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deeprecession blog
january 2008 - august 2007 deeprecession BLOG
deeprecession blog
january 2008 - august 2007 entries tagged depression-recession
MAIN SUB-PRIME LOSSES SO FAR. Source: BBC, from Company reports
(last update Jan. 30, when UBS regains the Guinness from Citigroup)
1 UBS: $18.4bn
2 Citigroup: $18bn
3 Morgan Stanley $9.4bn
4 Merrill Lynch: $8bn
5 HSBC: $3.4bn
6 Bear Stearns: $3.2bn
7 Deutsche Bank: $3.2bn
8 Bank of America: $3bn
9 Barclays: $2.6bn
10 Royal Bank of Scotland: $2.6bn
11 Freddie Mac: $2bn
12 Credit Suisse: $1bn
13 Wachovia: $1.1bn
14 IKB: $2.6bn
15 Paribas: $197m
Sad savings: the Economist 2007\10\18
2008\01\30
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7218055.stm
Fed cuts US interest rates to 3%
The Federal Reserve has cut interest rates for the
second time in nine days as it tries to keep the US
economy from entering a recession.
The central bank lowered rates to 3% from 3.5%
after a two-day meeting.
Last week, the Fed slashed the cost of borrowing by
the largest amount in 25 years in a shock move to
calm tumbling global stock markets.
NOTES
• 8 days before (Tuesday, Jan. 22) the cut had been
of 0.75 points, after a weekend of world stock
markets in free fall; in one week time the quantum
cut has been from 4.25 to 3
• US income growth on an annual base has been
sharply decelerating in the last two 2007 quarters:
down from +4.9% to +0.6%
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Attacʼs view
Une grille de lecture de la crise financière
JOHSUA Isaac
Dire le capital, cʼest dire sa crise. Telle est, telle fût toujours lʼinstabilité foncière du système : ses
phases dʼessor ne sont que le prélude aux phases dʼeffondrement. Le libéralisme postule que la
défense des intérêts privés converge en un équilibre collectif. La thèse de Marx est lʼexact opposé,
car elle voit au cœur du dispositif capitaliste la contradiction entre le caractère de plus en plus
social de la production et la forme étriquée dʼune propriété privée maintenue. Cette contradiction,
latente en période normale, se dévoile lors des crises. Les décisions que chaque propriétaire privé
prend pour sa sauvegarde particulière menacent alors la stabilité générale du système,
précisément parce quʼelles ont une portée sociale.
Pendant longtemps, cependant, le système capitaliste a baigné dans un environnement de petite
production (paysannerie, etc.) qui a atténué la portée de ses crises. Un milieu hétérogène introduit
des discontinuités qui freinent la diffusion de lʼépidémie. (...)
Dans les pays développés, le salariat constitue désormais lʼessentiel de la population active. La
petite production réduite à la portion congrue, il nʼy a plus dʼobstacle à ce que lʼinstabilité foncière
du système puisse se manifester dans toute son ampleur. Dès lors, le fordisme détruit, quelque
chose doit le remplacer, car le problème auquel il sʼattaquait demeure : dans les moments
difficiles, il faut soutenir la demande globale, pour éviter quʼune récession ne se transforme en
dépression. La révolution conservatrice sʼopposant énergiquement au partage négocié de la valeur
ajoutée, il ne reste plus quʼune porte de sortie : pousser à toutes forces les dépenses des
ménages vers le haut avec de moins en moins dʼépargne, de plus en plus de dettes. En effet, à
revenu constant, la baisse du taux dʼépargne des ménages accroît la consommation sans bourse
délier ; quant à la montée du taux dʼendettement, elle augmente les dépenses de ces derniers
sans passer par le « cauchemar » de la hausse des salaires réels.
Aux Etats-Unis, le surendettement de ménages mis en régime de surconsommation a remplacé le
pacte social keynésien. Ce pacte, négocié, pouvait par tâtonnements trouver un point dʼéquilibre.
Le nouveau modèle, par contre, est explosif, car il repose sur une aggravation constante des
déséquilibres. En principe pourtant, la hausse des taux dʼintérêt devrait, si nécessaire, pousser les
ménages à accroître leur épargne et à réduire leur endettement. Mais ce nʼest guère le cas, le
système emprunte la plus forte pente, celle de la facilité : cʼest-à-dire consommer en confiant la
fonction dʼépargne aux gains virtuels de la Bourse ou de lʼimmobilier et sʼendetter en comptant sur
la montée du prix des actifs détenus ou sur de futures possibilités de refinancement. On sʼhabitue
à lʼargent facile qui, dans un univers de finances libéralisées et dénué de contrôles, ira alimenter
les bulles spéculatives.
