Romanian Review of Political Sciences and International Relations

Transcription

R O M A N I A N REVIEW OF POLITICA L
S C I E N C E S A N D I NTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
VOL. VI
No. 2
2009
CONTENTS
LOCAL AND NATIONAL IDENTITY
ION BULEI, L’identité des Roumains....................................................................
IONAª AURELIAN RUS, The Roots and Early Development of MoldovanRomanian Nationalism in Bessarabia (1900-1917) ..........................................
CRISTI PANTELIMON, Vladimir Soloviev et le problème national à la lumière
de l’approche morale .........................................................................................
DOINA FLOREA, Der Hesperidengarten und der Rumänische Goldene Apfel ...
ABDENBI SARROUKH, Emmanuel Levinas’ Ethical Metaphysics and the
Critique of the Philosophy of Violence: the Concept of the Other ...................
HENRIETA ANIªOARA ªERBAN, The Feminist Identity as a Political Edge:
The Project of Engendering Democracy ...........................................................
VIORELLA MANOLACHE, National vs. Global Identity: Philosophical and
Political Discourse After September 11, 2001 ..................................................
REGION AND REGIONALISM
MARIA SASS, Sächsische Landschaft als Bezugspunkt Kultureller Identität ......
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8
23
36
43
54
62
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INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
FLAVIA JERCA, The Transformation of the CSCE, 1990-1995. An Institutionalist
Perspective ........................................................................................................
EDUARDO ARAYA LEÜPIN, La Formación del Estado y de la Nación
en América Latina. Estudio de caso sobre Mexico ...........................................
RÃZVAN VICTOR PANTELIMON, La izquierda actual en America Latina ...
MARIA CÃTÃLINA MOISESCU, Étude de Cas.................................................
LUCIAN JORA, Contemporary Challenges to Public Diplomacy: Theory
and Practice .......................................................................................................
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116
129
BOOK/BOOKS IN DEBATE ...........................................................................
149
BOOK REVIEWS .............................................................................................
164
SCIENTIFIC LIFE ............................................................................................
THE REVIEW OF REVIEWS ..........................................................................
THE AUTHORS................................................................................................
Pol. Sc. Int. Rel., VI, 2, p. 1–184, Bucharest, 2009.
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TOM VI
R E V I E W RO U MA INE DE SCIENC ES
P O LI TI Q U ES ET RELATION S
I N T ERNATIONAL ES
No. 2
2009
SOMMAIRE
COLLECTIVITÉS LOCALES ET IDENTITÉ NATIONALE
ION BULEI, L’identité des Roumains....................................................................
IONAª AURELIAN RUS, Les racines et le début du développement du nationalisme
moldave-roumain en Bessarabie (1900-1917) .................................................
CRISTI PANTELIMON, Vladimir Soloviev et le problème national à la lumière
de l’approche morale .........................................................................................
DOINA FLOREA, Le jardin des Hespérides et la pomme d’or roumaine ..........
ABDENBI SARROUKH, La métaphysique éthique d’Emmanuel Levinas et la
critique de la philosophie de la violence: le concept de l’Autrui .....................
HENRIETA ANIªOARA ªERBAN, L’identité féministe en tant que périphérie
politique: le projet de générer la démocratie ....................................................
VIORELLA MANOLACHE, Identité nationale et globale: le discours philosophique
et politique après le 11 Septembre 2001 ...........................................................
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8
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36
43
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RÉGION ET RÉGIONALISME
MARIA SASS, Le paysage culturel des «Sächsische» en tant que point
de référence de l’identité ...................................................................................
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RELATIONS INTERNATIONALES
FLAVIA JERCA, La transformation de la CSCE, 1990-1995. Une perspective
institutionnaliste ................................................................................................
EDUARDO ARAYA LEÜPIN, La création de l’État et de la nation en Amérique
Latine. Etude de cas sur le Mexique .................................................................
RÃZVAN VICTOR PANTELIMON, La gauche actuelle en Amérique Latine ...
MARIA CÃTÃLINA MOISESCU, Étude de Cas.................................................
LUCIAN JORA, Les défis contemporains de la diplomatie publique: théorie
et pratique ..........................................................................................................
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129
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LIVRES EN DÉBAT .........................................................................................
149
COMPTES RENDUS........................................................................................
164
LA VIE SCIENTIFIQUE ..................................................................................
REVUE DES REVUES.....................................................................................
AUTEURS .........................................................................................................
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L O C A L A N D N AT I O N A L I D E N T I T Y
L’IDENTITÉ DES ROUMAINS
ION BULEI*
Abstract. Romania does not belong to Central Europe, to the Balkans or
to the vastness of the Slavic East. It is both Balkan, East-Central European,
though so bounded belongs to any of these divisions. History, in the case
of Romanians, imposed a certain identity, which is a synthesis of rural
background, — powerful and strong — and outside influences. A summary
of contrasts. There is now in the Romanian society a coexistence of disparate
elements, taking in account the traditional life of nostalgia for the interwar
period, structures and attitudes communist developments post-communist
yet well defined. Hopes in historic reunion of the Romanians are not least:
the cohesion of their country in a troubled area, with borders that threaten
to move, the remarkable ability to assimilate models, the important strategic
position for Europe, integration into the new structures of the continent.
A Romanian philosopher, Constantin Noica, wrote that the history of
Romanians is open to all possibilities. Therefore, to all hopes too.
Key words: Romanian identity, communist and post-communist attitudes
and developments, historical reunion.
Introduction
Le pays des Roumains1 n’appartient ni à l’Europe centrale, ni aux Balkans,
ni à l’immensité slave de l’Est. Il se trouve à leur carrefour et il a quelque chose
de chacun de ces espaces. Il est à la fois balkanique, oriental, central-européen,
sans pourtant appartenir de manière délimitée à aucune de ces divisions.
Son histoire est, elle aussi, une histoire de frontière: aux confins de l’Empire
romain, de l’Empire byzantin, à l’orée de l’expansion ottomane, russe ou, plus tard,
occidentale. Une situation de frontière qui, d’une part, a créé un état d’isolement
de cet espace, de marginalisation, et, d’autre part, une conservation de certaines
valeurs autochtones traditionnelles, état qui s’est perpétué jusqu’aux temps
modernes et même au-delà d’eux. La situation dans laquelle cet espace s’est
trouvé a entraîné une assimilation des influences, différenciée en fonction des
régions ou des époques, mais toujours présente. Une incessante circulation des
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* Director of the Institute of Political Sciences and International Relations of the Romanian Academy.
1 La Roumanie compte aujourd’hui 21,5 millions d’habitants sur une superficie de 238 391 km².
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ION BULEI
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personnes et des valeurs, propre aux territoires ouverts. Tout comme l’Europe à
laquelle elle appartient, la Roumanie est une synthèse des diversités, lesquelles,
à cause de l’instabilité permanente, n’ont pas eu le temps nécessaire de se fondre
les unes dans les autres et de se redéfinir. D’autre part, il y a toujours eu dans cet
espace une mesure qui a empêché l’excès et a provoqué une résistance. C’est
l’élément autochtone qui a nourri cette résistance. De là, l’originalité de cet espace,
sollicité de tous les côtés, chargé de toutes les tentations et se maintenant pourtant
comme une unité au milieu des diversités.
Contexte
Pour l’Occidental, l’espace roumain constitue une sorte de premier cercle de
l’altérité. Un espace intégré à la civilisation européenne, mais insuffisant pour
être considéré tout à fait européen, un espace de frontière, un amalgame de vie
citadine moderne et de primitivisme rustique. L’écrivain français Paul Morand
observait, non sans amusement, qu’à Bucarest en 1935 on pouvait voir circuler
dans la ville des voitures Ford ainsi que des chariots traînés par des bœufs! Un
monde de l’élément relatif, dans lequel l’écrivain français remarquait l’indulgence,
l’adaptabilité, l’optimisme, une sorte d’insouciance historique où rien n’était
vraiment pris au sérieux, parce que rien ne méritait d’être pris comme tel. Et tout
cela dans un espace où la nature est belle, les sites sont pittoresques, les gens sont
hospitaliers, l’art est original, de même que les chansons populaires! Un espace des
contrastes.
L’histoires des Roumains est un besoin permanent d’intériorisation, de «descente
en soi-même». Un vœu presque jamais accompli. Et lorsqu’il semble s’accomplir,
comme dans la période de l’entre-deux-guerres, il s’agit alors d’une existence
sous la terreur, «la terreur de l’Histoire», selon l’expression de l’historien des
religions Mircea Eliade. C’est une sorte d’obsession. L’histoire américaine ou
celle française ont des vocations universelles, l’histoire russe est messianique.
Celle des Roumains est une recherche. Ils sont toujours en train de chercher leur
identité. Ils essaient toujours de se définir. C’est un drame muet, vécu par chaque
génération. En même temps, l’histoire des Roumains est une histoire des
contradictions non résolues, selon l’expression de l’historien français Catherine
Durandin. Une histoire à la recherche de l’identité, une culture à la recherche de
sa propre destinée2.
Plus que chez d’autres peuples, dans l’histoire des Roumains persistent des
confusions que chaque génération s’efforce à tirer au clair: les sources écrites ne
parlent des Roumains que tard, au IXe siècle; l’espace roumain a été politiquement
fragmenté pendant de longues périodes de temps et les provinces roumaines (La
Valachie, la Moldavie, la Transylvanie) ont été et continuent à être historiquement
revendiquées par les voisins; en cherchant leur spécifique culturel, les Roumains
————————
2 N. Iorga, La place des Roumains dans l’histoire universelle, Bucarest, 1980; Vl. Georgescu, The
Romanians: a history, Londres, 1991; C. Durandin, Histoire des Roumains, Paris, 1995; L. Boia, La Roumanie:
un pays à la frontière de l’Europe, Paris, 2003; I. Bulei, Brève histoire de la Roumanie, Bucarest, 2005.
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5
tombent sur les Russes, les Ukrainiens, eux aussi de confession orthodoxe pour
la plupart; ils tombent sur les les peuples de l’ancien Empire des Habsbourg, aux
côtés desquels ils ont d’ailleurs longtemps vécu; ils tombent sur les peuples des
Balkans, avec lesquels ils partagent en plus le même héritage byzantin, etc.
De l’identité roumaine
L’espace roumain s’est toujours trouvé à une croisée des civilisations et des
courants d’idées. La civilisation indo-européenne s’y est développée dans la
seconde moitié du Ier millénaire av. J.-Chr., par l’intermédiaire des Géto-Daces,
qui sont nombreux (on connaît les noms de 20 tribus daces), relativement
unitaires, sédentaires. Ils vouaient un culte au dieu Zamolxis, croyaient à
l’immortalité et méprisaient la mort. Les Géto-Daces sont entrés en contact direct
avec le monde grec et sa civilisation, laquelle les a marqués de son influence, à
travers les colonies grecques du littoral occidental de la mer Noire: Istros (Histria),
Callatis (la ville actuelle de Mangalia), Tomis (la ville actuelle de Constantza).
Ils sont également entrés en contact avec la civilisation des Celtes, qu’ils ont
d’ailleurs en partie assimilée. Au début du IIe siècle après J.-Chr., sous le règne
de l’empereur Trajan, l’espace dace a été intégré à l’Empire romain, se trouvant,
de ce fait, massivement colonisé avec des éléments romains ou romanisés,
amenés, selon Eutrope, de tout le monde romain (ex toto orbe romano). Le processus
d’urbanisation a été très rapide. Des chemins pavés sillonnaient la province, en
l’intégrant, avec ses richesses, au flux général économique et commercial de
l’empire. Après le retrait de l’armée et de l’administration romaines au sud du
Danube, entre l’an 271 et le XIIIe siècle, l’histoire de l’espace carpato-danubianopontique peut être définie comme un millénaire sous les migrations. Un
millénaire pendant lequel l’histoire des Roumains s’est écoulée entre l’empire de
Constantinople (l’empire de la nouvelle Rome) et les peuples migrateurs. L’empire
byzantin a été un facteur de consolidation du caractère roman, de même qu’un
facteur de christianisation. Il a a représenté aussi un modèle pour les structures
des États féodaux roumains. Par contre, les peuples migrateurs ont eu une
influence négative sur le développement historique du peuple roumain, en le
retardant et en le déformant. Parmi les peuplades migratrices, les Slaves ont joué
dans les contrées danubiennes le rôle des Francs et des Burgonds en France, des
Lombards en Italie, des Wisigoths en Espagne. Au nord du Danube, les Slaves,
réduits au nombre après 602, ont cohabité avec la population locale, en finissant
par être assimilés, jusqu’aux Xe-XIIe siècles, par les Roumains. La romanité au
nord du Danube est restée une île entourée par des peuplades slaves.
Le christianisme a pénétré dans cet espace dès l’époque de la domination
romaine et s’est répandu ensuite par la conversion de la population. Les Roumains
n’ont pas été christianisés de haut en bas, comme leurs voisins ou autres peuples
européens, parce qu’ils n’avaient pas, à l’époque, de chefs politiques. Ce fait a
entraîné, du point de vue religieux, une annexion des Roumains par leurs voisins.
Les prêtres des Roumains deviennent orthodoxes de rite slavon. Les Roumains
se sont ainsi écartés de l’église de Rome, ils se sont, une fois de plus, isolés de
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ION BULEI
4
l’Occident par la confession, et se sont attachés à l’Orient. Non pas à l’Orient
grec, byzantin, mais à celui slavon. La langue de communication ecclésiale,
mais aussi culturelle et officielle, a été, à partir du Xe siècle, le slavon. Cette
langue a imposé une suzeraineté culturelle à travers laquelle l’éclat de l’Occident
n’a plus réussi à pénétrer.
Sous la domination ottomane, effective au XVIe siècle, les Pays roumains,
qui ont conservé une situation d’autonomie dans le cadre de l’empire, ont mené
une existence contradictoire. Au début, depuis la fondation des États roumains
au XIVe siècle jusqu’à la chute de Constantinople, en 1453, l’influence de la
civilisation byzantine a été évidente. Mais l’influence des cours royales de Buda
et de Cracovie (la Hongrie et la Pologne se disputaient la suprématie dans
l’espace roumain) s’est fait aussi sentir avec force. L’influence byzantine a
coexisté avec celle occidentale. On a fréquemment évoqué la manière dont a été
conservé le portrait de l’érudit prince régnant Dimitrie (Démètre) Cantemir: on
peut le voir tantôt en vêtement oriental, tantôt en vêtement à l’occidentale. Cette
dualité a été aussi présente dans les manifestations culturelles de ces siècles
médiévaux: Il y a eu les splendides églises situées au nord de la Moldavie —
Voroneþ, Moldoviþa, Suceviþa, etc. — influencées par l’art byzantin, ou les églises
situées dans d’autres centres monastiques — Cozia, Curtea-de-Argeº, en Valachie,
etc. En même temps, les fils d’aristocrates sont allés faire des études dans des
centres de la culture catholique, à Cracovie, Padoue ou Vienne. À cette contradiction
s’en est ajoutée une autre, de nature linguistique, entre le slavon et le latin,
langues entre lesquelles il y a eu un conflit permanent qui s’est fait aussi sentir
dans les créations littéraires.
Les sens de la modernisation chez les Roumains, comme d’ailleurs dans tout
le monde non occidental, a été la synchronisation du développement de l’esprit
roumain avec celui de l’Occident. Mais le résultat n’en a été que partiel. La
modernisation dans la zone de l’Europe du Sud-Est est restée un processus
inachevé. Elle est souvent demeurée à l’état de cadre formel et instable. Le cadre
vide ne s’est pas rempli avec un contenu réel. La Roumanie avait eu les
conditions de devenir en effet une «Belgique de l’Orient», selon l’expression de
l’époque, grâce à ses richesses naturelles. Mais son évolution normale (commencée
après le milieu du XIXe siècle) a été brusquement interrompue par l’occupation
soviétique en 1944. Le bilan de l’expérience communiste a été, au cours des
deux dernières décennies du XXe siècle, la relégation du pays dans les statistiques
internationales aux côtés de l’Albanie. L’expérience communiste a été doublée
par l’expérience d’une dictature du type totalitaire, celle de N. Ceauºescu, laquelle
a isolé une fois de plus la Roumanie du reste de l’Europe et même du reste des
pays socialistes, en modifiant et en singularisant la destinée historique du pays.
Faute d’une continuité du développement, ce qui a suffisamment contribué
à accentuer le décalage entre la Roumanie et l’Europe centrale et occidentale,
en 1989 les Roumains se sont vus à nouveau obligés à tout reprendre dès le
commencement, comme en 1821, 1859, 1918, 1945, comme dans un perpétuel
mythe de Sisyphe.
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7
L’histoire, dans le cas des Roumains, a imposé une certaine identité, qui est
une synthèse du fond rural, puissant et résistant, et des influences extérieures.
Une synthèse des contrastes. Il y a aujourd’hui dans la société roumaine une
coexistence d’éléments disparates, tenant de la vie traditionnelle, des nostalgies
pour la période de l’entre-deux-guerres, des structures et des attitudes communistes,
des évolutions post-communistes pas encore bien définies. Les espoirs dans des
retrouvailles historiques des Roumains ne sont pas moindres: la cohésion de leur
État dans une zone trouble, avec des frontières qui menacent de bouger, la
remarquable capacité d’assimiler les modèles, la position stratégique importante
pour l’Europe, l’intégration dans les nouvelles structures du continent. Un
philosophe roumain, Constantin Noica, écrivait que l’histoire des Roumains est
ouverte à toutes les possibilités. Par conséquent, à tous les espoirs aussi.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Boia, L. La Roumanie: un pays à la frontière de l’Europe, Paris, 2003.
Bulei I., Brève histoire de la Roumanie, Bucarest, 2005.
Durandin, C., Histoire des Roumains, Paris, 1995.
Georgescu, Vl., The Romanians: a history, Londres, 1991.
Iorga, N., La place des Roumains dans l’histoire universelle, Bucarest, 1980.
THE ROOTS AND EARLY DEVELOPMENT
OF MOLDOVAN-ROMANIAN NATIONALISM
IN BESSARABIA (1900-1917)
IONAª AURELIAN RUS*
Abstract. A study of Moldovan national consciousness is necessary for
understanding Bessarabia. Outside the former Soviet Union, it has been
almost generally accepted by Romanians and by Western experts that
Moldavians are not ethnically distinct from Romanians.
In this paper, I have dealt with how the Moldovan national movement
appeared and became a mass phenomenon. The “old” and weak national
movement, pre-modern and aristocratic before 1900, can be said to have
given way to the modern national movement of “commoners”, especially
intellectuals, which emerged around 1905. Even this movement was rather
weak before the Russian Revolution of 1917. A large majority of the
Moldovan-speaking people felt that they were ethnic “Moldovans” rather
than “Romanians” throughout the period, with the percentage of the latter
increasing over time. One might be surprised that most Moldovans voted
for autonomist platforms in the elections of 1917 if he would look at
literacy and other “development” statistics and at the weakness of the
Moldovan national movement; it is clear that the strength of pre-existing
proto-nationalism is key in the process of determining the growth of the
national movement.
Key words: Moldovan national identity, “old” Moldovan national movement,
“new” Moldovan national movement.
Bessarabia, the historical province between the Prut and Dniester rivers, is
undoubtedly one of the most mysterious and underresearched areas in the former
Russian Empire (or Eastern Europe). The issue of Moldovan/Romanian nationalism
is undoubtedly more interesting and controversial than most topics connected
with Bessarabia. In this paper, I will try to evaluate, almost exclusively on the
basis of secondary sources, the nature and strength of the Moldovan national
movement before the Bolshevik Revolution in the fall of 1917. How nationalistic
were the masses? How much mass support did the nationalist movement get, and
————————
* Professor of Political Science at Raymond Walters College.
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NATIONALISM IN BESSARABIA (1900-1917)
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from whom? What was the nature, and what were the divisions of the national
movement? How much Moldovan-Romanian nationalism was “Moldovan”, and
how much was “Romanian”? How should one place Moldovan nationalism in
relation to the agrarian question and the Russian Revolutions of 1905-1907 and
1917? What were the strong points and pitfalls of the various historiographical
and sociological treatments of the problem? How did Moldovan reality fit in the
framework of a number of studies on nationalism, and Russia during that
particular period of time?
A study of Moldovan national consciousness is necessary for understanding
Bessarabia. Outside the former Soviet Union, it has been almost generally accepted
by Romanians and by Western experts that Moldavians are not ethnically distinct
from Romanians. This is no longer denied by most post-Soviet authors, and
especially by Moldovan historians. The Bessarabian Moldovan idiom, “Moldovan”,
diverges from standard Romanian only in terms of differences of dialect and
accent. However, if one uses Walter Feldman’s terminological framework, there
is, and there has been throughout history, a very large population of Romanian
“nationality” with a “Moldovan” “nationality consciousness”.1
Overall, Romanian scholarship has argued that historically all ethnic Romanians
(including the Bessarabian Moldovans) have thought of themselves as Romanians.
Soviet sources have argued that the process of the formation of the Moldovan
nation was ended in the late 19th century. The truth is, of course, more complicated.
Since at least the 13th to 15th centuries, in the principality of Moldova, in addition
to a Romanian identity shared by a minority of the population, including (but not
only) members of the aristocratic and intellectual elites, there was a Moldovan
identity shared by most people, who thought that they were part of the “Moldovan
people”.2 Historically, many individuals seem to have shared both identities.
Each one of them had different degrees of salience (and meaning) in comparison
with the other one for different groups of people.3 During the period of Russian
rule in Bessarabia, which lasted from 1812 to 1917, the survival of the Moldovan
identity was caused by traditionalism, plus the isolation, backwardness, repressive
character and Russification policies of the Tsarist Empire.
In any case, according to the most prominent conservative Russian Bessarabian
landlord, politician and anti-Romanian activist, A.W. Krupensky, probably
————————
1 Walter Feldman, “The Theoretical Basis for the Definition of Moldavian Nationality”, in Ralph S. Clem
(ed.), The Soviet West: Interplay Between Nationality and Social Organization, (New York, Praeger Publishers,
1975), p. 47-48.
2 See, for example, Vlad Georgescu, The Romanians, (Columbus; Ohio State University Press, 1991),
p. 15-16, 18, 41-42, 67, 70-71, Dimitrie Cantemir, Descriptio Moldaviae, (Bucureºti; Editura Academiei
Republicii Socialiste România, 1973), p. 298-299, 337-341, etc., Cronica Ghiculeºtilor, (Bucureºti, Editura
Academiei Republicii Socialiste România, 1965), and Radu Popescu, Istoriile Domnilor Þãrii Româneºti,
(Bucureºti, Editura Academiei Republicii Populare Române, 1963), Ionas Rus, “Românii ºi Minoritarii în
Basarabia Interbelicã”, in Revista de Istorie a Moldovei, (Chiºinãu, ªtiinþa, 1994), no. 1 (17), January-March 1994,
p. 29-30, and Ionas Aurelian Rus, Self-Determination, Moldovan-Romanian Nationalism, and Nationality
Conflict in Bessarabia, 1900-1940, Henry Rutgers Thesis, History and Political Science Departments, April 1995,
p. 9-11, and passim.
3 See Dimitrie Cantemir, Descriptio Moldaviae, p. 298-299, 337-341, 365-367, Mihai Canciovici,
Domnitori Români în Legende, (Editura Sport-Turism, 1984), and Octav Paun and Silviu Angelescu, Legende
Populare Româneºti, (Bucureºti, Editura Albatros, 1983) and my two works cited above.
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IONAª AURELIAN RUS
3
developed in 1917-1918 or before that, 48.2% of Bessarabia’s population was
“Moldovan” and 21% “Romanian”.4 Of course, the percentages are not wholly
accurate because the Moldovans/Romanians, officially counted as “Moldovans”
represented 47.6% of the province’s population according to the Russian census
of 1897. Even adjusting for Russification, the Moldovans represented, according
to the research of a Soviet scholar, only 52.1% of Bessarabia’s population.5 In
any case, Krupensky’s estimate that most Moldovan-Romanians of Bessarabia
thought of themselves as “Moldovans” at the beginning of the twentieth century
is accurate and corroborated by various Romanian estimates.
The Moldavian-Romanian nationalist movement (a term which refers to
networks and groups of Moldovan-Romanians, some of whom had a
predominantly “Romanian”, and some of whom had a “Moldovan”, identity and
nationalism) was initially very weak. It did not involve the peasant masses (who
formed more than 90% of the Moldovan population) for a long period of time. This
was the situation between 1812 (the year when Russia annexed Bessarabia, mostly
from Moldova, and the south-eastern and extreme northern parts, from the Ottoman
Empire) and around 1900. It was so partly because of the repressive Russification
of the church, school and administration, and the end of the use of Moldovan for
any public functions. Perhaps even more importantly, it happened this way because
of the pre-political, pre-activist frame of mind of the serf peasants and their
descendants, and, to a lesser extent, of the other non-noble sections of the
population. This mentality did not start to slowly wither away until the beginning
of the twentieth century.6 Up to the last decade of the nineteenth century, the only
politically-minded and politically-activized group was the landed aristocracy.7
Demographics also played a role. A Soviet scholar, V. Zelenchuk, shows on
the basis of Russian archival data, that in 1817, Moldovans formed 78.2% of the
population of the province, 58.2% in 1835, and in 1858, 51% (or 54.9%, if one
includes Russified Moldovans, in 1859) of all the Bessarabians.8 In other words,
the proportion of Moldovans was lower than most official Russian imperial
estimates, and the Romanian sources which used these numbers, alleged. The
demographic change is explained by the colonization of the province (especially
up to the 1860’s) with, or other forms of immigration into the province of,
Russians, Ukrainians, Germans, Bulgarians, Gagauzi, Jews, etc., as well as by the
Russification of Moldovans.
The Moldovan national movement in the nineteenth century has been dealt
with only in Romanian sources. Throughout the nineteenth century, some members
————————
4 A.W. Kroupensky, Bessarabie, (Paris, 1920), cited in Ioan Scurtu, Constantin Hlihor, 1940. Drama
Românilor dintre Prut ºi Nistru, (Bucureºti, Editura Academiei de Înalte Studii Militare, 1992), p. 145.
5 Michael Bruchis, The USSR: Language and Realities — Nations, Leaders, and Scholars, (Boulder,
Colorado, East European Monographs, 1988), p. 276-278.
6 Consult, among others, Prince Serge Dimitriyevich Urussov, Memoirs of a Russian Governor, (London;
Harper and Brothers Publishers, 1908), and Grigore Constantinescu, “Din Vremuri Þariste”, in Iurie Colesnic,
Basarabia Necunoscutã, (Chiºinãu, Universitas, 1993), p. 35-36.
7 Consult Prince Serge Dimitriyevich Urussov, and Iurie Colesnic, Basarabia Necunoscutã, (Chiºinãu,
Universitas, 1993), p. 35-36, 250.
8 Michael Bruchis, The USSR: Language and Realities – Nations, Leaders, and Scholars, p. 276-278.
4
11
of the Moldovan aristocracy very much desired, and sometimes agitated for, a
number of things. They demanded the greater use of the Moldovan (as opposed
to Russian) language in the public sphere, for political autonomy for Bessarabia
and, in the case of some isolated individuals throughout the period, for union
with the other Romanian-inhabited areas in a Romanian national state.9 In 18621867, the nationally-minded sections of the Moldovan nobility united in a
loosely-structured, small “Party of the Moldovan Boyars”.10 In the repressive
conditions of the Russian empire and with the banishing of the Moldovan language
from education and the church which started in the 1860’s and 1870’s, nationalism
switched from being both political and cultural to being only cultural. National
organizations disappeared.
There is a universal consensus that many Moldavian nobles and city people
became completely or partly Russified, even before the 1860’s. Nevertheless, the
view of a number of Romanian and Western scholars, including the Romanian
nationalist historian and politician Ion Nistor, that most Moldovan nobles had
switched to using Russian as their mother tongue, is false. According to various
Romanian and Western scholarly works, the nobility of Moldovan descent
represented 28.6%, 29.5% or 34.7% of the Bessarabian nobility.11 Seymour Becker’s
study on the Russian nobility shows that 22% of all the Bessarabian nobles used
“Moldovan” as their native language. Most Bessarabian nobles used Russian as
their mother-tongue, but 63-77% of those of Moldovan descent (or even more)
were Moldovan-speaking. It would be more fair to say that most Moldovan
nobles believed that Russian should be used in public affairs, and Moldovan in
family, colloquial and local discussions.12
Russification did not make any significant inroads into the great mass of the
Moldovans because of the latter’s peasant traditionalism and inertia, and even
more saliently, medieval-style ethnic identity, pride and xenophobia. Historians
such as Ion Nistor note some examples of this. For example, during the 1860’s
there were a few unsuccessful petitions signed by peasants who de facto demanded
that the switch from Moldovan to the Russian language in teaching in the village
schools, which was taking place during that decade, be reversed. The petitioners
also demanded more Moldovan-language schools.13 However, the only form of
widespread militant fight against Russification during the nineteenth century
was the smuggling (and reading) of Romanian books, but even this was an informal
grass-roots rather than organized effort, which, of course, involved only a small
minority of the population.
————————
9 See ªtefan Ciobanu, Basarabia: Populaþia, Istoria, Cultura, (Chiºinãu, ªtiinþa, 1992), p. 47-60. Also
consult Ion Nistor, Istoria Basarabiei, (Bucureºti, Humanitas, 1991) and Alexandru V. Boldur, Istoria Basarabiei,
(Bucureºti, Editura Victor Frunza, 1992), p. 454-455.
10 See ªtefan Ciobanu, p. 58-60, 95-97 and Alexandru V. Boldur, p. 395-398. Also consult Ion Nistor.
11 See Alexandru V. Boldur, p. 538, Ifor L. Evans, The Agrarian Revolution in Roumania, (Cambridge,
Cambridge University Press, 1924), p. 171, Charles Upson Clark, Bessarabia: Russia and Roumania on the
Black Sea, (New York, Dodd, Mead & Company, 1927), p. 111.
12 The data are from Seymour Becker, Nobility and Privilege in Late Imperial Russia, (Dekalb, Illinois,
Northern Illinois University Press, 1985), p. 185.
13 See Ion Nistor, passim.
12
IONAª AURELIAN RUS
5
A number of ethnic Romanian scholars, including Andrei Popovici and
myself, have argued that the Russification process failed, and that this compelled
the Russian authorities to make a few concessions.14 This was undoubtedly
partially true, but a Romanian sociological study by D. Dogaru of the village of
Napadeni, a village of formerly free peasants of mostly aristocratic descent, who
were classed by the Russian authorities as small nobles, presents a somewhat
different picture. These people were always Romanian-speaking, but at least the
peasant-nobles believed that knowledge of Russian made one a “distinguished”
man.15 Although this phenomenon has not been noted by historians, it is clear
that a minority of the Moldovans took Russian-style first and second-name
forms (e.g. “Nikolai Ivanovich” instead of the Moldovan “Nicolae Ion”) or Russian
nicknames/abbreviations such as “Vania”.16
Many students learned very little in the Russian schools because of their lack
of knowledge of the Russian language. The use of Russian in education also
accounts for why fewer rural Moldovans went to school, which explains why,
according to Keith Hitchins, the number of village schools in Bessarabia plummeted
from 400 (with 7,000 students) in the mid-1860’s, to only 23 in 1880.17 Whatever
literacy existed among the Moldovans was often only in the Moldovan language,
and, as C.U.Clark notes, the Russian authorities found it necessary to print
“emergency” information about epidemics, plant diseases, etc., in Moldovan all
throughout the Russian period.18 The Russian authorities felt compelled to
permit Moldavian to be used again in church activities in 1900.19
The national movement emerged in 1898, 1901, 1903 or 1905 (according to the
chronologies of Ion Nistor, Alexandru Boldur, Keith Hitchins20, etc.). I would
argue that Hitchins’ definition of a national movement is more restrictive than
the others. His conceptualization of “a Moldavian national political movement,
or even a political party”, which “did not exist before 1905”21 does not include
the underground small, but modern, nationalistic group of Bessarabian Moldovan
students in the Ukraine, and even in Bessarabia, before 1905.
During the 1905-1907 Russian Revolution, many (though, because of passivity,
not most) Moldovans clearly demonstrated their opposition to Russification, and
their desire for cultural and territorial autonomy. Even more peasants showed
that they wanted more land from the mostly city-living absentee landowners,
who happened to be overwhelmingly Russian or Russified.
The various Moldovan nationalist currents which were emerging during the
1905-1907 revolution were not united, as Nistor notes. The “Moldavian Cultural
Society”, a continuation of noble nationalism, demanded the end of Russification,
————————
14 See Andrei Popovici, The Political Status of Bessarabia, (Washington, D.C., School of Foreign
Service, Georgetown University, 1931), and Ionas Rus, “Românii ºi Minoritarii în Basarabia Interbelicã”.
15 Dumitru Dogaru, “Nãpãdenii, Un Sat de Mazili din Codru”, in Sociologie Româneascã, Year 2, no. 7-8,
July-August, 1937, p. 297.
16 Ibid.
17 Keith Hitchins, Rumania, 1866-1947, (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1994), p. 245.
18 Charles Upson Clark, Bessarabia, p. 80-81.
19 Andrei Popovici, p. 105-106.
20 See Ion Nistor, passim., Alexandru Boldur, passim., and Keith Hitchins, p. 249.
21 Keith Hitchins, p. 249.
6
13
and teaching in Moldovan. The nationalism of this group was, as one can see
from its program and activities, cultural rather than political.
The Democratic Moldavian Party, founded by the lawyer Emanuel Gavrilita
and which included, as Alexandru Boldur and some newer research show,
mostly current or former students of the Theological Seminary of Kishinev
(Chiºinãu), the provincial capital. Iurie Colesnic argues (I think convincingly in
view of the few dozen cases of important activists whose lives are discussed in
his work and other sources) that these young people of rural origin, mostly the
sons of priests and deacons, absorbed in the villages, as children, a Moldovan
ethnic consciousness.22 However, I believe that they absorbed an activistic frame
of mind, which allowed them to act on their beliefs, not from the villages, but
from more modern realities and forces. This group included numerous people
with an emerging “Romanian” national consciousness.23 It obtained the support
of a number of priests, teachers, other intellectuals, and peasants, especially
younger ones. It demanded education in Moldovan, land reform, Bessarabian
autonomy, universal suffrage and the creation of a cooperative movement.24 The
leadership and activists of the group were, like their Ukrainian counterparts,
mostly Social Revolutionaries in sympathies according to Alexandru Boldur.
The program of this nationalist group, more than that of the aristocratic
nationalists, is consistent with Miroslav Hroch’s model of the fight of the nationallyactivized population in “small nations” (even though the Bessarabian Moldovans
do not fit perfectly in the category of “small nations” under “foreign” rule as
described by Hroch). He believes that these nationalistic movements fought for
“equal rights, national language and culture, for a share in economic prosperity,
for social liberation and political autonomy”, which is certainly true of the Moldovan
movement.25
For a time, the Russian authorities allowed the publishing of various Moldavian
newspapers (including one in Latin characters, as in Romania). They also permitted
the introduction of teaching in Romanian at the theological seminary, and at a
high school in the provincial capital of Kishinev (Chiºinãu in Romanian).26 In
1905, a church congress decided that Moldovan could again be used for preaching
in the villages, after a formal interdiction of such practices for a few decades.
But after that, during the period of reaction that started in 1906-1908, the authorities
tried to minimize the open manifestations of Moldovan nationalism and to roll
back some of these Moldovan gains.
It is rather clear, as I have argued elsewhere, that the politicized Moldovan
national movement of 1905-1907 was still rather weak.27 It was not able to get
its members elected to the Russian Duma (parliament). In 1905-1907, some
————————
22 Iurie Colesnic, p. 250.
23 R. W. Seton-Watson, A History of the Romanians, (Archon, 1962), p. 563.
24 Andrei Popovici, p. 113, 116-117.
25 Miroslav Hroch, “How Much Does Nation Formation Depend on Nationalism?” in East European
Politics and Societies, (University of California Press), vol. 4, No. 1, p. 109-113.
26 Hugh Seton-Watson, The Decline of Imperial Russia, (New York; Frederick A. Praeger Publishers,
1969), p. 235.
27 See Ionas Rus, “Românii ºi Minoritarii în Basarabia Interbelicã”, p. 30-31.
14
IONAª AURELIAN RUS
7
grievances were expressed through meetings and mass petitions to the Tsar for
land and national linguistic rights (like the ones convened in a few localities).
Nevertheless, in numerous, possibly most villages, people were not concerned
with things beyond the village level, as the study by the Romanian interwar
sociologist T. Al. ªtirbu of the village of Valenii would seem to indicate.28
Therefore, no activity in favor of Moldovan nationalism or the Moldovan
language took place during the period of Russian rule in them.
Only a minority of the agrarian discontent was channeled towards the national
movement, which was demanding land reform. Most rural discontent manifested
itself in spontaneous agrarian unrest. The non-nationalistic character of the
agrarian strife would seem to indicate that most peasants found their Moldovan
identity relevant only in terms of language, traditions and culture, not in the
political and social arenas.
The aristocratic cultural nationalists were opposed to land reform. So, as the
Romanian historian Ion Nistor emphasizes, the Moldovan nobles made common
front with Russian conservative forces, apparently driven by their class interests.
This would indicate that social and political factors were more important in shaping
their attitudes than their nationalism, which was in any case cultural rather than
political-autonomist.
It is not clear whether 1905-1907 represented the “breakthrough” for the national
movement. The work of the Romanian interwar historian Alexandru Boldur contains
statistical data showing that a small (though, one could argue, increasing)
number of non-nationalist Moldovan deputies were elected among the nine
Bessarabians sent to the various Dumas. There were no Bessarabian Moldovans
in the 1906 first Duma. There was one in the February 1907 second Duma, one
in the third Duma of November 1, 1907, and two in the fourth Duma of 1912.29
It is possible that, even in Russia’s system of unequal suffrage, and not altogether
free and fair elections, the Moldovan population’s electoral choices were
increasingly discriminating along the ethnic line.
In 1913, a newspaper which represented a common nationalist front of some
nobles, and especially members of the radical group of 1905, including both
laymen and priests, appeared. It was called Cuvânt Moldovenesc (Moldovan
Word). It was the first Moldovan endeavor in which nobles and non-nobles came
together. The nucleus of the Moldovan-Romanian national movement consolidated
itself around this newspaper.30
Nistor argues that in 1905 (and, it would appear, also in 1917), most nationalist
activists were not the descendants of serfs, but the educated sons of clergymen,
and to a lesser extent, of the old estates of market-town dwellers and free
peasants. I would tend to think that his use of class or estate is to some extent
misleading because there were comparatively few, if any, nationalists before
1917-1918 who were descended from the old market-town dwellers. Moreover,
————————
28 T. Al. ªtirbu, “Vãlenii de Lângã Prut”, in Sociologie Româneascã, Year 3, October-December 1938, p. 521.
29 Alexandru V. Boldur, p. 377-378.
30 See Onisifor Ghibu, Pe Baricadele Vieþii în Basarabia Revoluþionarã (1917-1918), (Chiºinãu, Editura
Universitas, 1992), Alexandru V. Boldur, and Iurie Colesnic, etc.
8
15
the students (or former students) of the Kishinev theological seminary were
social-revolutionary nationalist activists because of their social position as
students or budding intellectuals rather than because of who their parents were.
One observes the comparative lack of importance of the industrial and commercial
bourgeoisie and proletariat in national activism. The role of industrialization,
which Miroslav Hroch and Ernest Gellner emphasize as a factor in the development
of nationalism31, was totally unimportant in Bessarabia, at least among Moldovans.
By 1900, as Edward H. Judge shows in his study of the famous 1903 anti-Jewish
pogrom in Kishinev (in which, like in the 1905-1907 pogroms throughout Bessarabia,
the participants included Russians, Moldovans, Ukrainians, etc.), commercial
and other business positions were occupied overwhelmingly by Jews. They
formed more than 80% of the merchants of the province, and three fourths of all
the industrialists of the provincial capital, Kishinev.32 By 1900, there were also
very few Moldovan proletarians, bureaucrats, or urban inhabitants in general. At
the turn of the century, 37.2% of all urban people were Yiddish-speakers, 24.4%
were Russian-speakers, 15.8% spoke Ukrainian, and only 14.2% Moldovan.
Roman Szporluk’s category of nations without a modern economy, where
nevertheless nationalism is developing in the area of civil society/culture is
useful for understanding the case of the Bessarabian Moldovans.33 One has to
agree that the Eastern European pattern postulated by Szporluk, that nationalism
first appeared in the area of culture is applicable to the Bessarabian Moldovans,
especially in the area of print culture.34 This is true in terms of “cultural”
nationalism, with its “journalistic” connections. The previously-noted evidence
shows that his emphasis on the role of schooling (for the “studious youth” which
was enrolled in the national movement), newspapers, and (sometimes smuggled)
books is to some extent accurate.35 However, Szporluk, Gellner, Hroch and other
analysts (though not Ronald Grigor Suny) tend not to discuss, and to de facto
ignore, the existence of ethnic identities, and of pre-modern mass protonationalisms, among the popular masses since the Middle Ages. These “ethnocentric”
realities would transform into genuinely modern nationalism at the time when
the masses would later be mobilized or activized, and politicized.
During the first part of World War I, the newspaper Cuvânt Moldovenesc
(“Moldovan Word”) marginally helped the national cause. After the fall of Tsarism
on March 12, 1917, the Moldovan nationalist movement reemerged politically
in the form of the Moldovan National Party (PNM) on April 3rd. Its party
committee and activists included prominent figures from the 1905-1907
generation, and people of various social classes, including peasants. The party’s
newspaper was Cuvânt Moldovenesc, and the party demanded the use of Moldovan
————————
31 See, for example, Miroslav Hroch, p. 106 and Ernest Gellner, “The Dramatis Personae of History”,
East European Politics and Societies, (University of California Press), vol. 4, No. 1, 126-127, 131.
32 Edward H. Judge, Easter in Kishinev: Anatomy of a Pogrom, (New York; New York University Press,
1992), p. 26.
33 Roman Szporluk, “In Search of the Drama of History: or, National Roads to Modernity”, in East
European Politics and Societies, (University of California Press), vol. 4, no. 1, p. 141-144, 146.
34 Ibid, p. 141-143.
35 See Ibid, p. 146.
16
IONAª AURELIAN RUS
9
in education, the church and administration, and an autonomous Bessarabia, a
mostly Moldovan state or polity.
Although traditional scholarship has presented the PNM as a very popular
party, indeed as the party which included most Moldovan nationalists and
obtained the support of large numbers of Moldovans, I would argue that this was
not the case. One of its weaknesses was the fact that the party was accused of
being in favor of union with Romania by Russocentric anti-autonomist, mostly
non-Moldovan revolutionaries. PNM was also accused by groups more leftist
than itself (like the Socialist Revolutionaries) of not being radical or revolutionary
enough on issues of social reform (especially land reform, that is, the giving of
land to the peasants without compensation).36
Moldovan nationalism and the option of union with Romania had the support
of only a small minority of even the Moldovans according to a Romanian sociologist
who investigated the attitudes of the Moldovan soldiers on the Romanian front
during the period.37 For most of them, their community of language with other
ethnic Romanians did not have too much significance, and did not indicate a
common nationality. The people felt that they were “Moldovans”, not “Romanians”,
and did not find anything unnatural in living under Russian rule.38 There is
universal agreement that many articulate and less articulate Bessarabians,
including some Moldovans, were anti-unionist partly because Romania was seen
as an undemocratic country ruled by landlords who owned most of the land.
The Soviet of Deputies of the Peasants (SDT), which is still a mysterious
group, and which has been largely ignored by Romanian and Western
scholarship despite its great importance, was an officially non-partisan group of
people originating from various political parties. Its most important activists had
been elected by the peasants in the provincial peasant Soviet. These people
would eventually put forward an electoral list for the elections for the Russian
Constituent Assembly in late 1917. SDT included among its foremost personalities
popular and well-known more or less Socialist Revolutionary Moldovan
nationalist leaders and activists. SDT was in favor of the restoration of Moldovan
Bessarabian autonomy (like in 1812-1828), which explains the conflict between
SDT and the SR’s. There is widespread scholarly acceptance of the view that
land reform was somewhat more important for the party than Moldovan
nationalism. In any case, it is an accepted fact that the Bessarabian peasants had
seized 2/3 of the arable surface of the landed estates from March 1917 until the
end of the year. The desires of the SDT leaders, and of its overwhelmingly
Moldovan peasant constituents, caused the group to adhere to the program of the
National Moldovan Party, including in its demands for Bessarabian autonomy,
but with more radical plans for land reform than the PNM.
The SDT was widely regarded as being led mostly by “Moldovan nationalists”
(some of whom had a “Romanian” national consciousness) and as being almost
————————
36 Gheorghe Cojocaru, “Cu Privire la Problema Adunãrii Constituante în Basarabia în anul 1917”, part 1,
in Revista de Istorie a Moldovei, (Chiºinãu, ªtiinþa, 1991), no. 2(6) for 1991 (April-June).
37 Dumitru Dogaru, p. 297.
38 Ibid.
10
17
a Moldovan peasant party. However, as some recent research done in Moldova
shows, unlike the PNM, it was not regarded as, or accused of, being in favor of
Bessarabia’s union with Romania, despite the past desires for such a union of
some of its leaders. It was accused only of having some reactionary nationalist
leaders.39 The mostly false accusations of reactionarism did not stick, and the
“reactionary nationalist” SDT leaders were apparently the most popular politicians.
The party’s calls for Bessarabian autonomy, which were convenient for the
Moldovan majority in the province, and were well-received among that native
population, were hardly supported by any non-Moldovan descendants of the
colonists who settled in Bessarabia during the Tsarist period. This guaranteed
that SDT would get very few non-Moldovan votes. Some Ukrainians who had
been natives of northern Bessarabia for centuries voted for SDT, but the
ethnonational rift between SDT and the SR’s can not be doubted.
After the overthrow of the Tsars, the Moldovan population, or, more exactly,
a large part of it, through its political mass mobilization, achieved for itself the
national linguistic rights which the national movement was demanding (the use
of Moldovan in education and the church, etc.). It was increasingly agitating in
favor of autonomy. Elected peasants’, teachers’ and priests’ congresses, cooperative
congresses, a number of grass-roots village assemblies, etc., proclaimed their
support for not only the use of Moldovan in public functions, but also for
Bessarabian autonomy. There was even ethnic friction, which partly explains the
creation of the SDT political group. In the first (multiethnic rather than
Moldovan) peasant congress, the Moldovans felt insulted by the other ethnic
groups, and left the Congress until concessions were made to them in the area of
ethnic rights. The PNM activists were also able to make more Moldovans
identify themselves as Romanians.
Pro-autonomy rallies, in which thousands of people (mostly soldiers and
peasants) participated, took place. On October 20/November 2, 1917, there was
a meeting of the Military Committee. This body represented not 300,000 Bessarabian
soldiers, as most scholars have believed, but slightly less than 100,000, because
each of the 989 delegates to the committee were selected either one delegate by
one hundred soldiers, or two by one hundred officers.40 In fact, the number
300,000 probably refers to the entire adult male population 18 to 60 years old.
The body decided that a local parliament or diet, Sfatul Þãrii (“The Council of
the Country”), should rule an autonomous Bessarabia.
For the elections for the All-Russian Constituent Assembly held in November
1917, we have three published sets of statistics. One set was published by Oliver
Radkey in his updated study of the Russian Revolution, which covers a minority
of Bessarabia’s population on the basis of the calculations of the Soviet historian
Afteniuk (who is well known for his polemics against pro-Romanian studies
dealing with Bessarabia). Another set includes the partial, detailed results whose
————————
in Revista de Istorie a Moldovei, (Chiºinãu; ªtiinþa, 1991), no. 3 (7) for 1991 (April-June), p. 18.
40 Wim P. Van Meurs, The Bessarabian Question in Communist Historiography: Nationalist and
Communist Politics and History Writing, (Columbia University Press; East European Monographs, 1994), p. 59.
18
IONAª AURELIAN RUS
11
accuracy has been proven, and which have been published in Revista de Istorie
a Moldovei (“Moldovan History Review”) by G. Cojocaru. They cover almost
two-thirds of Bessarabia’s voters, but do not include the votes of the soldiers.
There are also allegedly complete results published by the Soviet author G. Ustinov
in the interwar period, which seem plausible enough since they tend to be
corroborated by the other data. Although Radkey does not indicate the districts
for which he has the data, one realizes (after playing with the numbers) that the
Moldovan numbers apparently includes the districts covered by Radkey’s data,
plus some new electoral new statistics. However, one can not be completely sure
because of some discrepancies in connection with the numbers, so I will also
include Radkey’s figures. Finally, I will also include my own calculations in which
I will add the military votes to the civilian votes of G. Cojocaru, thereby including
all the reliably counted ballots cast in Bessarabia.
According to the Moldovan set of data, between a little over 40% of all adult
men and women, or over 60% according to the second Ustinov set, participated
in the election.41 For the districts where the rate of turnout is known, 52.4% of
the eligible voters participated in the elections.42
According to my calculations on the basis of the various sets of data, the
National Moldovan Party won 2.2%-2.3% of vote (2.6% according to Radkey’s
data, and 2.1% according to my numbers). The province’s list of the Soviet of
Deputies of the Peasants, whose votes were almost exclusively Moldovan, won
36.7% of the reliably counted votes according to the Moldovan historians,
35.3% according to my numbers, one-third of the total according to the Soviet
interwar source, and only 27.2% according to Radkey’s data. The two predominantly
Moldovan parties obtained about 42.5% of all the rural civilian votes tabulated
by Cojocaru, and 38.9%, 35.7% and 37.5% of all the votes according to the
Moldovan, Soviet, and, respectively, my, numbers. The votes for the SDT came
from the rural areas where peasant holdings were of particularly small size. The
greatest mass land seizures by the peasantry largely coincide territorially with
support for the SDT.
One has to take into account the fact that the Moldovans represented about
52.1% of the population. On the basis of the county by county, and locality-bylocality electoral and ethnic distribution and turnout figures, to the extent to
which they are available, it would appear that a clear and undeniable majority of
the Moldovan voters cast their ballots for the two autonomist lists. However, less
than 1/5 (indeed 1/10) of the urban Moldovan vote went for these two lists.
One-fourth or less of all the Bessarabian civilian Ukrainian voters supported
a left-wing nationalist party, the Ukrainian Socialist Party, which won 4% of the
vote according to Cojocaru, 4.1% according to my numbers, and 1.7% according
to Radkey. The Socialist Revolutionary Party (SR), which was opposed to Bessarabian
autonomy, obtained 31.2% of the vote according to Cojocaru, 31.6% if one
————————
41 Oliver H. Radkey, Russia Goes to the Polls: The Election to the All-Russian Constituent Assembly,
1917, (Ithaca; Cornell University Press, 1990), p. 107-108, 153-158.
p. 10-15 and passim.
12
19
includes the soldiers’ vote, 33.6% according to Radkey, and 38.2% according to
the Soviet source. The SR obtained numerous ethnic minority votes (the bulk of
its support), particularly from southern Bessarabia. A substantial minority of
Moldovan votes seems to have gone to the SR according to Radkey.43 The
National Jewish Party obtained 10-10.6% (11.3% according to Radkey, 10.2%
according to me) of the total number of votes, at least 90% of the members of
the Jewish f the votes according to the Moldovan source and my numbers, and
6.5% according to Radkey.44
The closest thing to a Bolshevik electoral list were the Internationalist
Socialists (SI), which included Bolsheviks and Mensheviks. The SI were for this
reason generally branded as Bolsheviks by a part of the press, and by Radkey.
The SI list obtained 6.9% according to Cojocaru, 8.2% according to me, 10.1%
according to Radkey, and more 15% of all votes of the “workers and peasants”
of Bessarabia according to the unproven and improbable allegations made by
Soviet sources published after World War II.45 The Bolshevik votes were
overwhelmingly non-Moldovan, with a strong Ukrainian overrepresentation.
According to the partial detailed results, the SI (Bolsheviks) were popular
among the soldiers who voted in military polling places. They obtained 41% of
all the military votes, which represented 39.8% of the SI-Bolshevik votes in
those districts. In addition, many soldiers who voted SR (41.4%) were in favor
of the SR agrarian policy, but took the radical Bolshevik position that there
should be an immediate peace in the war against the Central Powers.46 These
Left SR and Bolshevik soldiers, and their comrades who were leaving the
Romanian front and passing through Bessarabia, especially after the October
25/November 7, 1917, Communist takeover in St. Petersburg (Petrograd), were
almost exclusively neither Bessarabians nor Moldovans, but from the Russian
heartland, and secondarily, from the Ukraine. This explains why only 2% of the
soldiers in Bessarabia voted for SDT and PNM.47
Overall, Bessarabia elected five deputies from SDT, 5 SR’s, one Kadet, one
Jewish National Electoral Committee candidate, and an InternationalistBolshevik.48 All the SDT deputies were Moldovans, and the other deputies
included 5 or 6 Russians and 2 or 3 Jews (including 1 or 2 SR’s).
The history of Bessarabia from November 1917, with which I have dealt with
elsewhere, does not concern us in this paper, except to the extent to which a
synopsis might help put some things in perspective.49 The deputies from Sfatul
Þãrii (more than 70% of whom were Moldovans), were elected, mostly
————————
43 Oliver H. Radkey, p. 151,160.
p. 14-15, and Oliver Radkey, p. 151, 160.
45 Idem.
46 Idem.
47 Ibid.
48 Gheorghe Cojocaru, “Cu Privire la Problema Adunarii Constituante în Basarabia în anul 1917”, part 2,
p. 15.
49 For more details and information, consult Ionas Rus, “Românii ºi Minoritarii în Basarabia Interbelicã”,
and Ionas Aurelian Rus, Self-Determination, Moldovan-Romanian Nationalism, and Nationality Conflict in
Bessarabia, 1900-1940.
20
IONAª AURELIAN RUS
13
indirectly, by about half of the Bessarabian population. The emergence of Sfatul
Þãrii on November 21/December 2, 1917 inaugurated the beginning of Bessarabia’s
separation from Russia. Sovereignty was declared. When “the right time” (January
5-13/18-26, 1918) came, most of the soldiers, whose political opinions I have
discussed above, supported the attempted Bolshevik coup against Sfatul Þãrii.
The Romanian troops called in by the diet defeated the Bolsheviks in January
1918, after which, for a number of reasons, Sfatul Þãrii voted for independence
(January 24/February 6, 1918) unanimously, and later for union with Romania
(March 27/April 9, 1918). At that time 86 members voted for union, 3 against,
36 abstained, and 13 were absent.
The evidence from both primary (including archival) and secondary sources
clearly supports the view that from the 1923-1924 on, and probably from 1918,
until 1940, half (between 1938 and 1940) or more (before 1938) of the Bessarabians
were pro-Romanian. The rest was divided between the pro-Soviet population
and a slightly smaller group of “neutral” people. The available evidence suggests
that most Moldovan historians have found my arguments persuasive.50 It is also
clear that most Moldovan-Romanian voters were clearly definite and conscious
supporters of Romanian nationalism by the late 1930’s.
It has already been shown that the period up to 1917 presents a Moldovan/
Romanian nationality that was a nationality in itself, aware of its identity. But it
was not necessarily also “for itself”, if one adapts Szporluk’s terminology.51 The
nation becomes “for itself” when its members support nationalist demands,
hopes, options, fears, desires, etc. This did not happen to most Moldovans until
1917, when, during the Russian Revolution, they showed this in a fashion which
was undeniable from the electoral point of view. Most of those Moldovans who
had a choice between more than one candidate from their ethnic group, chose
nationalists over non-nationalists, and the SDT over the PNM. These choices
were consistent with their mentality. Most Moldovans were clearly ethnicallyminded and proto-nationalistic (or, more exactly, in a state of transition from
proto-nationalism to nationalism). However, I would hesitate to call most of
those who lived in 1917 Moldovan and/or Romanian “modern nationalists”.
It is hard to place the Moldovans in the framework of Ronald Grigor Suny’s
models of national (“vertical”) and class (“horizontal”) integration during the
Russian Revolution. The Moldovans, unlike the Belorussians, Lithuanians and
Azerbaijanis, did have a national consciousness.52 Moldovan ethnic consciousness
was older and more universally widespread than the Ukrainian one, even though,
obviously, the Moldovan population was more inert and more illiterate.53 Suny
argues that most Ukrainian peasants voted for Ukrainian parties because they
preferred people of their own kind over foreigners rather than because of
————————
50 See the response of the editorial board of Revista de Istorie a Moldovei to my article, in Revista de
Istorie a Moldovei, (Chiºinãu, ªtiinþa, 1994), no. 1(17), January-March 1994, p. 29, 37.
51 Roman Szporluk, p. 136.
52 Ronald Grigor Suny, The Revenge of the Past: Nationalism, Revolution, and the Collapse of the Soviet
Union, (Stanford, California, Stanford University Press, 1993), p. 30-43.
53 Oliver H. Radkey, p. 108.
14
21
nationalism.54 In any case, the Ukrainian SR’s and other Ukrainian parties were
simply national offshoots of Russian parties with the same names. This applied
to many other parties of other non-Russian nationalities (Finns, Georgians,
Estonians, Latvians, etc.), but did not apply to the Bessarabian Moldovans.55
The Moldovans had the SDT and the PNM, which were not offshoots of any
Russian party. These groups were two genuinely Bessarabian major parties in
every sense of the word despite the former, or current, SR connections of many
Moldovan nationalists. The Moldovans were also different from the Armenians
because the latter had only one real option, the Armenian Revolutionary
Federation (Dashnaksutiun), but similar because that Armenian group, like the
SDT, was a group including people of various political ideas.
The issue of vertical, as opposed to horizontal, integration is difficult and, in
some sense, somewhat dialectical and irrelevant for the Bessarabian Moldovan
case. For the voters of the SDT, that is, for most Moldovan peasants, class or
land was more important than Moldovan nationalism. However, they refused to
vote for horizontal integration across the national line, by not voting for the
SR’s, Bolsheviks, Kadets, Mensheviks, etc. Instead, they preferred a Bessarabian
solution to the agrarian problem, and for a moderately, but unambiguously,
nationalistic program. We are dealing with oblique integration.
I would argue that the Moldovans should be treated as an ethnic group different from
most other peoples in Russia. Moldovan-Russian nationalism was definitely as much
central or southeastern European as similar to other nationalisms in the Russian Empire.
A large majority of the Moldovan nationalists were educated in seminaries, and
were religious and parochial or provincial-minded. Moreover, there was the panRomanian aspect. Many key Moldovan nationalists, including the PNM activists,
and some of the SDT leaders of SR origin, had been more connected to Romania
through their university education, through what they read and wrote, and
through their friends and mentors, even before the war. The program of the
Moldovan National Party of 1917 was written by a Transylvanian Romanian,
Onisifor Ghibu, who wanted to “channel” the Moldovans out of all-Russian and
Social Revolutionary orientations, and largely succeeded in doing that for most
intellectuals and activists.56 The SDT accepted the PNM program with few
changes and additions. Moldovans, to the extent to which they had cared about
all-Russian currents before, retreated into provincialism. Being interested in
Bessarabian autonomy within Russia, and in Bessarabian rather than in allRussian politics by November 1917, the Moldovans elected to the Constituent
Assembly simply did not leave Bessarabia to go there.57 Most Moldovans
started not to care about new Russian ideas and politics before they started to
separate from Russia. The switch to the Latin alphabet was intimately connected
with this, because it represented a change in orientations.
In this paper, I have dealt with how the Moldovan national movement appeared
and became a mass phenomenon. During the period from roughly 1900 until
————————
54 Ronald Grigor Suny, p. 48.
55 Oliver H. Radkey, p. 160.
56 Consult Onisifor Ghibu.
57 Gheorghe Cojocaru, “Cu Privire la Problema Adunãrii Constituante în Basarabia în anul 1917”, part 2, p. 15.
22
IONAª AURELIAN RUS
15
1917, most Moldovans had proto-nationalistic views, but passivity was dominant
before 1917. Nationalism and national mobilization increased through the
activization of the masses rather than through the imposition of an ethnic
consciousness by the elites, or by turning “peasants into Moldovans/ Romanians”.
The “old” and weak national movement, pre-modern and aristocratic before
around 1900, can be said to have given way to the modern national movement
of “commoners”, especially intellectuals, which emerged around 1905. Even this
movement was rather weak before the Russian Revolution of 1917. A large
majority of the Moldovan-speaking people felt that they were ethnic “Moldovans”
rather than “Romanians” throughout the period, with the percentage of the latter
increasing over time. During the year 1917, most Moldovan voters came to support
the Moldovan-Romanian national movement which was in favor of giving the
land to the peasants, and was fighting for national rights, and especially
provincial autonomy. The agrarian current, which was visibly stronger than the
national one, and distinct from it, in 1905-1907, was merged with the national
current through “oblique integration”. One might be surprised that most Moldovans
voted for autonomist platforms in the elections of 1917 if he would look at
literacy and other “development” statistics and at the weakness of the Moldovan
national movement; it is clear that the strength of pre-existing proto-nationalism
is key in the process of determining the growth of the national movement.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bruchis, Michael, The USSR: Language and Realities — Nations, Leaders, and Scholars, Boulder, Colorado,
East European Monographs, 1988.
Cantemir, Dimitrie, Descriptio Moldaviae, Bucureºti; Editura Academiei Republicii Socialiste România, 1973.
Cantemir, Dimitrie, Cronica Ghiculeºtilor, Bucureºti, Editura Academiei Republicii Socialiste România, 1965.
Constantinescu, Grigore, “Din Vremuri Þariste”, in Iurie Colesnic, Basarabia Necunoscutã, Chiºinãu,
Universitas, 1993.
Canciovici, Mihai, Domnitori Români în Legende, Editura Sport-Turism, 1984.
Feldman, Walter, “The Theoretical Basis for the Definition of Moldavian Nationality”, in Ralph S. Clem (ed.),
The Soviet West: Interplay Between Nationality and Social Organization, New York, Praeger Publishers,
1975.
Georgescu, Vlad, The Romanians, Columbus; Ohio State University Press, 1991.
Kroupensky, A.W., Bessarabie, Paris, 1920, cited in Ioan Scurtu, Constantin Hlihor, 1940. Drama Românilor
dintre Prut ºi Nistru, Bucureºti, Editura Academiei de Înalte Studii Militare, 1992.
Popescu, Radu , Istoriile Domnilor Þãrii Româneºti, Bucureºti, Editura Academiei Republicii Populare Române,
1963.
Pãun, Octav, Angelescu, Silviu, Legende Populare Româneºti, Bucureºti, Editura Albatros, 1983.
Rus, Ionaº, “Românii ºi Minoritarii în Basarabia Interbelicã”, in Revista de Istorie a Moldovei, (Chiºinãu, ªtiinþa,
1994), no. 1 (17), January-March 1994.
Rus, Ionaº, Self-Determination, Moldovan-Romanian Nationalism, and Nationality Conflict in Bessarabia,
1900-1940.
Urussov, Serge Dimitriyevich, Memoirs of a Russian Governor, London; Harper and Brothers Publishers,
1908.
VLADIMIR SOLOVIEV ET LE PROBLÈME NATIONAL
À LA LUMIERE DE L’APPROCHE MORALE1
CRISTI PANTELIMON*
Abstract. The study tries to evaluate and to find possible answers to the
question “May the post-modern humanity, not ethnic, may find the moral
resources necessary for it to exist?”, approaching Vladimir Soloviev’s major
philosophical ideas. The design of Soloviev is a Christian humanism, a true
humanism, which ultimately emerged the voice of Christian love for all
people. It is not an easy cosmopolitanism, indifferent to the plight of real
people or careless to them. It is an internationalism, based on Christian
personalism, which can be found elsewhere in the German Romantics, of
course, with less religious connotations.
Key words: Vladimir Soloviev, Christian humanism, Christian personalism,
moral resources.
«Le premier et le plus important système éthique de la philosophie russe» est
La justesse du bien (1897) de Vladimir Soloviev. Sa conception sur la nation et
le nationalisme a un caractère extrêmement systématique et clair, étant
construite à l’ombre claire de la foi chrétienne. Le texte du grand philosophe ne
connaît pas de tensions excessives, n’est pas soumis à des passions nationales,
ni à des craintes cosmopolites, il n’exalte pas et il ne détruit aucune des
deux dimensions du sentiment de l’amour pour la patrie (nationalisme et
cosmopolitisme — volets antagoniques d’une possible attitude envers les
peuples). Préoccupé par l’idée du bien chrétien dans l’histoire, Soloviev déplore
dès le début ce qu’il appelle le mal collectif qui se manifeste suite au
débordement des passions au sein de la société. La conception de Soloviev est
un humanisme chrétien, un véritable humanisme, dans lequel, finalement, surgit
la voix de l’amour chrétien pour tous les peuples. Il ne s’agit pas d’un
cosmopolitisme facile, indifférent au sort réel des peuples ou insouciant envers
ceux-ci, il ne s’agit non plus d’un internationalisme qui, en pérorant au nom de
tous les peuples, perd de vue justement le concret de chacun, mais d’une sorte
————————
* Senior Researcher at the Romanian Academy, Institute of the Political Science and International
Relations.
1 Traduction par Ruxandra Luca, ISPRI.
24
CRISTI PANTELIMON
2
de personnalisme des peuples, inspiré du personnalisme chrétien, et qu’on
retrouvera d’ailleurs chez les romantiques allemands, certes, avec moins de
connotations religieuses.
Le nationalisme et le cosmopolitisme sont, d’après lui, des attitudes exagérées,
partisanes. Le premier se résume tel que l’on voit ci-après: „On doit avoir de
l’amour pour notre peuple et apporter notre concours, par tous les moyens, à son
bien-être, et envers les autres peuples nous avons le droit d’indifférence; en
situation de confrontation entre leurs intérêts el les nôtres nous sommes obligés
de traiter ces peuples comme ennemis»2.
Le cosmopolitisme s’exprime par les idées suivantes: „Le peuple est un
phénomène naturel, dépourvu de toute signification morale; nous avons une
obligation pas envers le peuple en tant que tel (le nôtre ou un autre), mais envers
des individus, quelle que soit leur appartenance à un peuple ou à un autre”3.
Le philosophe russe n’est d’accord ni avec la première ni avec la deuxième
version d’attitude. La première donne une importance exagérée, absolue à la
différence entre les peuples (ce qui constitue une exagération), alors que la
deuxième ne respecte point la différence entre les peuples.
Le nationalisme signifie exagérer les différences entre les peuples (en accentuant
les traits positifs de son peuple, et le désintérêt, voire la haine envers les autres
peuples — en situation de conflit), alors que le cosmopolitisme nie l’importance
des différences ethniques au profit d’un individualisme abstrait, qui reste au
niveau de l’individu et n’arrive pas au niveau ethnique. Dans le premier cas
l’individualité des peuples est excessive, alors que dans le second on leur nie le
droit à l’individualité, une fois que la «réalité» concrète n’appartient qu’aux
individus de l’espèce humaine, séparément.
Evidemment, le nationalisme et le cosmopolitisme se définissent par leur
opposition. En raison de leur rapport antagonique, il est intéressant de voir si, dit
Soloviev, l’amour pour son propre peuple peut servir de bonne justification de
l’emploi de tous les moyens afin d’en défendre les intérêts, et de l’indifférence
ou de la haine envers les autres peuples, et, à l’égard du cosmopolitisme, si une
attitude morale égale vis-à-vis de tous les humains peut conduire à l’indifférence
envers les autres peuples, généralement, et plus particulièrement envers son
peuple.
Le nationalisme se justifie par le patriotisme. Mais il y a plusieurs formes de
patriotisme: il existe le patriotisme irrationnel (aveugle, qui nuit au peuple,
même si des actions sont faites à son nom), il existe le patriotisme stérile (la
simple prétention orale, la simple fanfaronnade patriotarde, «l’ivresse des mots»
patriotiques, sans conséquences bénéfiques au peuple) et le patriotisme faux (qui
n’est qu’un masque au service des buts égoïstes et ignobles). Ces formes
corrompues de patriotisme (faire attention à leur graduation) n’excluent pas
l’existence du patriotisme authentique. L’idée de patriotisme authentique est liée
à l’idée de morale, par le biais d’une comparaison de nature économique.
————————
2 Vl. Soloviev, La justesse du bien, Ed. Humanitas, Bucarest, 1994, p. 326.
3 Ibidem, p. 326.
3
LE PROBLÈME NATIONAL À LA LUMIÈRE DE L’APPROCHE MORALE
25
Prenons l’exemple d’une relation d’amitié, celui qui se déclare ami de quelqu’un
fait tout ce qui lui est possible pour que son ami acquière tous les biens
imaginables. Le bien-être matériel constitue un but justifiable, mais il n’est pas
absolu, puisque si les moyens mis en place pour y arriver sont ignobles, l’action
entière est atteinte de nullité morale, et en conséquence, l’amitié est pernicieuse.
Au dessus de toute considération sur le bien-être d’un individu ou d’une
nation, on retrouve la problématique des moyens mis en place pour parvenir à ce
bien-être. Dans le sillage de la grande tradition de la pensée antique, continuée
par l’approche chrétienne, Soloviev considère que les biens matériels doivent se
subordonner aux biens moraux. Exprimé différemment, toutes les actions visant
à soutenir de point de vue matériel le peuple ne sont pas bénéfiques. Si la lutte
pour le bien-être matériel du peuple est menée par des moyens ignobles, l’action
aura des connotations négatives et ne sera pas une preuve de patriotisme. Le
patriotisme ne signifie pas servir le peuple par n’importe quel moyen, et le
meilleur enseignement en ce sens est tiré de l’histoire, qui nous fait voir que les
plus grands peuples ont été ceux qui s’étaient mis au service d’idéaux universels.
D’autant plus que «l’histoire nous démontre au travers les faits le caractère
non fondé de l’idée même selon laquelle les nations ou ethnies seraient
originairement et définitivement porteuses de vie communautaire de l’humanité»4.
L’universalité sera, à partir de ce point, la clé à l’aide de laquelle Soloviev
essayera de déchiffrer l’histoire des plus importants peuples de l’Europe. Le
nationalisme même sera placé, tranquillement, sous le parapluie plus ample de
l’universalité, dans son acception chrétienne.
Si l’on regarde vers le passé très lointain, l’Antiquité, l’idée nationale y apparaît
extrêmement faible. Toutefois, le monde avait ses propres critères forts lui
permettant de distinguer entre les groupes communautaires. L’humanité ne
connaissait pas les différences nationales, mais cela ne veut pas dire qu’elle
n’était qu’une masse amorphe, homogène. Au contraire, les différences étaient
encore plus marquées qu’aujourd’hui. Il ne faut pas en déduire que la nation
n’est pas suffisamment marquée pour assurer à ses membres le sentiment
d’appartenance stable, mais qu’elle peut se constituer en forme de transition vers
le type de communauté du Christ à laquelle l’humanité tend. Même s’il ne
l’affirme pas de cette façon, c’est celle-ci l’idée du sous texte de Soloviev.
