducation généralisée que je propose ici, je dois m’arrêter
davantage sur la définition de quelques concepts clefs appelés devenir des
outils de pensée accessibles à tous. Il existe un lexique technique propre
à mon écriture de l’histoire de la pensée dans l’espace méditerranéen ; ne
pouvant le reprendre entièrement ici, je privilégierai les suivants : Parole ;
discours prophétique ; textes recueillis dans les Corpus Officiel Clos (COC);
logos et muthos ; mythohistoire et mythoidéologie.
Le travail de ces concepts exige une stratégie méthodologique et
cognitive que je résume dans trois verbes à l’infinitif : transgresser, déplacer,
dépasser.
Il s’agit de transgresser des frontières rigides tracées au cours des siècles
par ce que chaque groupe social plus ou moins autonome appelle la
tradition. Le terme français renvoie au latin tradere, transmettre, propager.
Mohammed Arkoun
280
Avec les trois traditions monothéistes, la transmission des enseignements
des prophètes qui ont eux-mêmes transmis la Parole de Dieu remplace au fur
et à mesure de son expansion, la reproduction des us et coutumes propres à
chaque groupe ethnoculturel. C’est pour exprimer cette suprématie de l’acte
de transmission et du contenu de ce qui est transmis qu’on écrit Tradition
avec une majuscule quand il s’agit du donné révélé et de sa réception dans
les trois Traditions monothéistes et on réserve la minuscule aux traditions
au sens ethnographique qui survivent plus ou moins efficacement selon les
parcours historiques des groupes, des communautés et des nations modernes.
Dans le cas de l’islam, le terme sunna réfère aussi à la pratique commune
conforme aux normes coutumières qui sont confirmées ou remplacées par
les enseignements du Coran et des conduites du prophète. L’interpénétration
entre la tradition ethnographique et la Tradition scripturaire est demeurée
constante et active jusqu’à nos jours.
Ces précisions sur les mécanismes de formation et d’expansion de toute
tradition nous aident à mieux définir le statut linguistique et les fonctions
complexes des concepts clefs qui commandent la production du sens, la
circulation des significations et des valeurs dans ce que j’appelle les sociétés
du Livre-livre9. C’est dans ces sociétés que le Livre révélé, appelé aussi
Ecritures saintes, va générer une intarissable production de livres ordinaires
(avec minuscules) jusqu’à nos jours. La littérature ainsi générée dans l’histoire
concrète historicise la Parole de Dieu et sécularise les enseignements
des prophètes. La croyance orthodoxe continuera cependant de parler
directement de la Parole de Dieu et traditions prophétiques qui sacralisent le
vécu profane. Cette dialectique entre transcendance postulée et historicisation
de fait de la Parole de Dieu, revendication du pouvoir de sacralisation des
traditions prophétiques et négation ou effacement de la désacralisation de
fait quand ces traditions s’inscrivent dans la vie quotidienne profane; cette
dialectique définit le nœud de l’incommunication entre la croyance sans
questionnement critique et la croyance autocritique.
Cette incommunication ne peut être surmontée que par une pédagogie
appropriée dans l’interprétation et l’enseignement du fait religieux. La laïcité
militante n’a pas reconnu la nécessité de passer par cette recherche et cette
didactique du fait religieux ; elle a choisi avec une certitude tranquille la voie
de la facilité : on renonce à parler de religion dans l’enseignement public ; on
abandonne ce travail aux gestionnaires traditionnels du sacré. Il en résulte une
double carence et irresponsabilité : la religion est abandonné aux gardiens des
9
Sur la portée socio-culturelle de ce concept, voir Arkoun 2002, chapitre 3.
281
orthodoxies dogmatiques, ce qui entraîne des conséquences sur la gestion
citoyenne de l’espace public ; on appauvrit la connaissance adéquate des
forces imaginaires de construction de la société et les conditions optimales
de déploiement du sujet humain. C’est l’occasion de souligner à nouveau que
l’appel constant à plus de police pour contrôler la violence et les dérives de
« la racaille » et des sauvages nous réfèrent à l’arbitraire intellectuel du choix
irresponsable de l’Etat positiviste et laïciste qui a institué l’ignorance dans
l’école publique de la portée anthropologique irréductible du fait religieux.
La didactique préconisée passe par les opérations de transgression, de
déplacement et de dépassement pour tester dans toute démarche cognitive
la validité épistémologique de trois hypothèses heuristiques qui ont orienté
les recherches des sciences de l’homme et de la société depuis les grands
débats théoriques et pratiques qui ont marqué les mises en crise de la raison
des Lumières durant les années 1950–1990. La bibliographie sur ces années
cruciales est immense ; j’ai eu le privilège de prendre part à l’effervescence
des années exceptionnelles et de contribuer à ces mises en crise à partir de
la Sorbonne. Ce que j’écris dans ces pages repose sur cette expérience qui
se poursuit encore aujourd’hui dans un contexte politique et épistémique
changeant depuis la chute du mur de Berlin, puis le 11/9/2001. Je rappelle
les trois hypothèses heuristiques qui subvertissent les postulats de la raison
religieuse telle qu’elle continue de s’imposer dans les discours contemporains
sur le retour ou la réactivation du religieux.
1. L’histoire est le produit des acteurs sociaux en compétition pour l’exercice
du monopole de la fonction symbolique qui fonde à son tour la légitimité
du pouvoir politique ; la légitimité est l’instance de l’autorité qui fait
accepter la légalité comme exercice du monopole de la violence légale.
2. « Le monde civil est entièrement l’œuvre des hommes et par conséquent on
doit savoir en trouver les principes dans les modifications de notre esprit
lui-même », J. B. Vico, La science Nouvelle, 1725.
3. A la proposition de Vico qui remonte à 1725, mais déjà présente
implicitement dans les analyses de la solidarité agnatique et des
structures des sociétés urbaines et bédouines chez Ibn Khaldûn (m.
1406), s’ajoutent les travaux sur la production imaginaire de la société
(C. Castoriadis), la construction sociale de la réalité (Peter Berger) et
l’institution sociale de l’esprit (Jean de Munk).
Munis de tous ces préliminaires, revenons à l’examen de nos concepts. La
linguistique moderne nous permet de bien distinguer le statut de la parole
de celui du texte. « Au commencement était le Verbe », enseigne déjà la Bible.
Mohammed Arkoun
282
Le philosophe linguiste et sémioticien à la fois radicalise comme suit les traits
distinctifs de la parole comme logos et muthos unis dans une interaction
créatrice. Méditons ce riche énoncé :
« Au commencement fut le Topos. Et le Topos indiquait le monde, étant
lieu; il n’était pas en Dieu, il n’était pas Dieu, car Dieu n’a pas de lieu
et n’a jamais lieu. Et le Topos était le Logos; mais le Logos n’était pas
Dieu, étant ce qui a lieu. Le Topos, en vérité, c’était peu de choses :
la marque, la remarque. Pour marquer, il y eut des traces, celles des
animaux et leurs parcours, puis les signes : un caillou, un arbre, une
branche cassée, un cairn, les premières inscriptions, les premiers écrits.
Si peu qu’il fût, le Topos c’était déjà « l’homme ». Or, le premier mot : le
Topos, c’était le verbe et quelque chose de plus: l’action, « Am Anfang
war die Tat ». Et quelque chose de moins – le lieu, dit et marqué, fixé.
Ainsi, le Verbe ne se fit pas chair, mais lieu et non-lieu.»10
Topos, logos, action : la parole vivante prononcée dans le for intérieur ou
adressée à une audience mobilise indivisément ces trois constituants de toute
communication orale. Le discours prophétique tel qu’il se manifeste dans les
différents livres ou suite d’énoncés recueillis dans la Bible, les Evangiles et le
Coran, est entièrement parole dans les perspectives ouvertes par l’analyse
du discours incluant le concept théologique de parole de Dieu. La parole se
distingue du texte par plusieurs fonctions ; elle est reçue par l’oreille et les yeux;
elle est prononcée dans un environnement sémiologique très riche (la nuit, le
jour, dans un lieu sacré ou profane ; dans des circonstances de joie, de deuil,
d’urgence, de communication solennelle, didactique, confidentielle…) ; elle
peut être explicitée par une demande de l’interlocuteur ou de l’audience ;
le charisme, l’autorité, le statut moral, social, intellectuel et la gestuelle du
locuteur ajoutent de la valeur, de la signification, de l’efficacité à la parole
prononcée dans le face à face avec le Tout Autre appelé Dieu (parole mystique),
ou l’autre ordinaire qui résiste à ma subjectivité (rhétorique de la conviction
et de la persuasion). Le texte au contraire, est silencieux et orphelin de son
auteur qui, dans le cas des prophètes, est irréversiblement absent; chaque
lecteur le fait parler selon ses compétences linguistiques, ses références
cognitives et culturelles, ses choix subjectifs ; ses émotions heureuses
ou chagrines ; même le critique le plus averti est obligé de souligner ses
incapacités à percer le sens originel des mots, la vérité des contextes et des
systèmes de connotation…
10
Lefebvre 1969, XLVII.
283
Ces rappels servent à souligner la fragilité et souvent les errances des
exégètes des Ecritures saintes avant l’intervention de la connaissance
linguistique moderne et de la prudence des historiens critiques qui
renouvellent de plus en plus les conditions de l’interprétation des textes
fondateurs des grandes Traditions religieuses. Les trois religions monothéistes
ne sont pas encore à égale distance par rapport aux enseignements de la
critique moderne. L’islam est le plus dépourvu parce qu’il en est encore à une
lecture littéraliste du texte coranique et des traditions prophétiques. Il est vrai
que l’ensemble des fidèles du judaïsme et du christianisme ne connaît pas les
grands acquits de la littérature savante qui a modifié considérablement le
rapport au sens et à la réalité historique des textes sacrés. Même quand un
grand media comme Arte fait connaître de manière très accessible les travaux
archéologiques sur la Bible ou le Nouveau Testament11, les représentations
communes sur la religion restent dominées soit par les notions orthodoxes
chez les croyants, soit par les postulats de la culture positiviste de l’incroyance.
Il n’y a pas seulement insuffisance de la transmission des savoirs nouveaux ; on
doit réfléchir à des contradictions insurmontées de la civilisation dominante
qui dénigrent la violence et le fanatisme des religions, concentre ses guerres
contre les menaces du fondamentaliste terroriste, mais néglige d’apporter
des solutions adéquates aux ravages de l’ignorance institutionnalisée, même
là où la recherche scientifique atteint des résultats révolutionnaires et de
grande portée émancipatrice pour l’esprit humain.
Montrer la continuité linguistique du discours prophétique en suivant
l’itinéraire de la Figure symbolique d’Abraham des bords de l’Euphrate au pays
de Canaan, puis la bifurcation jusqu’à La Mekke avec la double généalogie
des lignes d’Isaac et Jacob pour la mémoire juive et d’Ismaël pour la mémoire
arabo-islamique ; poursuivre l’exploration du même discours sur le Mont
Sinaï avec Moïse, en Palestine avec Jésus que la tradition fait naître à Nazareth
avant la construction de la Figure théologique de Jésus-Christ, à La Mekke et
à Médine enfin avec le Hashémite Muhammad ibn ‘Abdallah avant la lente
construction de la Figure Symbolique du Prophète-Messager. Ce parcours
linguistique, historico-critique et anthropologique n’ignore pas le parcours
théologique qui a exercé le monopole de l’autorité spirituelle pendant des
siècles au point qu’aujourd’hui encore il fait obstacle aux corrections et aux
révisions inexorables des déchiffrements scientifiques de l’aventure humaine.
Le terme aventure s’impose de plus en plus à mesure qu’on découvre la
11
Je pense notamment aux travaux de Israël Finkelstein et Neil Asher Silberman
2002 ; Voir aussi les trois volumes novateurs de John Paul Meier 2004–2005.
Mohammed Arkoun
284
suprématie de l’imaginaire sur la rationalité analytique et critique dans les
représentations mythohistoriques et mythoidéologiques que les hommes
continuent à reproduire sur leur passé, leur présent et leur futur.
La ligne linguistique de la recherche oblige à s’interroger sur la
continuité du socle sémantique des langues sémitiques dans lesquelles se
sont exprimés les prophètes fondateurs : il y a l’hébreu, le syriaque forme
savante de l’araméen qui est la forme parlée utilisée par Jésus, l’arabe enfin.
La recherche philologique s’intéresse à ce socle sémantique, sans pouvoir
cependant ébranler les fausses certitudes enracinées dans les langues et les
mentalités pendant des siècles de pieuses répétitions rituelles et de pieuses
adorations. Sous le pseudonyme de Christof Luxenberg12, un chercheur a
récemment tenté de faire une lecture syro-araméenne du discours coranique.
La connaissance scientifique heurte de front une théologie séculaire qui
a sacralisé ce qu’on appelle les Textes fondateurs et qu’il est plus éclairant
de nommer Corpus Officiels Clos. Ces trois concepts obligent à réfléchir
sur des problèmes linguistiques et historiques abolis et ignorés par les
clercs gestionnaires des orthodoxies doctrinales. Ainsi, dans un livre récent,
Jean-Claude Milner13 distingue le juif de savoir au sens du savoir absolu
revendiqué par la wissenschaft allemande depuis le 19e siècle et le juif d’étude
qui commence dès l’âge de 10 ans à entrer dans l’univers de connaissance
propre à la tradition talmudique. Il en est de même pour le musulman et
le chrétien. Cette distinction renvoie au clivage mental qu’instaurent deux
types de connaissances, deux modes d’exercice des facultés de l’esprit raison,
imagination/imaginaire/imaginal et mémoire individuelle dépendante
de la mémoire collective du groupe, de la mémoire mythohistorique de la
communauté et de la nation dans l’étape historique de l’Etat-nation.
Chacun des concepts que je viens d’énumérer nécessite de longues
investigations et mises au point pour ouvrir de nouveaux espaces
d’intelligibilité et identifier des enjeux escamotés, embrouillés, éliminés par
des systèmes officiels politiques et religieux de contrôle du vrai et du faux, du
mal et du bien, du juste et de l’injuste, du beau et du laid… Ces systèmes ont
toujours existé dans toutes les sociétés et toutes les cultures. Dans les régimes
démocratiques avancés, la censure directe est bannie dans les constitutions ;
mais le libéralisme autorise la concurrence et on sait dans quel sens agissent
les lois du marché utilisées par les partis politiques et les grands décideurs de
la production et des échanges économiques. C’est pourquoi il y a conflit entre
12
13
Luxenberg 2000, ix + 306, bibliography, 307–311.
Milner 2006.
285
libéralisme débridé et libéralisme surveillé par les Etats. Ces mécanismes ne
parviennent pas à endiguer par exemple, la prépondérance de fait de ce
que les philosophes appellent la raison télétechnoscientifique sur les formes
critiques et humanistes d’exercice de la raison. La culture philosophique est
devenue l’apanage de cercles réduits et les outils d’analyse et de pensée
utilisées par les sciences de l’homme et de la société ne sont pas mis à la
portée de toute la population scolaire ; quant aux larges opinions publiques,
elles sont réduites aux représentations et aux logiques propres aux discours
des médias qui ont remplacé l’ancien sens commun. La suprématie de cette
raison est comparable à celle de la théologie des Magistères doctrinaux des
religions avant la séparation des Eglises et de l’Etat; la théologie détrônée à
partir du 18e siècle européen par la raison des Lumières a permis le déploiement
compétitif des différents types de rationalité. On parle de raisonnement
historien, sociologique, anthropologique, linguistique, psychanalytique que
peu de chercheurs ouverts à la pluri ou transdisciplinarité parviennent à
articuler en s’appuyant sur un faisceau de méthode. On aura compris que
grâce à mes allers et retours incessants des champs islamiques aux champs
modernes de la rationalité, je m’efforce d’habiliter une transrationalité pour
ouvrir ces nouveaux champs d’intelligibilité déjà évoqués.
Le fait nouveau qui vient complexifier les usages inégaux, rivaux jusqu’à
la tension où politique et épistémologie sont indistinctement mêlées14 c’est
l’expansion récente du terrorisme national et international. Les régimes
démocratiques les plus solides se trouvent atteint par l’embrouillage des
légitimités, la régression vers les conservatismes des droits nationaux et
internationaux, la paralysie des forces imaginantes du droit. L’agression du
11/9/2001 autorise la plus grande puissance du monde actuel à utiliser
le statut de victime pour légitimer une « guerre juste » de protection et de
diffusion des libertés démocratiques dans le monde ! Après l’échec avéré
de cette généreuse ambition, on se contente jusqu’ici de commentaires
redondants, de supputations rarement validées par le temps, d’évocations
de solutions incertaines. On ménage l’irremplaçable allié ; on biaise avec le
droit, on continue à soutenir des « valeurs » mises à mal au point que le grand
magistère des sciences morales et politiques se fait à peine entendre dans les
14
Lors de l’éclatement de la Sorbonne après mai 1968, on a pu mesurer à quel point
des enseignants chercheurs, producteurs et transmetteurs des savoirs peuvent
aller jusqu’à faire prévaloir le critère de solidarité politique sur celui d’engagement
épistémologique pour rejoindre des universités de droite ou de gauche. J’ai été
témoin de bataille peu glorieuse.
286
Mohammed Arkoun
instituts hérités de l’âge classique ou dans des livres à grand succès pour la
philosophie des cybercafés. Quant aux autorités religieuses, elles continuent
de miser sur les vertus de la vieille rhétorique des sermons, des exhortations
et des rappels à la conscience du bien et du juste.
Repenser les trois sphères géohistoriques : Islam, Europe,
Occident
Est-il possible de réduire ce brouillage généralisé ou de tenter des sorties
d’une culture de banalisation de la raison par le bas, le scepticisme, le
relativisme, les recours arbitraires au droit à l’exercice du monopole de la
violence légale, à la différence, à l’identité, à la foi personnelle ? Il y a des
chercheurs penseurs, des politiciens qui travaillent dans ce sens. Mais les plus
visibles d’entre eux comme Michel Rocard, Hubert Védrine, J. Delors, E. Morin,
le regretté P. Ricœur en France ne se sont pas donnés les connaissances
nécessaires pour penser un futur politique, intellectuel et culturel intégrant
dans la construction en cours de l’Union européenne, non pas l’islam comme
système de croyances et de représentations mythoidéologiques, mais l’islam
comme protagoniste positif et négatif de la formation au cours des siècles
de ce que j’appelle l’espace géohistorique méditerranéen. Aucun historien
ne peut nier à l’islam ce rôle de protagoniste constant à l’instar de ceux du
christianisme, du judaïsme et de l’Europe moderne. F. Braudel est le premier
à avoir donné au concept de géohistoire la grande fécondité cognitive
et méthodologique que l’on connaît. J’ai souvent dénoncé l’oubli de cette
contribution chez beaucoup de dissertateurs sur l’Union méditerranéenne.
Je ne cesse de regretter aussi la rareté ou l’incompétence des voix venant de
cet islam pour élargir, enrichir, éclairer les débats sur ce thème à l’occasion
notamment de la candidature de la Turquie. Les argumentaires présentés
de part et d’autre s’enferment trop étroitement dans les peurs, les menaces,
les incompatibilités indéniables que suscite cette candidature comme si
elle devait se réaliser dans l’immédiat. Il manque partout une ouverture sur
les données de la longue durée pour reconstruire les différentes mémoires
collectives dans le sens d’une conscience historique critique généralisée.
Cette perspective fait partie intégrante de mon programme de Critique de
la Raison islamique.
J’ai déjà évoqué la nécessité de repenser les trois concepts Islam, Europe,
Occident où seul l’islam conserve l’ambiguïté d’une référence d’essence
religieuse qui voile et dénature sa face de grande force de soulèvement
historique des peuples et des cultures. Tant que le monde de l’islam était
soumis sans voix audible aux souverainetés des puissances coloniales,
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l’Europe a dessiné la carte géopolitique du monde en tenant compte
de la seule rivalité intra-européenne. L’islam était assimilé aux religions
ethnographiques appelées à disparaître ou entrer dans le silence des
consciences croyantes à l’instar du christianisme après sa longue résistance
à la modernité intellectuelle, politique et culturelle. Cette représentation
des religions et des sociétés dites archaïques ou traditionnelles est travestie
aujourd’hui sous des déclarations formelles de respect de tous les cultes,
toutes les expressions de foi, de vérités ou de valeurs propres aux cultures
non occidentales. On s’oblige à répéter avec insistance qu’on ne confond
pas les terroristes islamistes et l’islam comme religion, tradition de pensée
et grande civilisation. On s’empresse d’organiser des rencontres de dialogues
et de découverte mutuelle dans l’espoir d’atténuer les effets ravageurs de
guerres de conquête, d’occupation et de punition. Toute cette agitation et
les mises en scène internationales d’une diplomatie réparatrice continuent
à s’imposer au détriment des populations civiles et des évidences ressassées
par les chercheurs, les penseurs critiques, les esprits les plus respectés de
notre temps.