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Lʼenchaînement qui, aux Etats-Unis, mène de la crise de la « nouvelle économie » (en 2001) à la
crise financière actuelle est une parfaite illustration des impasses de ce modèle. La crise de la
nouvelle économie a été précédée dʼune bulle boursière dʼune extraordinaire ampleur, le seul
précédent comparable étant celui des années vingt. La spéculation aidant, une crise de
suraccumulation et de surendettement est venue se greffer sur une montée rapide des profits.
Comme on pouvait sʼy attendre, la réaction ultérieure a été en proportion : lʼéclatement de la bulle
boursière a débouché sur une violente chute de lʼinvestissement des entreprises (- 4,2% en 2001
et – 9,2% en 2002), entraînant un affaissement des niveaux de lʼactivité et de lʼemploi.
Pourtant, la récession ne sʼest pas transformée en dépression. Lʼexplication se trouve du côté des
dépenses des ménages, qui ont résisté. Les ménages ont poussé leur taux dʼépargne à un plus
bas historique (1,8% en 2001), favorisant la consommation. Surtout, une véritable thérapie de
choc a été mise en œuvre, combinant politiques budgétaire et monétaire. Tournée vers le soutien
au revenu des ménages, la politique budgétaire a opéré une stupéfiante volte-face, passant dʼun
confortable excédent de 239,4 milliards de dollars en 2000 à un imposant déficit de 282,1 milliards
en 2002. Cependant, cʼest la politique monétaire qui a joué le rôle essentiel : le principal taux de la
Fed a été ramené en un temps très court de 6% à 1%. Du coup, entre 2001 et 2006, le taux
dʼendettement des ménages américains a réalisé un bond sans précédent de 30 points, ouvrant la
voie à la crise de surendettement que nous observons aujourdʼhui. On nʼa pu surmonter les effets
de la première bulle, boursière, quʼen se lançant tête baissée dans une deuxième bulle,
immobilière. La crise actuelle, cʼest en somme la crise de la nouvelle économie qui continue :
celle-ci nʼa pas été surmontée, mais seulement stockée dans les déséquilibres accumulés. Par
une fuite en avant depuis longtemps engagée, les échéances ont été reportées, à lʼaide du modèle
que nous venons de décrire : de moins en moins dʼépargne (privée et publique), de plus en plus
de dettes (celles des ménages). Encore faut-il financer la surconsommation ainsi portée à bouts
de bras. Compenser le déficit dʼépargne intérieur et alimenter la boulimie consommatrice exige du
reste du monde un apport constamment renouvelé de sommes énormes, atteignant en 2006 plus
de 6% du PIB américain. Aux déséquilibres internes de lʼéconomie américaine, le modèle rajoute
les incertitudes constamment renouvelées du financement dʼun déficit externe devenu abyssal.
Lʼéclatement dʼune bulle immobilière a des effets bien connus. Le risque le plus grand vient de la
restriction de crédits que peuvent pratiquer des banques qui se sentent menacées, quʼil sʼagisse
des crédits hypothécaires (pour les achats de logement), des crédits à la consommation ou de
ceux destinés aux entreprises. Une telle politique pourrait paralyser lʼéconomie américaine et la
précipiter dans la récession. Elle peut peser particulièrement lourd sur des ménages habitués à
consommer à crédit. Nʼoublions pas lʼeffet richesse, qui postule un impact négatif sur la
consommation de la baisse de la valeur du logement, surtout pour des ménages habitués à «
adosser » leurs divers crédits sur la valeur de leur maison. Or, la consommation des ménages
occupe une place exceptionnelle aux Etats-Unis (70% du PIB).
Les crédits à risque (subprime), dont on a beaucoup parlé, ne sont quʼun accompagnement
logique de la bulle. La véritable innovation réside dans la titrisation des créances bancaires.