Lorsque la nation aura disparu, l’humanité aura besoin d’une autre forme
communautaire; il ne s’agira pas de dépasser la nation par le biais de la négation,
mais de la transfigurer dans une autre communauté, où les relations entre les
hommes auraient la même nature spiritualisée: c’est l’humanité chrétienne:
«L’opposition entre les nôtres et les étrangers étaient à cette époque-là beaucoup
plus tranchante et intransigeante que de nos jours, mais ce n’était pas le critère
national qui la déterminait»5.
————————
4 D’où l’on déduit que les nations n’ont pas été et ne seront pas à jamais les matrices de la vie communautaire
du monde. Elles n’ont pas été dès le début présentes dans l’histoire et il est possible qu’elles ne durent pas dans
l’avenir. Mais leur disparition ne va pas priver l’humanité de sa vie communautaire. La communauté, d’après
Soloviev, est vie spirituelle renouvelée par le Christianisme et en aucun cas vie communautaire fondée sur la
liaison de sang.
5 Soloviev, op. cit., p. 329.
26
CRISTI PANTELIMON
4
Le premier peuple analysé sous l’angle du rapport entre ses sentiments et sa
trajectoire historique est le peuple grec. Celui-ci n’a pas connu de sentiments
patriotiques proprement dits, ou, en tout cas, de sentiments patriotiques à accent
national et moderne. L’unique moment de l’histoire de l’antiquité grecque où le
patriotisme est sorti à la lumière est celui des guerres médiques. Cette période
n’a duré que quatre ans, car, avec la guerre de Péloponnèse les luttes intestines
sont redevenues dévastatrices. Ces luttes intestines ont fait que les petites
communautés de Grecs perdent leur indépendance, mais sans pour autant en
faveur de l’unité nationale, mais d’un projet culturel à valeur universelle. Ce
passage du particularisme à l’universalité sera suivi par Soloviev, comme on l’a
déjà dit, chez tous les peuples importants de l’Europe. Il essaye, ainsi, de saisir,
tacitement, une loi historique. Les grands peuples ne sont pas ceux qui se
renferment à l’intérieur de leurs confins ethniques, mais tout au contraire, ceux
qui se sont ouverts à l’universalité, même au prix d’une perte partiale d’identité.
Le prix payé pour ce sacrifice universaliste n’est jamais bas, mais il vaut
pleinement la peine de l’accepter. Les Grecs ne sont pas devenus une nation au
sens moderne du terme, mais ils ont donné au monde entier la mesure culturelle
de tous les temps. Il est fort probable que le renfermement égoïste à l’intérieur
du périmètre ethnique ne leur ait été aussi bénéfique sur le plan de leur
excellence culturelle.
C’est peut-être aussi le cas de Rome, plus spectaculaire encore, en raison de
sa dynamique: «En ce qui concerne Rome, son entière histoire s’affiche comme
un passage continu de la politique de la cité à la politique de la monarchie
mondiale — ab urbe ad orbem —, sans qu’il y ait d’arrêt sur un moment
purement national. Durant la résistance face à l’invasion punique, Rome n’était
que la plus forte ville en Italie, et lorsque son ennemi a été vaincu, elle a dépassé
subtilement les frontières ethniques et géographiques de la latinité et a acquis la
conscience du pouvoir universel et historique (...)»6.
Le scénario se répète pour tous les peuples analysés.
Même si les Juifs avaient une conscience nationale extrêmement soudée à la
veille de l’apparition du Christianisme (ils étaient, à ce titre, une sorte d’exception
à l’époque antique), cette conscience ethnique était indissolublement liée à la
prémonition d’une vocation historique universelle. Les prophètes d’Israël l’annoncent
dans le Livre de Mésie, et le Livre de Daniel «est la première philosophie de
l’histoire au monde», dans lequel, on le sait, on évoque la monarchie mondiale
et l’empire de la vérité du Fils de l’Homme7.
C’est à ce point qu’intervient une question assez sensible, que Soloviev résout
sans hésiter. La religion chrétienne a été souvent accusée de cosmopolitisme, en
raison du fait que son message ne s’arrête pas aux barrières ethniques, mais il a
————————
6 Ibidem, p. 330.
7 Livre de Daniel, 2, 37 „Toi, ô roi, roi des rois, à qui le roi du ciel a donné la royauté, la puissance, la
force et la gloire, 38 dans la main duquel il a donné, dans tout le monde habité, les hommes, les bêtes des
champs et les oiseaux du ciel, et qu’il a fait dominer sur eux tous: c’est toi qui es la tête d’or. 39 Après toi, il
s’élevera un autre royaume, moindre que toi, puis un troisième royaume, d’airrain, qui dominera sur toute la
terre (...) 44. Dans les temps de ces rois, le Dieu du ciel suscitera un royaume qui ne sera jamais détruit et dont
la domination ne passera pas à un autre peuple; il brisera et anéantira tous ces royaumes-là et lui-même
subsistera à jamais”. La Sainte Bible, Copright by Société Civile d’Études et de Publications non Commerciales,
Auteurs-Éditeurs, Paris, 1951.
5
27
un caractère universel. Pourtant, l’universalisme n’est pas cosmopolitisme. Les
Apôtres ne pouvaient pas ignorer l’existence des peuples à leur époque, nous dit
Soloviev, mais, d’autre part, les peuples avaient franchi leur conscience limitée
et guerrière d’autrefois. La pax romana fonctionnait, même si de manière
imparfaite, et par la suite, le message chrétien ne pouvait pas être limitatifnational, mais universel, au reflet du monde politique de l’époque. Ce qui,
encore une fois, ne suppose pas ignorer les peuples, mais avoir la conscience que
le message chrétien s’adresse de manière égale à tous ces peuples. L’universalisme
signifie garantir l’égalité de tous les peuples considérés positivement comme
unités concrètes, alors que le cosmopolitisme signifie égaliser les peuples en les
ignorant8.
La religion chrétienne a réussi, a travers le personnalisme, à concilier le
dilemme individuel — universel. “Grâce au Christianisme, la conscience fait le
passage de l’homme généralement abstrait des philosophes et des juristes, à
l’homme concret, personnalité pleine, en écartant de la sorte, définitivement,
l’ancienne hostilité et l’ancienne distance entre diverses catégories d’hommes.
Chaque homme, une fois ayant reçu le Christ, c’est-à-dire, une fois pénétré par
l’esprit achevé de l’homme, se dirigera vers Son visage qui s’identifie à la norme
idéale et à l’activité, en s’impliquant de la sorte dans la divinité par la force de
la présence du Fils de Dieu en lui”9.
Et encore, en parlant des actions de l’Apôtre Paul, Soloviev remarque que
celui-ci “était obligé de déclarer que Christ n’était ni Juif, ni païen, ni hellène, ni
Scythe, ni homme libre, ni esclave, mais qu’il était le «nouvel être»10, ce qui n’est
pas pour autant une simple réduction au dénominateur commun des Anciens”11.
On comprendra pour quoi Soloviev dit que la distinction entre le caractère
d’un peuple et le caractère d’un individu n’est pas d’ordre principiel12:
————————
8 D’après l’Église, le nationalisme combiné avec le localisme religieux s’appelle phylétisme, ou la
tendance à accaparer ou «nationaliser» excessivement le message universaliste de l’Église. C’est une
exagération qui menace les églises autocéphales, locales. D’où la raison qui justifie de lutter contre lui. D’autre
part, il n’est non plus souhaitable de nier le localisme et les traditions locales. L’universalité de l’Église
n’implique pas nier le spécifique ethnique. Voilà ce que dit, de ce point de vue, le théologien grec Christos
Yannaras: „On a beaucoup parlé du phylétisme qui torture les Églises Orthodoxes et qui est, comme je l’ai dit,
une vraie maladie. Dans le même temps, il existe pourtant un risque de plus, à savoir celui de considérer
l’Église et l’Orthodoxie comme une réalité abstraite. Je veux dire que l’Église a toujours été incarnée dans un
peuple concret, ayant sa langue propre, ses racines propres, ses coutumes propres, ses traditions….On ne peut
pas l’ignorer. L’Église se nourrit d’expériences locales. Pour cette raison notre tradition n’est pas une tradition
intellectuelle, mais la tradition des expériences du peuple. On ne peut pas s’opposer à ce caractère local,
spécifique pour les Églises Orthodoxes. Le nationalisme est l’exagération du local, ou, plutôt, il en est
l’idéologisation”. (L’orthodoxie sous la pression de l’histoire, Ed. Bizantinã, 1995, p. 49-50.)
9 Soloviev, op. cit., p. 333.
10 Epîtres aux Galates, 6, 15: „Car la circoncision n’est rien, pas plus que l’incirconcision; seule est
quelque chose la créature nouvelle”, Epîtres aux Colossiens, 3, 11: „Là, il n’est plus question de Grec ou de
Juif, de circoncision ou d’incirconcision, de barbare, de Scythe, d’esclave, d’homme libre; il n’y a que le
Christ, qui est tout en tous”.
11 Ibidem, p. 333.
12 Une nation est une personne, disait Adam Müller. Finalement, tel que Soloviev l’affirme, «le
Christianisme ne réclame pas la dépersonnalisation, il ne peut même pas accepter la suppression des caractéristiques
propres du peuple. La résurrection ou le renouvellement spirituel qu’il demande aux individus et aux peuples
ne conduit pas à la suppression des caractéristiques et des capacités natives, mais exclusivement à leur
modification dans le sens d’en renouveler le contenu et de les réorienter» (p. 334). Formulé différemment, dans
l’approche chrétienne les peuples sont pleinement (ré)configurés dans la mesure où ils respectent la morale
innovatrice de l’Evangile.
28
CRISTI PANTELIMON
6
autrement dit, le Christianisme accepte toutes les différences, leur confère un
potentiel créatif, mais, dans le même temps, se soucie pour que ces différences
ne conduisent pas à des conflits. La définition de l’humanité coïncide avec celle
de l’Église et comprend l’ensemble des traits positifs que les divers peuples
possèdent. Ces traits positifs sont cultivés par l’Église et c’est ici qu’on peut voir
la vraie universalité qu’elle réclame. Sur ce point, l’universalité de l’être humain,
en tant qu’Humanité, est synonyme de l’Eglise, telle que ses Apôtres la voyaient.
En approchant l’époque moderne, on voit que le cas des nations européennes
ayant atteint leur maturité, pleinement constituées, s’insère dans le même
paradigme des idéaux universalistes, les seuls ayant donné du sens au processus
même de maturation nationale de chaque ethnie prise à part. Les nations sont
d’autant plus elles-mêmes que les idéaux auxquels elles adhèrent sont «plus»
universels, sans pour autant être moins ethniques et moins locaux.
Les peuples de l’Europe occidentale ont été les premiers à se constituer en
pleine autonomie. Parmi ces peuples, dit Soloviev, le premier à avoir une conscience
nationale pleinement formée (au XIIe siècle, au travers la ligue lombarde) a été
l’italien. Le génie italien, pleinement forgé avec Dante ou Saint Francis, a
exprimé dès le début des valeurs universelles, sans prétentions unilatérales, de
type nationaliste moderne. Dante est d’ailleurs reconnu pour son attitude hostile
au localisme des communes italiennes. L’Italie s’exprime comme force créatrice
par des génies du calibre de Dante, Marco Polo, Amerigo Vespucci. Grâce à eux,
l’Italie devient une force spirituelle de premier rang en Europe. L’Italie doit sa
brillance et sa force à ces noms à valeur universelle, mais qui appartiennent
pourtant au peuple italien. On retrouve à ce point une preuve de plus du caractère
moral de la catégorie ethnique: en dehors du bien universel, l’ethnicité s’avère
être un récipient trop étroit et l’exacerber ne fait qu’épuiser le contenu naturel de
l’énergie créatrice.
Si les Italiens ont excellé en quelque sorte dans l’universalisme naturel, décliné
de leur caractère ethnique, les Espagnols, confrontés durant des siècles au danger
musulman, ont, en quelque sorte, dénaturé l’esprit du Christianisme et ont instauré
la violence à son sein. Certes, les Espagnols n’avaient non plus cette conscience
exagérée de leur caractère ethnique exclusif13.
Soloviev n’hésite pas à affirmer que la violence non justifiée des Espagnols,
pour laquelle ils ont trouvé des arguments religieux, est la cause première de leur
déchéance14. Au-delà des intérêts de moment de la nation, le fait de servir à
l’universalisme chrétien a permis à l’Espagne de survivre dignement le long de
l’histoire. Par contre, sa déchéance nationale devient une évidence lorsque les
forces morales au service desquelles la nation s’était mise ne sont plus aussi
fortes. En autres termes, la lutte excessive contre la Réforme (appréciée par le
————————
13 «Jamais ne leur avait traversé l’esprit de dire que l’Espagne était aux Espagnols, ce qui serait en fait
dire que l’Aragon appartenait aux Aragonais, la Castille aux Castillans etc. Ils sentaient, réalisaient et disaient
que l’Espagne appartenait au monde chrétien dans son ensemble, tout comme le christianisme appartient au
monde entier» (p. 339).
14 On peut comparer cette vision et celle de Ortega y Gasset, qui sans insister sur le caractère pécheur du
christianisme espagnol, voit dans la suppression de l’universalisme des faits historiques de l’Espagne une des
forces fondamentales de la déchéance ibérique.
7
29
philosophe russe comme un moment nécessaire dans l’évolution du Christianisme)
a représenté l’abandon de la voie de normalité morale et l’entrée de l’Espagne
dans la zone d’échec historique.
La correspondance entre la dimension morale universelle et la trajectoire
heureuse des histoires nationales se vérifie aussi dans le cas du peuple anglais.
Bacon, Shakespeare, Milton, Newton ou Penn sont les créateurs de la grandeur
de l’Angleterre, sans pour autant l’envisager! L’universalisme anglais, vérifié
par la constitution de l’empire britannique ou des États-Unis, ne pouvait pas se
réduire au localisme des îles britanniques. Probablement plus que dans le cas des
autres peuples, dans les grands actes historiques des Anglais, le caractère universel
est directement ressenti, prôné, accompli.
Le cas de la France est lui aussi facilement à déchiffrer. La période post 1789,
la période des guerres napoléoniennes représentent le comble de l’universalisme
français, époque de gloire de la France dans sa qualité de peuple civilisateur. Ni
dans le cas de la France il n’y a de lien direct entre sa force de rayonnement
historique et le caractère exclusivement national de ses actions: finalement, le
grand auteur de la gloire universelle de la France était un personnage dont le
sang qui lui coulait dans les veines était un peu italien!
Soloviev continue la série de ces exemples avec le cas allemand (et qu’est-ce
qui peut être plus universel encore que la philosophie profondément allemande
de Kant ou Hegel, ou la littérature de Goethe?), mais aussi avec le cas polonais
ou russe (les cas évoqués sont Pierre le Grand et Pouchkine). Tous ces exemples
servent de vérification pour une vraie loi historique:
«À son époque de gloire et de grandeur, tout peuple a pensé que sa
signification et son spécifique s’affirment au-delà de ses limites, au niveau de
l’universel, du supranational dont il ne doutait pas l’existence, en se mettant à
son service et en l’accomplissant par sa propre création nationale au regard de la
source et des modalités d’expression, mais pleinement universelle par son
contenu et par les œuvres achevés (…), d’où il apparaît que les peuples ne vivent
pas que pour eux, mais aussi pour tous les autres»15.
Mais qu’est-ce que cette vie des peuples au service de l’universel, des autres
peuples, peut-elle être, sinon une vie inspirée des lois morales universelles? Certes,
les modalités concrètes d’atteindre ces idéaux moraux peuvent être discutables.
On l’a vu dans le cas de l’Espagne, la volonté exagérée insufflée au Christianisme
tend à occulter le vrai message des faits des Espagnols. De même, l’universalisme
des droits des citoyens diffusés par la France peut être mal compris et mal mis
en œuvre. Aujourd’hui, au nom des droits fondamentaux de l’homme énormément
d’erreurs de politique étrangère peuvent être commises. Pourtant, dans la mesure
où les peuples croient à ces valeurs, il est évident que le lien entre morale et
dimension universelle-ethnique de ceux qui y sont attachés est très fort.
On ouvre de cette façon un chapitre particulièrement difficile de nos propos:
dans quelle mesure les déclarations d’intention des représentants politiques de
notre époque conservent-ils encore un lien avec les principes moraux qui ont
jalonné la politique de l’Europe dès sa constitution jusqu’à présent? L’Europe
————————
15 Op. cit., p. 345.
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CRISTI PANTELIMON
8
est-elle encore le lieu où la morale universelle est incarnée par les peuples
individuels? Du tableau brièvement crayonné par Soloviev on déduit que
l’universalisme de la morale, du bien, est ce qui a mis pratiquement en mouvement
l’histoire significative de l’Europe, non seulement au niveau politique, mais
aussi artistique, spirituel, culturel. Mais aujourd’hui, qu’est-ce que c’est cette
Europe encore peuplée de nations, mais incapable de croire à une dimension
morale transcendante? En quelle mesure peuvent les peuples européens prendre
le relais de la morale et la transformer en faits historiques significatifs? C’est une
question à laquelle le présent ne peut pas répondre (d’autant plus que le présent
semble ne pas encourager une réponse positive à cette interrogation); il est peutêtre nécessaire d’attendre que l’avenir déchiffre cette énigme16.
L’Europe actuelle, unie ou en train de s’unir, ne pourra pas se parfaire de
point de vue historique (nous y introduisons une nuance importante: de point de
————————
16 Il est à noter que l’approche moraliste des relations internationales est encore conservée au XXe siècle,
au moins dans les déclarations des hommes politiques américains de notoriété. Cette approche ressort, par
exemple, de la lettre envoyée par le président Theodore Roosevelt à Edward Grey le 22 janvier 1915, dans
laquelle il évoque le non respect de la neutralité de la Belgique par l’Allemagne en 1914. Roosevelt explique
à Grey (à l’époque ministre des affaires étrangères de la Grande Bretagne et adepte du réalisme politique) que
pour les États Unis le respect des principes de la morale internationale vaut plus que les intérêts ou les affinités
de moment: «Pour moi, le coeur de la question a été la Belgique. Si la Grande Bretagne ou la France s’étaient
comportées avec la Belgique de la même façon que l’Allemagne, je m’aurais opposé aux deux de la même
manière où je m’oppose à l’Allemagne. J’ai approuvé avec beaucoup d’émoi vos actions en tant que modèle
pour ce que pourraient faire ceux qui croient que les traités doivent se respecter de bonne volonté et qu’il existe
quelque chose qu’on nomme de morale internationale (n.s., C.P.). Je prends cette position en qualité d’Américain
qui n’est pas plus Anglais que Allemand, qui essaie loyalement de servir les intérêts de son pays, mais qui
s’efforce, dans le même temps, de faire tout ce qu’il lui est possible pour la justice et la décence de l’humanité
en général et qui, donc, se sent obligé de juger toutes les autres nations en fonction de leur comportement en
toute circonstance», (Hans J. Morgenthau, Politica între naþiuni, Ed. Polirom, 2007, p. 54).
L’impression que les relations internationales sont soumises aux principes généraux et valables de la
morale reste encore, aujourd’hui, reconnue. La nuance apportée au réalisme politique porte sur le fait que, audelà de l’expérience indiscutable de ces principes, personne ne sait avec précision quelles sont les bonnes et
quelles sont les mauvaises actions. En plus, cette reconnaissance rejoint à un certain moment le besoin de
prudence résultant de l’impératif de la survie nationale: «Tant les individus que l’État doivent juger l’action
politique conformément aux principes de la morale universelle, tout comme au principe de la liberté. Mais
alors que l’individu a un droit moral de se sacrifier au nom d’un tel principe, l’État n’a pas le droit de permettre
que la contestation morale des transgressions de la liberté empêche l’action politique de succès, inspirée, à son
tour, du principe moral de la survie morale» (Hans J. Morgenthau, op. cit., p. 51).
Les propos de Morgenthau ne sont point convaincants. Car on ne peut pas comprendre pour quelle raison
les principes moraux universels s’appliqueraient plus facilement aux individus qu’aux États nationaux et pour
quelle raison ceux-ci seraient plus dignes de survivre que les individus. Certes, une nation peut sembler avoir
un plus de légitimité de survivre aux individus en raison du grand nombre d’individus qui la composent.
Autrement dit, si les individus peuvent se sacrifier par «excès» de principes, les nations doivent être plus
prudentes, justement puisqu’elles représentent le destin de plusieurs générations d’individus. Mais, une fois de
plus, une telle idée n’est pas du tout justifiée et ne peut pas être démontrée dans la sphère idéale de la morale
universelle, où les principes sont souverains et ne prennent pas en compte la quantité de l’espèce humaine qui
les respecte ou non. Le réalisme politique est à ce point dépourvu de réalisme, sur un plan supérieur, car la
survie de la nation par le moyen de l’amputation de certains principes universels pourrait lui être fatale à une
époque différente, lorsque ces principes ne peuvent plus être éludés. Imaginons une nation excessivement
prudente, envieuse de survivre à tout prix, dans telle ou telle circonstance historique: justement en raison d’un
tel comportement de précaution, ne serait-elle plus faible et moins capable de survivre dans des conditions
historiques dures, qui lui exigent une capacité de sacrifice? La prudence évoquée par Morgenthau ne peut pas
exclure un certain défaut de prudence, dans le sens des risques encourus, au moins dans des circonstances
particulières. Le réalisme est la doctrine qui s’oppose au dogmatisme des relations entre nations. Mais le
réalisme peut aussi devenir un dogme, dans la mesure où il se substitue aux principes universels de la morale
et arrive à relativiser toute valeur transcendante.
9
31
vue politique elle peut être, au moins temporairement, une entreprise viable. De
point de vue historique, cependant, les choses sont plus compliquées (car par
l’histoire on comprend la mise en œuvre concrète des idéaux universels de la
morale) si ses peuples n’apprennent pas une forme dérivée du commandement
évangélique: aime les autres peuples comme s’ils étaient ton propre peuple. Cela
signifie pleine acceptation des autres peuples, totale fraternité entre eux,
conscience de la multiplicité ethnique acceptée au niveau européen, et, au fond,
redécouverte des racines chrétiennes de l’Europe, une entreprise avec laquelle,
malheureusement, l’appareil administratif et politique du supra-État européen
n’est pas d’accord. Dans la zone d’intérêt de la philosophie de Vladimir Soloviev,
nous dirons qu’une Europe chrétienne peut devenir une Europe unie, mais par
contre, une Europe néo-païenne, une Europe dépourvue de sa dimension morale,
exclusivement économique, ne pourra jamais être la matérialisation des idéaux
évoqués au niveau continental.
Le primordialisme est synonyme de l’universalisme. Le paradoxe
du particularisme et sa déduction de l’universalisme
Donc, les peuples sont, selon Soloviev, des particularités de l’universalité de
l’être humain, de point de vue biologique, et de point de vue moral, ils sont des
particularités naturelles du bien absolu. Le rapport entre la morale et l’ethnie est
d’autant plus important que cette dernière n’a pas de caractère primordialuniversel. Les peuples sont, exprimé différemment, des parties naturelles de l’être
humain universel. Les peuples ne peuvent pas prétendre un statut primaire dans
l’ordre de la création. Même si la morale est indissolublement liée au peuple,
d’une manière très concrète, les peuples ne sont, à une analyse plus avancée, que
des «fragments» moraux de l’humanité entendue comme manifestation du bien
absolu. Du peuple universel et bon se détachent des fragments vivants de morale
communautaire, c’est-à-dire les peuples concrets, chacun avec sa propre langue,
ses habitudes, ses lois, ses ascendants etc.
À la place de l’humanité constituée de la somme des qualités essentielles des
peuples, Soloviev met en lumière l’idée des peuples qui ressortent du peuple
universel. Les éléments communs de constitution et d’identification des peuples
sont l’occasion de la démonstration de cet apparent paradoxe. Nous savons tous
que Renan recherchait des solutions à la question de savoir ce qu’une nation est,
en avançant de divers éléments de sa coagulation: langue, territoire, passé
commun, intérêts communs etc. Les mêmes éléments concrets peuvent être
initialement passés au patrimoine universel, pour se retrouver après dans les
particularismes ethniques. Ce qu’on appelle aujourd’hui primordialisme est un
courant de réflexion cherchant à prouver que les ethnies sont des créations
primordiales de l’humanité, ayant, de la sorte, un caractère universel, pérenne et
achevé de point de vue politique. En tant que réaction à l’inventionisme, qui est
le courant contraire, niant l’origine naturelle des peuples, le primordialisme
retrouve des arguments justes. L’inventionisme ne prend pas en compte un
facteur essentiel du devenir ethnique, c’est-à-dire le passé. Etant donné que nul
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CRISTI PANTELIMON
10
peuple ne peut se constituer en dehors d’une aire temporaire vaste ou
extrêmement vaste, l’inventionisme (qui est une forme de volontarisme considérant
que l’apparition des peuples est un processus à date fixe, certaine, déterminée
par des conditions historiques strictement détectables) pèche par son autoritarisme.
Le grand avantage du primordialisme par rapport à l’inventionisme est
justement l’idée de passé, qui voile nécessairement toute ethnie, quel que soit
son positionnement. Toutefois, de point de vue logique, métaphysique et religieux,
ni le primordialisme n’est assez fort pour lutter contre l’universalisme chrétien,
qui voit les peuples sous l’espèce de l’unité d’une création primaire unique.
L’espèce humaine étant une et dérivant de la volonté divine, le primordialisme
ne peut pas prétendre plus que la gloire d’une juste vengeance contre la vision
étroite — idéologisée de l’inventionisme17.
Pour quoi le primordialisme serait-il une forme d’universalisme, ou pour
quoi les ethnies ne peuvent-elles prétendre leur primauté logique et métaphysique
par rapport à l’humanité?
Les arguments de Soloviev portent sur trois volets. Le premier est relatif au
lien biologique ou à l’unité biologique. «Pourtant, cette supposition (n.s.C.P.),
est plus valable dans le cas de l’humanité que dans le cas de l’ethnie. L’unité
originaire de l’humanité constitue non seulement le dogme des trois religions
monothéistes, mais de surcroît l’opinion prédominante parmi les philosophes et
les scientifiques18, alors que l’idée de l’unité de l’origine biologique est dans la
plupart des cas une fiction pure19».
S’il est impossible de soutenir, dans le cas de l’ethnie, l’unité ou la pureté
biologique, serait-il possible que l’unité de langue soit un argument à sa faveur?
Nous savons que la langue est souvent invoquée à l’appui de l’unité nationale,
ethnique, voire comme facteur essentiel de cette unité. Soloviev soutient, au
contraire, que la diversité des langues n’exclut pas l’unité de compréhension
entre les hommes. Dit d’autre manière, la langue est un accident engendrant des
différences postérieures à une unité originaire de conscience humaine. Alors que
la langue spécifique du peuple représente la forme différente de compréhension
entre les hommes, dans cette forme se moule un contenu unique, qui rend
compte du parentage latent entre tous les humains.
“La langue constitue l’expression la plus profonde et la plus fondamentale du
caractère populaire, mais tout comme les différences entre le caractère individuel
des hommes n’empêche pas l’unité réelle du peuple qui regroupe tous ces
hommes à identité distincte, de la même façon les différences entre les unités
————————
17 Celui-ci, à son tour, dispose de certains fondements découlant de la pratique politique immédiate,
instrumentale, surtout à l’époque moderne. Pour cela, l’inventionisme, dans la mesure où il est „valide”, ne
peut s’appliquer que dans les cas modernes. Mais à ce point aussi il se voit dépasser par la vision plutôt
compréhensive — grandiose du primordialisme.
18 Aujourd’hui, d’autant plus qu’à l’époque de Soloviev, l’argument de cette unité est soutenu par les
récentes découvertes en matière de génétique.
L’impossibilité de démontrer la pureté biologique de la nation est une constante de la science historiquesociale.
19 Op. cit., p. 476.
11
33
nationales ne peuvent pas obérer l’unité réelle de tous les peuples au sein de
l’humanité qui, pour sa part, a sa propre identité”20.
De la sorte, même si la langue nationale est reconnue comme expression
fondamentale du caractère national, elle ne peut pas se constituer en unité ultime
de celui-ci. Même si elles trouvent dans la langue leur façon la plus adéquate de
s’exprimer, les différences ethniques ne supposent pas une faille totale entre les
peuples. Au contraire, l’unité de conscience ou l’unité de vie spirituelle de l’humanité
est le gage de l’unité et de l’indivisibilité de l’humanité, au-delà de toute différence
de forme. Il aurait été inexcusablement erroné de la part du philosophe russe de
ne pas reconnaître à la langue ce statut exemplaire dans la définition des traits
ethniques. Mais, tout comme chaque peinture est différente par rapport à une
autre en fonction de la façon du peintre de manipuler son pinceau, l’unité essentielle
des peintures provient de l’unité ou de l’unicité du créateur (peintre) et de l’espèce
au sein de laquelle il a placé son entière création.
Enfin, si le sang et la langue ne sont pas des éléments suffisants pour définir
l’ethnie en tant que monade séparée de toute les autres, l’élément historique ou
l’histoire pourrait, probablement, assumer ce rôle? Il est vrai que l’histoire peut
modeler ou remodeler, dans une grande mesure, le matériel ethnique ou linguistique
qu’il a à sa portée, à un certain moment. Les traditions communes, le passé commun,
la communauté d’histoire, de destin, on l’affirme souvent (les théoriciens
roumains qui s’intéressent à cette problématique l’affirment eux aussi), semblent
être suffisamment forts pour souder, de façon indestructible et pour toujours, les
parties disparates d’une ethnie dans une unité indestructible. Tel que nous
pouvons le constater, le scénario se trouve ici inversé: il n’y a plus d’unité initiale
(le sang) qui se conserve non altérée. Par contre, il y a une unité post-festum, une
unité surgie de l’exercice de la vie ensemble sur des longues durées de temps.
La tradition achève ce qui ne s’est pas dès le début achevé. Le temps unit ce
qui n’a pas été dès le début identique: le sang et la langue. Dans le passé lointain
des peuples, le sang aura été «multi couleur». De même que la langue, avec ses
accents locaux ou avec ses origines diverses. Mais, suite à un long processus de
façonnage côtés à côtés, le sang et la langue ont acquis un profile unique, non
répétable. Ce profil porte le nom d’un peuple et ne peut pas se répéter, tout comme
l’information génétique d’un individu ne peut pas se répéter.
A ce point il faut insister sur le fait que, réellement, le processus est inversement
orienté par rapport au cas invoqué, celui de la génétique. Le temps qui s’écoule
fait que les humains se différencient de point de vue génétique, à partir du tronc
commun d’un ancêtre. Ce qui porte le nom d’unité individuelle n’est qu’une
différenciation par rapport au cas unique, à une unité primordiale. Pour quelle
raison les choses se passeraient-elles de manière distincte dans le cas des
peuples? Pour quelle raison les peuples seraient-ils constitués par des «rajouts»
d’unité et non pas par le fait de briser cette unité initiale? Ainsi, l’unité acquise
dans le temps est-elle que dans l’apparence une croissance dans l’unité. L’unité
acquise dans le temps est, fondamentalement, différenciation, et cette
————————
20 Ibidem, p. 477.
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CRISTI PANTELIMON
12
différenciation revêt un aspect d’unité, car la comparaison se fait avec les autres
unités apparues elles aussi suite à la différenciation. Néanmoins, le fait que les
unités apparues suite à la différenciation ne ressemblent plus trop entre elles ne
signifie pas qu’elles sont devenues ou qu’elles découlent d’éléments distincts,
mais par contre que le processus historique occulte souvent l’unité essentielle.
L’histoire est une différenciation qui engendre des unités apparemment
distinctes. La différenciation historique, si l’on s’exprime différemment, mène à
d’unités de rang inférieur par rapport à l’unité de rang supérieur d’où elles sont
parties. L’histoire est un processus dérivé. Le processus fondamental par contre
est la création originaire. Or, la création originaire est fondamentalement unité.
Soloviev retrouve d’autres formules pour exprimer la même idée: “Si l’histoire
nationale est la base de l’unité du peuple, l’histoire universelle ou mondiale
fonde l’unité plus ample, mais pour autant également durable, de l’humanité
entière. Plus encore, l’histoire nationale ne peut se concevoir que comme partie
intégrante de l’histoire universelle”21.
Finalement, si nous sommes conscients de l’argument premier de cette triade
(unité biologique de l’humanité qui prévaut sur l’unité biologique de la nation),
ce dernier argument est par lui-même compréhensible. Car, comment pourraiton imaginer que l’histoire particulière puisse être plus relevante que l’histoire du
Tout qui englobe le particulier (ici le particulier est le peuple et le Tout est
l’humanité)? Il serait impossible de prouver que l’histoire d’une partie —
humanité est, logiquement, plus forte que l’histoire du Tout — humanité. Certes,
dans l’histoire les parties sont extrêmement actives. Ce sont les peuples qui font
l’histoire. C’est celui-ci le sens dans lequel les peuples jouent tout le temps à la
roulette leur propre destin. Mais ce mouvement particulier très important ne peut
pas nous tromper: la scène, le fond sur lequel ce destin est joué est toujours celui
de l’entière espèce humaine, de l’humanité. Il existe des peuples si forts, qu’on
a parfois l’impression qu’ils veulent mener à bout des missions universelles,
comme s’ils étaient réellement l’humanité. En réalité, aucun peuple, aussi
universaliste que ce soit sa manière de voir son propre destin, n’a réussi à jouer
plus qu’un rôle partiel dans l’histoire de l’humanité. L’universalisme constitue
la grande attraction pour la vie des peuples — ce qui est parfaitement naturel vu
le rapport de subordination qui s’installe entre partie et Tout. Il est tout à fait
naturel que la partie soit tentée par le destin majeur, ultime, du Tout. Il est tout à
fait naturel que la partie (le peuple) souhaite le destin du Tout (l’humanité). C’est
la raison pour laquelle les aspirations de certains peuples sont du niveau de
l’universel. Mais ces aspirations ne sont atteintes que à court terme. Les Egyptiens,
les Romans, les Espagnols, les Français, les Anglais, les Russes ou les Américains
ont désiré et ont fait, pour des durées courtes de temps, figure presque universelle
dans l’histoire. Mais tous, jusqu’à présent (à l’exception des Américains) ont
dépassé ce stade universaliste ou prétendument universaliste et se sont retirés,
sagement, au local, à leur matrice nationale, limitée.
————————
21 Ibidem, p. 477.
13
35
L’universalisme s’assoit, naturellement, sous le signe de la morale. Or, c’est
la morale qui donne de l’unité à l’espèce humaine. Le peuple, tout comme l’humanité,
se nourrit de la même unité de morale:
«Sous le signe du Bien, la même solidarité morale non conditionnée qui lie
l’individu à ses prédécesseurs et à ses successeurs, en constituant ensemble la
famille normale, l’attache par le biais de ces liens libérateurs initiaux et directs
au Tout universel, tel qui est concentré dans l’humanité»22.
L’ethnique est, de la sorte, une des formes partielles de manifestation de la
morale. Partielles, cela veut dire que l’idée morale n’existe pas exclusivement au
niveau national. Elle est pourtant parfaitement représentée à ce niveau et ceux
qui croient que les peuples sont “dépassés” par l’histoire supposent une chose
qui est impossible: que l’universel peut se passer du particulier pour exister.
La crise morale que le monde actuel traverse ne découle pas de l’existence
des peuples, mais, tout au contraire, de la méconnaissance des forces morales
que les peuples abritent et qui, d’ailleurs, donnent du fondement à leur existence.
Les peuples sont des formes morales — s’ils sont authentiques. En qualité de
foules, ils n’ont plus aucun rôle moral. C’est, peut-être, la raison pour laquelle
aujourd’hui, dans un monde affranchi de la problématique morale, les peuples
sont condamnés à une sorte de mort civile. Il semble que leur mission ait fini.
Est-ce que l’humanité post-moderne, non ethnique, peut trouver les ressources
morales qui lui sont nécessaires pour exister? La réponse à cette question
conditionne la réponse à la question de savoir en quelle mesure est possible un
monde sans peuples.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Morgenthau, Hans J., Politica între naþiuni, Editura Polirom, 2007.
Soloviev, Vl., La justesse du bien, Ed. Humanitas, Bucarest, 1994.
————————
22. Ibidem, p. 478.
DER HESPERIDENGARTEN UND DER RUMÄNISCHE
GOLDENE APFEL1
DOINA FLOREA*
Abstract. The critical project of European identity has the natural
condition of a European uniform mentality. But association is far from
uniformity. The inauguration of a culture includes the transformation of
the inner core in reformed values: the weight of a historical moment is not
as extensive as the possible incorporation of diverse values and heterogeneous
elements, but in some decisive preponderance own values, which shape
the era and character.
Key words: European identity, European mentality, reformed values.
Die Geistigkeit der Völker enthüllt sich in ihrem Schaffen, das heißt im Gespräch
mit der Existenz, durch den Vergleich zur Ewigkeit, Energien anziehend und sie
mit Bedeutungen auffüllend. “Keine starke, gesunde Literatur, fähig den Geist
eines Volkes zu bestimmen, kann ihrerseits selbstständig existieren nur festgesetzt
vom Geist des betreffenden Volkes, nähmlich auf dem ausgebreiteten Grunde
des Nationalgenies” (Mihai Eminescu).
Der Girant der Echtheit ist das Selbstgewissen, welches die Zeit-und Ortlage
durchsetzt. “Den eigenen Geist im Wert zu setzen ist erstens vom sich selbst
entdecken bedingt und nur so dann in die Richtung des Ganzen zusammen zu
arbeiten. Sadoveanu, Arghezi, Blaga tun unbegrenzt mehr als ein paar — zig
Schriftsteller, die ausschließlich damit beschäftigt sind, eine universelle
ästhetische Sprache in Wirklichkeit zu setzen”2 — betont Constantin Ciopraga.
Als er den Grundbegriff der Nationalität als “Mittel zu einem höheren
Zweck” definierte, und zwar “der Fortschritt der menschlichen Zivilisation durch
Toleranz und Wissenschaft, durch materielles Wohlsein und Moralität, immer an
dem Kulturniveau eines Volkes angepasst”3, beschloss Titu Maiorescu eigentilch
eine Kultur. Die rumänische Kultur.
————————
* Professor of Cultural Studies at the “Lucian Blaga” University, Sibiu.
1 Rückübersetzung: Alexandra-Catrina Ciornei.
2 Const. Ciopraga, Personalitatea literaturii române, Iaºi, Junimea Verlag, 1973, Seite 10.
3 Titu Maiorescu, Critice III (1867-1892), Neue und ergänzte Auflage, Bukarest, Verlag der Buchhandlung
Socec & Comp., 1893, Seiten 174–175.
2
DER HESPERIDENGARTEN UND DER RUMÄNISCHE GOLDENE APFEL
37
Ein großer Historiker und Theoretiker, A.D. Xenopol, meinte, dass der Ziel
der Nationalkultur “das Selbstgewissen eines Volkes zu erhalten” sei, in Folge
dessen, gemäß seiner Begabungen, dieser dann zum universellen Fortschritt
mitwirkt. Als ein Bestandteil der Nationalkultur, genügt die rumänische Literatur
diesen Aufträgen. Es sprach sich über Voltaires Jahrhundert und über Goethes
Epoche (Geist der Goethezeit). “Warum würden wir, aus unserem eigenen
Sichtpunkt — fragt sich der Kritiker — nicht über Eminescus Epoche reden, oder
diejenige von Sadoveanu — Arghezi — Blaga?”4
Die Einweihung einer Kultur schließt die Verwandlung des “Innenkerns” in
reformierende Werte ein: “Das Gewicht eines historischen Moments liegt nicht
in einer so umfangreichen wie mögliche Einverleibung von vielfältigen Werten
und uneinheitlichen Elementen, sondern im entschiedenen Überwiegen mancher
eigenen Werte, welche der Epoche Gestalt und Charakter verleihen”5. Unsere
Wiederbelebung im kulturellen Sinne hat — laut der “Richtlinie” von Maiorescu
— im Geiste der modernen Kultur stattgefunden.
Jedwelche Interpretation des heimischen Phänomens schliesst, ab initio,
folgende Bemerkung ein: eine Literatur mit eigener Identität, die keinen eigenen
Raum, keine historische Bestimmung und kein völkskundliches Profil hat, geht
über die Begriffe. “Es existiert, in Folge dessen, ein genius loci, nicht als ein
irrationales, metphysisches Element, sondern al seine Synthese der psychophysischen
Faktoren, welche eine voranschreitende Realität definiert”6. Fachleute der
Kulturphilosophie bringen öfters die Beziehungen, die sich zwischen einem
gegebenen Raum und dem geistigen Stil bilden, vor. Lucian Blaga ist der
Verfasser des wissenschaftlichen Konzepts der “stilistischen Matrix”, dadurch
erscheint das rumänische Phänomen als “eine von Latenzen und Leistungen
umrissene Gesamtheit”7. Die Faktoren der stilistischen Gestaltung analysierend,
erkannte Lucian Blaga drei Arten der formativen Bestrebung: die individualisierende
Art, die typisierende Art und die geistige Art. Der Dichter, auch Kulturphilosoph,
zitiert die deutsche Kultur als vorbildlich für die individualisierende Art.
Goethes Sagen verleiht Farbton diesem stilistischen Muster: “Das größte Glück
der Sterblichen ist die Personalität”.
Auf ihrem Wege zur Universalität, muß sich eine Literatur durch eine deutliche
Note bemerkt machen, welche dann ihre Besonderheit festsetzt. Die Einflüsse
und die Vermengungen, die Ansätze und die Parallelismen, die Abstammungen
oder die Überschneidungen zwischen den Kulturen und Kulturstile haben
mehrfache Maße. Aber die Originalität einer Literatur besteht, insbesondere, in
ihrer Fähigkeit sich abzutrennen, sich zu unterscheiden. “Zum Universellen
geöffnet, vergleicht die rumänische Literatur alles zu einem ihrem Raum
eigenen Humanismus. Sie bringt eine forma mentis zum Ausdruck — das heißt,
dass verschiedene Impulse von Außen sich progressiv anders modelliert haben.
————————
4 Const. Ciopraga, op.cit., Seite 272.
5 Emil Cioran, Schimbarea la faþã a României, Bukarest, Humanitas Verlag, 1990, Seite 181.
6 Const. Ciopraga, op. cit., Seiten 15–16.
7 Lucian Blaga, Trilogia culturii, Bukarest, E.L.U., 1969, Seiten 255–256.
38
DOINA FLOREA
3
(…) In einem Wort, die Dauer wird immer erneut, sich selbst neue Elemente
hinzufügend, so dass die Botschaft der Kunst und der Literatur nur eine evolutive
sein kann. Es gibt keine “vorherbestimmte” Literaturen. Kräftige Stimmen können
immer aufwachen, von überall. Im Sinne der Schaffung, die Benennung kleines
Volk (von der Anzahl her) verliert ihre statistische Bedeutung; durch die kreativen
Verfügbarkeiten, ein eingeschränktes Volk tritt unbehindert im Wettkampf mit
anderen großen”8.
Die Literaturkritiker und -historiker haben bemerkt, dass das 19-te Jahrhundert,
das der Durchsetzung der Nationalitäten, ein Jahrhundert der erweiterten Öffnung
zum Universellen war. Das Interesse für andere Literaturen schwankt immer:
Alecsandri, Russo, Bãlcescu machten die lateinische Idee zu eigen; Kogãlniceanu
ist dem deutschen Geist geneigt; die Junimisten der ersten Etappe: Maiorescu,
Eminescu, Slavici, in den deutschen Schulen belehrt, verteidigen das deutsche
Phänomen, wobei der Gegenjunimist Hasdeu dieses heftig widerlegt; Macedonski
wird später gleich wie Hasdeu handeln; von den Persönlichkeiten der Zeit um
das Jahr 1948 beeinflußt, steht der junge Eminescu der Idee der Romanität bei,
um sich danach, zu einem späteren Zeitpunkt, der Idee des Dakismus anzuschließen.
Zwischen dem Orient und dem Okzident liegend, haben wir uns nach eigenen
Modellen gerichtet. Die Tatsache, dass in der rumänischen Literatur der
Romantismus, der Symbolismus, der Expressionismus einen verschiedenen Ton
haben, ist offensichtlich. Es spielt keine Rolle wieviel eine Literatur von der
anderen leiht, sondern in welchem Maße dieses Geliehene zur Verwertung der
eigenen Gabe hilft — bemerkt Constantin Ciopraga.
Der grundlegende Stil einer Kultur, verglichen zum Universellen, verwirklicht
sich, in acto, im Streben nach Kohärenz. Basil Munteano macht eine suggestive
Präzisierung: eine Synthese entsteht “aus einer langen Anstrengung des Geistes
in Richtung der Einigung und stellt den Begriff eines langen Labors der Trennung
dar, in der Essenz dann zu der Kombinierung der verwandten Elemente führend”9.
Der Mentor der Junimea Gesellschaft ist derjenige, der “die Entmutigung”
der Nichtwerte im rumänischen Raum verteidigt hat, zum Zweck der Unterstützung
der klassischen Werte, so dass der Name von Titu Maiorescu nicht von der Idee
der Synthese getrennt werden kann. Eine Strategie der Werte entwickelnd,
Maiorescu wird für die Eingliederung dieser in der nationalen Kultur kämpfen,
mit dem Ziel der Bestimmung des “Grundes”.
Das Postulat von Maiorescu zielt eigentlich die Festlegung eines universellen
Maßes der Kultur. “Durch Eminescu wurde, in der zweiten Hälfte des Jahrhunderts,
eine Synthese der rumänischen Geistigkeit hergestellt, von anderen Größen und
mit anderem Widerhall als diejenige von Cantemir vollzogen. Eminescu ist,
literarisch und außenliterarisch, eine hervorragende Mühe in Richtung
Konvergenz”10.
————————
8 Const. Ciopraga, op. cit., Seite 264.
9 Basil Munteano, Constantes dialectiques, Paris, Éditions Didier, 1967, Seite 16.
10 Const. Ciopraga, ibidem, Seite 268.
4
39
Über die Veränderung der ästhetischen Werte erläuternd, machte Eugen
Lovinescu eine kraftvolle Bemerkung: “Wir sind weit davon die Schwelle Europas
mit leeren Händen zu betreten und wir schreiten nicht nur mit den Möglichkeiten
eines originellen Geistes, vom Grunde und Form her, voran, sondern auch
mit festen Behauptungen, solidarisch untereinander, aber differenziert in
der Chromatik der Weltliteratur”11. Der Kritiker sprach für Gleichlauf, als
lebenswichtiges Gesetz des rumänischen sozialen Lebens definiert. Die
wesentlichen literarischen Werke der rumänischen Schriftsteller, im Patrimonium
der universellen Werte anerkannt, sind das Zeichen einer vollen Reife.
Die literarischen Versuche vor Eminescu haben den Verdienst Voraussetzungen
geschaffen zu haben, das Feld durch Bestreuung mit fruchtbaren Samen vorbereitet
zu haben. “Eminescu hat über den bis zu ihm existierenden individuellen
Koeffizienten einen Nationalkoeffizient gelegt, polarisierend und vereinigend”12.
Der Nationaldichter stellt sich als ein summum einer Geistigkeit vor, als “ein
vollständiger Ausdruck des rumänischen Geistes”, und ist im gleichen Maße ein
“Europäer seiner Zeit”, weil “das ganze metaphysische Europa in ihm lebt”13.
Das Modell Eminescu — unterstreicht Tudor Vianu — überschreitet das
Nationalgebiet: Der Emineszianismus ist viel umfaßender und viel nuancierter.
In aufregenden Essays, das Paradox benutzend, spricht Nichita Stãnescu über
“den Größten der rumänischen Geistigkeit”: “Eminescu ist für uns ein Geschöpf
gleich dem Meer, welches den homerischen Archipel des Odysseus mit Wellen
wäscht. (…) Eminescu ist der Name dieses Landes. Rumänien ist Eminescus
Name”14.
Im rumänischen Kulturgewissen ist der Emineszianismus das höchste
Wertkriterium. Eminescu bedeutet für uns ein “Identität ausdrückendes Paradigma”15
— unterstreicht Mihai Cimpoi.
Als ein hochkomplexes Phänomen, besteht eine Literatur aus unzählige einzelne
Gewissen, welche mit Hilfe der Sprache, sich im Feld des sozialen Gewissens
und im Umkreis der historischen Zeit wiederfinden, und sich durch das Wort
“die Stimme” und die Gestalt eines Volkes definieren. Die Sprache verleiht
Identität und entfaltet sich als ein vereinigendes Prinzip.
Merkwürdigerweise, kann die Sprache manchmal ein Hindernis auf dem Wege
zur Universalisierung darstellen. Weit erörtet ist die Schwierigkeit des direkten
Zugangs zu den Literaturen in nichtuniversellen Sprachen. Wörter, scheinbar
einfach, wie: doinã, dor, colind sind Teile der Kategorie der unübersetzbaren
Ausdrücke, welche keine Synonyme haben, und tief in der rumänischen Sprache
verwurzelt sind. Prinzipiell sprechend, ist die Unübersetzbarkeit eines der
Merkmale der Genialität.
————————
11 Eugen Lovinescu, Istoria literaturii române contemporane. VI. Mutaþia valorilor estetice, Bukarest,
“Ancora”, 1923, Seite 153.
12 Const. Ciopraga, ibidem, Seite 35.
13 N. Iorga, Eminescu. Gepflegte Auflage, einleitende Studie, Bemerkungen und Bücherverzeichnis von
Nicolae Liu, Iaºi, Junimea Verlag, 1981.
14 Nichita Stãnescu, Fiziologia poeziei, Bukarest, 1990, Seite 237.
15 Mihai Cimpoi, Critice. Fierãria lui Iocan, Craiova, “Scrisul Românesc” Stiftung, 2001, Seite 176.
40
DOINA FLOREA
5
Die Werke bezüglich der Theorie des Übersetzens heben die Unmöglichkeit
des Übersetzens der lyrischen Rede in anderen Sprachen ohne Rest hervor. Auf
dem Gebiete der Dichtung, setzen sich die Übersetzer mit der “Vergangenheit”
der Metaphern auseinander, mit deren enormen ästhetischen Ladung zum
Kennzeichen der emotionalen Geschichte gebunden. Mit Hilfe der
sprachwissenschaftlichen Vorgänge, welche auch der Semiotik zuzuschreiben
sind (die Bestandteilanalyse, die Entlehnungen, die Berechnung, die Umsetzung,
die Modulierung, die globale Ausgleichung, die Anpassung), wird manchmal die
Versetzung des Bildes aus der Quellensprache in die Zielsprache gemacht.
Als Beispiel, die fremdsprachigen Fassungen der Gedichte von Lucian Blaga
werden als ein glücklicher Fall der “Ausfuhr” des rumänischen Bildes betrachtet.
Im Gegensatz dazu, die Lektüre — in Übersetzung — der Texte von Sadoveanu
heben die zweifellose Wahrheit hervor, dass “Mihail Sadoveanus Werke oratio
poetica sind. Was eigentlich Musik ist, also unaussprechlich, geht in den
Übersetzungen verloren, wie treu sie auch sein mögen bezüglich der
Ausdruckskraft”16.
Aber der Bruch welche die Übersetzer in der undurchdringlichen Mauer der
Unübersetzbarkeit geschlagen haben, wird ständig erweitert, und die Anzahl der
gemeinsamen Werte der Humanität wächst exponential.
Über die “Odysee des Kampfes für die rumänische Sprache” erläuternd,
beweist der Literaturkritiker Mihai Cimpoi eine traurige Wahrheit: “Die
rumänische Kultur aus Bessarabien stellt ein einmaliges Phänomen in der Welt
dar: sie ist im Laufe von mehr als anderthalb Jahrhunderte geschaffen, in einer
verbannten Sprache”17. Für die bessarabischen Schriftsteller ist das Schreiben,
vor allem, eine “existenzielle Handlung”18. Ihr Werk bedeutet eigentlich Mühe
für Wiederentdeckung und Durchstetzung der rumänischen Sprache, für die
Wiederkehr auf die rechte Bahn.
Im Ausdruck Heideggers, ist die Sprache die essenzielle Rede, die Rede des
Gottes im Mund des Sterblichen gesetzt. Der Dichter macht sie durch seine
prophetische Ansprache bekannt, welche höchste Gewissheit der Volksidentität
wird. Eine hauptsächlich romantische Erscheinung, der bessarabische Dichter
Alexie Mateevici (in Cãinari — Tighina, 1888 geboren, und in Mãrãºeºti, auf
dem Kampffeld, in 1917, gestorben) ist der Autor der schönsten Hymne, welche
der rumänischen Sprache gewidmet wurde. Das Gedicht Unsere Sprache besteht
aus “Bilder einer großen Dichtung” (G. Cãlinescu).
Die bessarabischen Dichter der Generation der 60er-70er Jahre stellen ihr
Werk unter dem “Stern” Eminescu, die Liebe für das Volk, die Zuneigung zum
Glauben und zur Sprache, die Wiederkehr zu den Quellen verkündend — in
Richtung des Mittelpunkts der rumänischen Geistigkeit. Das Gedicht Auf deiner
Sprache, von Grigore Vieru, befindet sich in einer erhabenen Konsonanz, über
————————
16 Doina Florea, Mihail Sadoveanu sau magia rostirii, Vorwort von Constantin Ciopraga, Bukarest, Cartea
Româneascã Verlag, 1986, Seite 100.
17 Mihai Cimpoi, O istorie a literaturii române din Basarabia. 2te Auflage, durchgesehen und erweitert.
18 Idem, ibidem, Seite 342.
6
41
die Zeit, mit der Hymne von Mateevici. Der Anhäufung von glühenden Verben,
im Sinne der Identität, setzt der Dichter, am Ende, die Heimlichkeit der UnWörter, der Un-Sprache entgegen. Die Stille wird hier zum Identität
ausdrückender Protest: Auf derselben Sprache/ Alle weinen,/Auf derselben
Sprache/Weint eine Welt./Nur auf deiner Sprache/Kannst du Schmerzen
trösten,/Und die Fröhlichkeit/In einem Lied verwandeln./Auf deiner
Sprache/Vermisst du deine Mutter,/Und der Wein ist der beste Wein,/Und das
Essen ist das beste Essen./Und nur auf deiner Sprache/Kannst du alleine
lachen,/Und nur auf deiner Sprache/Kannst du dich vom Lachen trennen./Und
wenn du nicht/Weinen und auch nicht lachen kannst,/Wenn du nicht trösten/Und
auch nicht singen kannst,/In deiner Welt,/Mit deinem Himmel vor dir,/Dann hälst
du still/Auch auf deiner Sprache.
Im Dialog mit dem “Freund Europaeus”, in dem einmaligen Stil von Mihai
Cimpoi, werden wir — unvermeidbar — zur Frage der Veränderung kommen:
wie wir unseren Wesen in einem Gewissen von kontinentaler Größe integrieren?
“Europa ist der auserwählte Platz der vielfachen, vielfältigen, komplementären
Werke: vom geistigen und kulturellen Standpunkt, Europa ist kein
monolithischer Block — und kann auch nicht sein. Es braucht also die orphische
und zamolxische Dimension um sich zu vervollständigen und um neue
Synthesen zu schaffen” — erweckte damit Mircea Eliade die Aufmerksamkeit.
Die rumänische Kultur bildete sich, im Falle von Eminescu, mit der ganzen
Kultur der Welt, und “das Wunder” hat sich ergeben. “Warum würden wir nicht
einsehen, dass die Weltkultur sich mit der rumänischen Kultur gebildet hat, wie
es bei Eminescu oder bei Brâncuºi der Fall ist?”19 — fragt sich, mit voller
Gerechtigkeit, Mihai Cimpoi.
Das kritische Projekt der “Euroidentität” hat als natürliche Voraussetzung
eine europäische einheitliche Mentalität. Aber Vereinigung heißt bei weitem
nicht Vereinheitlichung. “Wird sind dazu berechtigt an einem von Wunden geheiltem
Europa zu glauben, welches fähig ist seine Einheit wieder zu erwerben. Dem
Rhinozeros von Ionesco, Symbol des Irrationalen und des Sinnlosen in der
heutigen Welt, fertig uns aufzuspeisen, können wir die Kraft der Vernunft, des
Heiligen, der harmonisierten Ordnung entgegensetzen”20.
Kontinent der “weißen Idealität, geträumt in blauen Farben”, erscheint Europa
als ein Raum der kulturellen Vielfältigkeit, ein “Hesperidengarten, in welchem
der Goldene Apfel verheimlicht steht”21. Aber wenn wir unser Feld mit Vorsicht
bearbeiten werden und wenn wir unseren Garten mit Schüchternheit reinigen
werden, die Anregung des Herrschers aus der Citadelle von Saint-Exupéry
folgen, werden wir bei uns selbst, zu Hause, die mythische Frucht, entdecken.
Seht, in dem wundervollen Garten der Hesperiden trägt der Goldene Apfelbaum
schon seine Früchte.
————————
19 Mihai Cimpoi, Europa, sarea Terrei..., Bukarest, Ideea Europeanã, 2007, Seite 12.
20 Idem, ibidem, Seite 202.
21 Ibidem, Seite 8.
42
DOINA FLOREA
7
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Cimpoi, Mihai, Critice. Fierãria lui Iocan, Craiova, “Scrisul Românesc” Stiftung, 2001.
Ciopraga, Const., Personalitatea literaturii române, Iaºi, Junimea Verlag, 1973.
Cioran, Emil, Schimbarea la faþã a României, Bukarest, Humanitas Verlag, 1990.
Florea, Doina, Mihail Sadoveanu sau magia rostirii, Vorwort von Constantin Ciopraga, Bukarest, Cartea
Româneascã Verlag, 1986.
Iorga, Nicolae, Eminescu, Gepflegte Auflage, einleitende Studie, Bemerkungen und Bücherverzeichnis von
Nicolae Liu, Iaºi, Junimea Verlag, 1981.
Lovinescu, Eugen, Istoria literaturii române contemporane. VI. Mutaþia valorilor estetice, Bukarest,
“Ancora”, 1923.
Maiorescu, Titu, Critice III (1867-1892). Neue und ergänzte Auflage. Bukarest, Verlag der Buchhandlung
Socec & Comp., 1893.
Stãnescu, Nichita, Fiziologia poeziei, Bukarest, 1990.
EMMANUEL LEVINAS’ ETHICAL METAPHYSICS
AND THE CRITIQUE OF THE PHILOSOPHY
OF VIOLENCE: THE CONCEPT OF THE OTHER
ABDENBI SARROUKH*
Abstract. Some words have the chance to be resurrected from the
confines of dictionaries and suddenly they become current and public in
being cited, mentioned in books and figure on TV and in official
discourses. The aim of this paper is to try to delimit the notion of the Other
in Emanuel Levinas’ critical reading of the Occidental philosophical
tradition from its Greek origins up to modern times. As ethical
metaphysics that subverts modern thought of violence and imperialism
which excludes and assimilates alterity, Emanuel Levinas’s work, mainly
his Totality and Infinite, traces Hegel’s antagonistic notion of the other, the
violence of theoria in Husserl and Martin Heidegger’s insufficient
ontological anthropology. Instead, he proposes the respect for the irreducible
face of the other that resists all pretensions of domination since it is
created in the image of the Infinite.
Key words: Emanuel Levinas, Otherness, ethical metaphysics, violence
of theoria.
“Je te cherche pour ne pas te trouver, car si je te trouvais, je te
perdrais, et je me perdrais.”
(E. Morot-Sir, La pensée française D’aujourd’hui)
While in Sein und Zeit, Heidegger analysis of Dasein’s Being-with-other falls
short of embracing the radically Other, his inadequacy is made clear when
Emanuel Levinas criticizes the former’s notion in his Totalité et Infini:
“L’ontologie Heideggérienne qui subordonne le rapport avec autrui à la relation
avec l’être en général … demeure dans l’obédience de l’anonyme et même,
fatalement, à une autre puissance, à la domination impérialiste, à la tyrannie.”1
Heidegger’s analysis of the other in public as another Dasein “different” from
the self is thought of negatively in the sense that this existence with the other
absorbs the thinking Dasein in publishes and hence is swallowed in that common
————————
* Professor of Political Philosophy at Abdelmalik Essaâdi University, Tétouan, Morocco.
1 Emanuel Levinas, Totalité et Infini: essai sur l’extériorité, Lahay, Martinus Nijhof, 1980, p. 17.
44
ABDENBI SARROUKH
2
and superfluous everydayness finding himself lost in the talk of the public which
presumes to understand everything. And in dismissing what is close on the basis
of familiarity, Dasein shows curiosity for the new only. In such a mode of
existence, the “they” does the talk of everyone and no one. Here Daseins become
interchangeable since they are active in the same anonymous “they”. Heidegger
says in this regard that” everyone is the other and no one is himself”2 in the sense
that the subject should make his own way to an authentic existence excluding the
other’s inauthenticity.
However, where Heidegger’s analysis of the other proves to be short of any
description of the other as radically other in his irreducibility and inaccessibility,
the mode of existence with (mit-sein) as Dasein’s — everyday-being — with
poses every other Dasein’s presence in a spatial position characterized by
besideness only (neben-sein), are necessarily as hostile as posing the binary
correlation of subject versus object. The latter correlation has its main origin in
the classical formulation of the pretension of scientific method or theoria that
assumes understanding and therefore mastering the known object announced
first by Descartes scientific method towards objectivity when he established the
dichotomy between Res cojetans versus Res extansia. Therefore, the analysis of
the other as radically other calls for a description outside the confines of Heidegger’s
limited analysis of otherness, with emphasis on language as epiphany in the face
of the other
Emanuel Levinas’ ethical metaphysics, particularly when dealing with the
relation to the other, is the appropriate framework within which the extremely
important phenomenon of the other must be considered in this paper together with
Maurice Blanchot’s thought on the Outside and exteriority, will also concern us.
So according to Blanchot, what belongs to and is the Outside as exteriority
can only exist in errance as the stranger, the homeless and the separate within the
field of the other. Thinking about the other in such terms is thinking beyond
Being as the Same. Heidegger’s thinking of the Same and Levinas’ questioning
of it constitute two modes of presences. Nonetheless our purpose is not intended
to force together opposite and incompatible models of thought, that of Levinas
criticizing and subverting Heidegger’s, as it is meant to indicate a meaningful
perspective of inquiry in view of what I consider the one primordial issue to
contribute to the promotion of world peace by encouraging an active, and open
responsibility towards the other, namely the question of the other not inherited
from the philosophy of presence since the Pre-Sarcastic thought, but rather from
the point of view of ethical metaphysics that goes beyond history and Greek
thought to interpret the creation of man or Adam in the image of God, giving
supremacy to the other over the self, serving the other instead of appropriating
him as a term to oneself.
The thought of exteriority where the other is posited as the Outside is
characterized by Levinas and Blanchot as a departure from any recognizable
————————
2 Martin Heidegger, Being and Time, tans. John Macquarie and Edward Robinson, Oxford, Basil Blackwell,
1978, p. 165.
3
THE CONCEPT OF THE OTHER
45
limits. It is a departure with no return to an Ithaca and an epic without Audia as
self-centered intelligence of an Odysseus and an ex-posure of the self in the
absence of the manifestation of Logos or Arêté, facing the seductive silent chants
of the sirens. The thought of the Outside also differs from the experience of
mysticism where there is a loosing of oneself in the ecstasy of the union mystica
or Nirvana in a union with the neutral or the totally Other as Atman or Spirit or
any principle, in that it negates any hope to recompense the expenditure spent on
the way out. It is an exteriority without interiority, a separation without union
and an exi-stance without a stance as in the fixed position of the ‘I’ . The “ex”
in existence is itself the without, the de-possession and negation of any
plenitude. In this connection Michel Foucault says: Cette pensée (the Outside)
qui se tient hors de toute subjectivité pour en faire surgir comme de l’extérieure
les limites, en énoncer l’absence, et qui en même temps se tient au seuil de toute
positive mais pour retrouver l’espace où elle se déploie, le vide qui lui sert de
lieu, la distance dans laquelle elle se constitue3.
The Other in Emanuel Levinas’ thought
Emanuel Levinas’ thought of the Ouside and the question of the relation with
the Other is partly related to the post-Socratic philosophy namely Plato’s and
Descartes’ in their ideas of the Infinite or the absolute good (Eperkeina tes ousia).
It is mainly an exegesis of ther ethical question in the Tora where he emphasizes
the manifestation of the Infinite in the face of the other. For Levinas Plato’s
positing of the Eidos in a beyond and Descartes’ idea of the Infinite show that the
question of the other is not only religious but philosophical when the former posits
the Eidos as the Good beyond Being. He sees that in the Occidental philosophical
tradition, concepts like Being, the Same, Unity, totality presence, Ousia, the One,
Consciousness, Self, subject, Dasein, etc., lead to the egology which claims to
possess the’ object’ and the ‘other’ and tends to submit them to the power of the
‘I’. Thus the foundation of Being as truth in the hands of the subject’s appropriation
of the object is challenged by Levinas’ metaphysical ethics. He attracts attention
to the oblivion of the question of the other as an ethical experience and not as a
concept within the framework of the metaphysics, since it relates the existent other
with its Arché, that is, the absolute Other as the Good.
Maurice Blanchot’s summing up of a typology of possible relations with the
other is interesting here: Dans l’espace interrelationnel, je puis chercher à
communiquer avec quelqu’un de diverses manières: une première fois, en le
regardant comme un autre moi, fort différent peut-être, mais dont la différence
passe par une identité première… Une troisième fois, dans une tentative de
relation immédiate, le même et l’autre prétendant perdre l’un dans l’autre selon
la proximité du tutoiement qui oublie ou efface la distance. Ces trois rapports on
ceci de commun qu’ils tendent tous trois à l’unité. Le “je” veux s’annexer
l’autre… reste une modalité (sans mode). Cette Fois il ne s’agit pas d’une
————————
3 Michel Foucault, La pensée du dehors, “Critique”, Juin, 1966, no. 229, p. 225-226.
46
ABDENBI SARROUKH
4
recherche unificatrice… Ce qui est enjeu, c’est l’étrangeté entre nous… c’est
tout ce qui me sépare de l’autre, c’est-dire, l’autre dans la mesure ou je suis
infiniment séparé de lui, séparation, fissure, intervalle qui le laisse infiniment
hors de loi, mais aussi prétend fonder mon rapport avec lui sure cette
interruption même.4
These are then two basic modes of relating oneself to the other. In the first,
the other is missing but is accessible, and the search of the ‘I’ is nostalgic,
unitary and comes to a full circle by appropriating the other and effacing
separation. In the second, the looked for other is forever stranger, unknown and
inaccessible because the relational space is a-symmetric and poses the other
outside of the confines of the ‘I’. The first points to the aspiration for the other
for consumption as for a lost unitary identification in what would Jack Lacan
say, lack and need; the second points to the metaphysical desired other as for a
desire never fulfilled. In other words, these two modes are two different
discourses and opposing thoughts of the other which is the aim of this paper to
make clear namely the Greek (Hellenic) as the philosophy of presence and the
other (Jewish messianic), that is, the metaphysics of absence.
While in Levinas’ thouhgt the self looses its sovereign coincidence with itself
and its identification where consciousness becomes triamphant and reposing on
itself. However, in front of the other, the self or ego expulses itself from its
repose. For Levinas, la vérité indiquerait ainsi l’aboutissement d’un mouvement
partant d’un monde intime et familier… vers l’étranger, vers là-bas, Platon l’a
dit. La vérité impliquerait mieux qu’une Extériorité, la transcendance. La
philosophie s’occuperait De l’absolument autre… Fille de l’expérience, la
philosophie, prêtent très haut. Elle s’ouvre même sur la dimension de l’idéal. Et
c’est ainsi que la philosophie signifie métaphysique et que la métaphysique
s’interroge sur le divin.5
It was Parmenides who first thought of Being as identity and unity. Almost
similarly, Plotinus thought of the unity of Cosmos with the subject. Later
Leibniz echoes Aristotle’s’ thinking of the Same. However Levinas does not
agree with such formulations and goes beyond Being as totality and the Same in
an identity with itself by thinking of identity in difference. Here he comes nearer
to Nicholas of Cusa’s view of identity in the idea of coincidentia oppositorum
when he thinks the relation between the finite and the Infinite or rather the
presence of the Infinite in the face of the other created in His own image.
For Aristotle, Being as the One, the spirit of principle, that is to say, as
Energia, is thought of in relation to the Many as particulars. Here Plato’s Eidos
and its imitation are handled by Aristotle as the One and the Many. Among the
latter’s definitions of identity and Sameness under the One and the Many is the
example he gives about the ultimate substratum of wine and water as
indivisibility in kind, namely as fluid, soluble, water and air. From these categories
————————
4 Maurice Blanchot, L’entretien Infini, Paris, Gallimard, 1969, p. 188.
5 Emaunel Levinas, La philosophie et l’idée de l’infini in “En découvrant l’existence avec Husserl et
Heidegger”, Paris Vrain, 1982, p. 165.
5
47
he draws the following conclusion. “Two things are said to be essentially one
when their definitions are indistinguishable”.6 The same definition of identity as
unity is taken up by Leibniz in his idea of Monadology as simplicity, individuality
and uniqueness obtained through the undiscernability between two things: “If
two things have absolutely nothing which distinguishes them from each other,
they are identical, they are the same thing.”7
In modern Occidental philosophy, Hegel’s analysis of the other in his
Phenomenology of Spirit, especially in his second part of the first volume,
emphasizes the force of dialectic and negation behind the self recognition and
behind the ever antagonistic struggle of the master and the slave as the history
of the free man’s self-consciousness. For Hegel the presence of the other as the
other opposite term is necessary for self-consciousness only in so far as the latter
comes back to itself in a narcissistic return: “La conscience de soi est la réflexion
sortant de d’être du monde sensible et du percu; la conscience de soi est
essentiellement ce retour en soi-meme a partir de d’être-autre.”8
The movement of the self to its self-recognition after fighting to death for
recognition in war applies equally to the other term who is taken as an object in
the eyes of the subject while he sees himself as subject and hence the conflict
and antagonism. Each of the self and the other are looked at in their own
essences. Yet they are so only through the mediation of the other. This mediation
lets the two find their essences in a reciprocal relation. Hegel says that “Le
rapport mediate constitue l’essence du movement negative,au cours duquel la
conscience se dirige contre sa singularité, qui néanmoins comme rapport, est en
soi positive et produira pour la conscience, cette union sienne.”9 Consequently
this identification with themselves of the two Hegelian struggling consciousnesses
is an identification in the Same as union and is obtained through the mediation
of the other conscience as an object of knowledge and hence assimilated and
subjected to the power of the central dominating and reflexive self conscious
subject. For Levinas, this is the second feature after the claim of union, in the
occidental philosophy of presence. Understanding the non-self as an object only
and as another essence subordinates alterity to the power of the self. Instead of
maintaining its singularity, the being of the other conscience becomes a theme,
a concept and an object seized and made one’s own appropriation: Se range déjà
sous un concept ou se dissout en relations. Il tombe dans le réseau des idées
appriori, que j’apporte pour le capter. Connaitre, c’est surprendre dans
l’individu affronté… Cet étranger (L’autre) entre dans un concept. La
connaissance consiste à saisir l’individu… non pas dans sa singularité qui ne
compte pas, mais sa généralité. La réédition des choses extérieures à la liberté
humaine a travers leur généralité ne signifie pas seulement leur compréhension,
mais aussi leur prise en main, leur domestication, leur possession. Dans la
————————
6Aristotle, Metaphysics, ed. and trans., John Warrington London, The Adeline Reass, 1956, p. 13.