Poursuivons la quête de sens déjà esquissée ci-dessus sur les rapports
entre les trois grands protagonistes des conflits récurrents dans l’espace
méditerranéen depuis l’émergence de l’islam comme posture théologique
face aux religions antérieures et comme force d’expansion conquérante
de 632 à 1200 avec les prolongements ottomans de 1453 à 1683. Partout
on continue à utiliser le même terme islam pour englober des sociétés,
des Etats, des cultures, des langues, des parcours historiques, des données
sociologiques et anthropologiques d’une très grande diversité et complexité.
Les observateurs des sociétés qui se réclament de l’islam comme instance
de l’autorité, sources des valeurs et fondement d’identités pourtant très
disparates, n’ont pas réussi à contrebalancer les usages idéologiques,
confusionnistes, voire fantasmatiques du mot islam par les musulmans euxmêmes notamment depuis l’irruption de la Révolution dite islamique en Iran.
Cela tient à plusieurs facteurs dont je retiendrai ici la solidarité fonctionnelle
entre le nombre croissant des politologues, les besoins des médias pour
fonder leurs bulletins d’information sur des connaissances scientifiques
minimales, les succès de librairie des titres attractifs sur la relation entre
islam, terrorisme, fondamentalisme, régression culturelle et institutionnelle,
rejet des droits de l’homme, Etats voyous, absence de société civile, contraste
entre rente pétrolière, classes parasitaires et misère sociale, etc. Ce tableau
noir favorise en Occident l’expansion de la droite extrémiste, la peur
collective, le désir d’assouvir une haine grandissante contre une religion
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violente et dogmatique qui s’installe de plus en plus au cœur des sociétés et
des institutions démocratiques.
Le fossé se creuse entre deux imaginaires de construction négative
de l’autre dans un mélange inextricable d’émotions incontrôlables,
d’indignation permanente, d’ignorances anciennes et nouvelles accumulées
des deux côtés, de révolte contre des politiques nationales inadéquates,
d’exaspération devant les violences quotidiennes, l’insécurité permanente
d’un côté, l’islamophobie et le racisme de l’autre… Et il est vrai que beaucoup
d’Etats ne trouvent pas de réponses pertinentes pour sortir du cercle vicieux
de la violence systémique tant au niveau des Etats qu’à celui des opinions
publiques. L’islam est l’autre intolérable de l’Occident et inversement celuici est l’autre à la fois mythologique, attractif et ennemi irréductible de
l’islam. Des deux côtés, la référence à l’Europe est rare, car elle exigerait des
précisions historiques et culturelles totalement absentes des mécanismes
de construction imaginaire de l’autre, comme dans toute dialectique
manichéenne de l’Axe du Bien et de l’Axe du Mal. Et l’on sait que ce vieux
cadre de représentation, de perception et d’interprétation des « valeurs » et
des contre valeurs, est explicitement invoqué par le président américain et
implicitement présent dans le discours commun des sociétés travaillées par
ce que j’appellerai le fait islamique reconstruit, réapproprié aux idéologies de
combat qui mobilisent les générations actives entre les années 1950–1990.
Cette référence aux idéologies de combat est d’autant plus éclairante
qu’elle est rarement invoquée dans la littérature pléthorique qui nourrit de
part et d’autre les imaginaires d’exclusion réciproque dans la perspective
de longue et moyenne durée à la fois. C’est à la lumière de ce concept qu’il
faut en effet repenser comme je l’ai dit la portée historique et la profondeur
anthropologique des contentieux entre Islam, Europe et Occident. Les
perspectives de longue et moyenne durée obligent en effet à redonner à
l’islam naissant, puis classique et à l’Europe chrétienne15, puis moderne leurs
rôles respectifs d’acteurs premiers dans l’histoire intellectuelle, scientifique
et religieuse de l’espace historique méditerranéen. Pendant des siècles de
conflits récurrents entre terre d’islam et chrétienté, les termes Orient et
Occident n’émergent que pour référer au Levant et au Couchant du soleil
15
Un ouvrage très instructif renvoyant aux grands enseignements de la longue
durée vient d’être consacré par Marie-Françoise Baslez (2007) à la naissance du
christianisme. Une monographie équivalente pour le même thème lors de la
naissance de l’islam, délivrerait des constructions dogmatiques et arbitraires sur
lesquelles vivent encore aujourd’hui bien des expressions de la foi.
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auquel s’ajoute à partir d’Avicenne notamment, le riche concept d’Orient
de la pensée illuminative. Il convient d’insister sur l’écriture réflexive de
l’histoire de ces siècles en intégrant plus clairement qu’on l’a fait jusqu’ici
les enjeux intellectuels, spirituels et culturels des affrontements entre islam
et christianisme comme protagonistes porteurs de témoignages différents
par delà les cadres théologiques d’exclusion réciproque qui fonctionnaient
déjà avec les mêmes émotions, les mêmes thématiques de diabolisation
de l’autre rappelées ci-dessus. L’identification de ces phénomènes et leur
déchiffrement relèvent de la psychologie historique et de l’anthropologie
comme critique des cultures et des systèmes de pensée, deux disciplines que
l’écriture de l’histoire politique, économique et sociale ou même idéologique
a trop minimisées jusqu’ici. Nous payons très cher cette ignorance perpétuée
au niveau de la recherche en sciences sociales qui continuent d’investir le
champ religieux sous l’angle de l’érudition ethnographique et de l’exhaustivité
descriptive et même statistique quand il s’agit d’enquêtes d’opinion. Un
tel conservatisme au niveau de la recherche retentit sur tous les niveaux
d’enseignement, notamment aux niveaux primaire et secondaire.
Les années 1945–2006 relèvent de ce qu’on appelle l’histoire du temps
présent. Bien qu’elle soit une perspective de moyenne durée, elle contient
des événements nombreux et très représentatifs des processus de mise en
place dans le monde de la violence devenue systémique après le 11/9/2001.
L’histoire de ce temps présent ne peut remplir sa fonction de catharsis pour
les générations vivantes que si elle n’est pas réduite aux informations sèches
des médias actuels. Elle doit expliciter les ressorts cachés, les stratégies
constantes d’acteurs déterminants, les intentions inavouées et les tragédies
programmées dans les négociations secrètes, les politiques de domination
et d’expansion, les marchandages secrets et les connivences calculées des
« grandes puissances ». Il est vrai que ce but serait partiellement atteint déjà
dans la seule énumération des décisions internationales et nationales, des
trahisons ou perversions répétées des principes généreux inscrits dans les
chartes des Nations Unies et de l’UNESCO, des guerres dites de libération et
de leurs répressions coloniales, des ravages de la guerre froide jusqu’en 1990,
des stratégies d’alliance entre les puissances qui consacrent la suprématie du
concept géopolitique d’Occident au détriment d’une Union européenne qui
peine encore à définir et défendre sa vocation révolutionnaire à construire un
nouvel espace de citoyenneté par delà ceux des Etats-nations. Je ne reviendrai
pas sur l’importance des facteurs internes et externes dans chaque pays, qui
génèrent la catastrophe mondiale du 11/9/2001 et les réponses désastreuses
données par des puissances dont les parcours historiques et démocratiques
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laissaient espérer qu’elles ouvriraient enfin les horizons d’une culture de paix
définitive dans un monde irano-turco-arabo-musulman particulièrement
éprouvé par deux siècles de domination politique succédant à 3 siècles
d’administration ottomane (safavide pour l’Iran).
A ce point de l’analyse historique surgit le drame central commun aux juifs
que je n’ai pas mentionnés jusqu’ici, aux chrétiens et aux musulmans d’une
part ; à l’Europe comme espace historique d’émergence de la modernité, des
Lumières laïques et scientifiques que des révolutions politiques sanglantes
substituent aux trois versions des Lumières monothéistes. Le drame se
cristallise pendant des siècles d’humiliation, de marginalisation, de rejet
des minorités juives en contextes islamiques et plus durement encore en
contextes chrétiens européens jusqu’à leur émancipation à la fin du 18e
siècle. Le statut juridique de protégés (dhimmi) continue de s’imposer en
contextes islamiques jusqu’au partage de la Palestine en Novembre 1947
suivi par la création de l’Etat d’Israël le 14 mai 1948. Ce que j’ai nommé
drame moral et politique se mue alors en tragédie au sens grec de destin
inexorable de deux peuples devenant eux-mêmes la même victime émissaire
des volontés de puissance qui ont toujours fait obstacle et perverti la quête
de sens dans l’histoire des hommes telle que la racontent les grands récits
fondateurs des parcours historiques les plus significatifs. Car le drame
vécu par les juifs au cours de longs siècles n’a pas empêché le peuple juif
de devenir « le témoin privilégié du cheminement de la liberté dans le
monde ». Cette belle expression prononcée par André Neher, spécialiste
reconnue de la pensée juive, au cours d’un entretien privé à Strasbourg en
1956, a toujours dirigé mon attention sur les dangers de l’histoire du temps
présent quand elle réduit systématiquement les guerres israélo-arabes aux
assassinats et attentats quotidiens, à la comptabilité macabre des victimes
innocentes, au travestissement des responsabilités encourues au jour le
jour par tant d’acteurs, au point d’effacer toute prise en charge historique et
philosophique de la tragédie programmée dès les accords Sykes-Picot pour
les destins individuels ou collectifs.
Les tragédies historiques programmées et la tragédie comme
destin
Toutes les guerres civiles qui éprouvent tant de sociétés depuis que les grandes
puissances ont dessiné la carte géopolitique du monde16, sont programmées
16
C’est-à-dire les accords de Yalta entérinant ou modifiant les tracés des traités
antérieurs depuis le 19e siècle.
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dans les choix politiques effectués à deux niveaux : celui des gouvernements
nationaux qui génèrent des oppositions privées de moyens démocratiques
d’expression ; celui des grandes puissances qui, selon les conjonctures
politiques dans les sphères géopolitiques, pactisent soit avec les oppositions,
soit avec les régimes en place. Une constante demeure dans le jeu changeant
des alliances et des ruptures : l’islam est instrumentalisé par tous les acteurs
en présence : les régimes en place affichent leur volonté de promouvoir et
protéger l’islam en renforçant la politique de traditionalisation (tasnîn):
renforcement de l’islam ritualiste, application du dispositif légal de la sharî‘a,
enseignement des expressions orthodoxes d’un islam populiste, affirmation
insistante de l’identité dite islamique… Les oppositions surenchérissent sur
l’observance stricte de toutes ces mesures ou prescriptions; des militants
très engagés tissent des liens forts avec les couches les plus démunies de
la population en leur apportant une assistance morale et matérielle qui
concrétise les valeurs projetées spontanément sur l’islam. On ne peut nier
que ces initiatives sociales soulignent les carences des Etats et rehaussent
l’attachement à un islam garant de la justice sociale et de l’efficacité politique.
En même temps, on s’éloigne de l’idée moderne de la séparation du religieux
et du politique et on proroge l’étatisation de la religion. On marche à rebours
du parcours des sociétés démocratiques modernes qui se libèrent de l’emprise
du religieux sur le politique et le juridique.
On voit bien que le concept du retour du religieux n’a de sens historiquement
que pour les sociétés qui non seulement ont travaillé à leur sortie du religieux,
mais ont favorisé l’expansion de la culture de l’incroyance. Les forces en travail
de la mondialisation font apparaître des décalages considérables entre les
sociétés closes repliées sur leurs croyances et leurs coutumes et les sociétés
plus dynamiques et créatrices, notamment avec l’apparition du capitalisme,
de l’industrialisation, de la technologie et des régimes démocratiques
laïcs. Ici se ressent la rareté des chercheurs-penseurs qui éclaireraient les
carences, les ignorances, les cynismes qui ont toujours contrarié la gestion
adéquate de ces décalages générateurs de déséquilibres, de désintégration
sociale, de régressions intellectuels et de violence structurelle. Les régimes
coloniaux ont évoqué l’idée d’émanciper les sociétés traditionnelles en leur
ouvrant les chemins de la modernité ; aujourd’hui encore, on parle d’aider les
sociétés attardées pour réduire les flux migratoires en procurant des emplois
aux générations montantes. On connaît le sort de ces velléités. L’idéologie
communiste a longtemps nourri l’illusion d’un dépassement historique de
tous les décalages en mettant fin simultanément aux superstitions religieuses
et aux dominations du capitalisme bourgeois. L’effondrement brutal de cette
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religion athée a partout exacerbé les tensions entre un capitalisme triomphant
et un reste du monde qui s’accroche désespérément à des identités bricolées
et à des religions qui ne sont plus ce qu’elles ont été jusqu’aux années 1940.
La tragédie comme destin résulte des effets multiplicateurs des violences
structurelles internes à chaque société pauvre ou riche, développée ou
démunie et de la violence systémique générée par les décalages économiques,
politiques, juridiques, institutionnels, culturelles, scientifiques, religieux entre
ce qu’on appelait dans les années 1960 les pays sous-développés et les pays
riches, puissants, capables de produire leur propre histoire par un lent travail de
soi sur soi. Les Partis-Etats postcoloniaux ont promis à leurs peuples de brûler
les étapes pour rattraper et même entrer en compétition avec les puissances
capitalistes. Jusqu’en 1970, on faisait confiance à la Révolution socialiste, à la
collectivisation des terres pour faire passer les paysans de leur conservatisme
au dynamisme de la culture prolétarienne. On affichait la volonté de sortir à
la fois de la religion comme opium des peuples et du capitalisme exploiteur
du prolétariat. Nasser, Tito et Nehru conduisaient le camp des non-alignés ;
les peuples se laissaient gagner par l’espérance révolutionnaire… En 1967,
la guerre des six jours brise des élans éphémères, dévoile les ravages de la
mythoidéologie et révèle le rôle irremplaçable de la religion comme capital
symbolique, recours sûr, refuge pour les opprimés, repaire pour les assoiffés
de revanche, tremplin pour toutes sortes d’ambitieux sans projet, sans culture
ni politique, ni religieuse. Israël élargit impunément la reconquête de la terre
promise ; la Nation arabe exaltée par Nasser et les leaders irakiens et syriens
du Ba‘th, mesure l’inanité d’une rhétorique belliqueuse et avale l’amertume
d’une défaite humiliante. Nasser meurt en 1970 ; son successeur ranime un
faible espoir avec une quasi victoire à la guerre de Kippour en 1973; il réussit
à récupérer la terre égyptienne occupée, mais il paye de sa vie un succès
diplomatique renié par les peuples arabes.
La tragédie poursuit son déploiement comme destin. En 1979, l’imam
Khomeiny prend le pouvoir dans son pays ; la révolution est qualifiée
d’islamique. Des intellectuels s’enflamment même en Europe. On n’a guère
remarqué dans cet événement une nouvelle illustration de la marche
à rebours de l’histoire en contextes islamiques par rapport à ce que les
Européens ont appelé révolution au 18e siècle. Les moments forts de la vie
politique ont toujours besoin de recourir à la fonction symbolique ; mais
c’est pour rabaisser ses charges de significations positives à des éruptions
mal contrôlées d’émotions ou colères collectives. Le nouveau leader iranien
veut arrêter le Shah, le faire juger et condamner par les révolutionnaires
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pour mettre fin au régime injuste de Pharaon (figure coranique de l’injuste
oppresseur) comme les français l’avaient fait en exécutant Louis XVI, symbole
de l’Ancien régime monarchique. L’exécution du Shah devait consacrer le
retour au régime islamique de l’imâmat shî‘ite, alors que celui de Louis XVI
ouvrait la voie de la République dont la légitimité repose sur la souveraineté
du peuple de citoyens libres et égaux17.
On remarquera les insuffisances de la psychologie, la sociologie et
l’anthropologie historiques pour identifier les mécanismes de désintégration
et de banalisation de la fonction symbolique dans les sociétés de spectacles,
de consommation, de précarité, de la pensée jetable comme les ustensiles
de la vie quotidienne, des disparités scandaleuses entre classes dirigeantes,
classes parasitaires, classes laborieuses, classes dangereuses, masses
délaissées, des centres et des périphéries, des puissances et des résidus, des
faillites frauduleuses, des abus de biens sociaux, de la corruption généralisée,
de l’ignorance statufiée, applaudie, vénérée (je pense à des chefs d’Etats qui
s’érigent en interprètes des textes sacrés ou mettent en scène des ‘ulamâ’
stipendiés pour réfuter les exégèses sauvages de leaders populistes). Nous
savons que le symbole meurt comme la métaphore, après avoir connu des
expansions plus ou moins durables dans des sociétés où l’interaction entre
langue, pensée, créativité, inventivité n’est pas entravée par les interdits,
les conservatismes, les dogmatismes, les ignorances avérées et transmises
comme des connaissances, ou, à l’inverse, quand cette interaction est livrée
sans régulation, sans finalités déclarées aux seuls mécanismes aveugles du
marché.
On dira à juste titre que ces aspects menaçants de la mondialisation en cours
n’affectent pas de façon égale toutes les sociétés contemporaines ; on ajoutera
même qu’il y a partout aussi des initiatives positives pour l’émancipation
de la condition humaine. Assurément ; mais il demeure nécessaire d’attirer
l’attention sur tout ce qui diminue, compromet, aliène et fausse durablement
l’exercice optimal des facultés de l’esprit. Ainsi, quand on observe la régression
intellectuelle et culturelle de beaucoup de sociétés contraintes pendant
des décennies à une marche à rebours de l’histoire moderne, on se trouve
devant le dilemme bien connu de l’obligation juridique de non ingérence ou
de danger moral de non assistance. L’Occident croit dépasser ce dilemme en
favorisant des aides dites humanitaires, sans avouer qu’il renonce, ce faisant,
aux impératifs catégoriques de l’attitude humaniste qui ne se contente pas de
soulager des misères générées totalement ou partiellement par les excès de
17
Voir Duprat 1993.
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la Realpolitik et de la Machtpolitik choisies depuis le 19e siècle par toutes les
« grandes » puissances.
Dans la pensée des Lumières le concept d’impératif catégorique renvoie
immédiatement à la morale kantienne du sujet transcendantal. Nous
sommes dans l’intellectualisme abstrait d’une pensée qui a effacé de la
culture dominante toute référence à une autre voie possible d’intériorisation
de l’impératif catégorique : c’est la conscience de culpabilité qui a surgi dans
le discours prophétique et que résume clairement le récit évangélique sur
la femme adultère : le juif Jésus veut sortir du rituel collectif de la lapidation
en appelant chaque sujet humain à la conscience de sa propre culpabilité
qui va déplacer le jugement moral et judiciaire vers une définition plus
universalisable de la faute (péché en religion) et de la sanction. En évoquant
cet épisode très connu, je ne veux pas réactiver les tensions séculaires
entre la raison religieuse et la raison moderne laïque ; l’objectif demeure le
dépassement des faux problèmes ou des controverses désuètes qui continuent
d’obstruer nos débats politico-religieux. Pour progresser dans cette voie de
dépassement, je retiendrai deux exemples concrets d’une actualité brûlante :
1) la pendaison de Saddam Hussein au matin de la commémoration dans
tout le monde musulman d’un récit de fondation commun aux trois religions
monothéistes ; 2) la question juive que viennent de reposer deux livres qui
donnent beaucoup à penser18.