Nombre de banques américaines ont pris leurs précautions, en transformant les crédits
hypothécaires quʼelles ont accordé en titres de créances, quʼelles ont vendu. Lʼavantage est
dʼéviter la concentration dans les bilans des banques de créances douteuses. Lʼinconvénient est
de disséminer le risque dans toute lʼéconomie nationale, voire internationale : les milliards et
milliards de créances douteuses nʼont pas disparu, ils sont logés quelque part, mais où ? La
méfiance devient universelle. Deux types de crise menacent alors les banques. Une crise de
liquidité, car il devient de plus en plus difficile pour les banques dʼemprunter de lʼargent auprès
dʼautres banques, ce qui contraint les banques centrales à des interventions massives. Une crise
de rentabilité, car les pertes liées à la crise immobilière viennent en déduction des profits, ou sont
couvertes par de nouveaux apports de capitaux (sʼils sont possibles) ou mènent à la faillite. Des
institutions aussi prestigieuses que Citigroup, Merrill Lynch ou JP. Morgan ont annoncé des
sommes colossales de dépréciations dʼactifs pour les troisième et quatrième trimestres 2007. Une
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nouvelle phase de la crise est franchie : lʼappareil bancaire de la première puissance mondiale est
durement atteint, certaines parmi les plus grandes banques sont menacées.
Face aux périls, les marges de manœuvre de la politique américaine sont fortement réduites. En
2001, on est parvenu à éviter une vraie dépression en portant à bouts de bras la dépense des
ménages. Ces moyens ne peuvent plus être utilisés, en tous les cas pas à la même échelle. Le
taux de la Fed a été ramené en catastrophe (le 22/01) à 3,50%, mais, dʼune part, il nʼest pas sûr
que cela incite les entreprises à investir et, dʼautre part, jusquʼà quel point cela peut-il pousser les
ménages à sʼendetter, alors que nous sommes précisément face à une crise de surendettement ?
De son côté, le taux dʼépargne des ménages est nul, et, pour financer le plan de relance Bush (de
150 milliards de dollars), il nʼy a plus dʼexcédent budgétaire, mais un déficit (qui sʼélève déjà à
2,6% du PIB en 2006). Enfin, nous avons toujours lʼépée de Damoclès du déficit de la balance
américaine des transactions courantes, qui pousse à la chute du billet vert face à lʼeuro.
Lʼéconomie américaine est placée devant un dilemme redoutable : soit on réduit les déséquilibres,
mais au risque de la dépression ; soit on relance lʼactivité, mais en aggravant les déséquilibres. Si
le taux dʼendettement des ménages baisse, le niveau dʼactivité est menacé ; sʼil poursuit son
ascension, il prépare la future crise. Si le taux dʼépargne des ménages reste à son niveau
dʼinsignifiance, il ne garantit pas le financement de lʼéconomie américaine ; sʼil se redresse, il porte
atteinte à la consommation. Si la Fed continue à baisser ses taux, elle risque un krach du dollar ; si
elle veut écarter ce risque, elle ne baisse pas ses taux, mais nʼapporte pas dʼaide à lʼéconomie.
Lʼéconomie américaine joue le rôle de locomotive pour le monde entier, et il nʼy en a pas dʼautre.
Cʼest dire ce que serait lʼimpact dʼune récession américaine. La mondialisation libérale a renforcé
cette fragilité, en généralisant le salariat, en instaurant une financiarisation grosse de périls
nouveaux, en interconnectant la planète entière. La fabuleuse croissance chinoise nʼest pas un
recours : elle est en réalité largement dépendante du niveau dʼactivité américain et ainsi en est-il
pour nombre de pays émergents.
Alors quʼon nʼen avait plus connu depuis la grande dépression, la succession de crises financières
depuis les années 1990 montre que le grand responsable de la situation actuelle est la
mondialisation libérale. Il faut tout reprendre de A à Z, balayer le tout marché et lʼinadmissible
liberté laissée à la rapacité du profit. Il y a un devoir dʼingérence économique, en faveur de
lʼimmense masse de la population, les travailleurs, de façon à ce quʼils ne supportent pas les
conséquences dʼune crise qui nʼest pas la leur, et que lʼon ouvre enfin la voie à un système tourné
vers la satisfaction des véritables besoins sociaux.
Rédaction achevée au 30 / 1 / 2008
JOHSUA Isaac
* Article à paraître dans le numéros 3 (mars 2008) de la revue « Savoir/Agir ». Le Conseil
scientifique dʼAttac a fait circuler cet article dans ses réseaux de diffusion.