7 Leibniz cited in introduction to Heidegger’s Identity and Difference, trans. John Stambaugh, New York,
Harper and Torchbooks, 1969 p. 10.
8 G.W.F. Hegel, La phénoménologie de l’esprit, trad. Jean Hyppolite Paris, Montaigne, 1941, p. 146.
9 Ibid., p. 189.
48
ABDENBI SARROUKH
6
possession le moi achève l’identification du divers. Posséder c’est maintenir
certes la réalité de cet autre qu’on possède… suspendant son indépendance.
Dans la civilisation reflétée par la philosophie du Même, la liberté s’accomplit
comme richesse. La raison qui réduit l’autre est une appropriation et un
pouvoir.10
It is in these terms that Levinas questions the liberty of the appropriative
power of the self vis-à-vis the other. And to possession, identification, concept,
self, wealth, liberty, etc., he advocates de-possession, separation, face-to faceencounter, other, donation, being a hostage. With regard to the narcissistic
movement of conscientiousness, he sees that when posing the other as radically
other, irreducible to understanding, the return to the self reveals itself as
pretension to bring the wealth and the complete possession of the other to the
extent of indicating not only egoism but also imper-rialism.
The tyranny of the ‘I’ over the other is exemplified in the Hegelian struggle
for recognition between the master and slave dialectic, in the Nietzschian will to
power, in the Heideggerian potentiality-for-being-oneself and even in the
Socratic maeutic, to name but a few. Violence and war are what comes out of the
supremacy of the philosophy of presence and the Same over absence and the
other. Therefore Levinas advocates the killing of the Greek god or father, that is
to say, the philosophy of the Same and totality issued from a pagan civilization.
Instead of violence, he repeatedly points out to the other untrodden path in
thought where metaphysics is an insatiable desire that never possesses a
complete truth as an adequation between logos and reality, nor does it pretend to
do so in consuming the other. Thus the metaphysical desire or ethical
metaphysics is posited beyond pleasure and need that Aristotle’s theory of
pleasure overlooks in his Ethics. The metaphysical desire is transcendental and
constitutes the essence of ethics in its being a transcendental intention. It follows
that this Greek pagan philosophy of the Same is against the Infinite, the
metaphysically desired. For Levinas the relation between the Same and the other
is far from being reduced to the knowledge of the other in the Same as the
Heideggerian unconsealment of an entity in Dasein’s understanding of its
existential structures. Such a relation is represented in Descartes’ thought as that
between the finite cogito and the Infinite in his Metaphysical Meditations. The
radical separation of the cogito from the Infinite and the impossibility for the
thinking ‘I’ to contain the Infinite is called by Descartes the idea of the Infinite.
En pensant l’infini, le moi d’ambré ne pense plus qu’il ne pense. L’infini ne
rentre pas dans l’idée de l’infini,n’est pas saisi; cette idée n’est pas un concept.
L’infini, c’est le radicalement, l’absolument autre.11
Far from positing intentionality where the subjective thinking ego is an
adequatio to the ‘object’ of thought, Levinas emphasizes an irreducible distance
between the two terms and the capacity of the self.
————————
10 Levinas, L’idée de l’Infini et la métaphysique, in “En découvrant l’existence avec Husserl et Heidegger”,
op. cit., p. 172.
11 Idem.
7
49
To contain more than it is possible for it to contain. The surplus of the Infinite
that overwhelms the confines of the ‘I’ points to the disproportion, irruption and
a-symmetry between the two terms. And in Levinas’ words there is a spatial
curve that disrupts formal logic implied in the equation or opposition of the two
terms inside a simplistic notion of the spatial dimension. The impossibility of the
self to break through the frontiers separating it from the alterity of the radically
other, is akin to Plato’s Eidos which has no fixed spatial dimension. Levinas’
view of the other is such that the alterity of the other cannot enter into an
opposition or a positing of the two identities; the other’s alterity being anterior
to egoism: Dans le rapport éthique, autrui se présente à la fois comme absolument
autre, mais cette altérité radical par rapport à moi ne réduit pas, ne nie pas ma
liberté… La relation éthique est antérieure à l’opposition des libertés, à la
guerre qui d’après Hegel, inaugure l’histoire.12
The impossible opposition between the Same and the other is due to the fact
that the latter cannot be enclosed in a totality or a co-relation characteristic of
being. Hence the ethical experience is produced beyond the economy of Being,
the Same and narcissistic return to the self. Its production lies in the departure
from the self towards the other (autrui) in a face to face encounter that cannot be
reduced to the understanding and to the synthetic thinking activities that
establishes identification between the two terms. Hence, this relation cannot be
qualified as being even an inter-subjective one, since ‘inter’ and ‘subjective’
point out to a symmetrical equation where the subject’s thinking is an adequation
to the object. That is to say, a-symmetry, heterogeneity, the overwhelming
Infinite and the thinking-more-than-the self-can think, are counter words used
by Levinas in his thinking of the ethical metaphysical experience beyond
essence and beyond Being. If Levinas establishes an irreducible rupture between
the ‘I’ and the Thou as the Absolutely other, this rupture seems to fade away
between the latter and the other (autrui). The other is posited in the image of “the
radically Other”. Hence the sphere of the metaphysical desire of the self for the
Infinite is an ethical one, where the other is not a mere photocopy of the radical
Other yet, once encountered face-to-face, the ‘I’ experiences separation and
weakness as Levinas says: L’absolument Autre c’est Autrui. Il ne fait pas nombre
avec moi… Ni la possession, ni l’unité du nombre, ni l’unité du concept, ne me
rattache à autrui. Absence de parti commune qui fait de L’autre-l’étranger… sur
lui je ne peux pouvoir… Nous somme le même et l’autre. la conjonction
n’indique ici ni addition, ni pouvoir d’un terme sur l’auter.13
The equation “L’absolument Autre c’est Autrui” allows for an experience
with the radically Other in ‘Being-for-the-other’ through the encounter with his
or her face. The latter is not so much mediation for the ‘I’ but rather holds
him/her in a mysterious retreat. The other in his/her otherness is also irreducible
to common measures with the ‘I’, because an unbridgeable gulf separates them.
They are so separate that neither Heidegger’s referential totality nor Husserl’s
————————
12 Emanuel Levinas, Une religion d’adultes, in “Difficile Liberté”, Paris, Albin Michel, 1963, p. 33-34.
13 Emanuel Levinas, Totalité et Infini: essai sur l’extériorité, op.cit., p. 9.
50
ABDENBI SARROUKH
8
analogical intuitive representation of the object of consciousness, nor even
Aristotle’s’ truth as adeqautio rei et intellectus between the intellection as
abstract knowledge and the object, can render without reducing the other/object
to the Same. Hence to the tyranny of the pre-Socratic logos and the adequatio of
Aristotle in the apophansis (something as smoothing), there is the face of the
other where language bids the ‘I’ to the obedience in its epiphany. Here the face
is itself the in-between and the relation that appropriates nothing for the benefit
of the ‘I’. Hence Levinas posits the face as “The Relation”(reli-gion ), “Religar” in Latin ,where the ‘I’ as a hostage for-the-other expresses the “here I am”
before the orphan, the stranger and the outcast. Levinas often cites the words of
Dostoevsky’s hero in The brothers Karamazov: “Nous somme tous coupables de
tout et de tous, et moi plus que les autres.”14
Such a being-for-the-other as responsibility and service is presupposed by
sociability and ethical relation which require also sensibility and being-ahostage-for-the-other (le prochain) in the face to face encounter with him\her.
The French word ‘’prochain’’ points to the closeness to the other in his/her
sociability with the ‘I’. In Levinas , such a relation must be understood not in its
reference to a side-by-side only but also to a more intimate yet separate face-toface presence . However, in the closeness to the pro-chain lies a resistance to
possession. Therefore to Heidegger’s primordially of the ontological over the
ontic, Levinas substitutes the priority of the existent over existence as essence.
Both of Levinas and Blanchot approve of Franz Rosenweig’s remark about the
essential character of the commandments: “Je ne puis pas présenter le caractère
divin de toute la Thora d’une autre manière que le Rabbin Nobe: et dieu apparut
à Abraham: celui-ci leva les yeux et il vit trois hommes.”15
The third term between the ‘I’ and the radically Other is a “mediation” that
increases rather than reduces the distance between them. In Sartre’s words, the
other is a hole in the world. His/her relation with the absolutely absent does
neither indicate nor signify the Absent. Yet the latter has a signification in the
face of the other as the neighbor (le prochain).This relation, which goes from the
face to the Absent, is outside every Heideggerian essence of truth as
concealment in language. Rather in the face, discursive relation is established
between the other and the self taking place in their encounter and it is the
condition of truth: La condition de la vérité… est la parole de l’Autre, son
expression… Aborder Autrui dans le discours, c’est accueillir son expression ou
il déborde à tout instant l’idée qu’en emporterait une pensée. C’est donc
redevoir d’autrui, au-delà de la capacité du Moi, ce qui signifie exactement:
avoir l’idée de l’infinni.16
Levinas defines the face as language. The latter is the way the other presents
himself/herself to the self: “Le visage d’autrui détruit à tout moment, et déborde.
Il ne se manifeste pas par ses qualités. Il s’exprime. Le visage, contre l’ontologie
image plastique qu’il me laisse, l’idée à mesure de son ideatum-l’idée adéquate…
————————
14 Levinas, Ethique et infini, Paris, Fayard, 1982, p. 95.
15 Maurice Blanchot, L’entretien Infini, op.cit., p. 188.
16 Emanuel Levinas, Totalité et Infini: essai sur l’extériorité, op.cit., p. 22.
9
51
contemporaine, apporte une notion de vérité qui n’est pas le dévoilement d’un
Neutre impersonnel, mais une expression.”17
The nudity of the other’s face is an epiphany and its manifestation is discourse.
Levinas’ metaphysics of the face describes the idea of immediacy as interpellation
and as a face-to-face encounter to be distinguished from the schematization and
the sensibility of contact. The abstraction of the mystery of the face drives from
the beyond. The face has the signification of a trace (Spur), the trace of the
unnamable and inaccessible beyond. It is the opening where the significance of
the beyond does not negate the ‘I’: but signifies beyond Being. Such a relation
between the signified and the significance is not correlative, formal or adequate.
The other’s presence as discourse and significance unlike Heidegger’s
significance that refers to the totality of the matrix of referents in being in the
world as unconcealment in logos and the opening of an entity. Levinas’ view of
significance is not a phenomenon offered to the intellectual intuition but is the
presence of exteriority as a presence that overwhelms the ‘I’. In the nudity of the
other’s face, the eyes and the look speak. Their discourse is an appellation from
a remote place; the enigma of an absent agent.
Such a dialogue as discourse in the encounter of the face of the other is
described by Blanchot in terms of equality and the mutual recognition of
otherness as: Le dialogue est fondé sur la réciprocité des paroles et l’égalité des
parlants; seul deux “je” peuvent établir une relation dialogue; chacun reconnaît
au second le même pouvoir de parler qu’à soi, chacun se dit égal à l’autre et ne
voit dans l’autre qu’un autre “Moi”.18
Yet in Levinas the incommensurable separation negates the possibility of
symmetry and common measures between them and the ‘I’ is in a nude relation,
without any mediation and in an immediate exposure to the other and where
infinite distance or the presence of the infinite manifests itself in the resisting
detour of the face. As such, the face-to-face encounter is an authentic relation
where the power of the ‘I’ is questioned by the ambiguity of the epiphany of the
face. The latter’s resistance lies in its expression of the presence of an absence.
As Levinas says: La vraie extériorité est dans ce regard qui m’interdit toute
conquête. Nom pas que la conquête défie mes pouvoirs trop faibles, mais je peux
plus pouvoir:la structure de ma liberté se renverse totalement ... Ici s’établit…
ce qui arrête l’impérialisme irrésistible du Même et du Moi. Nous appelons
visage l’épiphanie de ce qui peut se présenter aussi directement à un Moi et, par
la même, aussi extérieurement.19
The assertion of the interiority in the wished for face-to-face, is an encroaching
upon the alterity of the other since it supposes a “vis-à-vis”, a homogeneous
equality with other. In this context Blanchot argues that: Cette expression est
trompeuse; elle l’est doublement. En premier lieu parce qu’un tel vis-à-vis n’est
————————
17 Ibid., p. 21-22.
18 Emanuel Levinas, La trace de l’Autre, in “En découvrant l’existence avec Husserl et Heidegger”,
op.cit., p. 200.
19 Levinas, La philosophie et l’idée de l’infini, in “En découvrant l’existence avec Husserl et Heidegger”,
op.cit., p., 173.
52
ABDENBI SARROUKH
10
pas l’affrontement de deux figures, mais l’accès de l’homme en son étrangeté
par la parole. En second lieu, parce que dans un tel face-à-face, ce qu’il rend
grave le mouvement ou l’homme se présente directement à l’homme… C’est
qu’il n’y a pas de réciprocité de rapports: je ne sis jamais en face de celui qui
me fat face; ma façon de faire face à celui qui vient en face n’est pas une
confrontation égale de présences. L’égalité est irréductible.20
To sum up we can say that Heidegger’s pre-Socratic logos is undermined by
Levinas since it is still based on the propositional predicative logos that assumes
the structure of positing something-as something. On the contrary the ethical
metaphysics of a language as Levinas advocates the de-possession of the ego
from, appropriating or positing the other as a subject. Whereas the predication
substitutes the signs to things by gathering them into the identity of the One, it
poses a possibility and the Grund to justify any appropriation with the pretension
to thematise the subject’s intentionality. As such the predication proves to be
pretentious: “Non pas que cet” en tant que “ éloigne le pensant de “l’être en
original” comme l’intention “significative” de Husserl… L’entendement de ceci
en tant que cela, n’entend pas l’objet, mais son sens… Le sens ni donné ni non
donné, est entendu. Mais c’est à partir de son sens qu’un être se manifeste
comme être… Le mystère de la conscience ne se résume pas en ce que “toute
conscience est conscience de quelque chose. “L’intentionnalité est pensée et
entendement, prétention, le fait de nommer l’identique, de proclamer quelque
chose en temps que quelques chose… La formule est Heideggérienne.”21
Hence Levians in his Autrement qu’etre ou au-dela de l’essence takes the
signification of the saying as going beyond the said and that it is not ontology or
essence related to the subject who says something. On the contrary it is the
signification of the Saying that goes beyond essence gathered in the saying
which could justify the exposition of being or ontology. So the ethical existence
near the other or in proximity signifies more than what a mere propositional
predication in an apophanitic discourse. For Levinas such nearness from the
other allows for a resistance of the other in one’s nearness to him and therefore
becomes an ex-postion to Being rather than an opening on Being. It lies outside
spatial mediation and hence the impossibility to measure and comprehend the
mystery of the other’s existence: “La proximité n’est pas un état, un ropos, mais,
précisament inquietude, non-lieu, hors lieu du repos bouleversant le calm de la
non-ubiquity de d’être qui se fait repos en un lieu… La proximité ne se fige pas
en structure sinon… elle retombe en simple relation.”22 Here the example of the
sense of election illustrates the ethical responsibility of the practice of the
avatars in Buddhism, the service of others in Christianity, the dedication to
others in Sufism, the erasure of subjectivity in its proximity to the other goes
beyond intentionality to a compassionate inter-subjectivity that feels rather than
thinks the existence of the other. And with respect to the superiority of the
————————
20 Maurice Blanchot, L’entretien Infini, op.cit., p. 89.
21 Levinas, Langage et proximité, in “En découvrant l’existence avec Husserl et Heidegger”, op.cit.,
p. 218-219.
22 Levinas, Autrement qu’être ou au-delà de l’essence Lahay, Martinus Nijhof, 178, p. 103.
11
53
other’s face in relation to the subject elected to service Levinas says that: “dans
la proximité s’etend un commandement venu comme d’un passé jamais present,
qui n’a commencé dans aucune libérté. Cette façon du prochain est visage.”23
Here the other becomes neither a subject nor an object but an articulation itself of
the encounter. The other is what makes meeting in proximity a separation and an
interval is established in-between to resist the pretension of the ego to appropriate
the other to oneself. It is this in-between that represents the space of significance.
The essence of language that deploys itself in the interval, consists neither in a
predicative proposition nor in the doxa of the appophanisis that announces
adequation between what-is-said-in-the-talk and the Being it encounter is, epso
facto, language addressed to the self. The presence for the other is an engagement,
a service, an election bound to be responsible for the other and a presence-for-theother that experiences infinitude or the infinite in the face of the other.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Aristotle, Metaphysics, ed. and trans., John Warrington London, The Adeline Reass, 1956.
Blanchot, Maurice, L’entretien Infini, Paris, Gallimard, 1969.
Foucault, Michel, La pensée du dehors, “Critique”, Juin, 1966.
Hegel, G.W.F., La phénoménologie de l’esprit, trad. Jean Hyppolite Paris, Montaigne, 1941.
Heidegger, Martin, Identity and Difference, trans. John Stambaugh, New York, Harper and Torchbooks, 1969.
Heidegger, Martin, Being and Time, tans. John Macquarie and Edward Robinson, Oxford, Basil Blackwell,
1978.
Levinas, Emanuel, Une religion d’adultes, in “Difficile Liberté”, Paris, Albin Michel, 1963.
Levinas, Emanuel, Totalité et Infini: essai sur l’extériorité, Lahay, Martinus Nijhof, 1980.
Levinas, Emanuel, La philosophie et l’idée de l’infini in “En découvrant l’existence avec Husserl et
Heidegger”, Paris Vrain, 1982.
————————
23 Levinas, ibid., p. 12.
THE FEMINIST IDENTITY AS A POLITICAL EDGE:
THE PROJECT OF ENGENDERING DEMOCRACY
HENRIETA ANIªOARA ªERBAN*
Abstract. The author presents a perspective of feminist identity as sustained
by Anne Philips in her work Engendering Democracy and within the
complex context of the works reshaping political theory from a feminist
perspective. A special attention is given to the interplay between a contesting
activity and one aiming to reshape politics and political theory. Private
and particular gender constraints shape the scope and the relevance of
the public involvement, and thus the meanings of “freedom”, “citizenship”,
“oppression”, etc. Glimpses of certain observations made by Slavenka
Drakulic, Kate Millet, Mihaela Miroiu, Carol Pateman, Sheila Rowbotham,
and Iris Young are underlined, too.
Key works: feminist identity, reshaping political theory, feminist vindication.
The topic of feminist and gender identity as political identity is not a radically
new subject in political science, but it continues to be relevant and actual, to a
greater or to a lesser extent, strictly related to the profile of patriarchy for the
local political power. Everywhere in the world, due to the social and political
realities and expectations in contemporary societies gender and feminist identity
remain meaningful in terms of interpreting and alleviating contemporary social
and political inequalities.
Feminist identity as political identity aims to redefine terms such as “political”
and “politics” along with the relationship between public and private and the
critique of (liberal) democracy. “Feminist identity” is a generic phrase for a range of
feminist identities situated in various relations with the women’s movement, the
women’s rights, the gender issues and the slogan “the personal is political.” I am
sustaining here that feminist identity makes more sense to be conceived in
relation to feminist action, even if merely discursive, and a political project of
(revolutionary) reform, again, even if merely in a discursive state, while all these
cannot be understood outside a theoretical tide reinterpreting political theory.
Matters related to who looks after the children, who goes “out” to work and
for how long are private affairs that influence the ability to be present in the
————————
* Senior Researcher at the Institute of Political Science and International Relations of the Romanian
Academy.
2
THE FEMINIST IDENTITY AS A POLITICAL EDGE
55
public space, to be informed about public decisions, to comment upon them and,
more importantly, to pressure in order to have a say in (these) decisions. From
this perspective, feminist identity is with necessity build up around contestation.
Anne Phillips is a first rank feminist writer construing the aspects of social
inequity to shape the project of engendering democracy. This project implies the
need to reconsider the rich and diverse feminist and gender literature available
in order to identify the wrongs of society and the possibilities to correct them in
accordance with the guiding lines represented by the implementation of
“dignity”, “freedom” and “rights” within family and society, and in politics and law.
Most of the authors come from the Anglo-Saxon world and are, understandably,
interested in concepts related to “patriarchy”, “gender equality”, “ethics of care”,
“freedom”, “rights”, “independence”, “citizenship”, “privacy”, ”empowerment” that
are central for the liberal and democratic political theory. In the environments
beyond Europe and the USA such concepts are not only as well relevant, but also
even more “revolutionary” in nature. The political marginality experienced by
women has a common ground with that experienced by people due to ethnicity
and race. Investigating this common ground a “politics of difference” becomes
both clearer and necessary. The gender blind conceptualization of the “rights”,
“freedom”, “citizenship”, “privacy”, “public/private dichotomy” does nothing else
but privilege the (white) male.
A first observation indicates that feminist identity as a political identity was
shaped by the American left daring in the 60’s to embrace women’s problems as
political problems, apparently unrelated to the complexities of the act of
government nor to these of elections or to the theories of state. They are closely
involved with the structures of exploitation functioning when women are treated
either as sexual objects, or as persons depending materially on men because they
are not paid as well as men and thus incapable of living on their own. Anne
Phillips nuances this observation quoting Kate Millet who defined politics in her
work Sexual Politics (1970) as the essence of politics and the patriarchal government
as “the institution whereby that half of the population which is female is controlled
by the half which is male.”1
Another observation shows that whenever politics is redefined, so is democracy.
Sheila Rowbotham noticed from this perspective that feminism directs attention
toward everyday life, hence widening the substantial scope of democracy to
include “domestic inequality, identity, control over sexuality, challenge to cultural
representation, community control over state welfare and more equal access to
public resources.”2
Anne Phillips explains how private constrains shape public involvement. In
all the countries women have the main responsibility in caring for household and
children. They play important roles in agriculture, textile, electronics and computer
parts, in most cases without the flexibility of part-time jobs. And, as the
————————
1 Kate Millet, Sexual Politics, Johnatan Cape, 1970, p.25, apud Anne Phillips, Engendering Democracy,
Cambridge, Polity Press, 1991, p. 94.
2 Sheila Rowbotham, Dreams and Dilemmas, Virago, 1983, pp.85-86, apud Anne Phillips, Engendering
Democracy, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1991, p. 95.
56
HENRIETA ANIªOARA ªERBAN
3
Romanian political scientist Mihaela Miroiu3 and other authors have noticed in
several occasions in the public sphere and in interviews, with rare exceptions,
when “reading” the political dimension of the social life, women do the actual
work and men are often in supervising and decision making positions. Slavenka
Drakulic captures this aspect in a more literary form: “Women’s lives, by no
means spectacular, banal in fact, say as much about politics as no end of
theoretical political analysis. I sat in their kitchens — because that was always
the warmest room in their poorly heated apartments — listening to their life
stories, cooking with them, drinking coffee when they had any, talking about
their children and their men, about how they hoped to buy a new refrigerator, or
a new stove or a new car. (…) We had all been forced to endure the same
communist system, a system that ground up people’s lives in a similar way
wherever you lived; then, of course, as women, we shared a perspective on life
that was different from men’s. Ours was trivial, the ‘view from below’. But trivia
is political.”4 From this perspective, the personal is relevant as legitimate
grounds for political action. In this sense, Mihaela Miroiu also wrote in her
recent book Nepreþuitele femei. Publicisticã feministã (Priceless Women. Feminist
Newspaper Writings) meaningful comments on the patriarchal transformation of
the concept of Trivia — the mythological Tree of Life — into that of “triviality”
(something that lacks importance) and especially interesting is the way she
changes it back, imposing the trivial female experience as valuable, personal,
political and priceless.
Participation in the public life is therefore impeded by a great number of
practical obstacles generated by the lack of time, sometimes for economic reasons
(because in many cases women are less paid than the men executing same jobs),
or because of the particularity of their role in society and family. I see this final
aspect is in a strict correlation with the aspect that Anne Phillips mentions the
differences in the experiences of power between women and men, but also with
another one.
Women and men are differently influenced by the misogynist cultural and
political traditions of society, in the first case they being discouraged, and in the
second case, encouraged, to take part into the processes of decision-making. The
author implies the aspects I mention when she notices that “feminists have frequently
argued that the experience of domestic and familial subservience undermines
women’s self-confidence and that the patterns of male dominance will continue to
reassert themselves until women have learnt to participate in groups of their own.”5
I consider such a perspective especially dangerous for the feminist positions.
One cannot sustain both that women could and should participate in the public
————————
3 Mihaela Miroiu, “Despre societatea în care mintea femeilor nu conteazã” (“About the Society Where
Women’s Mind Does Not Matter”), in the Romanian newspaper “Observator cultural”, nr. 240, 2004. See also
http://www.progen.md/index.php?mod=home&hmod=viewinterview&id=188 and Mihaela Miroiu,
Nepreþuitele femei. Publicisticã feministã (Priceless Women. Feminist Newspaper Writings) Iaºi, Polirom,
2006.
4 Slavenka Drakulic, How We Survived Communism and Even Laughed, HarperPerennial, 1993, p. xvi.
5 Anne Phillips, op. cit., p. 98.
4
57
sphere, which implies public communication and debates preceding the decisions
and that they might lack the self-confidence to do so. At the same time, how
would such a participation in groups of their own would transform women
lacking self-confidence in relating to men, in women possessing the necessary
self-confidence in relating to men, since they avoid this type of interaction? Not
to mention that women do interact with men on a daily basis within their families
where they participate successfully in all sorts of decision-making processes with
projective political, cultural, social and economic relevance. In my view
sustaining the position considering that whatever men can do women can do, and
yet, that they should not copy male attitudes at all costs, since not everything is
either beneficial or dignifying, seems more useful as a political position, from a
feminist standpoint.
Also, there is the following aspect: “If democracy were just about the occasional
trip out to vote, then the differences might not much matter. But as soon as you
move on to a more participatory notion of democracy, then equal involvement of
women and men seems to depend on substantial change in the private sphere.”6
Men political theorists have confirmed similar arguments for participatory
democracy. Thus, David Held is quoted with his model of democratic autonomy
that has as an important condition the “collective responsibility for mundane
tasks and reduction of routine labour to a minimum.”7 Then she relates to the
point of view advocated by Philip Green. He argues for a radical democracy with
a participation that goes beyond the conventional political sphere where it is
merely “episodic” and “occasional” at best.
Here would be interesting to slightly enter into the discussion about the
significance of the feminist literature quoting male literature on political theory
with feminist relevance, which could be seen either as a need for validation from
men or as a treachery of some sort, or as a daring enterprise (in the light of the
comments about women exercising their participatory abilities with other women
before they confront men). But such a standpoint is narrow-minded when we
consider that both women and men should advance relevant, accurate and
comprehensive political theories, both interpreting and benefiting society as a
whole. With this observation, we can better understand that it is crucial that the
feminist and gender political theory to be in an open dialogue with political
theory as a whole, provided that a feminist political literature for women would
be a non-sense, actually erasing any shred of feminism. But these aspects compose
a different subject matter and would be worth of a separate investigation.
Returning to the slogan that opens the wider perspective on the issue of
feminist identity, “The personal is political”, one has to understand it in its whole
complexity. As shown by Anne Phillips, the personal is political not only because
it influences the political in multiple ways through the constraints of the personal
situation within society, but also because the political intrudes all the deepest
most private corners of the “personal”, It stresses “the ubiquity of power”: “Never
————————
6 Idem.
7 Idem. David Held, Models of Democracy, Polity Press, 1986, p. 291.
58
5
mind the learning process, never mind the equalization of time, never mind the
cumulative effects of household equality on political participation outside.
Democracy is as important in the household as anywhere else, for in the household
there is unequal power.”8
At this point, outside the theoretical realm described by radical democracy
where the personal, as politics in general, are interpreted as a matter of becoming9,
this perspective appears as a collapse of the personal into the political (Carol
Pateman) and as attack on the family (Jean Bethke Elshtain).
Perceiving the personal as political does not imply also a rejection of the right
to privacy. In this respect a woman’s right to choose is a key phrase in feminist
activism and thought. It is now considered that freedom for women cannot be
conceived disregarding the woman’s right to decide about her body. This right
was conceptualized in relation with the woman’s right at abortion. In this view,
Anne Philips mentions that in the USA in the case of Roe v. Wade the right of
abortion was established under the interpretation of a broader right of privacy, a
right that encompasses that of the woman to decide over terminating or not a
pregnancy.
Meanwhile, the feminist position seems to encounter a paradoxical situation,
when we think that the claim that fathers and society should get involved more
with raising the children is in a contradiction with the demand that father and
society should be denied a voice in the decision of continuation of termination
of pregnancy. But when argued that a woman’s decision to have children has
social implications the comments turn toward the cases when women decide to
have more children than the norm, demanding a redirection of social resources
toward them, and not to the cases where they decide to terminate a pregnancy.
In my view, this cannot be a social matter even if it is always socially contingent.
“The personal is political” is in this situation just a political claim at the right to
decide in the specific situation of a woman’s life which aspects of her life we are
entitle to state that they are our own and exclude others from them.
This is taking Iris Young’s argument a step further.10 But, as Anne Phillips
notes none of us should be compelled to keep private a certain domain either.
“There is no inconsistency, for example, in saying that our sexuality should be
our private concern, but that homophobia should be on the public agenda. In a
similar vein, there is no inconsistency in saying that abortion is a decision we
should make for ourselves, but that the treatment of children should be a public
concern.”11 Thus, women should not be, for example, compelled to clean the
house, or to have a baby, or ten, or to give up the job when they decide to have
children. All such things should be outcomes of decisions made by women
————————
9 Anne Phillips comments in this respect the opinions of Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis that
democracy is vital at once in the liberal democratic state, in the capitalist economy and in the patriarchal
family. (p. 103)
10 Iris Marion Young, “Impartiality and the Civic Public,” in Sheyla Benhabib and Drucilla Cornell (eds.),
Feminism as Critique, Polity Press, 1987. She states in her chapter that there ought to be several aspects of our
life that we can keep entirely as our own. A similar point was made by Carol Pateman.
6
59
themselves, by the women in question, and not by men or by the other women
for that matter. Indeed, all these can empower women in claiming their rightfully
place as equals, adapting the practices of democracy in the home, too, therefore,
inducing a grassroots process of democratization of society. “At the end of the
day, what happens will depend on the individuals themselves, on how much they
insist on change.”12 The “personal is political” is not to dismantle the personal,
but to function as a political edge, within a wider process of political change. “The
personal is political” says that politics should be grounded in the realities of the
everyday life and not reduced to rules, procedures and programs for change
which are not sufficient.13 On the other hand, the adamant insistence on the
democratization of everyday life cannot be a substitute for the “classical”, lively
political life.14
Feminism identity is politically relying heavily on an extension of participation,
and, in turn, the extension of participation and equalitarianism is caught between
the danger of a tyranny of majority and that of a “tyranny of structurelessness”
(Jo Freedman).
Investigating the limits of the liberal society from a feminist perspective, she
identifies two approaches to the opportunities to involvement in politics. The
first one sees people in their abstract character as abstract individuals and
concentrates on reducing the relevance of sex in order to reduce inequality and
to increase the opportunities for involvement. The second one takes into account
the differences of at least two (sex-based) groups in society, each with different
interests. Given this situation, in the second approach the proportionality should
not be left to chance. If sexes have different degree of power even if the
procedures are genuinely neutral, the distribution of the power positions should
be equalized to a greater extent, or even ensured to be equal.
To state it briefly, we acknowledge that liberal democracy accords formal
equality to all in public life. Feminist identity is shaped by the inequality that prevails
in the economy and the family. This inequality inevitably gets translated into politics.
Capitalizing on Anne Phillips’ ideas, the project that should define from a
political standpoint the feminists ought to emphasize the fact that even with
universal suffrage some are more equal than others, and many, especially
women, never get to voice their perspectives, interests or demands. In other
terms, liberal democracy has some exclusionary tendencies that might not be
miraculously cured by means of participatory democracy (even if this democratic
form was championed by 1960s feminists and unionists and by the civil rights
workers as the answer to liberal democracy’s exclusionary tendencies).
The forum that participatory democracy granted brought to the fore many
opinions about gender oppression and how to overcome it, at the cost of the
————————
12 Ibidem, p. 111.
13 As well, political thought, lately, experienced this powerful pragmatic turn, reevaluating its increased
interest for the (political) philosophy. Anne Phillips quotes Benjamin Barber with the idea that “essential
contestability is the premise of politics”, in Strong Democracy: Participatory Politics for a New Age, 1984, because
politics begins only there at the point where we do not agree.
14 Ibidem, p. 119.
60
7
further exclusion of those who have chosen to continue to attend their family
obligations — the great majority of women. Anne Phillips points to the distinction
that it is one thing to dream of an unfashionably androgynous future and another
to wish differences away.15 In the light of this fact Iris Young was proposing a
political scenario where the oppressed groups were granted a veto power. Since
our identities are shaped by inequalities and we are who we are given the
differentiations along the lines of the classical dichotomies women or men, nonwhite or white, worker or employer, our political projects should be shaped by
these differentiations as well, and we should be granted opportunity to voice
these different interests. “We live in a class society that is also structured by
gender, which means that men and women experience class in different ways,
and that potential unities of class are disrupted by conflicts of gender. To put the
emphasis the other way around: we live in a gender order that is also structured
by class, which means that women experience their womanhood in different
ways, and that their unity as women is continually disrupted by conflicts of
class. Draw in race to complete the triangle and you can see how complex the
geometry becomes. No one is ’just’ a worker, ’just’ a woman, ’just’ a black. The
notion that our politics can simply reflect one of our identities seems implausible
in the extreme.”16
Thus, groups ought to be seen different, while individuals ought to be seen
still as essentially the same. This is paradoxical only if we do not understand the
nuances implied by the modern civic republicanism, where the equitable and
democratic society is one in which political participants are able to abstract
themselves from their selfish interests and identify with the public good. Only in
this sense the individuals continue to be essentially the same. Focus on gender
differences should be only a stage in this effort to identify with the public good.
Universal suffrage and universal representation should not be replaced but
corrected by the attention for gender differences. And this attention, for now,
should take the form of affirmative action, either by reserving a number of seats
for women in the legislative branches of majoritarian systems as it happens in
the United States or set a fixed percentage of seats to be occupied by women
under systems of proportional representation as it is in Britain. The example of
Norway is extremely relevant. Statistics show that in 1972, only 10 percent of
public officials were women 30 percent were by 1985, and 40 percent by 2008.
Is self-conscious political engineering utopia? Is it in some paradoxical boomerang
effect a sort of confirmation of the second rate position as citizens for women?
In my view, such experiences are to be considered extremely relevant for
countries with less consolidated democracy such as Romania. The stages of
political change should not be unquestionable, but efficient. What counts up to
now is that the difference made by this increased female presence in the
advancement of policies important to women has been dramatic. Using the
————————
15 Ibidem, p. 151.
16 Anne Phillips, Divided Loyalties: Dilemmas of Sex and Class, Virago, 1987, p.12, apud Anne Phillips,
op. cit., p. 155.
8
61
terminology mentioned above at Mihaela Miroiu, and in the light of all these
arguments presented above, it makes sense to consider a Romanian development
and the implementation of a Project Trivia for political change in Romania with
two dimensions: (a) a first one, operating against instigation at contempt, and (b)
retrieving the self-awareness of males in what concerns their importance for life
as potential fathers, as a political platform for militating for the reservation for
50% seats in the Romanian Parliament for women.
Feminist identity is shaped by the power relationships, by the discourse
contesting the power relationships and by the projects proposed, and all these
elements are important, but most of all it is shaped by the particulars of each
situation, country and society, by the realities and traditions that are still at play
(representing nothing else but the forms of manifestation of power relationships).
At the same time, without a project and a discourse, all identities are helpless, at
the “mercy” of the tides brought about by the power relationships and confrontations.
“We have to find a political language that can recognize heterogeneity and
difference, but does not thereby capitulate to an essentialism that defines each of
us by one aspect alone. The arguments now raging inside feminist circles provide
an exhilarating guide through this terrain.”17
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Drakulic, Slavenka, How We Survived Communism and Even Laughed, Harper Perennial, 1993.
Held, David, Models of Democracy, Polity Press, 1986.
http://www.progen.md/index.php?mod=home&hmod=viewinterview&id=188 Millet, Kate, Sexual Politics,
Johnatan Cape, 1970.
Miroiu, Mihaela, “Despre societatea în care mintea femeilor nu conteazã” (“About the Society Where
Women’s Mind Does Not Matter”), in the Romanian newspaper “Observator cultural”, nr. 240, 2004.
Miroiu, Mihaela, Nepreþuitele femei. Publicisticã feministã (Priceless Women. Feminist Newspaper Writings),
Iaºi, Polirom, 2006.
Phillips, Anne, Engendering Democracy, Cambridge, Polity Press, 1991.
Phillips, Anne, Divided Loyalties: Dilemmas of Sex and Class, Virago, 1987.
Rowbotham, Sheila, Dreams and Dilemmas, Virago, 1983.
Young, Iris Marion, “Impartiality and the Civic Public,” in Sheyla Benhabib and Drucilla Cornell (eds.),
Feminism as Critique, Polity Press, 1987.
————————
NATIONAL VS. GLOBAL IDENTITY:
PHILOSOPHICAL AND POLITICAL DISCOURSE
AFTER SEPTEMBER 11, 20011
VIORELLA MANOLACHE*
Abstract. My analysis starts from the conviction that after September 11,
2001, the American spot (a place in which “parochial” and “global” are two
inseparable coordinates) holds forth dual antinomies: pressure/oppression.
My hypothesis affirms that peace reappears, from the perspective of a
cultural accomplishment in a space specific for temporal refuge, in which
the citizen gradually processualizes the liberties (in a defensive or a
projective way) within a quotidian institutional reconstruction found at the
basis of impartial assessment of moral conflicts of action.
Structured on three levels (Peace and Freedom. Sovereignty and power;
Americans vs. Terrorists: pressure and oppressor and Cultural discourse
after September 11, 2001 in 22) my study (re)affirms that, after September
11, the American Leviathan settles a guideline: on the surface, the space is
guided up by a mechanic commotion. There, the human being is not standing
still, but is it becoming, following some well-known pulses, which conserve
ideal steadiness, considered by Nietzsche and Heidegger as fortuity samples.
Key words: pressure vs. oppression, moral conflicts of action, national vs.
global, September 11, 2001.
Peace and Freedom. Sovereignty and power
It is already well-known that the historical coordinate is the convergence
point of some manifest or latent oppositions. The political and historical mentality
existed before its verbalization: it existed, diffuse, coagulating a meaning mood.
The spotting major idea is that no language, no wording is innocente: all these
are trying to hide/complicate their primal structure, at the end very simple,
delineated through binary or ternary opositions: a system of indexes, emblems,
constituents of a typical language which asks for deciphering, first and foremost
politically speaking, for deserving the terms of the new polis.
————————
* Researcher at the Romanian Academy, Institute of the Political Science and International Relations, at
the Department of Political Philosophy.
1 The paper was presented (in a short form) at the conference New Meanings of Peace after 9/11, 2001,
Tetuan, Morocco, 2008.
2
NATIONAL VS. GLOBAL IDENTITY
63
If the twentieth century launched the concept of political and/or legal sovereignty,
providing definitions, principles, criteria and classifications, a thinker such as G.
Bataille2 proposes a different perspective: sovereignty is not a kind of Hegelian
or Nietzschean lordship which still works within the traditional understanding of
sovereignty. One is sovereign when he has the right or the force of command
over oneself or one’s dominions. In this political and philosophical equation,
sovereignty is the collapse of the dualism that grounds Western thought: subject/
object, good/evil, body/spirit.
If, from Descartes and Hobbes, neither political philosophy nor the knowledge
can be designed out of their articulation on the idea of sovereignty, Bataille
provides that neither the power nor the knowledge or the subject cannot be designed
as sovereign.
In the Preface to transgression3, M. Foucault4 passes over the conceptualization
and archeology of sovereignty, considerate it bound, inextricably, to the idea of
the leviathan of repression by the king which must be cut head just to find that
subjectivity transgression invoice. Starting from this premise, Foucault develops
strategic conception of power, a philosophy more concerned about the relations
of power than the language games, played in terms of tactics and strategy.
Foucault makes a distinction between games of limited power, small, marginal
and single games and power structure with strong, provided that the power
games of the marginal in greater measure than the battle state and institutional
unrest of the subject multiple theorization.
Because, according to Michel Foucault, power means action after action.
Choosing a layout of the system of power, Foucault believes that the legal and
civil penalty interrogates the moral ideas. From the perspective of practice and
penal institutions, prison became the general form of punishment. The
transformation of the penalty can not be associated only with a history of bodies,
but, more specifically, with a history of the relations established between political
power and bodies. The report launching a new triad consists of an optical
political power (the panoptical establishment of the organs of general and
constant surveillance, the police organization, a system of records), a new mechanical
(total disciplinarily establishment, isolation and regrouping of individuals,
optimum use of force, control and improve efficiency) and a new physiology
(defining the rules, a mechanism of restoring their corrective and punitive
therapeutic interventions).
Sovereignty takes many forms: it is rarely condensed in a person, but even
then it is diffused. Sovereignty adds force to violate the prohibition that opposes
killing, under the conditions that define the customs. Sovereignty becomes a
particular historical reality, marked by an autonomous decision!
Using the same deluged register, after September 11, 2001 the American spot
(a place in which “parochial” and “global” are two inseparable coordinates) holds
————————
2 Georges Bataille, Suveranitatea, Editura Paralela 45, Piteºti, 2004.
3 Maurice Blanchot, L’entretien infini, Gallimard, Paris, 1969.
4 Michel Foucault, Dits et écrits, vol. I, Gallimard, Paris, 1994.
64
VIORELLA MANOLACHE
3
forth dual antinomies: pressure/oppression. The American Leviathan settles a
guideline: on the surface, the space is guided up by a mechanic commotion.
There, the human being is not standing still, but is it becoming, following some
well-known pulses, which conserve ideal steadiness, considered by Nietzsche
and Heidegger as fortuity samples.
The political actor on-comings nearby the new American limits, changes him
into a zoonpolitikon, contested both by the mundane space (with its political,
economic, military) and by the spatial borne. This pressure is being politically
counterbalanced by the triad: authority — oppression — pressure as frames/order
or disorder contender formula.
The theorethical option invests the American space with a common perpective:
the citizen appears disputed by the exterior sphere of opportunities, by the
interior one of constraint. In the sphere of privacy, the individual organizes it
morally and politically, according to the driving principles and the principle of
concord that require means of manifestation and liberation from the pressure of
its negation as an entity, and the achievement of certain ways of manifestation at
the level of the individual, the group, the micro-macro community.
The removal of all the elements of supervising history transposes us into a
sphere of re-irrigating the human perspective from a perspective of liberating
decisive historical close-ups. Thus, freedom becomes the model that is hidden
beyond this reciprocal revilement. The encounter of liberty requests its inventory
from the point of view of its practical nuance of outburst in history and reality:
on one hand, freedom means the possibility of the subject to choose its shape of
human achievement and on the other hand, freedom means the free subject’s
possibility to create itself and the world according to its nature.
Peace reappears, therefore, from the perspective of a cultural accomplishment
in a space specific for temporal refuge, in which the citizen (American or Terrorist)
gradually processualizes the liberties (in a defensive or a projective way) within
a quotidian institutional reconstruction found at the basis of impartial assessment
of moral conflicts of action.
Americans vs. Terrorists: pressure and oppressor
The umma society involves living together in terms of freedom and a reciprocal
influence of the “I” and the “other”. The rational motivation of the versus the
other, the peopling of the political sphere with active human presence, threatens
the institution as a reaction to absolute individual freedom. The structural and
basically, or only random limits, clarify the status of state-freedom, by avoiding
abuse of any kind. Society becomes the compound shape, in which man’s
disposure to his equal with a view to living together receives a special significance.
This dual (pressure/oppression) picture takes into account the liberty understood
in a liberal way, as the liberty of the individual subject towards the choices and
political judgments of the subject (negative liberty) and the liberty of the individual
subject to accede to or to fall, respectively to detect politically speaking as a
result of the individualist exclusive thinking (positive political liberty!).
4
65
Searching for reasons to validate it, the individual that is subdued to freedom
suggests extensive variants of choosing freedom as a resurrection of a dynamic
way of making history. For the human being, essential remains the practice of
freedom, perceived both from the inside — as means of interior manifestation
— as well as from the outside — as a polytheic political action. The constant
question concerning the existing relationship between the ever greater influence
of reason over thinking, ideology and techniques of government, over the ever
increased restrictions brought to the individual and collective liberties nowadays
appears on the background of “recoil” of hope in a general emancipation of mankind.
According to Baudrillard5, the American power deploys the rhetoric of military
conflict as a means of legitimizing its authority to act as global police and economic
center: the global police state will resort to hot wars in order to validate itself.
Proposing a postmodern option, Baudrillard uses this approach to understand
September 11, 2001 in terms of critical intensification rather than dialectical
opposition. His claim that people in the west had dreamt of an event such as
September 11, 2001 immediately disposes of the ”clash of civilizations” hypothesis.
Baudrillard argues that September 11, 2001 is a manifestation of globalization’s
attack upon itself: the terrorists’ mirror, the violence that western capitalism creates
but cannot use, constitute a Diaspora that is produced by and structurally mirrors
multinational capitalism, and assimilate and intensify all aspects of power, such as
using “the banality of everyday American life as cover and camouflage”.
For Baudrillard, the towers of the World Trade Center are figures for the
dominance of a binarism that includes digital culture, the genetic code, and the
duopoly of liberal capitalist states. Developing this analysis, Baudrillard suggests
that the towers suffered two attacks and two deaths that constitute a critical
extension of a binary logic: the effect of the attacks is to suggest the possibility
of the overthrow of the power embodied in the towers. Baudrillard’s claims that
the WTC attacks represent “a setback for globalization”. According to him, the
terror attacks are an “absolute event” because they combine western technological
advancement and sacrificial suicide, operational structure and symbolic pact. He
describes September 11, 2001 as a hyperrealist spectacle that is so extreme that
it generates an extra degree of fictional supplementary, and it is this process of
“reinventing the real as the ultimate and most redoubtable fiction”, a certain
possibility of global capitalism’s death6.
The zoonpolitikon appears cultivating the productive hypnosis of becoming
accustomed to freedom. What is produced is the attempt to organize these
principles of freedom step by step, to take them seriously, in order to draw prerequisites and conclusions. In this context, the first free election took place,
without any outside involvement, gapping the democracy settlement and its
consolidation. As part of this actionable motivation, the individual that is subject
to the reasons of subjectivity, distinguishes between freedom as rational choice
and freedom as volunteering, pathos or dissolution. These “laws” imply the
————————
5 Jean Baudrillard, The Spirit of Terrorism and Requiem for the Twin Towers, New York, Verso, 2002.
6 See also http://www.electronicbookreview.com/thread/internetnation/anniversary.
66
VIORELLA MANOLACHE
5
existence of an active subject, whose actions start and become obvious through
constructions and permanent de-constructions of freedom.
Taking over a concept by Michel Mafesoli, we consider the terrorists as new
tribes. “Meet the terrorist of the future: less ideological, more likely to harbor
ethnic grievances, perhaps fired by apocalyptic visions, harder to distinguish
from others outside the law. He (or she) is armed with new weapons and
experimenting with others, and using them more indiscriminately. Terrorism is
by no means the only option now; a political wing can openly raise funds, run
schools, and contest elections. The loner with a grudge has turned to terror, and
may be the computer hacker next door. At the other end of the scale, statesponsored terrorism takes the place of warfare. The destructive power of terrorism
is on the rise, and the most advanced societies are the most vulnerable.”7
The new tribes are sociability outbursts, spontaneous expeditions into the
world of the inaccessible morality. Because these are not some hereditary or
legislative patterns, the new tribes organize short recognition invasions8. These
are like a phenomenon described by Ilyia Prigogine, that of creating the crystal
in saturate solvents. We assimilate the concept of new tribes to a conscious self,
and the American space to a habitable substrate. The variability: citizen/stranger
overlap to the oppressive dichotomy: captive/inhabitant into a status space.
According to Konrad Lorenz, the territory is only the function of a deferential
dependence on pressure. The aggressive, oppressive instinct grows up, intensively,
as the distance to the centre of the territory is overgrowing. In an attempt to
define the aggressive instinct, K. Lorenz, E. Fromm and J. Monod believed that
this is bipolar, destructive and creative, an instinct that reflects the discrepancy
between the genetic evolution, slow and rapid cultural evolution of the human
environment. On such an argumentative approach, for Lorenz, the most intimate
relationships the higher animals are capable of (including humans) are based on
aggression and inhibition.
Getting into another utopia of the History of the American “valley”, Zizek’s
theory9 of the political meaning of the terrorist attacks engages with a vast range
of cultural and political material.
Considering it as a tensegrity, the American space is an architectural system,
both natural (exterior) and artificial (politically, military or economically). We
“see” intermediary forms between alive putty-skeletons (cartographies by Donald
E. Inger) and cable/ metallic balks’ sculptures of Kenneth Snelson. This production
structure will be stabilized only when the dynamic forces of pressure (tension)
and oppression (compression) are balanced.
————————
7 Laqueur, Walter, Postmodern Terrorism: New Rules for an Old Game, “Foreign Affairs”, September/October
1996.
8 The greatest change in recent decades is that terrorism is by no means militants’ only strategy. The manybranched Muslim Brotherhood, the Palestinian Hamas, the Irish Republican Army (IRA), the Kurdish
extremists in Turkey and Iraq, the Tamil Tigers of Sri Lanka, the Basque Homeland and Liberty (ETA)
movement in Spain, and many other groups that have sprung up in this century have had political as well as
terrorist wings from the beginning (Walter Laqueur, Postmodern Terrorism: New Rules for an Old Game, in
“Foreign Affairs”, September/October 1996).
9 Slavoj Zizek, Welcome to the Desert of the Real: Five Essays on September 11 and Related Dates, New
York, Verso, 2002.
6
67
Even if the liberties nowadays are perceived as an essential subject-liberty for
the individual and personality as an object, negative liberties, and as directionliberties of the risk and of exploring, peace as a principle must be understood as
a progressively democratic value and perception. In the attempt to get accustomed
to freedom and global peace as a vision and mission, the new identity is required
to eliminate any kind of means of alienation in the framework of a viable
community consensus, as a reverse of passivity and technical reasoning. Freedom
can’t but allow the search of conditions of political legitimacy.
Anticipating the decisive historical movements and the importance of this
dismount which involves Unity and Multiplication, Ihab Hassan asked himself
in “The Dismembering of Orpheus” what paradigm is hidden Outside or Beyond
this mutual involvement? Terrorism and totalitarian, heresy and ecumenical
tendencies mutual involvement, and an annihilated authority, concludes the
postmodernist theoretician.
Relegated from Marshall McLuhan’s global village, sent into another
Alexandrines paradigm which requires another language and dialogue.
Cultural discourse10 after September 11, 2001 in 2211
Beyond what we usually call, tolerant to the external theoretical influences an
“events pragmatic”, the idea of an “infinite theory” provides for a imperative which
emits that “something is a sign only if it is interpreted as a sign for something by
an interpreter”12.
The triad sign — type — occurrence13 or the relation sign — icon — index —
symbol14 establishes, pragmatically, a signification relation marked as sign —
interpreter — object. I hold forth for an out of the accent from an analysis of the
————————
10 The media content functions as a machine of the consuming civilization, in the sense that it is no longer
a stage for the manifestation of life style. The pretensions and the power of absorption of the message by each
category of population guide those who finance, for instance, the political advertising. The new political
direction in the U.S.A, namely that of “yuppies” groups with a limited social consciousness and an extremely
developed consumer consciousness, adapts the social category of the “average man” to the new reality. The
fundamental values acknowledged by this “average man” (“the common person”) are those of friendship,
solidarity, of their acceptance by the whole community. The policy of altruism, of lacking any sense of identity,
of blurring the outlines of personality up to its total absorption in a given group addresses precisely to this
category. Consequently, we have to include within this equation another two concepts, typical for postmodernity,
defined by Fukuyama as spontaneous order and hierarchy, networks or individual agents groups that share
informal norms or values besides those previously considered necessary for the common transactions of the
market. This is a society in which fashion and taste are eclectic, “opportunities” seem numberless, and the
search for new market segments seems constant. The services and industries mainly offer entertainment. It is
well-known that, in its canonic sense, the term nation-state used to imply, besides its juridical nature, (in this
sense, as a set of norms that euphemize and dissolve forces and interests within some legitimating illusions) a
civic nature, as a system of force relationships. Yet, the nation-state gives way to the prerogatives of the
wealth-state. This represents an attempt to mobilize the economic interests as a means of setting free all the
political interests from moral restraints.
11 “22” is the first independent Romanian Review after 1989. Its name is related to the 22 December 1989,
the day when Ceauºescu left the Central Committee Building’s. The Review proposes a philosophical, historical,
political, social and economic perspective and is it known as the best Romanian Review of cultural politics.
12 Umberto Eco, Lector in fabula, Editura Univers, Bucureºti, 1991.
13 Charles S. Pierce, Semnificaþie ºi acþiune, Editura Humanitas, Bucureºti, 1990.
14 Ferdinand de Saussure, Curs de lingvisticã generalã, Polirom, Iaºi, 1998.
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VIORELLA MANOLACHE
7
cultural discourse conventions into a crosscheck of what it is called “the act of
interpreting the text and the event by a cooperating lecturer”15. This imperative
gets an insight into the text’s regularity obstruction, into the formal experiences
‘memories, intercession into the persuadable act, into the optimum organization
of the text.
My analysis endorses September 11 celebration articles, from “22” (no. 758,
762,885/2004, 653/2002, 810/2005), for the fact that “22” submits a circuit
simulation — crisis — tendency which operates for recovering a significations
order16. Following Umberto Eco’s analytic equation, we allow that the
communication chain parceling into four factors: transmitter — receiver —
message — code — with its repertoire of logical and/or abstract definitions,
emotive frame, like, cultural commonness, a multitude of prefabricate
representations, provided and well organized possibilities.
The article Filosofia dupã 11 septembrie17 (22, No. 885, 2004) proposes an
overlap of actualize to reference, underlying designations which postmark an
expressive adequacy, conjuring the relation object — event — text. The object
(philosophical and political order, after September 11) has some properties
which allow us to recognize a specific philosophical relation: object — world,
by presenting Habermas and Derrida’s point of views. Concretely, the article
uses objects which are understood as signs (strategies, confrontations, monstrous
accidents, disillusion and crisis). The running thrill inclines an intrinsic temporality
(September 11, 2001) and configures the new dimensions of the post September
11 philosophy. According to Traian Ungureanu18, September 11 never ends. When
it will be over we will be aware of out cowardiceness and blindness/as well in
West and in the Est.
In Derrida’s terms19, “to mark a date in history” presupposes that “something”
comes or happens for the first and last time, “something that we do not yet really
know how to identify, determine, recognize, or analyze” but that should remain
unforgettable: an ineffaceable event in the shared archive of a universal calendar,
that is, a supposedly universal calendar. The brevity of the appellation (September 11)
stems not only from an economic or rhetorical necessity. Derrida believes in the
necessity of being attentive first of all to this phenomenon of language, naming,
————————
15 Umberto Eco, Limitele interpretãrii, Editura Pontica, Constanþa, 1996.
16 The approach is an “old” one in the Romanian cultural and philosophical context. In 1943, in
Luceafãrul, D.D. Roºca considered that the interpreters of the identity phenomena do not usually distinguish
between legal and philosophical basis of the scientific idea of national. In any case, the lack of qualitative
discrimination leads, in terms of political philosophy, reaches dangerous practical confusion. Nation as a
universal value is not only due to the fact that there is. Its existence is justified by the cultural values that make
it possible. A nation is justified by its potential spirituality existence. In this perspective, our politics appears
as an extension of the biological. Ethics which detaches from such a design becomes, according to D.D. Roºca,
only a transcript, in the form of rules and laws found in the biological field. Because, there are rights which
some people have and others not (D.D. Roºca, Temeiuri filosofice ale ideii naþionale, in Luceafãrul, 1943, III,
p. 83-87).
17 “Philosophy after September 11” signed by Camil Pârvu.
18 Când va veni 12 septembrie (When 12 September will come), 22, no. 653/2002.
19 Giovanna Borradori, Philosophy in a Time of Terror: Dialogues with Jürgen Habermas and Jacques
Derrida, University of Chicago Press, 2003. See also http://www.press. uchicago. edu/books/ derrida/ derrida
911.html
8
69
and dating, to this repetition compulsion (at once rhetorical, magical, and
poetic), not in order to isolate ourselves in language, but on the contrary, in order
to try to understand what is going on precisely beyond language precisely there
where language and the concept come up against their limits. Such an “event”
calls for a philosophical response.
Nevertheless, the denial of the traditional structures, the overlapping of successive
movements make up an answer given to the public necessity of “putting on
stage” as a way of concentrating feelings, of organizing events or determining space.
“The message of the second grade” incubates an operational zone of transgression
of precision to the transmitter, marked by dissemblance and indetermination.
The multiple transmissions make the rigor of the factors which participate in the
determination of the discourse questionable.
Despite any pressures, the writing and (re)writing of the political segment,
especially on its discursive and image side, follows the route of a socialized art,
which requires an activity of political socialization, of interiorizing any standards,
and reactivate it by “in situ” approaches. The article Cei ce înþeleg terorismul
(Henryk Broder, 22 no. 762/)20 establishes that assuming that no geography, no
“territorial” determination, is thus pertinent any longer for locating the seat of
new technologies of transmission or aggression.
For Traian Ungureanu (De ce ne apãrãm21, “22” no. 810/2005) the matrix of
discourse follows the approach of the political receiver situated between private
and public, thus creating an “enlarged private”. But in a full postmodernist
disintegration of the public sphere, it can only speak about a sphere of alchemy
and hybridization as exponential reference of a project about political resumption.
The territorization policy implies (re)defining the relationship among the
victim and aggressor. Generally speaking, it replaces a sector function with a
coordination function, pleading for a public actor/private actor partnership. While
the network is a social term, the territory, as redistribution of chances, belongs
exclusively to the political domain.
According to Traian Ungureanu symbolical structuring of the territory implies
the contract procedure mediator/receiver, as reconciliation between autonomy
and political purpose of the transmitted political message (even Katrina became
an amnesiac index!).
The reconstruction of the public discourse, in its territorialized hypostasis
requires the celebration imperative, as a relay-point of the centre. Trei ani de la 11
septembrie 200122 proposes a celebration discursive ritual, confirming that the new
territory of communication is the meeting place of fluxes and networks, but also of
achieving symbolical productions, according to an imperative of institutional
exigencies, because “symbolical forms/shapes can be applied to any object”.
The characteristic of this type of territoriality, according to Bauman23 is
represented by the fact that politics implies “that public dialogue, that noisy
————————
20 “Those who understand terrorism”, translated by Florin Gabrea.
21 “Why are we protecting for”.
22 “Three years from September 11, 2001”, Alexandru Lãzescu, 22, no. 758, 2004.
23 Z. Bauman, Etica postmodernã, Editura Amarcord, Timiºoara, 2000.
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VIORELLA MANOLACHE
9
conversation that society keeps up with itself in order to produce and manage its
own historicity, as a faithful performant expression of a social formation that
proves capable to tell in a conscious way, what it wants and what it can be”. Such
political options about public risks of technical communicational difficulties,
view a double axiom, according to which, by these public variants “what you
can do, but also what you must do” is accessed. The article Trei ani de la 11
septembrie 2001, concludes that the new order establishes a lose-lose parameters
for Europe, U.S. and for the world.
In conclusion, we can deny ourselves the possibility, that at the beginning of
all, for the entire land to use only one vernacular and common collocation.
However, we are used to scheme the thorny problem of survival according to
land desertion and to the fact of heading for a (post) beyond.
Moving easterly, the human being sets up a land, dismounts and bricks up a
stronghold, using well burned bricks.
The rock look corporal: these are rising inwards, having as a vow the rainbow.
Left alone in this “no man’ s land”, the first human being and his History anchored
into artificiality, excluding all the conventional dense: “the bricks commuted the
stone and the tar commuted the hydrate of lime”.
God interrupts the temptation of the complete, but he will no longer destroy
those who were eager to gain fame former to their dissipation!
This is the point of origin in History!
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bataille, Georges, Suveranitatea, Editura Paralela 45, Piteºti, 2004.
Baudrillard, Jean, The Spirit of Terrorism and Requiem for the Twin Towers, New York, Verso, 2002.
Bauman, Z., Etica postmodernã, Editura Amarcord, Timiºoara, 2000.
Blanchot, Maurice, L’entretien infini, Gallimard, Paris, 1969.
Borradori, Giovanna, Philosophy in a Time of Terror: Dialogues with Jürgen Habermas and Jacques Derrida,
University of Chicago Press, 2003.
Eco, Umberto, Lector in fabula, Editura Univers, Bucureºti, 1991.
Eco, Umberto, Limitele interpretãrii, Editura Pontica, Constanþa, 1996.
Foucault, Michel, Dits et écrits, vol. I, Gallimard, Paris, 1994.
Pierce, Charles S., Semnificaþie ºi acþiune, Editura Humanitas, Bucureºti, 1990.
Saussure, Ferdinand de, Curs de lingvisticã generalã, Polirom, Iaºi, 1998.
Zizek, Slavoj, Welcome to the Desert of the Real: Five Essays on September 11 and Related Dates, New York,
Verso, 2002.
REGION AND REGIONALISM
SÄCHSISCHE LANDSCHAFT ALS BEZUGSPUNKT
KULTURELLER IDENTITÄT, EXEMPLIFIZIERT
AM ROMANWERK DES RUMÄNIENDEUTSCHEN
AUTORS EGINALD SCHLATTNER
MARIA SASS*
Abstract. The present article centers on the “Transylvanian landscape” as
a reference point for the cultural identity of the Transylvanian Saxons,
identity that is exemplified through the work of the Romanian-German
writer Eginald Schlattner. The above text is made up of two parts: a
theoretical part — where the theoretical notions of individual, social and
cultural identity are explained by reference to the French sociologists
Émile Durkheim (1858-1917) and François de Singly (*1948) — and an
interpretative part — where, through the analysis of the work of the writer
Eginald Schlattner, I have tried to point out the constitution of the cultural
identity of the Transylvanian Saxons, which lasted eight centuries and
which decayed over five decades to the point that it is represented almost
just in literary works at present. The notion of “Transylvanian Saxons”
refers to a German ethnic minority which was colonized in Transylvania
by the Hungarian King Geysa II beginning with the 12th century, which
gained privileges and liberties due to the Hungarian King Andrew II, by
building up a cultural identity. Eginald Schlattner (born 1933, Arad) presents
in his so-called “Transylvanian trilogy” — which is made up of the novels
Der geköpfte Hahn, Rote Handschuhe, Das Klavier im Nebel — the
destruction of the culture of the Transylvanian Saxons with whom he
identifies and from whom he draws his inspiration in his works: the
Second World War, in which many Saxons took part, attracted by the
perspective of the “Third Reich”; the Communist Dictatorship, with all its
means — pursuits, arrests, deportations, hard labour, etc.; the Revolution
of 1989, which made a massive immigration to Germany possible.
Schlattner’s novels seem to preserve this secular culture through literature,
for the generations to come.
Key words: Eginald Schlattner, cultural identity, cultural minorities, political
resistance.
————————
* Professor at the “Lucian Blaga” University, Sibiu.
72
MARIA SASS
Vorüberlegungen: Zur kulturellen Identität
der Siebenbürger Sachsen
2
Billigt man jemandem eine Permanenz, eine zeitliche Kontinuität zu, so
verleiht man ihm eine Identität. Diese ist nur schwer zu fassen, etwas Absolutes,
Invariantes, Unantastbares, das eine Person oder ein Volk in seiner Kontinuität
definiert. Eine Identität setzt Einheit und Kohärenz voraus, welche jedoch, genau
wie Permanenz und Kontinuität, nie einfach gegeben, sondern von Menschen
angestrebte Ideale sind.
Nach dem französischen Soziologen Émile Durkheim (1858-1917) existiert
eine duale Identität: — das individuelle Sein, das Charakterzüge, Erbgut und
persönliche Erfahrungen umfasst — und das gesellschaftliche Sein, das den
Werten und Normen der Zugehörigkeitsgruppe entspricht. Beide Identitätsarten,
das individuelle und das soziale bzw. kollektive stehen in Wechselwirkung
zueinander, weil die Zugehörigkeit zu einer Gruppe und deren Identitätsmerkmale
auf den Einzelnen zurückwirkt. Zugleich entwickelt sich aus den individuellen
Identitäten die kollektive Identität. Ein weiteres Element, das erwähnt werden
muss, ist das des Soziologen François de Singly (*1948), der der Ansicht ist,
dass sich die Identität als Konfrontation und Selbstbezug zum Anderen aufbaut.
Fragt man sich nun nach der kulturellen Identität, so bezeichnet man damit
institutionalisierte Ordnungsvorstellungen, die eine Einheit bilden, sich gegen
andere abgrenzen lassen und sich dadurch selbst beschreiben. Kulturelle Identitäten
sind immer heterogen und umfassen bestimmte Vorstellungen, die untereinander
in Konflikt geraten können. In solchen Konflikten tritt die Identität meist in
Erscheinung.
Kulturelle Identität umfasst Gemeinsamkeiten, wie Klima und Geographie,
Sprache oder Religion und die Identifikation mit einem territorialen Raum über
mehrere Generationen hinweg, wobei sie sich auch durchaus verändern kann. Es sei
hier noch ergänzt, dass kulturelle Identität nicht zwingend an ein bestimmtes
kulturelles Gebiet und an eine historische Epoche gebunden ist. So ist zum Beispiel
die jüdische Diaspora ein Beispiel für identitätsstiftende kulturelle Gemeinschaft,
die zunächst über Jahrhunderte auch ohne ein von ihr fest bewohntes Gebiet eine
ausgeprägte kulturelle Identität entwickelte, vielleicht sogar stärker als bei
monoterritorialen Kulturen und, in diesem Kontext kann auch mit der sächsischen
kulturellen Identität exemplifiziert werden, die durch die Auswanderung der Sachsen
im binnendeutschen Kulturraum in neu konstruierten Gruppen weiterlebt.
Kulturelle Identität ist also eine Bezeichnung für das im kulturhistorischen
Zusammenhang erworbene Weltbild oder Selbstverständnis eines Individuums,
einer Gruppe oder Nation im Hinblick auf Werte, Fähigkeiten und
Gewohnheiten. Die kulturelle Identität des Individuums entsteht aus dem
Eingebundensein des Einzelnen in die kulturelle Identität eines Kollektivs
einerseits und dem Bestreben nach Autonomiebewahrung der eigenen Identität
andererseits.
Im Folgenden werde ich mich auf die Siebenbürger Sachsen beziehen, zu
deren Gruppe Eginald Schlattner gehört, und mit deren Kultur er sich identifiziert.
3
SÄCHSISCHE LANDSCHAFT ALS BEZUGSPUNKT KULTURELLER IDENTITÄT
73
Mit dem Begriff “Siebenbürger Sachsen” bezeichnet man eine
Bevölkerungsgruppe, die im Zentrum Rumäniens angesiedelt wurde und die als
die älteste deutsche ethnische Gruppe Südosteuropas gilt. Die Kolonisation
begann im 12. Jahrhundert durch den ungarischen König Geysa II und wurde
durch den Ungarnkönig Andreas II weitergeführt, der den Kolonisten durch den
sogenannten “Goldenen Brief” weitgehende Privilegien, politische und kirchliche
Autonomie verlieh.1
Das Ansiedeln der Sachsen wirkte sich positiv auf die Entwicklung
Siebenbürgens aus, gemeint ist der wirtschaftliche und kulturelle Fortschritt des
Gebietes. Gepflegt wurde auch eine intensive Beziehung zu Deutschland und im
siebenbürgischen Raum entwickelte sich eine starke deutschsprachige Kultur, die
schon durch den Anschluss Siebenbürgens an Rumänien (1918) einiges einbüßen
musste. Und dies war nur der Beginn, denn nach dem II. Weltkrieg wurden alle
Deutschen in Rumänien — nicht nur die Sachsen Siebenbürgens — als Mitläufer
des Naziregimes qualifiziert und in ihrer Substanz schwer getroffen. Es seien hier
erwähnt: Die Trennung vieler Familien infolge von Krieg, Flucht, Evakuierung
und Deportation, die Zerstörung der Existenzgrundlage der Deutschen in Stadt
und Land — durch die kommunistische Enteignung und Verstaatlichung von
Gütern — der Verlust des ethno-kulturellen Identitäts- und Zusammengehörigkeitsgefühl, die zunehmende Isolierung vom gesamten deutschen Sprachund Kulturraum, schließlich das Gefühl der Rechtsunsicherheit und der totale
Mangel an Vertrauen in die kommunistische Führung des rumänischen Staates.
Somit kommt es zu einer schrittweisen Zerstörung der siebenbürgischsächsischen Gemeinschaft und implizit der jahrhundertelang konstruierten
kulturellen Identität dieser Gruppe, die zum Kernpunkt des Werkes vieler
rumäniendeutscher Autoren geworden und auf mehrere Faktoren zurückzuführen
ist: Die ersten, die die Sachsen ins Verderben geführt haben, waren die
Nationalsozialisten, die ihnen den Gott genommen und sie durch Manipulation
in einen abenteuerlichen Krieg geführt hat. Danach waren es die Kommunisten,
denn das von den Nazis Begonnene wurde von dem “neuen Regime” durch
Deportation und Enteignung weitergeführt. Zur Zerstörung der sächsischen
Identität sollte auch der Verrat der sächsischen Opportunisten, die Liquidierung
der sächsischen Presse und, nicht zuletzt, die Kirche — die auch als
nationalistische Institution gewirkt haben soll — eine Rolle spielen.