La pendaison du dictateur irakien le matin d’une commémoration
sacrificielle qui renvoie à la Figure fondatrice d’Abraham comme référence
commune aux trois religions monothéistes, permet d’enrichir la réflexion
esquissée à propos du Shah d’Iran et de Louis XVI. Une fois de plus, une
puissante symbolique religieuse se trouve inextricablement mêlée à un
climat politique aussi complexe que tragique. Les polémiques vont bon train
sur l’identité et les responsabilités de ceux qui ont voulu un tel mélange
détonnant de croyances réputées sacrées et sanctifiantes, de « valeurs »
morales et juridiques formellement défendues par le magistère occidental
de la démocratie la plus avancée, de stratégies cyniques d’amplification des
haines sectaires qui font couler le sang d’innocents depuis mars 2003, sans
parler d’une longue histoire d’exclusion réciproque entre sunnites et shî‘ites
depuis le martyr de Hussein en 680. Tout cela renvoie normalement à la
quête de sens si présente dans les traditions religieuses et la longue lignée
de philosophes depuis la Grèce hellénique jusqu’à nos jours en passant par
les grands médiateurs en contextes islamiques. Le 11/9/2001 a accentué
18
Morin 2006 ; Milner 2006.
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le brouillage des enjeux de sens et de connaissance avec les objectifs
prioritaires de la Machtpolitik mise au service de la Realpolitik. Ce brouillage
systématique affecte profondément les prétentions des deux protagonistes
Islam versus Occident à défendre deux modèles d’action historique différents
dans leur expression formelle, mais également obsolètes au niveau de leurs
fondements mythohistoriques et idéologiques. C’est pour éclairer davantage
les différences formelles et les convergences idéologiques que j’ai choisi
deux exemples récapitulatifs des errements anciens et des confusions en
contextes de modernité.
Nous avons vu comment le protagoniste Islam s’est enfermé dans la
proclamation d’une religion valide pour tous les temps et tous les lieux
du monde (sâlih l-kulli zamân wa kulli makân). Cette formule doctrinale est
devenue un slogan politique avec le lancement du mouvement des Frères
musulmans en Egypte en 1928 ; elle est reprise par les divers courants militants
apparus dans les années 1970–2000. En clair, le modèle occidental moderne
de production de l’histoire est trompeur, illusoire et incompatible avec celui
instauré par le prophète à Médine entre 622–632. Une mythohistoire à usage
populaire, puis populiste depuis les années 1970, a construit un puissant
imaginaire commun à tout le domaine islamique contemporain. C’est cet
islam qui finit par prendre le pouvoir en Iran, en Afghanistan et avec moins de
radicalisme militant dans un nombre croissant de régimes. Le protagoniste
Occident construit dialectiquement cet islam volontariste en ennemi absolu
en utilisant les mêmes procédés de rejet et de diabolisation que son vis-àvis. Dans ce jeu d’exclusion réciproque, il y a cependant une telle inégalité
de ressources intellectuelles, scientifiques, culturelles, institutionnelles,
politiques et économiques que l’Occident devient, comme on l’a noté, la
victime inattendue de la victime réelle depuis l’émergence de la modernité
en tant que discriminant irréfutable. C’est un fait historique indéniable que
le protagoniste Occident a contribué depuis le 19e siècle à la dissolution du
« modèle » islamique d’intégration sociale et de réalisation de soi de l’individu,
du groupe, de la communauté et de la nation. Cette dissolution a affecté de
façon plus brutale encore les sociétés où le christianisme a joué le même
rôle que celui de l’islam en tant qu’instance de référence à la fois spirituelle,
éthique, juridique, culturelle et politique. Mais, pour des raisons nombreuses
et connues que je ne peux détailler ici, les tensions éducatives entre
modernité et christianisme ont eu une intensité, une continuité historique,
une fécondité pour la religion et pour l’Etat dont l’islam s’est paradoxalement
éloigné davantage dans la deuxième moitié du 20e siècle. Ce qui explique les
guerres meurtrières en cours.
Mohammed Arkoun
296
Dans les deux cas, toutefois, on constate une persistance des volontés de
puissance à pervertir les nouvelles quêtes de sens. A ce point de l’analyse,
il est nécessaire de s’interroger sur le phénomène terroriste tel qu’il s’est
développé et étendu à la planète depuis les années 1950. Nous vivons sur
l’idée indiscutable que le terrorisme est une forme barbare d’opposition
politique principalement liée à l’islam fondamentaliste. Je ne peux
m’attarder à approfondir une approche historique et phénoménologique
de cette question. Je renvoie à l’essai récent de Jean-François Daguzan sur
Terrorisme(s). Abrégé d’une violence qui dure19. Là encore, l’Occident ne se gêne
pas pour étendre au domaine scientifique des procédés de travestissement
de la réalité pour construire des légitimités qui ne résistent pas à la critique.
La raison télétechnoscientique marginalise la quête de sens en confiant aux
seuls experts et spécialistes le soin d’établir des faits empiriquement vrais
et donc fiables, alors que la critique linguistique et philosophique distingue
le sens des effets de sens. Ainsi, la construction imaginaire de l’autre pour
le réduire à un vis-à-vis négatif qui sert de faire valoir à mes propres valeurs
et à mes légitimités, fait reposer toutes les validations sur des effets de
sens mobilisateurs, mais intrinsèquement faux. Malheureusement, cette
distinction essentielle n’est pas rendue accessible à ce qu’on appelle le sens
commun dans toutes les sociétés contemporaines ; à ce niveau de discours
et de culture qui autorise l’expansion de la crédibilité religieuse ou laïque, les
effets de sens tiennent lieu couramment de sens sûr et immédiat.
A la lumière de toutes ces précisions, la mise en scène théâtrale du procès,
de la sentence et de la pendaison de l’ex-leader irakien est perçue comme telle
par l’opinion mondiale ; les auteurs et les acteurs de la scène ne continuent
pas moins à jouer leurs rôles respectifs pour maintenir la fiction d’une
souveraineté irakienne qui fonctionne avec une légitimité irréprochable.
L’avenir nous éclairera davantage sur les calculs des uns et des autres pour
inscrire cet événement dans la suite d’une longue tragédie dont personne ne
peut prédire la fin heureuse pour les uns et sombre pour d’autres. On posera
en attendant les questions suivantes pour déplacer les débats vers l’ouverture
d’horizons d’espérance pour les peuples les plus injustement éprouvés.
L’idée d’introduire une culture et une pratique démocratiques en Irak
aurait reçu un accueil positif dans la conjoncture créée par le 11/9/2001 si
elle avait été inscrite dans une vision géopolitique globale des déséquilibres
grandissants entre l’accélération de l’histoire pour la sphère de l’Occident
que représente le G8 et les régressions dramatiques observées dans le reste
19
Daguzan 2006.
297
du monde. Les pays regroupés dans l’OPEP entretiennent des rapports
d’échanges importants avec l’Occident tout en demeurant rattachés au
groupe des sociétés en quête ou attente de développement. En effet, les
pétrodollars sont recyclés dans les économies dynamiques de l’Occident
bien plus que dans la promotion d’une culture et d’un régime politique
démocratiques. On écrit beaucoup sur le thème du pétrole chance et malheur
à la fois des grands pays producteurs ; mais on passe plus ou moins sous
silence la Realpolitik des grandes démocraties qui ont toujours soutenu les
régimes les plus conservateurs, antidémocratiques et souvent corrompus
et corrupteurs. Les attentats ciblés sur certains régimes après le 11/9 ont
renforcé le besoin de protection auprès d’un Occident par ailleurs stigmatisé.
Cela explique les réactions prudentes aux violences que subit le peuple
irakien depuis cinq ans ; la pendaison de Saddam Hussein est traitée comme
une simple péripétie dans la série quotidienne d’attentats, d’assassinats, de
destructions chez un membre de la Ligue arabe. Il y a aussi une saturation
des opinions publiques devant des enchaînements de violence sans aucun
horizon de paix ou de solution apaisante ni en Irak, ni en Palestine, ni dans
d’autres foyers de passions dévastatrices.
Au mélange de lassitude, d’indifférence, de résignation, d’indignation,
s’ajoute dans le cas de la pendaison, la mise à nu de l’incapacité de l’opinion
arabe et islamique d’ouvrir un riche débat sur la participation aux efforts
déployés à travers le monde pour l’abolition de la peine de mort. On s’insurge
contre le procédé et l’instrument choisis pour donner la mort, mais on ne
va pas jusqu’à envisager l’abolition. Cela obligerait enfin à mieux définir le
statut de la personne ou sujet humain et tout ce qui le distingue de celui
de l’individu, du citoyen, de l’acteur social par delà les discriminations entre
l’homme et la femme, l’enfant et l’adulte, le croyant et l’incroyant, le blanc,
le noir et le jaune, le concitoyen et l’étranger… L’abolition de la peine de
mort est un test très éclairant sur la richesse ou la pauvreté et parfois les
régressions humanistes de chaque tradition de pensée et de culture qui
proclame avec véhémence sa spécificité positive, voire sa supériorité tout
en refusant l’indispensable autocritique ou confrontation avec autrui. Du
côté euro-américain, on pouvait espérer l’ouverture d’un débat escamoté
jusqu’ici sur la légitimité de tout ce qui se passe en Irak depuis le premier jour
de la confiscation d’une souveraineté politique assurément pervertie par le
dictateur, mais pas un cas isolé dans le monde actuel. On peut certes faire
valoir que les envahisseurs agissent avec responsabilité quand ils refusent
de quitter l’Irak avant d’avoir rétabli les conditions d’une paix civile durable.
Cet objectif de portée éthique serait plus crédible si tant de faits sombres
Mohammed Arkoun
298
n’étaient pas accumulés : escamotage d’un procès, d’une sentence et de son
exécution confiés à un tribunal ad hoc soi-disant national, alors que tout
s’est déroulé hors de toute légitimité et même légalité dans un pays conquis,
occupé, mis à feu et à sang, privé de toute souveraineté réelle. On aurait
pu renforcer l’existence et améliorer le fonctionnement du Tribunal pénal
international de La Haye qui préfigure mieux l’avènement d’une gouvernance
et d’une légitimité judiciaire mondiale. Au lieu de ces horizons d’espérance
et d’émancipation de la condition humaine, on préfère continuer à mettre en
scène théâtrale des caricatures de démocratie et de justice. Les puissances
démocratiques qui autorisent ce jeu et ce mépris des opinions nationales et
de l’opinion mondiale, détruisent leur prétention à conduire d’autres peuples
vers des valeurs démocratiques.
Le Tribunal pénal international aurait sûrement ouvert une ample
discussion sur sa compétence à mettre en examen un dictateur d’une
société conquise, un Etat-nation aboli, un peuple composite avec des
mémoires collectives conflictuelles, déchirées par des héritages archaïques
cyniquement manipulée par le monstre déchu et plus dangereusement
encore par les conquérants du 21e siècle au nom des valeurs démocratiques.
Le constat d’un procès impossible ouvre en même temps l’urgente nécessité
de deux concertations internationales au niveau de l’ONU : 1) l’une sur le droit
d’ingérence partout où apparaît manifestement le danger de non assistance ;
car il est vrai que les Etats voyous se sont multipliés dans la deuxième moitié
du 20e siècle avec la bénédiction des démocraties les plus avancées. 2)
L’autre sur la refondation du droit international pour régler des problèmes de
sécurité et d’environnement à l’échelle mondiale, au lieu de les abandonner
à la discrétion de la seule nation qui s’est donnée les moyens militaires et
technologiques de protéger les faibles et de détruire les méchants. On dira que
ces évocations relèvent de la naïveté intellectuelle et de la rêverie utopique.
Je serai le dernier à ignorer l’état présent des ignorances meurtrières, des
obscurantismes dogmatiques, des idéologies dévastatrices usurpant les
« valeurs » religieuses ou les promesses de la démocratie pour perpétuer les
rapports de domination, d’exploitation et de dépossession des estropiés, des
oubliés, des vaincus, des attardés, des marginalisés de l’histoire.
La question juive aujourd’hui
J’ai annoncé un second exemple fécond pour approfondir l’analyse critique des
rapports d’hier et des solidarités de demain entre islam, Europe et Occident.
Qui nierait que la question juive à la lumière de tout ce qui vient d’être dit et
enrichie pour la première fois sur les données et les ambitions d’une histoire
299
critique de la pensée islamique, est une des clefs majeures qui permettrait
de pénétrer dans plusieurs champs verrouillés de l’histoire religieuse,
politique, intellectuelle et culturelle de l’espace historique méditerranéen
déjà évoqué ? La question juive reprend le titre d’un essai de J. P. Sartre au
lendemain du désastre conçu et conduit par les serviteurs du nazisme. J’ai
mentionné deux titres proches qui apportent de nouveaux éclairages sur
le parcours des juifs et de l’Etat d’Israël jusqu’en 2006. Pour l’historien de
la pensée islamique, la difficulté du parcours réside dans le refus ascétique
de céder au moindre glissement vers les argumentaires ressassés jusqu’à la
nausée entre les protagonistes israéliens/juifs et palestiniens/musulmans ou
chrétiens. L’immense littérature qui a accompagné les guerres, les attentats,
les massacres, les assassinés ciblés, les manipulations des opinions, les ruses
et les cynismes des acteurs politiques, les rendez-vous manqués, la perversion
des opinions et des perceptions mutuelles, sera une source inépuisable
pour les diverses sciences de l’homme et de la société. Le philosophe et
l’anthropologue auront aussi beaucoup à penser et à expliciter sur les
errements et les automutilations des hommes comme individus et comme
peuples ou communautés. Nous toucherons brièvement à tout cela ; mais
parce que le parcours est délicat, long, complexe et inédit dans la perspective
de la présente réflexion, je préfère lui consacrer un chapitre à la mesure des
promesses d’ouverture qu’autorise un tel sujet. Pour focaliser la curiosité du
lecteur, j’annoncerai les thématiques suivantes : Palestine et Israël ; judaïsme,
christianisme et islam ; hébreu–syriaque–araméen–arabe ; Parole de Dieu–
Discours prophétique–Textes fondateurs/Ecritures saintes/Corpus Officiels
Clos–Communautés interprétantes et Corpus interprétants ; muthoslogos–
monothéisme ; traditions vivantes–modernité–laïcité, raison religieuse/
raison théologique et raison philosophique, raison télétechnoscientifique,
etc. On devine l’ampleur du travail que méritent ces thématiques. Beaucoup
de travaux érudits ont été accumulés depuis le 19e siècle ; mais j’ai dit que
l’érudition froide, factuelle ne déclenche pas nécessairement la pensée
critique propre aux opérations de transgression, déplacement et dépassement.
C’est avec de nouvelles volontés de savoir pour agir qu’il faut revenir, comme
l’a fait René Girard, aux «choses cachées depuis les origines du monde ».
Je laisse donc en suspens la conclusion finale de cet essai. Je n’ai cessé de
penser en écrivant ces pages à plusieurs travaux d’Avicenne qui illustrent la
mobilité et la fécondité d’une pensée ouverte et libre de ses mouvements
en un siècle où la pensée d’expression arabe accueillait des richesses venant
de toutes origines iraniennes, indiennes, grecques, arabes, islamiques, juives,
chrétiennes… Le Nouveau Moyen Âge restitué par la Nouvelle histoire pour
300
Mohammed Arkoun
l’Europe, est encore loin de l’être pour la période correspondante appelée
l’islam classique. Alain de Libéra a resitué dans un sens d’ouverture, les
contributions d’Avicenne et plus spécialement d’Averroès. Son livre Penser
au Moyen Âge n’a pas cependant mis fin aux débats sur ce que l’Europe
médiévale doit à la pensée philosophique et scientifique d’expression
arabe du 8e au 12e siècle. Un livre polémique vient d’être publié par Sylvain
Gouguenheim sous le titre parlant, Aristote au Mont St Michel. Les racines
grecques de l’Europe chrétienne20. Cela montre qu’il y a encore beaucoup à
faire pour remembrer les apports des pensées et des cultures dans l’espace
géohistorique méditerranéen.
Réferences
Arkoun, Mohammed (1982) : Lectures du Coran. Maisonneuve et Larose.
Arkoun, Mohammed (1984) : Critique de la Raison islamique. Maisonneuve et
Larose
Arkoun, Mohammed (2002) : The Unthought in Contemporain Islamic Thought.
London: Saqi Books in association with The Institute of Ismaili Studies.
Arkoun, Mohammed (2003) : Pensée arabe. 6e édition. PUF.
Arkoun, Mohammed (2005) : L’humanisme arabe au IVe/Xe siècle: Miskawayh,
philosophe et historien. 3e édition. Vrin.
Arkoun, Mohammed (2006a) : Islam : to Reform or to Subvert ? 2. ed.
London : Saqi Essentials.
Arkoun, Mohammed (sous la direction de) (2006b) : L’histoire de l’islam et des
musulmans en France du Moyen Age à nos jours. Albin Michel.
Arkoun, Mohammed & Joseph Maïla (2003) : De Manhattan à Bagdad. Au-delà
du bien et du mal. Desclée de Brouwer.
Baslez, Marie-Françoise (2007) : Les persécutions dans l’antiquité : victimes, héros,
martyrs. Fayard.
Duprat, Anne (1993) : Le roi décapité. Essai sur les imaginaires politiques. Le Cerf.
20
Gougenheim 2008.
301
Finkelstein, Israël & Neil Asher Silberman (2002) : La Bible dévoilée. Les nouvelles
révélations de l’archéologie. Bayard.
Gouguenheim, Sylvain (2008) : Aristote au Mont St Michel. Les racines grecques de
l’Europe chrétienne. Paris : Seuil.
Daguzan, Jean-François (2006) : Terrorisme(s). Abrégé d’une violence qui dure.
Paris : CNRS éditions.
Lefebvre, Henri (1969) : Logique formelle et logique dialectique. 2e édition.
Anthropos.
de Libera, Alain (2003) : Raison et foi. Archéologie d’une crise d’Albert le Grand à
Jean-Paul II. Seuil.
Luxenberg, Christoph (ps.) (2000) : Die syro-aramaeische Lesart des Koran; Ein
Beitrag zur Entschlüsselung der Qur’ānsprache. Berlin: Das Arabische Buch.
Meier, John Paul (2004–2005) : Un Certain juif Jésus. T. I., Les Sources, les origines,
les dates ; t. II, La Parole et les gestes ; t. III, Les données de l’histoire. Cerf.
Milner, Jean-Claude (2006) : Le juif de savoir. Grasset.
Morin, Edgar (2006) : La question juive et la modernité. Seuil.
Urvoy, Dominique (2006) : Histoire de la pensée arabe et islamique. Seuil.
The implications of Arab Islamic influence
on the Italian Renaissance for the
Europeanization of Europe’s Muslims today
Peter Gran
Introduction
The crisis of Muslims in Europe today is a serious one. Muslims are an integral
part of European life in fact but European media and culture tend to deny
this attempting to exclude them on the grounds that Islam is not modern so
they, meaning Muslims, are therefore inherently foreign to Europe which is
modern. This paper takes up the problem of the supposed non-modernity of
Islam as a problem in European history. Not uncommonly in European history
and in other histories as well, the dominant power constructs its narrative
so as to exclude some minority on one basis or another and this appears
to have been the case here. Historical knowledge however is not always so
predictable or so easy to control. This paper discusses one such example, the
unexpectedly discovered influence of Arab-Islamic culture on Renaissance
Italy. The paper reflects on what this might mean for the existing narrative.
As the student of cultural history would know, Arab-Islamic influence
on Medieval Europe has long been acknowledged in Western scholarship.
In recent years, however, there has been an unexpected addition to this
traditional body of scholarly work. In this more recent work, evidence emerges
not only of an Arab-Islamic influence on medieval Europe but on that of
the Italian Renaissance as well especially on Venice. However, this rather
important discovery has tended to be obscured given another development
that took place at about the same time. I refer here to the even more dramatic
–and much written about – implosion of the field of Renaissance studies in
the past few years, many scholars now shunning it and indeed shunning
even the idea of modernity with which it is associated.1 The upshot appears
to be that as a result of scholarly choices being made today, fields such as the
Renaissance perhaps even the Enlightenment will have to be reconstructed
1
A sign of the times is an influential work emphasizing the connection between
the Renaissance, colonialism and racism in the New World, is Mignolo 2003.
Peter Gran
304
by a new generation of scholars although on what basis is not yet known.2
Perhaps this new generation would be inclined to take up this task with an
eye to the problem of the Europeanization of Islam. One might hope so.