* « Savoir/Agir » est la revue de lʼassociation « Raisons dʼAgir ». On la trouve sur le site
suivant : www.raisonsdagir.org/
2008\01\28
Fernando Canzian, O Brasil e a crise nos EUA. A Folha oL
http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/folha/pensata/fernandocanzian/ult1470u367628.shtml
Na atual crise, as empresas norte-americanas têm pelo menos três trunfos: 1) tiveram nos últimos anos os
maiores lucros da história; 2) cerca de 40% de seus ganhos são gerados hoje fora do solo norte-americano,
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epicentro da crise, concentrada no mercado imobiliário; e 3) estão aumentando fortemente as exportações
com a desvalorização do dólar (as vendas externas americanas subiram 13% em 2007).
Foi exatamente essa exuberância toda que alimentou a crise, com operações de empréstimos temerárias a
consumidores e compradores de imóveis nos EUA. No setor imobiliário, a oferta de dinheiro levou 70% das
famílias americanas a terem, no ano passado, pelo menos uma casa própria (quitada ou sendo paga).
Como efeito da atual crise, espera-se agora que 2 milhões de norte-americanos tenham de devolver seus
imóveis por falta de dinheiro para pagá-los. Cerca de cem fundos que montaram financiamentos imobiliários
devem desaparecer, amargando prejuízos superiores a US$ 400 bilhões. (..)
E o Brasil? Cerca de 16% das exportações brasileiras vão para os EUA. Se os EUA esfriam, não apenas
essas exportações diminuem mas também as destinadas a outros países (como a China) que têm nos EUA
um grande mercado.
O atenuante é que, a exemplo das empresas norte-americanas, as brasileiras, européias e asiáticas
também ganharam muito dinheiro nos últimos anos e reduziram fortemente suas dívidas. Ou seja, têm um
colchão mais grosso para agüentar um período de solavancos.
No caso do Brasil, embora o país tenha crescido menos do que a média mundial nos últimos anos, houve
melhoras macroeconômicas significativas: o país acumulou US$ 185 bilhões em reservas cambiais,
praticamente zerou a dívida interna atrelada ao dólar e produziu fortes superávits comerciais. Resultado
disso é que, ao contrário de outras crises, o dólar permaneceu manso diante das turbulências dos últimos
dias.
Como dito no início, porém, o Brasil continua vulnerável devido à gastança incontrolável do setor público.
Em um cenário de recessão nos EUA e de desaquecimento por aqui, a tendência é de queda na
arrecadação de impostos. Se isso ocorrer, teremos dificuldades sérias, já que o país já tem problemas para
fechar as contas crescendo 5% ao ano. Se crescer menos, será pior ainda.
2008\01\25
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7209839.stm
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/25/business/worldbusiness/25export.html?
_r=1&th=&emc=th&pagewanted=all&oref=slogin
NY Times:
At the Evergreen Knitting Company in Ningbo, China, orders from the United States for
T-shirts and sweaters abruptly dropped 20 percent this winter. The company expects some
rival Chinese knitwear producers to shut down altogether.
“We anticipate that this year, 10 to 20 percent of the knitwear factories will have to close
due to the inability to compete,” said Sean Zhu, Evergreen's sales manager.
In response to the downturn, some companies are pursuing remedies that will affect
economic output, like Aigret Industries, which has lengthened next month's Chinese New
Year vacation for its workers to 20 days, instead of the usual 10.
Others are investing in more technological research and developing new models, like
the Xigo Electric Company in Zhongshan, China, which manufactures air-conditioners and
liquid-crystal display television sets.
“We really felt the impact of the slowdown in the U.S. during the second half of 2007,”
said Stan He, a Xigo sales manager. “Orders were generally down by 10 to 20 percent
relative to the same period a year ago.”
2008\01\24
Dubai and sheiks, China and Russia: cats like the cream
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7207715.stm
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Who's afraid of sovereign wealth funds?
By Tim Weber
Business editor, BBC News website, in Davos
Sovereign wealth funds - government-controlled investment funds - are one of the
hottest topics at the World Economic Forum in Davos. But are they really
dangerous?
(...) In Davos, the session on the "myths and realities of sovereign wealth funds" was
oversubscribed.
There is a certain deja vu to this debate.
Two years ago the leaders of hedge funds had to defend their track record.