Der rumäniendeutsche2 Autor Eginald Schlattner
Eginald Schlattner wurde am 13. September 1933 in Arad geboren und lebt
heute als Pfarrer und Schriftsteller in Siebenbürgen. Er wuchs in Fogarasch —
am Fuße der Karpaten — auf und studierte evangelische Theologie, danach
Mathematik und Hydrologie in Klausenburg.
————————
1 F. Zimmermann und C. Werner, Urkundenbuch zur Geschichte der Deutschen in Siebenbürgen. Urk. 19, S. 11.
2 Der Begriff “rumäniendeutsche” Literatur bezeichnet eine deutschsprachige Literatur, die auf dem
Gebiete Rumäniens entstanden ist. Alexander Ritter (In: Südostdeutsche Vierteljahresblätter. 50/2001, 4,
München 2001, S. 364) definiert diese Literatur als schriftliche Leistung eines Bevölkerungsteils, der sich in
74
MARIA SASS
4
1957 wurde er verhaftet und 1959 wegen “Nichtanzeige von Hochverrat”
verurteilt. Nach der Entlassung arbeitete er als Tagelöhner und später als
Ingenieur. 1973 nahm Schlattner noch einmal das theologische Studium, diesmal
in Hermannstadt, auf. Er war bis zur Pensionierung evangelischer Pfarrer in
Rothberg (Roºia) bei Hermannstadt und auch als Gefängnispfarrer in Gherla
tätig. Auch nach seiner Pensionierung ist er weiterhin als Gefängnispfarrer,
sowie als evangelischer Pfarrer für seine inzwischen nicht mehr vorhandene
Gemeinde tätig.
Seine bisher drei erschienenen Romane, die in der siebenbürgischen
Landschaft angesiedelte Romantrilogie, — Der geköpfte Hahn (1998), Rote
Handschuhe (2001) und Das Klavier im Nebel (2005) — brachte dem Autor
großen Erfolg im In- und Ausland. Die Bilder, die durch die großangelegten
epischen Schilderungen Schlattners angeboten werden, lassen sich zeitlich ganz
bestimmt festlegen: eine autobiographisch motivierte Erinnerungslandschaft aus
der Zeit des zweiten Weltkrieges und der nationalsozialistischen Verstrickungen
der siebenbürgisch-sächsischen Gemeinschaft (Der geköpfte Hahn), aus der
unmittelbaren Nachkriegszeit — eine zerrissene und vertriebene Gemeinschaft
(Das Klavier im Nebel) und die frühen Jahre des Kommunismus bzw. Stalinismus
mit den jeweiligen Verfolgungen und Repressionen (Rote Handschuhe).
Neben seinen Romanen, in vielen anderen Aussagen, spricht Schlattner vom
“Ende der Siebenbürger Sachen”, von der Zerstörung einer kulturellen Identität,
mit der er sich als Individuum identifiziert — Hier ist mein Platz! — und aus der
er Stoff für seine Schriften schöpft.
Schlattners Heimat scheint wie ein in Unordnung geratenes Eden. Ein in die
Weite eines sanften Tals hingewehtes Dorf. Dort lebt der Schriftsteller in einem
barocken Pfarrhaus mit antiken Möbeln, die letzten Überbleibsel einer Epoche,
deren Untergang nicht erst die Kommunisten, sondern schon die Nationalsozialisten
einleiteten, mit denen sich die Rumänen zunächst verbündet hatten. Das Dorf
Rothberg, in dem er lebt und als Pfarrer dient, hinterlässt den Eindruck eines
atemporalen Ortes. Vom Turm der verwaisten Kirche hat man einen Blick über die
Landschaft Siebenbürgens. Hinter Weizenfeldern und Kartoffeläckern, Hügeln
voller Mais, dichten Wäldern, türmen sich die Fogarascher Berge. Zu ihren Füßen
liegt die Stadt Fogarasch. Sie ist die Kindheitsheimat des Autors, die “menschliche
Lebensform”, wie er sie in Anlehnung an Thomas Manns Essay “Lübeck als geistige
Lebensform” nennt. In den Augen des Autors ist es eine edenische Landschaft.
————————
Folge von wanderungsgeschichtlichen und/oder politisch-territorialen Veränderungen in einer allgemeinen
Minderheiten-situation befinde. Somit lässt sich die rumäniendeutsche Literatur, von der Verfassung und
Verbreitung her, als die Literatur der deutschsprachigen Minderheit (Deutsche und deutschsprachige Juden)
in Rumänien beschreiben. Ihre Entstehung wurde von einer spezifischen Wanderungsgeschichte, von
geopolitischen Entscheidungen und soziologischen Umständen geprägt. Weiter muss noch gesagt werden, dass
diese Literatur zwischen zwei Sprachen und Kulturen positioniert ist (die binnedeutsche und die rumänische
Kultur). Die “Position zwischen den Sprachen und Literaturen ist gleichzeitig eine diese Literatur wesentlich
prägende Herausforderung an Identität und Autobiographie, an literarisch-künstlerischem Auftrag und
Authentizität.” (Al. Ritter, Germanistik ohne schlechtes Gewissen. Die deutschsprachige Literatur des Auslandes
und ihre wissenschaftliche Rezeption. In: Deutschsprachige Literatur im Ausland. Hg. Von Al. Ritter. Göttingen
1985, S. 29).
5
75
Schlattners schriftstellerische Karriere begann “aus einsamer Verzweiflung” nach
dem Zusammenbruch der rumänischen Diktatur 1989, als die Siebenbürger
Sachsen seines Dorfes mit allem was sie hatten nach Deutschland auswanderten.
“Sie beraubten sich Ihrer Wurzeln”, sagt Schlattner. Mit jedem Sonntag jedenfalls
wurden die Kirchenbänke leerer, die Häuser verlassener, schließlich brauchte der
Pfarrer nicht einmal die Glocken mehr zu läuten. Die Gegenwart, die Zukunft von
Rothberg, sie waren gelaufen. Es gab nur noch die Vergangenheit, die ihn an den
Schreibtisch zwang, sie aus der Erinnerung aufzuschreiben und durch seine Romane
wieder zum Leben zu bringen.
Über Eginald Schlattners Siebenbürgische Romantrilogie ist viel geschrieben
und gesagt worden. Die Rezeption im deutschsprachigen Raum ist fast besser als
in Rumänien, ein Grund dafür ist, dass der siebenbürgische Autor eine für
Deutschland historisch und geographisch entfernte, “mithin exotische Kulturlandschaft
in lebendigen Farben wiedererstehen lässt, und zwar in einer literarisch gefälligen
Form, die die komplexe Erinnerungskultur Siebenbürgens trotz des Einsatzes
von Verfremdungselementen wie Ironie und Groteske auf drei abgerundete
Großerzählungen herunterbricht.”3
Der geköpfte Hahn ist ein Erinnerungsroman von starker erzählerischer Kraft über
die allmähliche Zerstörung einer europäischen Kulturlandschaft durch politischen
Fanatismus, “genau beobachtet und mit einem kräftigen Schuß Humor erzählt.”4
Der Debütroman Eginald Schlattners gehört in den Kontext der kleinen
rumäniendeutschen Literatur und muss an ihr gemessen werden. Der Autor ist
einer der wenigen, der in Rumänien geblieben ist, die meisten-Oskar Pastior,
Herta Müller, Werner Söllner, Richard Wagner u.a.-sind nach Deutschland
ausgewandert und haben mit ihm nur noch den vergangenen Erfahrungshintergrund
gemeinsam: die problematische Geschichte ihrer Herkunftsgruppe in Siebenbürgen,
im Banat, in der Bukowina, die Nazizeit, die rote Diktatur, schließlich den
Weltwechsel. Von den einst ca. 750.000 Deutschen leben noch wenige in Rumänien.
Eine alte, über achthundertjährige Kultur stirbt. Die Vertreter der rumäniendeutschen
Literatur können daraus ihre Themen und Stoffe schöpfen. Schlattners Erfolg
beruht auf seinem Abschiedspathos, dem “Schwanengesang” nach dem
geschichtlichen Ende. Der Autor geht in diesem Roman an den Anfang dieses
Endes zurück, im Roman ist “Der geköpfte Hahn” ein immer wiederkehrendes
Untergangs- und Todesmotiv. Die Handlung setzt am 23. August 1944 ein, der
Tag des Frontwechsels Rumäniens, eines Schicksalstages. Die Klammer dieses
Tages ist das magische Wort “Exitus” und “Exitus letalis”. Die Exitus-Feier, ein
Tanz von Schülern, und der “exitus letalis”, der Selbstmord des deutschen
Botschafters in Bukarest kurz vor dem Einmarsch der Sowjets. Doch immer
wieder weist der Roman auf das eigentliche Ende der Rumäniendeutschen hin:
ihre schuldhafte Verstrickung mit Nazideutschland; 6.500 dienten in der WaffenSS; der Auschwitzapotheker war Siebenbürger Sachse usw.
————————
3 Lulé, Susanna, Siebenbürger Erinnerungsorte. Zur Erschreibung des Vergangenen bei Eginald
Schlattner und Joachim Wittstock. Typoskript, S. 3.
4 Eva Leipprand (1998), “Süddeutscher Zeitung”.
76
MARIA SASS
6
Eginald Schlattners Roman beginnt scheinbar ganz harmlos und fast idyllisch:
“Exitus das war das Fest am Nachmittag, das die Großmutter mit zwei
Hausangestellten vorbereitete. Unsere Klasse, die Quarta der Deutschen Schule
von Fogarasch, feierte Exitus — so der tradierte Sprachgebrauch in
Siebenbürgen: Abschied von der Schule, Abschied voneinander, Abschied von
der Kindheit sowieso, wir alle waren über fünfzehn. Ein verspätetes Fest, denn
die Schulen hatten bereits im April geschlossen, als die ersten Bomben auf
Bukarest, Ploieºti und Kronstadt fielen. So wurde die Veranstaltung verschoben,
eben auf heute, den 23. August 1944.”5.
Gleich danach folgt ein Erwachen: “unsere Deutschen” schossen mit
Maschinen-gewehren auf eine im Schulhof versammelte Schülerklasse, wobei
ein Schüler verletzt wurde. Der Roman bietet die Jugendgeschichte Schlattners,
mit Rückblenden bis Advent 1942, dabei wird die schuldhafte Verstrickung mit
dem Dritten Reich dargestellt. Die dargebotene Landschaft ist oft apokalyptisch
gefärbt. Es ist ein seltsames Bild Siebenbürgens, wo gegenwärtig sogar die
Sachsen mit ihrer Ahnengalerie ein “Exotikum” darstellen. Das Erzählte ist
doppelperspektivisch: einerseits ist es die Sicht des erwachsenen erinnernden
Autors, andererseits ist es der Sechszehnjährige, der die Welt eben entdeckt,
wobei alles auf das Abschiedsfest fokussiert ist, als könne die Zeit damit
aufgehalten werden. Die Verwendung von Rückblenden hilft dem Autor ein
eindrucksvolles Panorama der Nazizeit zu zeichnen: alltägliche Vorurteile,
Antisemitismus, Ordnungssucht, nationalistische Haltungen der Siebenbürger
Sachsen lassen die Ursachen der Verstrickung aus den Dialogen, der Erzählung
selbst, deutlich werden. Meist ist es der schrecklich banale Familientag, der
diese Schuld plastisch, und genau am Ort ihres Entstehens, erzählbar macht.
Das Buch scheint volksnah, nah dem siebenbürgisch-sächsischen Charakter zu
sein. Der Autor verwendet Witze, Anekdoten oder Volksweisheiten. Alles wirkt,
auf jemanden, der die ehemalige siebenbürgische Atmosphäre kennt, fremd. Diese
Verfremdung ist wohl das Subtilste und Wertvollste an diesem Roman. Es zerfällt
alles, es ergibt sich kein einheitliches Bild mehr. Alles wirkt fremd, distanziert,
gerade weil es in jenen, die es kennen (sogar im Autor selbst, der, weil er vor Ort
lebt, es täglich miterlebt), ein Prozess der Entfremdung von der eigenen Heimat
sattgefunden hat. So gibt der Autor diesen Zerfall wieder und es gelingt ihm mit
traditionellen Erzählmitteln zu suggerieren, dass es all dies Vertraute von früher
bis in die Großfamilien, die Bräuche, die Redensarten, die Landschaft und die Orte
hinein, nicht mehr gibt, dass Siebenbürgen heute — um mit Dieter Schlesak zu
sprechen — “ein Panoptikum, ein Wachsfigurenkabinett”6 ist.
Auch die Erinnerung ist anders, das Gedächtnis ist entleert, verstört durch die
Ereignisse. Vielleicht ist genau dieses die Chance des Autors gewesen, der die
Zeit beider Diktaturen schmerzlich miterlebt hat, denn er wurde verfolgt, war
mehrere Jahre in Haft, das von Sachsen leere Siebenbürgen, mit leeren Dörfern,
————————
5 Eginald Schlattner (1998), Der geköpfte Hahn. Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, S. 8.
6 Schlesak, Dieter (1999), Halbjahresschrift für die südosteuropäische Geschichte, Literatur und Politik.
Heft. Nr. 1/Mai 1999, 11. Jahrgang. AGK Verlag.
7
77
wo er als Pfarrer hiergebliebene Landsleute aber auch Häftlinge betreut, all
dieses hat ihn weitgehend geprägt. Die Seelenlandschaft von heute überlagert
überall, unsichtbar im Buch, diejenige von früher, als es das deutsche Siebebürgen
noch gab. Die Nazizeit und das Ende, die Endzeit, strahlen ein unheimliches
Licht auf den Roman.
“Es erhebt sich die Vergangenheit, in dem woran einer Schaden genommen
hat an Leib und Seele, was er erlitten hat in seinem Gewissen: der Aufstand der
Vergangenheit. Nicht nur vor dem, was kommt, auch vor dem was war fürchte
man sich!”
“Leuchtend und seidig schimmerte der Himmel über der Stadt und anders als
über Berlin. Denn dies war Siebenbürgen, das `Land des Segens´ im Südosten
des Abendlandes”.
“Wenn einmal der eiserne Vorhang vor der Zukunft fällt, dann wird die
Vergangenheit über mich daherrauschen und wird mich in einer Weise
verschlingen, dass es mir heute noch graust. In jeder schlaflosen Nacht ist die
Vergangenheit in einer Intensität hier. Außerdem, diese übergenaue, Sie sagten
vom “Aufleuchten”, dieses Aufleuchten der Erinnerung hat auch ein Moment
der Vereinsamung, bringt Vereinsamung mit sich. Ich habe aber Angst vor der
Erinnerung. Nur, dass diese Bücher doch diese Intensität, diesen Grad an
Sinnlichkeit vermitteln, das hängt ganz bestimmt auch damit zusammen, dass
diese Dinge in dieser leuchtenden oder brennenden Weise präsent sind.”7
In Schlattners Erinnerung hatten alle Ethnien — Rumänen, Ungarn,
Zigeuner, Juden und Siebenbürger Sachsen — das siebenbürgische Völkergemisch
— ihren Platz. Dies konnte an einem dargestellten Sonntagspaziergang in
Fogarasch jener Jahre deutlich gemacht werden. Doch anhand der Jahre 19421944 wird der Vorabend des Untergangs der Deutschen von Fogarasch und
implizit jener Siebenbürgens geschildert. Das Naziunwesen hat nämlich auch in
Siebenbürgen mit Fahnen und Aufmärschen voller Pathos Einzug gehalten. Im
“Rassenkuddelmuddel” dort enthüllt sich die ganze Perversion des völkischen
Gedankens. Dem Erzähler stehen an der Schwelle zum Erwachsenwerden zwei
Initiationsriten zur Wahl — die Vereidigung auf den Führer oder die
Konfirmation. Zunächst lockt die Hitlerjugend mehr, mit ihren Ritualen von
Befehlen und dem Erzähler stehen an der Schwelle zum Erwachsenwerden zwei
Initiationsriten zur Wahl — die Vereidigung auf den Führer oder die
Konfirmation. Zunächst lockt die Hitlerjugend mehr, mit ihren Ritualen von
Befehlen und Gehorchen, ausgetobt in wilden Kriegsspielen, dem Hochgefühl
der Männergemeinschaft, wofür Schlattner Sätze von bestürzender Direktheit
findet. Der alles überschwemmende, homoerotisch gefärbte “Rausch der
Verwandlung” ist wie Schmerz und Lust und Tod alles eins: “Welch ausschweifendes
Glück, mit dem geliebten Feind zu verschmelzen!” Auf den Höhepunkt folgt aber
rasch die Demütigung durch die stumpfe Horde; die Parolen, zeigt sich, sind so
hohl wie die Helden. Jetzt wendet sich der Erzähler Alfa Sigrid zu, der
Märchenprinzessin im roten Samtkleid, und ihren drängenden Fragen nach dem
————————
7 Schlattner, Eginald, a.a.O, S. 317.
78
MARIA SASS
8
ewigen Leben. Er lässt sich konfirmieren und lädt zu seinem SchulabschlussTanztee auch die verfemte Jüdin Judith Glückselich ein.
Dieses Abschlussfest, in Fogarasch Exitus genannt, bildet den erzählerischen
Rahmen des Romans. Es ist der 23. August 1944, der Tag, an dem Rumänien
sich auf die Seite der Alliierten schlägt. Der Tag wird ein Schlusspunkt für alle,
für die Klasse, für die Naziherrschaft in Siebenbürgen und für das “sächsische
Völkchen” selbst. “Wir gehen unter”, sagt der Großvater. “Ein Wunder der
Weltgeschichte, dass wir uns achthundert Jahre über Wasser gehalten haben.
Exitus letalis”. Man trifft zwar gewisse Vorbereitungen, baut einen Splittergraben
im Garten und tauft den Hund Litwinow um in Ingeborg, um die Russen, wenn
sie kommen, nicht zu verärgern. Trotzdem: wenn sie kommen, ist alles aus. Aber
dies ist kein Grund, um nicht lustig zu sein. Beim Fest sind alle noch einmal
zusammen, die Freunde, die ganze Verwandtschaft. Aber schon darf die Jüdin
Glückselich anfangen aufzuatmen, die Rumänen gehen auf Distanz zu den
Deutschen, der hitlertreue Hordenführer Hans Adolf wird entthront und hat
ausgespielt. Märchenhaft verklärt erlebt der Erzähler die Berührung mit Alfa
Sigrid und die unmittelbare Nähe des Todes.
In Schlattners Roman werden immer wiederkehrende Bilder aus Märchen
und Aberglauben aufgenommen. So z.B. ist der geköpfte Hahn so doppeldeutig
wie das Leben selbst. Er ist Vorbote des Unheils; der Kopf allein aber, an die Tür
genagelt, bannt die bösen Geister. Die schöne siebenbürgische Landschaft mit
dem Fluss Aluta bildet die innere Entwicklung des Erzählers ab, das Forschen
ins Ungewisse, das Untertauchen und Zerfließen im sexuellen Erwachen. Die
Sprache selbst ist für den Heranwachsenden ein wichtiges Mittel des Erkundens
und Erkennens; der Brockhaus der Mutter erschließt neue dunkle Wörter wie
Orgasmus und Libido. Aber auch die Sprache ist zweideutig, sie schafft Nähe
zwischen Menschen und liefert sie einander aus, sie erfasst die Dinge und
verändert, verfälscht doch gleichzeitig, das in Worte Gefasste. So hält der
Roman die Dinge in einer reizvollen Schwebe, an der Schwelle, im fließenden
Zwielicht zwischen Leben und Tod. Der Hahn ohne Kopf — wie es auch im Titel
beginnt — wird vom ungarischen Hausmeister auf einem Fensterbrett des
elterlichen Hauses des Protagonisten gefunden, in dessen Festräume die
bürgerliche Jugend ein Fest zum Schulschluss feiert; Es ist ein Fest, das den
frühen Ausklang einer kurzen Jugend besagt, eine Jugend, die von Krieg und
Verrat bedroht wird. Der Bulibascha der Bindnerischen Zigeuner, weiß es
gewiss: ein geköpfter Hahn zieht böse Geister ins Haus, der Kopf aber allein ans
Tor genagelt, der hält sie ab. Hier aber fehlt gerade der segensreiche Kopf.8 Es
ist 23. August 1944, an dem Rumäniens König Michael der I., als Verbündeter
der Deutschen die Partner wechselt, mit den Aliirten einen Waffenstillstand
abschließen will und den Mareschal Antonescu als Gefährten Hitlers verhaften
lässt: “Der deutsche Botschafter Manfred Freiherr von Killingen war eben von
der Gemsenjagd in den Karpaten zurückgekehrt. Stehenden Fußes suchte er
beim König um eine Audienz an, die ihm zu später Stunde gewährt wurde, und
————————
8 Schlattner, E., a.a.O., S. 456.
9
79
forderte die sofortige Freilassung von Antonescu: Andernfalls, Majestät werde
ich Rumänien in ein Blutbad verwandeln. Ich bin so frei.”
Wieder in der deutschen Botschaft, schoss sich der Freiherr eine Kugel in den
Kopf. Die Ärzte befanden: “Exitus letalis!”9 Meistens ereignet sich Politik informell
in das gesellschaftliche Gefüge hinein, bestehend aus Onkel und Tanten, unter
Heranwachsenden, unter wackligen Balance der sozialen Klassen, in der fragilen
Kultur des Zusammenlebens mit Rumänen, Ungarn, Deutschen, Juden und
Zigeunern. In dieser Verwobenheit lässt sich nichts ausmachen, ob der zitierte
Exitus, der ganz am Ende des Romans steht, sich speziell auf den Tod der
deutschen Minderheit beziehen lässt. Ein Hauch von Vergänglichkeit streift
jedenfalls die gesamte transsilvanische Multikulturalität. Denn “Exitus” ist auch
das allererste Wort des Romans. Zwischen diesen beiden Erwähnungen des
Untergangs wird der Tanztee der jungen Leute gefeiert, begegnen uns Nationalisten
aller in Fogarasch versammelten Völker, Zivilisten, Offiziere und ihre Burschen,
rasche Liebe und immerwährende Gleichgültigkeiten, Flüchtende, Versteckte
und Evakuierte: Theatrum mundi transsilvanum. Diesen Roman kann man sich
als filmisches Gemälde vorstellen: kleinteilig-siebenbürgisch und darin auch
deutsch und rumänisch.
Schlattners zweiter Roman Rote Handschuhe ist, chronologisch gesehen, das
dritte Glied der Trilogie, bezieht sich auf den Beginn der kommunistischen Ära
in Rumänien, die stalinistische Zeit, mit Verfolgungen, Verhaftungen und
Einkerkerungen von siebenbürgischen Intellektuellen. Der Autor wurde von
seinen Landsleuten als “Verräter” bezeichnet, er sei im Gefängnis vom Staatsfeind
zum Staatsmitarbeiter geworden, habe fünf deutsche Schriftsteller “verpetzt”, so
dass diese verhaftet und eingekerkert worden sind. Der Roman ist Schlattners
Bekenntnis zum Verrat und seine Selbstdemütigung. Die Geschichte des
rumäniendeutschen Autors von der erzwungenen Aussage unter der Folter wird
von den meisten bezweifelt.
Der Roman Rote Handschuhe enthält hauptsächlich den Verhöralltag der
brutalen Jagd auf Konterrevolutionäre der kommunistischen Machthaber, denen
der Ich-Erzähler erliegt und gilt als spannendes Zeitdokument rumänischer
Nachkriegsgeschichte, das aber die Schuldfrage des Verrats offen lässt. Er
erzählt die Geschichte und Vorgeschichte der zweijährigen Haftzeit. Die Zelle ist
der Ort des Erzählvorgangs. Die Personen werden ständig gewechselt. So z.B.
finden sich am 23. August 1958 in der Zelle ein katholischer Priester, ein
proletarischer Aktivist, ein jüdischer Buchhändler und ein orthodoxer Mönch
ein. Alle haben sich entweder durch zu viel oder zu wenig gesellschaftliches
Engagement verdächtig gemacht und sie wissen, dass sie auf Gerechtigkeit nicht
hoffen dürfen. Sie erzählen tage- und nächtelang, wobei manchmal der Priester
als Moderator eingreifen muss, die Häftlinge durch Anekdoten oder Späße zu
beruhigen, damit sie sich nicht gegenseitig zerfleischen.
Die Zelle wird für den Erzähler in diesem Roman ein Ort der Erinnerung, die
Nachkriegsgeschichte in Rumänien wird mit so viel Ressentiments dargestellt,
————————
9 Ebenda, S. 517.
80
MARIA SASS
10
wie noch kein anderes Buch über diese Zeitspanne in Rumänien. Auch hier ist
ein weiterer Schritt zur Zerstörung der siebenbürgischen Identität zu vernehmen.
Im August 2005 erschien das dritte Glied der sogenannten SiebenbürgenTrilogie von Eginald Schlattner. Es umfasst die Jahre 1948-1951, chronologisch
betrachtet wäre es das zweite Glied in der von Schlattner geschilderten
siebenbürgischen Zeitgeschichte. Der Ort der Handlung ist Schässburg — das
örtliche Gymnasium soll zur Hebammenschule werden, auf klassische Fächer
wie z.B. Latein und Religionsunterricht wird verzichtet, demgegenüber wird
russischer Sprachunterricht und Parteigeschichte in die Curricula aufgenommen.
Clemens Rescher, vor nicht zu langer Zeit ein wohlhabender Fabrikantensohn,
wird nun als Klassenfeind betrachtet. In wenigen Wochen hat er fast alles
verloren: das Elternhaus wird von der Partei besetzt, das Klavier wird verholzt.
Der Vater sitzt in Kronstadt im Gefängnis, weil er einen Kommissar bei der
Enteignung seiner Fabrik geohrfeigt hat. Alleine Ottilie Rescher, die Großmutter
des Protagonisten, ist zurückgeblieben und hat sich in einem Pferdestall
eingerichtet. Ihr Kammermädchen hat ganz plötzlich ihr Klassenbewusstsein
entdeckt und macht beim großen Diktaturspiel des Volkes mit. Das ist der Stand
der Dinge in Siebenbürgen dieser Jahre.
Es sei hier festgehalten, dass Clemens Rescher als Alter-Ego des Autors zu
betrachten ist, wobei viel Autobiographisches in die dargestellten Ereignisse
einfließt. Nach der Jugendzeit in Fogarasch 1944 und vor den Erlebnissen eines
Securitate-Gefangenen, der auch zum Verräter wird, wandert der Erzählfaden
nun in den Mittelteil zurück, wobei von kleineren Dingen gesprochen wird,
hauptsächlich von Liebe und Familie. Ein Onkel bringt Clemens bei, dass er sich
an die neuen Umstände anpassen müsse, wobei auf den zivilisatorischen
Komfort verzichtet werden muss. Er flüchtet “zu den Feldern seiner Vorfahren”,
wobei er nicht einmal “strictul necesar” — das Notdürftigste — mitnimmt, nur
einen “Kotzen” (eine schäbige Decke), mit der er sich nachts unter freiem
Himmel zudecken kann. Ein Hirt lehrt ihn “Palukes” zu kochen und so lernt er
überleben. Es kommen die ersten Lieben, doch sie gehen auch bald. Für den zum
Aktivisten gewordenen Vater der jungen Petra ist Clemens kein rechter “Arbeiter”
und Isabelle, mit der er früher vierhändig Klavier gespielt hat, hält die Grenzen
des Standesgemäßen hoch. Nicht einmal die Liebe mit dem Zigeunermädchen
Carmencita gelingt, weil in Clemens Adern falsches Blut fließt, das zur
Ausgrenzung führt. Einzig mit der schönen Rumänin Rodica, mit der ihn tiefe
Gefühle verbindet, kommt es zu einer Liebesgeschichte. Und wenn das junge
Liebespaar dann eine Reise von Siebenbürgen bis in das Banat macht, dann nutzt
der Autor die Gelegenheit, in kleinen Nebenhandlungen, die Geschichte der
nach Rumänien eingewanderten Sachsen und Schwaben neu aufzuleben. Diese
soll dazu dienen, die untergehende deutsche Kulturlandschaft Siebenbürgens,
einem Album gleich, in die Seiten des Romans zu drängen. Dieser Darstellung,
der viel Traurigkeit anhaftet, fehlt es nicht an Ironie, wenn der Erzähler über den
“neuen Menschen”, der “herausgeprügelt” wird, spricht. Die Dorfbewohner, die
zur kollektiven Wirtschaft übergehen müssen, lernen so schnell und klatschen so
heftig, dass Stalins Portrait von der Wand fällt. Weniger kooperationswillig sind
11
81
die in der Staatsfarm “Roter Stier” zusammengefassten Kühe. Sie reagieren auf
die Grobianismen der Massentierhaltung mit einem Produktionsstreik. Nur
nachdem die sanften Hände der zurückgeholten sächsischen Bäuerinnen eingreifen
lassen sie die Milch fließen. Dazu kommt natürlich auch die klassische Musik.
Ein Klavier steht — es wird zum metaphorischen Titel — “im Nebel”. Diese
Metapher kann als Allegorie auf die Sinnlosigkeit der gewaltsam veränderten
Verhältnisse gedeutet werden. Klassische Musik, als bürgerliche Musik
betrachtet, kommt nur in den Ställen zum Klingen und sie wird auch nur dort
geduldet, denn wenigstens das Vieh darf allergisch auf Parteigebrüll sein und mit
Mozart bei Laune gehalten werden. Das Klavier im Nebel ist eine Metapher für
die Zerstörung und den Untergang einer Gesellschaft, die stolz auf ihre Kultur
war. Es wird in diesem Roman ein bleibendes literarisches Denkmal der
untergehenden sächsischen Lebenswelt gesetzt.
Schlattners Romane sprechen implizit und explizit von der sächsischen kulturellen
Identität Siebenbürgens, die in jahrhundertelanges Bemühen konstruiert und
danach, wie oben erwähnt, im Laufe einiger Jahrzehnte zugrunde gerichtet
wurde. Die Romantrilogie hat die Rolle, diese Kultur für die Nachwelt und das
Ausland zu konservieren. Wie sich Susanna Lulé ausdrückte: “Der Wille zur
Großform in Verbindung mit einer Betonung des ,Exitus’ oder ‚Exitus letalis’,
des tödlichen Abgangs, des Untergangs, unterstreicht die Intention des Autors,
eine zu Ende gehende 800-jährige Gemeinschaft in Literatur zu transformieren
und darin zu bewahren.”10
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Lulé, Susanna, Siebenbürger Erinnerungsorte. Zur Erschreibung des Vergangenen bei Eginald Schlattner und
Joachim Wittstock, Typoskrip, 2001.
Ritter, Alexander, Germanistik ohne schlechtes Gewissen. Die deutschsprachige Literatur des Auslandes und
ihre wissenschaftliche Rezeption. In Deutschsprachige Literatur im Ausland. Hg. Von Al. Ritter, Göttingen
1985.
Ritter, Alexander, In Südostdeutsche Vierteljahresblätter, 50/2001, 4, München, 2001.
Schlattner, Eginald, Der geköpfte Hahn, Deutscher Taschenbuch Verlag, 1998.
Schlesak, Dieter, Halbjahresschrift für die südosteuropäische Geschichte, Literatur und Politik, Heft. Nr.
1/Mai 1999, 11. Jahrgang. AGK Verlag, 1999.
————————
10 Lulé, Susanna, a.a.O., S.5.
THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE CSCE, 1990-1995.
AN INSTITUTIONALIST PERSPECTIVE
FLAVIA JERCA*
Abstract. The research is focused on explaining why the process of
adaptation of the CSCE led to this degree of institutionalization. The study
consists of four sections. The one presents the theoretical framework on
which I will later draw the analysis of the CSCE’s institutionalization. The
external shock and the states’ policies towards the European institutions in
general, and in particular towards the CSCE are elaborated in the next
section, so that afterwards, withholding each state policies, to focus in the
third section on the bargaining process from which the final form of the
OSCE resulted. Before drawing the final conclusions, the fourth section
advances a comparison between the “old” and the “new” CSCE, with emphasis
on different institutional quality indicators. It was considered necessary to
specify from beginning the starting and the ending point in the institutional
degree of CSCE. Therefore, the section below shortly presents the “old” and
the “new” CSCE.
Key words: institutionalization, “old” CSCE, “new” CSCE, security
architecture.
Introduction
The 1989 revolutionary year, the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from the
Eastern Europe and the end of the Cold War brought with them new challenges
that were going to change the existing international security, by their extension
or adaptation. One of these institutions was the CSCE (Conference of Security
and Cooperation in Europe), which was created as a dialogue and consensusbuilding process since the early 1970’s in the context of an East-West conflict.
By adapting it to the new challenges the participating states considered it a
suitable framework for addressing the current European security issues. The
institutionalization process is considered to have taken place between 1990 and
1995. In December 1994 the participant states decided to change its name in
OSCE (Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe), but this did not
————————
* Ma Student in International Relations, University of Bucharest.
2
THE TRANSFORMATION OF THE CSCE, 1990-1995
83
change its legal status. In 1995 it had all the characteristics of an organization
(permanent bodies, political organs, instruments and mechanisms) but it lacked
juridical personality.
My research is focused on explaining why the process of adaptation of the
CSCE led to this degree of institutionalization*. This means that from a diplomatic
conference it was transformed into a security management institution. Why
would it be important for us to know? Because at the end of the Cold War and
after WTO’s dissolution, the CSCE was one of Europe’s two multilateral
security institutions, but the only one in which all the former enemies were
participating and also with a special meaning for the East-European countries,
left for the moment without any security umbrella.
The analysis starts from two working hypotheses. The first hypothesis is a
general one, based on the existence of an external shock. The new security
challenges of the post-Cold War era consisted in a pressure to adapt this atypical
conference by strengthening it with new structures and mechanisms. Yet, this
cannot explain us the specific CSCE’s institutionalization. For this purpose an
actor centered complementary hypothesis must be introduced. This one can help
explaining the specific change that took place from moment A (CSCE in 1990)
to moment B (OSCE in 1995). The CSCE’s final functions and forms depended
on state’s interests, because each state had different aims and interests and faced
different domestic, foreign, security problems.
As a theoretical foundation I will draw upon the institutional theory, formulated
by C. Wallender, H. Haftendorn and R. Keohane. This approach starts from the
point that ‘institutions matter’, i.e. state policies are influenced by the existence
of international institutions. The theory’s focus is on the reciprocal interaction
between institutions and national governments: first focus on the impact of
institutions on national policies and then on the impact of such national policies
on the institutions themselves1. Correlated with the institutional theory, the
analysis uses the function and form framework, which provides the basis for
explaining, along other elements, the change that occurs inside an institution.
The study consists of four sections. The one presents the theoretical
framework on which I will later draw the analysis of the CSCE’s institutionalization.
The external shock and the states’ policies towards the European institutions in
general, and in particular towards the CSCE are elaborated in the next section,
so that afterwards, withholding each state policies, to focus in the third section
on the bargaining process from which the final form of the OSCE resulted.
Before drawing the final conclusions, the fourth section advances a comparison
between the “old” and the “new” CSCE, with emphasis on different institutional
quality indicators. It was considered necessary to specify from beginning the
starting and the ending point in the institutional degree of CSCE. Therefore, the
section below shortly presents the “old” and the “new” CSCE.
————————
* The letters written in italics show my emphases.
1 Celeste Wallender, Helga Haftendorn, Robert O. Keohane: “Introduction”, in Helga Haftendorn, Robert
O. Keohane, Celleste Wallender (ed.): Imperfect Unions. Security Institutions over Time and Space, Oxford,
1999, p. 12.
84
FLAVIA JERCA
3
2.1. The “old” and the “new” CSCE
Two main block-agendas led to the establishment of this Conference. On one
hand, the Soviet Union was looking for the recognition of the Second World
War’s status-quo, and on the other hand, the West was looking for a possibility
to stimulate democratic changes the communist regimes from inside. The
Helsinki “Decalogue” from The Final Act (August 1, 1975), which established
the basic ten principles that should have guided the relationship between states,
and the three “baskets” (political-military security; economic, environment,
technology; humanitarian area), constituted the framework for interaction
between the two blocks. It should be noted that all European states were
participating to this political process (minus Albania). Yet, the Helsinki Final Act
was not a legally but a political binding document, a comprehensive code of
conduct for all major areas of international relations. Some argue that in the mid
80’s the increase in the frequency and length of the CSCE review sessions,
regularly attended by the same group of national officials, allowed the CSCE to
develop even an institutional identity2.
For many it was hard to imagine the ‘old’ CSCE in the new Europe. After the
events in 1989, the Conference had an uncertain future because its raison d’être
had been the division of the continent, so it had little relevance for the post-Cold
War Europe3. But instead of disappearing, the CSCE was adapted to the new
order, as the only way to reunify the continent. The first step came in November
1990, when the participant states of the CSCE adopted the Paris Charta for a
New Europe (November 1990), which contained basic principles and rules for
an intensified cooperation after the East-West conflict, plus permanent organisms,
instruments, and mechanisms. Yet, the functions of these organs will take time
to be clearly defined. The events that followed (intrastate crisis, ethnic violence,
internal wars, spillover of conflicts into regional conflagrations) demanded from
the CSCE more organs and mechanism. Especially the CSCE’s weak response
to the Yugoslav crisis determined an overall review of its structures.
At the end of the institutionalizing process, the OSCE structure consisted of:
Summits, Ministerial Councils, a Senior Council, a Permanent Council (regular
body for political consultation and decision-making, weekly meetings), a Forum
for Security Cooperation (regular body for arms control and CSBMs, weekly
meetings), a OCSE Parliamentary Assembly. The Chairman-in-Office had a large
structure under its command: personal representatives of the CiO, the Office for
Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, the OCSCE Representative on
Freedom of the Media, the OSCE Secretariat with its Secretary General, a High
Commissioner on National Minorities, the OCSE field activities; the OCSE
Assistance in Implementation of Bilateral Agreements. There were also the
————————
2 ªtefan Lehne: “Vom Prozess zur Institution: Zur aktuallen Debatte ueber die Weiterentwicklung des
KSKE-Prozesses“, Europa-Archiv, no.16(1990), p. 500; quoted in Richard Weitz: “Pursuing Military Security in
Eastern Europe“, in Robert O. Keohane (ed.): After the Cold War: International Institutions and State Strategies
in Europe, 1989-1991, Center for International Affairs, Cambridge; Hardwar Univ. Press, 1993, p. 347.
3 ªtefan Lehne: The CSCE in the 1990s, Common European House or Potemkin Vill?, Wien, Braumüller,
1991, p. 1.
4
85
OCSCE related bodies: the Court of Conciliation and Arbitration (Geneva), the
Joint Consultative Group which promotes the implementation of the CFE Treaty,
and the Open Skies Consultative Commission which promotes implementation
of Open Sky Treaty.
As it was showed above, in a few years the old Conference was endowed with
several political and decision-making bodies, some of them permanent, plus
instruments and mechanisms useful to implement their purpose. The paper does
not have the intention to look at the “new” OCSE effectiveness and efficiency.
So a statement whether the institutionalizing process led to a “better” CSCE or
not won’t be made here. Yet, in the last part of the paper a comparison of the
“old” and “new” is made, focused on several institutional quality indicators.
2.2. Theoretical framework: “the institutionalist theory”4
In the last two decades the international institutions started to get more attention
from scholars, and shortly after, the idea that “institutions matter” emerged. This
approach knew in time various versions, and the “institutionalist theory” presented
in the current study is one of these versions, generally named “neo-liberal
institutionalism”, and based on the presumptions of the rational institutionalism5.
Having as bedrock the idea that institutions matter, the theory views the
system not as an anarchic but as an institutionalized one, which affects, due to
this character, the states actions. They define institutions as ‘persistent and
connected sets of rules, often affiliated with organizations, which operate across
international boundaries’. Why do institutions matter in the view of this approach?
Because they affect states’ cost-benefits calculations and due to that also are
shaping their strategies, by reducing possible actions; they induce conformity,
due to the norms and rules that regularize behavior; they alter how societies view
their interests and the mandate that states have to act in world politics6.
States are expected to cooperate in pursuing common interests, since cooperative
strategies under some circumstances produce more benefits than unilateral ones.
States will still face the problem of uncertainty and will worry about being
exploited, but these can be minimized by institutions by increasing information
about other states’ intentions and likely choices. The state as an actor is not to be
neglected, but the vector is reversed, from the institutionalized system to the
states. Power and interest remain important. Preferences are fixed but the theory
admits that these can change due to a fundamental external shock, or in time.
Due to the limit space, not all security institutions’ effects are going to be
discussed, just the ones that apply more on the current case study. Institutions
————————
4 The institutional theory can sometimes create confuson due to the name, as even the authors themselves
admit, because in some of the literature, this approach has been referred as ‘neo-liberal institutionalism’. But
due to several reasons, the authors prefer the first name.
5 The authors underline that “... our brand of institutionalism relies heavily on contractual theories in
economics and on the rationality assumptions. States are viewed, within limits, as actors whose strategies can
be seen as the result of rational calculations by their leaders. (…)…institutions play a role…by effecting states’
cost-benefit calculations”. Celeste Wallender, Helga Haftendorn, Robert O. Keohane (ed.): “Introduction”, in
Helga Haftendorn, Robert O. Keohane, Celeste Wallender (ed.): Imperfect Unions…, p. 3-5.
6 Ibidem, p. 1.
86
FLAVIA JERCA
5
may affect a state’s strategies by changing the options available and altering their
costs and benefits, which leads in the current analyze to the conclusion that the
institutionalization of the CSCE after the Cold War was meant to prevent the
return to mistrustful and overly defensive security strategies by involving
member states in an ongoing process of information exchange and transparency7.
Coming back to the core of the present analyzes, that is explaining institutional
change, we come around another process: change by adaptation. This seems to
be necessary for an institution in order to survive, and requires it to be sensitive
not only to general changes in its environment, but specifically to the interests
and foreign-policy preferences of its most important members8. After
investigating the change in state policies, the analyze needs to be extended to
institutional dynamics, more precisely to see how interactions between state
policies yielded outcomes, through bargaining processes, that were not
necessarily predictable from the set of policies themselves9.
The core element in the analysis of the CSCE’s institutionalization is the
functions and forms framework (Fig 1). Therewith, the relation between the
institutional functions and forms is important for the institutional theory because
it provides the basis for explaining the variation I the institutional forms and for
framing hypotheses with view to the causes and the directions of the institutional
change10. Different security obstacles and problems impose for their solution certain
institutional functions, and different functions impose different institutional
forms. To help for a better highlighting of this analysis framework, the attention
has to be first directed towards the security institutions and the security problems
with which states confront themselves during their cooperation.
Common
denominator
=
Definition of
common security
problem
+
Common concept
on required functions
and forms
Identify each state’s
security problem
definition
diffrent security problems
diffrent security strategies
Identify each state’s
functions and forms
definition
different functions
interaction between states policies and bargaining processes
Fig. 1. Functions — Forms Framework
————————
7 Ibidem, p. 9.
8 Ibidem, p. 12.
9 Ibidem, p. 13.
10 Ibidem, p. 7.
different forms
6
87
The final result of the institutionalization process represents in fact the common
denominator reached during the bargaining process. Identifying each state’s
security problem definition leads to the common security problem. Identifying
each state’s functions and forms definition for the institution in change leads to
the common concept on required functions and forms. All together point out the
common denominator. We are interested in the interaction between states policies
which takes place during the bargaining processes. This process is influenced by the
institutions, because when choosing a strategy, a state depends not only on what
it wants, but also on what it believes other states seek, information which is
provided due to the existence of institutions.
In modern informational terms, the essence of the security dilemma lies in
uncertainty and private information. This leads us to the observation that the
Conference should be changed in an institutions designed to cope with these
kinds of risks, this means will have rules, norms, procedures to enable the
members to provide and obtain information and manage disputes in order to
avoid generating security dilemmas11.
2.3. States’ policies
Governments in the west and east sought to develop appropriate strategies to
cope with the decline in Soviet power, the unification of Germany and the
collapse of the Soviet Union itself12. Plus the new kind of risks: possible
fragmentation of control over Soviet nuclear weapons, the outbreak of ethnic
violence within states and across borders and spread of civil violence, possibility
of political and economical collapse in the East with profound social
consequences, mass migration in the wake of violence and collapse, military
actions outside Europe, as in Middle East etc.. In an international environment
more and more interdependent, the fate of an institution is directly influenced by
the existence of other institutions. Once with the end of the Cold War, the
institutions needed to be adapted in order to face the new challenges, otherwise
they might no longer meet the challenges of the new world. The institutionalization
degree depended not only on the characteristics of the respective institution, but
also on the availability of the member states to invest in these, according to their
own security problems and strategies, or to the opportunities or constrains raised
by other institutions.
In the western highly institutionalized system state behavior was governed by
rules and norms and the CSCE represented only a part of this system. Therefore,
we have to look not only on how the Conference influences states policies, but
also at the other institutions part of that system, some of them with a very high
influence role, like the NATO and the European Community. The former Eastern
‘block’ is characterized after the Cold War by a void of institutions, tried to be
field by some Central and Eastern countries with western institutions. States’
————————
11 Ibidem, p. 26.
12 Robert O. Keohane, Joseph S. Nye: “Introduction: The End of the Cold War in Europe”, in Keohane,
Robert O. (ed.): After the Cold War…, p. 1.
88
FLAVIA JERCA
7
policies towards the CSCE will be influenced also by these institutions, by being
a member or by wanting to become one. And not to forget that these also went
through an extensive process of institutionalization. The sections below focus
on the characterization of each state’s position, continued to general functions
and then linked to respectively institutional form. The attitude towards the
institutionalization of the CSCE is also analyzed according to some criteria, like:
competencies, mode of decision-making, instruments, encompassed policy
areas13. Only significant representatives of the old blocks will be presented.
Germany. As a legacy of the Cold War, Germany developed reflexive support
for institutions that were not only instruments of policy but also normative
frameworks for policy-making14. This means that the web of interlocking
institutions of which it was a member defined and limited its foreign actions.
In its quest for unification, Germany had to reassure both allies and former
adversaries of the consequences of its unification. In order to handle its security
problems and to achieve its foreign policy objectives, Germany used, in general,
the following strategies: deepening its support for NATO to reassure the US and
for the EC to reassure France and Britain, support for strengthened CSCE to
allay Soviet fears15, bilateral diplomacy towards east bloc countries. Germany
was one of the unceasing promoters of the adaptation of existing international
institutions to the circumstances of the new world. Germany’s strategies were
determined by NATO, CSCE, EC, and WEU, perceived as indispensable and
complementary. In this picture, the CSCE provided a framework that was
appropriate for increasing stability among the countries on the continent and for
addressing spillover regional conflicts, but a framework that had to adapt its
structures as to avoid inefficiency16. The CSCE was also an important pillar in
her policy to promote economic and political stabilization in the former eastern
bloc, and to prevent the political and economic isolation of the USSR.
The unification was accomplished under the 2 plus 4 process (the four
winners of the Second World War plus the two German states) but the CSCE was
going to be the framework through which Germany would reduce uncertainty
about its own intentions. In this way CSCE, in the big picture of institutionalized
multilateralism, became from mean an end. Germany wanted the CSCE to
perform a new function, which was to include a new kind of international
cooperation, with new operational measures for multilateral attempts to manage
and possibly dissolve emerging risks and conflicts and to foster democratization.
————————
13 For the whole table of the criteria for assessing international institutions and institutionalization
policies (in this case, security institutions) and more explanations see Ingo Peters: “The “old” and the new
CSCE” — Institutional Quality and Political Meaning”, in Ingo Peters (ed.): New Security Challenges: The
Adaptation of International Institutions, New York, Lit Verlag, p. 87-89.
14 Jeffrey J. Anderson, John B. Goodman: “Mars or Minerva? A United Germany in a Post-Cold War
Europe”, in Robert O. Keohane (ed.): After the Cold War…, p. 23-24.
15 Initially a united Germany as member of the NATO was not acceptable for USSR, and after long
bilateral negotiations and unilateral concessions made by Germany, like limitation of the army or financial
support for the soviet army forces leaving GDR, plus inviolability of borders and a change in NATO’s doctrine,
the latter agreed.
16 Jeffrey J. Anderson, John B. Goodman: op. cit.; in Keohane, Robert O. (ed.): After the Cold War…, p. 43.
8
89
The CSCE was to become the main engine of an “all-European cooperative
security strategy”17. To be able to accomplish all these new functions, the CSCE
needed new form (instruments and institutional structure): new political
structures, a council of the Foreign Ministers, regular summits, agencies, forums,
institutions for conflict prevention and peaceful settlements of disputes, etc.
Regarding the CSCE’s future policy area, beside the three classical baskets,
now it should have also promoted democracy, protected minorities, prevented
conflict and manageed crisis. The CSCE’s competencies were to be very
comprehensive, from consultations, setting norms and rules, implementation
verification, operational measures, to political sanctions. Germany also wanted
to change the mode of decision-making, introducing the “consensus-minusone”. It can be concludeed that Germany was one of the leading countries with
extensive institutionalization programs for the CSCE.
The Soviet Union. Immediately after the events in 1989/90, it can be argued
that Soviet (and later the Russian Federation) strategies were substantially affected
by the existence of institutions in Europe and it relied at least in part on institution
restrains and opportunities in calculating policies. It relied on institutions in
coping with the new uncertainties and in the same time to reassure other states
about Soviet intensions18.
The Soviet Union was most interested in German unification and the collapse
of the alliance system it had imposed in the Eastern Europe. Regarding the WTO,
it first proposed to be transformed in a political organization (as well as the
NATO), and after its disintegration, it used it as an example for the western
military alliance. The CSCE would have to take its place as an all-European
institution more appropriate for the entire range of post-confrontation European
security19. The CSCE remain so important in the first years of the new era, due
to its characteristic of being the only major European institution in which the
Soviet Union was a member. And was also an important link to the West, which
allowed it to participate on an equal basis in the management of European
affairs20. After the military withdrawal from the Eastern Europe countries and the
turn of these to the western institutions, the Soviet Union saw the strengthening
of the CSCE as the only way to prevent the lost of the political influence in this
part of Europe. The CSCE had a special relation with the Russian Federation in
the context of its missions of conflict prevention in former soviet territories.
With such functions to accomplish, the CSCE also needed new forms. Russia
pursued to extend the Conference competencies and component, by creating, for
example, a “«pan-European security system» through which Russian security
problems could be administrated”21. A significant increase of CSCE’s policy
————————
17 Ingo Peters: “The “old” and the new CSCE…”, in Idem (ed.): New Security Challenges…, New York,
Lit Verlag, p. 199.
18 Celeste A. Wallander, Jane E. Prokop: “Soviet Security Strategies toward Europe: After the Wall, with
Their Backs up against It”, in Robert O Keohane (ed.): After the Cold War…, p. 99-100.
19 Ibidem, p. 91, 94.
20 ªtefan Lehne: op. cit., p. 7.
21 Itar Tass, 31 January, 1922, quoted in Leszek Buszynski: Russian Foreign Policy after the Cold War,
Praeger, London, 1996, p. 251.
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areas (especially regarding peacekeeping) and its institutional structure was also
wanted. However, the support existed, but no finality was sought. On the other
hand, Russia bitterly opposed a change of the voting procedures.
The United States. US ought to adapt NATO in order to maintain it as a
source of American influence, and to continue support for the EC as a stabilizing
force in Western Europe and a magnet to democratic change in Eastern Europe22.
The adaptation to the new challenges sought also to maintain NATO as the
central military alliance that would address the European security. In the same
time it supported the development of a strong European defense policy, as a way
to reduce American burden, but not to the limit of undermining the importance
of NATO. Regarding the CSCE after the end of the Cold War they wanted to
transform it in a large security framework that would give the east European
countries the sensation of playing an important role in the European security
(e.g. the CSCE new institutions were located in countries from the former east
bloc) while they were still left outside the NATO’s door. US were ready to go
along with the strengthening of the CSCE to the extent that this was necessary
to encourage democracy and to assist the East European governments, to
promote German unity and to strengthen Gorbachev’s internal position, but the
support for the change was temperate by the wary of the risk that this
development might affect NATO’s role23. To successfully accomplish these
functions, the CSCE must not pass through an extensive process of
institutionalization, therefore, its forms (institutional structure), as well as the
bureaucracy which followed it, should be as simple as possible. U. S were
perhaps the state which resisted the most the process of reforming the CSCE,
trying to get as little as possible at the negotiating table.
France. Immediately after the events that took place during 1989, France
was concerned about two things: the effects of German unification and the
maintenance of an independent French diplomacy. Its strategy to cope with the
first concern was to promote the ‘deepening’ of the EC, which came in dispute
with the other important stream within the Community, the ‘widening’. France
was also active within the debate between the primacy of NATO and an
independent European security policy. In the minds of the French officials came
back the old concern of a “European Europe”, i.e. a Europe that would not be
dominated by the U.S.24. In this context the WEU would had to gain an independent
role and to become the institutions responsible with the European security.
In this highly institutionalized environment, the CSCE captured no special
attention from the French officials. Before 1989 it was seen as a good way to
influence change within the eastern countries; now it was seen as lacking
potential in addressing the new challenges with which the whole Europe was
confronting. As functions, the Conference had to activate in the field of peaceful
settlements of disputes and supporting democracy, rule of law and fundamental
human rights in the new eastern democracies. An ambitious plan, approved in
————————
22 Robert O. Keohane, Joseph S. Nye: op. cit., in Keohane, Robert O. (ed.): After the Cold War…, p. 11.
23 ªtefan Lehne: The CSCE in the 1990s…, p. 8.
24 Ibidem, p. 139.
10
91
the end, was a court of arbitration and counseling based on a judicial convention.
It also pleaded for a permanent executive political organ and for the CSCE
development on a legal line.
Great Britain. One concern for Britain was the unification of Germany. This
was perceived as a threat both to its position in Europe and to its relationship
with the US, especially after George Bush’s offer to Germany of a ‘partnership
in leadership’ (May 1989)25. This privileged position near the United States was
usually occupied by Great Britain. The problem posed uncertainty about Britain’s
place in general in Europe and in the world, and especially in the economic
sphere. The fear of a more integrated Community that would tie its hands,
determined Britain to be the leader of the ‘widening’ stream. In this direction, it
pushed for a sooner enlargement of the EC towards the new democracies in the
East Europe. Related to NATO, the British position was another story. During
the Cold War, British defense policy had become so integrated with NATO
policy that it was difficult to separate the two26. Going down this road, Britain
supported a more political role for the alliance and a strengthen WEU that would
allowed the Europeans to have an increased role in their own defense while not
undermining NATO’s importance, read as US. In the same time it opposed an EC
role in defense issues.
In this whole picture, the CSCE drew little attention. Even during the Cold War
the British officials had little faith in its abilities. Now they were supporting the
strengthening but without expecting big outcomes. With regard to CSCE’s functions
and forms, the British officials mostly were not counted among those with initiatives;
instead they tried — at least in some issues — to undermine the final outcome. They
opposed a increase of CSCE’s autonomy and supported the American argument, that
maximum efficiency is obtained with a minimum of bureaucracy.
East Europe. After the collapse of the Eastern institutions — the WTO and
CMEA — most of the governments from this region turned their eyes towards
the western institutionalized system. But lacking invitations to join, they sought
to use the CSCE, although its procedures were slow and difficult and its ability
to act coherently against a determined threat virtually nonexistent27. Along these
years we can observe that the East European governments tried to do their best
to meet the standards of the institutions in which they were (CSCE) or were not
yet (NATO, EC) members.
Regarding the CSCE, the states were fervent supporters of the strengthening.
But due to the opposition of some important countries, particularly the US, the
ambitious proposals of the Eastern countries of a categorical change were
always simplified. The East European governments had several reasons for
supporting an increased role for the CSCE regarding the security of Europe28.
————————
25 Louise Richardson: “British State Strategies after the Cold War”, in Keohane, Robert O. (ed.): After the
Cold War…, p. 150-151.
26 Ibidem, p. 159.
27 Robert O. Keohane, Joseph S. Nye: op. cit., in Keohane, Robert O. (ed.): After…, p. 14.
28 See Richard Weitz for a detailed description of the reasons; Richard Weitz: op. cit., in Robert O.
Keohane (ed.): After…, p. 346-347.
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1) Through the CSCE they identified themselves as members of the European
commonwealth. 2) Offered a place to exchange information and to express their
defense concerns in very uncertain times through an extensive dialogue. 3) The
Conference’s existence facilitated their campaign to weaken the WTO and
Soviet Union’s membership made it easier for Moscow to relinquish the WTO.
4) The CSCE remained the only European security institution in which the
Soviet Union (and afterwards the Russian Federation) was still a member. It is
worth mentioning that the CSCE’s weak response to the Yugoslavian crisis
undermined its importance in the eyes of eastern countries. Their focus will be
afterwards on confidence building and crisis management mechanisms29. The
most ambitious plan of transformation came from Czechoslovakia. The vision
was of a Europe-wide security system centered on a Commission on Security in
Europe, which would have assumed the functions of all existing alliances, ending
with a confederation that would have act as a single actor30.
There is no doubt that the relative abundance of international institutions did
affect the East European security environment, especially if we consider that there
were weak governments, and traditionally they favor international institutions31. The
membership or not of an institution influenced in equal measure the states’ policies.
2.4. Proposals, bargaining, decisions
The new environment after the Cold War was characterized by a high degree
of uncertainty, which combined with competitive bargaining, would have to
result in obstacles to cooperation32. Being an institution dealing with risks, the
transformation of CSCE would have to consider a design that copes with
problems of assurance and coordination. The first problem required mechanisms
that allow members to exchange information about one another’s preferences,
while the latter required negotiating forums and bargaining structures, especially
in an institutions characterized by the consensus principle. Immediately after the
end of the Cold War, the CSCE offered the perfect framework for negotiations
between the former enemies. There were now focused on adapting the Conference
to the new challenges of the international environment by strengthening its
institutional structure and endowing with new mechanisms, instruments and
capabilities. The section below presents chronologically the stages of the
institutionalization process, by emphasizing on states’ proposals, bargaining and,
in the end, the reached common denominator.
In the wake of the 1989/90 revolutions, ambitious packages for the
strengthening of the CSCE were offered by the East-European countries and
GDR, with concrete proposals for permanent organs, like a secretariat, centers
for disarmament and verification, or for conflict prevention and peaceful
————————
29 Ibidem, p. 353.
30 Ibidem, p. 362.
31 Ibidem, p. 374, 378.
32 Ingo Peters: “Introduction: New Security Challenges and Institutional Change”, in Ingo Peters (ed.):
New Security Challenges…, New York, Lit Verlag, p. 13-15.
12
93
settlements of disputes (even permanent agencies at the political level)33. In
December 1989 the Soviet president Gorbachev called for an earlier summit of
the CSCE in the second half of 1990 for the strengthening of the CSCE, a
response to Kohl’s ten-points plan ‘for overcoming the division of Germany and
Europe’34. Immediately French president Mitterrand offered Paris as the place
where the first summit after the one in 1975 to be hold, but now in totally new
international context. At the Conference on the Human Dimensions of the CSCE
in Copenhagen (July 5-29, 1990): it was decided to set up a Committee to prepare
the summit.
The Preparatory Committee was the first one to reflect the new changes
within the negotiating partners. There were no longer two blocks with the NNAs
as mediators. The new central force was now EC, as the only group of states still
closely coordinating their positions35. The Soviet Union presented flexibility,
and was interested only in the common NATO-WTO declaration. Within the
eastern countries, Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia were very active and
with ambitious proposals. Yet what was to be obtained at the Paris summit had
been already decided. In July 1990 at the NATO summit, the London Declaration
was released as the common denominator within the West. The document contained
the program concerning the institutionalization of the CSCE: at the center of the
new CSCE would be a mechanism for regular consultations at the head of state,
ministerial and senior official levels, which would be supported by the permanent
secretariat, a mechanism to monitor elections, a center for the prevention of
conflicts and a CSCE parliamentary body36. For the moment the idea of a strong
CSCE was reduced by the fear of the Western states that it would diminish the
role of NATO and affect the integration within the EC.
The Charta of Paris for a New Europe37 signed at the Paris summit in
November 1990, was the first official document to record that the era of
confrontation and division of Europe has ended and that the time of profound
change has come. Also there were taken the first decisions regarding
institutionalization. At the political level regular meeting were established:
summits, a Council of Foreign Ministers (will provide the central forum for
political consultations within the CSCE process; regularly meetings, at least
once a year.), follow-up meetings (every two years). A Committee of Senior
Officials will prepare the meetings of the Council and carry out its decisions.
The Committee will review current issues and may take appropriate decisions,
including in the form of recommendations to the Council. Permanent organs
were established in order to provide administrative support to the political level
(both the Council and the Committee), i.e. the Secretariat in Prague. Plus
————————
33 Ingo Peters: “The “old” and the” new” CSCE — Institutional Quality and Political Meaning”, in Ingo
Peters (ed.): New Security Challenges…, New York, Lit Verlag, p. 102-103.
34 Ingo Peters: “The CSCE and German Policy: a Study in How Institutions Matter”, in Haftendorn,
Keohane, Wallender (ed.): Imperfect Security Institutions..., p. 202.
35 ªtefan Lehne, The CSCE in the 1990s…, p. 17.
36 Ibidem.
37 The information regarding the decision taken in Paris is from “Charter of Paris for a New Europe”,
Paris Summit, 21.11.1990, www.osce.org.
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specialized agencies on specific policy areas: the Conflict Prevention Centre in
Vienna to assist the Council in reducing the risk of conflict. It will also support
the implementation of the CSBMs mechanism for consultation and co-operation
as regards unusual military activities; annual exchange of military information;
communications network; annual implementation assessment meetings; cooperation as regards hazardous incidents of a military nature. An Office for Free
Elections in Warsaw was created to facilitate contacts and the exchange of
information on elections within participating States. Instruments for
implementing agreed measures have been developed, ascribed to either the
political forums or the organs, depending on the areas of assignments. Also
mechanisms, which would provide prearranged procedures for consultations and
decision-making in conflicts or crisis situations, e.g.: “unusual military activities”,
“human rights mechanism”. It was also created the CSCE parliamentary assembly,
involving members of parliaments from all participating States.
Starting with 1991 there is a “second wave” in the construction of new CSCE
institutions, a phenomenon with more causes: the NATO government no longer
feared the CSCE, as a potential rival of the Alliance; the central and eastern
countries realized they will would not receive direct western security guarantees
and reoriented towards the CSCE. Hereby the wishes of the small states were
this time welcomed by a positive western attitude38.
So the Paris summit was the first one to decide in the matter of
institutionalization. But it wasn’t going to be the last one, because as it was
mentioned, the process lasted at least until 1995. The first Council of Ministers39
held in Berlin in June 1991 decided on a mechanism for consultation and
cooperation with regard to emergency situations, which “arise from a violation
of one of the Principles of the Final Act or as the result of major disruptions
endangering peace, security or stability”. A state can demand an emergency meeting
if it has the support of only other 12 states. But the rule of consensus remains
valid regarding other decisions (like measures to be taken, etc.). It followed the
second meeting, Prague Council, which had to set the guidelines for the third
CSCE summit at Helsinki.
The Prague Council40 which took place in January 1992 represented a totally
different CSCE, at least regarding participating states, with ten new ones; some
of them not even ‘European’. The Council took some important decisions
towards strengthening the CSCE. In order to increase its effectiveness, the
Committee of Senior Officials (CSO) will meet more regularly, at least every
three months, and it can delegate tasks to other CSCE institutions or to openended ad hoc groups with a precise mandate. An important deviation from the
consensus principle was realized: appropriate action may be taken by the
Council or the Committee of Senior Officials, if necessary in the absence of the
————————
39 The information regarding the decisions taken in Berlin is from the “Summary of Conclusions”, the
First Meeting of the Council in Berlin, 19/20.6.1991, www.osce.org.
40 The information regarding the decisions taken in Prague is from the “Summary of Conclusions”, the
Second Meeting of the Council in Prague, 30/31.1.1992, www.osce.org.
14
95
consent of the State concerned, in cases of clear, gross and uncorrected violations
of relevant CSCE commitments (para, 16, p. 16), i.e. principle of ‘consensusminus-one’. Functions and methods of the CPC were further enhanced. For example,
it has the authority to initiate fact-finding and monitor missions in connections
with the mechanism on unusual military activities within CSBMS. The Office
for Free Elections in Warsaw was expanded and renamed Office for Democratic
Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR), with the task of reviewing implementation
of the CSCE human dimensions and of serving as an institutional framework for
sharing and exchanging information, expertise and programmes aimed at
assisting the new democracies in their institutional-building. The Economic
Forum was created to meet within the CSCE framework to discuss economic
cooperation, the transition to market economy and other related issues.
There was also no agreement in several issues proposed like: the CSCE role
in peacekeeping, a court of arbitration and conciliation (France), a high commissioner
for minorities (Netherlands)41. The discussion of these had to be postponed for
the forthcoming summit. It should be mentioned that the idea of the CSCE to
become a regional IGO started to take shape since then. The main supports were
France and Germany followed closely by Italy, Belgian, Poland, Sweden, Finland,
Greece and Austria. The main opponents were clearly the United States. A
special focus was on the further development of conflict prevention and crisis
management mechanisms, especially now when the ethnic conflicts seemed to
be an increased risk to everyone. Germany was perhaps the most fervent
advocator of these further strengthening, yet others were also preoccupied, like
U.K. or Italy.
At the Helsinki summit42 states had reached the compromise in some of the
issues presented above. Germany’s idea for supporting the Chairman-in-Office
(CiO) was accomplished by creating the troika, formed by the CiO, its
predecessor and its successor. The post of a High Commissioner for National
Minorities was created within the human dimension. The security dimension
was reinforced by the creation of the Forum for Security Cooperation, a place
for negotiations on disarmament and arms control, as well as confidence and
security building measures. As instruments of conflict prevention and crisis
management, were created fact-finding and rapporteur missions, and peacekeeping
operations as support for a political solution.
The third Council meeting in Stockholm43 (December 1992) stood under the
sign of adapting the mechanism for the peaceful settlements of disputes, and the
one of regional issues, i.e. the ethnic conflicts within the former Yugoslavia and
the former soviet territories (the Baltic States, Transnistria, Abkhazia, South
Ossetia, Nagorno-Karabakh). The deficiencies obvious during the attempt to
————————
41 Alexis Heraclides, Helsinki-II and its Aftermath: The Making of the CSCE into an International
Organization, London, Pinter Publishers, 1993, p. 29.
42 The information regarding the decisions is from the “Challenges of Change”, Helsinki Summit, 10.07.
1992, www.osce.org.
43 The information regarding the decisions is from the “Summary of Conclusions”, the Third Meeting of
the Council in Stockholm, 14/15.12.1992, www.osce.org.
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deal with these conflicts and the appearance of a marginal role left for the CSCE
in the European security issues, were sufficient reasons for a comprehensive
review and a further reform44.
The review report of the new Secretary General of the CSCE led to the
adaptation of new decisions regarding the institutionalization process, at the
fourth Council meeting in Rome, in December 1993. Under the title of “CSCE
and the New Europe-Our Security is Indivisible” the document recorded: the
CSO became the Permanent Committee in Vienna (ambassadorial level), in
charge of the day-to-day work and supervision of operational measures; the new
Secretariat in Vienna, while in Prague remained only a bureau; the CPC became
the fourth department of the new secretariat; new responsibilities for the Bureau
for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights in Warsaw etc.
The numerous proposals for a further development of the CSCE and its third
follow-up meeting at Budapest in December 1994 were all overshadowed by the
question of NATO and EU expansion with respect to the East-Central European
states45. Russia was clearly against an expansion of NATO towards its former
satellites, and as a contra weight favored a further expansion of the CSCE. In this
context the adoption of several institutional proposals were again prevented and
the Budapest documents consisted of compromising variants. It can be said that
the results stood under the sign of changing names. A lot of central CSCE
institutions were touched by this change: the CSCE Council of Foreign Ministers
was renamed into the CSCE Ministerial Council; the Committee of Senior Officials
became the Senior Council; the Permanent Committee became the Permanent
Council. Yet all these process of renaming had no consequences on their
responsibilities. But perhaps the most notable change was recorded by the name
of the institution itself. The transformation of the CSCE into the OSCE (‘O’ from
Organization) can be seen as a compromise made towards Moscow. Because it
consisted only in a political transformation and not a legal one. The states remained
to be bound politically and not legally, and the “organization” still had no international
juridical personality.
The negotiation process after the Cold War presented new features comparing
with what was before. The CSCE was not anymore characterized by the two
blocks and the NNA as mediators, but by states that wanted a more profound
transformation, the ones that wanted as little as possible to be changed, and the
ones on the middle ground. The EC was now the central force during the
negotiations, and sometimes have appeared to be taking over the traditional role of
the NNA by providing the middle ground and articulating a compromise
acceptable to all. The emergence of the five states of the Pentagonale (Italy,
Austria, Hungary, CSFR, and Yugoslavia) as an effective and well-coordinated
group, rivaling even the cohesion of the “12”. The gradual appearance of Central
and East European states as protagonist (Hungary first, after Poland, CSFR, Soviet
————————
44 Ingo Peters: “The “old” and the new” CSCE…”, in Ingo Peters (ed.): New Security Challenges…, New
York, Lit Verlag, p. 107.
45 Ibidem, p. 108.
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Union). The solidarity and cohesion within the NATO group has been shakier than
before, the difficulties being between the EC and US46. Germany was perhaps the
most fervent supporter from the western camp for a more ambitious adaptation of
the CSCE. It tried to coordinate its strategies with its other NATO allies and EC
partners. Yet due to their reluctance it had to compromise many times.
It can be drawn as a conclusion that the common denominator was obtained by
reducing the Czech initiative as to become compatible with the continued existence
of NATO47. Strong interests in promoting integration within the EC and in
preserving a key role for NATO were clearly the most important limiting factors48.
2.5. Assessing the “new” CSCE/OCSCE
The process of adaptation that took place until 1995 has changed some basic
features of the original CSCE. Thus for a better understanding of the process a
comparison between what it was and what it became is suitable. Interesting are
the characteristics in which they differ. Due to the limited space only a few of them
are discussed here49.
International system: The “old” CSCE was characterized by the East-West
conflict and the blocks’ incompatibility, while the “new” CSCE/OCSE was
composed by more homogeneous structures of states. The threats of the old
bipolar system were more tangible than the ones characterizing the new
multipolar system. The new risks were no longer state-centered and varied from
inter-or intra-states ethnic conflicts combined with their spillover, to terrorism
and illegal activities. The new post-Cold War environment and security challenges
were characterized by interdependence that led to a demand for cooperation,
especially institutionalized cooperation. A lot of European states were left outside
a security umbrella and were confronting with political, economic, social instability.