There are a large number of Muslims in Europe living there on a permanent
basis seeking to be accepted as Muslim Europeans but doing so with very
limited success. It apparently does not suffice for them that the medieval
contribution of the Islamic world to European culture is acknowledged,
the need they have, here to repeat, is to be recognized as participants in
modernity in whatever sense of the word modern is in use. But is it the case
that Arab-Islamic culture is so alien to the formation of modern Europe? Is the
premise of the media polemic all that accurate? Given the new research on
the Renaissance, one would think not.
This paper reviews some of this newer scholarship accepting its findings
but wondering how there could have been such influence. How would it be
that the elites of these two different regions came to have a similar taste in the
decorative arts allowing for there to be this borrowing? Was this an accident
or was this a predictable development given what had come before?
To proceed, the paper first looks (a) at the way the Renaissance has
been dealt with in European scholarship over the past century up through
recent years, i.e., as the awareness grew among scholars of an Arab-Islamic
influence on Venice. (b) With this as background, the paper proceeds to
try to explain how there could have been a general acceptance of ArabIslamic design among the aristocracy and art patrons of the Renaissance.
It hypothesizes that if this was not some exotic import of the moment and
this does not seem to have been the case, the likely alternative would be
that this art must have been some small part of a larger shared formation
already in place which made this borrowing non-controversial.3 What a wider
reading suggests is that this probably was the case, that both regions did in
fact share an aristocratic and rich merchant type of culture, one which was
rooted in Humanism and Scholasticism. One suspects that on the popular
2
Why is it the case in the Arab world as well today the use of the word Nahdah is
also in decline? Looking back at a more confident age in Arabic culture, one finds
Taymur (2003), a reprint from the 1930’s edition. Here was a book from the Arab
renaissance period on the history of Arab art in the classical period. There is no
recent book to my knowledge to replace it.
3
Several recent works attest to the connection between trade and art; some
reference is made to Islamic patronage of Western and of local art as well. (Maclean
2005)
Arab Islamic influence on the Italian Renaissance
305
level in both regions, opposition to that culture including opposition to
representational art existed as well.4 There is certainly some evidence to that
effect. (c) To explore the hypothesis of a shared high culture, the most logical
approach seemed to be to turn to the work of George Makdisi, a specialist on
the subject of Humanism and Scholasticism and of the Madrasa’s influence
on the European university. Makdisi makes the case for a shared high culture
in his study of elite education. If one assumes, following Makdisi, that there
was a common structure of elite education across the Mediterranean then
borrowing among these elites be it in art or in other fields was something to
be assumed right through the Renaissance and beyond. What art historians
are finding for Venice at this point would thus appear to fit into a larger pattern
and would make sense. For our purposes, here would be modern European
culture in the process of formation and here too would be Islam. This is where
the hegemonic narrative of Europe appears to be in trouble.
The rise and fall of the Renaissance in Western scholarly
thought, 1860–2000
In the nineteenth century, Jacob Burckhardt, (1818–1897) the Swiss scholar
who was sometimes called the father of cultural history, wrote The Civilization
of the Renaissance in Italy (1867). This book remained the classic work on the
subject of the Renaissance for a long time. Optimistic and forward-looking in
tone, it fit the age of nation-state building as one found it in countries such
as Germany in particular. And, here it should be noted that it was Germany,
the nation-state builder par excellence which produced most of the great
scholarship on the Renaissance. The nineteenth century, however, came and
went. The attraction to state-building came and went as well. In the twentieth
century which followed, very different ideas about modernity and its origins
came to prevail, and here I refer in particular to the academic thought of the
years after the World War II on that subject.
In this later period, the idea of a Renaissance with its belief in man, in
progress and in the future was in crisis. Why this was so remains a matter of
speculation and there are different perceptions of the matter. Some point to
the fact that the middle classes themselves were in crisis; some point to the
fact of the sudden arrival of many immigrants at the end of the colonial era
and argue that this in itself was a new form of crisis, not one reducible to the
fact of migration per se but to the combination of the fact that this migration
came at a time when because of neo-liberalism European states could not
4
Grafton 2004, 57.
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Peter Gran
easily create new citizens formed in Western culture. In some instances, the
crisis was doubtless exacerbated as well by the fact that the migration came
from the former colonies. In any case, racism began to rise in Europe. Much
of it was anti-Arab or anti-Muslim. This racism gave power to a new class of
politicians, those willing to support and to use it. Meanwhile anti-racism
grew weaker. In the past generation, the only ongoing attempt to combat
racism has been the one on the level of youth and of the marginal.5 Here
one continues to find attempts to form cross-racial solidarities and fusion
cultures.
Against this rather somber background, a hopeful sign is that a few
scholars, who appear aware of the gravity of the situation, have begun to
point to evidence showing how the Italian Renaissance reflected Italy’s links
through Venice to the Middle East, how it was that much of the culture of the
Italian Renaissance was thus in fact influenced by the Arab and Islamic world.
All this scholarship is of course new to the last twenty years. It is difficult to
decide to what extent, it has had time to sink into the wider cultural history
and thereby to really influence the study of the Renaissance much less the
study of modernity.6
John Martin, the Cambridge scholar, writes “that for Italian historians – like
many of their counterparts in the United States and Britain – the Renaissance
as a conceptual framework for the analysis of Italy in the period running from
roughly 1300–1600 has lost much of its explanatory power and attractiveness.
”The Italians”, he finds, “take the Burckhardt tradition to be a part of the rise
of the Anglo-Saxon world, one which simply was making use of Italy. Apart
from that, even on scientific grounds, Italian writers appear to doubt the
modernity of the Renaissance. At most, he concludes, we are left with art,
literature and music but not social and political life.”7
In the US, Walter Mignolo, the influential Argentinean-American literary
critic at Duke University has been emphasizing the connections between
Renaissance culture, European racism and imperialism in the New World.8
At this point, what seems clear is that whatever Western modernity may be
or will become in academic thought, it will not be the familiar history from
5
Most of the progress so far has been on the informal level among groups and
individualized who have been marginalized. (Dawson & Palumbo 2005)
6
Brotton 2002.
7
Martin 1996, 613.
8
Mignolo 2003.
307
the Renaissance to the Enlightenment that we all learned back in school a
generation ago.
For Muslims in Europe, the history of the Renaissance and of European
modernity has thus suddenly become a matter of some importance. If one
finds Arab and Islamic influence, this would have a bearing on much else right
down to the present day. Whatever the case may be, scholars clearly can not
rest on the formulations of times past. They need to rethink the Renaissance
and what followed from it given the new evidence at hand.9
The operative word here is rethinking. The bulk of the known Muslim
population of Europe has already been identified in European scholarship
and categorized as Balkan. In this scholarship, the Balkans are often almost
invisible and often unknowable. They are not a part of Europe yet not a part
of the Middle East or even of the Islamic world. Albania, a predominantly
Muslim European country in the Balkans, is the extreme case. Most scholars
skip the subject of Albania in discussions of modern Europe as they do in
discussions of the modern Middle East or of modern Islam. Yet as specialists
on Albania have shown, Albanians participated in one way or another way in
all the main periods of European history from George Castrioti Skanderbeg
in the Renaissance onward.
The hypothesis of a shared high culture versus popular culture
An important assumption found in the traditional scholarship on Islam and
on the Renaissance is the one differentiating the two civilizations in terms of
individualism supposedly reflected in the representational art of Renaissance
and its absence symbolized in the Islamic preference for design. For many,
the representational art found in the Renaissance even symbolized a different
and higher form of human consciousness, one pointing toward a specifically
European modernity, one separate from all that came before. Today this is
disputed. Few today would assume a dichotomy between Europe and its
pictorial representation and the Islamic world and its opposition to pictorial
representation. If one took this approach, what would one make of the
contribution to representational art of the artists of the Ottoman, Iranian
and Mughal courts? And what would one make of Savonarola, who opposed
representational art in Italy? The attempt to sustain a civilizational dichotomy
approach today confronts other problems as well. How does an era, such as
our own which identifies with deconstruction and with abstract art as its
symbolization of modernity go about trying to valorize pictorial art in the
9
Matar 1999.
308
Peter Gran
manner of the nineteenth century art critic? How would such a valorization
proceed at this point? Such criticisms today are common; the issue is what
formulation could historians come up with that could rise to these challenges?
Here what is hypothesized is that it would be more fruitful to re-think the
Euro-Islamic region in terms of a shared high culture, one which was resisted
on the popular level and still is.
Thus one finds in the sixteenth century, rather than Europeans in favor of
representational art and Muslims opposed to it, it turns out on closer scrutiny
that certain groups opposed it both in the Islamic world and in the West.
Girolamo Savonarola, (1452–1498) a Dominican Friar, an ascetic with populist
leanings ordered the burning of Renaissance art and of other sinful art objects
in Florence in the so-called Bonfire of the Vanities on Shrove Tuesday in 1497.
During that event, Sandro Botticelli, the very famous painter, placed his own
art on the bonfire as part of the sinful objects to be destroyed. These were the
working classes and artisans destroying the art of the aristocracy. If this is on
one side, on the other, the old argument that Islam opposes representational
art seems belied not just by the indigenous production of representational
art but by Sultan Mehmed’s cosmopolitan taste in portrait art. What has long
been known is that the Italian artist Gentile Bellini (1426–1507) was invited
by the Sultan to stay in Istanbul and to draw his portrait. A second major
portrait painter of the Renaissance period was Reza Abbasi (1565–1635).
Abbasi was a painter from the Isfahan School in Iran. He drew portraits for
the court but for a period in his life, he withdrew from serving in the court
to be free in the society. This is what is repeated about him. What we know
is that the inclusion of this condensed and unexplained information was in
those days a common device to allow an author to convey some controversial
piece of information but to do so in a neutral way. Abbassi one deduces was
not simply a courtier.
If one pursues, as part of one’s hypothesis, the idea of a conflict between
high culture and popular culture, there is already a somewhat familiar
example upon which to draw, that of the coming of the printing press to the
Middle East. Rulers quietly promoted it; other voices more representative of
the mass culture declared the printing press to be un-Islamic. What has also
been noted is that the coming of the printing press un-employed a large guild
of copyists who lost their craft and their livelihood as a result. One could infer
the artisanal world understood what was happening and in the course of their
struggle invoked religion. Thus in a sense the introduction of the printing
press was against Islam. If one extends this approach to interpretation to
the issue of art patronage one might suppose that a shift in royal patronage
309
away from the guild and its decorative arts to a few portrait painters would
be resisted in the same manner and for the same reasons. While this remains
to be established a point worth noting is that such an explanation would
certainly fit with the general impression scholars have of the economic
history of the period. The rise of the merchants in Lucca in Italy over against
their Egyptian and Syrian counterparts was a matter of differential labor
power. Middle Eastern guilds were able to demand better remuneration than
were their European counterparts. Thus European businessmen were able to
move ahead. In places such as Italy, one could more easily have a break with
the past or a Renaissance than one could in the Middle East. And, while the
strength of the guilds may have contributed to the economic decline of the
Middle East in world power terms over the long run, and this is another claim,
it allowed for a number of centuries of relative social stability internally in
these societies.
Bringing this up to date, one finds that there still is a certain class basis of
interest in representational art right down to modern times. One of the very
few books on the history of representational art in Arab culture was written
by an Egyptian aristocrat, Ahmad Taymur Pasha. Taymur Pasha writing in the
heyday of the Nahdah (Arabic Renaissance) in the 1930’s simply assumed the
existence of such a tradition in Islamic Civilization and wrote accordingly.
Clearly many other writers have not started from the same premise nor did
they reach the same conclusions. In turning to the Encyclopedia of Islam
(2nd edition) article on “Taswir” in order to try to get a general overview of
recent scholarship on the subject, one finds Priscilla Soucek, the art historian,
claiming that there was no Qur’anic interdiction against painting but that
one arose in the theology of the late Umayyad Period. Even then, there was
some ambiguity as the subject was never directly addressed as such. There
was for example a Hadith about a Muslim not entering the house of painter
and that how on the death of the painter he the painter would be responsible
for failing to bring to life those whom he depicted. There was another one
which described the Prophet ordering the destruction of all images save that
of the Virgin Mary and Child. What was the relation of the one subject to the
other? Was the Prophet referring to art or idols? Whatever the case, there was
a way around this possible prohibition for wealthy Muslims. Thus we find that
many of the painters of the classical Islamic world were Greeks, Christians or
Chinese and not Muslims but they were patronized by Muslims.
What is apparent as well is that among the wealthy classes in Ottoman
Turkey, collecting art was an ongoing activity in Early Modern history.
Painting in the Ottoman tradition led to court painters producing albums
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310
containing pictures called Muraqqa’s. There is an article on that subject in the
Encyclopedia of Islam by B. W. Robinson, an authority on Islamic art. Where
Western painters painted wall art, the Ottomans produced art albums. Western
art however was also available at least in Istanbul. By the 18th century, hybrid
styles developed in the Ottoman Court as European art began to have an
impact on Ottoman style. One wonders how much this was simply a function
of different labor histories?
Putting this aside for the moment, it is important to note that current
researchers are acknowledging certain difficulties in trying to establish
the fact of Arab-Islamic influence on Italian art. One such difficulty is that
important writers and artists of Renaissance Italy do not exhibit much curiosity
about foreign influence past or present, Islamic or otherwise. This leaves the
question were the Italians aware of the Middle East, were they curious about
it? Did they have informed views about their trading partners there or is this
too simplistic a way to deal with the subject of influence in any case?
From the work of the historians Nancy Bisaha and Julian Raby, one comes
to believe that Venetian awareness of Middle Eastern countries was in fact
quite superficial.10 Julian Raby, writing on the Oriental Mode a Venetian
decorative art trend, noted how superficial the depiction of the Middle East
was in Renaissance art. Only briefly did the artists even try to distinguish
Arabs and Turks. After 1517, they homogenized the whole region as Turkish.
The borrowing of culture which they engaged in through trade apparently
did not awaken a very deep interest in whom they were trading with. Thus,
it is,11 one could find a considerable borrowing of and emulation of foreign
art and artifacts but a fairly limited awareness of who or what was producing
such work. This is of course simply an impression. Before it can be taken as one
which is fairly certain, some resolution of other issues in order. Presumably the
knowledge of Greek, Jewish, Armenian and Ottoman merchants who served
as intermediaries between Italy and the East was of a deeper order than that
of the painters.12 In looking at Renaissance culture as a whole would one not
have to include such knowledge? This is unresolved. Perhaps awareness as
such was greater but demands placed by patrons explain the art which was
produced. This too is a possibility.
In view of this ambiguous situation, one in which there is uncertainty
about both art influence and even about the significance of the period of the
10
Bisaha 2004, epilogue; Raby 1982, 21–22.
Howard 1991.
12
An initial plunge into this is Kafadar 1985.
11
311
Renaissance, one needs corroborative evidence to support the hypothesis
of a shared high culture. Art alone will not suffice. Why not consider art
education, better yet education as a whole? If Italian art was influenced by
Islamic culture, there must have been more than simply commercial contact.
This appears to be the case and here more conclusive research is available.
One particularly outstanding researcher in this area was the late George
Makdisi, a scholar who devoted a lifetime to working on the problem of
Arab Islamic influence on European education and high culture. The paper
concludes taking up some of the major insights in his work.
George Makdisi and the study of the structure of higher
education of the elites
Professor George Makdisi (1920–2002), an Arab-American born in Detroit,
received his PhD at the Sorbonne and taught at Harvard and Penn. He was
one of the main critics of the Eurocentric history of the Renaissance period
of our times and a major contributor to the field of the history of education.
Judging from book reviews, his works hit a sensitive nerve. Journals outside
Middle East studies tended to ignore his writing altogether. One might
conclude from this that his work is best known among specialists in medieval
and Renaissance Europe and of course classical Arabic studies. For whatever
reasons, his two main books were never translated into Arabic leaving him
to be known in the Arab world simply as an editor of the Al-Wadih fi usul
al-fiqh of Ibn ‘Aqil. For those who read him in English, however, it must have
been clear how much Makdisi contributed to the study of the Arab Islamic
contribution to Humanism and Scholasticism in Medieval and Renaissance
Europe.13
It could also be noted that Makdisi was a very cautious writer. Perhaps given
the uncertainties about how Venetians and other Italians saw the Islamic
world and its influence on them, one finds a scholarly reticence on his part
to argue for direct influence. He claimed that the cultural history of Medieval
and Renaissance Europe has to be understood in terms of its complex relation
with the Arab Islamic world. What Makdisi meant was that the Arabs gave the
Europeans the Scholasticism of the medieval schools and the Humanism of
the Renaissance but that the process was a more or less indirect byproduct
of the translation movement. For this reason, a Renaissance Italian might
have been unaware of it as he was focused on some detail in medicine or
astronomy found in some particular translation and only incidentally on the
13
Makdisi 1981; 1990.
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312
larger scaffolding which came with it. In any case, the result was clear enough.
The Scholastic movement, which one finds in Europe, much resembled and
thus doubtless actually arose from the earlier one of the Arab world. It was
centered on the school, on the skills needed by the student to study his lesson,
on the skills needed by the student to defend a doctorate, and by extension
the requirements needed to grant the student a degree by a school.14
What should we understand then about the Arabs giving the West “Greek”
learning? As Makdisi shows, what we should understand is that the Greek
knowledge which did get transferred to the West from the various fields of
learning came with the philosophical and methodological developments
from within Arabic culture. When the Europeans got Aristotle, they got him
as developed by Arab Falsafa. This was how the transfer of Arabic culture
occurred; it occurred in a way that seems indirect, here to repeat the above
point.
One would think Makdisi’s works would have been best-sellers but such was
not the case. Where his contemporary Edward Said was widely read, George
Makdisi was a name mainly known to specialists, as for example, to his fellow
Orientalists. And, while he had his detractors among them, he clearly was
appreciated in those circles being elected president of the American Oriental
Society in 1978. Outside of those circles, however, the extent of his influence
is less clear judging as was noted from where his books were reviewed.
As a result, until now few realize that it was the methodology and
philosophy of learning in the Renaissance which specifically came from the
Arabs; the common emphasis in Western scholarship on the subject remains
one on the level of particular texts, some of which did have roots going back
to the Greeks.
Here it is also important to underscore the point that Makdisi was concerned
with institutions and approaches and not simply with the details of subject
matter. Herein lay much of his originality. For example, he showed that given
a certain organization of knowledge and a certain manner of argument one
would expect institutional developments of a certain kind. In this way, he
was able to identify the major Islamic contribution to the workings of the
first universities in the medieval West. Thus we have “fellows” holding a “chair,”
or students “reading” a subject and obtaining “degrees,” or professors giving
inaugural lectures or wearing academic robes, institutions taken for granted
as traditional European ones, institutions which, however, can be traced back
14
Makdisi 1989.
313
to Arab Madrasa practices. Indeed the idea of a university in the modern
sense – a place of learning where students congregate to study a wide
variety of subjects under a number of teachers – is generally regarded as
an Arab innovation developed at the al-Azhar university in Cairo. As Makdisi
has demonstrated, it was in cities bordering the Islamic world – Salerno,
Naples, Bologna, Montpellier, and Paris – that first developed universities in
Christendom, the idea spreading northward from there.
As Makdisi also showed,15 the Latin-based curriculum of Studia Humanitatis
from the Medieval period on through the Renaissance was set up on the
model of that of the Madrasa. It taught the fields that were needed, e.g.
grammar (Al-Nahw) and rhetoric (al-Khataba). In medieval times and then
later in the Renaissance as well, knowledge of these fields was needed by
court officials for the purposes of letter writing (‘Ilm al-Tarassul) and for
public communication, hence oratory (Al-Khatabah). Humanism emphasized
eloquence while Scholasticism the dialectical method and disputation (AlMunazarah). Both had a role to play. For example, the latter was used to
test students and job applicants. If Scholasticism was uniquely a school and
religion-based orientation, Humanism was found more widely in clubs, salons,
and the like, both civilizations having many such institutions. Humanism
included art appreciation, here to make some reference to the question of
art.