Last year it was the turn of private equity firms.
(...)
The $20 trillion investors
Maybe it is their size that is intimidating.
On a conservative estimate they have assets worth
about $3 trillion.
Richard Fuld [picture], chief executive of investment bank
Lehman Brothers, predicted that - with other statecontrolled firms taken into account, these countries
would control $15-20 trillion in 5 years.
The owners are 15 governments, and five of them control
70% of the total. (...)
Stephen Schwarzmann, chief executive of private equity giant Blackstone, derided the
notion that these funds were a threat: "It's almost amusing to see that pools of capital that
we have always dealt with now have a new name, sovereign wealth funds, and are seen
as an inherent threat."
He described the funds as "model investors", "smart, highly professional," simply looking
for the best possible return for their money.
"When the Chinese investment fund took a 9.5% stake in our company there were
questions in the press: 'why do they do this, what are their motives?'"
"Well, it's a non-voting investment, that was important for them...they said they don't want
to vote."
What if?
But Larry Summers [picture], Harvard professor and once US treasury secretary, had his
doubts.
These funds had to understand that governments worried about possible hidden motives.
What if a state invested in a firm and then started making suggestions? Proposed to an
"airline to fly to their country, want a bank to do business in their country, or want a rival to
their country's national champion disabled"?
And what if a country's investment fund ran an active trading operation and - George
Soros style, when he brought down the pound - decided to launch a large-scale
speculative attack on another nation's currency?
Mr Summers called on sovereign wealth funds to be transparent about their investments
and strategy, and sign a binding code of conduct.
While Norway's finance minister, Kristin Halvorsen, said she was happy to do that, her
peers were more circumspect.
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Muhammad Al Jasser, vice governor of Saudi Arabia's Monetary Agency, did not
understand the call for regulation.
There had been "failures galore" in the world of hedge funds, but all attempts of
regulations had been rejected, because they would "interfere with the smooth working of
financial markets".
The behaviour of sovereign wealth funds had been without fail, and now they "seemed to
have been found guilty before being proven innocent".
END of BBC quotation
SYNTHESIS OF THE MEETING IN THE OFFICIAL DAVOS SITE
http://www.weforum.org/en/knowledge/Events/KN_SESS_SUMM_23264?url=/en/
knowledge/Events/KN_SESS_SUMM_23264
Myths and Realities of Sovereign Wealth Funds
Richard S. Fuld Jr · Kristin Halvorsen · Muhammad S. Al Jasser · Robert M. Kimmitt ·
Aleksey Kudrin · Bader M. Al Sa'ad · Stephen A. Schwarzman · Lawrence H. Summers
Moderated by · Martin Wolf
Thursday 24 January
The growing prominence of sovereign wealth funds (SWFs) has attracted widespread
media attention and political scrutiny, thanks in large part to their recent acquisition of
stakes in troubled financial institutions in the United States and Europe. Critics suggest
these funds – created to manage the foreign exchange reserves of the major oil producers
and other exporters − could inject political considerations into their investment decisions or
otherwise destabilize the global capital markets. How, asked moderator Martin Wolf,
Associate Editor and Chief Economics Commentator, Financial Times, United Kingdom,
should policy-makers respond to these concerns?
The rise of SWFs should be welcomed, not opposed, participants generally agreed. By
providing long-term capital, sovereign investors are reducing market volatility and
providing relief from the credit crunch threatening the US and global economies. That role
will only grow more valuable, said Richard S. Fuld Jr, Chairman and Chief Executive
Officer, Lehman Brothers, USA. If high oil prices continue to channel surplus funds into the
coffers of the major exporting countries, sovereign assets could reach US$ 15 trillion within
the next five years. "They need the capital markets to function and the markets need the
liquidity they provide."
Muhammad S. Al Jasser, Vice-Governor of the Saudi Arabian Monetary Agency, noted his
country does not have a SWF as such, but has long relied on its central bank to invest
surplus oil earnings. Smoothing out the Saudi fiscal budget not only contributes to
domestic economic stability but also makes it easier for the country to respond to changes
in international oil demand – promoting global stability as well. The same considerations
apply to other SWFs. To date, Al Jasser added, criticism of the SWFs has been based on
concerns about actions they might take in the future, rather than any actual abuses. "The
attitude seems to be that sovereign investors are guilty until they are proven innocent."