All of these new features of the international system were opportunities for the
creation of a “new” CSCE.
Negotiation process: Fundamental conflict of interests and values no longer
hamper the “new” CSCE negotiations in general, instead conflicts were about
means50. The negotiations were no longer between the two blocs, now there
were different coalitions from an issue to another. It can be said that the EC and
NATO shaped the most the outcomes of the process. The Central and East
Europe usually had a principal role in negotiations due to their ambitious plans
and their eagerness to fortify the “old” CSCE.
The policy areas: The “old” CSCE was characterized by the traditionally
three “baskets”: security and military; economy, technology, environments; human
rights. The “new” CSCE known a widening of its policy areas, dealing beside
————————
46 This resume is drown upon the conclusions of Alexis Heraclides: Helsinki-II and its Aftermath: The
Making of the CSCE into an International Organization, London, Pinter Publishers, 1993, p. 26-27.
48 Ibidem, p. 8.
49 For a complete schema with the criteria’s for comparison of the “old” and the “new” CSCE, see Peters,
Ingo: “The “old” and the “new” CSCE…”, in Ingo Peters (ed.): New Security Challenges…, New York, Lit
Verlag, p. 117.
50 Ibidem, p. 113.
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the three “baskets” with: democratization processes, protection of minorities,
conflict prevention and crisis management.
The mode of decision-making: The decisions in the “old” CSCE were taken
only by the consensus of all participant states. In the “new” CSCE the general
principle is still consensus, but there is an exception: consensus-minus-one. This
means that in cases of violation of norms and rules, the state/s in discussion
cannot vote for the mechanism that should be applied.
Institutional structure: The “old” CSCE was a political process, with a flexible
structure (follow-up and sporadic experts meetings) that was suitable for that
international context. The disappearance of the East-West conflict facilitated it
to gain a whole new and more complex structure, with political and decisionmaking bodies, permanent and functional organs, mechanism51.
As a general description it can be said the “new” CSCE/OCSE is an “allEuropean” institution (“from Vancouver to Vladivostok”), politically not legally
bounded, has participant not member states, consensus or consensus-1 for decisionmaking, and with a “comprehensive concept of security” with 4 components: early
warning, conflict prevention, crisis management, post-conflict rehabilitation.
Conclusions
In the course of five years the CSCE went over “a series of steps that
transformed it from a loosely structured conference of states into a more organized
political entity”52. Therefore it became a security management institution, which
means an institution designed “to meet the need to provide for transparency,
consultation, incentives for cooperative strategies among their members”53 (here,
among its participants).
It was shown that the external shock existed and with it the pressure to adapt
the CSCE. The next step was to show that this external shock created different
dilemmas for different states. As a consequence, there were a variety of interests,
and the final outcomes regarding the CSCE’s functions and forms was the
common denominator of these.
The theoretical framework used for this research was suitable for explaining
the evolution of the CSCE due to its focus of the reciprocal interaction between
the international institution and the national governments. In the context of new
security architecture in Europe (highly institutionalized) with a central focus on
NATO and the EC/EU, explaining the institutionalization of the CSCE cannot be
focused only on states’ interests or on the institution itself. States’ policies were
influenced by the existence of a network of complementary institutions, while
the negotiation process for the institutionalization of the CSCE was determined
exactly by these constrained policies.
————————
51 A complete description of the “new” structure is included in 2.1. The “old” and the “new” CSCE, as
part of this paper.
52 Miriam Sapiro: “Changing the CSCE into the OSCE: Legal Aspects of a Political Transformation”, The
American Journal of International Law, Vol. 89, No. 3. (Jul., 1995), p. 631-637.
53 Celeste Wallander, Robert O. Keohane: “Risk, Threat, and Security Institutions”, in Helga Haftendorn,
Robert O. Keohane, , Celleste Wallender (ed.): Imperfect Unions…, p. 33.
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99
The bargaining took place especially between the states with advanced views
regarding strengthening the CSCE, and the ones that wanted the change as little
as possible. The latter ones were relying more on other institutions for their security
interests, and the outcome was highly influenced by the existence of these. The
integration process within the EC/EU and the urge not to undermine NATO
determined a limitation of more ambitious plans.
The structure of the OCSE in 1995 embodied the features of an interdependence
world that required a more cooperative and institutionalized international system.
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Heraclides, Alexis, Helsinki-II and its Aftermath, The Making of the CSCE into an International Organization,
London, Pinter Publishers, 1993.
Keohane, Robert O., “Neoliberal Institutionalism, A Perspective on World Politics”, in Keohane, Robert O.,
International Institutions and States Power. Essays in International Relations Theory, Boulder, CO, 1989, p. 1-20.
Keohane, Robert O. (ed.), After the Cold War, International Institutions and State Strategies in Europe, 19891991, Center for International Affairs, Cambridge; Hardwar Univ. Press, 1993.
Keohane, Robert O.; Martin, Lisa L., “The Promise of Institutionalist Theory”, International Security, Vol. 20,
No. 1. (Summer, 1995), p. 39-51.
Kummel, Gerhard, From Yesterday to Tomorrow — CSCE/OSCE a Twenty, Achievements of the Past and
Challenges of the Future”, OSCE Bullerin, Winter 1994/1995, vol. 4, nr. 1, Varºovia, p. 9-16.
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in Helsinki, Arbeitspapiere der Schweizerischen Friedensstiftung, nr. 15, Bern, Decembrie 1992.
Lehne, ªtefan, The CSCE in the 1990s. Common European House or Potemkin Vill?, Wien, Braumüller, 1991.
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LA FORMACIÓN DEL ESTADO Y DE LA NACIÓN
EN AMÉRICA LATINA. ESTUDIO DE CASO SOBRE MEXICO
EDUARDO ARAYA LEÜPIN*
Abstract. The study approaches the process of emancipation in Latin
America, which can generally be treated, with the exception of the cases
of Cuba and Brazil, under two different readings, but complementary to
each other. These processes of decolonization, also represent the task of
building a new political order, formally and ideologically liberal Republican;
additionally represent parallel processes of nation-building, defined here
as the generation process, basically of collective identities that define an
“imagined community”.
Key words: Latin America, emancipation, decolonization, “imagined
community”, collective identities.
Nación y Estado en el Contexto de la Independencia
Los procesos de emancipación en Iberoamérica, si se exceptúan los casos de
Cuba y Brasil, pueden ser tratados genéricamente bajo dos lecturas diversas pero
complementarias entre si. Son procesos de descolonización, pero representan
también la tarea de construcción de un nuevo orden político, ideológicamente
liberal y formalmente republicano;1 adicionalmente representan en paralelo procesos
de construcción de la nación, entendiendo aquí este proceso básicamente como
la generación de identidades colectivas que definen una “comunidad imaginada”.
¿ Existía al momento de la independencia una cierta “conciencia nacional”?
Algunos autores, como Eyzaguirre para el caso de Chile sostiene que si, otros
como Góngora han afirmado que es el Estado el que crea la Nación. También
hay quienes afirman que se trata de procesos paralelos.2 Si existía ese tipo de
————————
* Director of the Institute of History and Political Science from Pontificia Catholic University of Valparaiso.
1 El caso Mexicano representa una excepción parcial, dado que el régimen que emerge inmediatamente de la
independencia, el “Imperio” de Agustín de Iturbide, (en la práctica una Monarquía Constitucional que se fundò en
la misma Constituciòn española de 1812) representa una experiencia muy breve que durò menos de un año (Mayo
1822-Marzo 1823). Sobre la Independencia mexicana véase Hamnett, Brian, Revolución y Contrarrevolución en
México y Perú (México, 1979). De la Torre, E.: La Independencia de México (Madrid 1992).
2 Véase: Eyzaguirre, J: Ideario y Ruta de la Emancipaciòn Chilena (Santiago, 1957) Góngora, M: Ensayo
Històrico sobre la Nociòn de Estado en Chile en los Siglos XIX y XX (Santiago, 1981), Oszlak analiza el caso
argentino como procesos paralelos, Oszlak, O, La Formaciòn del Estado Argentino (Buenos Aires, 1985).
2
ESTUDIO DE CASO SOBRE MEXICO
101
certidumbres a nivel de ciertas elites, esta no era en ninguna parte de América
Latina extensiva a la totalidad de la sociedad ni tampoco era claro el espacio
territorial que debía abarcar el estado-nación. En Argentina, a tres décadas de la
Independencia, Esteban Echeverría observaba que:
“La patria para el correntino es Corrientes, para el cordobés, Córdoba, para
el gaucho el pago en que nació. La vida e intereses comunes que envuelve el
sentimiento racional de la patria es una abstracción incompresible para ellos y
no pueden ver la unidad de la república simbolizada en su nombre”3.
Si se toma como ejemplo el caso de Argentina, al momento de la constitución
de la Junta del 25 de Mayo de 1810, la fracción predominante de la élite de
Buenos Aires, asumió la representación de la soberanía real sobre la totalidad del
Virreynato del Río de la Plata. Dichas pretensiones fueron cuestionadas y
resistidas militarmente en diversos puntos de ese Virreinato. En la vecina
Córdoba, la Junta de Mayo debió imponerse por las armas. La antigua provincia
de Misiones, el actual Paraguay, tanto como la “Banda Oriental”, el actual
Uruguay, debieron hacer su proceso de independencia tanto en contra de la
Monarquía Española como en contra de Buenos Aires.4
Esto permitiría tal vez contra-argumentar, que si esto ocurrió fue por que
existía algún tipo de identidad colectiva nacional o al menos proto-nacional. Ya
hemos señalado que es posible que esta existiese efectivamente a nivel de
fracciones de las elites, pero en ninguna parte el “espacio” del ejercicio de la
soberanía nacional estaba plenamente definido. El caso de José Gervasio
Artigas, una de las principales figuras de la independencia de Uruguay es
ilustrativo al respecto. Por la independencia de su patria Artigas debió luchar
tanto contra los realistas uruguayos, como contra los invasores portugueses,
como contra las pretensiones de sus aliados-enemigos de Buenos Aires y en esta
pugna contra la hegemonía de Buenos Aires, Artigas en algún momento (18151816) (con la denominación honorífica de “caudillo de los pueblos libres”)
hegemonizó una región que incluía no solo el actual Uruguay, sino también la
región “argentina” de Entre Ríos (Santa Fe-Corrientes), por la sencilla razón de
que el alineamiento político mas importante y común era la oposición a la
supremacía política y comercial de Buenos Aires.
Esta claro que en Iberoamérica al momento de la independencia existían
regiones que habían ido adquiriendo fisonomía propia a través de los siglos de
dominación colonial. Para alguien como Bolivar que siempre pensó y soñó
Hispanoamérica dentro de un horizonte de dimensiones continentales, eran
absolutamente claras esas diferencias regionales, pero al momento de escribir su
célebre Carta de Jamaica5 Bolivar seguramente no prefiguraba los Estados
————————
3 Echeverrìa, E. “El Dogma Socialista” (Buenos Aires, 1846) cit en Oszlak, op. cit., p. 42.
4 Véase: Narancio E., “La Independencia de Uruguay“ (Madrid, 1992) Acevedo, E.O: La Independencia
Argentina” (Madrid 1992).
5 Bolivar, S. “Carta de Jamaica” en Salcedo, J: “La Esperanza del Universo” Collier sostiene que el uso
del término “nación” en los escritos de Bolivar (aleatorio al uso de “patria”) no tiene un contenido homologable
a un cierto nacionalismo. Véase: Collier, S: “Nationality, Nationalism and Supranationalism in the Writings of
Simón Bolivar” en “Hispanic American Hstorical Rewiew” (HAHR) Vol. 63 N. 1, 1983, p. 37-65.
102
EDUARDO ARAYA LEÜPIN
3
Nacionales que hoy existen (se refiere por ejemplo a Chile, pero globalmente al
“Río de la Plata”) sino que pensaba en la diversidad regional que se había
constituido de hecho a partir de la estructura político — administrativa del
Imperio Español en América. Por lo demás, el uso del término nación en el
sentido que hoy le otorgamos, es bastante posterior a la independencia, su uso
tradicional (derivado del latín natio) se refiere a lugar de origen o estirpe y Eric
Hobsbawn nos recuerda que la característica central de la nación es su modernidad6.
Antes de 1884 el Diccionario de la Real Academia de Lengua Española, le
asignaba a la palabra “nación” como significado solo el de “colección de los
habitantes de alguna región, país o reyno” a partir de esa fecha, nación se define
“estado o cuerpo político que reconoce un centro común y supremo de
gobierno” y también como “ territorio que comprende y a sus individuos...”, es
decir recién a partir de 1884 se relacionan directamente nación con gobierno.7
Nación y Estado Nacional como problemas conceptuales
A diferencia de lo que ocurre con el concepto de Estado, respecto del cual en
mayor o menor grado las definiciones apuntan al tema del poder legitimado
(Weber) o su virtualidad productora de “orden” o de “relaciones de dominación”
(Marx, Gramsci) el concepto de nación y sus términos afines resulta mucho mas
elusivo. ¿ Como, cuando y porque una colectividad se define una nación ? En autores
tan diversos como Maritain, y Stalin una nación es una comunidad que define
vínculos de pertenencia, a partir de elementos culturales comunes (idioma,
tradiciones, etc.),8 Renan por su parte, en su celebre definición de la nación
como un plebiscito cotidiano puso de manifiesto otro elemento central: la nación
existe cuando existe la voluntad (colectiva) de que exista9; no obstante, resulta
enormemente difícil discernir el peso de cada uno de esos factores en la
construcción de estados nacionales a fin de construir una suerte de modelo
explicativo de aplicación general.
En su cuna europea, la nación fue identificada como comunidad cultural y el
nacionalismo, al estilo de Mazzini como la demanda de hacer simétrica la
relación entre nación y estado (tantos estados como naciones), pero ni en Europa
ni en ninguna parte del mundo se ha dado esa simetría de manera estricta. Un
suizo que habla alemán puede sentirse mucho mas afín y con sentimientos de
identidad colectiva con suizos que hablan francés o italiano que con los
habitantes de Viena y probablemente mucho menos con algún berlinés, ejemplos
de ese tipo podrían reproducirse hasta el infinito.
————————
6 Hobsbawn, E.: “Nación y Nacionalismo desde 1780”, (Barcelona, 1991), p. 24, y ss.
7 Ibidem, p. 23.
8 “Una comunidad étnica puede definirse como una comunidad de normas de sentimiento arraigadas en
el suelo físico original del grupo asi como en el suelo moral de la historia ; se convierte en una nación cuando
esta situación de hecho entra en la esfera del autoconocimiento, en otras palabras, cuando un grupo étnico se
torna consciente del hecho que constituye una psiquis común incosciente... Una nación es una comunidad de
gentes que advierten como la historia las ha hecho...” Maritain, J.: “El Hombre y el Estado” (texto original de 1949)
(Santiago, 1973 p. 30) Stalin: La Naciòn texto de 1912 cit en Hutchinson, J y Smith, D: Nationalism (Oxford,
1994) p. 18-21.
9 Renan, E: Que es una Naciòn? (texto de 1882): en Hutchinson y Smith op. cit. p. 17-18.
4
103
En relación a la “nación”, una de los pocas cosas que están absolutamente
claras es que la construcción de los estados-naciones han respondido a pautas
muy desiguales en el tiempo. La Nación francesa se definió en su momento por
el ideario de la revolución (ciudadanía, republicanismo) y no por la homogeneidad
lingüística. Fichte y Herder, en la línea del romanticismo alemán apelaron
específicamente a la idea de comunidad cultural definida por tradiciones e
idioma, pero en ambos casos identificaron la nación con una suerte de
“comunidad imaginada” dotada de soberanía. En algún momento, la reflexión
sobre la nación también incluyó el tema de la economía nacional; en todos los
casos las demandas por la construcción de la nación correspondieron a un
imaginario que identificaba nación y “modernidad” (imaginario además compartido
tanto por liberales como por socialistas). El nacionalismo del siglo XIX, al estilo
de Mazzini fue básicamente una demanda de autonomía y unidad para comunidades
culturales que existían dentro de imperios multiculturales y multiétnicos; el
nacionalismo en el siglo XX se ha orientado a demandar autonomía contra
estados, que a su vez se autorrepresentan como comunidades nacionales.10
El nacionalismo fuera de Europa ha sido — dependiendo del momento y del
lugar — un eco de todas esas tendencias, a veces de manera segmentada, a veces
de manera superpuesta, pero un eco en donde la resonancia la constituyen
normalmente élites formadas o influídas por Occidente. En esta perspectiva
resultaba evidente que el impacto de la modernización (alfabetización,
reestructuración de relaciones sociales y económicas, etc.) socavan las lealtades
tradicionales (clan, tribu, religión, etc.) y dejaba a los individuos disponibles
para sumir nuevos valores, nuevas pautas de conducta, permitiendo la transferencia
de lealtades a una entidad mayor: la nación.
Es efectivo que también se han dado ciertos procesos en donde la comunidad
imaginada se define en función de patrones religiosos y con un discurso
“antimoderno”, pero el fundamentalismo religioso (de cualquier tipo) tiene una
diferencia básica respecto del nacionalismo cultural o étnico: la adscripción a la
fé “verdadera” es la que salva e integra, independientemente de cualquier otra
característica individual o grupal.
El punto de partida en esta reflexión, es la consideración de la nación como
una comunidad imaginada11 caracterizada por su limitación espacial y por su
aspiración a la soberanía política. Esto supone tanto la generación de identidades
colectivas como la transferencia de lealtades primarias (la patria chica, la región,
el patrón, la iglesia, etc.) a una entidad superior que integra y subssume a las otras.
El nacionalismo sería la fuerza ideológica capaz de dar vida a esa comunidad.
La generación de identidades colectivas es un producto cultural que como tal
puede ser definido y redefinido transformándose a lo largo del tiempo, esto
resulta particularmente evidente en el contexto de procesos revolucionarios. La
generación de identidades colectivas en cualquier grupos social supone la
definición de un “nosotros” que se contrapone a “otros” por exclusión y contraste,
————————
10 De Blas Guerrero, A: Nacionalismos y Naciones en Europa (Madrid, 1994).
11 Anderson, B. Imagined Communities, (Londres, 1983).
104
5
por lo mismo, hay mucha sabiduría en un viejo aforismo de Tilly que dice que
el estado hace la guerra y la guerra hace la nación. En algunos casos son los
conflictos externos los que definen una identidad nacional, no obstante, parece
ser que este en muchos casos es solo uno de los elementos, también la definición
de un cierto “proyecto histórico común” resulta muy importante porque responde
a aquello que Renán identificaba como un “plebiscito cotidiano”: la voluntad de
ser (o de hacerse) nación no solo en función de la historia (pretendida o real) sino
de cara al futuro.
La generación de identidades colectivas adquiere por tanto las características
de un proceso de imposición, exclusión y cooptación y por lo mismo el Estado
es normalmente el instrumento que termina por configurar o redefinir la nación
y no a la inversa12, no obstante, sería erróneo identificar el tema de la construcción
del estado-nación solo como un problema de competencia o de capacidad de
elites, la nación también se construye — a veces — como un diálogo entre
impulsos desde arriba y desde abajo, pero este proceso es lo que Hobsbawn ha
denominado protonacionalismo popular, asociado por ejemplo a ciertas
percepciones históricas de haber pertenecido, a lo largo de la historia, a una
comunidad cultural específica.13
Las “naciones” hispanoamericanas se originaron y consolidaron fuera de
procesos de esa naturaleza, se originaron sin el impulso del nacionalismo como
ideología, como ocurrió en muchos casos europeos, por lo mismo, nuestra tésis
central en este trabajo es que el imaginario de la nación y del estado-nación es
una “construcción” producida y difundida desde el Estado (o si se prefiere por
las fracciones de la élites que lo dirigen), que se define en algunos casos como
un proyecto modernizante, en otros en función de conflictos externos, o
finalmente por combinaciones de ambos.14
La consolidación del estado nacional en América Latina es un proceso
complejo y lento que se despliega a lo largo del siglo XIX. Chile en ese contexto,
representa un caso excepcional en donde una confluencia de diversos factores
(Espacio acotado, ausencia de tensiones centro-periferia, homogeneidad de las
elites, ausencia de intereses regionales significativamente divergentes,
capacidad de la elite política, etc.) permitió resolver tempranamente el tema del
“orden” estatal y de la nación. La situación común de hispanoamérica tras la
independencia sin embargo fue la anarquía. La crisis de la monarquía en 1808
generó un vacío de poder que hizo colapsar el orden político. La consolidación
militar de la independencia (hacia 1824) resolvió el tema de la dependencia
colonial, pero no restauró el orden político. La anarquía y el caudillismo son
————————
12 “... One might well define the concept of nation in the following way: nation is a comunity of sentiment
which would adequately manifest it self in a State of its own; hence, a nation is a community whch normally
tends to produce a state of its own”. Weber, M. Essays in Sociology, en Hutchinson y Smith op. cit. Guellner:
Cultura e Identidad Política. Nacionalisdo y Cambios Sociales. (Barcelona, 1989).
13 Es el caso de nacionalismos europeos antiguos como el francés o cierta imágenes como la de la “Santa
Rusia” Véase: Hobsbawn, op. cit., p. 56-86.
14 Resulta sorprendente que en el penetrante ensayo de Marcos Kaplan “La Formación del Estado Nacional
en América Latina” (Santiago 1969), el autor desarrolle una extensa reflexión sobre el estado y la producción
del orden, pero que eluda toda reflexión sobre la construcción de la nación.
6
105
problemas complejos que requieren de explicaciones multicausales, pero en gran
medida estan asociados al vacío de poder generado por la crisis de la monarquía
y a la atomización de los mecanismos de dominación en un contexto de relaciones
sociales de tipo patrimonial propias de una sociedad rural o “pre-moderna”.15
El análisis que queremos aplicar aqu, el modelo de “nation building”,16 aunque
se trata de un tipo de análisis relacionado de la teoría de la modernización (y por
tanto una derivación del paradigma estructural-funcionalista) y desarrollado en
función de los procesos de descolonización de la década de los 60, parece
también plausible para al análisis de la construcción de estados nacionales en
América Latina en el siglo XIX, con esta racionalidad común, pero con distintos
matices, Oszlak y Sinkin han analizado los casos de Argentina y México. El esquema
que usamos toma elementos de ambos y supone básicamente que el estadonación se consolida en la medida que puede desarrollar capacidades (“formas de
penetración”) en tres dimensiones diversas pero complementarias entre si: coacción,
cooptación y penetración material.
La capacidad coactiva supone concentrar en una sola entidad (el estado) el
uso de la violencia legítima o legitimada a través de un instrumentario (fuerzas
armadas y un aparato policial) que garantice de manera eficiente y efectiva la
alocación de decisiones colectivas. El problema no es menor, si se considera que
los incipientes estados que emergen de los procesos de independencia en
Hispanoamérica lo hacen en medio de guerras civiles o con una sociedad
altamente militarizada y dominada por caudillos. El tema por tanto se relaciona
a un proceso de transferencia de relaciones de poder atomizadas desde actores
locales y /o tradicionales hacia un actor estatal que concentra y simultáneamente
expande su propio poder.17
No obstante, no hay experiencias históricas en donde el orden político haya
surgido solo sobre la base de la coacción. La construcción de cualquier “estado”
supone recursos tanto a la coacción como a la construcción de ciertos consensos. La
capacidad de cooptar grupos mas allá de las fracciones dominantes de la elite resulta
por lo tanto básica para la estabilización de algún tipo de orden político. Esto supone
tanto la existencia de una cierta producción simbólica o un “proyecto” histórico (un
cierto imaginario colectivo sobre la sociedad deseada o deseable) como un
instrumentario capaz de socializarlo: sistema educativo, prensa, producción cultural,
en general mecanismos de comunicación que proyecten identidades colectivas.18
El problema que se conceptualiza como “penetración material” dice relación
con la capacidad del estado de extraer recursos (económicos) desde la sociedad
————————
15 Lynch, J “Caudillos en Hiapanoamérica” (Madrid, 1992).
16 “Nation Building refers the processes by which certain groups in society act to attain political
autonomy for the society. Nation building should be viewed as only one aspect of the larger process of
modernization, which can be generally defined as the expanding control over the environment throughcloser
ineraction among men Deutsch, Karl y Foltz, William: Nation Building (NY, 1963), Bendix, Reinhard: Nation
Building and Citizenship: Studies of our changing social order (NY, 1964) Sinkin, D. The Mexican Reform. A
Study in Liberal Nation Building (Texas, 1979).
17 Huntington. S. El Orden Político en Sociedades en Cambio (1968).
18 Véase: Kaplan, M: op. cit., p. 43-46 Deutsch, K.: Nationalism and Social Communication en Hutchinson
&Smith op. cit., p. 26-28.
106
7
para garantizar su “reproducción material” o transformarlos en capacidad coactiva
y cooptativa financiar aparatos coactivos, aparatos burocráticos y mecanismos
de cooptación y en última instancia también la capacidad de generar bienes
públicos. En otras palabras, el estado no se consolida sin que se consolide también
algún tipo de economía nacional y las implicancias de este problema son
particularmente evidentes en las limitaciones de los incipientes estados
latinoamericanos.
Estudio de Caso. México
Tanto en el Cono Sur de América del Sur como en la “Gran Colombia” la
independencia tuvo la matriz común de un proceso conducido por la élite criolla
y que apeló a la alternativa de Juntas de Gobierno autonomistas en una primera
fase. En México y Perú en cambio, en el contexto de la crisis de la monarquía,
en las que fueron la colonias mas ricas de todo el Imperio Español en América,
la reacción predominante de la élite (tanto de hispanos como de criollos) fue la
defensa del statu quo. Por lo mismo, en México, la pequeña fracción de criollos
interesada en promover un cambio político, intentó movilizar a las masas
indígenas como la única alternativa eficiente en la promoción del cambio
político, pero para provocar esa movilización debieron incorporar también lo
que constituían demandas mas reales dentro de la población indígena: el tema de
la propiedad de la tierra.
El proceso de independencia en su primera fase (bajo la dirección de caudillos
como los religiosos Hidalgo y Morelos) adquirió así las características de un
movimiento social, sustentado en masas indígenas, con un programa notablemente
radical en sus demandas de transformación de las relaciones económicas y
sociales19 y no solo en al ámbito político. No obstante, este movimiento de masas,
pese a algunos éxitos iniciales se agotó rapidamente: las improvisadas milicias
campesinas no fueron capaces de enfrentar el sólido aparato militar del Virreinato
y el riesgo de transformaciones radicales solidificó a la élite blanca en defensa
del statu quo. Tras la temprana pérdida de sus líderes principales, el movimiento
insurgente derivó en un movimiento guerrillero segmentado, incapaz por si solo
de forzar el cambio político, pero aun lo suficientemente vigoroso como para obligar
a las autoridades monárquicas a mantener un enorme y agobiante gasto militar.
Los cambios políticos ocurridos en España entre 1812 (instauración de una
Constitución liberal), la restauración del absolutismo tras el regreso de Fernando
VII (1814), la rebelión del ejército encabezada por el Gral. Riego y la subsiguiente
restauración liberal (1820) tuvieron efectos decisivos en el proceso político
mexicano. De la misma manera que ocurrió en Perú, las conflictivas alternancias
————————
19 Se expresó en medidas como la supresión de la esclavitud e impuestos, pero particularmente en el caso
de Morelos hay decretos que apuntan a la supresión de todas las formas de una economía capitalistas basadas
en la gran propiedad territorial en beneficio de las formas de propiedad comunal tradicionales del mundo
indígnena, no obstante este reformismo social no puede considerarse como rasgo determinante del movimiento
independentista con posterioridad a la muerte de Morelos ocurrida en 1811, Véase. Silva Herzog. J, “El Pensamiento
Económico, Social y Político de México” (México 1974), p. 39-53.
8
107
entre liberales y absolutistas en España fracturaron las lealtades al interior de la
élite blanca y la consiguiente inestabilidad llevó a una fracción de los realistas
en México a considerar la conveniencia de la independencia.
Como consecuencia de esos procesos, la independencia mexicana se resolvió
con un mecanismo de pacto entre algunos de los lideres guerrilleros (Vicente
Guerrero entre otros) y uno de los líderes del ejercito realista (Agustín de Iturbide).
Este pacto, denominado Plan de Iguala, fue finalmente refrendado por el último
Virrey español (O´Donoju), aunque rechazado por la monarquía española. Esta fase
del proceso de la independencia mexicana (febrero de 1821 hasta Mayo de 1822)
dio lugar a alineamientos muy diversos al interior de la élite: La fracción mas
conservadora (absolutista) estuvo a favor de la independencia como una forma
de rechazo al gobierno de los liberales españoles. Las fracciones mas liberales de
la élite (independientemente de su origen) se dividieron entre aquellos que siempre
habían defendido la independencia (muchos de los cuales lucharon desde 1810) y
aquellos que por fidelidad al Gobierno liberal español se opusieron a la independencia.
Esta situación y la forma pactada de la independencia mexicana ha sido interpretada
de maneras diversas. Algunos autores lo interpretan como una suerte de
revolución conservadora y antiliberal,20 no obstante, aunque como ya se señalo
el primer gobierno independientemente fue una monarquía, este utilizó la misma
constitución liberal española de 1812 y el tema de las “garantías” pactadas (“fe,
independencia y unión”) deben ser interpretadas fundamentalmente como una
defensa de intereses corporativos (fueros) que beneficiaban también al Ejercito.21
Estas particularidades de la independencia mexicana contribuyeron a la
pervivencia de fracciones conservadoras al interior de la élite, que a diferencia
de otros casos hispanomericanos no solo eran católicas y antiliberales (en lo
ideológico), sino que además monárquicas. Paradigma de esta posición fue Lucas
Alamán, destacado político e intelectual mexicano. El desarrollo o la mantención
de una perspectiva monárquica como una solución al problema del “orden” en
esta fracción de la élite se vinculó inicialmente a las propias características de la
Independencia, luego a la percepción de crisis generada primero por la pérdida
de Texas y finalmente a la perdida de mas territorio mexicano (en total una cifra
cercana a la mitad de lo que fue el territorio Virreynal) en al guerra con Estados
Unidos (finalizada con un Tratado en 1848).22 En esa perspectiva, un gobierno
monárquico encabezado por algún miembro de alguna familia real europea y la
consiguiente vinculación a potencias europeas, era vista como una eventual
salvaguardia para contener otros intentos de expansión o anexión norteamericana23.
————————
20 Lynch, J: “Las Revoluciones Hispanoamericanas” (Barcelona,1980) p. 316-345.
21 Hamnett, B: op. cit., p. 316-345.
22 Texas se autonomizó en 1836 aunque solo en 1845 fue anexada a la Unión. En 1846 se inició la Guerra
y aunque solo duró unos meses, esta concluyo oficialmente solo en 1848 (Tratado Guadalupe-Hidalgo), Mexico
perdió Nuevo México y California, aunque logró mantener la Baja California y recibió US $ 15 millones, lo
que evitó que la economía mexicana colapsara, posteriormente también cedió el territorio de Tucson Bazant,
J: México en Bethell L (edit) Historia de América Latina (Cambridge / Barcelona, 1991) p. 105-143.
23 Alaman (1792-1853) fue diputado y varias veces ministro de relaciones exteriores, además uno de los
pioneros de la industrialización mexicana.Entre sus obras se destacan: “Disertaciones” e “Historia de México”,
Véase: Siva Herzog J: op. cit. (México, 1967) Josè Luis Romero: Pensamiento Conservador en Amèrica Latina
(antologìa) Caracas, 1986, p. 52-55.
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9
El liberalismo mexicano por consiguiente (y a diferencia de los otros casos
latinoamericanos) — se desarrolló desde sus inicios en una permanente tensión
ideológica y programática con esta tradición conservadora, aun cuando también
existieron siempre áreas de confluencia.24
Sea cual fuese la interpretación de la independencia y de su inmediata solución
“imperial”, esta no se tradujo ni en la consolidación de un orden político y en la
consolidación de la nación. Por el contrario, solo significó el inicio de una
prolongada fase de inestabilidad y guerras civiles cuyas causas son muy similares
a la de otros casos latinoamericanos. México representa y representaba una
enorme diversidad de intereses regionales derivados de formaciones geográficas
y económicas muy diversas, a la cual debían sumarse de manera recurrente
conflictos étnicos y sociales (como por ejemplo la “Guerra de Castas en Yucatán
hacia 1847”); por lo mismo, las precarias posibilidades de consensuar o imponer
algún tipo de orden estable pasaba por los actores que realmente detentaban el
poder: caudillos que sustentaban su poder en el ejército o los caudillos
regionales25 y finalmente la Iglesia. Ejercito e Iglesia eran las únicas instituciones
propiamente “nacionales” en su cobertura y la Iglesia era la institución mas rica
en todo el país. El estado central, con escasos recursos de poder no era capaz de
ejercer un control efectivo sobre la totalidad sociedad.
La Iglesia mexicana, fuera de detentar una posición muy influyente en la
cultura, era la institución mas rica del país, las razones que permitirían explicar
esta situación son complejas y múltiples y sus detalles escapan a los propósitos
de esta monografía, pero es importante señalar que, mas que la Iglesia en cuanto
institución, algunas órdenes religiosas y por cierto su jerarquía eran los principales
propietarios en México, tanto en relación a la propiedad rural como respecto de
bienes inmuebles urbanos, pero estos quedaban además en el status de “manos
muertas”, es decir no podían ser nuevamente transadas en el mercado.26
El orden político trató de estructurarse sobre una constitución de tipo federal
(1824)27 a imitación norteamericana pero el federalismo mexicano fue básicamente
una forma de mantener la autonomía de los caudillos regionales. Entre los casi
30 años que van desde 1824 hasta 1855 hubo en México 46 cambios de gobierno.
En 1833 la presidencia de México cambio en 7 oportunidades y en 1847 en 5. El
promedio de duración de los gobiernos en todo el período que va desde la
Independencia hasta el “Plan de Ayutla” (1855) fue de solo 9 meses; no obstante
contra lo que pudiera suponerse, esto no significaba en México una alta
————————
24 Sobre los orígenes del liberalismo mexicano véase: Hale, Charles: El Liberalismo Mexicano en la
Epoca de Mora 1821-1853 (México, 1972).
25 En realidad la distinción ente caudillos regionales y caudillos militares es muy precaria, todo caudillo
(por definición) era capaz de movilizar un contingente militar, pero evidentemente había un ejército (no
profesional) que era un actor per se: Bajo Iturbide el ejercito tenía 16.136 plazas, bajo Santa Anna este llegó a
te ner 64.316. que en 1855 consumía el 80% del presupuesto federal. Sinkin op. cit., p. 97.
26 En 1857 Lerdo de Tejada, ministro de hacienda liberal calculó que el total de la propiedad en México
tenía un valor aproximado de $ 1.3 billones, de los cuales 275 millones (21%) pertenecía a la Iglesia, estos
datos deben ser contrastados con el peso “demográfico” de la Iglesia, para una población de 8.000.000 habitantes,
el clero (sin considerar a las religiosas) solo representaba el 0,5% de la población.Véase López, Francisco: La
Estructura Económica y Social de México en la Epoca de la Reforma (México, 1967) p. 191-201.
27 Vasquez, Josefina: El Federalismo Mexicano (1823-1847) en Carmagnani, M: op. cit., p. 15-50.
10
109
“circulación de las elites”, por el contrario, el control del aparato estatal se mantuvo
concentrado en la manos de relativamente pocos caudillos. Tres “presidentes”
ocuparon ese cargo en tres oportunidades (Nicolás Bravo, Anastasio Bustamante
y José Joaquín Herrera), pero el General Antonio Lopez de Santa Anna batió todos
los records: Entre 1834 y hasta 1855 como presidente y/o dictador, varias veces
depuesto y varias veces llamado de nuevo al poder como “restaurador” del orden,
gobernó México en 9 oportunidades. De todos los cambio de gobierno ocurridos
en el período, 18 de ellos involucraron solo a 4 caudillos.28
En 1855 una revolución “liberal” encabezada por Juan Alvarez, caudillogobernador del Estado de Guerrero logró expulsar del gobierno central — por
última vez — al sempiterno Gral. Santa Anna. Este, con el apoyo de los
conservadores, había derrocado un gobierno liberal en 1853 y había seguido una
política fuertemente centralista que afectó naturalmente los intereses de
caudillos y oligarquías regionales. La rebelión liberal contra Santa Anna y que
convirtió a Alvarez en presidente de México se fundó, como tantas veces en la
historia de México en un “plan”: El Plan de Ayutla, que suponía recuperar la tradición
del federalismo y generar un nuevo orden constitucional que garantizara el
ejercicio de las garantía individuales. El Plan de Ayutla no fue una revolución,
pero fue mas que uno de los tantos cuartelazos de la historia de México: con él
entró en escena una nueva generación de políticos que son los autores de “La
Reforma” y con ella la consolidación del orden nacional en México.
De una manera similar a la generación argentina del 37, en esta generación,
solo 3 habían nacido antes de 1810, la mayor parte de ellos (2/3) lo hicieron
entre 1810 y 1830; es decir, se trata de una generación formada en los años de
los post-independencia, y el caos político fue una constante en sus vidas y eran
adolescentes en los años de la guerra con EEUU. Pero no solo se trató de un
recambio generacional, también fue un movimiento desde la “periferia contra el
centro”29, la mayoría de estos liberales provenía de lo que fue la “periferia colonial”,
en donde, como por ejemplo en Guadalajara o Veracruz, pervivían resentimientos
localistas contra la tradición centralista del México colonial. Veracruz además,
como todo puerto, tenía una sólida tradición liberal-modernizante, y por lo mismo
anticlerical. Dicha periferia también tenía una mayor tradición de movilidad
social. Algunos de las figuras de la generación liberal de la Reforma eran
mestizos (Manuel Doblado, I. Comonfort, Lafragua y los Hermanos Lerdo de
Tejada), otros, los menos, eran indios como Benito Juárez e Ignacio Altamirano,
aun cuando para muchos efectos sociales ambos (por su educación) podían ser
considerados también como “mestizos” y este rasgo (lo “mestizo”) llegó a ser
————————
28 No obstante, aunque cabe hacer un paralelo entre la generación argentina del 37 y la generación méxicana
de la Reforma, no se puede establecer el mismo paralelo entre Rosas y el General Santa Anna. En el primero
es valorable tanto su preocupación por la expansión interna (inició la incorporación efectiva de la Pampa al
estado argentino) y tuvo la capacidad de defender a Argentina de las presiones del imperialismo europeo; por lo
mismo, hay toda una tradición historiográfica argentina (independientemente de los fundamentos que tal
interpretación pueda tener) que recupera su imagen como precursor del nacionalismo argentino. Santa Anna en
cambio pasó a la historia solo como una figura pintoresca (se hacia llamar a si mismo “su alteza serenisima”)
que como señala Charles Hale que en México solo cosecha burlas.
29 Ibidem, p. 37.
110
11
desarrollado dentro de este grupo como un elemento de identidad colectiva
aunando lo étnico y el tema de la discriminación social.30
Profesionalmente, los liberales de la Reforma era un grupo heterogéneo, pero
predominaban los abogados, los militares y los burócratas, muchos de ellos
además desempeñaban funciones como periodistas o editores, pero a pesar de
algún éxito profesional en su gran mayoría era gente que debió luchar arduamente
contra la discriminación social y étnica. Por este rasgo vinculado a su formación
y/o a su ejercicio profesional eran anticlericales, pero muchos de ellos (Juarez
por ejemplo) no eran antirreligiosos. En la óptica de estos liberales, México aparecía
como una sociedad tradicional, cuya cultura y educación eran controladas por la
Iglesia y esto era un actor que generaba discriminación. Para muchos de ellos, el
paradigma de orden conservador estaba representado por la pervivencia de la
tradición colonial de “fueros” para la iglesia y el ejército.31
En contraste con esta imagen de la realidad mexicana, estos liberales creían
en el progreso32, mas o menos en los mismos términos que la generación de
Alberdi en Argentina, por cierto, el tema de la “población” o la inmigración no era
en este caso tan relevante, pero en la generación liberal anterior (la de Mora) el
tema de la inmigración europea también fue vista como una solución frente al
lastre que la población indígena representaba en la producción del progreso33. El
resto del imaginario del orden y del progreso era genéricamente compartido. Frente
a un México débil, arcaico, dominado por caudillos incapaces de defender a su
país e impotente frente a un vecino demasiado fuerte y ambicioso, no había mas
alternativa que construir un orden “nacional”, liberal y secular que fuese capaz de
promover el “progreso”, este a su vez permitiría reproducir materialmente el “orden”.
Francisco Zarco en su periódico “El Siglo XIX” escribía: ¿ Que importa que
haya buenos caminos si nadie puede recorrerlos sin pasaportes, sin vejación; si
las mercancías han de permanecer estancadas y ha de haber trabas que hagan
————————
30 En Francisco Zarco, editor y periodista del “El Siglo XIX”, el tema de lo mestizo adquiere
reminiscencias o un paralelo evidente con el texto de Sieyes “Que es el Tercer Estado”, según Zarco, los
mestizos son ... la parte mas fuerte de la nación, los mejores trabajadores, los mas industriosos, los políticos
mas ilustrados... (pero) sistemáticamente discriminados, por una intolerancia llevada al extremo de no
admitirlos ni en el clero, ni en las cortes de justicia, ni en los altos grados militares, porque, como individuos
no pueden ostentar ser descendientes de alguien con titulo de nobleza... La elite tradicional, de mentalidad
aristocrática representa el pasado, pero se ha hecho inutil de la misma manera que la nobleza francesa se hizo
inútil, justificando la revolución. La aristocracia y el clero, incapaces de defender a los reyes no quieren ni
pueden defender al pueblo Sinkin p 43.
31 Los fueros era básicamente el privilegio corporativo de no poder ser juzgado por tribunales ordinarios,
sino solo por tribunales especiales dentro de la propia corporación, pero este privilegio se hizo extensivo
además a las familias en el caso de los militares y en todo los casos a dispensas de pagar algunos impuestos.
Estos fueron suprimidos por la llamada “Ley Juarez” de 1855, Bazant, op. cit., p. 131.
32 “Como creo que el progreso es una condición de la humanidad, espero que el porvenir seré
necesariamente de la democracia y tengo cada día mas fe en las instituciones republicanas del mundo
americano se harán extensivas a los pueblos infortunados de Europa que aun conservan, a pesar suyo, monarcas
y aristocracias”, Silva Herzog, op. cit., p. 194.
33 “... El indio se aferra con obstinación a sus costumbres, lo cual hace dificil que progrese... estos cortos
y envilecidos restos de la antigua población mexicana aunque despierten compasión no pueden considerarse
como la base de la sociedad mexicana progresista...” Mora: Revoluciones 1, 63-73.
“Mora creía que mediante un programa concertado de inmigración europea, México en el término de un
siglo podía realizar la fusión completa de los indios “y la total estinción de las castas” Hale, Ch. op. cit., p. 229.
12
111
imposible el desarrollo de la agricultura y de la industria ¿ Para que quiere
buenos puertos y faros salvadores el país que no admite en sus costas buques
extranjeros, que rechaza nueva población y prohibe caprichosamente el libre
cambio ¿ Quien ha de emplear sus capitales en canalizar ríos o construir puentes
si la propiedad está insegura, si la leva ha de privar de brazos a los trabajos
útiles y si los hombre que se reúnen a promover mejoras han de inspirar
desconfianza.¿ Habrá colonización en donde son frecuentes las contribuciones
de guerra ‘? ... ¿ Que progreso es posible donde el ciudadano vive a merced de
despreciables esbirros...¿34
En la misma línea Benito Juarez escribía: ...La falta de población produce la
falta de consumo ; así es que los agricultores solo cultivan la parte de terrenos muy
necesarios para cosechar las semillas suficientes para el abasto, bajo la pena de
que toda abundancia considerable disminuya los precios y los precise a perder
existencias... la exportación es muy difícil por la falta y lo escabroso de los caminos
; así es que cuando suele hacerse de semillas y algunos otros frutos resultan en las
plazas para donde se exportaron de un valor excesivo que impide su venta35.
La dictadura de Santa Anna funcionó como una suerte de catalizador para
esta heterogénea generación de liberales, en algunos casos esta experiencia se
tradujo en exilio “fisico” (Juarez y Ocampo por ejemplo)36 en otros casos, esto
se tradujo en “exilio moral”. Los resultados de esa experiencia común para hombres
de formación y origen diferente fue hacerles descubrir intereses y visiones comunes
acerca del futuro.
La coyuntura para llevar a cabo ese proyecto fue el “Plan de Ayutla”, el Gobierno
de Alvarez (en donde muchos de estos jóvenes liberales asumieron importantes
roles políticos), posteriormente los trabajos de la Asamblea Constituyente en la
Constitución de 1857 y finalmente en las “Leyes de la Reforma” (1857-1861)
que completan la consolidación de México como un estado-nación. La constitución
de 1857 recoge y resume el imaginario liberal de esta nueva élite, pero representa
un “imaginario”, no la realidad del México de la época, el proyecto que esta
incluía era vista por ellos no solo como una forma de legitimar una rebelión, sino
como una suerte de regeneración de la nación.. Reconocía el principio de la
tolerancia religiosa y la libertad de educación, de la misma manera, recogía la
concepción típicamente liberal de la sociedad fundada en individuos iguales ante
la ley, por lo mismo, tanto los fueros, como otras restricciones corporativas
relativas a a ejercicios profesionales fueron suprimidas. Con todo, los liberales de
la “Reforma” por moderación o por simple cálculo político, no radicalizaron su
anticlericalismo, el fuero eclesiástico por ejemplo, fue suprimido por una ley de
Juarez, pero se mantuvieron los tribunales eclesiásticos para algunas causas.
Los temas relativos al status de la Iglesia y la religión fueron los que mas
resistencias causaron fuera de la élite liberal, pero para los constituyentes de
————————
34 Francisco Zarco doc. cit. en Carcía Cantú “Utopías Mexicanas” cit. por Silva Herzog op. cit. p. 217.
Por otra parte, el imaginario del orden y el progreso de esta élite mexicana tampoco aparece expuesta con el
mismo grado de sistematicidad y coherencia que en el caso de Alberdi.
35 Juarez, B. cit. en Silva Herzog, op. cit., p. 189.
36 Silva Herzog, p. 178.
112
13
1856 los temas relativos a las relaciones entre los poderes del estado fueron los
issues mas intensamente debatidos37. La razón es entendible: la política mexicana
se había movido hasta allí en el marco de un federalismo muy amplio que en la
práctica significó solo alternancias entre dictaduras y anarquía, por lo mismo,
pese al discurso de defensa de libertades amplias y de que en su origen el Plan
de Ayutla fue una reacción contra el centralismo de Santa Anna, los Constituyentes
de 1856 creían en un orden mucho mas centralista y autoritario, el núcleo (no
resuelto) del problema era de un lado la fé en un orden liberal como proyecto y
del otro las certezas sobre las necesidades de imponer (apelando a las dimensión
coactiva del estado) la construcción del orden nacional contra la tradición de la
multiplicidad de poderes locales y regionales.
Como una forma de generar “conciencia nacional”, por primera vez en su historia,
todos los habitantes de México fueron obligados a jurar la nueva Constitución,
aunque obviamente muchos se resistieron, entre ellos el clero. El marco generado
por la nueva Constitución y la posición inflexible de la Iglesia derivó en la
promulgación de un conjunto de leyes tendientes a limitar su poder. Una de ellas,
la Ley Lerdo de Tejada obligó a la Iglesia a vender su cuantiosa propiedad
inmobiliaria en condición de “manos muertas”, impidiendo paralelamente su
posible reconstitución. La motivación de esta legislación no era una cuestión de
puro anticlericalismo, en ella subyacía también el ánimo de, por la vía de generar
un mercado de tierras, crear un nueva clase de pequeños y medianos propietarios
que debían ser, a imagen y semejanza de los “farmers” en Estados Unidos, el sustrato
social del México “moderno”, no obstante, este segundo objetivo nunca llegó a
concretarse.
La respuesta de la Iglesia y los Conservadores no se hizo esperar y por tres años
(1858-1861) una sangrienta guerra civil asoló México En una sociedad ya
acostumbrada a la violencia entre huestes de caudillos, la Guerra de la Reforma o
“de los tres años” fue algo nuevo. Para ambos bandos la lucha fue vivida como una
cuestión que definía el futuro de la sociedad en su conjunto, pero los liberales además
la transformaron en una cuestión “nacional”, no solo por el carácter universal de la
Iglesia, sino porque ellos identificaban su propia causa con el interés general de la
sociedad. “Fueros y privilegios o reforma y progreso”.38 El triunfo liberal en 1861
permitió imponer el programa anticlerical de la Reforma mucho mas allá de su
diseño original. La Iglesia no solo había apoyado al bando conservador, también
había financiado sus campañas militares, no solo era un lastre para la producción del
“progreso”, era un contendor por el poder, por lo mismo, la Iglesia fue separada
completamente del estado, sus restantes bienes fueron nacionalizados (Julio de 1859)
y tanto las ordenes regulares como las hermandades fueron suprimidas.39
————————
37 Sinkin, R.: “The Mexican Constitutional Congress 1856-1857: A Statistical Analysis. HAHR” Vol. 53/1,
1973 p. 1-25.
38 Powell, T.G.: Priests and Peasants in Central Mexico: Social Conflict During “La Reforma” HAHR
Vol. 57/2, 1977, p. 296-313, Sinkin p. 134-137.
39 Como consecuencia lógica de la separación entre Iglesia y Estado se definió además un conjunto de
leyes civiles (matrimonio, registro, cementerios, etc.) Sinkin p. 134-137. También la representación diplomática
ante la santa Sede fue retirada y dichas relaciones a nivel de embajadores no se restauraron sino hasta mediados
de los 90 en el siglo recién pasado.
14
113
Los conflictos entre Iglesia y Estado (liberal) representan un clivaje generalizado
en la América Latina de mediados de Siglo XIX, estos no solo estaban relacionados
a formas diversas de entender el ser y el deber ser de la sociedad, también estaban
vinculadas a la institución del patronato colonial (un conjunto de atribuciones de
la monarquía en el ámbito eclesial que los gobiernos liberales asumieron
posteriormente como “atributos de la soberanía”)40, tésis rechazada obviamente
por la jerarquía de la Iglesia, pero en donde paralelamente, la Iglesia aspiraba a
mantener los privilegios de su relación con el Estado (el carácter de religión
oficial por ejemplo y todas sus derivaciones). Las tensiones entre la Iglesia y los
liberales mexicanos deben situarse en este contexto, pero agravadas tanto por el
peso económico e influencia política de la Iglesia mexicana como por la ausencia
de una “arena” política institucionalizada que permitiera soluciones negociadas.
No obstante el gobierno liberal no tuvo la posibilidad de disfrutar de su triunfo.
En 1861, los gobierno de España, Inglaterra y Francia suscribieron un acuerdo
tripartito para intervenir en México como consecuencia de deudas por empréstitos
y demanda por daños de nacionales de esos países radicados en ese país. En
1862 México fue invadido por un cuerpo expedicionario francés quien debía
transformarse, junto con el apoyo de los conservadores y de la Iglesia mexicana,
en la base política de la Monarquía de Maximiliano de Habsburgo, pero contra
las espectativas de la Jerarquía de la Iglesia, ninguna de las “Leyes de la Reforma”
fueron abolidas por el nuevo régimen.41
En 1866 las preocupaciones de Napoleón III respecto de la dinámica expansión
de Prusia lo llevó a que retirar a su cuerpo expedicionario de México, aunque era
obvio que sin ese soporte militar, el “Imperio” de Maximiliano no podría sobrevivir
y no sobrevivió. En Julio de 1867, Benito Juarez, después de cuatro años regresó
a Ciudad de México como gobernante. El resultado de la intervención francesa
fue solidificar la identidad entre nación y Reforma42. Para los liberales, la guerra
contra los franceses fue percibida en gran medida como continuidad de la misma
lucha: Los conservadores y la Iglesia no solo apoyaron la monarquía de Maximiliano,
también durante la guerra de los tres años, el gobierno conservador de Zuloaga
había solicitado y obtenido el reconocimiento de algunas potencias europeas.
Por otra parte, la intervención francesa estimuló la cohesión de los mas
diversos grupos mas allá de cualquier identidad regional o local, se tradujo en la
emergencia no solo de un genuino patriotismo sino también en la consolidación
de una ideología nacionalista dentro de la elite liberal que se construyó tanto en
oposición a la amenaza norteamericana (preservación del territorio) como en
oposición a Europa. Paradojalmente, junto con luchar contra las tropas francesas,
————————
40 Véase: Matinez de Codez: La Iglesia en el Siglo XIX. (Madrid 1992). Krebs, R y otros: Catolicismo y
Laicismo.
41 Para una visión “conservadora”, pero crítica de los problemas y contradicciones del Gobierno de
Maximiliano de Habsburgo en México, existe una singular fuente: el epistolario de un noble alemán que actuó
como oficial de ejército. Véase: Haydenreich, T: Ein Unbekantes Zeuge der Intervention in Mexico: Engelbert
Otto Freiherr Von Brockal-Velda en Jahrbuch für Geschichte,Staat, Wirtschafts und Gesellschaft Lateinamerikas
(JbLA) 25 Köln, 1986.
42 Ni la libertad, ni el orden constitucional, ni el progreso ni la paz, ni la independencia de la nación hubiesen
sido posibles sin la Reforma. P. 83 / nota 21.
114
15
los liberales mexicanos siempre se habían sentido herederos culturales de
Francia, de la revolución y de su liberalismo, por lo mismo, esa “contradicción”
francesa sirvió para cimentar una concepción mas autónoma y concluir el proceso
e separación del Viejo Mundo43. En relación a Estados Unidos, pese a la importante
ayuda en material militar que los liberales mexicanos recibieron, se mantuvo una
fuerte desconfianza, tanto que estos asumieron que la mejor política posible
respecto del poderoso vecino del norte era el aislamiento y que la mejor frontera
posible era las mas “profunda”, es decir el desierto.44
Los años de guerra aunque militarizaron a la sociedad, (el ejército llegó a
tener 60.000 soldados) permitieron simultáneamente la emergencia de una nueva
élite militar y una nueva estructura coactiva para el estado. La élite militar
tradicional, estuvo en el lado de los perdedores y eso permitió una renovación
drástica de sus cuadros: los nuevos generales fueron “civiles con uniforme” en
donde el Gobierno además apeló al viejo recurso de “divide et impera” creándose
estructuras militares paralelas: milicias y posteriormente los “rurales” una suerte
de “guardia nacional” cuya función básica fue imponer el orden nacional contra
la autonomía de los caudillos locales y en las áreas mas periféricas contra toda
forma de disidencia (incluyendo grupos marginales o indígenas)45. Así, el gobierno
mexicano no dependería mas de la buena voluntad de los militares en cuanto
instituciòn corporativa o grupo de presiòn. Sinkin sostiene que ocurrió lo mismo
con muchos de los grandes caudillos regionales, pero F. Xavier Guerra ha
aportado suficiente evidencia en el sentido de la que la política mexicana siguió
basándose en redes clientelísticas46, lo que efectivamente ocurrió es que los
caudillos regionales y locales perdieron mucho de sus antiguos espacios de
autonomía, pasando ahora a depender mas de relaciones clientelísticas (redes)
establecidas en el nivel del gobierno central.
La consolidación del estado también dio lugar a una mayor penetración
material: en 1860 México tenía solo 15 millas útiles de ferrocarril (entre Ciudad
de México y Veracruz), en 1872 eran 200 y 1876 400. Aun cuando la expansión
mas significativa de los ferrocarriles se dio bajo el largo Gobierno de Porfirio
Diaz, la existencia del Ferrocarril no solo permitió generar mercados integrados,
también (como lo insinuara tempranamente Alberdi) permitió hacer llegar la
presencia del Estado Central (y en particular su dimensión coactiva) hasta los
rincones mas apartados de la Nación. Por otra parte, como se adelantó, el Estado
dio lugar a una profunda reestructuración de la propiedad territorial; esta se
inició con la desamortización de tierras de la Iglesia, y continuó con una conjunto
de leyes (denominadas de Colonización y Baldíos) tendiente a poner en producción
una mayor cantidad de tierras, estas leyes tendieron tanto privatizar tierras
————————
43 Francia viola su propia tradición y legado, Francia no puede seguir siendo un ideal... ahora somos
solo mexicanos que aspiramos a defender nuestro país, a no obedecer ningún gobierno excepto a aquel que
emana de nuestro pueblo, nosotros moriremos por nuestra soberanía nacional cita 56 en p 160.
44 Lerdo de Tejada prohibió expresamente la construcción de Ferrocarriles entre Estados Unidos y
México, su lema fue “... entre (su) fortaleza y (nuestra) debilidad,, el desierto”, Lerdo de Tejada, F.: cit por
Pablo Macedo en Silva Herzog, op. cit., p. 301.
45 Vanderwood, P.: Mexico’s Rurales: Image of a Society in Transition HAHR Vol. 61/1, 1981 p. 52-84.
46 Guerra, F.X: Mexico el Antiguo Régimen y la Revolución (México, 1989).
16
115
improductivas de propiedad del Estado como s a entregar a particulares todas
aquellas tierras en donde no se pudieran acreditar efectivamente títulos de dominio.
Estas leyes, pretendían generar una nueva clase de propietarios capitalistas en
desmedro de las formas tradicionales de propiedad comunal. El resultado, en un
contexto de apertura de la económica mexicana,fue una importante expansión de
cultivos industriales y agroexportación, pero la gran propiedad solo se reconcentró
y nunca se cumplió el sueño liberal de un México de pequeños propietarios.47
Pero la presencia del estado no solo se expresó en sus dimensiones de penetración
material y coactiva. sino también a través de una significativa ampliación del
aparato educativo, monopolizado ahora por el estado. Para figuras como Juarez,
la educación pública siempre fue un tema central, por cuanto veían en ella no
solo un mecanismo de movilidad social sino también una posibilidad de
democratizar la sociedad.48 Al inicio de la Reforma solo existían 1310 escuelas
primarias en todo México, de las cuales solo un pequeño número eran
gubernamentales. Juarez promulgó desde 1860 varios decretos sobre educación,
pero en el contexto de la guerra estos no pasaron de ser buenas intenciones, si
embargo en 1876 el número de escuelas primarias superaba las 8000. El efecto
de esta acción del Estado en la generación de identidades colectivas resulta obvio,
tanto mas, cuanto ciertas áreas de la educación, como por ejemplo la enseñanza
de la Historia se hizo sobre la base de una historiografía oficial que exaltaba la
Reforma y el naciente nacionalismo Mexicano.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
De la Torre, E., La Independencia de México, Madrid 1992.
Góngora, M., Ensayo Historico sobre la Nocion de Estado en Chile en los Siglos XIX y XX Santiago, 1981.
Hamnett, Brian, Revolución y Contrarrevolución en México y Perú, México, 1979.
Hobsbawn, E., Nación y Nacionalismo desde 1780, Barcelona, 1991.
Huntington. S., El Orden Político en Sociedades en Cambio,1968.
Lynch, J., Las Revoluciones Hispanoamericanas, Barcelona,1980.
Oszlak, O., La Formacion del Estado Argentino, Buenos Aires, 1985.
Silva, Herzog J., El Pensamiento Económico, Social y Político de México, México 1974.
Véase, Eyzaguirre J., Ideario y Ruta de la Emancipacion Chilena, Santiago, 1957.
————————
47 En general las granades figuras de la Refoma (BenitoJuarez, Melchor Ocampo, los Hermanos Lerdo de
Tejada, Fransico Zarco etc) fueron tan liberales en lo político como en lo económico, en los fragmentos de sus
escritos reunidos por Silva Herzog se aprecia esta idea común de asociar la imagen del progreso a la
liberalización de todo tipo de relaciones económicas. Véase Silva Herzog p. 177-259.
48 “La instrucción es la base de la prosperidad del pueblo y el medio mas seguro para evitar el abuso de
los poderosos... El deseo de saber y de ilustrarse es innato al corazón del hombre. Quitenles las trabas que la
miseria y el despotismo le imponen y el se ilustrará naturalmente... ” Juarez, B cit por Silve Herzog, op. cit., p. 191.
LA IZQUIERDA ACTUAL EN AMERICA LATINA
RÃZVAN VICTOR PANTELIMON*
Abstract. This article assesses the general trend in Latin America’s Left
in the last twenty years, the characteristics of left-wing political parties
and the change in the ideology and political discourse of Latin American
socialism. Our working hypothesis is that the fall of the socialist and
communist regimes of Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union has an
important influence on the evolution of the traditional socialist parties in
this region.
Key words: Latin America, political discourse, ideology, traditional socialist
parties.
En el comienzo de los años 90 la situación de la izquierda en América Latina
no ha sido nada alentador, el letargo político y la desorientación, el descrédito
político y el fracaso del modelo socialista fueron pautas comunes de la izquierda
latino-americana. Este articulo quiere analizar cual ha sido la evolución general
de la izquierda de América Latina en los últimos veinte años, las características
de los partidos políticos de izquierda y como cambio la ideología y el discurso político
del socialismo latino-americano.
Nuestra hipótesis de trabajo es que la caída del los regimenes socialistas y
comunistas de Europa del Este y de la Unión Soviética ha influido en una medida
importante la evolución de los partidos socialistas tradicionales de esta región.
También un hecho muy importante, más que el derrumbe del Muro de Berlín, ha
sido la derrota electoral de los Sandinistas en 1990, que demostraba que el
socialismo revolucionario del pasado no funcionaba más y que tuvo mayores
consecuencias para el conjunto de las fuerzas de izquierda1. En estas condiciones
los partidos de izquierda tradicionales han cumplido la tarea de “reconciliar el
socialismo con la democracia”, mientras en el mismo tiempo las estrategias políticas
de estos organizaciones cambio también en el sentido de la renunciación al
asalto sobre el poder y la adoptacion de estrategias que tienen más a ver con los
conceptos de Gramsci sobre “hegemonía”, “guerra de posiciones” y “sociedad civil”.
————————
* Researcher within the Institute of Political Sciences and International Relations (Romanian Academy).
1 Löwy, Michel, 2007, El marxismo en América Latina. Antología, desde 1909 hasta nuestros días (edición
actualizada), Editorial Lom, Santiago, p. 59.
2
117
Nunca fue sencillo ponerse de acuerdo con respecto a qué se entiende por
izquierda en América Latina. Una de las especificidades de la política
latinoamericana desde muy temprano en el siglo XX ha consistido en las enormes
y muy conocidas dificultades de la diferenciación convencional entre partidos o
fuerzas políticas de derecha y de izquierda, para dar cuenta de los más relevantes
procesos de transformación social y política con sentido de progreso — algo
generalmente asociado a posiciones de izquierda. Fenómenos de amplia convocatoria
popular con impacto duradero en el diseño de sus sociedades y sus entramados
institucionales como las revoluciones mexicana y boliviana, o las muchas
variantes de regímenes nacional-populares, se acoplan con dificultad al concepto
convencional de izquierda. Más aún: en diferentes momentos de su desarrollo
esos procesos se vieron enfrascados en enfrentamientos ríspidos con partidos y
organizaciones socialistas y comunistas, al mismo tiempo que impulsaban políticas
de transformación que estimulaban las esperanzas de los trabajadores del campo
y la ciudad y alimentaban la oposición de los sectores del poder económico o de
las potencias que sentían cuestionada su hegemonía.2
Siguiendo a Norberto Bobbio consideramos que el criterio básico diferenciador
de la izquierda y la derecha lo define la postura frente a la igualdad. Ser de izquierda
se identifica como una postura que asume la defensa de la igualdad, lo que no debe
confundirse con el igualitarismo. Esta postura entiende que la desigualdad es en lo
básico un asunto social, no natural. De aquí el establecimiento de un programa donde
lo central es, en la perspectiva social, la lucha por la igualdad de oportunidades y, en
consecuencia, la lucha contra todo tipo de exclusión social y económica. De esta
forma mientras para la derecha el criterio de asignación de recursos es en lo
fundamental el mercado, para la izquierda lo es la sociedad; mientras para la derecha
el criterio exclusivo de demarcación política lo es el de la democracia liberal,
básicamente de tipo electoral, que afirma sobre todo la ciudadanía política y civil,
para la izquierda la democracia debe ir más allá y englobar una ciudadanía afirmativa
en el ámbito de los derechos sociales, la defensa de las minorías y la participación
de la sociedad civil como actor legítimo en la escena política.3
Acerca de la calificación de los partidos como de izquierda o no para la
realización del presente estudio se entenderá como partido de izquierda aquellos
partidos que en la escala izquierda-derecha son situados en izquierda o centroizquierda. Consideramos que esta escala es un mecanismo correcto para conceder
a cada partido una etiqueta ampliamente aceptada en las ciencias sociales.
Creemos que podemos extender a América Latina la afirmación de Peter Mair,
quien refiriéndose a Europa Occidental indica que izquierda y derecha no solamente
continúan siendo los mayores principios de organización en la política sino que
también ayudan a crear unos cimientos uniformes en las pautas contemporáneas
de la competición política.4
————————
2 Vilas, Carlos M, “La izquierda latinoamericana y el surgimiento de regímenes nacional-populares” en
Nueva Sociedad, no. 197, mayo/junio 2005, Caracas, p. 84-85.
3 Bobbio, Norberto, 1995, Derecha e izquierda. Razones y significados de una distinción política, Taurus,
Madrid, p. 131-135.
4 Mair, Peter, 1997, Party System Change. Approaches and Interpretations, Oxford, Clarendon Press.
118
RÃZVAN VICTOR PANTELIMON
3
Son algunos científicos como el periodista Andrés Oppenheimer, quien consideran
como superado el antiguo binomio derecha-izquierda: Existen muchos países
donde líderes «izquierdistas» siguen la exitosa apertura económica chilena, y
unos pocos donde líderes petro-populistas despilfarran dinero sin preocuparse
por construir una base sólida de crecimiento a largo plazo. La próxima vez que
escuche que Latinoamérica está virando hacia la izquierda, diga que sí, pero
añada que en la mayoría de los países la izquierda está virando hacia la derecha.5
Para delimitar exactamente nuestras unidades de análisis, los partidos de
izquierda que van a ser utilizados como estudios de casos o ejemplos para
analizar los cambios que han surgido después de la caída del socialismo real,
vamos a utilizar los datos presentados en un estudio reciente de Manuel Alcántara6.
A lo largo del período de democratización de los sistemas políticos
latinoamericanos acontecido después de las transiciones políticas, para unos
casos, y de continuidad para otros, los partidos políticos de la región han sufrido
profundas mutaciones que tienen su base en aspectos tanto endógenos como
exógenos, en cuestiones de alcance estrictamente político institucional como en
otras de contenido social o económico.
La gran mayoría de los autores son de acuerdo que el descalabro del socialismo
real y la pérdida de un referente sólido ideológico y práctico para grandes sectores
de la izquierda latinoamericana fue el factor exógeno por excelencia. Los efectos
del año 1989 sobre América Latina son muy evidentes al nivelo macro político,
porque después de la caída del muro de Berlín se redujo a la mínima expresión
los apoyos procedentes de aquel espacio, se hizo desparecer en el imaginario de
Washington la idea que su “patio trasero” pudiera caer en manos enemigas,
desplazo la centralidad de la política norte-americana hacia el este de Europa y
el Oriente Medio etc.7
Son muchos autores que han escrito sobre el desgaste de la izquierda al
comienzo de los noventa, pero lo más conocido es el politólogo mexicano Jorge
Castañeda que abría su libro de 1993 con una sentencia categórica: La guerra
fría ha terminado y el bloque socialista se derrumbó. Los Estados Unidos y el
capitalismo triunfaron. Y quizás en ninguna parte ese triunfo se antoja tan claro
y contundente como en América Latina. Nunca antes la democracia representativa,
la economía de libre mercado y las efusiones oportunistas o sinceras de
sentimiento pronorteamericano habían poblado con tal persistencia el paisaje
de una región donde antaño hombres y mujeres del mundo entero depositaron su
fe revolucionario en otro ideario a partir de otra victoria: la Revolución Cubana.8
¿Cuales pueden ser las causas de este descrédito de la izquierda? Marta
Harnecker una observadora muy atente del panorama político latino-americana
————————
5 Oppenheimer, Andres. “Latin American ‘Left’ Has Been Shifting to the Right” en Miami Herald, disponible
en www.miami.com/mld/miamiherald/news/columnists/andres_oppenheimer/16205845.htm, consultado en
25.05.2008
6 Alcántara, Manuel, 2004, La ideología de los partidos políticos latinoamericanos. Estudio/Working
Paper no. 20, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid, Madrid.
7 Alcántara, Manuel y Freidenberg, Flavia, “Los partidos políticos en América Latina” en América Latina
Hoy, no. 27, 2001, Salamanca, p. 24.
8 Castañeda, Jorge, 1993, Utopia desarmada, Ariel, Buenos Aires, p. 9.
4
119
de izquierda consideraba que la izquierda latinoamericana quedó desconcertada
y sin proyecto alternativo; está viviendo una profunda crisis que abarca tres
terrenos: el teórico, el programático y el orgánico.
En su opinión la crisis teórica de la izquierda latinoamericana tenia un triple
origen: su incapacidad histórica de elaborar un pensamiento propio porque en la
mayoría de los casos la tendencia fue más bien la de extrapolar esquemas de
análisis propios a otras latitudes; no ha sido capaz de realizar un estudio riguroso
de las experiencias socialistas — tanto de sus éxitos como de sus fracasos — y
tampoco ha realizado un análisis serio de las causas de sus derrotas; la inexistencia
de un estudio crítico del capitalismo de fines del siglo XX-el capitalismo de la
revolución electrónico-informática, de la globalización y las guerras financieras.9
En el mismo tiempo la izquierda latinoamericana ha vivido una crisis programática
al comienzo de los noventa, cuando ha tenido grandes dificultades para diseñar
un proyecto transformador que pueda asumir los datos de la nueva realidad
mundial y que podría hacer confluir en un sólo haz a todos los sectores sociales
afectados por el régimen imperante.10 La crisis orgánico o institucional de los
partidos de izquierda se ha expresado tanto en la pérdida de su capacidad de
atracción y convocatoria ante las gentes y especialmente ante la juventud, como
en una evidente disfuncionalidad de sus estructuras, hábitos, tradiciones y maneras
de hacer política, con las exigencias que la realidad social reclama de un actor
político de carácter popular y socialista.11
Vamos a ver cuales han sido las características de la izquierda tradicional en
América Latina, para entender después el cambio que surgió después del momento
1989.