What gives all this its importance here is that if we find art we do not find it in
isolation but rather as a part of the totality of fields of learning and institutional
forms. Here Makdisi’s work is quite useful. Makdisi found similarities not just in
subject matter but in methods of pedagogy as well, especially in humanistic
education. He found that memorization played a major role in humanistic
education.16 Memorization, it was commonly thought, created the basis from
which the creative faculties would then be developed. Education thus would
go from dictation (al-Imla’) to memorization (Al-Hifz), and finally instructive
discussion (Al-Mudhakara) and debate (Al-Munazarah). It would begin with
Al-Riwaya, the simple acquisition of knowledge, then Al-Diraya, the analysis
of this knowledge and finally it would reach Al-Ijtihad, the use of one’s ideas
arising from the possession of this knowledge. Al-Mudhakara or instructive
conversation was used as a part of the test of the job applicant. There was
also self-education and guide books on how this was to be done, e.g., Thabit
b. Qurra’s Kitab fi maratib al-ùlum. And similarly a work by Al-Farabi, Kitab
15
16
Makdisi 1990, 332, 335.
Ibid., 202, 239.
314
Peter Gran
ihsa’ al-‘ulum wa tartibiha for which there were two Latin versions in the
Renaissance. In addition, there was advice to the learner again often stressing
the virtues of memorization as a part of learning. In both civilizations, the
student used the same implements notably the inkwell (mahbara) and the
notebook (daftar or kitab).
In both civilizations as well, Makdisi found, the Humanists felt themselves
to be a guild and felt solidarity (Ikhwan, Sinaàt al-adab, Hirfat al-adab).
Again as in Europe so in the Arab world, one could distinguish between those
more of a professional sort in the guild such as court poets and court orators
and those more amateur such as calligraphers and copyists. Then there was
politics. There were different kinds of ruler patrons, some more cultured, some
less. The common strategy of the Humanists was to tutor each new ruler as
a child so he in turn would employ tutors for his children. There was also
a great deal of jealousy and rivalry among Humanists in both places. Some
tried to have more than one position. Salaries of humanists varied according
to politics from a little to a lot.
As was noted, teaching and tutoring began with reading (Al-Iqra’) and
dictation (Al-Imla’). The names for the teacher make clear what precisely these
functions were. The Mukattib or Al-Muktib taught these skills on a basic level.
The Mu’addib (tutor) taught Al-Adab, manners and humanities. For scientific
subjects there was the Muàllim. Then there were students who took the
approach of apprenticing or learning on the job such as the Al-Mutafaqqih.
The word student (Al-Talib) applied to those studying while for the graduates
the term Al-Mushtagilun as in medicine conveyed the idea of working while
still learning. European practices were quite similar.
In the case of the Arab world, the defeat of the Mu`tazili and the return
of traditionalists affected the direction of humanistic study. Institutions such
as Bayt al-Hikma changed into Dar al-Qur’an and Dar al-Hadith. The rise of
the traditionalists also brought an end to the institution of the Nadim or
boon companion. In the Italian context, Lorenzini de Medici (1515–1547), a
member of the cadet branch of the Medici family, was the boon companion
of Alessandro de Medici. Be that as it may, he secretly plotted his murder,
possibly out of republican convictions. Here too the boon companion was a
dying institution, no pun intended.
As was noted before, the education system in both cases had its
professionals and amateurs. Professionals were naturally those who
dominated various fields and earned a living through them such as the
tutors. The most advanced professional instructor was called Al-Mutasaddir.
315
To teach a course on an advanced level was tasaddara li-l-iqra’ as for example
Arabic as a subject (al-‘Arabiya). In the Arabic context, the assistant to the
professor was the Mufid, an individual who helps the professor by imparting
useful knowledge to the students. Hierarchies of this sort were also found in
the academic libraries, in the secretarial bureaus and elsewhere as they were
a bit later in Europe as well.
Makdisi looked at the matter as one of complex contact between two
different civilizations.17 It was not a question simply of Europe borrowing
something to fit an entirely comparable structure now to return to this
point. The Europeans had to change quite a bit which they did. Sometimes
they borrowed, sometimes they emulated, and sometimes they used their
own tradition as a way to emulate. This may be a fruitful way to look at the
Renaissance. Some of the main differences that Makdisi noted between
the two civilizations was that the European university or Universitas was
distinguished by its own particular organization, structure of privileges and
system of protection. In effect, in the European case, the university was a
corporation protecting its interests functioning as an alien entity in the city
of which it was a part. Roman law recognized the corporation as a legal
person apart from its leading members and this allowed the university in this
context to survive. By way of contrast, a Muslim was not an alien anywhere in
the Muslim world, thus there was no need for the protection of students nor
of the Madrasa. If in need, a student could get Zakat as a wayfarer anywhere,
i.e., as Ibn al-Sabil. The difference shows up as well when it came to giving a
degree. In Europe, the Licentia Docendi or license to teach in a certain field
was a corporate decision granted in combination with the permission of
the Church. In the Islamic world, the Ijazah was a personal matter between
teacher and student. In Europe learning thus became highly political as
different powers were involved while in the Islamic world the student simply
went from teacher to teacher getting Ijazas. Where the fight of the European
university to grant degrees against the power of the city led to fixed semesters
and other requirements, this is not found in the Ijaza system. The rulers had
no such power to neither interfere nor impose conditions. Madrasas were
supported by Waqf donations and the terms of the Waqf defined who would
attend the madrasa and even what its purpose would be.
To survive in the West, the university often tried to play the interest of
the Pope off against those of some king. When this failed, the university
could face hardship. In the Arab Islamic context, the politics were different.
17
Makdisi 1970.
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316
A Madrasa could not simply leave. It was tied by its Waqf money, money
which in any case made it somewhat independent. The difference in funding
meant that education was not easily controlled in the Islamic world as it was
in Europe. The professor as a result had more freedom. Thus Makdisi argues
if the European system still under these conditions translated large number
of books and adopted new methodologies this involved some complex
series of choices. This still needs to be studied. For our purposes, the fact that
European education moved along these lines in Humanistic fields seems to
lend some credence to the idea of Arab-Islamic influence in the Renaissance
art world, this being the larger point of this section. Education would serve
as a base which would make borrowing and adaptation such as we find it
something obvious even if the Italians of the Renaissance were not always
conscious of why this was the case.
Conclusion
This paper set out to inquire into the subject of the Arab-Islamic impact
on the Italian Renaissance and the new research surrounding it. The point
of the exercise was that this new research might serve to alleviate some of
the problems of Muslims in Europe, who are today in process of trying to
become Europeans. In other words, if the Renaissance was shown to have
been subject to a good deal of Arab Islamic influence in the area of art and
if the Renaissance was the starting point of European modernity, Muslims
in Europe could no longer be regarded as foreigners as they are today. They
were from the beginning a part of Europe’s modernity. The evidence found
when taken on its own was not decisive. However, when combined with a
somewhat wider view of elite education and of popular culture, the idea of an
Islamic cultural contribution to the birth of modern Europe seems eminently
reasonable. In one way or another there was doubtless some contribution to
art as well.
317
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Mehdi Mozaffari
Amity and enmity in the Koran
In the universe of the Koran, amity and enmity are determined by a single
criterion, which is obeisance to or disobedience of Allah’s Will. In this Manichean
view, the Koran does not recognize any opposition, but only friends and
enemies. According to this simple rule, those who themselves fully and
completely submit to Allah’s Will are acknowledged as true friends and those
who rebel against Allah’s Will are recognised as enemies and there are some
people in between, some Ahl al-Kitâb. In a few verses of the Koran, Allah
denounces His (own) enemies (‘adow/a’iddâ’) and promises them the eternal
fire.1 “You may dismay the enemy of Allah and your enemy”.2 There is no further
precision about the identity of Allah’s (personal) enemies in explicit terms.
This peculiar Koranic remark put aside, in the real world, amity and enmity in
the Koranic discourse is defined in relation to (Muslim) believers. Seen from
this perspective, Satan, by the fact that he is a creature of the God, is not
seen as His equal – rival nor His enemy; Satan remains as a formidable enemy
for human beings in general3 and for true Muslim believers in particular. In
the Koran, Satan has two names: Shaytan and Iblis. The latter is often used
when referring to his rebellion against God’s command to prostrate before
Adam and the former is mostly referring to his role as a corruptor of humans
beginning with misguiding Adam and Eve, causing their fall from Paradise.
In this sense, Satan represents the archetype of an enemy and, more than
this, Satan constitutes an “enemy model”; all other enemies have to measure
themselves against him, because he is the perfect and “impeccable” enemy.
He rarely confronts you directly. His role is acting in such a way that you by
yourself commit wrong actions. Therefore, Shaytan lives inside everybody
and is always ready to give you wrong and dangerous ideas. In the political
vocabulary, Shaytan is often the symbol for the subversive and/or corrupted
1
Sura 8, Verse 60; Sura 41, Verses 19 and 28.
Sura 8, Verse 60.
3
The Koran uses different terms to define a human being, such as Bashar (generic),
Banu Adam (genealogic), Insân (social) being. For “people” in general, the term An
Nâs is employed.
2
Mehdi Mozaffari
320
character of an idea or the character of some political forces. It was in this
sense that Ayatollah Khomeini launched one of his successful slogans against
the United States of America, dubbing the USA a Shaytan-e Bozorg/Great
Satan!
The Tâghut is another Koranic symbol for an enemy which is presented
in the statue of an idol.4 This symbol also has a political purpose and often
governments or leaders in Islamic countries who are accused (by Islamists)
of being hostile to true Muslims are called Tâghut (e.g. the Shah of Iran). A
personified Tâghut is represented in the Koran in the person of the Pharaoh
(e.g. President Anwar el Sadat according to Islamists), referring to human
arrogance and rebellion. Each year in the hajj ceremony, millions of Muslim
pilgrims in Mecca proceed to the ritual stoning of Satan (rajm min alShaytan).
Apart from these symbolic and metaphorical enemies, the Koran proceeds
to a careful classification of friends and enemies who have been real actors in
the formation and the evolution of the religion of Muhammad. The Koranic
classification is predominantly directed towards internal friends and enemies.
Considering the historical context of the 7th century (A.D.) and especially the
geographical exiguity of Mecca and Medina, where all activities related to
the rise and evolution of Islam were concentrated, the idea of one or many
external enemies was apparently excluded. Therefore, the whole Koranic
classification is essentially inspired by internal friends and enemies.
Let us have a closer look at the Koranic classification of amity and enmity.
The list is composed of seven groups: three friends in different degrees and
three enemies in different degrees too. The criterion of distinction remains
always the degree of obeisance to Allah or disobedience of His commands.
Consequently, Allah stands in the centre of the whole system of amity and
enmity. The friends and enemies are separated from each other by a group
of people who are playing in the Koranic logic a neutral role. This group,
Ahl al-Kitâb, is composed of Jews, Christians, Sabeans and Zoroastrians. On
the friendship side of the list, the following three groups are in hierarchical
order:
1. Mu’minîn:5 True Believers
4
Sura 2, Verses 257 and 259; Sura 5, Verse 65; Sura 16, Verse 38; Sura 39, Verse 19.
The Koran does not explicitly distinguish between Mu’minîn and Muslimîn. In
the Koran, the mu’mîn (singular) means “someone who protects, gives safety”
and God himself is called mu’mîn. Similarly, imân (semantic origin of mu’mîn) in
the Koran ought to be understood as “giving mutual protection and security”. In
5
321
2. Muslimîn: Formal Believers
3. Mustaz’afîn:6 Deprived peoples
0. Ahl al-Kitâb. Jews, Christians, Sabeans and Zoroastrians
1. Munafiqîn:7 Hypocrites/Dissenters
2. Kafirîn: Unbelievers
3. Mushrikîn: Polytheists
4. Murtadîn: Apostates
other Koranic contexts, it is not clear whether mu’mîn refers exclusively to those
contemporaries of Muhammad who recognised Muhammad as the Messenger of
God or whether other monotheists of Medina are being included (E.I. mu’mîn). The
uncertainty around this denomination opens the door to different interpretations.
One interpretation could be that mu’minîn and muslimîn are reflecting the same
thing and are identical. Another interpretation could be that muslimîn is a generic
term and an umbrella covering all kinds of Islamic “believers”, beginning with True
Believers and ending with the Hypocrites.
6
It is not clear whether this term goes beyond deprived Muslims embracing
all other deprived peoples. As we will se later on, this term has especially been
used by Ayatollah Khomeini in its broader sense, probably under the influence of
Iranian communists (Toudeh Party) who supported him at the beginning of the
revolution. In their analysis, Khomeini’s “deprived peoples” was equivalent to the
Marxist vocabulary of the “proletariat”.
7
Munafiqîn (Hypocrites) are recognized as being Muslim thus in dissension to
Muhammad. The appellation of Hypocrites has been used by the Koran to refer
to a group of Muslims in Medina who did not follow Muhammad’s instructions
on all and every issue. The Koran cited at least on one occasion the reason for
Muhammad’s anger against Hypocrites. It is because of the construction of a
mosque without Muhammad’s permission. It was the reason for this particular
mosque being called the Mosque of Dissension (Masjid al-Zirâr) in the Koran.
In fact, the banishment of the unsatisfied Muslims by the Koran reaffirms the
difficulty that the government of Muhammad in Medina had to admit the right
of some Muslims to not fully agree with him on every issue. Many centuries later,
when Ayatollah Khomeini seized power in Iran and established an Islamic regime
à la Medina, he applied the same policy as Muhammad in excluding a group of
pro-revolutionary Muslims (Mujahidin-e Khalq) from the community of genuine
Muslims, calling them Munafiqîn instead of Mujahidîn. Since then, a bloody
struggle has ensued between the Islamic regime in Teheran and the Organization
of Mujahidin which did cause the death of thousands of people from both sides.
322
Mehdi Mozaffari
Amity and Enmity through Islamic history
After the death of Muhammad in 632, Muslims continued to look at internal
enemies who were still within the Community (Umma). The situation became
severely critical under the reign of Othman, the third caliph (644–656). A
group of Muslims rebelled against him, leading to the assassination of the
caliph by a mob. This crisis entered into the Islamic vocabulary as Fitnat alKubra (Great Discord) and was followed under the caliphate of his successor
Ali (656–661) by civil war between Muslims. Thus, Muslims became enemies
to each other without any external interference. Perhaps, when a group of
Muslim combatants leave the army of Ali because of his acceptance of an
arbitrage, we can talk of the beginning of the externalization of enmity. Those
who leave Ali in protest call themselves (or others call them): Khawârij which
means “those who went out”. The question is “went out from where”; from
the entire Umma or only from the camp of Ali? Since Ali was assassinated by
one of them, Ali’s disciples consider the Khawârij as excommunicated. But, to
the Non Shi’a in general, the other interpretation prevailed and Khawârij are
considered as having belonged to the Muslim community and their rebellion
must therefore be seen as yet another internal political event.
It seems that there exists a direct relation between, on the one hand, the
territorialization of the Islamic empire and the construction of the image
of external enemies on the other. When the Islamic caliphate became a
formidable empire (under the Umayyads), multiple administrative functions
(taxation, police, civil and military administration, etc.) required adequate
knowledge about the geographic limits of the Empire. Muslim authorities
therefore were confronted with a new and important problem, although the
resolution of the issue of territorial delimitations. The real question was, how
should a non-territorialized Umma be governed territorially? To resolve this
problem, the Muslim authorities had to define and conceptualize territories
already under their authority in the first place. Which name to give to these
territories? A country? A state? Or what? It was because of this imperative and
bureaucratic need that a new administrative and jurisdictional notion was
invented: Dâr al-Islam or the “World of Islam” which has also been dubbed
Dâr al-Salam (the Peaceful World). Territories which are situated outside of
the World of Islam fall under Dâr al-Harb or the “World of War”. Between these
two antagonistic worlds, there can be in some circumstances the “World of
Contract or Armistice”/Dâr al-Aqd or Dâr al-Sulh) which is independent from
the World of Islam; thus it is not at war with Muslims. From this point onwards,
Muslims become conscious of the existence of external enemies; enemies who
323
ironically were created and were imagined by Muslims themselves, especially
as their answer to their own administrative and bureaucratic exigencies.
This new administrative invention contains some important political
implications. The question of the legitimacy of war was one of them. Against
whom is it legitimate to launch a war? In theory, one answer is that war is
justified against those who are living in the World of War. In this case, the
World of War and “enemies of God” are considered identical; and belonging
to the World of War in itself is a sufficient motive for war; even when it is
not provoked by an/the enemy. This (legitimate and justified) war can
continue until the full pacification of the World of War and its merging into
the World of Islam. This theoretical principle could be employed as far as
realities permitted. This situation did continue during centuries under both
Umayyads and a good portion of Abbasids. The situation, however, changed
dramatically when the Islamic empire became divided into two rival centres;
one in Baghdad and the other in Cairo, where the Shi’a Fatimids established
themselves as a rival to the Abbasid Empire in Baghdad. This division, besides
its political tensions, created a new problem questioning the identity of the
enemy. Are Abbasids and Fatimids (both Muslim) enemies to each other? Is
the war between them justified as a legitimate Jihad? Our purpose here is not
to answer these questions but to put forward a variety of problems for which
Muslim lawyers, mufti and average Muslims had to find acceptable solutions.
As a result of the Islamic dichotomy, the frontiers between internal and external
enemies became seriously blurred over the centuries. A huge and ferocious
struggle was engaged in by the Bâtini (from Fatimi’s side) against the caliphs
of Baghdad and this gave birth to the first organised terrorist actions which
later became famous under the name of The Assassins8. History is witnessing
that the first terrorist organisation, similar to the contemporary ones, was
created by Muslims and the first victims were also Muslims themselves.9
Importantly, Muslim authorities, especially the caliphate of Baghdad, which
was still in the hands of the Abbasids (thus formally) did not react to the attack
of the Crusaders against Muslim territories10. Fatimids in Cairo made some
8
Lewis 1987; Mozaffari 1998.
The word assassins derives directly from Shi’a history. It was the name given to
the disciples of Hassan al-Sabbah (d. 1124), the Segnor de Montana, a region in
the heart of the Alburz montains in the Iranian Caspian provinces of Guilan and
Mazandaran. They killed a number of Muslim personalities; the most famous of
them was Khâja Nizam ul Mulk, the powerful vizir of Seljuk kings.
10
Cahen 1983: Laoust 1970.
9
324
Mehdi Mozaffari
movements but it was not enough to push back the Christian invaders. At that
time, Muslims were more occupied by their internal conflicts and dissensions
than taking care of non-Muslims (friends or enemies) outside of the perimeter
of their territories. The lack of sufficient attention from the Muslim side to
an event of the magnitude of the (first) Crusade, demonstrates how a “nonevent”’ becomes through history a “major event” as well as how a perceived
“non-significant enemy” turns into a dangerous and “terrifying enemy”. This
has been the case with the image of the Crusaders then and the Crusaders
later on and especially with the image that both Muslims and Christians
have of each other in contemporary times. When the Abbasid caliphate was
abolished by the Mongols in 1258, for some Muslim theologians (but not all),
the image of a “Mongol” became the symbol of the “Enemy of Islam”. In this
connection, the man who has animated in the most consistent way Muslim
feeling against the Mongols is indisputably Ibn Taymiyya (1263–1328),
who stands today as one of the most influential figures for contemporary
Islamists. The image of a Mongol as a “brutal, barbarian intruder” survived
through history and still today it is used by Muslims against Americans, in
particular concerning US military intervention in Afghanistan and Iraq,
accusing Americans of being the new Mongols due to their “destructive” role
in the world and the second fall of Baghdad in 2003.
While continuing our journey through history, we see that during the whole
period of the Ottoman Empire, which is probably one of the longest empires
in history (ca. 1299–1924), Muslims had not created a new common image
for the enemy. The image of “enemy” gave progressively way to the word
of “stranger”, “ferenji”.11 Different from the image of the Mongol, it was the
image of a European invader, General Napoleon Bonaparte, in Egypt in 1798.
He and his soldiers were of course considered occupying forces and some of
them were assassinated by Egyptians. This was the case for general Kléber,
the successor of Bonaparte. However, this expedition did not cause a durable
hostility or even animosity between French people and Egyptians. On the
contrary, Al-Jabarti, the chronicler who was a direct witness to Bonaparte’s
journey in Egypt, admired some aspects of the French political culture: the
principles of equality, fair justice and fair practices in general12.
After this brief review of Koranic and Islamic positions on the notions of
amity and enmity, we begin the analysis of the position of Islamism towards
the same issue.