Aleksey Kudrin, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Finance of the Russian Federation,
observed that concerns about foreign ownership were rarely heard in the developed
countries when capital largely flowed to, rather than from, the emerging markets. Now,
however, the SWFs are being singled out for scrutiny – even though more than 60% of
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their assets are held in fixed-income securities while the rest is largely invested in minority
stakes in public companies. While national security concerns are often cited as reasons to
be wary of SWFs, these objections are often vague or exaggerated, Kudrin suggested.
If policy-makers truly are concerned about financial instability, they should focus their
attention on private investors, such as hedge funds, argued Bader M. Al Sa'ad, Managing
Director, Kuwait Investment Authority (KIA), Kuwait. "Have you ever seen a sovereign
fund, one which is leveraged 20 or 30 times, force a central bank to devalue its currency?"
he asked. "No. So there is no substance here." The KIA, he noted, has been a shareholder
in Daimler Benz since 1969 and in British Petroleum since 1986, and has never used its
position to advance political objectives. "We look at the bottom line. We donʼt look at
anything else," he said.
Lawrence H. Summers, Charles W. Eliot University Professor, Harvard University, USA,
suggested concerns about the influence of SWFs are not entirely unfounded. The
unwillingness of the sovereign funds to take an activist role could be a boon to entrenched
corporate management, while greater involvement in the foreign exchange markets could
be seen as a hostile action by other governments. A voluntary code of conduct could help
assuage these fears, he said. "If we believe in free markets, shouldnʼt we have some kind
of guidelines for transactions that have an element, if only a small element, of cross-border
nationalization?"
Robert M. Kimmitt, US Deputy Secretary of the Treasury, noted that G7 leaders have
asked the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank to work with sovereign
investors and recipient nations to develop such guidelines. Drafts should be ready for
review by the autumn IMF/World Bank meetings, he said.
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7188909.stm
Citigroup's $9.8bn sub-prime loss
US banking giant Citigroup has reported a $9.83bn (£5bn) net loss for the last three
months of 2007.
Chief executive Vikram Pandit said the loss had been caused by a $18.1bn exposure to
bad mortgage debt and was "clearly unacceptable". (...)
It was also announced that Citigroup is going to get a cash injection of $6.88bn from
Singapore government investment agency GIC, while the Kuwait Investment Authority said
it had bought a $3bn stake in the firm, as well as a $2bn holding in Merrill Lynch.
This follows a similar $7.5bn investment in Citigroup from another government agency, the
Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, last November.
2008\01\22
A remarkable piece of discussion about the “Fed put” comes today from this
excellent blog by S R Waldman:
http://www.interfluidity.com/
If the Fed were only using world equity prices as an indicator, and were not
specifically concerned with altering US stock market outcomes on this day,
Tuesday, January 22, 2007, they would not have scrambled over a holiday
weekend, perhaps over a single long night, to put together a virtual FOMC meeting
prior to market open on a cold, tired winter morning. Nor is this the first time the
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Bernanke Fed has behaved this way. By my count this is the third unexpected premarket announcement issued by the Bernanke Fed following indications of turmoil
in equity markets. [1]
Let's recall what William Poole, President of FRB St Louis (and, interestingly, the
only dissenter to this morning's move) said in November, 2007 about the "Fed put":
I can state my conclusion compactly: There is a sense in which a Fed put
does exist. However, those who believe that the Fed put reflects unwise
monetary policy misunderstand the responsibilities of a central bank. The basic
argument is very simple: A monetary policy that stabilizes the price level and
the real economy cannot create moral hazard because there is no hazard,
moral or otherwise. Nor does monetary policy action designed to prevent a
financial upset from cascading into financial crisis create moral hazard. Finally,
the notion that the Fed responds to stock market declines per se, independent
of the relationship of such declines to achievement of the Fedʼs dual mandate
in the Federal Reserve Act, is not supported by evidence from decades of
monetary history.
Poole is quite clear that he believes it is within the Fed's mandate to use monetary
policy "to prevent a financial upset from cascading into financial crisis". That's a
plausible view of what the Fed is after with its surprise, early morning interventions.
Poole goes on to say...