En oposición con la nueva izquierda sobre cual vamos hablar más tarde, la
izquierda histórica es entendido en este trabajo como el conjunto de partidos
políticos, movimientos sociales y organizaciones guerrilleras que conformaron
el espectro de la izquierda entre 1959, con la revolución cubana y 1990, con el fin
de la segunda ola revolucionaria latino-americana.
La mayor parte del siglo pasado los partidos de izquierda no se cuestionaba
los objetivos, que estaban muy claros, pero analizaban solo sobre los métodos
para realizar su misión histórica, sobre las formas de las acciones para llegar a
estas metas. Los objetivos que deberían ser obtenidas estaban una simple
reproducción en el espacio latino-americano de unos modelos u otros (aquel de
URSS, de Cuba, de China, de los países comunistas, de Yugoslavia). Podemos
decir que para los partidos latinos-americanos “si qué hacer ya estaba aclarado,
bastaba discernir el cómo hacerlo”.12
Lo más conocida discusión ha sido aquella entre los partidarios del modelo
revolucionario para tomar el poder (que tenia sus origines intelectuales en la
————————
9 Harnecker, Martha, 1999, Haciendo posible lo imposible: la izquierda en el umbral del siglo XXI, Siglo
XXI Editores, Mexicó, p. 223-224.
10 Idem, p. 232.
11 Idem, p. 238.
12 Castro, Nils, 2005, Las izquierdas latinoamericanas: Observaciones a una trayectoria, Fundacion
Friedrich Ebert, Panama, p. 95.
120
5
teoría leninista del asalto sobre el poder y sus origines practicas en la Revolución
Cubana) y aquellos que sostenían la vía democrática, electoral para llegar al
poder. Podemos hablar de la influencia de estas dos teorías utilizando la
metáfora de los flujos y reflujos: si el los años 60 el más fuerte estaba el modelo
revolucionario, impulsado por el éxito de la Revolución Cubana, y adoptado de
muchos partidos, por ejemplo: el Partido Socialista de Chile, que en diferentes
Congresos de estos años proclamaba la legitimidad de la violencia revolucionaria
como única vía para lograr el éxito de la Revolución Socialista13, al comienzo
de los 70 el fracaso del movimiento guerrillero de Che Guevara en Bolivia y el
éxito del Salvador Allende creaban la impresión que la vía electoral puede ser
mejor; pero, el golpe de estado contra Allende y la victoria de los sandinistas en
Nicaragua hacían de nuevo muy atractivo el modelo revolucionario que se ha
mantenido en los 80; la derrota electoral del FSLN y del golpe militar de Hugo
Chávez en 1992 han hecho que los partidos de izquierda renuncian de nuevo a
la idea de revolución y buscan métodos legales para tomar el poder, modelo que
se ha probado exitoso en el comienzo del nuevo siglo.
Una de las ideas fuertes de la izquierda estaba la creencia en la imposibilidad
de un camino “nacional-democrático” para el desarrollo social en América Latina
y la necesidad de una revolución socialista como única respuesta realista y coherente
al subdesarrollo y a la dependencia.14
Democracia social, cambios socioeconómicos profundos orientados hacia las
clases trabajadoras y autodeterminación nacional constituyeron hasta recientemente
el núcleo de las propuestas “de izquierda” en América Latina.15
La crisis vivida de la izquierda latino-americana en los últimos lustros del
siglo pasado ha sido la expresión regional de una crisis mundial de la vieja
izquierda, manifestada en el declive de las tradiciones progresistas provenientes
de dos de las grandes revoluciones modernas, pero en el mismo tiempo, hay otro
componente de esta crisis que tiene a ver con la estrategia política y esta
simbolizado por el ocaso del canon leninista proveniente de la revolución rusa.16
Estas dos direcciones: el cambio ideológico y el cambio de estrategia política
son en nuestra opinión las características principales de la evolución de la izquierda
latino-americana en los últimos veinte años.
Son muchas interpretaciones sobre las causas del surgimiento de una nueva
izquierda en América Latina, dentro de una coyuntura mundial muy poco favorable
a este tipo de políticas. Nos vamos a limitar aquí a presentar la opinión de Atilio
————————
13 Verdejo, Inés Picazo, 2001, “Chile” en Alcántara Sáez, Manuel y Freidenberg, Flavia, eds. Partidos
políticos de América Latina. Cono Sur, Ediciones Universidad de Salamanca, Salamanca, 2001, p. 312. Véase
también Jobet, Julio César, 1987, Historia del Partido Socialista de Chile, Ediciones Documentas, Santiago;
Arrate, Jorge y Rojas, Eduardo, 2003, Memoria de la Izquierda Chilena, Ediciones B, Santiago.
15 Vilas, Carlos M., “La izquierda latinoamericana. Búsquedas y desafíos” en Nueva Sociedad, no. 157,
septiembre/octubre 1998, Caracas p. 78.
16 Garavito, César A. Rodríguez y Barrett, Patrick, “¿La utopía revivida? Introducción al estudio de la
nueva izquierda latinoamericana” en Garavito, César A. Rodríguez, Barrett, Patrick y Chavez, Daniel, 2005,
La nueva izquierda en América Latina. Sus orígenes y trayectoria futura, Grupo Editorial Norma, Buenos
Aires, p. 25-26.
6
121
Borón que en un trabajo reciente encuentra cuatro puntos principales que explican
el surgimiento de una nueva izquierda y que sintetiza muy bien los debates.17
En primer lugar, a principios de los noventas comenzaron a sentirse los
problemas y los limitaciones del modelo neoliberal basado en las políticas del
Consenso de Washington. A medida que se multiplicaron las crisis económicas
y los escándalos de corrupción, relacionadas con las reformas estructurales,
surgieron o se fortalecieron los partidos y movimientos de izquierda que se
oponían a este tipo de políticas económicas. Un segundo factor que puede explicar
el renacimiento de la izquierda es la aparición de nuevos actores políticos que
vinieron a compensar el declive de los viejos actores, como los sindicatos.
Aunque la organización clásica de partido queda vigente, cada día aparecen nuevos
tipos de organización (movimientos indígenas, organizaciones campesinas,
movimiento de desempleados, organizaciones feministas etc). El tercer factor ha
sido el desgaste, el descrédito y la crisis interna de los partidos políticos tradicionales,
que ha dado lugar a nuevas formaciones de izquierda. El caso lo más claro es el
de Venezuela, donde el “fenómeno Chávez” y su consolidación en el poder no
puede ser entendido sin tener en cuenta la situación de los partidos tradicionales
que perdieron toda la confianza de los electores como resultado de casi cuarenta
años del Pacto de Punto Fijo. Un último factor que fortaleció la izquierda latinoamericana ha sido la revitalización de la izquierda internacional a partir del
surgimiento de un movimiento global contra la globalización, el neoliberalismo
y la guerra.
Para sintetizar podemos decir que el voto popular por los partidos de izquierda
es en mayor o en menor grado conforme a los países, la expresión de un
descontento con el neoliberalismo, con la dominación imperialista, con el
desorden establecido y busca una alternativa radical a las estructuras sociales
existentes — independientemente de los límites programáticos de tal o cual
organización o frente político.18
Aun hoy en día existe una pluralidad de partidos y movimientos dentro de la
izquierda latino-americana actual con experiencias muy diversas podemos
destacar algunos rasgos comunes que constituyen características principales de
estas formaciones y cuales diferencian los partidos de izquierda actuales de una
izquierda tradicional.
Si la izquierda anterior sostenía la unidad teorética y la centralización estratégica,
la nueva izquierda es caracterizada de una pluralidad de estrategias y de formas
de articulación organizativas descentralizadas. En lugar del partido como
vanguardia del proletariado, sujeto político unitario especifico por el leninismo,
en actualidad las formas predominantes son los frentes amplios de partidos y
movimientos, las coordinadoras o los encuentros. Otro rasgo de la nueva izquierda
es la ampliación de la base social y de las agendas políticas para incluir otros
————————
17 Boron, Atilio, “La izquierda latinoamericana a comienzos del siglo XXI: Promesa y desafíos” en Garavito,
César A. Rodríguez, Barrett, Patrick y Chavez, Daniel, 2005, La nueva izquierda en América Latina. Sus
orígenes y trayectoria futura, Grupo Editorial Norma, Buenos Aires, p. 405-433.
122
7
temas como la lucha contra la discriminación, los derechos de las minorías etc.
Un tema recurrente y común de las fuerzas de izquierda actuales es la reivindicación
de la sociedad civil como espacio de acción política. La diferencia con la
izquierda tradicional tiene a ver también con la estrategia política, cual pone el
acento en el reformismo y deja a un lado la revolución o las vías insurrecciónales.
Una ultima característica de la nueva izquierda es el acento sobre la democracia
como “el único juego en la ciudad” para utilizar una frase celebre de Juan Linz y
Alfred Stepan, lo que significa la “reconciliación del socialismo con la democracia”.19
Hemos visto las causas del surgimiento de una nueva izquierda y unos de sus
características. Antes de analizar más detallado el cambio ideológico y las nuevas
estrategias políticas, debemos dar una definición de esta nueva izquierda para
saber a que nos referimos cuando hablamos de ella. Por eso utilizamos una
definición de Marta Harnecker, citada de Ronald H. Chilcote en un articulo
sobre la izquierda en América Latina: ser de izquierda hoy significa luchar o
apoyar un proyecto de sociedad cual se opone a la lógica capitalista de profitmaking y cual busca de construir una sociedad con una lógica humanística.20 Es
una definición bastante larga pero consideramos que ella cubre todas las
organizaciones o estructuras que hoy en día son conocidos como “de izquierda”.
Si antes de la caída del “socialismo real” la izquierda latino-americana debatía
sobre las modalidades y formas para cambiar la sociedad e implementar el
socialismo en estos países, hoy en día la cuestión principal es aquella de cómo
obtener la mejor justicia social en una economía de mercado. Asistimos a la
“declaración de la muerte de las ideologías. El evento que suscitó esa desilusión
fue el fin de los socialismos reales, considerado como el fracaso de los grandes
discursos o de los discursos que pretendían sostener una teoría de la historia,
que vinculara de manera férrea, a través de leyes, el presente con el porvenir”.21
La desaparición del modelo comunista ha tenido consecuencias importantes
sobre la izquierda latinoamericana tradicional que perdía su mayor referente, los
modelos invocados de los socialistas probándose a ser equivocadas y que no
podrían resistir a la prueba del tiempo y de la historia. Como resultado la izquierda
latinoamericana tradicional ha debido de adaptarse a las nuevas realidades, de
buscar nuevos modelos, de redefinir sus objetivos y de buscar unos nuevos para
nacer un nuevo proyecto. Esto puede ser muy bien observado en los discursos y
declaraciones de los líderes políticos de izquierda, que han sido obligados, en su
mayoría, de utilizar teorías y conceptos nuevos, pero aun se pueden encontrar
algunos ideas y teorías que han sido antes expuestos de los que pueden ser
denominados “clásicos del socialismo latinoamericano” como Jose Marti, Juan
Mella, Jóse Carlos Mariatégui, Che Guevara, Salvador Allende.
————————
19 Garavito, César A. Rodríguez y Barrett, Patrick, “¿La utopía revivida? Introducción al estudio de la nueva
izquierda latinoamericana” en Garavito, César A. Rodríguez, Barrett, Patrick y Chavez, Daniel, 2005, La nueva
izquierda en América Latina. Sus orígenes y trayectoria futura, Grupo Editorial Norma, Buenos Aires, p. 31-37.
20 Chilcote, Ronald H., “The Left in Latin America: Theory and Practice” en Latin American Perspectives,
Issue 131, Vol. 30 No. 4, Julio 2003, Sage Publications, p. 10.
21 Moulian, Tomás, “El sistema de partidos en Chile” en Cavarozzi, Marcelo y Abal Medina, Juan Manuel
(compiladores) El asedio a la política. Los partidos latinoamericanos en la era neoliberal, Homo Sapiens
Ediciones, Rosario, 2002, p. 244.
8
123
De estas mismas fuentes, pero en una medida más amplia, se alimentan los
líderes de los nuevos partidos socialistas que encuentran en los escritos de los
“viejos marxistas de América Latina” el material par sus discursos, ideas políticas
y actitudes. Por ejemplo, aquí se puede encontrar la justificación de las medidas
de nacionalización tomadas reciente en algunos países, que no son basadas en la
idea marxista de la necesidad de la propiedad publica de las medidas de
producción, pero en la lucha para la soberanía nacional contra los intereses
imperialistas de los grandes multinacionales, representantes del antiguo enemigo
imperialista de América Latina: EE.UU. (los casos de nacionalización del petróleo
en Venezuela o del gas en Bolivia)
Conceptos como la lucha de clase, proletariado, explotación, internacionalismo
proletario, dictadura del proletariado etc, que han hecho parte del discurso y de
los programas de los partidos de izquierdas por muchos años, han sido
remplazados con: justicia social, equidad, redistribución, los derechos de los
indígenas y de las minorías, la integración y la unidad latinoamericana, la
soberanía nacional frente al imperialismo y capitalismo. Los dos temas centrales
de la nueva izquierda son la búsqueda de alternativas al neoliberalismo y la
democratización de la política y las sociedades latinoamericanas (incluida la
democratización de las propias fuerzas de izquierda).22
Si hasta el comienzo de los noventa la izquierda se presentaba como una
alternativa al modelo social, hoy constituye una más de las alternativas dentro de
la oferta política. A veces, para ampliar su base de sustentación y su legitimidad
democrática, la izquierda debe presentarse con un discurso menos “a la
izquierda” que otros partidos ubicados en el centro o a la derecha. Quizá no haya
muestra más concisa del significado del famoso lema “el fin de las ideologías”
que esta suerte de enredo ideológico cotidiano que implica para las organizaciones
de la izquierda que sus discursos deban adaptarse a las demandas sociales mientras
se atiende al mismo tiempo a las bases partidarias y los temores electorales.23
En actualidad los conceptos de democracia y reformas han ocupado el espacio
que hasta hace no mucho pertenecía al cambio sistémico o a la revolución social.
Estamos en presencia de una izquierda gradualista y pragmática, sin definiciones
ideológicas duras. En vez de un enfrentamiento en bloque al diseño estructural
del capitalismo neoliberal, o incluso un drástico cambio de modelo macroeconómico,
postulan un capitalismo más balanceado, con un Estado que, más que intervenir
directamente en los mercados, regula y fiscaliza su desenvolvimiento para
ampliar la competitividad, articulando las demandas de rentabilidad y los requisitos
de inversión del capital, las aspiraciones de bienestar social de la población, y la
vigencia efectiva de las instituciones democráticas y los derechos humanos.
Constitutivo de los diseños de reforma es el énfasis en el fortalecimiento de la
————————
Aires, p. 37.
124
9
sociedad civil a través de la descentralización y la promoción del asociativismo y el
desarrollo local.24
Los discursos de los lideres políticos de la izquierda latinoamericana ilustran
muy bien este transforme de los ideales e ideologías de la izquierda actual,
muchos de ellos rechazando la titulatura de socialistas o comunistas, que antes
ha sido ligado con la izquierda. Vamos a dar en adelante algunos ejemplos de
declaraciones o discursos políticos para observar como se ubican ellos mismos
unos líderes que son cualificados como “de izquierda”.
Tabare Vazquez, el presidente de Uruguay, declaraba a pocos días desde el
comienzo de su mandato: ”[S]i me pregunta si ideológicamente nuestro programa
de gobierno es un programa socialista, le voy a decir que no lo es. Es un
programa nacional, profundamente democratizador, un programa que busca
por el camino de la solidaridad, la justicia social, el crecimiento económico con
justicia, es decir el desarrollo humano (…) Los cambios que vamos a hacer son
cambios a la uruguaya o no serán (…) es un cambio pacífico, gradual,
meditado, serio, profundo, responsable, con participación amplia de todos los
actores de la vida económica, política y social del país, que busque un objetivo
central de nuestro gobierno, que es mejorar la calidad de vida de todos los
uruguayos, comenzando con el mandato histórico que tenemos que se remonta
a la noche de los tiempos de nuestra nación, el ideario artiguista, cuando
Artigas decía que los más necesitados sean los más privilegiados; que la causa
de los pueblos no admite la menor demora”.25
El Partido Socialista Chileno ha abandonado el marxismo y promete mantener
las características centrales de la revolución neoliberal de Pinochet. Hoy en día
el PSCh no tiene ninguna continuidad histórica con el pasado porque refundo su
historia, renegó de ella, convirtiéndose en una corriente social demócrata
después de haber sido desde su fundación un partido revolucionario. Ricardo
Lagos, presidente de Chile entre 2000 y 2006 repetía que no quería ser “el
segundo presidente socialista de Chile (después de Allende) sino el tercero de la
Concertación (después de dos demócrata-cristianos)”.26 El mismo Lagos, responde
a una pregunta sobre si después de las elecciones de 2005–2006 se puede hablar
sobre un giro hacia izquierda, que la región, más que hacia la izquierda, gira
hacia la profundización del sistema democrático.27
El discurso de los líderes del nuevo socialismo es diferente en mayoría de los
casos, pero son casos cuando se parece al discurso de los partidos más
moderados. Por ejemplo Hugo Chávez, el más conocido y visible líder socialista
de hoy declaraba: “no acepto que [actualmente] vivamos un período de revoluciones
————————
24 Vilas, Carlos M, “La izquierda latinoamericana y el surgimiento de regímenes nacional-populares” en
Nueva Sociedad, no. 197, mayo/junio 2005, Caracas, p. 88-91.
25 El País, Montevideo, 4 marzo 2005 apud VILAS, Carlos M, “La izquierda latinoamericana y el surgimiento
de regímenes nacional-populares” en Nueva Sociedad, no. 197, mayo/junio 2005, Caracas, p. 93-94.
26 Colomer, Joseph M. “Las elecciones primarias presidenciales en América Latina y sus consecuencias”
en Cavarozzi, Marcelo y Abal Medina, Juan Manuel (compiladores) El asedio a la política. Los partidos
latinoamericanos en la era neoliberal, Homo Sapiens Ediciones, Rosario, 2002, p. 131.
27 Zovatto, Daniel, “América Latina después del «rally» electoral 2005-2006: algunas tendencias y datos
sobresalientes” en Nueva Sociedad, no. 207, enero/febrero 2007, Caracas, p. 24-26.
10
125
proletarias; la realidad nos lo dice día a día. Pero si me dicen que por esa
realidad no se puede hacer nada por los pobres, entonces respondo [que] jamás
aceptaré que no pueda haber redistribución de la riqueza en la sociedad. Creo
que es mejor morir en la batalla que mantener una bandera revolucionaria muy
alta y muy pura, y no hacer nada... [Prefiero] avanzar un poco, aunque sea un
milímetro, en la dirección correcta, en vez de soñar en utopías.”28
Una última opinión citada aquí es de los líderes del MAS (Movimiento al
Socialismo), el partido político que ha ganado las elecciones en Boliva. Hugo
Salvatierra, Ministro de la Agricultura define el MAS como “una herramienta
encaminada a plasmar la «autodeterminación» de las 31 naciones indígenas del
país. Para lograrlo, el MAS ha ido desarrollando la idea de un socialismo «a la
boliviana», un modelo que no parte de las teorías sociales o políticas, sino de la
experiencia concreta”. Habla, por ejemplo, de un sistema de propiedad
colectiva, que no es obra de los intelectuales tradicionales sino de la vida misma
de los pueblos. Para Salvatierra, la principal contradicción no es la que enfrenta
a indígenas y no indígenas, sino la que contrapone a Bolivia y el imperialismo.
Otro líder boliviano, Asterio Romero, vea Bolivia como „la patria de todos”,
este modelo integrador pasando los clásicos diferencias clasistas o raciales.29
Una de las características del discurso de izquierda actual es que el no es dirigido
a los trabajadores o al proletariado, si no a unos conceptos unificativos muy largos,
como “pueblo” que intentan a integrar muchos grupos sociales. Este tipo de
discurso no es totalmente nuevo porque la izquierda latinoamericana reclutó sus
bases sociales, sus cuadros y sus dirigentes, de un amplio espectro: asalariados del
campo y la ciudad, campesinado pobre y medio, pequeña burguesía rural y urbana,
actores de reclutamiento generacional o ideológico (movimiento estudiantil por
ejemplo). Fue una izquierda popular más que estrictamente proletaria, apoyada por
y orientada hacia un amplio arco de actores unificados por el común denominador
de la opresión — social, nacional, cultural — y no solo por la explotación de clase.
En consecuencia la “frontera” que separó a la izquierda del resto del espectro
político fue difusa y de carácter político-ideológico más que social.30
Pero si antes de 1989 existían algunas referencias a la clase obrera, al
trabajador etc, que daban a los partidos de izquierda un carácter más o menos
clasista, hoy en día el discurso de izquierda renuncia totalmente a cualquier
referencia hacia una diferencia de clase y utiliza conceptos más difusos como
pueblo o población, que le da un carácter más integrador. Si para la izquierda
tradicional las clases sociales estaban el actor principal del enfrentamiento y de
la lucha social, para la nueva izquierda no hay una diferencia entre gobernantes
y gobernados porque el pueblo que debe participar al acto de gobernar.
Heinz Dieterich, uno de los más importantes ideólogos del socialismo del
siglo XXI del presidente Hugo Chávez, afirmaba, hablando sobre el nuevo modelo
————————
28 Ali, Tariq, „¿Por qué gano Chávez?” en La Jornada, México DF, 19 agosto 2004.
29 Archondo, Rafael, “¿Qué le espera a Bolivia con Evo Morales?” en „Nueva Sociedad”, no. 202, eneromarzo 2006, Caracas, p. 7-8.
126
11
de izquierda, que lo que se busca es que la población sea un simple receptor
pasivo del actuar gubernamental, sino por el contrario; en consonancia con el
paradigma democrático protagónico y participativo; se impulsa una verdadera y
absoluta participación del pueblo en el gobierno, otorgando de esta manera un
nuevo sentido a nuestra democracia.31
Como un resumen de los nuevos valores e ideas de la izquierda contemporánea
utilizamos el preámbulo de la Constitución de la Republica Bolivariana Venezuela,
considerado este país como lo más vocal caso de lo que puede ser denominado
“nueva izquierda”: ….establecer una sociedad democrática, participativa y
protagónica, multiétnica y pluricultural en un Estado de justicia, federal y
descentralizado, que consolide los valores de la libertad, la independencia, la
paz, la solidaridad, el bien común, la integridad territorial, la convivencia y el
imperio de la ley para esta y las futuras generaciones; asegure el derecho a la
vida, al trabajo, a la cultura, a la educación, a la justicia social y a la igualdad
sin discriminación ni subordinación alguna; promueva la cooperación pacífica
entre las naciones e impulse y consolide la integración latinoamericana de acuerdo
con el principio de no intervención y autodeterminación de los pueblos, la
garantía universal e indivisible de los derechos humanos, la democratización de
la sociedad internacional, el desarme nuclear, el equilibrio ecológico y los bienes
jurídicos ambientales como patrimonio común e irrenunciable de la humanidad.32
También se cambio mucho el modelo organizativo de los partidos de
izquierda que tiene a ver con el cambio en la visión para llegar al poder. Como
hemos dicho anterior si antes de los 90 el partido estaba visto y organizado según
el modelo leninista, como la vanguardia del proletariado cual debe asaltar el
poder, hoy en día, en un mundo más complejo, el modelo organizativo es muy
influido de las teorías y conceptos de Antonio Gramsci sobre la “guerra de
posiciones” y sobre “hegemonía”. Es necesario captar y organizar la sociedad
civil, las organizaciones sociales, y después se puede obtener la victoria electoral
(así podemos explicar la importancia de los movimientos sociales, de los
movimientos indígenas etc, en las victorias de la izquierda actual).
La influencia gramsciana ha sido muy fuerte en America Latina, y en los
últimos años sus ideas y su filosofía han sido redescubiertos de loa lideres
políticos de izquierda. Con la derrota electoral de los sandinistas en 1990 la
izquierda latino-americana abandona la vía revolucionaria y el modelo basado
en el asalto sobre el poder, que se han probado ineficientes al largo plazo. El
plazo de esta estrategia ha sido ocupado por ideas tomados desde Antonio
Gramsci, muchos de sus conceptos enunciados en los años 30 del siglo pasado
probándose ser más apropiados para el nuevo contexto político y social.
Asistamos así a una novedad en la estrategia de la izquierda contemporánea, que
en términos de John Holloway radica en el proyecto de cambiar el mundo sin
tomar el poder.33
————————
31 Dieterich, Heinz, 2007, Hugo Chávez y el socialismo del siglo XXI, Editorial Quimantú, Santiago, p. 23.
32 http://www.constitucion.ve/documentos/ConstitucionRBV1999-ES.pdf .
33 Holloway, John, 2001, Cambiar el mundo sin tomar el poder. El significado de la revolución hoy,
Universidad Autónoma de Puebla, Puebla, p. 174.
12
127
Aun si no todos los partidos de izquierda utilizan de un modo explicito los
conceptos de Gramsci, en la práctica ellos han seguido una ruta común para
construir su capacidad política y reducir las dificultades de las disyuntivas que
enfrentan. Se trata de una estrategia de escalas, que parece mucho a la “guerra
de posiciones” de Gramsci, y que va desde avances en los ámbitos locales y
provinciales hasta a victorias en el ámbito nacional. Como ha sido documentado
en varios estudios los gobiernos locales de izquierda han sido invariablemente
los puntos de apoyo para el lanzamiento de candidaturas y plataformas políticas
nacionales.34
La influencia de Antonio Gramsci sobre las estrategias políticas de los
partidos políticos de izquierda tiene una “historia” bastante larga. Todo el proceso
de Renovación Socialista en Chile de los años ochenta, la integración de MAPU
en el socialismo, la unificación de los diferentes corrientes del socialismo, la
estrategia de la Concertación (que aun funciona) se han hecho sobre la influencia
de los conceptos gramscianos.35
Uno de los conceptos de Gramsci lo más utilizado de la izquierda latinoamericana ha sido el termino de “hegemonía”. Podemos analizar muy bien la
evolución y el uso de ese concepto si consideramos como caso de estudio el
Partido des Trabajadores de Brasil. En los documentos preparativos para el
programa político del partido de 1979 se utiliza el término de hegemonía. Un
momento muy importante ha sido la quinta Conferencia Nacional de 1987 donde
los conceptos de hegemonía y de sociedad civil han utilizados muy a menudo.
Lo mismo pasó con la resolución de la sexta Conferencia Nacional de 1989.36
Pero el término de hegemonía va a ser el concepto clave de la séptima Conferencia
Nacional del PT, al menos seis de las ocho tesis presentadas aquí utilizan de un
modo explicito conceptos e ideas gramscianas.37
En el primer Congreso del PT llevado a cabo en 1991 dos de las secciones de
la resolución final han sido denominados El papel central de la lucha para la
hegemonía y La lucha contemporánea para la hegemonía. Esto se constituye en
una demostración muy clara del hecho que la lógica política para definir la
estrategia política esta basada en el concepto de hegemonía.38
————————
Aires, p. 54-55.
35 Véase Massardo, Jaime, “Consideraciones iniciales a propósito de la lectura en Chile del pensamiento
de Antonio Gramsci”, en Älvarez, Rolando y Massardo, Jaime (editores), Gramsci. A 70 años de su muerte.
Ariadna Ediciones, Santiago, 2008, p. 11-38; Quiroga, Patricio, “Gramsci y la política. Una reflexión desde la
historia de los derrotados” en idem, p. 111-132; Arrate, Jorge, “Gramsci: apuntes para una memoria y sucintas
reflexiones sobre qué hacer” en idem, p. 133-144.
36 Burgos, Raul, „The Gramscian Intervention in the Theoretical and Political Production of the Latin
American Left” in Latin American Perspectives, Issue 122, vol. 29, no. 1, January 2002, Sage Publications, p. 23.
37 Diaz, Osvaldo Fernandez, „In America Latina” en Eric Hobsbawm, Gramsci in Europa e in Americhe,
Editori Laterza, Roma-Bari, 1995, p. 135.
38 Burgos, Raul, “The Gramscian Intervention in the Theoretical and Political Production of the Latin
American Left” en Latin American Perspectives, Issue 122, vol. 29, no. 1, January 2002, Sage Publications, p. 24.
128
13
Paul G Buchanan aplica los conceptos de Gramsci, especialmente hegemoníacontra hegemonía como una modalidad de oponerse al auge del neoliberalismo
en Argentina.39
Hemos visto anteriormente como otro concepto muy caro a Gramsci, la
sociedad civil, se ha transformado en una de las características mayores de la
nueva izquierda latino-americana. Podemos analizar el caso de casi todo los
partidos y movimientos de izquierda de América Latina y somos seguros que en
todos estos casos vamos a encontrar, en una medida más o menos explicita,
algunos de los conceptos de Gramsci.
La intención de este artículo ha sido de ofrecer una imagen general, muy
rápida y por supuesto incompleta, de la evolución de los partidos de izquierda
en América Latina en los últimos veinte años, de los cambios surgidos en estos
partidos después de la caída del socialismo real y de las nuevas direcciones y
características de la ideología y de la estrategia política de estos partidos.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
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no. 27, Salamanca, 2001.
Arrate, Jorge y Rojas, Eduardo, Memoria de la Izquierda Chilena, Ediciones B. Santiago, 2003.
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1995.
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Sociedad, no. 197, mayo/junio, Caracas, 2005.
————————
39 Buchanan, Paul G., “Counter hegemonic Strategies in Neoliberal Argentina” en Latin American
Perspectives, Issue 97, vol. 24, no. 6, November 1997, Sage Publications, p. 113-132.
ÉTUDE DE CAS1
MARIA CÃTÃLINA MOISESCU*
Abstract. Study: Press articles qualitative analysis about the intervention
of the ambassadors and of the officials of the international organizations
in Bucharest: before and after the integration in NATO and the EU.
The ambassadors and the officials of the international organizations
have played a very active role in the international relations as well as in
the national context. But a question does arise: how much do the international
officials have interfered with the Romanian political projects? In order to
answer this question I found relevant to study the information offered by
the press relating to this aspect, considering two intervals situated before
and after the integration in NATO and in the EU, as the changes that took
place had been significant. All in all, I would say that the results obtained
are relevant for understanding the role played nowadays by the ambassadors
and by international organization officials.
Key words: media studies, NATO and the EU integration, Romanian political
projects.
Introduction
Dans quelle mesure les ambassadeurs et les représentants des organisations
internationales ont intervenu dans les projets politiques de la Roumanie? En vue
de répondre à cette question, on a comparé deux périodes différents de temps:
1er mars-22 mai 1998 et la même période de l’année 2008. Cette recherche a le
but d’offrir une perspective plus claire sur l’importance de ces interventions qui,
on va voir, sont très nombreux. Un autre motif pour lequel j’ai décidé de
développer cette étude c’est parce que j’ai considéré importante la réaction des
medias aux nouvelles réalités dont le pays devait faire face. Le rôle joué par les
journaux devient plus important, au moment où il devient évident qu’ils peuvent
avoir une influence très grande sur l’opinion publique, et l’appui des citoyens
————————
* Master Student of European and Romanian Policy at the Faculty of Political Science within the University
of Bucharest.
1 Le reflet dans la presse roumaine des interventions des ambassadeurs étrangers à Bucarest et des représentants
des organisations internationales dans le contexte du projet roumain d’adhésion à l’OTAN et à l’Union Européenne
et dans la période post adhésion 2008.
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MARIA CÃTÃLINA MOISESCU
2
dans un processus aussi compliqué comme c’est l’intégration dans les grandes
structures internationales est essentiel.
La perspective des représentants du milieu international — les ambassades
étrangères, le FMI, la Banque Mondiale, l’UE et l’OTAN — sur la Roumanie,
change graduellement. L’appui de ces institutions dans le processus de reforme
a été visiblement nécessaire au moment 1998. Il sera utile de comprendre la
nature, le contexte et aussi la dimension de ce changement de la Roumanie en le
rapportant aux interventions étrangères. L’un des buts principaux de cette étude
est de voir, en comparant les deux périodes, l’efficacité et la fréquence des
interventions des ambassadeurs et des représentants des organisations internationales
à Bucarest. Outre, une analyse comparative de l’importance des interventions
des ambassadeurs vis-à-vis celles des représentants des organisations internationales,
sera très utile pour voir la magnitude du rôle joué par ceux-ci.
Même si l’année 1999 n’est pas sujet de recherche dans cet étude de cas, il
faut mentionner un événement qui est définitoire pour comprendre la dimension
de l’intervention des organisations internationales en Roumanie. Les
interventions externes prennent de plus en plus contour sur la scène politique
roumaine. Le commissaire européen Günter Verheugen envoie une lettre au
premier ministre Radu Vasile dont il suggère que la Roumanie doit travailler
avec des experts du FMI et de la Banque Mondiale en vue de réaliser une
stratégie pour le développement du pays. À ce moment il y a eu beaucoup de
politiciens qui ont dit que la proposition d’aide du commissaire européen était
inacceptable. Même le président de PDSR, Ion Iliescu, a eu, au début, une
réaction contraire envers la lettre de Günter Verheugen. La proposition du
commissaire européen mettait en évidence deux aspects: le gouvernement n’était
pas capable d’élaborer une stratégie de développement pour le pays et la peur
des pays occidentaux que la situation en Roumanie pourrait devenir instable.
Le fait que la Commission Européenne a intervenu souligne la situation de
crise avec laquelle la Roumanie se confrontait en 1999. Même si l’on bénéficiera
de l’expérience des représentants des organisations internationales, leur
intervention met en évidence l’échec de la classe politique. Les choses étaient
simples: l’UE devait monitoriser la dépense de l’argent (700 millions de dollars
annuellement) n’importe les partis qui gouverneraient. Si le Premier Ministre Radu
Vasile a accepté l’appui, les positions des leaders politiques y étaient différentes.
L’ex premier ministre, Theodor Stolojan, a accentué les avantages et les
désavantages de cette implication. Il a dit que «les représentants des ces
organisations internationales — FMI, Banque Mondiale, l’UE — sont des
professionnelles mais que la perception de la population sera que la politique
économique ne se fait pas à Bucarest et que le FMI est celui qui fait la loi. La
conséquence sera la perte de confiance de la population dans les gouvernants».
Pendant que le ministre des transports Traian Bãsescu voit seulement des
avantages vis-à-vis de ce débat, Adrian Bãlãnescu, le président du Conseil national
économique de l’ApR, dit que «même si les organisations internationales sont
bien intentionnées, l’élaboration de cette stratégie devait être l’apanage de la
politique roumaine. Elle devrait être élaborée dans le pays et après elle pourrait
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être discutée avec les autres forums»2. On voit que les interventions du représentant
Günter Verheugen ont un impact très grand sur la scène politique roumaine. Les
autorités roumaines réagissent aux déclarations du commissaire européen dans
la mesure où le Premier Ministre a accepté la stratégie proposée par la Commission
pour le développement durable du pays.
Les méthodes utilisées pour réaliser la recherche
La méthode de recherche que j’ai considérée convenable à utiliser en vue de
réaliser cette recherche est l’analyse des articles des journaux qui traitent le sujet élu.
On a pris en compte le fait que les informations données par les journalistes peuvent
offrir, dans une certaine mesure, le tableau général pour les périodes prises. Mais, en
vue d’aller d’une analyse plus générale vers une analyse approfondie j’ai trouvé utile
de suivre deux autres moyens: l’analyse quantitative et l’analyse qualitative.
La recherche s’est concentrée sur une analyse quantitative parce que j’ai
trouvé nécessaire de voir les fréquences des articles concernant les ambassadeurs
vis-à-vis ceux concernant les représentants des organisations internationales.
D’un autre côté, l’analyse n’est pas réalisée seulement sur le nombre des articles
sur les deux entités, pendant trois mois de l’année 1998, respectivement de
l’année 2008. On a fait ce monitorage aussi en vue de déterminer la place des
articles ou leur grandeur.
L’analyse qualitative est extrêmement importante parce qu’elle révèle la
qualité du contenu de l’article en vue d’évaluer les attitudes médiatiques et les
réactions des autorités roumaines envers les événements qui sont en train de
prendre lieu et envers les représentants étrangers. La présentation journalistique
est parfois claire, parfois radicale ou parfois laconique mais toujours un étalon
pour essayer à comprendre les événements qui se déroulent autour de nous.
J’ai orienté cette recherche vers trois journaux — «Evenimentul Zilei», «Jurnalul
Naþiona»l et «Adevãrul». J’ai concentré cette étude sur 412 numéros des deux
périodes: 1er mars–22 mai 1999 et respectivement la même période de l’année
2008. Le motif est le suivant: on a fait cette recherche sur les trois publications,
les plus importantes selon le tirage3 et selon le numéro des accès on line4, en
soulignant qu’il y a des situations quand les tirages sont dépassés par les accès
on line5. On a considéré comme relevant de prendre en compte les quotidiennes
les plus lus, en tenant compte du fait que les journaux influencent dans une
certaine mesure l’opinion publique. On a élu pour la période du 1er mars–22 mai
1998 les mêmes publications que pour la même période de l’année 2008, parce
que l’on a voulu donner l’impression de continuité et parce que ces journaux
étaient parmi les préférences des citoyens aussi en 1998. On a élu ces périodes
————————
2 «Jurnalul National», no. 1962, 3 novembre 1999, p. 11.
3 Accessible en ligne sur http://www.brat.ro/index.php?page=cifre, consulté le 20 mai 2008.
4 Accessible en ligne sur http://www.banknews.ro/stire/7168_audiente_record_pentru_editiile_online_
ale_ziarelor_românesti.html, consulté le 20 mai 2008.
5 Accessible en ligne sur http://stiri.acasa.ro/articole/stiinta/topul-celor-mai-vizitate-categorii-de-site-uridin-internetul-romanesc, consulté le 20 mai 2008.
132
4
comme critère de recherche, parce que l’on a considéré que, en comparant le
reflet dans la presse roumaine des interventions des ambassadeurs et des représentants
des organisations internationales dans deux périodes différentes du point de vue
social et politique, on mettra mieux en évidence le changement au niveau de la
société roumaine. La période de 1998 est relevante en tenant compte du fait que
c’est juste l’année d’après le sommet de Madrid, dont on a mis en question pour
la première fois la possibilité de l’adhésion de la Roumanie à l’OTAN. On n’a
pas pris une période antérieure pour ne poser pas les institutions internationales
dans une position inférieure en tenant compte du fait que les ambassades sont
présentes sur le territoire de la Roumanie avant les représentations des organismes
internationales; la position de l’OTAN, par exemple, s’est consolidée dans notre
pays après le Sommet de Madrid. Depuis ce moment là, les discussions sur ce
thème, aussi comme les interventions des représentants de l’OTAN en Roumanie
augmentent. Outre, les mois mars, avril, 22 mai 2008, représentent la période la
plus récente dont cette recherche a été réalisée. On est parti de la supposition que,
le rôle des ambassadeurs et des représentants des organisations internationales
change pendant ces deux périodes étudiées.
Les questions de l’étude et les résultats
Cette recherche part d’une série des questions qui trouvent leur réponse dans
les pages des journaux étudiés:
1. Dans quelle mesure est-ce que les ambassadeurs étrangers en Roumanie
interviennent dans le milieu politique, social et économique du pays?
Les ambassadeurs sont des acteurs importants sur la scène politique mais
leurs actions ne sont pas toujours ouvertes au grand public. La raison de cette
situation est dans une certaine mesure explicable, en tenant compte du statut de
cette fonction, qui suppose: négocier pour l’intérêt de leurs pays, présenter leurs
pays le mieux possible, informer leurs états sur les événements qui prennent lieu
dans le pays accréditaire. L’étude réalisée met en évidence que les interventions
des ambassadeurs représentent seulement 28% du total des articles publiés sur
les organismes internationaux et les ambassades. En ce qui concerne la nationalité
des ambassadeurs qui jouent un rôle important sur la scène roumaine, il faut
préciser que dans les trois mois de l’année 1998, l’ambassadeur des États-Unis,
Son Excellence James C. Rosapepe, y a été le plus présent. Sur les lieux secondaires,
se situent les ambassadeurs de la France, de la Grande Bretagne et l’Italie. Un
autre aspect important de la recherche est le fait que la représentation des
ambassadeurs a diminué considérablement depuis 1998. Les mêmes mois de
2008 montrent qu’ils sont présents dans la presse seulement en proportion de
11% du total des articles publiée sur les interventions des ambassadeurs et des
représentants des organisations internationales. Cette diminution est due, en
premier lieu, aux événements des deux années étudiées. Si en 1998 les ambassadeurs
s’impliquaient dans le processus d’adhésion de la Roumanie à l’OTAN et
respectivement à l’UE, en 2008 la situation est différente: la Roumanie était déjà
membre de ces organismes internationaux. L’ambassadeur qui intervient le plus
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dans les événements de 1998, concernant l’aspect de l’intégration du pays à
l’OTAN, est, évidemment, l’ambassadeur des États-Unis. Ses discours sur
l’adhésion de la Roumanie à l’OTAN occupent les premières pages des journaux.
Dans une interview, prise en exclusivité par «Evenimentul Zilei», Son Excellence
James C. Rosapepe déclare que «pour améliorer la perspective d’adhérer à l’OTAN,
comme soulignait aussi le président Clinton l’année dernière, la Roumanie doit
se maintenir sur la même voie démocratique et réformiste. Tous ceux qui sont
intéressés de la situation de la Roumanie, doivent savoir que les Roumaines
n’ont pas renoncé aux reformes»6. On observe ici qu’il reprend les idées du
président des États-Unis pour les faire connaître aux Roumains. En fait, un
aspect connu de la diplomatie c’est que le rôle des ambassadeurs est aussi de
transmettre le message de leurs pays. À la question, s’il croyait que l’adhésion
du pays à l’OTAN était conditionnée par son acceptation dans l’UE, idée développée
par des sénateurs américains, l’ambassadeur a répondu qu’il partage l’opinion
du président Clinton qui était en contre. «La politique de la porte ouverte de
l’OTAN vers tous les pays européens et démocratiques est l’idée principale de la
politique de l’OTAN»7. En ce qui concerne son devoir comme ambassadeur
d’entretenir un fort lien avec le milieu des hommes d’affaires américaines, Son
Excellence dit que «c’est la plus grande provocation d’augmenter le nombre des
hommes d’affaires américains en Roumanie»8. L’intervention de son excellence
à un message positif: la Roumanie a toutes les chances d’adhérer à l’OTAN
parce qu’elle fait des reformes et parce que l’organisation reste ouverte aux pays
démocratiques dont la Roumanie y fait partie. Son Excellence s’implique aussi
dans l’économie en cherchant des hommes d’affaires américains qui pourraient
investir en Roumanie. Dans la recherche effectuée on voit que les actiones des
ambassadeurs se concentrent aussi sur d’autres aspects. Les diplomates étrangers
de Bucarest, ont critiqué le manque de protection envers les délinquants et
l’insalubrité de la ville. Jean Claude Joseph, l’ambassadeur de Suisse, a dit que
Bucarest est une ville très sale9. La problématique des visas est discutée par
l’ambassadeur de la France, Son Excellence Pierre Menat, qui informe les
autorités roumaines que la France a l’intention de libéraliser les conditions
existantes pour l’obtention des visas par les citoyens roumains10. En avril 2008,
l’action de l’ambassadeur anglais Robin Barnett, concernant les changements
climatiques, occupe la première page du «Jurnalul Naþional». «Le rôle de la
génération des jeunes dans la lutte contre les changements climatiques est très
important. Les jeunes ambassadeurs, qui participent au concours organisé par
l’Ambassade de la Grande Bretagne, auront la mission de promouvoir des actions
en vue de combattre d’une manière efficiente ces changements climatiques»11.
On voit que l’ambassadeur de la Grande Bretagne s’implique dans une action de
conscientisation de la population roumaine.
————————
6 «Evenimentul Zilei», no. 1757, 7 avril 1998, p. 3.
7 Ibidem.
8 Ibidem.
9 «Jurnalul Naþional», no. 1473, 31 mars 1998, p. 13.
11 «Jurnalul National», no. 4650, 16 avril 2008, p. 12.
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6
2. Comment est-ce que se positionnent les interventions des ambassadeurs
vis-à-vis les interventions des représentants des organisations internationales en
Roumanie?
Cette recherche a été effectuée sur les mois mars, avril et mai de l’année 1998
et respectivement 2008. Pour comprendre la position privilégiée des représentants
des organisations internationales envers les ambassadeurs, il faut souligner que
leur appui a été nécessaire pour l’adhésion de la Roumanie à l’OTAN et à l’UE
et pour dépasser les crises gouvernementales. On a vue que les interventions des
ambassadeurs sont moins débattues par les journaux dans l’année 2008. Mais
quelle est la situation des représentants des organisations internationales? Les
statistiques réalisées en lisant les trois journaux, montrent que ceux-ci jouent un
rôle plus important en 1998 qu’en 2008; il y a moins d’articles publiés sur les
représentants des organisations internationales, en 2008 qu’en 1998. Comme on
peut bien observer, l’importance de la participation des représentants étrangers
diminue. C’est aussi en 1998, que ce type d’information occupe les premières
pages des quotidiens. Le numéro des articles qui contient des photos est aussi
plus grand en 1998 qu’en 2008. En ce qui concerne la représentation dans la
presse roumaine des interventions des experts des organisations internationales,
le FMI occupe le premier lieu. Il est représenté sur la scène roumaine par Poul
Thomsen — le négociateur chef dans la relation avec la Roumanie, Michael
Deppler — le représentant FMI pour l’Europe et Albert Jaeger — le chef de la
mission du FMI en Roumanie. Sur le second lieu se trouve la Banque Mondiale
au nom de laquelle interviennent François Ettori — le représentant de la Banque
Mondiale à Bucarest, Kenneth Lay — le directeur pour la Roumanie de la
Banque Mondiale et Johannes Linn — le vice-président de la Banque Mondiale
et de l’Asie Centrale. Les dernières places sont occupées, en ordre, par l’OTAN
— par la voix de Javier Solana — le secrétaire général de l’OTAN et Strobe
Talbott — l’adjoint du secrétaire d’État américain pour les Affaires étrangères,
et par l’UE — qui est représentée principalement par Jose Maria Gil Robles Gil
Delgado — président du Parlement européen. Pour mieux comprendre les
interventions et le rôle joué par les représentants des organisations internationales
il faut prendre quelques exemples. L’expert de la Banque Mondiale, Francois
Ettori souligne que son rôle est d’aider la Roumanie à dépasser la crise dont elle
se trouve. «La Roumanie doit convaincre l’UE qu’elle accorde beaucoup
d’importance à la politique»12. En avançant dans la recherche, on découvre que
les représentants du FMI partagent les idées de la Banque Mondiale. Le FMI
«désire d’assurer l’expérience technique nécessaire pour aider la Roumanie. Le
nouveau gouvernement doit réfléchir avant de nommer les ministres pour éviter
les erreurs de l’ancien gouvernement»13. Les représentants de la Banque Mondiale
et du FMI interviennent dans le secteur économique du pays, en vue de réaliser,
en collaborant avec le gouvernement, des projets pour un développement
durable. Le FMI fait aussi des pronostiques. Le chef de la mission du FMI pour
la Roumanie, monsieur Albert Jaeger dit que «les turbulences internationales
————————
12 «Adevãrul», no. 2469, 8 mai 1998, p. 5.
13 «Adevãrul», no. 2447, 9 avril 1998, p. 1.
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peuvent affecter l’économie de la Roumanie»14. Pendant que le représentant de
l’OTAN, Javier Solana, dit que l’on n’a pris aucune décision, au moment avril
1998, en ce qui concerne l’adhésion de la Roumanie,15 il observe aussi que la
législation roumaine est très différente de celle internationale16. On voit, que les
autorités roumaines se concentrent à l’OTAN et à l’UE. On observe que les
interventions des organisations internationales sont concrètes. Il y a des fois
quand les représentants s’impliquent en vue d’offrir leur appui et leur expérience
pour le secteur économique mais il y a aussi des situations quand ils participent
à l’élaboration du programme gouvernemental. Ils offrent aussi des statistiques
très importantes. Les interventions des représentants internationaux sont plus
fréquentes que celles des ambassadeurs. La recherche met en évidence que la
plupart des articles publiés sur les ambassadeurs et les représentants des
organisations internationales, parlent des experts des ces organisations internationales.
3. Un aspect qui doit être pris en compte dans cette recherche, c’est le fait que
les événements sont à la base de tous les articles. C’est-à-dire que mêmes
les articles sur les ambassadeurs et les représentants des organisations
internationales peuvent être conditionnés par les événements déroulés sur la
scène politique interne et internationale. Dans quelle mesure est-ce que les
événements importants influencent les articles publiés sur la question étudiée?
L’année 1997 a été marquée par la conférence de Madrid où l’on a discuté
pour la première fois sur la possibilité que la Roumanie adhère à la plus forte
organisation internationale: l’OTAN. L’UE entre aussi fortement en scène.
Depuis ce moment là, les efforts du pays se sont concrétisés dans des reformes
implémentées maintes fois à l’aide des autres organisations internationales: le
FMI et la Banque Mondiale. Un autre aspect de la première période étudiée c’est
que le gouvernement n’était pas capable de réaliser un programme gouvernemental
fonctionnel. De nouveau, le FMI et la Banque Mondiale entrent en scène en
offrant leur appui. En 2008 la situation est visiblement autre: la Roumanie est
membre de l’OTAN et de l’UE; elle est aussi celle qui organise le sommet de
l’OTAN. C’est l’explication pour laquelle on a moins d’articles concernant le
sujet discuté, en 2008. La perspective d’adhérer à l’OTAN a fait que les journalistes
donnent plus d’importance au phénomène. Les interventions des représentants
des organisations internationales sont reprises par tous les trois journaux, parce
qu’elles contiennent des messages qui peuvent, ou non, confirmer la date d’adhésion
à l’OTAN et à l’UE.
4. Quelle est l’attitude des journalistes vis-à-vis le rôle des ambassades et des
organisations internationales — FMI, la Banque Mondiale, l’UE et l’OTAN —
en Roumanie?
Les éditoriaux sur le rôle joué par les organisations internationales peuvent
être considérés, dans une certaine mesure, comme formateurs d’opinion. Les
éditoriaux représentent aussi une manière pour que les journalistes expriment
————————
14 «Jurnalul Naþional», no. 2649, 23 avril 2008, p. 9.
16 «Evenimentul Zilei», no. 1747, 26 mars 1998, p. 6.
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8
leurs opinions concernant une problématique, le plus souvent, actuelle. On
observe que les éditoriaux des quotidiens étudiés débattent le statut de la
Roumanie vis-à-vis le projet d’adhésion à l’OTAN et à l’UE. En étudiant les
éditoriaux publiés sur ce sujet, il est important de prendre aussi en compte
quelques détailles très importantes: qui sont les auteurs des éditoriaux? Quel est
leur message? La plupart des éditoriaux traitent les événements importants et
d’actualité et leurs titres sont incitants en vue d’attirer l’attention: «L’économie
malade cherche un médecin expérimenté»17, «Le programme économique — un
voiture Dacia avec des modifications»18. Leurs auteurs se distinguent parce
qu’ils sont soit des personnes publiques — comme c’est le cas de «Evenimentul
Zilei» de 2008 avec Ion Cristoiu — soit ils occupent des positions importantes
— le directeur du département de politique, Alexandru Macoveiciuc, de
«Adevãrul». Les éditoriaux écrits par des personnes connues, ont un grand
pouvoir d’influencer l’opinion publique. La plupart des éditoriaux se trouvent
aux pages principales: la page 2 ou 3 dans «Adevãrul» et «Jurnalul Naþional» de
1998 et de 2008. «Evenimentul Zilei» accorde aux éditoriaux la page 6 ou 8. Les
sujets des éditoriaux sont différents, comme on a déjà dit, en fonction de
l’événement. L’éditorial de 28 mai 1998 du «Jurnalul Naþional», fait référence à
l’ambassadeur des États-Unis, Son Excelence James Rosapepe. La visite de Poul
Thomsen, le représentant de FMI pour la Roumanie, a soulevée l’intérêt de la
presse roumaine. Dans «Jurnalul Naþional», la visite de Poul Thomsen est
commentée dans les éditoriaux de 2 mars et de 4 mars 1998. «Les negociations
avec la délégation FMI a finit après trois semaines. La déclaration de presse de
monsieur Poul Thomsen a été très dure. Il a critiqué l’inflation, le parcours de la
reforme et les compagnies qui n’obtient aucun profit. Le gouvernement refuse
d’accepter la vérité. Je ne peux pas croire que les autorités appliquent la même
politique, celle de l’autruche, que le gouvernement Ciorbea après chaque faute
faite»19. Un autre journaliste, Constantin Gheorghe, publie un article deux jours
après avec le titre «L’état d’urgence économique»20. Ce sujet est traité aussi dans
les autres journaux étudiés. «Adevãrul» publie un article signé par Daniel Oanþã, qui
souligne le fait que «le Gouvernement doit être toujours ferme et non seulement
dans la présence du représentant du FMI, monsieur Poul Thomsen.»21 La situation
de crise qui existait en Roumanie à ce moment est intensifiée aussi par les
journalistes. On observe que les éditoriaux qui traitent les interventions des
ambassadeurs et des représentants des organisations internationales sont plus
nombreux en 1998 qu’en 2008. L’importance que les journaux accordent aux
interventions des ambassadeurs et des représentants des organisations
internationales en Roumanie, peut être discutée en tenant compte des quelques
critères: le positionnement des articles, le nombre des articles concernant cette
problématique, la dimension de l’article, la présence des photos. La plupart des
————————
17 «Adevãrul», no. 2415, 3 mars 1998 p. 2.
19 «Jurnalul Naþional», no.1448, 2 mars 1998, p. 3.
20 «Jurnalul Naþional», no.1450, 4 mars 1998, p. 3.
21 «Adevãrul», no 2443, 4 avril 1998, p. 2.
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137
articles sont de dimensions réduites, mais ils sont positionnés d’une manière
visible. Concernant le pourcentage des photos qui accompagnent les articles, la
situation est la suivante: les articles qui contiennent des photos représentent
approximativement 20% du total des articles prises en compte (sur les ambassadeurs
et sur les représentants des organisations internationales). Les trois quotidiens
accordent presque la même importance aux interventions des ambassadeurs et
des représentants des organisations internationales. La différence est subtile
mais il faut la discuter. En ce qui concerne les interventions des ambassadeurs,
«Jurnalul Naþional» a publiée plus d’articles que «Evenimentul Zilei» et «Adevãrul».
La plupart des articles sur les représentants des organisations internationales ont
été publiés dans les trois mois de l’année 1998. Le quotidien qui a met le plus
l’accent sur cet aspect a été «Adevãrul». La deuxième place est occupée par le
«Journal National».
5. Quel est le message de l’implication des organismes internationaux en
Roumanie et quelle est la réaction des autorités roumaines envers cela?
Le message de l’implication des représentants des organisations internationales
est vu parfois comme un échec du gouvernement qui n’est pas capable de
conduire seul le pays. Les interventions étrangères en Roumanie peuvent déterminer
la population à perdre la confiance dans les autorités. La réaction des politiciens
a été parfois dure, parfois en concordance avec les déclarations des représentants,
mais elle n’a jamais été inexistante. Chaque intervention d’un expert suscitait
l’intérêt des autorités. Le président du Bloque National Syndical, Dumitru Costin,
s’exprime sur la thèse formulée par quelques individus, conformément à laquelle
le FMI a fait le programme de gouvernement. «FMI présente des variantes. Le
nouveau Premier Ministre a été mis dans la situation de négocier avec des
experts et il n’avait à ce moment aucune variante propre; il a pris les propositions
des représentants des organisations internationales et il les a présentées comme
étant son propre programme»22. Les positons des politiciens roumains sont
différents. Il y en a certaines qui soutiennent qu’il y a des avantages mais en même
temps des désavantageas en ce qui concerne l’implication des représentants dans
les affaires nationales. Parmi les désavantages on dit que le gouvernement perdra
sa crédibilité de la parte de la population. L’avantage est que l’on travaillera avec
des experts mondiaux.
6. Quelle est la relation des ambassadeurs avec les organisations internationales?
Cette question s’impose en tenant compte du fait que l’on a découvert, en
étudiant les trois journaux, que la plupart des interventions de l’ambassadeur des
États-Unis faisaient référence à l’OTAN et au possible adhésion de la Roumanie. Si
l’on prend en compte que les organisations internationales sont formées par des
pays, on comprendra la relation avec les ambassadeurs. Un autre aspect c’est que
dans l’intérieur de chaque organisation il y a des pays qui se remarquent en étant
plus forts et plus importants que les autres. C’est le cas, par exemple, de l’OTAN et
des États-Unis, ou de l’Union Européenne et de la France ou l’Allemagne. En plus,
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138
10
les ambassadeurs sont ceux qui représentent les intérêts des leurs pays à l’étrangère.
Ils sont aussi ceux qui présentent la position de leurs pays envers un certain aspect
ou événement. Tous ces motifs donnent du crédit à l’ambassadeur des États-Unis de
s’exprimer en ce qui concerne la position de l’OTAN en Roumanie. «L’OTAN n’a
pas promis qu’il invite des nouveaux états à y adhérer à l’occasion du sommet de
1999. Pour s’intégrer, la Roumanie doit accélérer la privatisation et combattre la
corruption. À ce moment, l’OTAN pourrait décider ou non à inviter des nouveaux
États.»23 «Je crois que la Roumanie a un appui massif de la part des Américains en
tenant compte du sondage Gallup, où 52% ont été pour l’adhésion de la Roumanie
à l’OTAN. Si le nouveau gouvernement était capable à accélérer la reforme, cela
serait une chose positive»24. On voit que l’ambassadeur J. Rosapepe exprime dans
ses discours la position américaine en ce qui concerne l’adhésion. C’est un motif en
plus pour les journaux, en vue d’apprendre des nouveautés sur ce processus,
d’interviewer l’ambassadeur américaine.
Conclusion
La redéfinition de la diplomatie traditionnelle, par les interventions des
représentants des organisations internationales, est une réalité qui nécessite plus
d’attention. Cela ne veut pas dire que les ambassades n’existent plus ou quelles
ne doivent plus exister. Cela n’est pas du tout le cas! Mais il faut prendre en
compte que leur statut s’est modifié. Il faut accorder, si l’on ne l’a pas fait encore,
aux institutions internationales la place qu’elles ont gagné par l’intermédiaire
des interventions des leurs représentants au niveau national.
La recherche que l’on a faite met en évidence que l’importance donnée aux
interventions des ambassadeurs sur le territoire de la Roumanie a beaucoup
diminuée depuis 1998. De nos jours, les articles publiés ne traitent plus le rôle
et les activités des ambassadeurs. On observe que l’intérêt donné aux interventions
des représentants des organisations internationales est plus grand que l’intérêt
pour les déclarations des ambassadeurs.
Cette étude est importante parce qu’elle offre une vision différente sur le
statut de la diplomatie de nos jours. Les informations données offrent une image
plus claire sur le statut des ambassadeurs vis-à-vis la position occupée par les
représentants des organisations internationales. La nouveauté des découvertes
est que, en comparant le rôle des ambassadeurs avec le rôle des représentants des
organisations internationales, on a offert aux derniers une position privilégiée sur
le territoire national.
La diplomatie joue un rôle extrêmement important mais «elle toute seule ne
peut pas tout résoudre. Il est besoin d’un esprit nouveau, de la tolérance, de la
compréhension, de la modération et de responsabilité de la part de tout le monde:
citoyens et hommes politiques»25. La diplomatie a plusieurs mérites, c’est un motif
de la garder et de ne pas renoncer facilement à ses services.
————————
23 «Jurnalul Naþional», no.1491, 22 avril 1998, p. 13.
25 Teodor Meleºcanu, «Renaºterea diplomaþiei Româneºti 1994–1996», Dacia, Cluj Napoca, 2002, p. 29.
11
ÉTUDE DE CAS
139
Je considère nécessaire que la nouvelle tendance est de transférer les tâches
des ambassades établies par un seul État dans une structure au niveau européen.
«L’UE met en discussion la possibilité d’ouvrir les propres ambassades avec un
personnel d’approximativement 3000 diplomates. La création d’un service
diplomatique européen est prévue dans le traité de Lisboa, mais il pose un
problème sensible parce que l’Union adopte l’image d’un État fédéral. Un autre
aspect qui doit être pris en compte c’est le fait que ce nouveau service rivalisera
avec le service diplomatique des pas de l’UE. De nos jours, il y a une bataille
pour le contrôle des corps diplomatiques qui se donne entre les gouvernements
nationales et la Commission Européenne. En fait, cela est le commencement de
l’établissement d’un seul service diplomatique européen qui remplacera les
services nationaux»26.
En guise de conclusion je considère nécessaire d’attirer l’attention que la
problématique discutée reste ouverte. Le rôle des ambassadeurs n’est pas mis en
question seulement par les organisations internationales qui sont devenues de
plus en plus importantes, mais aussi par les organisations non gouvernementales.
Les organisations non gouvernementales ont posé aussi des vrais problèmes —
les droits de l’homme, la nature, la pollution — sur l’agenda internationale:
Greenpeace, Amnesty International. La conséquence c’est que «les diplomates
et implicitement les gouvernements perdent le contrôle des relations
internationales.» Comment peuvent les diplomates justifier leur rôle concernant
ces problèmes qui sont discutés et résolus par les organisations non
gouvernementales? La diplomatie des ONG a un impact important sur le plan
mondial: par exemple, «L’action mondiale contre la pauvreté», action promue
par les ONG a passé sur l’agenda des discussions dans la réunion de G8 de 2005.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
«Adevãrul», no. 2415, 3 mars 1998.
«Adevãrul», no. 2442, 3 avril 1998.
«Adevãrul», no 2443, 4 avril 1998.
«Adevãrul», no. 2469, 8 mai 1998.
«Evenimentul Zilei», no. 1757, 7 avril 1998.
«Evenimentul Zilei», no. 1747, 26 mars 1998.
«Jurnalul Naþional», no. 1448, 2 mars 1998.
«Jurnalul Naþional», no.1450, 4 mars 1998.
«Jurnalul National», no. 4650, 16 avril 2008.
«Jurnalul Naþional», no.1491, 22 avril 1998.
«Jurnalul Naþional», no. 2649, 23 avril 2008.
Teodor Meleºcanu, «Renaºterea diplomaþiei Româneºti 1994–1996», Dacia, Cluj Napoca, 2002.
————————
26 «Adevãrul», no. 5538, 5 mai 2008, p. 9.
CONTEMPORARY CHALLENGES TO PUBLIC DIPLOMACY:
THEORY AND PRACTICE
LUCIAN JORA*
Abstract. Public diplomacy should be about building relationships, starting
from understanding other countries’needs, cultures, and peoples and then
looking for areas to make common cause presumably based on common
interests. The idea of public diplomacy is generally referred to as “international
cultural policy” or “foreign cultural policy”. Public diplomacy can no longer
be seen as an add-on to the rest of diplomacy — it must be seen as a
central activity that is played out across many dimensions and with many
partners. As a result most of the multilateral agreements in parallel with
an economic or a political basket a include nowadays a cultural one,
the Euromediterranean Partnership being an example. The concrete results
relay as usually not only in the initial design but also in a proper implementation,
whose results remain to be seen in the future.
Key words: public diplomacy, “international cultural policy”, “foreign cultural
policy”.
Public diplomacy (often confused or taken for granted as Propaganda) should
be about building relationships, starting from understanding other countries’needs,
cultures, and peoples and then looking for areas to make common cause
presumably based on common interests. The idea of public diplomacy is generally
referred to as “international cultural policy” or “foreign cultural policy”.
From the very beginning we can notice an overlap and an interchangeable use
between public diplomacy and cultural diplomacy. The diplomatic historian Frank
Ninkovich observed that public diplomacy is “the promotion or communication
between peoples as opposed to governments…” and is designed to “build
agreement based on common values.” (Ninkovich, 1996, p. 3).1 More or less the
aim of public and cultural diplomacy efforts is to tell own country’s story to the
world. Public diplomacy is a two-way communication process that includes both
————————
* Researcher within the Institute of Political Sciences and International Relations (Romanian Academy).
1 Quoted by Margaret j Wyszomirsky, Chirstopher Burgess, Chaterine Peila in International Cultural
Relations, A Multicountry Comparision, Arts Policy and Administration Program, The Ohio State University-2003,
p. 1, available at http://www.culturalpolicy.org/pdf/MJWpaper.pdf.
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PUBLIC DIPLOMACY: THEORY AND PRACTICE
141
efforts to project a nation’s image and values to other countries and peoples as
well as to receive information and try to understand the culture, values and
images of other countries and their peoples. Cultural and educational diplomacy
emphasize exchanges of persons and ideas that directly involve a relatively
small number of people and are concerned with promoting long-term mutual
understanding between peoples. However, the small number of people involved
in classical public diplomacy almost always the same it’s a solid counter argument
questioning the efficiency of classical approach to public diplomacy. Those
people who are usually attending the public diplomacy events usually know well
the culture and issues which are going to be expressed within that particular
event. Their presence is more motivated by maintaining relationships, or just the
desire to participate at a fashionable event. The message supposed to be
transmitted by this kind of events often does not reach its target audience.
Cultural diplomacy when in relation to Public Diplomacy in our view refers
to the cultural content of the message while public diplomacy refers to the
strategies the cultural diplomacy content known and well perceived by the target
audience. Both approaches (the one supposed by cultural diplomacy and the one
supposed by public diplomacy) are a matter of mutual knowledge and communication
which is meant to crate communities of trust and understanding. Public diplomacy
seeks to support traditional diplomacy by addressing non-governmental
audiences, in addition to governmental audiences, both mass and elite. It works
very much in coordination with and in parallel to the traditional diplomatic
effort. It obviously contributes to predictability, an important asset in International
Relations particularly in the Security area. However the mutual knowledge of
each other culture does not, per se, create trust. The existence of trust requires at
least some identification with the other because without such association actors
would be self-contained and devoid of any common basis.2 Communities can be
even “virtual”, linked by communication media (see the relationships between
UK and New Zealand), but usually they are attached to a particular locale.
Any public diplomacy approach appeals to the presumed existence of common
interests which often correspond to the process of the collective identity formation
and, more specifically, shared values, identities, and meanings. The collective
identity establishes patterns of diffuse reciprocity manifested in the mutual
responsiveness among the members of the community (Deutsch et al. 1957, 12933; Adler and Barnett 1998b, 30-33, 47-48; Williams 1998).3 The general Deutschian
emphasis on communication networks, leading to trust, social learning, and
institution building as paths to security communities have been adopted by
constructivist scholars (Adler and Barnett 1996, 63-72; Adler and Barnett
————————
2 Ideas developed in a short article in 2000 by Raimo Väyrynen, Stable peace trough security communities?
Steps towards theory-building, available at: http://kroc.nd.edu/ocpapers/op_18_3.pdf.
3 Adler, Emanuel, “Imagined (Security) Communities: Cognitive Regions in International Relations”,
Millenium: Journal of International Studies 26, no. 2 (Summer 1997a): 249-77; Williams, Michael C. “The
Institutions of Security. Elements of a Theory of Security Organizations, Cooperation and Conflict 32, no. 3
(September 1997): 287-307.
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3
1998b; and especially Adler 1997b). They see at least at regional level (Balkans,
Mediterranean, or more generously Euro-Mediterranean involving the deeply
cultural religious and economic divided shores of the Mediterranean Sea) the
creation of security communities as the formation of cognitive regions whose
borders are defined by the intensity of shared understandings and common
identities. However the continuous globalization process are continuously eroding
the valability of such theoretical constructs. The very notion of “border” cultural
or whatever become slim in the virtual space, while from another perspectives
the globalization and increased accessibility to information make the “border”
as such to be more painfully perceived especially in the minds of the younger
generations.
As the relationships deepen, public diplomacy can achieve a hierarchy of
objectives: increasing familiarity (making people think about your country and
updating their images of it); increasing appreciation (creating positive perceptions
of your country and getting others to see issues from your perspective); engaging
people (encouraging people to see your country as an attractive destination for
tourism and study and encouraging them to buy its products and subscribe to its
values); and influencing people’s behavior in all possible meanings involving a
favorable attitude towards the own country. To achieve these goals, governments
are supposed to build public diplomacy that operates in at least three dimensions:
The first would be the communication of dally events as far as those events
have any meaning for the target audience in the target country — in other words,
aligning traditional diplomacy with the news cycle. However we should bare in
mind that here the state actor does not have the exclusive control. The globalization
of news and the new technologies available to distribute it coverage complicates
this task. Diplomats have no control over the way the media present their
countries, since those reports are typically filed by foreign correspondents. Or
here the issue would involve the sources the foreign correspondents are using or
to what kind of sources those correspondents have access. Also many of the
stories that have the biggest impact abroad are not traditional foreign policy
stories that embassies are equipped to deal with but are domestic stories.
Diplomats will talk to the press about foreign news stories, but they will refer
enquiries about domestic stories to the relevant government departments (such
as education, health, culture or religious affairs), which are often not equipped
to understand the international repercussions of their actions.
According to Mark Leonard the second dimension of public diplomacy would
be strategic communication4. Governments are adept at conveying their stances
on particular issues (economic issues mostly related to trade, regional security
issues in Central Eastern Europe or Black Sea area, the peace process in Caucasus
or the Balkans etc.), but officials are much less effective at managing overall
perceptions of their country. One reason for this failure is that different institutions
have been responsible for dealing with politics, trade, tourism, investment, and
————————
4 Leonard, M. (2002), “Diplomacy by other means”, Foreign Policy, Vol. 132 No. September/October, p. 48-56.
4
143
cultural relations and in order to keep on the same track of public diplomacy all
these different issues a particular government needs whether professional
diplomats, whether top quality diplomatic teams. Strategic communication is
like a political campaign but at another level and in a more diverse an often
unknown environment. It involves developing a set of comprehensive messages
and planning a series of symbolic events and imagistic opportunities to reinforce
them. As people are exposed to thousands of messages every day, the themes
must not be very complex: In commercial advertising a big amount of work is
involved to decompose long messages and complex ideas into very simple concepts
and messages which are often transposed in images repeated obsessively trough
advertising campaigns. However we are not that convinced that what actually
works in the commercial advertising may work just as well in the public
diplomacy as the concepts, medium and the points of reference are just too
different. Dally commodities are not the same think as individual or collective
issues regarding identity may be.
For Mark Leonard the third dimension of public diplomacy would be at the
inter-individual level, and would consist in developing lasting relationships with
key individuals through scholarships, exchanges, training, seminars, conferences,
and access to media channels. This approach differs from the usual diplomatic
practice of nurturing contacts through lunches, cocktail parties, and receptions.