11
“Ferenji” and “farangi” are terms indicating “Europeans” and “Frenchmen” in
particular.
12
Al-Jabarti 1995.
325
The rise of Islamism and the construction of contemporary
“friends” and “enemies”
The study of the origins of Islamism is beyond the current study.13 Nevertheless,
with the purpose of finding out Islamism’s views on amity and enmity, we
need to have a precise idea about the circumstances of the rise of Islamism. In
many ways, Islamism resembles Bolshevism, Nazism and Fascism. They are all
totalitarian.14 They are all and in different ways consequences of the outbreak
of World War I, where four empires, located almost on the same continent
(Europe), collapsed simultaneously: the German, the Austro-Hungarian, the
Russian, and the Ottoman. Islamism in reality was a reaction to the fall and
then abolition of the Ottoman Empire.
Only a few years after the end of the Great War and in a time of high
“Panism” (Gross-Deutschland, Risorgimento, International Communism and
Pan-Islamism), Islamism as a political movement and organization (Ikhwan alMuslimîn/the Muslim Brotherhood) was founded by Hasan al-Banna (1906–
1949) in Egypt in 1928, four years after the official dissolution of the Ottoman
caliphate by Mustafa Pasha (later Atatürk), four years after the publishing
of Mein Kampf by Hitler, six years after Mussolini’s March on Rome and less
than eleven years after Lenin’s arrival to power. Here we have to mention an
important point which can elucidate a crucial difference between Islamism on
one side and Nazism, Fascism and Bolshevism on the other. This point is why
the rise and then the evolution of Islamism did not attract much attention. It
is quite possible that the reason for this negligence is found in the fact that
Islamism since the creation of the Muslim Brotherhood, did not succeed in
gaining power as fast as other extremist movements. After remaining almost
fifty years as a radical protest movement, Islamism gained power only in 1979
with the Islamist revolution in Iran. Putting it in retrospect, we may admit that
even this spectacular revolution was not sufficient to attract attention to the
novelty of the phenomenon of “Islamism”; apparently it took a tragic event
like 9/11 to make the world more aware of the importance and the highly
dangerous character of Islamism.
Now, the question is how Islamists define their friends and identify their
enemies? Here, we are confronting a methodological problem. In contrast to
Nazism, Fascism and Bolshevism, which are pretty well defined and numerous
13
See Mozaffari 2007.
Among scholars, there is no consensus about the totalitarian character of
Fascism. Hannah Arendt does not consider Fascism as a totalitarian ideology or
regime. See Arendt 1976, 256–257.
14
Mehdi Mozaffari
326
studies have brought to light various aspects of each of them, Islamism on
the contrary is still a diffuse and disputed concept embracing a large variety
of sub-divisions which cross Sunni, Shi’a, Wahhabi sects and are dispersed
over different countries and continents.
The method that I have chosen is based on a selection of the most
representative Islamist thinkers and leaders. The validity of the selection
is depending firstly on the fact that the selected persons have described
themselves as being Islamists. Secondly, they must represent a range of
contemporary Muslims. Thirdly, they must possess both ideological and
political influence during the period under investigation, although from 1928
to 2005. In this way, we get not only a qualified and representative view on the
question of amity and enmity; we are also able to make a comparative analysis
among different, always qualified and representative views. In accordance
with the above-defined criteria, four persons have been selected as follows:
Hasan al-Banna (1906–1949), the founder of the Muslim Brotherhood,
Sayyid Qutb (1906–1966), the most influential Islamist intellectual, Ayatollah
Khomeini (1902–1989), the man who realized the first Islamist revolution and
seized power, and finally Bin Laden as the leader of Al-Qaeda, responsible for
the 9/11 and many other terrorist acts around the world. The four persons
selected fulfill all the requirements necessary to having a sustainable picture
of amity and enmity. The list could be longer, including persons like Ali
Shari’ati (1933–1977) of Iran and Mawdudi (1903–1979) of India–Pakistan.
We find that the composition of the four Islamist leading figures, mentioned
above, is covering the main thesis of the two others (Shari’ati and Mawdudi),
therefore, we did not consider it necessary to extend the field of investigation
to them. Furthermore, the four selected personages have also the merit
that they represent the three main versions of Islamism; the Sunni, the Shi’a
and the Wahhabi versions. Al-Banna and Qutb stand for the Sunni version,
Khomeini represents the Shi’a Islamist and finally Bin Laden and a significant
part of Al-Qaeda’s known members stand for the Wahhabi form of Islamism.
The selection is not only applied to the choice of persons, it has also occurred
with regard to their respective writings or oral declarations, which is often the
case with Bin Laden and his companions. The selection of authors’ works has
been made in accordance with the criteria that the authors’ works must be
the most important political ones. Based on this criteria, the selected works
are: 1) Majmû’a Rasâ’il (Collection of Tracts) of Hasan al-Banna, 2) Ma’âlîm fil
Tariq (Milestones) of Sayyid Qutb, 3) Hukumat-e Islâmi (Islamic government)
and the Political testament of Ayatollah Khomeini, and finally 4) the Fatwa and
other declarations released by Osama Bin Laden, Al-Zawahiri and Al-Zarqavi.
327
The detailed study of these works is unfortunately beyond the current space
that has been allocated to the author.
References
Al-Banna, Hasan (1992): Majmû’a Rasâ’îl al Imâm al Shaîd. Cairo: Dâr al-Tawzi’
wan Nashr al-Islamiyya.
Arendt, Hannah (1976): The Origins of Totalitarianism. New York: A Harvest Book.
Al-Jabarti (1995): Napoleon in Egypt, translated by Shmue Moreh. Princeton:
Markus Wiener Publishing.
Cahen, Claude (1983) : Orient et Occident au temps des Croisades. Paris : Aubier.
E.I. (1993): The Encyclopaedia of Islam, New edition. Leiden & New York: E.J. Brill.
Khomeini, Ayatollah Ruhollah (1971): Hukûmat-e Islami (in Persian), clandestine
publication, no place of print, no publisher.
Koran, The Glorious (1992).Translated by Marmaducke Pickthall and introduction
by William Montgomery Watt. London: Random House.
Lambton, Ann K. S. (1981): State and Government in Medieval Islam. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Laoust, Henri (1970): La politique de Gazâlî. Paris: Paul Geuthner.
Lewis, Bernard (1985): The Assassins. London: Al Saqi.
Mozaffari, Mehdi (1998): Fatwa: Violence and Discourtesy. Oxford: Aarhus
University Press.
Mozaffari, Mehdi (2007): “What is Islamism? History and Definition of a Concept”,
Totalitarian Movements and Political Religions, 8(1), March.
Qutb, Sayyid (s.d.): Milestones. The Mother Mosque Foundation.
The Prophet’s tradition or modernity of the
state: the case of Turkish hadith project
Sylvia Akar
“Turkey is preparing to publish a document that represents a revolutionary
reinterpretation of Islam – and a controversial and radical modernisation of
the religion.” This is how in February 2008 BBC News eulogized the project of
the Turkey’s Department of Religious Affairs to carry out a “revision” of hadith,
the sayings of the Prophet Muhammad.
But how revolutionary is this? What are we dealing with when we speak
about hadith? Hadith literature is composed of a vast collection of texts
which are supposed to reflect the sayings of the Prophet Muhammad as well
as descriptions of his behaviour, his life, and his appearance but also gives
accounts of his sahaba (companions) and ansar (followers). The totality of
hadith literature constitutes the Prophet’s sunna (the correct way of living)
that Muslims are supposed to follow.
According to the view of Islamic scholars the foundation of Sunni hadith
was laid in the years 622–757, i.e. during the generation of the authoritative
sahaba and the first three Muslim generations. This early stage was followed
by several stages of the compilation, criticism, evaluation and systematisation
of the vast material, and the diffusion of the material throughout the Islamic
empire. The original books of hadith were completed by the turn of the second
millennium and the energy of the scholars has since then been devoted to
the compilation of biographical dictionaries as well as the preservation and
organisation of their predecessors’ work.
The most trustworthy collections, known as the Six Books, were compiled
in the ninth century, more precisely 850–900. Two of these, the collections of
al-Bukhari and Muslim, also known as al-Sahihan (the two sound ones) have
been considered to be the most important, comprehensive, and trustworthy
of the hadith collections. If a hadith is found either in al-Bukhari or in Muslim,
or even better, in both collections, it can certainly be considered authentic.
However, if a hadith is not found in either collection, that does not necessarily
mean that it could not be authentic.
330
Sylvia Akar
Although al-Sahihan occupied a very special place among the basic Islamic
texts, Muslim traditionists of the late first and early second millennium did
not hesitate to criticise individual hadiths in the collections. Al-Daraqutni
(919–995, Baghdad), who was the best-known traditionist of his generation,
attempted to show the weakness of about one hundred of al-Bukhari’s
hadiths. Ibn al-Jawzi (1126–1200, Baghdad) in his al-Mawdu’at al-Kubra
recognised the fact that al-Sahihan contain weak and forged hadiths.
But one of the most modern endeavours was the work by al-‘Ayni (1361–
1451, Cairo). In his eleven-volume work ‘Umdat al-qari’ fi sharh al-Bukhari
he examined each hadith in al-Bukhari’s collection from five points of view.
He investigated the relation between the hadith and the tarjama (the short
introduction in the beginning of each hadith). He studied the isnad (chain
of transmitters), and enumerated other chapters in the collection where the
same hadith occurs. But most importantly, he studied the literal and juridical
sense of the hadiths, and the ethical and juridical rules that can be deduced
from the hadiths.
Although the number of forged or unreliable hadiths in al-Sahihan was
limited to a few, it is significant that these scholars acknowledged the existence
of weak and forged hadiths in the standard collections and evaluated the use
of the texts as normative guidelines in Islamic societies.
‘Ulum al-hadith (hadith sciences) have historically been the Crown Jewel
of Islamic science. Scholars have taken painstaking efforts to try and verify
the authenticity of hadith literature. In outward appearance and according
to Islamic history, the ‘ulama (Muslim scholars) have combined meticulous
scholarship with the sacred purpose of reproducing the teachings of the
Prophet Muhammad as accurately as possible. However, many critics claim
that the need to promote a convenient interpretation of both political and
theological questions was the determining factor in the choice of authentic
hadiths, and that the ‘ulama’s consensus the was more essential than the
actual tools of the science of hadith.
In recent years one of the most important Islamic media scholars, the
Egyptian-born sheikh Yusuf al-Qaradawi (1926–) has drawn attention to
hadith literature. Al-Qaradawi is head of the European Council for Fatwa and
Research, and he is known world wide for his popular programme al-Sharia
wa-l-hayat on the al-Jazeera TV channel and the website IslamOnline, which
he has contributed to since 1997. In his book Kayfa nata’amal ma’a l-sunna
l-nabawiyya (1990) al-Qaradawi has stressed the need to compile three
encyclopaedias of hadith.
The Prophet’s tradition or modernity of the state
331
The project planned by al-Qaradawi is in line with the works of Muslim
scholarship. He proposes a comprehensive encyclopaedia on the narrators of
hadith, with biographies of all the narrators mentioned in the texts, be they
considered trustworthy or not, and even if they were known to be fabricators
or liars. A second encyclopaedia would concentrate on the textual subject
matter of hadith literature, including all the chains of transmissions of the
hadith reports. This part would then contain all the known Prophet hadiths
from the first to the last ones ever recorded, with all known isnads. But only
the third part of his project would present the real outcome of the work. It
would be devoted to pinpointing the trustworthy hadiths and, consequently,
it would be a tool to discard weak, defective and untrustworthy hadiths from
the corpus. The work would be done according to the criteria of traditional
hadith scholarship but with the aid of modern technology and data processing
tools.
Even more importantly, al-Qaradawi proposes the addition of new
commentaries to clarify the meanings of concepts and whole texts. All this
should, according to al-Qaradawi, be written in the modern languages of
Muslim peoples. The work should not imitate traditional methods but should
address the needs and interests of contemporary Muslims.1
A lot has already been done in recent years in the field of hadith studies,
but without gaining the attention of the general public. The IHSAN – The
International Hadith Study Association Network2 – has published a huge
work in print and a searchable database which includes “the Seven Canonical
Hadith Collections: Sahih al-Bukhari, Sahih Muslim, Sunan Abi Dawud, Sunan
al-Tirmidhi, Sunan al-Nasa’i, Sunan Ibn Maja and Muwatta’ Malik. “The aim of
the Association is “to encourage, facilitate and advance world-wide work in
all the disciplines of Hadith study.”
The Sunna Project seeks to assemble the entirety of hadith literature, and
to edit, publish and print it in a manner which serves all those who make
use of hadith texts in their research. The Project has taken full advantage of
the rise of computer technology to process enormous quantities of data in
a matter of seconds, and uses software which supports an almost infinite
variety of search methods.
Why has this project passed totally unnoticed by the public? The reasons
are many, the first of which is that the Sunna Project has been funded by The
1
2
About al-Qaradawi’s project in English, see Kamali 2005.
Http://www.ihsanetwork.org/ihsan-home1.asp?lang=e.
Sylvia Akar
332
Thesaurus Islamicus Foundation, which is a non-profit foundation established
to “advance and promote the preservation, study and dissemination of the
Islamic intellectual, cultural and artistic heritage.” The aim of the project
is to promote research, not to raise public discussion about the relevance
of hadith. Another important factor might be that the project works with
original Arabic texts and does not even plan to translate its publications into
Western languages.
Finally, the present Turkish project is not the first of its kind even in
Turkey. After the country was founded in 1923 the republic’s first parliament
commissioned a review of hadith literature. I have not been able to trace back
the actual reformations which were done at that time, but I have no reason to
suppose that anything that would not fit into the tradition of hadith science
was accomplished at that time either.
Numerous Islamic institutions continued to exist after the disintegration
of the caliphate. Atatürk spoke of the need to “cleanse and elevate the Islamic
faith, by rescuing it from the position of a political instrument, to which it
has been accustomed for centuries.”3 Ironically, with Atatürk’s introduction
of laiklik4 the traditional control of the imams became even stronger, since
imams became civil servants and the state paid their salaries and controlled
the content of the sermons.
Already in the early 1920s Atatürk declared a concern that his group’s
politics “lacked certain things in terms of religion.”5 Soon after Diyanet işleri
başkanlığı (The Directorate of Religious Affairs) was founded in 1924. It is one
of the largest state institutions, owning over 120 mosques, appointing and
supervising all Sunnite imams, and having several hundred employees in
various European countries.
In 1928 a report was issued stating that “religious life must be reformed by
means of scientific procedure and by the aid of reason.”6 From 1932 Atatürk
carried out some of the reforms proposed: the Qur’an was read in Turkish in
all mosques, and the Diyanet issued an edict requiring that calls to prayer can
be issued in Turkish. But the most important change took place in 1928 when
the Arabic alphabet was replaced by Latin. This “script revolution” loosened
3
Ahmad 1993, 54.
Laicism, secularism or as practiced in Turkey, subordination of religion to the
state.
5
Davidson 1998, 152.
6
Ibid, 153.
4
The Prophet’s tradition or modernity of the state
333
the ties of Turkey with the Islamic world and united it with Europe,”7 but it also
contributed to the rapid raise in literacy, which was even more important.
The current project of the Diyanet was first discussed in the Western media
two years ago, when The Washington Post (16, July 2006) published an article
about the initiative. At that time, Turkey’s “move toward reform” was widely
overlooked in the West, and there was little acknowledgment of it in other
Muslim countries.
The Diyanet launched the Hadith Project in June 2006 to carry out a
comprehensive review of hadith literature. This government-sponsored
project is being supervised by Dr. Mehmet Görmez, a British trained scholar
who is heading a team of Turkish specialists in Islamic studies at Ankara
University. The work will end by the end of 2008 resulting in six volumes,
and there are plans to have them translated into English, Arabic and Russian.
Once the project is completed, the Diyanet plans to offer the new version of
hadith to more than 76,000 mosques in Turkey and elsewhere.8
The reaction in Turkey to the project has been divided. According to Fadi
Hakura, an expert on Turkey from Chatham House, the Royal Institute of
International Affairs, in London, Turkey is doing nothing less than recreating
Islam: “The state is fashioning a new Islam…it’s changing the theological
foundations of [the] religion.”9 But in the words of the project’s supervisor
Dr. Görmez, the aim of the project is not to “expunge certain hadiths but to
make a new compilation of the hadith and re-interpret them if necessary.”10
The project is surveying, reviewing, and clarifying the legal interpretations of
authentic hadith. Everything else is just “Western fuss.”11
How far-reaching a reform the Turkish project will turn out to be remains
to be seen. A great deal depends on the courage of the researchers involved
in making real decisions about the relevance of the texts, but even so the
substantive impact of the reform will still be hard to estimate. Put plainly, it
must be acknowledged that the Turkish government does not carry a lot of
7
Ahmad 1993, 82.
Turkish project aims to give Muslims guidance, http://www.reuters.com/article/
reutersEdge/idUSL0637852720080307.
9
Turkey in radical revision of Islamic texts, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/
europe/7264903.stm.
10
Turkish project aims to give Muslims guidance, http://www.reuters.com/article/
reutersEdge/idUSL0637852720080307.
11
Turkey Classifying Not Revising Hadith, http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite
?c=Article_C&pagename=Zone-English-News/NWELayout&cid=1203757550116.
8
Sylvia Akar
334
religious credibility with Muslims in Turkey, to say nothing of Muslims around
the world.
References
Ahmad, Feroz (1993): The making of modern Turkey. Routledge.
Davidson, Andrew (1998): Secularism and revivalism in Turkey. A hermaneutical
reconsideration. Yale University Press.
Kamali, Mohammad Hashim (2005): A textbook of Hadith studies: authenticity,
compilation, classification and criticism of Hadith. Leicestershire: The Islamic
Foundation.
The secularising force of engaged religion:
reflections on Iranian and Egyptian
Islamism
Bjørn Olav Utvik
In a satirical Norwegian poem it is said that when Jesus returned to pass
judgment on the living and the dead, his application was turned down by
the Ministry of Church and Education as representing an undue mixing of
religion and politics.1 It is certainly clear that when God turns human she
or he must expect controversy. So must any human moving from passing
general moral judgment on society from a distance to actually engaging with
the concrete political and social issues of the day.
This article takes as its point of departure the following observation:
Both in Iran and in the Arab world from the 1980s and till today there is a
marked movement within mainstream Islamism in the direction of a more
principled acceptance of democracy, of pluralism and of tolerance for others,
and, crucially for the purposes of this article, in the direction of some sense
of separation of political institutions from those of religion and of reduced
direct reference to religious precepts when arguing for solutions to concrete
problems. This is as true for the Muslim Brothers and the Hizb al-Wasat in Egypt
as it is for the former Students Following the Line of the Imam (daneshjuyan-e
peyrow-e emam) now leading the reformist trend in Iran.
These parallel developments take place despite the widely diverging,
almost opposite, circumstances in which the movements in question find
themselves. In Iran we are talking of a reformist trend opposed to the clericaldominated theocracy that evolved out of the revolution, and working
to limit the political role of religion and religious institutions. In the Arab
world the main Islamist groups are working on the contrary to reinstate
religion as provider of guidance for social and political life – in particular the
reintroduction of the Sharia as effective law – and to reinvigorate the role of
religious institutions.
1
Botnen 1970.
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Precisely the difference in situation makes for the fact that among the actors
in question themselves an emerging hesitant recognition of the commonalities
is paired with a nervous suspicion of the others as being somehow in league
with the enemy, or at least of doubtful loyalty to democracy in the one case,
to the Islamic cause in the other. Typical of Arab Sunni Islamists Yemeni Islah
Party activists in Sanaa in 2002, when the similarities were pointed out to
them, asked: “Are you sure the reformists in Teheran are not about to abolish
the compulsory hijab?”; the implication being that if they did indeed harbour
such plans or wishes, they would somehow be betraying the cause and
acting as agents of Westernisation. From the other side it is revealing how the
stunned journalist from the Iranian reformist newspaper Sharq in February
2006 discovers that the visiting Khalid Mish’al, leader of the Palestinian
Hamas, contrary to the preconceived image of him as some Arab counterpart
of Ahmadinezhad, comes across as both “modern, pragmatic and freedomloving”.2
Why, then, do Arab Islamists and Iranian reformists seem to gravitate in a
similar direction in their ideological development? To clarify this it is useful
to ask about the possible effect on society, on religion, and on religious
movements themselves of the direct political involvement of religion, or
to perhaps be more precise of what happens when religiously motivated
groups decide to invest religion directly into the political struggle of a given
country or region. To be sure, in order to make more general pronouncements
on these issues a vastly more comprehensive comparative study would
be needed. What is attempted here is more modest; a reflection on some
interesting points that emerge from the two-way comparison in question,
with the Egyptian case representing Arab Sunni Islamism. First a tentative
clarification of some key terms is in place.
Secularisation, engagement, empowerment
A typical broad definition of secularisation, taken from an online dictionary,
is “the activity of changing something – – so it is no longer under the control
or influence of religion”.3 In terms of political system it is often thought of as
a strict separation of religion and state. In one sense this is a contradiction in
terms, since as long as religion remains a factor influencing the morals and
values of the population by the same token it will never be totally separate
from their political behaviour. Trying to eradicate this kind of influence, for
2
3
Sharq, 3 Esfand 1384 (22 February 2006).
http://www.wordreference.com/definition/secularization, August 2008.
The secularising force of engaged religion
337
instance by prohibiting parties with a religious reference in their programme,
only serves to make religious influence less explicit, and is more often than
not in reality a move to exclude an unwelcome political contestant for power.
An institutional separation of religion and state on the other hand is certainly
a relevant issue, and has been implemented by a number of countries,
historically most notably by France, where a strict policy of the total religious
neutrality of all state institutions has been in force since 1905.4
Turkey, often claimed as the beacon of secularism in the Middle East has
emphatically not followed this path. Turkey did admittedly remove religious
leaders from the privileged position they had in the Ottoman state, but rather
than separating religion from the state, it has placed the legal religious life of
the country under strict supervision by a government agency, the Diyanet
İşleri Başkanlığı (Presidency of Religious Affairs), commonly known as the
Diyanet. Whether secularisation in the sense of neutralising the state vis-àvis religion is a good thing or not, is open for debate. Yet it seems fairly clear
that one must separate between cases where such a process follows the free
decision of the population through an open debate and free elections, or,
as was the case in Turkey, it is forced on the population from on top by an
authoritarian leadership. It is also important to note that secularization can
proceed quite far in some aspects while the state in other aspects remains
committed to a certain religion. Norway would be a case in point, where the
king is still head of the church, the government decides on the appointment
of bishops, and the Constitution stipulates in its Article 2 that the religion
of the state remains the Lutheran version of Christianity. Yet this has not
hindered a very gradual reduction of the political influence of the church
and of the role played by religion in public matters. This has to do with the
other aspect of secularisation, often thought of as the reduced religiosity of
the population, or alternately the reduced role of religion in influencing the
thinking and the daily practice of people.
For the purposes of this article, then, secularisation will be understood to
imply the movement towards a greater degree of separation of institutions
of religion and those of the state and towards a reduced use of religious
references in deciding particular issues, and concurrently a movement
towards the pluralisation of interpretations of religion and towards greater
tolerance. The idea of “movement” here of course implies that these different
layers of secularisation can all be described as a graduated scale.
4
http://www.bbc.co.uk/dna/h2g2/A2903663, August 2008.
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Bjørn Olav Utvik
What then of engagement and empowerment? In this article these
concepts are used in relation to religious movements, or to be more precise,
movements which hold that religion does not only concern the individual’s
faith, but contains God-given regulations that should also guide social,
judicial and political relations within human society. Engagement, then,
refers precisely to the process whereby such movements try to put this idea
into practice, i.e. where they actively campaign to change social and political
conditions in the desired direction, in the process “operationalising” religion,
as it were. Empowerment refers to the accession of such moments to positions
of power, be it on a national political level or more “partial” access to power in
municipalities or in nationwide organisations of various kinds.
Iran
To a large extent the Islamic tendency that emerged victorious after the
internal fight over the leadership of the 1979 revolution in Iran was a de
facto coalition of two broad trends. While there were clerics and non-clerics
represented in both, broadly speaking one trend was constituted by mostly
younger clerics who considered Khomeini their marja’-e taqlid5 and were
otherwise guided by the moderately conservative teachings of clerical
reformers such as Morteza Motahhari, the other was made up of student
followers of the radical ideologue Ali Shariati who had come to see in Khomeini
the leader of the community envisaged in Shariati’s work Ommat va emamat.6
It is important to notice that these young Shariatists, while ardent followers
of Khomeini’s symbolic leadership, were not unconditional followers of the
clergy in general. Inspired by Shariati they maintained a radical programme
of social redistribution and of state-led development efforts. Under the
protection of Khomeini they were able to establish themselves as a major
faction within the system after the revolution. This “Islamic left”, as it came to
be known, throughout the eighties dominated the parliament, majles, and
the government. At times in sharp conflict with the conservatives dominating
the Guardian Council they pursued policies of land reform and economic
redistribution in favour of the poor, linked to a rather totalist conception of
the Islamic state as a social utopia in line with Shariati’s thinking.
5
”Source of emulation”: according to the dominant usuli school within Twelver
Shia every Muslim believer must choose one of the leading experts of Islamic Law
and follow his guidance.
6
Shariati 1978.
339
The end of the war with Iraq in 1988 and the death of Khomeini the year
after brought with it a new constellation of power in Iran. The pragmatist
forces who wanted above all to get the economy moving after revolution and
war struck a deal with the conservative elements in Qom and in the bazaar
which resulted in the dual set-up of Khamenei as supreme leader (rahbar)
and Rafsanjani as president. In the process the leftists were squeezed out of
their positions in government, and from 1992 also out of the majles.
Their response was a gradual but eventually radical rethinking of their
ideological stance. After a period of public soul-searching, not least through
the journal Kian, the former radical Shariatists emerged as spokespersons
for a thoroughgoing reform in the direction of cultural freedom, political
pluralism and democracy. The landslide election of Mohammad Khatami
to the presidency in 1997 suddenly brought power to the reformist faction.
Despite important limitations, mostly linked to the overriding powers of the
vali-ye faqih, Khatami and the reformist government he managed to have
accepted by the conservative Parliament of the time, from the autumn of
1997 controlled most levers in the executive branch of government. In
2000 the reformists also managed to win a large majority in Parliament. Yet
conservative control over the judiciary, and over non-elected organs like the
Guardian Council, gave their conservative opponents the power to prevent
much progress in implementing the reformist agenda of liberalising reform.
In 2004 the power of the Guardian Council to vet prospective candidates for
election was used to broadly exclude the reformist from the new parliament
elected that year. In 2005 the conservatives also took over the presidency
with the surprise election of Mahmud Ahmadinezhad.
Yet despite these setbacks the reformist movement continues as an active
political force in the country, and the support for its agenda is broad. For
the current discussion, anyway, the Iranian reformists serve as an important
example of a radical movement coming to power with the aim of creating a
religiously inspired utopia. Based on their experience since the revolution the
young radicals conducted an ideological rethinking of the relation between
religion and politics – in many ways a disconnecting of the two – where a
key element has been the recognition that while the religion of Islam may
through its holy scriptures represent absolute divine truth, what humans
have access to are merely fallible human interpretations of these scriptures.
Since the interpretations in themselves cannot claim divine status neither
can they represent undisputed guidelines for human behaviour. Armed with
this decoupling the reformists have felt free to advocate a greater degree of
cultural and political freedom and pluralism, and the introduction of a more
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Bjørn Olav Utvik
genuine democracy in Iran. This call for greater freedom and a more liberal
interpretation of religion has been accompanied by and intertwined with an
outspoken pragmatism, sometimes bordering on cynicism. In an obvious
reaction against the utopian and over-ideologised climate of the eighties,
and against those, like current president Ahmadinezhad, who continued
with the stark revolutionary rhetoric, the reformists moved to a position were
they explicitly stated that complete solutions to various problems were not
in sight and that the best one could do was to look pragmatically for steps
which in a limited way might lead in a positive direction.7
In fact one might surmise that since the revolution a de facto secularisation
of the religious institution has taken place. At the same time the practical
experience both of clerical rule and of themselves being put in positions
of power, has prompted among a dominant portion of the revolutionary
educated youth of 1979 a radical ideological transformation in the direction
of what amounts to a distinct “secularism with a religious reference”.
The accession to power of (a section of ) the Shia clergy has taken a
heavy toll on the traditional symbolic capital of the clerics. Previously they
could exercise moral judgment over politics from the outside. Now they are
steeped in the mundane affairs of state. And having taken power over the
Pahlavi state, they become dependent upon it; its functionaries. For while
the ayatollahs and hojjatoleslams were traditionally able to influence events
through an autonomy based on control of local fiefs involving the income
from huge tracts of land and networks of clients, in the new Islamic Iran they
wield power only in so far as they have gained positions within the state.
They have continued the expansion of the centralised state begun under
the last two shahs, to the effect of undermining any prospect of regaining
their traditional autonomous position. In a sense the Islamic revolution
institutionalised religion; thus it forced the secularisation of opposition
and society, and profaned the Sharia through its instrumentalisation by the
state.
Among some of the clerics affected, but primarily among the young lay
followers of Shariati who came into power positions in the eighties, the
fascinating and traumatising head-on confrontation with the exercise of
power in a modern state prompted a thorough revision of ideology. Among
the core principles emerging from this rethinking has been a) that no human
being has any privileged claim to represent divine truth, b) that accordingly
7
Hajjarian 1380/2001, 190.
341
pluralism has to be the order of the day, c) that there can be no privilege for
the clergy in the running of political affairs (and in radical versions neither in
the interpretation of the Sharia), and d) that God has made his delegation of
powers to the people in general, and not to specific experts, and that therefore
democracy is to reign within the Islamic Republic. Importantly the rethinking
leading to these views being established did not take place in a vacuum, but
is a reflection of the same questions being radically and centrally posed for
the religious population of Iran.
These developments can readily be interpreted as a reaction against
the traumatising experience of the attempt to install a monolithic religious
government. Yet the striking fact is that similar developments have taken
place within many of the Sunni Islamist movements that are in opposition
against more or less secularist governments in the Arab countries. And though
the Arab Islamist movements mostly have not yet tasted government power
they have lots of experience as leaders of professional unions and student
unions as well as of businesses and charities that work in the same direction.
Egypt will serve as an example.
Egypt
In Egypt, despite the long history of the Islamist movement, it is still in
opposition. Yet while its experience thus differs radically from that of Iranian
Islamists, similar ideological developments seem to be taking place.
In the Egyptian parliamentary elections of November–December 2005
the Society of Muslim Brothers (MB) had 88 of their number elected MPs.
Because of the formally non-legal status of the MB, which is recognised
neither as a political party nor as a welfare or religious society, they had
run as independents yet campaigned vigorously under the banner of the
Ikhwan.8 Despite the fact that they are still left without any grip on power
in an Assembly where the ruling National Democratic Party of President
Mubarak controls over two thirds of the seats, the success of the MB shook
both the regime and the secular opposition groups. It established the MB
as the overwhelmingly dominant opposition force in the country; the legal
secular parties sharing 9 seats between them.
What concerns us here is that the reinvigorated Ikhwan organisation
had gradually since the early nineties, at least, become dominated by the
8
Ikhwan is Arabic for Brothers and the commonly used short form for Jama’at alIkhwan al-Muslimun (The Society of Muslim Brothers).
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outlook of a new generation different from the old guard who had grown to
political maturity prior to the 1952 revolution and the 1954 crackdown on
the Ikhwan.
This new generation is often connected to the term al-wasat which has
become a buzzword among reformist-minded Islamists both in Egypt and
in the broader Muslim world. The term wasat carries multiple layers of
connotations. It has a Koranic reference, where the Muslims are spoken of
as ummat al-wasat, literally the “community of the middle,” but generally
understood to signify “the just and equitable community”. For those
promoting the idea of al-wasatiyya, an Islam-based reformist ideology,9 the
aim is to seek the middle ground in terms of moderation, always an ideal
in Islamic circles. This aspiration for moderation is partly one of means: they
denounce the use of violence to promote political goals, but equally the
passive, apathetic acceptance of current conditions. With it goes a moderation
of outlook: they seek a balance between the need to uphold sacred values
and the need for dynamic social change, as well as a balance between the
need to learn from abroad and the need to uphold independence. And they
consider themselves the standard bearers of the jil al-wasat, the “generation
of the middle,” a generation they see as having absorbed the experience of
the pioneers but still free to chart its own course, a generation aware of the
contemporary challenges but also able to guide the young onto the right
path.10
In 1996 a number of the former student leaders from the 1970s, impatient
with the lack of a formal political party through which to express their political
ambitions, declared the formation of a new political party to be named Hizb
al-Wasat, the Centre Party. When the MB leadership distanced themselves
from this initiative a number of the founders broke with the Brothers,
most prominently Abu al-Ila Madi and Salah Abd al-Karim. Despite several
attempts the Wasat has never been accepted by the authorities as a legal
political party. Yet the group remains active. However, the vast majority of
Islamist activists from the seventies and later generations still belong to the
Muslim Brother organisation proper. Though several wings exist within the
MB, in general the political outlook of those Brothers who have staid within
the mother organisation is not far removed from that of the Wasat.
To a large extent this outlook is most clearly expressed in the programmes
presented by the Wasat group with each new application for recognition
9
For a comprehensive, albeit somewhat panegyric, presentation, cf. Baker 2003.
Habib 2006, 7–19.
10
343
as a legal party. In a bid to establish a foundation for national unity across
religious groups, the programme, while demanding the implementation of
Article 2 of the constitution, where the Sharia is stated to be the main source
of legislation, defines the role of religion vis-à-vis state and society as that
of a marja‘iyya or point of reference. It is then made clear that, while for the
Muslims Islam is a matter of faith, for both Christians and Muslims Islam is
their inherited civilisation, to which they both have contributed. Rather
typical of the programme, it is not spelled out exactly how this idea would
translate in terms of the constitution and general legislation. However, the
concept of marja‘iyya is used to underscore the right of full participation for
non-Muslims in rights and duties. At the ideological level it is a definite step
in the direction of understanding religion as a provider of identity through
a common cultural heritage and a set of deeply embedded shared values,
rather than as a set of detailed regulations. The Wasat also puts great stress
on the point that in defining the religious values that must guide society, vital
distinctions must be drawn between what is permanent and unchanging
and what must change as society changes, between what is incumbent on
Muslims and what is incumbent on all citizens, and between those issues
directly regulated by the Sharia and the vast field of human activity that falls
within the neutral category of the “permitted,” or al-masmuh.
With regard to the preferred political system to be adopted in Egypt,
the Wasat adopted a clear-cut stance for a fully-fledged parliamentary
democracy. The programme did call, as we have seen, for the implementation
of the Sharia. However, it came very close to equating the Sharia with a set
of moral values. Its application would be effected by the legislature “through
democratic means,”11 and it was stated explicitly that the effort is not merely
one to clothe the ancient regulations (ahkam) in a contemporary language.
Rather the task was to choose interpretations that do not paralyze society
and economic development. The Wasat programme also emphasised
explicitly that the sovereign community, the umma, includes all citizens,
regardless of religious affiliation. There is a parallel development with regard
to the question of women’s role in society and politics, where the programme
supports the complete equality of women in civil and political rights and
duties and underscores the duty of society actively to secure the conditions
that will allow women to be mothers and simultaneously active members of
society.
11
It is noteworthy here that the loan word dimuqratiyya is being used instead of
the “indigenous” concept of shura.
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The ideological development of the Muslim Brothers points in a broadly
similar direction. In the autumn of 2007 a draft for an MB political programme
was circulated to a number of Egyptian public figures for comment, and
rapidly was made available to the public. In the Egyptian debate that followed,
prominence was given to the question of whether the Brothers were true
democrats or not. Already in 1994, the Muslim Brothers had published a
declaration, “Shura in Islam”, which goes a long way toward identifying
this Koranic (and indeed pre-Islamic) term with popular sovereignty and
representative democracy. The declaration states that “the people are
the source of political power” and that they must elect through free and
fair elections “a representative assembly possessing effective legislative
and supervisory authority”. For the purpose of creating a just system of
government the people must decide upon a written constitution securing a
balance between the different institutions of the state.12
The declaration saw limits to this democracy in that the constitution must
be based on the Sharia. Nevertheless, the Muslim Brothers acknowledged
that there is an act of human interpretation involved. The constitution must
be based first on the unequivocal texts of the Koran and the Sunna, thereafter
on the “intentions and general principles of the Sharia”. It is significant in this
regard that the declaration emphasises that most affairs dealt with by the
popular assembly will consist of questions of law and political decisions
that are subject to human interpretation, ijtihad, or which fall within the
scope of the permitted (al-mubah), that is where the choice of a particular
decision is neutral vis-à-vis the Sharia. From this they draw the conclusion
that disagreement and debate not only are natural but also indispensable in
order to reach the most socially beneficial decision, especially if the debate is
characterised by “tolerance, breadth of vision, and the absence of fanaticism”.
This leads the Muslim Brothers to the view that Islamic society needs to
practice a multi-party system, and they oppose any conditions imposed by
the future Islamic state on the free formation of parties and associations.13
This declaration came about mainly due to the initiative of the younger
guard, and it goes a long way toward expressing its outlook, although its
numerous references to Islamic precedence and strong emphasis on the
Sharia as a framework within which a popularly elected assembly must act
certainly reveals the effort to overcome the reservations of many in the old
12
The Muslim Brothers 1994.
Ibid. For similar views expressed by Islamists cf. al-Ghannouchi 1993; and alIryan 1993.
13
345
guard. The draft programme of 2007 is clearly more explicit and unequivocal
in its commitment to democracy. But it is also more detailed and in those
details critics have seen a devil or two.
First it should be noted that while in the 1994 declaration the Arabic
word for democracy, dimuqratiyya, is not found, in the 2007 programme it is
freely and frequently used as a positive term for the desired political system.
The programme contains a detailed discussion of important principles that
are considered prerequisites of a well-functioning democracy, such as the
division of powers, free and fair elections, genuine popular participation,
party pluralism (including the right freely to form parties), and so on. To be
sure even in this programme Islam and its Sharia is invoked as a framework
within which democracy and freedom must move, but this is clearly less
pronounced and less frequent than in 1994.
The harsh criticism that was filed against the draft programme by opponents
of the MB concerned mainly two issues. One was the reference to a “Council
of Higher Ulama” (hay’at kibar al-ulama), to be consulted by Parliament in
the process of legislation. This was criticised for bringing in an Iranian-style
system where a body of religious clerics could veto the decisions of the
elected representatives of the people; a criticism coming both from without
and from within the MB’s own ranks. (Apparently not even all members of
the supreme body, the Office of Guidance, had been properly consulted.) The
line of defence came along two lines: first if was emphasised that this clerical
council should also be popularly elected. Secondly, while the text of the
draft is distinctly ambiguous on this point, it was afterwards clearly stated by
Muhammad Habib, the Deputy Guide, among others, that the council would
only have consultative powers, and the Parliament remained sovereign in its
right to decide against the counsel received.
The second point, or rather two points, which came under fire for being
against democracy, was the fact that the programme made it a principle that
the effective head of state, whether this be a president or a prime minister,
must be a Muslim and a male. On the first point it was argued that while
non-Muslims would be exempted from Islamic rules on matters related to
personal status and to religious practice, it would still be the task of the state
to see to it that Islamic principles were in effect in society at large and among
its Muslim majority, and such a task could not be forced upon a non-Muslim.
As for a woman becoming president this was not desirable because the head
of state would also be a leader in war, and this does not harmonise with the
female nature. Two things should be emphasised here; first, that even on
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these points there was a lot of criticism internally in the MB, and secondly that
in the shadow of these hotly debated provisions, the programme otherwise
emphasises full equality in terms of political rights, and does this more clearly
and explicitly than the 1994 declaration.
The programme, in an apparent effort to show its commitment to the
unity of Egypt across religious boundaries devotes a separate section to the
Coptic Church, emphasising its pivotal role as a factor for social morality
and cohesion. Some effort is also made to present Islam as a civilisational
framework which does not obliterate the value of pre-Islamic culture and
religions.