These relationships are not built between diplomats and people abroad — they
are between peers (politicians, special advisors, business people, cultural
entrepreneurs, and academics). This approach differs from messages designed to
sell because it involves a genuine exchange that leads to a different picture of the
country. Would be useful to insist a bit about this dimension because in many
ways despite the fact that it seems to be the most effective in time, it is the most
difficult to perceive and for instance the most neglected by the researchers. The
daily events, people and officials are of paramount importance in creating a
certain desired image. A well done imagistic campaign at the individual level can
be easily ruined by a bad personal experience, with a corrupt state official, a theft
on the street, a late train, a dirty room or an under standard hotel service. In the
interwar period many reports coming from various Romania Embassies use to
recommend prudency in promoting a tourist offer until the country is having the
proper tourist infrastructure the international traveler is use to. Also other
members of the Romanian diplomatic service in their reports use to describe the
ways efforts of propaganda are just ruined by various uncontrollable events from
the individual’s experiences in Romania. For example many leading intellectuals
invited in Romania at the expenses of the Romanian State in the interwar period
ended by been attracted to the Hungarian point of view and propaganda simply
because during their trips in Transylvania especially they benefited of the
hospitality of various Hungarian aristocrats which at the time were numerous
and wealthy, possessing castles and properties. The corrupt civil servants were
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5
also a black spot which at any type could have ruined the efforts of an expensive
public diplomacy project as far as the individual perceptions are concerned.
Often communication initiatives developed after a striking event or crisis fall
into what Mark Leonard plastically describe as conveyor belt model for transmitting
information. Recent debates about public diplomacy suggest that many policymakers
feel the key problem is a lack of information for the cause of a particular state,
event or policy. However, nowadays considering the impact of new media
technologies the major international events are covered by enough information
campaigns. According to Mark Leonard referring mostly to the US and British
public policy towards the Islamic World, in the last years the Public diplomacy
of major international actors did not fail to deliver information5. Rather, it has
failed to deliver information convincingly. The tone of many messages is
declamatory, without any apparent intent to engage in dialogue or listen. And at
the same time most often the audiences are sensitive only to the information they
would like to listen which involves more sophisticated techniques of transmitting
a certain message, techniques which can be provided by proper cultural diplomacy
strategies and techniques. If a particular government is to move beyond cheap
propaganda which most often involve wasted funds and wasted time, they must
meet four challenges: understanding the target audience, confronting hostility
toward own culture, engaging people emotionally, and proving their own
relevance to the public concerned coming from the concerned public cultural
background and way to see the things. You don’t have to be a professional
negotiator or diplomat to know that your audience is the top priority for an
effective communication in any domain. But diplomats are often more interested
in winning arguments than in persuading skeptical publics. Governments
struggle to internalize and prepare for potential threats that do not conform to
their underlying strategic assumptions. The executive in charge with the external
affairs just like many other individuals have a one sided perception and are very
reluctant to accept anything which do not conform to a certain ideological
framework already set in their minds. Carrying out successful diplomacy is
difficult if you do not have ears for things you do not want to hear. The answer
seems to be not more information, but a different form of engagement specially
design to meet the target audience’s needs, (not necessarily expectations because
by doing that a public or cultural diplomacy approach would become automatically
propaganda). Just like any other political approach public diplomacy is not just
about delivering a message to an audience but rather about getting some effective
results. And to get a result, you need to acknowledge that the listener’s views
matter as much as the message.
The second step toward effective communication involves avoiding the
perception of cultural invasion some cultures create often in real terms. Also is
important for a certain state actor in terms of public diplomacy to avoid the
paternalistic discourse, the teacher and student attitude which most often
————————
5 Ibid.
6
145
generate frustration and the opposite result, and an instinctive hostile audience.
The right message and positioning on a topic can prevent arguments from falling
on deaf ears. Also the way a certain message is promoted should be carefully
calculated. For instance the issue of integration can be easily perceived by the
target audience coming from a certain cultural background as assimilation.
The third challenge to public diplomacy is to avoid isolation in the “Ivory
Tower”, to avoid the pretentious language, the excessive theoretisation, and
eventually to move beyond exclusive intellectual forms of communication. The
practice shows that several projects involving the “mutual knowledge” have as a
target audience a small number of intellectuals which usually are already
familiarized with the realities at the source. For example the islamist theorist
prophile in theory would be an ignorant and an easy prade for the extremist
discourse. The reality shows a different picture. Most often the islamist theorists
are college graduated (often in the Western countries) who are acquainted well
with the Western culture. In other words the haters may originate not in ignorance
or lack of mutual knowledge but rather in frustration.
Also according to recent studies most of communication is nonverbal. Many
other factors — experiences, emotions, images — influence people’s responses
to certain messages, fabricated or spontaneous, intended or unintended have to
be taken into account in order to transmit a certain message. To deliver
information is the easy part of the job, capturing the imagination or reinsuring
the effectiveness of this information is the real challenge. The degree a certain
message succeeded or not to capture the imagination as it was designed is very
difficult to measure and always needs a generous time perspective. By talking
about proving the relevance of a certain message we just came to the fourth
challenge of any imagistic campaign. For Mark Leonard one way of demonstrating
relevance is to concentrate on “niche diplomacy”. Norway, Finland, Sweden or
Austria are examples of a countries that have a voice and a presence on the
international stage out of proportion to their modest position, military power and
economic capacity. Those are examples of countries which had succeeded to
insure a valuable presence through a ruthless prioritization of the target audiences
and the concentration on a single message: The Nobel Peace Prize, originating
in Oslo, is a happy historical fact that also raises Norway’s profile as a trusted
peace provider in the international arena. Issues regarding the interests toward
environment protection policies and the respect of the human rights also
contributed to the respectable image those countries have in the international
system of today. To all this we may add also the fact that those countries are not
perceived as a potential military threat by any of the so called anti-western bloc
actors. Also the very presence into international meetings or UN projects is not
always representative for what is happening at the grass roots level in a
particular country especially in the developing world.
Mark Leonard wisely notice that: “effective public diplomacy relies on more
than just the quality of a message. Sometimes, the problem is the messenger.
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7
Even the most well-crafted argument will be ineffective if transmitted by an uninspired
or bay a partisan source. The traditional approach to public diplomacy activity
overseas, be it cultural festivals, seminars, economic promotion, or policy
advocacy, is that it should all be concluded with “a few words from the
ambassador”. In some cases, it would be far more useful to keep the ambassador
indoors. Sensitive messages to foreign publics are often best disseminated by
people who have something in common with the target audience”.6 If a message
will engender distrust simply because it comes from a foreign government, then
the government should hide that fact as much as possible. Increasingly, if a state
is to make its voice heard and to influence events beyond its direct control, it
must work through organizations and networks that are separate from, independent
of, and even suspicious of governments themselves. In the reports containing
advises for the Romanian Ministry of Foreign Affairs sent by the Romanian
cultural attaches in Washington in the interwar period there is repeatedly
emphasized the need for any kind of propaganda material to come from a locally
trusted source, most advisable form prestigious journalists or renown American
intellectuals otherwise they would be totally ignored by the American public
opinion. However, those assessments just like those of Mark Leonard 70 years
later are referring to realities and political culture specific to the US, British or
European political culture. We would rather say that a combination of both
sources official and unofficial would make a qualitative difference.
Remain to be seen which are nowadays the most effective media for this type
of public diplomacy. For Mark Leonard those are: NGOs, diasporas, and political
parties.
The NGOs have three key resources not readily available to foreign governments:
credibility, expertise, and appropriate networks. People are often quick to question
the motivations behind the diplomatic pronouncements of a state, but some
NGOs have a long-standing reputation for independence — and hence
credibility — that it is not feasible for a government to create for itself. NGOs
have access to networks of activists, experts, and foreign politicians — and they
know how to marshal those networks to exert pressure in a given policy area. No
diplomatic mission possesses (or would wish to possess) the capability to
organize street demonstrations, nor are diplomats well positioned to coordinate
sustained lobbying campaigns. More than 20.000 transnational NGO networks
are already active on the world stage (of which 90 percent were created during
the last 30 years), and many of them could make effective partners for conducting
public diplomacy.
Diasporas. Thanks to increased international migration during the latter half
of the 20th century, there are now “living links” — relations, friends, former business
partners — within virtually every country in the world. The untapped potential
————————
6 Parts of the article published quoted for Foreign Affairs were published in synthesis on: http://ics.leeds.
ac.uk/papers/vp01.cfm?outfit=pmt&requesttimeout=500&folder=7&paper=1062, accessed on 16 of March
2009, 14 pm.
8
147
in the global Diaspora could, with sustained involvement, yield several advantages
to policymakers. First, and most obviously, diasporas can help fill the demand
for language skills Furthermore, such links provide the cultural knowledge,
political insight, and human intelligence necessary for a successful foreign policy.
The mistakes and disasters that marked several events across the history might
have been avoided had there been more comprehensive and intimate knowledge
of those societies available to policymakers. An important and easily overlooked
aspect of Diaspora diplomacy is the complexity of relations between different
expatriates of the same country. For example the Romanian Diaspora in Canada
or US has a different image as compared to the Romanian Diaspora in Italy or
Spain simply because most often the origin of those immigrants the way they
immigrated and their motivation were different. While in the case of Canada and
US the immigrants are most often highly educated professionals carefully
selected by immigration schemes in the case of Italy or Spain the immigrants are
often society proscripts.
As a third area where nongovernment-to-government diplomacy could be
very fruitful is in building relations between political parties in different
countries. Problems between governments may appear to be diplomatic when, in
fact, they stem from difficulties that revolve around perceived political differences.
The relations between political parties of the same broad stripe in different
countries can be an important dimension of those nations’overall foreign
relations. On a growing list of issues — economic reform, social rights, agriculture,
drugs, terrorism, and the environment, not to mention humanitarian intervention
— national interests are neither immutable nor particular to a single country.
Instead, such issues can only be addressed through a deliberative political
process. Increased links between political parties represent one way to deal with
that historic shift. This approach has many advantages7. First, nurturing relations
between politicians of different countries makes diplomacy easier by giving both
sides a clear idea of the political positioning of the other. Second, such
relationships open a channel for policy exchange that renews the intellectual
capital of political parties. Third, exchanges help develop an international outlook
within parties that are not in power, which can be advantageous in smoothing the
transition between administrations.
Finally one of the biggest challenge is to the culture and priorities of diplomatic
institutions themselves. Public diplomacy can no longer be seen as an add-on to
the rest of diplomacy — it must be seen as a central activity that is played out
across many dimensions and with many partners. As a result most of the
multilateral agreements in parallel with an economic or a political basket include
nowadays a cultural one, the Euromediterranean Partnership being an example.
The concrete results relay as usually not only in the initial design but also in
a proper implementation, whose results remain to be seen in the future.
————————
7 Leonard, M. (2002), “Diplomacy by other means”, Foreign Policy, Vol. 132 No. September/October, p. 48-56.
148
LUCIAN JORA
9
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Adler, Emanuel, “Imagined (Security) Communities: Cognitive Regions in International Relations”, Millenium:
Journal of International Studies 26, no. 2, Summer 1997a.
Leonard, M., “Diplomacy by other means”, Foreign Policy, Vol. 132 No. September/October, 2002.
Väyrynen, Raimo, Stable peace trough security communities? Steps towards theory-building, 2000, available
at: http://kroc.nd.edu/ocpapers/op_18_3.pdf.
Williams, Michael C., “The Institutions of Security, Elements of a Theory of Security Organizations”, Cooperation
and Conflict 32, no. 3, September 1997.
Wyszomirsky, Margaret j, Chirstopher Burgess, Chaterine Peila in International Cultural Relations, A Multicountry
Comparision, Arts Policy and Administration Program, The Ohio State University-2003, p. 1, available at
http://www.culturalpolicy.org/pdf/MJWpaper.pdf.
B O O K S I N D E B AT E
GIOVANNI SARTORI
INGINERIA CONSTITUÞIONALÃ
COMPARATÃ.
STRUCTURI, STIMULENTE
ªI REZULTATE
Colecþia Politica, traducere de Gabriela
Tãnãsescu, Irina Mihaela Stoica
Iaºi, Editura Institutului European, 2008,
326 p.
CONSTITUTIONAL SYSTEMS
IN A COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE
ARISTIDE CIOABÃ
A new edition of Giovanni Sartori’s work, entitled Ingineria constituþionalã
comparatã. Structuri, stimulente ºi rezultate (Comparative Constitutional
Engineering: An Inquiry into Structures, Incentives and Outcomes), was issued
at Jassy in Romanian translation at the Romanian Publishing House, Editura
Institutului European.
This Romanian translation was conducted by the researchers Gabriela Tãnãsescu
and Irina Mihaela Stoica, foreworded and edited by the political scientist
Gheorghe Lencan Stoica, following the 1997 edition of the volume. This book
completes the series of fundamental works of the same author, issued in
Romanian in the last two decades: Teoria democraþiei reinterpretatã (1984),
2000; Homo videns (1997), 2006; and Ce facem cu strãinii? Pluralism ºi
multiculturalism (2000), 2007. This book under investigation reveals another
main direction for political analysis for the educated readers, through which
Giovanni Sartori leaves a clear and original mark on the political science of the
last half of the century, at whose progress he had remarkably contributed.
The core around which the analysis and the conclusions concerning the
functionality of the present day democratic and constitutional systems are
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constructed has as main theoretical landmarks of the democratic constitutions seen
as “structures of government”, based on “sanctions and incentives”. Given that
they establish procedures and forms that „structure and discipline the processes
of decision-making, the constitutions — says Sartori — show how should the
norms be created”, without substituting themselves to the popular will, nor to the
responsibility of the institutions to which they attribute the responsibility for the
political decisions, respectively, for the “processing” of the concrete public
policies. The essential function of the constitutions stays therefore in the “efficient
management of the organization of the state” (p. 268) through institutions (the
Parliament, the Executive) that “satisfy the exigencies of the governance” (p. 272).
Especially because within this realm we investigate structures through which
the people govern other people — to appeal to a Madisonian phrase —, the
guarantee of their functionality cannot be reduced, according to Sartori, to the
mere obedience in front of the orders and constraints stated by the constitutional
norms. The capitalization on the potential of stimulation and equilibrium
contained by the adequate recompense or reward of these entitled to govern, for
the proven merits of government, is as important as the obedience. It is
understood that the absence of a proper mechanism allocating incentives impedes
on the efficient functionality, even when there are stipulated drastic sanctions for
the infringements upon the constitutional constraints.
The hypothesis according to which the institutions, in general, and the state,
in particular, have “to be restrained by a system of rewards and sanctions, of
attracting incentives and terrifying menaces” represents undoubtedly one of the
most inventive and satisfactory perspectives of analysis and interpretation of the
constitutional systems.
Sartori submits this set of generalizations and hypotheses to a “compared
control”, functioning both as approaching method and as empirical covering,
proceeding to the analysis of all the existing democratic forms. The correct
appreciation of the comparative enterprise accomplished in this book cannot
avoid a brief reference to the contribution brought by Sartori to the development
of the comparative theory and method within political science, in general. Sartori
has introduced strictness and logical order to this field. His study “Concept
Misformation in Comparative Politics”, published in The American Political
Science Review (LXIV, No. 4, Dec., 1970, p. 1033-1053), remains until today a
methodological landmark in the theoretical and empirical comparative research.
Thus, as early as the 70s, when comparative politics has gained extension given
the behaviorist and systemic revolution and due to structural-functionalism, Sartori
was precisely and radically diagnosing the logical, theoretical and conceptual
shortcomings affecting the explicative and integrative capacity of the political
comparativism. Correlatively he was drawing a few directing lines envisaging their
remedy and the correct evaluation of the end and conditions necessary for the
analysis. A major requirement consists of the resistance in front of the temptation
of the “conceptual stretching”, that is the extrapolation of the concepts that are
specific to the Western political systems, through a dilution of their conceptual
content, in order to extend their applicability to the scale of world politics.
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This author has re-established the ultimate importance of the generalizations
used in classifications where the concepts play not only the role of the elements
of a theoretical system, but also that of instruments for the documentation and
classification (the storage) of the empirical data, that will be then controlled and,
respectively, compared, and eventually amended. Sartori was thus explicitly
rehabilitating a theoretical approach aiming at the adequate formation of the
classifying concepts and categories, as proper objective of a medium level of
abstraction, from which the comparative approach might drift (traveling) either
upwards or downwards on the scale of abstractions, as to combine a relatively
increased explicative force — the macro theories — with a relatively precise
descriptive (contextually configurative) content. At this medium level, note
Sartori “we are required to perform the whole set of operations that some authors
call “definition by analysis”, that is the process of defining a term by finding the
genus to which the object designated by the word belongs, and then specifying
the attributes which distinguish such object from all the other species of the
some genus” (p. 1043). For Sartori the comparative analysis does not produce
per se the explanation of the things that are compared, without a preamble of
theorizing and empirical conceptualization. “The unconscious thinker does not
ask himself why he is comparing; and this neglect goes to explain why so much
comparative work provides extension of knowledge, but hardly a strategy for
aquiring and validating new knowledge. It is not intuitively evident that to
compare is to control (our italics — A.C.), and that the novelty, distinctiveness
and importance of comparative politics consists of a systematic testing, against
as many cases as possible, of sets of hypotheses, generalization and laws of the
“if ... then” (p. 1035)*.
Sartori subsequently refined the comparative method, starting with its
application to the party systems in Parties and Party Systems. A Framework of
Analysis (1976) and continuing with the field of democratic political systems in
his Comparative Constitutional Engineering: An Inquiry into Structures, Incentives
and Outcomes.
This book includes three interdependent parts. In the first one the author
analyzes the electoral systems and their effects on the party systems, which they
are not necessarily components of the constitutional structure; they play an
indispensable role within the functional mechanism of the democratic systems.
The second part is reserved to the definition and the typological evaluation of the
democratic systems with their two distinct classes: the presidentialism and the
Parliamentarism. The third part will confront the functional problems of the
democratic political systems with the author’s proposal for the amelioration of the
present constitutional engineering, from the perspective of the intelligent structural
and normative combination of the threats with the compensatory incentives.
————————
* It is necessary to underline to this end that his merits in developing the qualitative methods in forming
the concepts “and especially his contribution to helping scholars think about problems of context as they refine
concepts and apply them to new spatial and temporal settings” were honored by the American Political Science
Association (APSA), the Section Qualitative and Multi-Method Research, instituting the Giovanni Sartori
Book Award in the field.
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The comparative analysis of the electoral systems emphasizes the defining
elements of the plurality formula, proportional representation, or “double-ballot
systems” with their intended and unintended effects to attempt determine which
one offers the best option. His preference turns toward the “double tour” voting
system or the ballotage, in the version used in the parliamentary elections in
France, nowadays. The argument seems to be that unlike the plurality voting
systems, the proportional representation ones or the alternative (preferential)
vote, etc., the “double tour” voting system allows the elector to revote. Thus,
after a more or less random vote in the first tour in selecting the candidates
(excepting the case of those who win the mandate with 50%+ from the first
attempt) the elector returns in the second tour, voting in full knowledge, on the
basis of the configuration selected in the first tour. Moreover, the accession in
the second tour of more than two (3 or 4) candidates permits political parties to
coordinate strategies entering in a negotiation of rational exchange, making
transparent agreements in the time interval between the two tours, while the
voters can approve or penalize these inter-party agreements, through their vote
in the second tour, offering to a greater extent a “rational vote” (p. 106-107).
But the most important point for the contribution of the author in this field is
the formulation of his own laws concerning the influence of the voting systems
on the party systems. Sartori develops and clarifies as well the theoretical
generalizations related to the notion of law in social sciences, as the specific
conditions under which the hypotheses (laws) suggested more than half of
century ago by Maurice Duverger can be validated or invalidated by the empirical
evidence. Sartori also includes in a fundamental manner in the theoretical and
explanatory equation that he proposes, not only the influence of the voting
systems on the party systems, but their own influence (or lack of influence) of
the parties and party systems on the electoral behavior of the citizens, according
to the degree of structure (or lack of structure) they provide (or not) for the
political life. As a correlate aspect, Sartori adds to the premises influencing the
formulation of his laws a clearer criterion for counting the parties in relation to
the assessment of their relevance. The result is the alternative formulation of
couples of laws concerning the effects or the non-effects of the plurality systems
on two party systems and of the proportional representation systems (with or
without access threshold) on the types of multiparty systems and on their
functional capacities (chapter III, 3 and 4) from the perspective of the exigencies
of the governance. If the electoral systems and the party systems do not represent
connotative attributes for the classification of the constitutional systems, the
functionality of the latter is influenced by that of the former.
In the second part of the book the analysis is concentrated on the typology of
the democratic systems. In a different manner than that of the well-known
juridical or political science approach, with the categories of democratic systems
— presidential, parliamentary and of assembly — Sartori delineates clearly the
defining criteria of the presidential and parliamentary systems, through the
mutual exclusion and the mechanism of the division/separation of the
governmental power, highlighting for each type their own systemic logic according
to which they are constituted and maintained.
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The prototype or the referential of the presidential system is the NorthAmerican one, where the President (the head of state) 1) results from a popular
vote (or as if it were a direct vote); 2) he cannot be deprived of confidence during
his mandate by the parliamentary vote; 3) presides and leads the governments he
names (p. 131). The division or the separation of power, as a structural and
constitutive arrangement, within the logic of this system, consists in the
separation of the executive from the parliamentary support, while the division of
power means that the executive is sustained by and falls without the support of
the Parliament (p. 133). In this case, the unified governance, that is, a governing
based on the parliamentary support for the government of the President, cannot
result otherwise than from the agreement between the presidential party and the
political majority in Congress; in its absence, the governance remains divided
and the presupposition according to which within such systems we have to deal
with a strong and efficient government is infirmed. If, nevertheless, the American
presidential system has functioned and is still functioning (even if only badly),
the fact is owed not to it divided structure of power, but to the unlocking of the
system performed by three non-structural political factors: the absence of
(ideological) principles, the weak parties, without a rigid parliamentary discipline,
and the local concessions offered by the President to the Members of Parliament
to gain their votes for the laws that are necessary for the governmental policies.
Even when the President has the majority in Congress, his control over the
Parliament remains relative, given the lack of discipline in what concerns the
vote within the party. Therefore, the presidential system contains a structural
logic predisposing it to obstruction. This fact is illustrated to a greater extent by
the Latin-American countries that imported the North-American system and
where the outcome of the presidential system is disastrous. The multiparty
system from these countries rendered futile the policies of the presidents who,
even though they have looked for the solution in increasing their constitutional
powers way beyond those of the American President, did not alleviate the
functionality of the system, but on the contrary, they have exposed it to the military
coup d’etat.
Sartori sees the solving of the structural deficiency of the presidential system
in the Latin-American context in the alternative of the semi-presidential system
that would answer to a large extent to the question of the structural rigidity of
the presidential system and not in that of a parliamentary system, because of the
lack of a party system in these countries that would be adequate (compatible) for
a functional parliamentary system.
The parliamentary systems are based entirely on the division of power between
the legislative and the executive, the governments depending in principle on the
Parliament for the nomination, the support and, if applicable, the overthrowing
from power, through the no-confidence vote of the Parliament. According, to the
structural (constitutional) arrangements and to the correlation with the party
systems, the parliamentarism denotes a variety of parliamentary systems that in
turn produce either powerful or weak governments, either stability or instability,
either efficiency or immobility (p. 151), related to the degree of cohesion, discipline
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and division of the party system. Thus, Sartori distinguishes according to the
measure of shared power of which the Prime Minister disposes in relation to the
members of government and to the Parliament, somewhere between the British
system of premiership, or Cabinet governance, based on a powerful Premier
(situated above unequals) and elections with plurality system, two party system,
and extremely disciplined parties (a combination difficult to obtain but easy to
dismantle) which, if consolidated, ensures the governmental stability and
efficiency. A moderate version, under the structural and functional aspects, is
presented in the German postwar parliamentary model, where the Chancellor is
the first among unequals (the only one named by the Parliament, while the other
Ministers are named by the Chancellor), the government cannot be demitted
unless the Parliament elects a new Chancellor instead of the old one (constructive
vote of confidence), operates with the excluding threshold of 5% at the access in
Parliament (sperrklausel) and the interdiction of the anti-system parties
according to a decision of the constitutional court from the 50s. Due to the last
two non-structural factors, the party system functions relatively well with two
bigger parties and one or two smaller parties, ensuring the stability of the
governmental coalition (because of the constructive no-confidence vote, too).
The efficient and standing parliamentarism includes cases such as the British
and German ones and similar as well to these from the countries with predominant
party systems (Sweden, Norway, Spain, Japan, along their different historical
phases) that, even where they do not present premiership or two-party system
(or, 2 ½ party) structures, have or had over the years a majority one-party government
of the same party, for a long while, generator of stability and efficiency. The
functionality of the parliamentary system does not rely so much, as Sartori
proves, on its structural and constitutional principle (the sovereignty of the
Parliament) as on the factors that are limiting the unfolding of its capacities,
either constitutionally, either due to the structuring and the functional mechanics
of the party system.
Hereby, we encounter a type of parliamentary system — assembly type
parliamentary system — where the Parliament is sovereign, the government
subordinate to the Parliament, the party system is weakly structured and extremely
fractioned (extreme multiparty), the responsibility is ambiguous, while the
Prime Minister and the governments cannot act efficiently and rapidly because
of the disagreements in the coalitions and the absence of the unity of the will.
Finally, another kind of democratic system is the semi-presidential system, to
which Sartori, starting from the French prototype of the Fifth Republic,
attributes as connotation the dual authority of the executive power, resulted from
its division between a President elected through popular vote, either directly or
indirectly, and a Prime Minister, according to the criteria concerning the following:
1) the independence of the President against the Parliament with which he
mediates through his government the acceptance of the given directives; 2) the
independence of the Prime Minister and the Cabinet against the President to the
extent they are dependent on the Parliament (through the confidence or noconfidence vote, or the support of the parliamentary majority) and 3) the facility
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of different equilibriums and mutual power arrangements within the executive,
related to the configuration of the relationships between the two factors of the
executive and to the parliamentary majority. Besides the French prototype,
Sartori includes in the sphere of semi-presidential system several similar cases
(Weimar Republic, Portugal between 1976-1982) and a few dissimilar cases (Sri
Lanka, Finland and, possibly Russia).
The thesis that Sartori is convincingly sustaining when he evaluates the
structural virtues and flaws of the pure presidential and parliamentary systems is
that concerning the superior capacity of the semi-presidential system to deal
better than the presidential system with the divided parliamentary majority and
than the excesses of the assembly systems, because “more applicable”, thus
more sensitive in what concerns the aspect of constitutional engineering, it could
partially eliminate the vices of extreme multiparty system and those of the
electoral proportional representation, through the double tour majority plurality
voting system and greater powers for the government in relation to the Parliament.
Even so, the semi-presidential system leaves several unsolved problems, to
which Sartori searches answers through an interesting proposal of presidential
system “with two engines,” respectively the alternant or intermittent presidential
system.
The fundamental idea of this proposal is to have for the whole length of the
legislature a “parliamentary system stimulated or, on the contrary, penalized, by
a presidential destitution-substitution” in case it does not work (it becomes
obstructed), the parliamentary engine — the rules of the responsibility of the
government in front of the parliamentary majority — could be replaced by a
presidential government, the role of the Parliament having to become significantly
reduced during the functioning of the presidential government. Sartori sees a
possible utility for this type of constitutional mechanism even in the case of the
non-functional presidential systems, similar to those in Latin-America (Brazil,
Mexico), or that of the systems with an accentuated party atomization or that of
many ex-communist countries with dysfunctional democratic systems.
The strong points of alternant presidential systems would be the following:
the limitation of the Parliament to voting one or maximum two formula of
government during a mandate of 4 or 5 years; the incapacity to maintain in
function the government beyond the precedent condition would be sanctioned by
the entry of the President on the political scene, who was directly (or indirectly)
elected by the people, and who would continue the mandate with his own
powerful government nominated exclusively by the President and independently
by the Parliament, to which it would be reserved only the role of legislative
control. As an element of stimulation, the President elected for a similar period
of time could be re-elected for several times — in order to avoid the abusive
behavior of the President in relationship with the Parliament.
The gain would be, according to Sartori, that in the alternant presidential
system, the initial phase (the parliamentary one) is going to consolidate the
power of parliamentary governments making them more incisive and more
responsible, in the detriment of the hunting for governmental chairs by the
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diverse Parliament Members. Otherwise, they would hurry up the triggering of
the presidential phase and that of the penalization of the Parliament. An
intermittent President should have, given the interregnum that he is enjoying,
greater powers than a standard President in a presidential system, during the
final part (from a third to a half of parliamentary mandate), the risks being
reduced due to the limited span for the effective exercise of the mandate and/or
re-election, or for the ending of the stimulated duration for the presidential and
parliamentary mandates.
Choosing both on the basis of the majority vote with the double tour would
describe a behavior that leads to the bipolar configuration of the parties and to
the insurance of parliamentary majorities that sustain governments with high
performances, in the initial phase.
Sartori envisions in the anticipation of the real behavior of the two alternant
protagonists — the President and the Parliament — consolidated democratic
systems and a reasonably high degree of rationality, beyond the brakes and the
constitutional counterweights that he proposes, such as the impossibility of the
President to reward the Parliament Members who eased the overthrow of the
parliamentary government, and even the incompatibility between functions such
as Member of Parliament and Minister. What happens when the majority
presidential party from the Parliament, initially and deliberately, gives in the
government to his leader, the President? Or, when a Parliament that is hostile to
the President maintains in function an inefficient government to avoid the phase
of a presidential government formed by its rival? Or, even, when the elected
Parliament fails from its very constitution in aggregating a majority? Of course,
such anomalies seem unbelievable in a consolidated democracy, but not within
the post-communist regimes, too, where it is most difficult to distinguish a phase
from another sometimes, the President being able to govern in disguise through
a façade parliamentary government, that is, when he is not tempted to enter
directly the political scene, and from the very beginning, through the means of a
personal interpretation of the Constitution. Probably, in this case one cannot
speak even about a minimal democratic system.
The book of the Professor and political scientist Giovanni Sartori stands out,
as his entire work does, given the exceptional density of ideas on which
unfortunately it is impossible to dwell here. Conscious of the simplifications and
reductions operated in this analysis, the invitation to read and study Sartori’s
book, admirable through its stylistic elegance and scientific precision, remains
the only recommendation.
GIOVANNI SARTORI, THE FATHER OF CONSTITUTIONS
CRISTIAN IOAN POPA
What Giovanni Sartori has accomplished by his comparative analysis of modern
constitutions, shows Gheorghe Lencan Stoica in Preface to the Romanian edition
of Comparative Constitutional Engineering: An Inquiry into Structures,
Incentives, and Outcomes, a good connoisseur of works and even Sartory itself,
may be compared with the work of the great Greek philosopher Aristotle who
studied in comparison the Greek polis and other states in the Mediterranean and
the Orient. “The enterprise is truly colossal...”1. Moreover, given that some
changes of the Constitution of Romania seems to be again at order of the day,
Romanian specialist invites all those interested in this topic to study carefully
Sartori’s Engineering.
Indeed, as assessed Gianfranco Pasquino, the substantially theoretical
contributions of Sartori on democracy, parties systems or political and constitutional
engineering has made Italian scientist “one of the most prominent theorists of
the politics in the XX century”2.
Comparative Constitutional Engineering is the result of a long study of electoral
systems and, generally, of modern political institutions and procedures. At 15
years after its first edition (1994), this work still enjoys the greatest authority in
this field. According to Pasquino, three aspects are particularly remarkable in
this work. Firstly, it makes immediately intelligible constitutions by presenting
them in terms of sets of “incentives” positive and negative, of rewards and
punishments. Then, it reveals the results of various political and electoral systems,
offers a typology of parliamentary, presidential and semi presidential systems
and evaluating their merits and shortcomings. The third aspect to be especially
emphasized reveals Sartori’s view of political science in general. “Sartori is
convinced — and he says so clearly — that the type of knowledge acquired by
political science can be put to work to improve the performance of political
systems. Of course, this kind of applicable knowledge (s.m.) must be acquired
and utilized through carefully crafted comparative analyses”3.
Thus, according to Sartori, the Greek politeìa (often translated by “republic”)
or Latin constitutio are very different in content from the modern concept of
————————
1 Lencan Stoica in Preface to the Romanian edition of Comparative Constitutional Engineering: An
Inquiry into Structures, Incentives, and Outcomes, Iaºi, Institutul European, 2008, p. 23.
2 Gianfranco Pasquino, The Political Science of Giovanni Sartori, in “European Political Science”,
nr. 4/2005, p. 33.
3 Ibidem, p. 38.
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constitution. The first modern constitution was promulgated in 1770 in the U.S.
Virginia, Maryland and Pennsylvania with the essential meaning of a “plan” or
“frame” of government, including even a Chart of Rights (Bill of Rights). At the
Philadelphia Convention of 1787 Madison and Hamilton were opposed to
placing it in the Constitution, arguing that rights are not protected by the
declarations, but by the frame of constitutional government itself. Only in 1789,
first Congress has introduced in the federal Constitution of United States a chart
of rights as the Ten Amendments.
Therefore, the fundamental theoretical problem suggested by this veritable
experimentum crucix is this: a constitution that lacks a charter of rights is
incomplete? Following Sartori, “a constitution without a declaration of rights is
still a constitution, while a constitution whose nucleus does not determine the
government scheme is not a constitution”4.
Any genuine constitution must first define the “free government” investing
with the primary function of formal protection of the rights of citizens, quite
different by their material claims. Thus, the constitutional state (protective) is
required to abstain from action, while the “social” state (productive) is required
to act. Current constitutions include “positive rights” (affirmative rights), economic
and social rights, including right to education, employment, health, social
assistance, etc. And their transformation in material “entitlements” appears to
exceed the constitutional sphere.
Or, for genuine constitutionalism, constitutions are only those state forms in
which-as Rousseau said-we are free because they are governed by laws, not by
other people. Madison had really a good summary of this idea in Federalist, 51:
“In creating a governance structure which means the administration of some
people by other people [...] must first to authorize the government to control the
political subjects, and then to force him to control himself”5. Therefore,
constitutions are, originally and essentially, “tools which restricts, requires and
brings under control the exercise of political power”6. And Sartori insists on that
“quintessential constitutionalism” which seems to be forgotten by the creators of
contemporary constitutions. After World War II, there were 74 states; today are
almost all 200 and all of them elaborate increasingly comprehensive constitutions
which promise the terrestrial paradise. For example, Brazilian Constitution of
1998 (the eighth), of the size of a “phone book”, contains many insignificant
details, but provisions and promises impossible to fulfill. The Constitution
“promised paradise on earth, but ultimately has disadvantaged the poor”, said
Antonio Britto, Minister for social assistance. It is a fact that in this country over
100 million people receive benefits of social services, while employees are, at
least formally, only 23 million. By engaging too many social promises, a constitution
may prepare the ruin of a country.
Constitutions must remain “forms”, “frames” which predetermine the processes
of major political decisions-making in a state. They define the procedures for
————————
4 Giovanni Sartori, op. cit., p. 266.
5 Ibidem, p. 267.
6 Ibidem.
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limiting the exercise of power, prescribing how the political decisions should be
taken. Therefore, constitutions are and should remain neutral in matters of
content (content neutral). A constitution which assumes a priori the contents of
public policies in a state substitutes in an abusive way the institutions
(parliaments and governments) to which it entrusts precisely these tasks. Such
“aspiration constitutions” should be avoided as far as possible.
As there were, with disastrous consequences, “target economies” — centralized
and planned in the Soviet-style —, in a same way develops today “target
constitutions”, likely to induce also social disasters. If the authors of
contemporary constitution can not quell their “high aspirations”, they must be
placed at best in a programmatically Preamble, after which to develop what is
properly to any constitution: a framework for the exercise of political power able
to meet the requirements of good governance. Sartori has in mind here the
juridical distinction between “programmatic” and “imperative” norms. First
suggested, and possibly encourage, some desirable courses of possible government
action. Second, however, are imperative norms, endowed with the full force of
the ultimate constitutional command. For example, when the Italian Constitution
envisages that “the Republic protects the natural environment”, this statement
contains a weak programmatic norm, which does not allow to Italian citizens to
call in court the “Republic” for its negligence towards the environment.
As for the Romanian Constitution, Sartori refers to it in his Speech on the
occasion of receiving the title of Doctor Honoris Causa of the University of
Bucharest, 20 June 2001, published in full in Annex 4 (“On the Romanian
Constitutional System”) of Romanian edition of Engineering. Obviously, Sartori
has in mind the Constitution in 1991, without its revisions in 2003.
The Constitution of Romania, considers Sartori, seems meant to create a semi
presidential political system following the model of French Constitution of the
Fifth Republic, but no one “forte”, but rather “weak”, which he considers to be,
however, “an appropriate system for the context in which it work“7. In general,
Sartori has strongly recommended the semi presidentialism for its flexible
character, suitable to constitutional engineering.
This system is largely the creation of the French Constitution of 1958, drafted
by Michel Debré, and then a result of constitutional practice initiated with the
direct election of the president in 1962. Having an intermediate status —
between the pure presidential system, such as the American one, and parliamentary
system — the semi presidential system establishes a structure of dual authority,
two-headed, with two alternant centers of power, in swinging one to another
depending on who holds majority in Parliament: the President or the Prime Minister.
The intrinsic merit of this system, asseses Sartori, is that it works satisfactorily,
inclusively in the cases of divided majorities. In pure presidential system, the
president found in a minority is largely paralyzed in its political actions, as is
frequently the case in Latin America; in a semi presidential system, instead/by
————————
7 Ibidem, p. 313.
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contrast, there is always a majority that can govern effectively. “The innovation
in constitution, if we stay to think well, is brilliant”8, Sartori concludes.
However, looking at particular constitutional provisions, the Italian scientist
considers that the Romanian political system is a parliamentary rather than a
semi presidential one, in spite of fact that the president is directly elected by
citizens. For example, Article 80, paragraph (2) establishes that “The President
shall/will act as a mediator (n.p.t.) between the powers of the state and between
state and society”9. However, this is a typical attribute for the President in
parliamentary systems. While/If the American president, for example, is a part,
a parliamentary president must be super parties.
Also, under Article 85 (1) the president has no power itself to appoint the
Prime Minister: “The President of Romania shall designate a candidate for the
office of Prime Minister and Government on the vote of confidence for the
Parliament” (n.p.t.). Similarly, according to Article 102 (1): “The President of
Romania shall designate a candidate for the office of Prime Minister, after
consulting the party which has an absolute majority in Parliament or, if there is
no such majority, the parties represented in Parliament” (n.p.t.). These are, evaluates
Sartori, typical constitutional rules and practices of parliamentary systems.
Similarly, under Article 86, “the President may (n.p.t.) consult with the Government
on urgent and special importance matters” and, according to Article 87 (1),
“President of Romania may (n.p.t.) take part in meetings of the Government
debating issues of national foreign policy, the country’s defense, public order
ensuring and, at the request of Prime Minister (n.p.t.), in other situations,
although it is true that, according to paragraph (2), “Romanian President
presides (n.p.t.) the meetings government in which he participates”.
These are — Sartori admits —, somewhat semi presidential attributes. But only
the last is really important, because the assertions that the “president can ...” do
not describe in any case strong constitutional powers. Then, the fact that even
the presence of President in meetings of the Government must be requested by
the Prime Minister substantially limits his constitutional powers.
Also, the dissolution of Parliament is not in any way a presidential prerogative,
under Article 89 (1): “After consulting (n.p.t.) the Presidents of both Chambers
and the leaders of parliamentary groups, the President of Romania may (n.p.t.)
dissolve Parliament if it did not give vote of confidence to form a government
within 60 days after the first request and only after rejection of at least two
requests for investiture”. Or, about Referendum, according to Article 90: “Romania’s
President, after consultation with Parliament (n.p.t.), may request the people to
express, by referendum, his will on some problems of national interest”. Similarly,
the president has no right of veto and no right of legislative initiative, etc., all of
these determining at the end Sartori to assess, from his perspective of comparative
constitutional law, that the Romanian “semi presidentialism” does not allow “a
dual power structure, with two heads and, therefore, a genuine semi presidential
system”10. With all the consequences, positive or negative, arising out of here.
————————
8 Ibidem, p. 315.
9 Constituþia României, Bucureºti, Editura All Beck, 2003.
10 Giovanni Sartori, op. cit., p. 318.
SCIENTIFIC LIFE
CERC BULLETIN No. 3/2009
A bulletin on European studies and research compiled by the Contemporary Europe Research
Centre (CERC) at The University of Melbourne
Globalisation and European integration: ‘the nature of the beast’ 5-6 June 2009,
University of Warwick.
The conference aims to stimulate interdisciplinary exchange on the historical materialist
frameworks used to investigate the relationship between global governance, regional integration
and the national state, with special reference to the European Union. It will also seek to stimulate
a constructive engagement, in one of its panels, between historical materialist, constructivist and
post-structuralist approaches to European integration. The conference will showcase and challenge
the most promising critical theories of regionalisation and globalisation, including neo-Gramscian,
Open Marxist, Regulation and World-System approaches, with the purpose of generating useful
connections and intellectual exchange.
Abstracts (250wds max) due 15 March to [email protected]
Further information: http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/pais/ss/beast/
Registration due 15 April. £27 per delegate inc. lunch, wine reception, refreshments.
Borders, theory, art and power. Contemporary borders, theory and art journeys in the
reciprocal construction of identity between Australia and Europe
17-19 June 2009, Bari, Italy
The second Imagined Australia International Forum continues its research and discussion of
the relationship between Europe and the Oceania-Australia region in artistic and cultural terms.
The specific focus this time is on contemporary Australia and the way European and Australian
thought and arts have occupied themselves with each other’s spaces and themes and why.
Abstracts due 15 March 2009
Further information: INFO@AILAE,ORG /+39 345 29 65 555
Legal, Political and Economic Initiatives Towards Europe of Knowledge
24 April, 2009, Kaunas University of Technology, Institute of Europe, Lithuania
Selected papers will be published in European Integration Studies: Research and Topicalities
Abstracts due: 20 March, 2009. Registrations due: 3 April, 2009
Further information: http://www. euroi.ktu.lt/en/ index.php?option= com_frontpage& Itemid=1
New journal on languages, linguistics and area studies seeks papers
Debut: the new, online, undergraduate journal of languages, linguistics and area studies welcomes
scholarly papers written by undergraduate students in languages, linguistics and area studies. Full
details and guidelines are at: http://www.llas.ac.uk/news/3088
JCER (Journal of Contemporary European Research) – articles wanted
Articles wanted for Autumn 2009 (general) issue of JCER.
Further information: www.jcer.net
Constitutionalism and governance beyond the state
The editors of ConWEB Jutta Brunnee (Law, University of Toronto) and Antje Wiener (Politics
and IR, University of Bath) invite the submission of unsolicited manuscripts from social science
and law backgrounds, which address the broad themes of constitutionalism and governance
beyond the state. Papers focussing on international relations, international law, European integration
162
SCIENTIFIC LIFE
2
theories and/or empirical studies of complex state contexts and international relations are welcome.
Interdisciplinary work is particularly encouraged.
Further information and manuscripts should be sent as email attachments to either Professor
Jutta Brunnee ([email protected]) or Professor Antje Wiener ([email protected]).
‘Boundaries of EU Law after the Lisbon Treaty’ – 7th Session of the Jean Monnet Seminar
19-26 April 2009, Dubrovnik
Accepted papers will be considered for publication in Vol 5. of Croatian Yearbook of European
Law and Policy
Further information: http://www.pravo.hr/EJP/jean_monnet_projekt/dubrovnik_2009
‘Europe’s Expansions and Contractions’ XVIIth Biennial Conference of the Australasian
Association of European Historians (AAEH) 6 – 9 July 2009, Adelaide, Australia
Papers and panels sought on modern European history (broadly defined). Postgraduates are
welcome to submit proposals. Co-sponsored by the Innovative Universities European Union
Centre. Abstracts sent to [email protected]
Further information: <http://www.theaaeh.org>
ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops: The EU in the World Economy, Lisbon 2009
Seeking papers on EU foreign economic relations in general from different theoretical angles
and using different methodologies. Workshop directors: Andreas Dür (University College Dublin)
and Manfred Elsig (Universität Bern, World Trade Institute).
Abstracts to be sent to [email protected] and [email protected]
The Laboratory of International Relations, ISPRI
THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE “RELIGIOUS TEXT
AND DISCOURSE” IAªI, 5-6 DECEMBER, 2008
The Department of Romanian Language from “Alexandru Ioan Cuza” University of Iaºi organized,
between the 5th and the 6th of December 2008, the National Conference “Religious Text and
Discourse”. The first edition of this scientific event was devoted to the analysis of the dominant
features that distinguish religious communication from other types of present-day communicative
practices. Among the main objectives of the conference, the organizers included the description of
the most prominent elements of the Romanian religious language and culture, the elaboration of
an adequate methodology to analyze and interpret various linguistic and cognitive aspects of the
religious phenomena in the broader context of cultural interference and the development of the
new media, the establishment of long lasting connection among the members of the scientific
community, by finding new medium and long-term research opportunities and promoting the
actual research to a broader audience.
In order to fulfil the objectives, the organization committee (prof. dr. Alexandru Gafton, lect.
dr. Sorin Guia, lect. dr. Ioan Milicã) proposed that the presentations should be divided according
to nature of the audience. Consequently, the plenary session, devoted to a larger public (researchers
and academics, students and other various persons) was followed by two sections, entitled “The
translation of the sacred text” and “The Rhetorics of the Religious Discourse”.
The proceedings of the conference were attended by more than sixty five specialists with
various research interests. The interdisciplinary approach was favoured in the presentations
delivered by many guests coming from the most important Romanian universities and research
institutes, such as Bucharest, Cluj, Iaºi, Sibiu and Timiºoara, to name just a few.
Among the most prominent speakers who took part to the scientific event hosted by the
University of Iaºi, we can mention Bartolomeu Anania, the Metropolitan bishop of Cluj, Alba and
Maramureº, Teofan Savu, The Metropolitan bishop of Moldavia and Bucovina, Petru Gherghel, the
Bishop of the Romano-Catholic Diocese of Iaºi, prof. dr. Vasile Iºan, the Rector of the “Alexandru
3
163
SCIENTIFIC LIFE
Ioan Cuza” University, prof. dr. ªtefan Avãdanei, The Dean of the Faculty of Letters, prof. dr. pr.
Gheorghe Popa (The University of Iaºi), prof. dr. pr. Ioan C. Teºu (The University of Iaºi), dr. Petre
Guran (The Institute of South-Eastern Studies, Bucharest), prof. dr. Dumitru Irimia (The University
of Iaºi), prof. dr. pr. Emil Dumea, the Dean of the Faculty of the Romano-Catholic Theology (The
University of Iaºi), prof. dr. Vasile Þâra (The University of Timiºoara), prof. dr. Gheorghe Manolache
(The University of Sibiu), prof. dr. Gheorghe Chivu (The University of Bucharest), prof. dr.
Constantin Frâncu (The University of Iaºi) and lect. dr. pr. Lucian Farcaº (The University of Iaºi).
The presentations and discussions focused on the technique and importance of the biblical
translations, the connections between the religious language and other cultural linguistic varieties
(the languages of literature and science, especially), the Orthodox iconographical art, the blending
of prophetical and religious discourse in the Romano-Catholic tradition and, last but not least, the
importance of the religious books in the development of the Literary Romanian. The proceedings
of the National Conference “Religious Text and Discourse” will be published in a volume and the
organization committee already plans the second edition.
Sorin Guia
Ioan Milicã
SESIUNEA ANUALÃ DE COMUNICÃRI ªTIINÞIFICE, COMITETUL
ROMÂN PENTRU ISTORIA ªI FILOSOFIA ªTIINÞEI ªI TEHNICII
(CRIFST), THE ROMANIAN ACADEMY, 15 OCTOBER, 2008
Wednesday, 15 October 2008, at the Romanian Academy Aula, took place the Annual Session of
Scientific Communications, Division of Logic, Methodology and Science’s Philosophy.
The debate focused upon logic, methodology and science’s philosophy implied both a “sketching”
of the dominating social, political, philosophical and cultural climate, and an “inventory” of the technical
postulates — all recognized in the theoretical models of an alternative communicational paradigm.
According to professor and researcher Angela Botez, logic, methodology and science’s philosophy
can be seen only as a summon of an organically evolution, which led to the “energetically
domination” of what can be called a transitive language, a transparent, multifunctional, non-mediated
one, as a background for a maximal (logical, philosophical and methodological) disponibility.
The inventories of the theoretical structures were focused upon: Current trends in philosophy
and social sciences (Angela Botez); Aristotle’s definition of truth. Binary operators (Cornel Popa);
About Ethics in oratorical fights (Maria Cornelia Bârliba); Ethics of science in the conscience
society (Ionuþ Isac); The source and the meaning of natural and artificial evolution (Laura Panã);
Some aspects of the emotional intelligence in neurobiology field (Mihai Teodorescu); Evolution
and progress in social sciences (Gabriel Nagâþ); Romanian coordinates of the social and political
sciences (Henrieta ªerban); Sociology and socio-political sciences. Romanian (post)modern
sketches (Viorella Manolache).
(Re)phrasing the old trends and theories, the conference promoted a new theoretical view,
intending to detonate the well-known patterns, articulated on some formalist and controlled
acceptations, proposing a de (and re) contextualization of what can be called a “rebuilt of the logic,
methodology and science’s philosophy”.
The distinction between the logical, methodological and philosophical basis and the substance
brought together various fields of procedures, in order to express the relations between the
elements which form the new Science and to reconfigure a so-called “corpus of logic, methodological
and philosophical discourse”.
Considering it more a debate than a simple academic procedure, the conference proposed only
to describe the dynamic of logic, methodology and science’s philosophy’s dynamics, updating it’s
mechanism and stratagem, identifying its major projects, annihilating the apparent dogmatic
linearity — so much used — in the scientific interventions!
Viorella Manolache
BOOK REVIEWS
Ion Goian
Machiavelli, Enigmaticul. Omul, epoca, volumul I, Editura Institutului de ªtiinþe Politice ºi Relaþii
Internaþionale, Bucureºti, 2008, 210 p.
Written and (trans)written according to a faustic imperative (that of the settlement on the writing table of
the translations and images, of what the author calls all the ingredients of a small iconography), Machiavelli,
the enigmatic writer. The man, the epoch aims to provide an immediate reality of Machiavelli, placed behind
derived images (direct or indirect), mortuary masks or imaginative representations (marked by posthumous irony).
Organized as “an annotated biography” of Niccoló Machiavelli, the study formula allows the reader to traverse
the main events of Machiavelli’s life in an chronological order, or, referring to the footnotes to the text, to be
introduced to the most influential comments of the experts in his biography and writings (p. 201-202).
Machiavelli, the enigmatic writer. The man, the epoch aims to overcome the iconography’s stasis, balancing
scientifically, what has been denatured by the assault of those who have considered a duty to block Machiavelli’s
thoughts into conventional factors (formulas/ terms in which Machiavelli is commonly described the Evil
Principle, the discoverer of ambition and revenge, the original inventor of perjury!). Machiavelli, the enigmatic
writer. The man, the epoch is a necessary tool of those who attempt to draw, documentary, the Machiavelli’s
portrait. The contradictions in Machiavelli’s writings should be understood in their historical context. This is
a useful corrective, because it would be unlikely for Machiavelli to measure himself by the academic values
of systematic coherence and plodding argumentation!
This volume is meant to be the first part of a trilogy. The second volume deals with some interpretations
of the most important writings by Machiavelli, while the third is an approach of the cultural background of the
historical lectures of his works.
Machiavelli’s life falls into three periods, each representing a distinct and important era in the history of
Florence. A member of the impoverished branch of a distinguished family, he entered the political service of
the Florentine republic and rose rapidly in importance.
His youth was concurrent with the greatness of Florence as an Italian power under the guidance of Lorenzo
de Medici, Il Magnifico. The downfall of the Medici in Florence occurred in 1494, when Machiavelli entered
the public service. During his official career Florence was free under the government of a Republic, which
lasted until 1512, when the Medici returned to power, and Machiavelli lost his position. The Medici again ruled
Florence from 1512 until 1527, when they were once more driven out. This was the period of Machiavelli’s
literary activity and increasing influence. When, in 1527, the republic was briefly reestablished, Machiavelli
was distrusted by many of the republicans, and he died thoroughly disappointed and embittered. He died,
within a few weeks of the expulsion of the Medici, on 21 June 1527, without having regained job.
Reconsidering the importance of the descriptive and historical fragments, Ion Goian return to a new sense
of the political and philosophical discourse engaging it with a different point of view and with different effects:
in a fringed interference between the iconography and the real, preconception and careful observation (of the
historical facts, documents and translations).
The historical preliminaries (The political life in Florence before the 16th century and the origins of
Florentine politics in Machiavelli’s time) provide, as Ion Goian states, a necessary, but short review of the
history of the city of Florence, essential in order to understand both, the political confrontations in which the
Florentine Secretary was involved, as an official of the Soderini’s government and afterwards as a thought-tobe opponent of Medici regime and theorist of Florentine liberty, but also Machiavelli’s perspective about
politics in general and about his fatherland’s history in particular (p. 201). These preliminaries, doubled by
Machiavelli’s annotated biography, establish a two-double time perspective: a historical and a political one,
assimilating, deliberately, the historical data, returning to the idea of a discursive (co)property in his process
of framing an epoch and a man.
From the perspective of a documented and philosophical restless point of view, Machiavelli, the enigmatic
writer. The man, the epoch focuses on a half decreased light in articulating Machiavelli’s profile as (still!) an
enigmatic presence. Although, from the Palazzo Vecchio of Florence, Machiavelli’s remains alert, almost
smiling, and completely inscrutable!
Viorella Manolache
2
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165
Viorella Manolache (coord.)
Centru ºi Margine la Marea Mediteranã (Filosofie Politicã ºi Realitate Internaþionalã) — Center and
Margin at the Mediterranean Sea (Political Philosophy and International Reality), Editura Institutului
de ªtiinþe Politice ºi Relaþii Internaþionale, Bucureºti, 2009, 460 p.
The collective volume focused upon Center and Margin at the Mediterranean Sea (Political Philosophy
and International Reality) joins scientific contributions from eight countries (Romania, Morocco, Tunis, Turkey,
Brazil, USA, Italy) providing a rich mix of theoretical and philosophical comparative, international and
transnational issues, addressed to all who are interested in the contemporary political phenomena in the
Mediterranean context of increasing international interdependence and global change.
According to Henrieta Aniºoara ªerban, the collective volume answering to the theme Center-Margin at
the Mediterranean Sea (Political Philosophy and International Reality) was conceived as an ampler echo and
also as a complementary dimension to the laboratory work of the journal of the Institute of Political Science
and International Relations of the Romanian Academy, entitled Romanian Review of Political Sciences and
International Relations. While the journal has proven a wide opening both for a great diversity of recurrent
themes now within political sciences, and for certain “marginal” areas of interdisciplinarity, this work aims
also at the same ample scope. In other words, the volume maintains the same type of innovative ambitions and
the same manner of relating to contemporary tendencies as the journal, approching through some of the texts,
certain attempts to inter-relate also a few “weak” theoretical concepts, to a significant extent more adequated
to the complexities associated with the investigation of such a theme, coming from different universities and
from different countries. You are contemplating the effort to estimate the present geo-political research of the
Mediterranean community, and the endeavour to enter into a dialogue with this community.
As the coordonator of the volume, Viorella Manolache states in the argument, the volume comes in the
context of an unfortunate Romanian theoretical void which enhances a sense of mechanistic synchronization
and/or the pressure of dogma, from proletcult-marxism to protochronism-impressionism. The volume’s pivots
on the modern/ postmodern political paradigms confirm three constant dimensions, in this dynamic formula:
Political philosophy of Mediterranean Centre and Margin; Cultural approaches on the Mediterranean Margin
and International reality at the Mediterranean Sea. The volume contains the following perspectives: Margins
of Theories and Theories of Margins. Short Introduction (Abdellatif Akbib), Coloniality/Post-Coloniality
Rhetoric and the Paradox of Center and Peripheries (Mohamed Dellal), The End of Theory in the Age of PostTradition (Said Graiouid), The East and the West: Relations of Centre and Margin (Abderrazzak Essrhir), The
Modernizing claim of “Partnership” between the U.N initiative and the southern Mediterranean region
(Abdenbi Sarroukh), Evaluãri “slabe” despre marginea mediteraneanã: filosofie ºi realitate internaþionalã
(Viorella Manolache), Despre centru ºi margini la Marea Mediteranã. Mediterana ca simbol al puterii (Lorena
Pãvãlan Stuparu), Ironismul ca gestionare a relaþiei dintre “Centru” ºi “Margine” (Henrieta ªerban), Gramsci
e i Sud del Mondo: Tra Oriente e Occidente (Carlos Nelson Coutinho), Perception de la Mediterranée et du
Maghreb a Travers le Recit de Voyage d’Emanuel De Aranda (Alia Bournaz Baccar), An archaeological
approach to the cultural and political background of East-Mediterranean: Alâiyye and its Periphery (Z.Kenan
Bilici), The Pentagon’s Palimpsest: How the screening of Battle of Algiers underlies the torture at Abu Ghraib
(Perri Giovannucci), Le relazioni economiche tra Europa e Islam nel Mediterraneo moderno (XV-XVII sec.)
(Daniele Casanova), E. Lovinescu ºi Mediterana. Note de cãlãtorie (Antonio Patraº), Reversiuni mediteraneene
în orientarea clasicistã de la Junimea (Anton Naum) (Gheorghe Manolache), Reconfigurãri ale mitului lui Don
Juan. Între tradiþia spiritualã spaniolã ºi culturalitatea mediteraneanã (Rodica Grigore), Le Dos Tourné À La
Terre (Diana Adamek), Consemnãri de (la) margine: persistenþa unei fobii (Leonte Ivanov), Creºterea, descreºterea
ºi renaºterea valorii de pivot geopolitic ºi geostrategic a Mãrii Mediterane (Florin Diaconu), Evoluþia Africii
de Nord în contextul Mediteranean (Gabriel Florea), UE ºi Bazinul Mediteranean. Dificultãþi ale Parteneriatului
Euro-Mediteranean (Ruxandra Luca), Parteneriatul Euro-Mediteranean–Consideraþii conceptuale (Lucian
Jora), Influencing the Process of Enlargement: The Commission and the Parliament case study: the 2007
Enlargement (Daniela Ionescu), Rolul României în politica europeanã de vecinãtate a UE (Rãzvan Pantelimon),
O þarã mediteraneanã: Italia–între proiect comunitar ºi perspectivã regionalã (Alexandra Vasile).
The volume is meant to be a focal point for the serious research exchange in terms of geographical and
political community, methodological orientation, and theoretical preference, concerning the domestic,
comparative, transnational and international political and cultural aspects, demonstrating highest standards of
excellence in conceptualization, exposition, methodology, illuminating significant research problem, or
answering important research question, of general interest in political science.
Center and Margin at the Mediterranean Sea (Political Philosophy and International Reality) has important
internal and external collaborators, constant ones, whose landmarks are offered in the rubric that contains
authors’ presentations (mentioning The Institute of Political Sciences and International Relations, Bucharest,
Romanian Diplomatic Institute, Bucharest, “Al.I.Cuza” University, Iaºi, “Babeº Bolyai” University, Cluj,
166
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3
“Lucian Blaga” University, Sibiu, Universidad Federal do Rio de Janeiro, University Mohammed V, Rabat,
AbdelMalek Essaadi, University in Tetouan, Université de La Manouba, American University in Dubai,
Ankara University, Università degli Studi di Napoli “L’Orientale”, Napoli s.o.)
Hence the innovative character of the volume resides in overcoming the general(ising) tendency of
Romanian political science thinking, re-directing the common analyze, built on the modernist canons, towards
the new horizons of transparent societies, re-thinking the research priorities, proposing a shift from
communication to performativity.
Multifaceted and plural, the topic includes fundamental concepts which enforce coincidences between two
platforms — the discursive, theoretical one, typical of the new, decentralized, structurally democratized university
pedagogies, and the intra — and interdisciplinary scaffolding of applied research — are easily recognizable in
the postmodern Romanian project, fed by pluralistic views, and encouraged by the rethinking of the actual
political and philosophical opportunities for research and political decentring.
The volume promotes a conversation among a spectrum of political scientists and it is opened also to the
contributions from related disciplines that help to enrich knowledge in political science.
These are the strong points of the Center and Margin at the Mediterranean Sea perception, an evaluation
of both coordinates — political philosophy and international reality, as a double face of some new challenges
in the Mediterranean area!
Alexandra Vasile
Guy Hermet
L’hiver de la démocratie ou le nouveau régime, Editions Armand Colin, 2008, 229 p.
Guy Hermet continue la série d’interrogations qu’il formule quant au régime démocratique par un nouveau
livre paru aux Editions Armand Colin en 2008, sous un titre expressif — L’hiver de la démocratie ou le
nouveau régime — recherché avec beaucoup de finesse par l’auteur, dans son souci de faire que le contenu du
livre soit complètement mis en valeur.
Ce titre annonce d’ailleurs sa thèse de la fin du régime démocratique, une thèse provocatrice vu le
rayonnement de ce régime dans le monde, son extension géographique impressionnante, mais aussi une
évidence si l’on regarde avec attention quelques aspects. En effet, cette extension géographique de la
démocratie est seulement un indicateur quantitatif, alors que le vrai critère à prendre en compte est celui
qualitatif: «…c’est le triomphe de la démocratie en surface, pour ainsi dire, qui attire l’attention du public. En
revanche c’est la perte de substance de la démocratie en profondeur qui demeure largement et volontairement
inaperçue» (p. 10). D’où l’on voit s’appliquer le paradigme qui fait que tout régime atteigne à un moment
donné sa fin, même si les contemporains de cet épuisement ne s’en rendent pas compte ou vivent avec la
conviction contraire de ce que le régime qu’ils connaissent se trouve au comble de son existence et qu’il n’y
a aucun signe de sa prochaine disparition: «Comme nos ancêtres de 1775 ou de 1785, nous touchons au terme
d’un futur ancien régime, d’un régime finissant, voué à céder la place à un autre univers politique encore
dépourvu de nom mais dès maintenant largement esquissé dans la pratique. Comme eux, nous sommes à la
porte du Prochain Régime» (p. 13).
Et l’auteur insiste à bien préciser qu’il n’annonce pas la crise de la démocratie mais exactement sa fin: «Parler
de crise, c’est suggérer que nous vivrions simplement un passage à vide, que la situation va s’arranger. C’est une
vue erronée. Je crois profondément que la démocratie telle que nous la concevons n’existera bientôt plus»1.
L’auteur rentre dans les subtilités de cette équation ancien régime — régime actuel — prochain régime
pour expliquer quels sont les arguments soutenant que la démocratie actuelle est arrivée à ses limites; il fait un
détour obligatoire en analysant la démocratie de la Grèce antique ou la citoyenneté médiévale pour expliquer
des concepts-clé de son discours — peuple, souveraineté, droits, citoyens, gouvernement, gouvernance, etc. —
et pour arriver à l’époque du suffrage universel avec lequel le peuple est devenu le point de référence requis
pour légitimer le gouvernement.
Mais comment entend le peuple d’accomplir ce rôle de détenteur de la souveraineté? Le processus de
démocratisation paraissait avoir atteint son objectif une fois que l’égalité juridique et la citoyenneté politique
ont été reconnues et complétées par une troisième phase correspondant à la citoyenneté économique et sociale.
L’égalité juridique et politique se voyait compléter par des droits sociaux et économiques menés à protéger les
travailleurs contre les inconvénients de l’économie libérale. C’est justement dans la superposition de ces trois
————————
1 Interview du 7 janvier 2008, réalisée par Dominique Berns et publiée sur http://archives.lesoir.be
(archives), dans laquelle Hermet explique les axes centraux de L’hiver de la démocratie.
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167
types de droits que Hermet place la source du déséquilibre de la démocratie: «Alors que les droits civils et
politiques se voulaient dès le début égalitaires dans leur principe et le sont devenus de plus en plus dans leur
réalité, les droits sociaux ne se sont jamais débarrassés de leur visage inégalitaire d’indemnité de sujétion
octroyée aux plus faibles. Pourtant, en dépit de leur nature condescendante, ils ont vite pris le pas sur les droits
précédents aux yeux de la masse des Européens» (p. 34). Hermet développe providence dans la continuité
logique de sa réflexion une critique de l’État —, dont le blocage est contemporain de la fin du régime
démocratique. Cette coïncidence dans le temps n’est pas du domaine du hasard. L’auteur le souligne par
exemple lorsqu’il s’interroge quant au choix que les citoyens feraient, s’ils étaient en situation de choisir entre
les droits juridiques et politiques et ceux sociaux et économiques. La probabilité accrue qu’ils optent pour les
derniers indique que pour eux la démocratie doit se légitimer à chaque fois par des promesses dont la spirale
ne peut plus être entretenue par l’État or, «sur le plan pratique, la démocratie a atteint ses limites. C’est le seul
régime qui est obligé se légitimer à chaque élection. Les promesses constituent son carburant. Au début, on a
promis le suffrage universel masculin, puis le vote des femmes, puis encore l’abaissement de l’âge du droit de
vote — tout cela ne coûtait pas très cher. Ensuite, on a promis la démocratie sociale: l’assurance-maladie, les
pensions de retraite, la sécurité sociale en général. Maintenant, la démocratie arrive au fond du réservoir des
promesses réalisables. Le déclin de la démocratie — et ce n’est pas une coïncidence — accompagne la fin de
l’État — providence»2.
Ruxandra Luca
Bart Cammaerts
Internet-mediated participation beyond the nation state, Manchester and New York, Manchester
University Press, 2008, 266 p.
The volume entitled Internet-mediated participation beyond the nation state brings to the fore a topic of
great interest concerning contemporary democracies. Communication and participation are the two facets of
the same coin and both represent a high stake in promoting substantial democracy. The triggering idea is that
democratic decision, may be revitalized now since all stakeholders in society have a voice, that can be heard
thanks to the spread of the new media and of the Internet, and thus we encounter a radical power shift worth
investigating.
The book is structured in two parts: “Theoretical perspectives” and “Empirical Analysis”. Convinced that
it is nothing more practical than a good theory (Kurt Lewin) I shall attempt to underline the first part. Thus,
the first section of the book starts from “Theorising multi-stakeholderism”, a chapter analysing the research of
this concept of multi-stakeholderism in the beginning used in the international politics with reference to
increased participation of non-state actors in policy processes beyond the nation state. Now this concept is
applied to national, regional and even local contexts and the author even talks about a “multi-stakeholder
discourse” (p. 13) implying several assumptions that show a deficit of theoretical perspective in what the concept
is concerned. These assumptions relate to the tensions between centralized and decentralised democracy, the
difficulties associated with deliberating in the public sphere and consensus, the theoretical perspective on the
signifier participation, the urge to define power both within and outside multi-layered decision processes,
along with the issues such as inclusion and exclusion of the citizens, etc. “For multi-stakeholderism to have
any meaning, the nature of its relationship with the still dominant representative, state centred and centralised
logic at international level must be clear. Furthermore, the consensual focus implied by multi-stakeholderism
requires more precise articulation” (p. 23), in my opinion with the notion of deliberation and with the processes
of inclusiveness defining the logic of democratic life. This type of discourse is founded of highly disputable
assumptions of rather equal participants to communication processes, the open access to the deliberation
process centred on the common good of the reasonable, active, interested, and open to new views and
knowledgeable citizens for whom the strength of the argument is more important than their agenda, their pride
as protagonists of discourse. At this point it becomes highlighted that the type of participation at the core of
multi-stakeholderism relies, on the one hand, on the possibility of emergence of Habermas’s public sphere and,
on the other hand, on a Lockian perspective on the political nature of the human being.
Since the 70s, the very important distinction between access and participation to/in media was introduced
in the debates. Decision-making and participation are to be seen in strict relationship (p. 25-30). The achievement
of full participation is now assessed as in Carol Pateman’s perspective stated in 1970 as following: “equal
power in determining the outcome”. Since then, notions of “pseudo-participation” (Verba, 1961), “non————————
2 Idem.
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participation” (Arnstein, 1969) or “manipulative participation” (Strauss, 1998) were overcome. The developments
in the specialised literature (R. Heeks, 1999) have brought to the fore several types of participation: veneered
participation (top-down and rhetorical), inequitable participation (decisions made solely by those in power
and/or able to better articulate themselves publicly), skewed participation (similarly, participation and decision
is biased in the favour of the more powerful and articulated), “non-communicative participation” (due to a
reticence or inability to communicate given the differences in culture, world views, or language in front of
delays, misunderstandings and inappropriate design or implementation) and “career-enhancing participation”
(the processes of participation reflect as well personal agendas of a few powerful staff rather than the concrete
needs of the organisation).
Thus, power and participation are to be seen in a strict relationship, too. Participation is an ideal motor of
interaction among actors. Nowadays, the actors are not only considered entitled to be animated by the will to
participate, but also they ought to. The social and political actors in the contemporary societies have the duty
to attempt to pursue their own agendas acknowledging the necessity to understand both the conflictual models
and the consensual models of power as in the works of Giddens, 1984 and M. Haugaard, 1997 not to fall under
the restrictive power and not to exclusively embrace the power to resist. This perspective is identified by the
Foucaultian remark: “Just as the ability to read and write and freely communicate gives power to citizens that
protects them from the powers of the state, the ability to surveil, to invade the citizens’ privacy, gives the state
the power to confuse, coerce and control citizens. Uneducated populations cannot rule themselves, but tyrannies
can control even educated populations, given sophisticated means of surveillance”. (Foucault, Discipline and
Punish, 1979: 290)
From this perspective, the question “Who do you represent?” gains both substance and complexity. Civil
society could be in this respect a stakeholder as well (in my opinion, including the market in the definition of
civil society in order to discuss more realistically aspects such as access, participation, agendas, inclusion and
exclusion). The multi-stakeholder concept is in this light the concept of an individual that is reasonably
knowledgeable, active, lucid and has a lot at stake in the social and political interaction within a society “of
birth and/or of residence” and beyond. The concept of multi-stakeholderism highlights the concept of participation
only in relationship with a more (optimistic) complex and general notion of citizenship, inscribed within a
broader discussion on constructivism and critical theory. Briefly put, the citizen should be the “rational, selfdirecting and knowledgeable agent of action” (M. Gergen and K.J. Gergen, 2003), within the paradigm of
productive power developed by the works of Foucault on discourse, power, resistance and truth, on Giddens’s
dialectics of control, and on the less acknowledge perspective on the generic type of liberal-ironist individual
proposed by R. Rorty in Contingency, Irony and Solidarity, 1989 and by the post-structuralism (and) feminism.