As for the relation between the genders and the role of women in general,
while emphasing the centrality of motherhood, the programme states the
necessity of activating women’s political and social role, emphasising that
it has become obvious that women can handle a lot of tasks which society
is in need of. To do so, the programme advocates a campaign to spread “the
culture of equality between the genders”.
Both the Wasat and a fortiori the MB programmes are out to square the
circle of making the parties appear at once modern enlightened organisations
and at the same time staunch defenders of authenticity and the Islamic
heritage against a perceived Western onslaught. Nevertheless there is an
unmistakable development in the same direction of accept for pluralism and
democracy and a diminished belief in the existence of ready-made divine
prescriptions for the details of how to build a good state and society.
Compared to the Iranian scene the rethinking of the Islamists seems to be
less philosophically profound. But there is very important common ground in
that in both cases the idea is developed that while the holy scriptures of Islam
represent an eternal divine truth, no human being can claim to possess the
correct interpretation of these scriptures. In both Iran and Egypt this insight
leads to a determined defence of the need for democracy and pluralism.
And, interestingly, in both cases appeal is made to the old fiqh principle of
maslaha which is now understood to mean that the public good must have
a decisive role in determining which interpretation of heavenly injunctions
should be acted upon.
Conclusion
Religion falls into the trap set by reason: trying to stand up against
the West, it is Westernised; trying to spiritualize the world, it becomes
347
secularized; and trying to deny history, it gets completely bogged
down in it.14
A key to the parallel developments in Iran and Egypt may be found in the
fact that a religious movement once it chooses to engage politics (and to
seek a road to power through popular backing rather than through terror
or “guevarist” tactics), is suddenly faced with having to deal concretely
and practically with all sorts of political and social issues confronting the
modernising societies of the Middle East.
I will argue that through the same process where religion becomes
activated and mobilised for the solution of burning social and political issues,
the religious society is actually on its way to secularisation for a number of
reasons. Not least important is that religion and its clerical representatives do
not longer hold the high moral ground where they can criticise the doings
of government and people for deviating from scripture, it has itself entered
the low grounds of practical politics. Thus it loses its sacred status. When the
borders between religion and the social and political sphere are dissolved
religion somehow lowers itself down into society. Through this act it becomes
an object of controversy and has to be adapted.
How then should we understand the tendency to move from the declaration
of an intent to implement the sacred eternal principles of religion in political
and social life, to a more pragmatic and sober discourse and practice? At one
level it could be seen as the renouncing of lofty ideals when confronted with
the harsh and complex reality of trying to affect developments or even exercise
power; a sort of resignation. Yet to stop at that would be a bit reductionist, at
least if this is understood as a turn towards a cynical attitude to politics. For it
is easily observable that people may remain deeply pious and committed to
religion while shifting away from the assumption of possessing unambiguous
divinely sanctioned answers to all possible questions and situations. A more
open and pragmatic approach where concern for beneficial results takes the
place of preconceived rigid frameworks for moral action, in many cases go
together with a deepened spirituality. In the case of Islamism there was from
the start both among Sunnis and Shi’is a clear affinity to Sufism in that great
emphasis was placed upon the purification of souls combined with a strong
urge to work for improvement of people’s living conditions.
Yet does all this mean that Islamism was a parenthesis and that religion is
leaving the scene? This may be the long-term result, but it is probably more
14
Shayegan 1992, 78.
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Bjørn Olav Utvik
useful, at least for our current purposes, to think of this as the democratization
and consequent pluralisation of the interpretation of religion, leading
among other things to greater tolerance, and not least to the need to seek
a consensus on concrete issues based on other grounds than religion. In the
sobered understanding of the Iranian reformists and Egyptian mainstream
Islamists, religion can only remain a factor for consensus if it is understood as
broad moral injunctions, rather than as specific regulations.
An optimistic take on this would be to envisage over time a passage from
a community around certain dogmas which existed (to a large extent) in
the abstract as moral norms, via the stage of politicisation, to a community
around wider norms and a consensus that most concrete choices are left to
humanity.
References
Baker, Raymond William (2003): Islam without Fear: Egypt and the New Islamists.
Harvard University Press.
Botnen, Trond (1970): Nattordbok. Oslo: Gyldendal.
al-Ghannouchi, Rached (1993): “The Participation of Islamists in a Non-Islamic
Government”, in A. Tamimi (ed.) Power-sharing Islam? London: Library for
Muslim World Publications.
Habib, Rafiq (2006): Awraq Hizb al-Wasat. Cairo.
Hajjarian, Sa’id (1380/2001): Az shahed-e ghodsi ta shahed-e bazari: orfi-shodan-e
din dar sepehr-e siyasat. Teheran: Tarh-e now.
al-Iryan, Isam (1993): “The Future of Power-sharing in Egypt”, in A. Tamimi (ed.)
Power-sharing Islam? London: Library for Muslim World Publications.
The Muslim Brothers (1994): “Mujaz ‘an al-shura fi al-islam”, al-Sha‘b, May 19.
Shariati, Ali (1978): Ommat va Emamat. Teheran: Qalam.
Shayegan, Daryush (1992): Cultural Schizophrenia: Islamic Societies Confronting
the West. London: Saqi Books.
Globalised Islam and the Alliance of
Civilizations
Kirsti Westphalen
Due to globalisation, national borders have lost some of their earlier
relevance in matters of culture and religion. Increased transnationalism
implies that national decision-makers have more restricted means at their
disposal to control religious developments in their territory than earlier.
Globalisation also highlights the centrality of the role of global and national
media in representing and explaining complex phenomena that transgress
traditional boundaries of all kinds. However, the role of the media is in many
ways fuzzy, as they are simultaneously an effect, a cause and an accelerator of
globalisation. Hence, increasing transnational bonds have created – at least
for the time being – pervasive cultural and religious flows between states.
This has increased both the religious diversity as well as the complexity of
the issues involved.
Whereas religion as a social force seemed to be weakening in Europe after
World War II, the situation has changed since the 1980s, and again since the
fall of the communist bloc. Religion has increasingly become both a political
force and a source of identity. This development has also been noted globally,
and common examples of it are the Islamic Revolution of Iran in 1979, the rise
of the Christian Right in the US in the 1980s and Islamist terrorism in the West,
especially 9/11.
Scholarly interpretations of the rise of religion onto the political agenda
vary, but certainty remains that the fall of the Communist bloc removed a
counter-ideology to the so-called global Western hegemony and gave place
to a politicised religion as an alternative. Developments in this respect have
taken place in all geographic regions.
The increase of religious pluralism in Europe has come as a surprise for
the majority of the continent’s inhabitants, political decision-makers and
academic researchers alike. Even though much of the recent religious pluralism
has been introduced by native and Western developments, international
migration has amplified it to a large degree. The plurality of religious and
other value systems is only likely to increase in the near future.
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Kirsti Westphalen
Contrary to common beliefs and despite the importance of transnationalism,
European populations of immigrant origin have rapidly and effectively
been incorporated into their new host societies, which has made their new
environment the single most important sphere of social relations.
However, incorporation does not necessarily mean successful integration,
as more often than not the migrants have found their places on the margins
of the labour market and faced persisting xenophobia. In addition, their
offspring (the second and subsequent generations) have partially failed to
climb the social ladders of education, professional development and welfare.
There is thus a widespread failure to become part of the mainstream society
and gain the benefits it brings along with it. All this implies that national
policies are still highly central, but in order to succeed, they must increasingly
take into account the transnational sphere.
The importance of religion as a defining factor of one’s identity has been
on the increase in the Muslim, particularly the Arab world. There has been a
failure by all too many governments to deliver the reforms and improvements
which their citizens have the right to expect in terms of democracy, respect
for human rights and concrete economic and social development. When a
political avenue has been closed to the expression of divergent social views,
many have channelled their frustrations through religious expression.
We are dealing with the results of years of accumulated frustrations in the
Muslim world. These frustrations have their roots in the both domestic and
international unresolved conflicts affecting Muslims.
Increasing religious and value diversity in European societies has brought
along many challenges. The situation demands self-reflection and adaptation
to changed circumstances by citizens, states and other actors, including
religious organisations and the media. Public discussions and conflicts are
two of the many ways in which these topics are identified, challenged and
negotiated, but we should not forget that they are also embedded in a
broader social reality. Many of the recent controversies relating to religious
issues of immigrant origin cannot be understood unless the social position of
these populations is taken into account.
Because religious identities in general and Muslim identities in particular
have become politicised, it is clear that religion becomes one of the most
important arenas for social negotiations regarding integration and social
inclusion. This means that religious activities become forums of wider
importance, where all kinds of issues are discussed, with or without the use
of religious language. European secular states have had large difficulties in
351
accepting religious demands as legitimate, even though they might eventually
not be so different from other types of demands, were those religious claims
to be “translated” into secular language. Claims by ethnic and “racial” groups
are more easily accepted.
There are no simple responses to complex social phenomena, but there are
several ways to improve mutual understanding and coexistence. Strong legal
means of protecting religious groups and individuals from insults, unless it is
a question of hate speech, do not seem realistic alternatives.
Calls and cries for dialogue over perceived civilizational, cultural, ethnic
and religious boundaries have been many in recent years. There is certainly
a need to find a new status quo regarding tolerance and understanding
of a changed world through all possible means, including education for
combating ignorance, stereotypes and the misunderstanding of religions.
Religious communities need also to discuss freedom of expression and
respect for religious beliefs within their own community and to pursue a
dialogue with other religious communities in order to develop a common
understanding of religious tolerance. In addition, media professionals and
their professional organisations should discuss media ethics with regard to
religious beliefs and sensitivities, and develop their own codes of conduct in
this respect.
Many kinds of efforts are needed, but it must not be forgotten that public
conflicts and discourses over religion also reflect a reality outside the realm of
religion and freedom of expression. Many of the recent controversies relating
to religious issues of immigrant origin cannot be understood unless the
social position of immigrant populations is taken into account. Dialogue may
be useful, but it does not cure social ills, such as unemployment, feelings of
unworthiness and marginalisation. Social problems facing many of Europe’s
migrant populations cannot be changed by discussion, but by deeds.
Against this background, it is easier to see that some of the challenges
we face in building multi-cultural and multi-religious societies are not due
to differences among religions as such. Instead, they are reflections of social
problems that give rise to small groups who seek to build an ideological
foundation and gain support for their political cause. We must not allow these
extreme views to overshadow those of the majority and the mainstream.
In Europe, it has become commonplace to speak of integration as a “twoway process”. Integration needs a welcoming society in order to support
immigrants, realize all their potential, and develop their skills for the benefit
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Kirsti Westphalen
of all. Furthermore, individuals and institutions in the host society must
also adapt to a world in which migration is a permanent phenomenon. All
individuals must assume responsibility in this integration process – as well
as state institutions, political parties, the media, businesses, and civil society.
Migrants who aim to stay permanently or for the long term will have to make
a deliberate effort to integrate, in particular learning the language of their
host society, and to respect the living conditions and the basic values of the
receiving society.
During the “Cartoon Crisis” it became evident that various political forces
within the Muslim world tried to gain legitimacy through religious rhetoric
by making a connection between the Middle East conflicts, terrorism and
immigration issues. It was easy to influence spiritually lost Muslims living in
Europe.
Rather than being forever politically nourished from their previous
motherlands, it has become vital for immigrants to create national conditions
for the emergence of European Islam. Here it is important to underline that
it is not the business of governments to master religious affairs, nor is it the
task of the European Union to manage Islam in Europe. Governments should
create conditions propitious for the growth of Muslim thinking which would
reflect the realities of Western democratic and egalitarian societies. To achieve
this, governments should focus on creating conditions for Muslims to build
their human and organisational capacities to represent their own interests
democratically and effectively in civil society. European governments
should encourage mainstream Muslim voices by engaging especially with
democratically elected bodies that represent faith and minority groups. In
other words, European Muslims should be empowered and anchored in the
European reality.
Opportunities for Islamic theological education are urgently needed in our
European countries, for the purposes of strengthening Muslim communities
and providing high-standard religious education for their children and
youth, as well as preparing them for spiritual and academic encounters with
the Christian, Jewish and other religious traditions present in Europe. These
educational opportunities and dialogical encounters should be supported
by governments according to the legal tradition of the respective states.
Alliance of Civilizations (AoC)
Finland has been encouraged by the multitude of local, regional and
international initiatives and processes promoting inter-cultural and interBuilding Peace by Intercultural Dialogue
353
religious dialogue and understanding. As a result of this positive development,
the importance of co-ordination between various initiatives has thus become
extremely important.
The Alliance of Civilizations was established in 2005, at the initiative of the
Governments of Spain and Turkey, under the auspices of the United Nations.
In April 2007, the United Nations Secretary-General appointed Jorge Sampaio,
former President of Portugal, as High Representative for the Alliance. The
AoC is supported by a Group of Friends – a community of over 85 member
countries and international organizations and bodies.
The Alliance of Civilizations Initiative has put the inter-cultural and interreligious dialogue firmly in a multilateral context and on the UN agenda.
The Alliance has the great advantage of bringing together many threads
emanating from other initiatives and processes in this field. It is important
to stress the need for concrete measures and the implementation of the AoC
Action Plan. Nations need to step up their efforts in the areas of education,
youth, women, migration and media.
For Finland, the Alliance of Civilizations is a key forum for the development
and implementation of measures to prevent divisions arising among different
populations, religions, cultures and civilizations – a task that seems to be
becoming more and more important in the entire world, Europe included.
The Alliance of Civilizations (AoC) aims to improve understanding and
cooperative relations among nations and peoples across cultures and
religions and, in the process, to help counter the forces that fuel polarization
and extremism. Working in partnership with governments, international and
regional organizations, civil society groups, foundations, and the private
sector, the Alliance is supporting a range of projects and initiatives aimed at
building bridges among a diversity of cultures and communities.
The Alliance functions, both globally and within the UN system, in the
following capacities − as a:
t bridge builder and convener, connecting people and organizations
devoted to promoting trust and understanding between diverse
communities, particularly − but not exclusively − between Muslim
and Western societies;
t catalyst and facilitator helping to give impetus to innovative projects
aimed at reducing polarization between nations and cultures through
joint pursuits and mutually beneficial partnerships;
t advocate for building respect and understanding among cultures
354
Kirsti Westphalen
and amplifying voices of moderation and reconciliation which help
calm cultural and religious tensions between nations and peoples;
t platform to increase visibility, enhance the work and highlight the
profile of initiatives devoted to building bridges between cultures;
and as a
t resource providing access to information and materials drawn from
successful cooperative initiatives which could, in turn, be used by
member states, institutions, organizations, or individuals seeking to
initiate similar processes or projects.
Finland seeks to contribute actively to two project areas of the AoC in
particular, which are outlined in the following sections.
Rapid Response Media Mechanism (RRMM)
The significant influence of the media in shaping how we see the world
and our perception of other cultures is widely recognized. While media
organizations are often criticized for producing generalizations and clearcut assessments of complex issues, the media can also be a potent force in
challenging stereotyped perceptions and become a channel for new ideas
and perspectives. Through balanced news coverage, analysis and debate,
journalists and editors can play a positive role in reducing cross-cultural
tensions and ensuring that a broad diversity of voices are heard on potentially
divisive issues.
In order to capitalize on the positive, constructive role the media can play
in bridging cultural gaps and helping to build understanding among nations
and cultures, the AoC is developing a Rapid Response Media Mechanism. The
aim of this initiative is to provide a platform for voices that can help reduce
tensions in times of cross-cultural crises. To this end, the AoC is creating an
online Global Experts Resource to support the work of journalists covering
stories on religious, cultural, and political tensions among diverse groups
and communities. With a specific focus on issues that threaten to widen
cross-cultural divides, this resource will provide journalists with access
to a network of individuals who can speak to these issues with a level of
knowledge and discernment that may ultimately help improve cross-cultural
understanding.
The AoC Rapid Response Media Mechanism (RRMM) has three
components:
1. An online resource of experts and analysts who can make a positive
contribution to debates on sensitive cross-cultural issues. The AoC
355
features these experts on a dedicated website, www.globalexpertfinder.org, and through direct outreach to the media.
2. The AoC works with this network of experts to develop messages (i.e.
op-ed articles, audio and video statements and interviews) that help
frame contentious issues in less polarizing terms and offer insightful
and nuanced perspectives on complex debates. Content will be provided in key languages and disseminated via a range of international
and regional media outlets.
3. To prepare the ground for these activities, the AoC works to build a
“community of interest” among journalists, editors, commentators
and opinion formers worldwide. To this end, the AoC is working with
think tanks and civil society groups to organize regional seminars and
workshops to explore ways in which a greater diversity of views can
be introduced in the media coverage of intercultural issues.
Finland is currently setting up a national Rapid Response Media Mechanism
to ensure that the multitude of voices in civil society, for example, migrants,
people of different beliefs and academics, are heard at times of crisis.
Clearinghouse, including media literacy programs
The Aoc is developing an online clearinghouse of best practices, materials
and resources on cross-cultural dialogue and cooperation projects related to
each of the four thematic areas: youth, education, media and migration.
The clearinghouse is intended to be a practical tool for governments,
organizations and institutions interested in launching projects in the abovementioned areas in their respective communities, countries and regions.
The AoC Secretariat is collecting information on initiatives underway
and best practices related to seven subjects within the clearinghouse. One
of them is media literacy programs. This is the opening item in the online
clearinghouse, the first among the seven in total.
The Media Literacy Education Project refers to a rapidly growing field that is
increasingly critical of improving cross-cultural relations: the field of educating
media consumers to be more critical and discerning of the information they
receive through new media technologies and to understand how the same
events may be portrayed in widely different ways depending on how they
are presented in the media.
Finland has chosen to be a contributor to the Media Literary Education Project
and has already established a partnership with the AoC in this area.
Authors – Auteurs
Sylvia Akar
Lecturer in Islamic studies and Arabic language
University of Helsinki, Finland
Jan Otto Andersson
Associate Professor at the Department of Economics
Åbo Akademi University, Finland
Mohammed Arkoun
Professeur émérite
Université de Sorbonne (III), France
Paul Balta
Ecrivain, ancien du journal Le Monde, Directeur honoraire du Centre
d’études de l’Orient contemporain, Université Paris III Sorbonne nouvelle,
France
Salvatore Bono
Professeur émérite
Université de Perugia, Italie
Président de la Société Internationale des Historiens de la Méditerranée
Lofti Boumghar
Consultant, chercheur
Algérie
Ahmed Driss
Professeur à l’Université de Tunis, Directeur du Centre des Etudes
Méditerranéennes et Internationles (CEMI), Tunisie
Peter Gran
Professor of History
Temple University, United States of America
Authors – Auteurs
Hassan Hanafi
Professor of Philosophy
Cairo University, Egypt
Kirsi Henriksson
Head of Research and Development
Crisis Management Centre CMC Finland
Jean-Robert Henry
Directeur de recherches
Institut de Recherches et d’Etudes sur le Monde Arabe et
Musulman, IREMAM-CNRS, France
Ulla Holm
Senior Researcher
Danish Institute for International Studies, Denmark
Anitta Kynsilehto
Researcher
Tampere Peace Research Institute, Finland
Jyrki Käkönen
Professor of International Relations
Tallinn University, Estonia
Karim Maiche
University of Lapland, Finland
Professor of Sociology and Director of Women’s Studies
Purdue University, United States of America
Mehdi Mozaffari
Professor, Head of the Center for studies of Islamism and Radicalization
University of Aarhus, Denmark
Seyfeddin Muaz
Executive Vice President
Royal Scientific Society, Jordan
Authors – Auteurs
Pertti Multanen
Docent
Institute of Development Studies, University of Helsinki, Finland
Susanna Myllylä
Senior Research Fellow
University of Jyväskylä, Finland
Frank Möller
Senior Researcher
Co-ordinator
Educational Services, German Technical Cooperation (GTZ), Germany
Bjørn Olav Utvik
Researcher
University of Oslo, Norway
Risto Veltheim
Roving Ambassador for Algeria
Coordinator of Euro-Mediterranean affairs at the Ministry for Foreign Affairs
of Finland
Unto Vesa
Researcher
Kirsti Westphalen
Ambassador
Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Finland
Tarja Väyrynen
Academy Research Fellow
Institute for Social Research, University of Tampere, Finland

Building Peace by Intercultural Dialogue Construction de la Paix par

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