Social constructivism indicates toward the importance of identity in the formation of the actors, to the
importance of the speech acts and of the socialisation and learning processes. Thus it offers a better view for
a discussion of a multi-centric world and power, a broader theoretical frame to interpret multi-stakeholderism
beyond the nation state, too.
In the second chapter of the first part, “Internet and democracy”, Internet is advocated as a political
opportunity structure (P. Eisinger, 1973, S. Tarrow, 1994), following a concept of not only productive, but
dynamic power as Giddens does. The argument starts from the easier access to policy documents and from the
increased transparency triggered by the use of the Internet. The networking and distribution of the alternative,
counter-hegemonic discourses are also favoured. On the other hand, while Internet creates offline citizens,
there is as well the argument that dissent might be ever easier ignored by the offline world. Yet, e-campaigning
is evermore received as a powerful tool in strategic communication bringing to the fore the concept of
permanent campaign. E-government and e-voting are still pragmatically captive at the rhetorical level. Econsultation might emerge as a decentralised decision-making process targeted at accommodating the multistakeholder citizens in a broad consensus. Finally, e-protest, forums and mailing lists are the promise for an
emerging e-civil society. Only the next decade could assess the hope of the Internet as the empowering
instrument for better access and participation, and for an articulate and influencing “voice”. Time hurries up.
The second part of the book is dedicated to empirical analysis. As concerns the global and European multistakeholder processes (Chapter 3) they are investigated in relation to the civil society actors and activities with
the intention to answer three important questions: How are participatory (multi-stakeholder) discourses of
international organisations (UN, EU) implemented?; What power mechanisms/resistance strategies enable or
restrict participation?; and What role does the Internet play in this dialectic context? Then, the chapters 4 and
5 look at the productive power processes from a generative perspective, against a restrictive one. Chapter 4,
“Productive power in the WSIS” related to the productive power process in the case of the WSIS. The World
Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) consisted of a couple of conferences about information,
communication and information society sponsored by the United Nations, that took place in 2003, in Geneva,
and in 2005, in Tunis. Briefly, their purpose was to address the imperative need to re-relate the so-called
“global digital divide” separating rich countries from poor countries by spreading access to the Internet in the
developing world. The author pleads for the importance of a more serious standpoint in these matters, both in
6
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what concerns the academic scholars and the activists so that WSIS does not remain a vain “war of words”
since it was from the very beginning a “war of positions”. There were concrete outcomes of WSIS, consisting
of an articulated opposition to the neo-liberal vision of the information society, a proof of the trans-national
civil society, and a learning exercise contributing to raising the awareness among the civil society national and
trans-national actors on the importance of media and communication.
Chapter 5, “Productive power in the Convention on the Future Europe” emphasized the role and the impact of
civil society in the production power process involved by this Convention. Civil society was consulted and listened
to, even if it did not extend to the deliberative and drafting processes, also provided that the diverging agendas within
civil society made passions, anxieties and concerns the enemy of a civil society articulated discourse.
Chapter 6, “Does any of it make a difference?” bridges the former two chapters in an assessment of the multistakeholderism in practice. The results of this well-situated, documented and conceived study are structured
around a critical position regarding the implementation of the participatory discourses (implicitly seen as the
pillars of the democratic processes). The emergence of the alternative is a plus, that of timid strategies of
resistance, too. International policy processes show glimpses of slight change. As for conclusion, making a
difference, as the accomplishment of the aim of more inclusive and democratically legitimate policy processes,
still remains a task, just not one to be addressed radically. A small but relevant difference is a great difference.
Henrieta Aniºoara ªerban
Rodica Grigore
Lecturi în labirint, Cluj-Napoca, Casa Cãrþii de ªtiinþã Publishing House, 2007, 256 p.
If the venerable Argentine writer Jorge Luis Borges imposed in the field of literature the image with
infinite meanings of a library seen as a perfect paradise, here we have a young literary critic, coming from
Sibiu, Rodica Grigore, who finds herself as a reader a similar space: the infinite act of reading. This is a cultural
space as specialized as it is equally privileged, for the author’s own work contributes in its turn to the action
of making the above mentioned library more and more complete. We are talking especially of her latest book,
Readings in the Labyrinth [Lecturi în labirint], Cluj-Napoca, Casa Cãrþii de ªtiinþã Publishing House, 2007,
256 pages.
Taking into consideration Sibiu as a cultural city, we have to mention first and foremost that Rodica
Grigore is one of the most distinguished members of her literary generation: she already published her doctoral
thesis, The Rhetoric of Masks in Romanian Modern Fiction. Mateiu I. Caragiale, Urmuz, Max Blecher, George
Mihail Zamfirescu, G. Cãlinescu (in 2005), as well as another book of literary criticism, Of Books and Other
Demons [Despre cãrþi ºi alþi demoni, 2002] and she is teaching Comparative Literature at “Lucian Blaga”
University of Sibiu. Besides, Rodica Grigore has authored several translations (from the work of Octavio Paz,
Manuel Cortés Castañeda and Andrei Codrescu), her Romanian version of Codrescu’s volume of novellas and
short stories, A Bar in Brooklyn having been awarded the special prize for translation of the Writers’ Union in
2006. And if we also think that in 2005 and 2006 Mexico and Spain have warmly welcomed her as an exquisite
translator of Romanian poetry, prestigious literary magazines from these two countries having published
anthologies of Romanian verse she has realized, we clearly see and easily understand that Rodica Grigore also
has the gift of using Cervantes’s language and placing Romanian poems in its specific rhythm, thus fulfilling
a very well defined literary destiny within the field of contemporary culture.
We should warmly welcome — and I certainly do it — Rodica Grigore’s book, a diary of her readings, as
the most recent accomplishment within a series tending to reshape, in its own rights, in contemporary
Romanian culture, some kind of democracy of authentic values, inscribing itself in a long and well-known
tradition of living together, perfectly identifiable within our Transylvanian world. It is, for sure, a clear sign of
a thorough and elegant cordiality, of course, sometimes full of antinomies, but never of antagonisms, an
attitude that characterized the young intellectuals known as Criterion Association during the years 20s and 30s
of the last century. Therefore, the young author practices a friendly criticism, somehow following the direction
imposed by Eugen Lovinescu. She has nothing of the pernicious mentality based upon the old saying “I may
destroy you whenever I want!” that characterized entire generations of literary critics until our times and even
nowadays. After all, Rodica Grigore expresses, by her writing, a new way of thinking as well: it is a wonderful
moment, so long desired and expected in our literature that could be placed under the following statement: “I
deconstruct you (your work) just in order to be able to reconstruct you afterwards and do structure you even
better; and therefore to be able to reconstruct myself for our common reader.” This kind of critical discourse,
be it somehow “impressionistic” needs to be cultivated more and more in our cultural space, be it East
European or post communist as well.
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7
Besides, the author’s “politic” attitude is more than honoring in the general confusion of values that surrounds
us and that sometimes also surrounds the process of critical evaluation by using some reductive patterns, a new
kind of censorship… Rodica Grigore analyses the work of many writers who were awarded the Nobel Prize or
some others prestigious literary distinctions. But this is not the author’s specific criteria of appreciation,
because what brings together all the subjects of her book Readings in the Labyrinth proves to be the obsession
of writing that fully characterizes the entire activity of those authors Rodica Grigore chooses to write about.
Some of the authors who express themselves this obsession are Manuel Cortés Castañeda, Eliseo Diego or Gao
Xingjian and their confessions are deeply analyzed in Rodica Grigore’s book. In other words, the authors
chosen by Rodica Grigore are the creators of that kind of true and great literature understood as a complete
destiny, or as a “continuous spiritual searching”, to repeat Gao Xingjian’s words.
In a word, we could say that Rodica Grigore is, herself, “an artist of the word”, even an artisan of the word,
maybe because her subtle lecture notes — notes that do not simply represent several pages dedicated to world
literature, but a true handbook of necessary readings, namely a very well structured critical system — apart
from proving her perfect and extensive knowing as far as world literature is concerned, especially LatinAmerican literature, apart from her style, lacking any inadequacy of tone or expression but always offering a
real joy to the reader, fight in their own way to surpass (or trespass) any politic border or boundary that might
stop the free circulation of any authentic cultural values, the poetic ones in particular. It is the courage of an
authentic intellectual, a courage come from a profound understanding of the realities of the world we live in,
that makes Rodica Grigore express always decently, but always explicitly, all the shortcomings that ruin our
life, especially those shortcomings affecting our mentality. We could find many examples in the pages of her
book, but let us just quote one: “The reasons why this remarkable poetry [the Cuban poetry] has usually been
ignored are many and various, but one of the most common is a regrettable and often confusion between the
politics and the poetics of this country and also the so called border of critical spirit, in reality a border or a
boundary that may be found only within the narrow minds of those who learnt to read using only the patterns
imposed by one or another of the cannons of our Occidental culture.” (p. 10)
Last but not least, Rodica Grigore knows perfectly how to reintegrate Andrei Codrescu (born, in fact, in
the same city, Sibiu) in the field of Romanian literature: she is the one who, apart from her translations of his
essays and short stories, also wrote several excellent pages about the Romanian born American author, without
being intimidated by his fame or his reputation gained in the United States, a reputation somehow comparable
to that of another native of Sibiu, Emil Cioran, who gained his celebrity in France and then in the entire world.
Therefore, Andrei Codrescu himself, deciding to write the preface of this young critic’s latest book, calls her
“Rodica, the guide” and compares Readings in the Labyrinth to a “Babylonian city inhabited by people fascinated
by books”. Moreover, he is proud to say the following: “This is where I came across myself more than once
and when I tried to find another way, I encountered other writers: José Saramago, Gao Xingjian, Alejo
Carpentier, Bei Dao or Samuel Beckett. For in this particular city that the young critic knows perfectly how to
map, live only people preoccupied by books and mirrors, thus the reader having to face the illusion of a
metropolis with a population exclusively dedicated to this unusual fortress. And those specific mirrors we, the
writers, are carrying, reflect everything but do not prevent us from greeting our fellow writers and even,
sometimes, to enthusiastically change among ourselves books or some other writings.”
This is an understanding of literature that could be called, without any hesitation, truly European. And
also, if we take into account the young critic’s high specialization in the filed of Romance and Anglo-Saxon
languages, an impressive international one. All these make the reader of Rodica Grigore’s book think of a wellknown poem by Fernando Pessoa: “A flor que és, não a que dás, eu quero./ Porque me negas o que te não peço./
Tempo há para negares/ Depois de teres dado./ Flor, sê-me flor! Se te colher avaro/ A mão da infausta esfinge,
tu perene/ Sombra errarás absurda,/ Buscando o que não deste.”
Mihai Posada
Lúdmila Malìková and Martin Sirák
Regional and Urban Regeneration in European Peripheries: What Role for Culture?, Slovak
Commission of UNESCO, National Committee of MOST, Institute of Public Policy, Bratislava,
2008, 98 p.
The increased attention paid to culture as a public policy tool is organized as a possible response to the
apparent new questions: Does it really matter who wins and who loses in this culture-led development game?
What makes a city, a region, a country culturally unique? Is it possible to measure the benefits and specific
impacts of cultural investment and culture-led development projects? Why do some Slovaks think that the
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171
country’s “centre of culture” lays anywhere but in the City of Martin and why do some people complain that
Bratislava is not a well-known brand across the world?
The study focused upon Regional and Urban Regeneration in European Peripheries: What Role for
Culture? tries to approximate an answer to a single question with its normative version: What is the role of
culture in the processes of renewal and development of cities and regions?/ What should be the role of culture,
so that it can contribute to successful local and regional development?
The contemporary process of restructuring the post-communist societies as European can be approximate
in terms of dissolution of the communist past and of its strong cultural impregnation.
Slovak history shows that changing cultures takes a long time, and social change requires stamina from
civic leaders and belief and involvement on the part of citizens in general. Regional and Urban Regeneration
in European Peripheries: What Role for Culture?, will help increase the interest of Slovak academics and experts
in this relativity new research agenda, contributing to the preparation of the Kosice ECOC 2013. The ECOC
event, introduced to the European cultural policy agenda in 1985, has provided the key for selecting and
organizing this study in order to present the experiences of the peripheral areas of European cities which have
experimented with cultural as a new strategic development asset.
The study Regional and Urban Regeneration in European Peripheries: What Role for Culture? is organized
in three parts, including analyses developed by young academics coming from “Classical Europe” (as Italy and
Greece), or qualitative accounts of how ECOC impacts on local populations and cultures (North WestLiverpool; North East of England-Newcastle and Stavanger-Norway).
The urban-cultural organizational metropolises of the Western settle political and social contradictions
through consumption and leisure organization, principle that is also applicable in the metropolises of South
Eastern Europe. In an attempt to imitate the lifestyle of the West, the East fails because of lack of purchasing
power for a wide blanket of the population. Europe is not an invention quota, but a state of aggregate. Europe
creates free democracy and culture. The way that Eastern Europe and West grow together produces a
transitional space — an ideal field of activity for culture. Culture transcends borders and is a producer of new
policies and discursive image, which help to overcome the old way of thinking.
Closed cultures get local under the assault of globalization and generalized communication, forced to
become able to “introduce” themselves to the others, to create an interface, to become a brand. Regional and
Urban Regeneration in European Peripheries: What Role for Culture? aims at restoration of the old eurocultural ties, placing the multicultural management in the context of European community consensus. Starting
from the belief that introducing the local culture, Lúdmila Malìková and Martin Sirák consider that the
European sensitivity can be resumed to its bivalent tension, putting together the centered-local-culture and the
decentered, multicultural and global one. A new cultural geography in which we are determined to live together!
Viorella Manolache
Brian J. Brown, Sally Baker
Philosophies of Research into Higher Education, Continuum International Publishing Group, London,
2007, 192 p.
Well accustomed with relevant and well chosen literature, well argued and structured, this volume is very
convincing that, as Kurt Lewin said, nothing is so practical as a good theory.
The book proposes a journey into the realm of research in education, and especially higher education, with
the starting point in investigating the philosophical and epistemological basis of the theories underlining
methodology, in order to allow for more useful, more innovative and better designed projects of research.
Addressed to a wide range of students, scholars and researchers the volume represents an interesting
dialogue between philosophy in everyday life and philosophy at work in higher education. The study insists
on the history and philosophy of knowledge, describing critically the different investigative traditions
(positivism, hypothesis testing, realism, “interpretativism” and postmodernism) at the same time empowering
the readers in what concerns interpreting research, designing and attempting one of their own.
The book provides a clear account of what is the modern and postmodern horizon for reading the
educational aspects and, namely, knowledge. From this relevant outline I have selected the greatest moments.
Talcott Parsons (1937, 1951)1 was among the first to analyze the function of educational institutions in modern
society. He discussed the anthropological idea that the patterns of social interaction have consequences in the
more or less adequate functioning of society. For the educational institutions the most important fact is that the
shared values and norms and the means to attain the ends dictate the operation of society as a system.
Gadamer2 placed the accent not on the functioning of the system, but on the interaction between people, and
————————
1 Apud, Brian J. Brown, Sally Baker, Philosophies of Research into Higher Education, Continuum
International Publishing Group, London, 2007, passim.
2 H.-G. Gadamer, Truth and Method, London, Sheed and Ward, 1979.
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9
therefore, on conversation. In his perspective, conversion makes people understand each other and open to
each other. The very knowledge is conceptualized within a horizon of understanding. Knowledge has to pass
through pre-judgment, involvement and understanding. As Bernstein notices (1991) the play of the dialogue
and not the mere agreement turns ideas intelligible, but without having necessarily to agree with the other
(Gadamer, 1979). In this perspective the horizons fusion and the new and the old “continually grow together
to make something of living value, without either being explicitly distinguished from the other.”3 (Gadamer,
1979) A more dystopian vision is brought to the fore by Jean-Francois Lyotard in The Postmodern Condition:
A report on knowledge, 1984. Lyotard shows that in postmodernism knowledge is a product manufactured to
be sold, consumed and/or valorized in a new production and not at all an end in itself.4 At the same time this
“product” becomes the major stake in the competition for power. From this perspective, the distinction
between knowledge and ignorance, but between “payment knowledge” (exchanged in a “daily maintenance
framework”) and “investment knowledge” (“dedicated to optimizing the project”).
The volume is relevant for the social sciences as well. They notice that, at present, within the developed
knowledge societies, research has become a “key building block in its approach to policy. The use of research
evidence in the formulation and evaluation of policy has become widespread across the range of public
services.”5 Even more, the argumentation of the authors is convincing that both evidence-based and evidenceinformed practices are politically also a fashion. Arguing that, we have to understand that at the core of all the
political activities stays the interest for legitimacy, and in this case we are talking about legitimacy by prestige.
Social science attempts in this respect to take its well-deserved place at the heart of policy-making. Again,
more so in the developed knowledge and learning societies Governments tend to understand, or at least begin
to understand the imperative of revolutionizing their relations with the social research community.
Yet policy-making is rarely a rational process. Having said that the authors of the volume emphasize though
the instances in which the policy makers might undertake research evidence. First, the knowledge-driven model
derived from the natural sciences shows that discoveries exercise a pressure for even more development and use
of knowledge. Second, the problem-solving model refers to the application of results to imminent decisions.
Third, the interactive model limits the consequence of research in the sense that researchers are just a part of the
complex process inter-relating experience, political insights, political pressures, social technologies and
(educated?) guesswork. Fourth, the political model sees research as political ammunition in supporting a specific
standpoint. Fifth, the tactical model, involves research in avoiding the responsibilities in front of unpopular
policies. Sixth, the enlightenment model underlines the indirect but powerfully influences and impact of research.
The authors capture the interesting idea that one cannot answer the question of what education is without talking
about what knowledge is and in which relationship it stays with the human beings and their lives. These last two
aspects previously stated could be related to answering the question of what is the purpose of a university. Thus, the
authors valorize the work of Delanty6, and Blackmore7, to identify the main directions for the future of the
university. The entrenched liberal thesis presents university as a place of cultural reproduction to be secured from
political life and from the superficiality attacking the “canon”: “great” literature or “significant” science. Then, the
postmodern thesis announce the “end” of the university provided the “death” of the author, the loss of the
emancipator role of the university along with the fragmentation of knowledge and the separation of research from
teaching. These dystopian views undertaken from Lyotard8 go unchallenged and nuanced. The reflexivity thesis
places the accent on the reflexive relationship between the users and producers of knowledge as in the perspective
of Barnett9. Finally, the globalization thesis underlines the instrumentalization of the university run by market values
and informational technologies, where the universities become major players in the global information market10.
The volume has the strong point of emphasizing the complexity of research nowadays, while it states its
relevance and utility, especially by this postmodern awareness that research might prove to be sometimes just
another inconvenient for a “canon”, administration, ideology, business, market, etc. The valuable lesson here is
that, when this is the case, they should be seen somehow heroically useful and emancipator, hence empowering.
————————
3 Ibidem, p. 273.
4 J.-F. Lyotard, The Postmodern Condition: A report on knowledge, Manchester, Manchester University
Press, 1984, p. 4-5.
5 Brian J. Brown, Sally Baker, Philosophies of Research into Higher Education, Continuum International
Publishing Group, London, 2007, p. 19.
6 G. Delanty, “The University in the knowledge society”, Organisation, 8 (2), 2001, pp. 149-54.
7 J. Blackmore, ‘Is it only ”What works” that “counts” in the new knowledge economies? Evidence-based
practice, educational research and teacher education in Australia’, Social Policy and Society, 1(3), p. 257-66.
8 J.-F. Lyotard, op.cit.
9 R. Barnett, Higher Education: A critical business, Buckingham, Open University Press, 1997.
10 The authors quote G. Rhoades and S. Slaughter, ‘Academic capitalism, managed professionals and
supply-side higher education’ in M. Randy (ed.) Chalklines: The politics of work in the managed university,
Durham and London, Duke University Press, 1998.
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173
Doina Florea
Repertoriul cãrþii germane, italiene ºi româneºti din Biblioteca Muzeului Brukenthal (secolele
XVII-XVIII), Editura TechnoMedia, Sibiu, 2008, 260 p.
In der Arbeit mit dem Titel Das Patrimoniumbuch-kulturelles Vektor (Verlag der “Lucian Blaga” —
Universität in Sibiu/Hermannstadt, 2007), setzt sich Doina Florea für die Kaste der Bibliophile ein. Die
Verfasserin bietet uns im Jahre 2008 eine zweite Überraschung an: Das Sammelwerk der deutschen,
italienischen und rumänischen Bücher aus der Bibliothek des Brukenthal Museums (XVII-tes-XVIII-tes
Jahrhundert), durch die Nachforschung eines umfangreichen kulturell-historischen Raumes.
Die alten und seltenen Bänder, aufgeschichtet in dem Gebäude des prunkvollen Palastes des Barons in
Hermannstadt, sind nicht nur vom Gesetz des Kulturerbes geschützt, sondern auch vom Eifer der Forscher. Stapeln
von ausländischen (deutsche, italienische) und rumänischen Büchern- aus dem XVII-ten und XVII-ten Jahrhundert
—, beherbergt in der Bibliothek des Brukenthal Museums, wurden aus der “Entschlafung” geweckt, danach
wurden sie geordnet und in einem Inventar gelegt, aus welchem dieses wichtige Sammelwerk entstanden ist.
Sachlich gesehen, kann jedes Sammelwerk- sei es auch ein Sammelwerk der Patrimoniumbücher- ein
einfaches “aide mémoire” zu sein scheinen. Der ausforschende Geist der Verfasserin hat für die Leser des IIIten Jahrtausends wertvolle Einzelheiten, scheinbar vergessen, die der Aufklärung angehören, ins Gedächtnis
zurückgerufen.
Was hebt das den Verfassern und Büchern aus den erwähnten Jahrhunderten: XVII-XVIII gewidmeten
Studium hervor? Eine flüchtige Statistik bringt wesentliche “Zeichen” der bildungssprachlichen Lebenskraft
ans Licht: die Sprache in der sie geschrieben oder übersetzt wurden; der Ort (die Stadt/ das Land) wo das
Drucken stattgefunden hat; Namen/ Familien von berühmten Herausgeber, Buchdrucker, Buchhändler;
Bibliophilieelemente (Buchbinderei-und Ornamentikeinzelheiten); Audienzgrad; der Umlauf der Bücher in der
Epoche; Lieblingslektürthemen und ihre Häufigkeit: Architektur, Astronomie, Biologie, Chemie, Philosophie,
Geographie, Geometrie, Geschichte, Wappenkunde, Linguistik, Medizin, Politik, Religion u.a.
Aus den über 1000 ausgewählte Titel im Sammelwerk, treten aus der germanischen Schriftwelt hervor: F.
Balduinus, Questiones illustres ex divinis…(Wittenberg, 1671), Aegidius Hunnius, Operum latinorum…
(Frankfurt, 1606), H. Drexelius, Trismegistus christianus (Monachia, 1618), Erasmus, Colloquia (Leipzig,
1684), J.Försterus, Luterische Catechismus (Wittenberg, 1609), I. Lipsius, Politicarum libri (Frankfurt, 1674),
Martin Luther, Biblia-das ist die gantze heilige Schrift (Wittenberg, 1613), A. Manutius, Thesaurus
elegantiarum (Köln, 1646), A. Osiander, Biblia sacra (Frankfurt, 1611), Ovidius, Metamorphosus… (Nürnberg,
1679), M. Wenderlerus, Practicae philosophiae (Wittenberg, 1655); aus dem italienischen und italienisiertem
Raum: Alphonso Ciacconius, Historia utriusque belli dacici (Roma, 1616), Athanasius Kircher, Musurgia
universalis seu ars magna (Roma, 1650), Fortunius Licetus, Hieroglyphia sive antique schemata (Patavia,
1653), Sforza Pallavicino, Istoria del Concilio di Trento (Roma, 1656), Petrarca, Di nuova Ristampata
(Venedig, 1609), C. Tacitus, Vita, honores et scripta (Venedig, 1645); schließlich, aus dem rumänischen Raum:
Biblia/ Die Bibel (Bukarest, 1688), Dimitrie Cantemir, Descrierea Moldovei/Die Beschreibung der Moldau
(Frankfurt und Leipzig, 1771), Clain – ªincai, Elementa linguae daco-romnae sive valachicae (Wien, 1780),
Dosoftei, Psaltirea în versuri/Das Psalmenbuch in Versen (Uniev, 1673), Noul Testament/Das Neue Testament
(Belgrad, 1648), Psaltirea/Das Psalmenbuch (Alba Iulia, 1651), Viaþa ºi pildele lui Esop/Das Leben und
Sprüche von Äsop (Sibiu, 1795).
Dieser echte “buchmäßige Schmaus” — versichert uns die Verfasserin —, veranlasst von seltenen und
wertvollen Arbeiten, bringt attraktive Studiumelemente vor, imstande nicht nur die Aufmerksamkeit der
Fachforscher, der Bibliophile, sondern auch die der begeisterten Buchprofessionisten zu fesseln.
Warum deutsche, italienische und rumänische Bücher? Die Verfasserin der Arbeit fasst durchgreifend die
Gründe kurz zusammen. Es ist bekannt, dass die Buchdruckerkunst in Deutschland entstanden ist, aber sich
gleich danach in Italien verbreitet hat. Und warum rumänische Bücher? Weil die Rumänischen Länder im
Mittelalter die Brücke dargestellt haben, die das uralte, kaiserliche bysantinische Reich mit dem Europa des
Toma d’Aquino, des Nicolaus Cusanus und später der Aufklärung, verbunden hat.
Warum die Jahrhunderte XVII-XVIII? Die Argumente die Doina Florea vorbringt sind schwerwiegend:
diese umfassen die europäische Geschichte, die Geschichte der europäischen Kultur, in einem chronologischen
Bogen, der mit dem ersten Jahrhundert nach der Reform und Gegenreform beginnt-der arhitektonische
Ausdruck der letzteren: der Barockstil-und die Aufklärung des Jahrhunderts in welchem der Baron Samuel von
Brukenthal gelebt hat.
“Gelehrt in berühmte Universitäten, in Jena und Halle, im hohen Geiste, der im Jahrhundert von Kant und
Voltaire vorherrschte, wird sich Samuel von Brukenthal in einem beeindruckenden Profil abzeichnen, typisch
der großangelegten europäischen Elite” — verzeichnet die Verfasserin.
Die aufmerksame Lektüre Des Sammelwerks der deutschen, italienischen und rumänischen Bücher aus
der Bibliothek des Brukenthal Museums (XVII-tes–XVIII-tes Jahrhundert), das Doina Florea zu verdanken ist,
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BOOK REVIEWS
11
beweist einwandfrei dass, das wissenschaftliche Vorgehen sich vorgenommen hat, nicht nur zu belehren,
sondern zu gleicher Zeit, auch ein Forschungsmodell anzubieten. Die Verfasserin der neulichen, von Techno
Media-Sibiu sorgfältig herausgegebenen Arbeit, hat als nützlich betrachtet dem Sammelwerk sowohl ein
buntes einleitendes Essay, ein Nachwort (Verfasser: Constantin Ittu), als auch die notwendigen Register
(Verfasserregister; Titel; Herausgeber und Drucker; Ortschaften und Buchdruckzentren) hinzuzufügen.
Diejenigen die die Patrimoniumbücher-die kultureller Nationalschatz geworden sind-liebhaben, werden
daher Zugang zu einer weniger bekannten “Welt” der Bücher, beherbergt von der Bibliothek des Brukenthal
Museums, haben. “Die zeitgenössischen Leser werden — jeder für sich selber-ein feinabgestuftes,
unbeschattetes Bild desjenigen Mecena von Hermannstadt, der für die rumänische Kultur ein echtes
monumentum aere perennius errichtet hat, zusammenstellen — betont überzeugend Doina Florea. Der zu
ermüdete Leser des XXI-ten Jahrhunderts wird-dank der Verfasserin-Stunden der Muße und Freude erleben,
in der Nähe der Hermannstädter Archiven, mit musealem Brukenthalduft, die seltene Bücher und deren
Geheimleben bewahren.
Alexandra-Catrina Ciornei
Dominic Hyde
Vagueness, Logic and Ontology, Hampshire, Ashgate, 2008, 226 p.
The topic of vagueness seems to be a contemporary heritor of philosophical topics of indeterminancy, of
the paradoxes of logic and of the theories of the semantic and logic of natural language. The volume investigates
the matters related to vagueness and the paradox of vagueness (the sorites paradox), proposing avenues for
future revisions in semantics, metaphysics and logic an opening perpectives in related fields of philosophy,
linguistics, cognitive science and geographic information systems.
The book is structured in 7 chapters: Vaguess, Russell’s Representational Theory, Descriptive
Representationalism, Going Non-classical: Gaps and Gluts, Ontological Vagueness, Vague Individuation and
Counting, and The Logic of Vagueness.
This analysis is based on a series of differentiations and nuanced arguments conerning the perspectives of
logic, semantics and ontology. Vagueness is introduced as an ambiguous term. Nevertheless, there is a more
clearer sense of vagueness when we differentiate the notion from the lack of specificity, exactitude and
precision. The specificity of vagueness, in this sense, is construed starting from a description of the borderline
or penumbral cases. The author is concerned with the vagueness of predicates. He underlines that the
characterisation of borderline chases is construed in terms of “an agent’s inability to apply predicates, rather
than in terms of the semantic properties of the predicate”. (p. 3) As a consequence the book unfolds a paradigmatic
concept of vagueness, applied to predicates and characterised by the presence of borderline cases. It is a concept
present in many of the works of many of greatest philosophers of communication seen from the perspective of
logic: Peirce (1902), Russell (1923), Black (1960), Church (1960), Quine (1960), and Alston (1964).
The author agrees with Menges and Skala (1974) that social sciences concepts tend to be more vague than
natural sciences concepts, but insists that their point is more related to the different nature of disciplines, to the
greater importance of interpretation and sometimes of ethics at the core of social sciences disciplines. Yet, his
interest focuses on the sorites paradox as a symbol for all borderline cases. This paradox is actually the
development of a puzzle, the sorites puzzle developed as a series of questions about the predicate “heap”. Its
very name comes from the Greek word for “heap”, “soros”. The puzzle goes as following: Would you describe
the presence of one grain a heap? No. What about two grains together? No. What about three grains together?
No. What about... What about ten grains? Maybe, a very small one. Where do we draw the line? The related
falakros puzzle is similar, addressing baldness.
The argument continues by explaining the road from puzzle to paradox and then to classical soritical cases,
to arrive at a very interesting discussion of the relationship between soriticallity and vagueness. Hyde leaves
open the question that all vagues predicates are “typically” soritical. (p. 15) This space for comments raises the
interpretation of the distinction between what Alston (1967) calls “degree-vagueness” and “combinatory
vagueness”. The first type refers to the cases where vagueness is caused by the lack of precision in what
concerns the boundaries between the application and the non-application of the case along a dimension. For
example, “bald” does not draw a sharp boundary along the dimension represented by “hair quantity”. Combinatory
vagueness is explained starting from the word “religion”. One need to list the clear cases considered religions,
the rituals, the sacred objects, the differences among them, the moral code sanctioned by Gods, the feeling of
awe and the sense of mystery, the prayers, the specific worldview, the more or less thorough organization of
individual and social life on the basis of all the above mentioned elements. Each of these conditions is
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175
necessary but not sufficient, and only the combination of elements becomes sufficient to define “religion”.
Even when some elements are missing a subset might be sufficient. The vagueness arises from the lack of
precision as to what characteristic, or combination of, is necessary.
Another distinction is between linear and multi-dimensional vagueness. Linear vagueness is illustrated by
means of qualities which form a continuum: defining blue does not clarify situations such as the presence of a
blue-green. (Burke, 1946) Multi-dimensional vagueness is defined with the example of chair: how much back
a chair needs to be a chair and not a stool?
He also distinguishes between vagueness of application (for instance, “mountain(s)” as topography) and
vagueness of individuation (for example, “mountain” as one, two, or many more mountains).
There are many more logical questions to be raised. Thus, one may wonder about the logical connections,
could these be vague? Is the vagueness of a singular term sufficient to determine the vagueness of any sentence
in which it figures? (p. 19)
The extension of the concept of vagueness leads to a general principle stating that precision is inherited.
“If all but one of the constituent sub-phrases of a complex phrase are precise, then if the complex phrase is
vague so is that one remaining constituent sub-phrase”. (p. 23-4) To give a more accurate impression of the
complexity of the debates on the subject, on the one hand, given a vague sentence, if the predicate is precise,
then the name is vague and if the name is precise then the predicate must be vague. On the other hand, when
the predicate is vague the name might be just passive, not necessarily precise.
Dominic Hyde identifies three directions for his analysis. The first is an epistemic perspective on
vagueness. Williamson (1994) and Sorensen (1988, 2001) sustain that the lack of clarity concerning the
boundaries of the predicates is a manifestation of human resilient ignorance. From this perspective, “the sorites
is valid but unsound”. (p. 31) The second one perceives vagueness as a semantic matter. The third deals with
the ontological perspective on the subject.
Russell is an exponent of the semantic perspective, mainly given his 1923 paper “Vagueness”. He places
the source of vagueness in the representational nature in language and, for this reason, in representations, but
not in what is represented. Russell defines a representation vague when the relation of the representing system
to the represented system is not one-one, but one-many. Hyde notices that the representational nature of
vagueness is related at Russell to a celestial nature of logic. This semantic perspective does not urge a revision
of the classical metaphysical view that the world is not vague, nor of classical logic or semantic. The criticism
brought to this position is given by confusion between connotation, the application of a term and denotation
the clear significance of the term. Another criticism states the lack of reference to borderline cases. These and
many other instances of criticism led to descriptive representationalism, which shows that vague descriptions
shadow the precise ones. The ideal language to clear vague terms and descriptions does not exist, but within
the celestial logic of Russell’s.
Then, Hyde investigates the answers given to the matter of vagueness by super-and subvaluationism,
considering them inadequate. He suggests that non/classical semantics and an associated logic should deal with
the phenomenon, but should look to “strongly paracomplete and strongly paraconsistent systems for a more
acceptable logic of vagueness”. (p. 103) The insight is in my view strongly related with the idea that the
vagueness of language and the vagueness of representations are possible to be sourced in what is represented.
Hyde argues that objects, properties and relations could be vague even if not all of them at all times. There is
an ontological basis of vagueness! His position relies on the explanations of Burks (1946), Rolf (1980),
Burgess (1990), Tye (1990, 2000), van Inwagen (1988, 1990), Zemach (1991), Akiba (2000, 2004), Dummett
(2000), Parsons (2000), Moreau (2002), and Rosen and Smith (2004). First he addresses vague identity starting
with split indeterminate identity the Evans criticism for the vagueness of objects, the characterization of vague
objects, the relation between vague composition and vague existence, the vague identity thesis, vague
properties. All these analyses lead to the interesting dilemma: vagueness “in the world” or “of the world”?
Hyde supports Sainsbury’s stand that there is no intelligible notion of the world independently of our concepts.
This is the reason why the dilemma is solved. The two apparently irreducible aspects overlap. At the same
time, this is a damaging conclusion to the traditional metaphysics. Vagueness is a semantic phenomenon of
ontological import. (p. 209)
Then, observing that the ontological source of vagueness does not quite answer the Russell’s problem of
denotation, the investigation relating vagueness, logic and ontology leads to a perspective where vague
predicates could designate with precision vague properties, and vague terms vague objects. In turn the
observation underlines the importance of the paracomplete approach in modeling vagueness: the truth-valuegap approach to vagueness.
Hyde’s compelling, well documented and argumented book is a definite gain in making “the streets of
speculation just a little bit safer for the philosophers of tomorrow” (Sorensen, 1989) even though he does that not
by bannishing it, but by placing speculation into quite a different and complementing logical-ontological limelights.
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Jeanette Bougrab, Les discriminations positives, Dalloz, 2007, 179 p.
13
En 2007 les Editions Dalloz nous proposent, dans la collection À savoir, sous la direction d’Evélyne Pisier
et Olivier Duhamel, le livre Les discriminations positives, de Jeanette Bougrab. Il s’agit d’une sélection de
textes de loi — américains, français, indiens, européens, de l’Afrique du Sud — mettant en lumière la
préoccupation du politique de lutte contre les discriminations à n’importe quelle raison: religie, ethnie, sex,
handicap etc.
Dans étude qui ouvre le livre et qui argumente la justesse de l’intérêt prêté aux textes qui font l’objet de
la sélection, l’auteur nous propose un débat autour d’un thème représentant un axe primordial de la pensée
philosophique et politique: la question de l’égalité. À partir de la réalité de deux société modernes —
américaine et française — dans lesquelles les inégalités persistent, et sont reconnues et assumées, l’auteur se
demande comment pourrait-on résoudre de telles inégalités, comment l’outil qu’est la loi agit pour les corriger,
quelle est la philosophie et la volonté politique qui se trouvent derrière ces lois et, finalement, quelles sont les
limites et les effets pervers de cette action. Les discriminations positives ne sont que le maillon qui ferme le
circuit qui débute par la problématique de l’égalité, passe par le constat des inégalités et des discriminations
de fait et ensuite par les mesures vouées à les corriger, mais au bout de cette boucle on arrive à: «Instaurer des
inégalités pour restaurer l’égalité, telle pourrait être la formule résumant la philosophie des discriminations
positives» (p. 1). Et au delà d’une position pro ou contre les discriminations positives, notre attention doit se
pencher vers tous les acteurs qui y sont entraînés: les individus destinataires des traitements préférentiels; les
individus qui ne sont ni visés, ni directement préjudiciés par les dits traitements; les individus à charge
desquels ces traitements sont appliqués et qui s’en sortent directement préjudiciés1.
Le parallèle entre les deux sociétés a comme point de départ le récent intérêt que la société française
manifeste pour le modèle américain de politique sociale anti-discrimination, et l’auteur s’interroge quant à la
viabilité du transfert du modèle américain — avec les adaptations nécessaires — en France, dans un moment
où le modèle français semble avoir atteint ses limites — la panne de l’ascenseur social.
L’usure du modèle français est-elle tout simplement suffisante pour justifier la mise en place d’un modèle
externe? La réponse à cette question est négative, mais avant d’exprimer son point de vue l’auteur analyse la
politique d’affirmative action aux États Unis, politique dont l’origine et le fondement seront un argument fort
pour sa conclusion.
Aux États Unis donc, avec l’abolition de l’esclavage et le principe de protection égale assurée par la loi,
s’instaure à partir de 1880 un système de ségrégation raciale accueilli par la Cour Suprême Américaine et qui
se repose sur le fait que la nation était conçue en tant que somme de groupes sociaux, entre lesquels il fallait
instaurer un équilibre social: le droit américain voit “le principe de l’égalité... en termes de parité statistique
entre les groupes et non entre les individus” (p. 7). L’auteur prend des exemples portant sur
l’institutionnalisation de la ségrégation raciale dans les écoles, sur le marché des emplois, dans la vie courante
avec l’interdiction des relations sexuelles ou des mariages mixtes. Le tournant des années 50’, lorsque
l’affirmative action — qui marque le glissement de la discrimination à la non discrimination active — débute
avec sa première phase, celle de “système classique de lutte contre les discriminations” (p. 6). Avec l’ampleur
grandissante que prend la question des discriminations à l’époque, avec les décisions des juges et les activités
de toutes sortes de commissions spécifiques traitant de manière segmentaire la problématique des
discriminations — par exemple Equal Employment Opportunity Commission — on assiste, au milieu de la
décennie 60’, à la transition progressive vers la seconde phase, celle des traitements préférentiels. Ceux-ci
représentent la réponse au fait que la “mobilité sociale ne suppose pas simplement l’élimination des barrières
dressées par les préjugés racistes ou sexistes”, situation qui a déterminé le pouvoir politique d’admettre que
“l’égalité ne peut être obtenue par le seul fonctionnement méritocratique et transparent du marché” (p. 12).
Depuis 1965 on peut parler de cette deuxième phase d’affirmative action, qui met de plus en évidence que
la discrimination n’est pas abordée, aux États Unis, au regard du comportement individuel, mais en tant que
phénomène structurel de la société américaine. Les divers instruments légaux instituant l’obligation pour les
entreprises d’embaucher des Noirs, condition pour pouvoir passer des contrats publics fédéraux en constituent
un exemple. La troisième phase de l’affirmative action, qui met en cause cette politique sociale, débute en 1995
et la contestation du modèle vient tant de la Cour Suprême Américaine que du peuple américain2.
L’auteur cite des exemples relevant les effets non désirés de ce mécanisme. L’affirmative action a
finalement bénéficié plutôt aux Noirs appartenant aux couches sociales dynamiques et éduquées, qui pouvaient
déjà prétendre à la reconnaissance par leurs équivalents blancs d’un traitement égal. En conséquence, un critère
neutre, économique et social, affranchi du facteur racial et ethnique, serait plus adapté pour que les mesures
sociales atteignent précisément le segment touché par l’exclusion sociale.
————————
1 P. 18
2 P. 12-13.
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177
Ensuite, les quotas de représentation des Noirs imposées par lois aux divers secteurs — enseignement ou
marché des emplois — ont conduit à ce que un citoyen noir qui obtient un emploi dans les conditions prévues
par une telle loi soit victime des doutes quant à ses vraies compétences professionnelles le recommandant pour
le poste respectif3.
En France, l’intérêt pour l’affirmative action se manifeste exactement dans cette période d’interrogations
et de mise en cause du modèle aux États Unis. Même si la pérennisation des inégalités à raison ethnique et
raciale et le blocage de la redistribution de la richesse légitiment en France la quête d’un nouveau modèle,
l’auteur construit son argument défavorable au transfert du modèle américain sur la différence essentielle entre
la nation américaine conçue en tant que somme de groupes sociaux et la nation française, avec la proclamation
de l’unité et de l’indivisibilité du peuple français4, et avec l’égalité entre individus et non pas entre groupes
sociaux, quel que soit leur critère d’organisation. De cette différence découlent d’autres arguments: le fait
qu’en France les citoyens ne doivent pas déclarer, lors des recensement, leur appartenance à un groupe; le fait
qu’il n’y a pas eu en France métropolitaine une vraie politique de ségrégation raciale.
À ces arguments liés au spécifique de la société française viennent s’ajouter des arguments extraits des
limites mêmes et des effets pervers de l’affirmative action dans son pays d’origine.
Ruxandra Luca
————————
3 P. 30-32.
4 Les seuls cas en France où le droit s’adresse à des groupes et non pas à des invidus sont celui des femmes
et respectivement celui des personnes handicapées.
THE REVIEW OF REVIEWS
APPRAISAL — The Journal of the Society for Post-Critical and Personalist Studies
Vol. 7 No. 1, March 2008
The philosophical and interdisciplinary perspectives of the Appraisal accumulate different theories and
constructing schemes of some referential points of “printed models” and constant thematic preferences in order
to study and translate contemporary points of views.
As the editorial policy states, Appraisal seeks to develop and promote constructive ways of thinking,
especially from within a personalist perspective, in philosophy and other intellectual disciplines. The journal
believes that philosophy should not be a narrow, academic and technical specialism, but should address itself
to the general public and to the intellectual and practical issues of the present.
From time to time Appraisal includes Re-Appraisals, articles or collections of articles upon 20th Century
thinkers whose work deserves to be more widely known. Appraisal takes a particular, but by no means
exclusive, interest in the work of Michael Polanyi.
Apart from some reserves, generated by the relation between technical points and “constructing scheme”,
what mainly held our attention is the preference for the dynamism of the philosophical theories and for their
everlasting possibility of (in) forming the specialized reader. Under the circumstances of an “alienated”
existence, Appraisal represents a fulfilled experiment of denying a “rhetorical perspective”, taking advantage
of some multi-dimensional approaches.
Vol. 7 No. 1, March 2008 proposes a corpus texts and referential points for some dynamic philosophical
concepts: the concept of person, philosophy of mind, rationality, the ended nature of interpretation, meaning,
intention and value (Charlie Lowney, Seeing, saying and being the Gestalt: Continuing Investigations on
Wittgenstein and Polanyi on the concept of the person, Philip Rolnick, Wittgenstein and Polanyi on the person,
Book Reviews on Dan O’Brien (A Critique of Naturalistic Philosophies of Mind. Rationality and the OpenEnded Nature of Interpretation — Henrieta ªerban and Viorella Manolache) and Graham Dunstan Martin
(Living on Purpose: Meaning, Intention and Value — Wendy Hamblet).
According to Philip A. Rolnick, neither Wittgenstein nor Polanyi offers a systematic concept of the person,
but each one offers important insights. After a brief biographical comparison that shows their similar origins
and background, their thoughts on the person are compared. Both are concerned with transcendence, but
Wittgenstein counsels silence where Polanyi ventures discourse. Both see the importance of language but
differ greatly on its use and limits. Wittgenstein sees his work as a kind of therapy for philosophy. Polanyi
attempts a kind of epistemological encouragement. Both see a crucial role for community — Wittgenstein’s
“form(s) of life” and Polanyi’s “dwelling in and breaking out”.
For Charles W. Lowney, L. Wittgenstein and M. Polanyi both recognize a tacit background to knowing,
but vary significantly in their understanding of how we know, what we can know, and what we can say about
it. The study explores whether we can say anything about the person as an emergent entity and how we know
it, as Polanyi believed we could, or whether, as Wittgenstein early and late believed, the person is among those
purported things that can only be shown and attempts to say how we know it lead to nonsense — if there even
exists such an entity apart from the actions we may describe.
Avoiding (pre)fabricated formulas, showing, saying and inventorying major concepts and philosophical
constructs, Appraisal’s structure can be seen as a totality of transitive and multifunctional theories, offering a
(re)vitalization of the philosophical sources, proposing new scientifically ingredients.
Seen more as a level and not as a textual procedure, Appraisal proposes a magma in which there are
correlated stratagems of practice and philosophy, along with personal achievements, as a common
philosophical and cultural project. These philosophical signs are “translated” in Appraisal, creating a relation
of tolerance between hard/ soft theories, insisting on textual and philosophical relations as Wittgenstein and
Polanyi, rationality and the open-ended nature of interpretation, meaning, intention and value, seeing, saying
and being.
With a forte profile found in a continual philosophical interest, Appraisal remains a journal capable of
articulating itself in a returning to the author openly extending the essential data of old or new theories: a
girovag aspect of a journal which imposes a tolerant relation philosophy/ reality.
Viorella Manolache
2
179
ARHIVELE TOTALITARISMULUI, An XVI, nr. 60-61, 3-4/ 2008, Institutul Naþional pentru
Studiul Totalitarismului, Academia Românã, Bucureºti.
The Totalitarianism Archives (Review of the National Institute for the Study of Totalitarianism, volume
XVI, number 60-61, Fall 2008) is organized as a “response of the researchers” to the “exigency of the new”
and to the accurate inventory of the past. The revitalization of the interest for the real historian sources, beyond
the prefabricated formulas, puts in the light the veridical theoretical filters which can bring us again, in a lucid
way, closer to the past.
The Review of the National Institute for the Study of Totalitarianism opens with an editorial of Radu
Ciuceanu, the president of the N.I.S.T., focused on History as Ballast, XXXII. The editorial combines the
historical truth about the strange correspondence between Roosevelt-Churchill-Stalin, with the style of a
scientific prerogative of a personality participating directly in the Romanian crucial historical events, capable
to (de)construct the truth beyond the already recorded facts.
The studies gathered in the Review deal with: The Legionary Movement between “Political Religion” and
“Collective Effervescence” (Radu H. Dinu), The road to Truth about Katyn (Ion Constantin), The Relations
between the Legionary Movement and the RCP, 1945-1948 ( Tiberiu Tãnase), The waves of Arrests in 1947
(Dumitru ªandru), The Dissolution of the National Peasant Party — A new Stage in the Plan on Sovietizing
Romania, II (Mihail Lancuzov), The Meaning of Signing the Romanian — Soviet Treaty from February 4, 1948
(Dragoº Zamfirescu), Parallelism and Convergence. Underpinnings of the French — Romanian Rapprochement,
1956-1963, I (Irina Gridan), The Influence of Anticommunism over Recent Romanian Historiography (Florin
Abraham).
The documents inform, looking into the personal historical details, about the reference historical points,
deciphering political aspects which also represent the phenomenon of “staging” social coexistence. Such
an operation has the role of inducing a system of representations through which it displays itself on the same
scene with its activators: Demetrescu Radu Gyr: An Essential Autobiographical Contribution, III (Alexandu
V. Diþã), The Churchill — Stalin Percentages Agreement in Soviet Documents (Laurenþiu Constantiniu),
The Collectivization of Agriculture. Total Repression, 1947-1962, XXV (Octavian Roske), Differently about
the Romanian — Soviet Relations: The Small Tourist Traffic (Dan Cãtãnuº), After invasion: Romania in
the Shadow of the “Brezhnev Doctrine”. September-October 1968 (Mioara Anton), Behind-the-Scenes of
Nicolae Ceauºescu’s Rise to the top (Vasile Buga), The Agony of the Communist Regime in Romania: the
Ceauºescu-Gorbachev Exchange of Messages, Nov. 1989 (Simon Gheorghiu). An initiative meant to facilitate
the access to the documents from the communist period and to debunk the certain huge historical
mystifications!
“The sense of biographism” does not only lie in the meaning of the biographical detail. The Totalitarianism
Archives focuses upon a biographical dictionary (Ana Maria Cãtãnuº — Vlad Georgescu and Cristina Diac —
Corneliu Mãnescu), because the personalism defines one of the main principles of the interpretation of a
determined interval (temporal, historical, cultural, and political).
Offering investigation and facets of the Romania phenomenon of Totalitarianism, in the new society
traumatized by the long communist experiment, but taking out the survey forms and precedents, The Totalitarianism
Archives became a turntable of historical information and documentation, despite any institutional and
historiographical pressure.
The National Institute for the Study of Totalitarianism remains in a state of wakefulness now, when the
totalitarian virus looks to be still alive, because there is no suitable land for its development than a drifting
democracy.
The dictatorships that have shaded also our country, established as a goal, the dissolution and the
destruction of any democratic components. Fulfilling this empty theoretical space, the Totalitarianism Archives
is built up depending on the expectance horizon of a mature public (reader), ranging from mere love of history
to the political leader interested in knowing the Romanian political system in the past, but also in decryption
and evaluation the post communist present. This confirms the constant concern of the historian and professor
Radu Ciuceanu and of the National Institute for the Study of Totalitarianism for avoiding the manipulation of
history and historiography and for releasing the historic speech from the rhetoric of some image (political,
historical, cultural) promoters.
Viorella Manolache
180
3
ANALELE UNIVERSITÃÞII DIN CRAIOVA, Seria Filosofie, No. 21 (1/2008), 187 p.
Present in the European Reference Index for Humanities and on the list of scientific magazines
AERES
In general, any accessing of the concept of postmodernity (which Umberto Eco has considered a term
good at everything), is claimed by the effects felt from the “end of the modern age” (G. Vattimo), through
postmodernity.
Reporting it to the Nietzsche’s problematic, which Habermas considers the turntable of getting into
postmodernism, or to the eternal return of the overcoming Heidegger’s metaphysic, the theorization of
postmodernism, mostly decentred and inconsistent, becomes accurate only following a philosophical rigor and
dignity by extending the new conditions of existence in the late industrial world.
Proposing a revision of the relation between the dominating modernism and the recessive postmodernism, the
Review of Craiova University focuses on the ontological dimension of the philosophical and cultural paradigm.
Browsing or scanning the texts published in the Review of Craiova University, a mature reader can find
an extrusive delimitating assumption of the concept, found in extravert theoretical and philosophical texts,
concluding the fact that the vogue of postmodernism represents also a language game, a specific aesthetic
modality, a subtle symptom of a diffuse premonition of the changing, an experiment, a montage, a manner of
expression and of refinement of perception of language!
Organized in three sections, the Review proposes three philosophical lines:
— Modernism and Postmodernism in Philosophy (Bruce A. Little — The Emergence of the
Postmodern Mind at its Mind; Angela Botez — Between Modernity and Posmodernity; Richard T. Allen — A
philosophy of diversity: R.G. Collingwood and Lucian Blaga; Ana Bazac — What means ontology of the
human? Following some remarks of Derrida and via Habermas or Foucault; Gheorghe Dãniºor — Ethical
Postmodernity; Henrieta Aniºoara ªerban — The typology of the Postmodern discourse; Marius Augustin
Drãghici — Modern presuppositions of the postmodernism in philosophy; Adriana Neacºu — “Anonimous”
and “hipostasis” at Emmanuel Levinas; Adrian Niþã — The concept of the world at the Merleau-Ponty; Lorena
Pãvãlan Stuparu — Postmodernism: relativism and humanization of the discourse);
— The Philosophy of Language and Science (François Rivenc — Philosophie du langage: une critique
du contextualisme; ªtefan Viorel Ghenea — Relativism and scientific rationality) and
— Moral Philosophy (Marta Rizea Albu — Le spectacle humain dans “Les Caractères” de La Bruyère).
The studies gathered in the Review of Craiova University (no. 21, 1/2008, imply both a sketching and an
inventory of the philosophical postmodern effects — all recognized in theoretical models as an alternative
paradigm. Seen as a summum of the fundamental marks of the postmodernity, the articles adopt the postmodern
ideology of plurality and of accepting the difference. All these under a forte philosophical and theoretical profile!
Viorella Manolache
THE MONIST, July-October 2008, Volume 91, Number 3-4 Peru, Illinois, The Hegeler Institute,
2008, 262 p.
This double issue of “The Monist”, founded in 1888 and edited by Barry Smith, is as well an expression
of an additional attention for the philosophy of everyday life within contemporary philosophy, as of the interest
for the political relevance of everyday life.
Thus, I see the first article of the journal comments on the value of contemporary theory of law in its social
implications. “Privatizing Marriage”, by Cass R. Sunstein and Richard H. Thaler sustain the idea that many of
the social practices represent only incomplete theoretic attempts. To understand marriage as an incompletely
theorized institution is a difficult endeavor when it is not seen a private business. From this perspective
privatizing marriage is somehow recommendable.
John Finnis deals with “Marriage: A Basic and Exigent Good” where he pleads for marriage as such a
good, basic and exigent and also fundamental for a humane way of life. He brings arguments for his distrust
in the possibility to replace marriage as a moral way of life and as an ideal. He does not see as an ideal the
world where the civil unions would decide everything, from the number of members and the sex of members
to the number of children (who would be raised and loved by all). His arguments place in marriage not only
social norms, but also the entire philosophy of the natural right and the philosophy of the inherent morality and
of the ability/need to sustain friendship of the human being.
The study “On the Nature of Marriage: Somerville on Same — Sex Marriage”, by Adèle Mercier, approaches
the reductive character of the language and of the “argument of nature” — briefly stating that nature is sacred,
4
181
to be preserved in its favorable aspects and “tamed” in these implying destruction, murder, rape, etc., context
within which a marriage is “naturally” formed by a woman and a man, its purpose being to procreate. This
reductive edge is nicely emphasized on the background of human complexity. The author interprets critically
the perspective described in Margaret Somerville’s 2006 book, The Ethical Imagination: Journeys of the
Human Spirit (Anansi Press). Somerville claims that: (1) the rule is to form families by natural reproduction;
(2) this rule establishes the right of the children to biological parents; (3) given the rule of natural reproduction,
children are entitled to biological parents or, a sufficient condition for the right of children to biological parents
is that natural reproduction is the rule; (4) if we allow the same sex couples to get married, the family would
not be based on the rule of natural reproduction anymore; (5) if natural reproduction is no longer the rule, then
the rule does not entitle children to biological parents, that is, a necessary condition for the right of the children
to biological parents is that natural reproduction is the rule, hence (6) if we allow the same sex couples to get
married, all children lose their right to biological parents. Adèle Mercier argues against this line of reasoning stressing
that essential both for raising children and for long term marriages is only the love doubled by stability.
Patrick Lee claims that true love comes exclusively from biological parents in “Marriage, Procreation and
Same-Sex Unions” sustaining the point of view advanced by Margaret Somerville, and criticized by Adèle
Mercier. For him, the political community has a duty of honor in protecting the institution of heterosexual
marriage. Adèle Mercier answers in the following text to these theoretical views that “any child whose parents
would use legal recognition of same-sex marriages as pretext for dispensation from their parental obligations
would be better off adopted by a child-eager same-sex couple.” (p. 441) Then, in his answer, Lee nuances his
positions pointing to the aspects that he considers same-sex marriages as a menace, for instance, for the attempt
to socially encourage fathers to fulfill their specific responsibilities as fathers (p. 445)
For political philosophy, especially interesting is Jeremy R. Garrett’s, “History, Tradition and the Normative
Foundations of Civil Marriage”, a study elaborated on philosophical ideas such as these sustained by Burke,
in order to defend the traditional civil marriage as an institutional form representing embodied wisdom. The
author comments as well on various other philosophical ideas, such as those of Friedrich Hayek, to overcome
the Burkean position. The study relates as well to the interesting observation of MacIntyre, stating that tradition
is less vulnerable to the dialectic investigation and generally toward the objections of all sorts. We have here
a captivating mechanism of cultural selection to be followed in Garrett’s study. The conclusion is that the
intrinsic value of marriage stays in the philosophical facets of the concept of marriage and not in the “historical
pedigree” of this institution.
The article “A Populist Argument for Legalizing Same — Sex Marriage” by Alex Rajczi brings arguments
in favor of the same-sex marriages from the perspective of liberalism. The author is aware that his arguments
might prejudice traditional marriage and they might be considered a more or less implicit agreement with
homosexuality, but considers that from a liberal perspective they are nevertheless at least theoretically
sustainable. “Marriage and the Norm of Monogamy” by Bryan R. Weaver and Fiona Wollard is captivating in
its philosophical nuanced argument for the acceptance of the norm of monogamy when it is originated in the
“reality” of an important, sexually and emotionally satisfying relation, and not when it is the expression of the
desire of control over the other.
Mary Catherine Geach in “Lying with the Body” elaborates a philosophical and poetic approach with
essentialist metaphysic aspects, intriguing in terms of “corporeal turn.” Thus, the differences between the beings
and their bodies should be erased since our humanity owes a great deal to the body. Human authenticity is to be
correlated, differently for women and men, inclusively through sexuality. The sexuality is human when it is
generative — the woman as an authentic being is a potential mother, while the man as a human being should be
seen as a potential father. Andrea C. Westlund interprets in “The Reunion of Marriage” marriage within the
liberal feminism. Marriage as a reunion on the one hand transcends the legal frame and on the other hand
provides the opportunity to re-conceptualize the dynamic interplay of perspectives on life. Therefore, marriage
becomes the effort of continuous reconstitution of the both necessary and fragile common practical perspective.
Brook J. Sadler in “Civil Unions and Same-Sex Marriage” wonders whether political wisdom should not
abandon the critique of the practice of marriage in general to be able to promote the cause of the same-sex
marriages, seen as short term political and social purposes, and in this sense, more realistic. Yet, the study tends
to be more in favor of the civil unions considered more a progress from a social standpoint, more radical from
a political standpoint and ethically easier to be sustained than the same-sex marriages. In “What’s in a Name?
A Philosophical Critique of ’Civil Unions’ Predicated Upon a Sexual Relationship” Gerard V. Bradley goes beyond
the perspective where the civil unions are just marriages under another name. he comments on the case Lewis
v. Harris to identify the substance of the name “marriage” in the moral normative frame for the sexual relations
and procreation.
As a whole, the journal presents a captivating and diverse range of arguments indicating the pragmatic turn
within contemporary philosophy.
THE AUTHORS
Ion Bulei is the Director of the Institute of Political Sciences and International Relations of
the Romanian Academy. He is a specialist in the modern history of Romania (1821-1920); specialization
development issues in Romanian political phenomenon in the general fund of social and economic
development, political and cultural discernable in Romanian political dimensions of the entire
Romanian space without omitting the international developments; participation in the editing tools
Work on modern history (governments, governance, democracy and liberalism to the Romanian
dictionary of political parties, encyclopedias); contributions in the politico-diplomatic and military
affairs, especially with Italy; participation and responsible in various projects Research Institute of
the Romanian Culture and Humanistic Research in Venice and the Institute of Political Sciences
and International Relations Research, activity reflected in the work and published magazines. He
participates regularly in the life science and international, contributions to both scientific and
organizational, as part of colloquia, symposia and scientific sessions are held under the aegis of
the Romanian Institute Culture of Venice, the Institute of Political Science and International
Relations of the Romanian Academy and the University of Bucharest.
Ionas Aurelian Rus is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Raymond Walters
College, the largest regional campus in the state of Ohio (USA) of the University of Cincinnati, a
major urban research university. He has received his PhD in Political Science in October 2008
from Rutgers University, New Brunswick, New Jersey, USA. The title of his dissertation is
“Variables Affecting Nation-Building: The Impact of the Ethnic Basis, the Educational System,
Industrialization and Sudden Shocks”. His fields of specialization include Comparative Politics
and International Relations, and he has an M.A. in Modern European History from Columbia
University. He has published six articles in peer-reviewed publications, including “The Rise of
Moldovan-Romanian Nationalism in Bessarabia (1900-1917)”, in Interstitio. East European
Review of Historical Anthropology, vol. 1, no. 2, and “The Electoral Patterns of the Romanian
Right in the Interwar Years”, parts I, II and III, in Arhivele Totalitarismului (1998-1999), etc. He
has published an encyclopedia article, articles in various internet journals, and has presented
papers at five, and served as a panel chair at two, international scholarly conferences.
Cristi Pantelimon, PhD in Sociology, researcher at the Romanian Academy, Institute of the
Political Science and International Relations. He is a professor at the “Spiru Haret” University,
Bucharest. Fields of interest: political sociology, sociology of nation and nationalism. He is the
author of the books: Sociologia politicã (Political Sociology, 2005), Prin cenuºa naþiunii (The
Nation ashes, 2006), Sociologia corporatismului ºi a capitalismului (Sociology of corporatism
and capitalism, 2007), and the coordinator of the collective volume Ideea naþionalã ºi ideea
europeanã (National Idea and the European Idea, 2008). Numerous articles published in Academica,
Sociologia Româneascã, Revista Institutului de ªtiinþe Politice ºi Relaþii Internaþionale.
Doina Florea, essayist and translator. Since 1999, she is professor at the “Lucian Blaga”
University, Sibiu. PhD with the research theme concerning Vizualitate ºi audiþie în opera lui
Mihail Sadoveanu (1982). Editor-in-chief of the Publishing House Junimea, Iaºi (1970-1991),
Albatros (1991-1992), editor of the Journal of Historical Monuments and General Director of the
FF-Press Publishing House in Bucharest (1993-1999). Employee of the journals Ateneu, Convorbiri
literare, Cronica, Luceafãrul, Transilvania and s.o. Author of numerous studies and critical essays
as: Mihail Sadoveanu sau magia rostirii (1986), Drumul spre eseu (1998), Scrierea ºi cartea
(1998), Bazele biblioteconomiei (1998), Studii de istoria literaturii române (2000), Bibliologie
generalã. Sinteze (2004), Edituri ºi colecþii (2004), Cartea de patrimoniu — vector cultural
(2007), Repertoriul cãrþii germane, italiene ºi româneºti din Biblioteca Muzeului Brukenthal
2
THE AUTHORS
183
/secolele XVI-XVII (2008), Dicþionarul copiilor francez-român (2008). Translations from the
universal literature: Vasili ªukºin (1972), Kostas Assimakopoulos (1972), Bonaventura (1973),
Willibald Alexis (1976), Emmanuel Roblès (1977), Marcus Clarke (1978), Émile Gaboriau
(1992), Franz Storch (1982), Voltaire (1985), Iannis Gudelis (1987), E. Barrington (1993), Walter
Scott (2003). Translations from the original language in other languages: versions in French by the
Brothers Grimm (1977) and Cezar Petrescu (1982). Supervised conditions: Nelu Ionescu (1984),
Traian Chelariu (1989), Daniel Defoe (1992), Mihai Cimpoi (1994), Danes G. (1996), Rudyard
Kipling (2003). Member of the Romanian Association of correspondence Eller (1980). Price of the
Eller Federation of Romania (1982).
Abdenbi Sarroukh is a member of the English Department at Abdelmalik Essaâdi University,
Tétouan, Morocco. He is a member of Moroccan Association of Human rights in Tetouan; member
of “The research group in theatre and drama” and a formerly member of “The research group in
linguistics and thought” in Tetouan. Publications: A call in “Aljisr”, a monthly journal in Tetouan, 1993,
third number; The question of Moral in Nietzsche’s work in Arabic in the daily journal “Al Itihad
Alichtiraki” May 1997; When we were in Challa in “Revue” no. 3, “Picturing Tangier”, July, 2007.
Henrieta Aniºoara ªerban owns a PhD from the Romanian Academy since 2006, and she is
a scientific researcher at the Institute of Political Science and International Relations of the
Romanian Academy, and the Institute of Philosophy and Psychology “Constantin RãdulescuMotru” of the Romanian Academy, Bucharest, Romania. Research interests: philosophy of
communication, political communication, (soft) ideologies (feminism, ecologism, ironism). She
has lectured at the Catholic University of Brussels (2000-2006, within the Academic Exchange
Programme), and at Loughborough University (2006, within the same programme). Authored
books: Limbajul politic în democraþie (The Political Language in Democracy) in 2006 and
Paradigmele diferenþei în filosofia comunicãrii. Modernism si postmodernism (The Paradigms of
Difference in the Philosophy of Communication. Modernism and Postmodernism) in 2007. She has
articles published in both Romanian and English languages (for example, in English, Reading the
new horizon. The role of Romanian media discourse in the 2004 elections power shift, in Carpentier,
Nico, Spinoy, Erik (coord.), Discourse Theory and Cultural Analysis: Media, Arts and Literature,
New Jersey, Hampton Press, 2008, p. 55-70.), and books translated from English into Romanian
(for instance, N. Chomsky’s Failed States for Antet Publishing House, Bucharest, 2006).
Viorella Manolache graduated from the Political Science Faculty, Law Faculty, has a master
in Journalism and Public Relations, with a PhD in History from the University of Bucharest. She
has published several books: Postmodernitatea româneascã între experienþã ontologicã ºi
necesitate politicã (Romanian Postmodernity/ Between Ontological Experience and Political
Necessity) “Lucian Blaga” University, Sibiu, 2004; Cecitatea politicã — între sindrom ereditar ºi
faza lungã a maºinistului (Political Blindness as a Heredity Syndrome), “Lucian Blaga”
University, Sibiu, 2005; Ipostaze ale fetiºului în presa culturalã româneascã (Fetishism. Hypostasis
of the Romanian Cultural Press), “Lucian Blaga” University, Sibiu, 2006; Elite. Conceptualizãri
moderne (Elitism. Modern Conceptualization), “Lucian Blaga” University, Sibiu, 2006; Antielitele.
Forme tipice ºi atipice ale elitismului politic contemporan (Antielites. Typical and atypical forms
of elitism), “Lucian Blaga” University, Sibiu, 2007; Elita politicã româneascã între deconstrucþia
comunismului ºi reconstrucþia democraþiei (Romanian Political Elites), Techno Media, Sibiu,
2008. She works as a researcher at the Romanian Academy, Institute of the Political Science and
International Relations, at the Department of Political Philosophy.
Maria Sass graduated from the Faculty of Sibiu, specialization German-Romanian (1983),
Phd since 1999 (doctoral thsesis: Coºbuc ºi literatura germanã), holder of the Chair of German
Studies and of the disciplines: German Literature and Translation of Literary Texts within The
Lucian Blaga University of Sibiu. Fields of research: German Literature and Language; Comparative
Literature, particulary — the study of literaly relations between the German and Romanian
literatures, author of numerous studies and articles published in professional periodicals from
184
THE AUTHORS
3
Romania and from abroad (Germany, Austria). Contributions at: Transilvania, Germanistische
Beiträge, Zeitschrift der Germanisten Rumäniens, Saeculum, Steaua, Tribuna (Cluj), Spiegelungen
(München) etc. Books: Coºbuc ºi literatura germanã (2000); Einführung in das Ûbersetzen
(2004); Die Analyse dramatischer Texte. Eine Einführung mit Beispielen aus der deutschen Literatur
(2004); Schiller (2005); Stationen deutscher Dichtung (2006). Several volumes of didactic use,
translations (in volume) and several translations of poetry in the following periodicals: Transilvania,
Tribuna (Cluj), Steaua etc. Editorial activity: the periodical Germanistische Beiträge (CNCSIS).
International scientific collaborations: J.G. Herder Institute-Leipzig/ Germany (1994); University
of Tübingen/ Germany (1994); University of Bochum/ Germany (1997); University of Marburg/
Germany (2003, 2005, 2006, 2007); Institute for German Culture and History of South — Eastern
Europe-München/ Germany (2006); University of Trier, The Department for Specialized
Researchers (2007); The Erika Mitterer Literary Society/ Vienna (2007).
Flavia Jerca has a Bachlor in International Relations and European Studies, obtained at
University of Bucharest. She is currently a MA candidate in International Relations at the same
university. In the university year 2007-2008 she had a scholarship at Freie Universität Berlin. Her
fields of interest are international security and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe and she is currently preparing a MA project on OSCE.
Eduardo Araya Leüpin graduated in History at the Pontificia Catholic University of Valparaiso
(Chile) and is PhD in Political Sciences and History at the Johannes Gutenberg University from
Mainz, Germany. Presently is Director of the Institute of History and Political Science from
Pontificia Catholic University of Valparaiso and professor at the same institution. His mains
directions of research are: contemporary history of Latin America, political science and electronic
democracy.
Rãzvan Victor Pantelimon graduated from the Faculty of Political Science at Bucharest
University and the Faculty of Law at “Nicolae Titulescu” University, Bucharest. He has a Master
Degree in “Romanian Politics and European Policies” from the Faculty of Political Science at the
Bucharest University. At present he is a PhD student in Political Science at Bologna University
and Bucharest University. Research interests: political parties, systems and doctrines in South
America. Participations at national conferences. Several studies and articles published in various
scientific journals.
Maria Cãtãlina Moisescu, graduated in 2008 the Faculty of Political Science, French
Department at the University of Bucharest. At present she is attending the Master of European and
Romanian Policy at the Faculty of Political Science within the University of Bucharest as well as
the Master of Security and Defense at the National University of Defense Carol I. Former
volunteer for the Francophone Summit in the Ministry of External Affaires, now she is collaborating
with the Romanian Academic Forum.
Lucian Jora is a researcher within the Institute of Political Sciences and International Relations
(Romanian Academy) in Bucharest. Postgraduate studies at the University of Catania, Copenhagen
University and Jangelonian University. At the moment he is preparing a PhD at Babeº-Bolyai
University in European Studies with a research on Cultural Diplomacy through the representation
in History. He authored several articles with a focus on International Relations, European Studies
and Cultural Diplomacy.

Romanian Review of Political Sciences and International Relations

Transcription

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