From time to time, to be sure, Fed action to stabilize the economy—to
cushion recession or deal with a systemic financial crisis—will have the effect
of pushing up stock prices. That effect is part of the transmission mechanism
through which monetary policy affects the economy. However, it is a
fundamental misreading of monetary policy to believe that the stock market
per se is an objective of policy. It is also a mistake to believe that a policy
action that is desirable to help stabilize the economy should not be taken
because it will also tend to increase stock prices.
Reviewing these two snippets reveals what I think are fatal tensions in the Fed's
practice of asymmetric macroeconomic stabilization (stimulate busts but never
prejudge a boom a bubble). Poole is at pains, throughout his talk (whose theme is
moral hazard) to claim that stabilization policy uses the stock market as a
instrument of policy, but that this does not imply that the stock market can use the
FRB as a backstop or guarantee. In the question of who's using who, Poole wants
to make it clear that the FRB is the boss. But, if the Fed must intervene to prevent
"panics", it has placed itself in the role of a parent habitually blackmailed by a selfdestructive adolescent. "If you don't give me what I want want Mommy, I'll cut
myself and maybe I'll die!" As too many parents know, it's a bad situation, precisely
9
january 2008 - august 2007 deeprecession BLOG
because the threat of harm can be credible. One can't condemn a parent for
capitulating in any particular squabble. But, it's also obvious that this is a bad
dynamic, one that shouldn't be lauded as the cutting edge of "intelligent
macrofamilial stabilization policy." It's not a particular policy action that's bad, it's the
macroeconomic game that we've settled into that has to be changed if we want
markets that aggregate external information and make wise allocation decisions
rather than focusing on intrafinancial Kremlinology.
I'm not optimistic that the current Fed will transcend heroics and push towards a
new dynamic. The Great Depression haunts the Fed chairman like the memory of
an older sibling's suicide. The troubled younger child will be coddled and indulged,
and fingers will be wagged only when it is very safe to do so. But, tragically,
indulgence and capitulation don't always work, what appears to be the least risky
course can sometimes be a sure route to escalation and destruction. When the last
child died, it was blamed on tough love. But that might not be right, or if it was, it
might say little about what this child needs.
Anyway, I think recent events have shown pretty clearly that a Fed put does exist.
The Fed can be counted on quite specifically to try to forestall extreme lower tail
outcomes on very short period US equity returns. That doesn't mean the Fed is
setting a floor under long-term asset prices. They might soberly stand aside as
markets fall by 60% over a period of months. But they don't want it to happen in a
day. Long-term, buy-and-hold investors should take little comfort. But short-horizon
traders have every reason to truncate the lower tails of the subjective probability
distributions that guide their moves.
Still, though Bernanke & Co may fully intend to try, there's no guarantee that the
Fed will succeed at preventing sharp drops or sudden stops. The Fed is doing its
best to offer traders a put, but as markets are now learning, counterparty risk can
be a bitch.
[1] The first surprise intervention was the announcement on August 17 of the cut in the discount window
spread from 100 to 50 bps following an overnight crash on Asian markets. The second was the Fed's
announcement of the TAF and central bank coordination on December 12, following a disappointed reaction
in equity markets to a fed funds cut of "only" 25 bps. The third intervention was today's. The timing of the
Dec 12 announcement may have been a coincidence not much related to equity prices behavior, but the Jan
22 and Aug 17 announcements were, in my opinion, clearly intended to affect US stock markets.
Steve Randy Waldman — Tuesday January 22, 2008 at 10:10pm
2008\01\11
In a speech today, I got later on from Delasantellis, Fed boss F S Mishkin (see also
2008\ ) unveals the Fed put strategy, in obsequium to the paradigmatic US société du
spectacle (the show must go on, otherwise: rich saver get angry and command
democratic media to make people cry, medium-small savers wonʼt vote a candidate
that guarantees it will go on and on again. Up to the final entropy à la Japanese.
10
january 2008 - august 2007 deeprecession BLOG
Armageddon? Not at all! Just an end to US and $ dominance, an Eastern fork in
capital-pedia)
The largest mortgage lender in the US, Countrywide, which pioneered sub-prime
mortgages, is bought by Bank of America for $4bn after its shares plunge 48%.
Read the full story: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7183221.stm
PLEASE NOTE THAT BANK OF AMERICA IS THE 8th BANK in the loser world league,
WITH $3bn SUBPRIME LOSSES
2008\01\10
the Economist on line ed.: The R word http://www.economist.com/research/
articlesBySubject/displaystory.cfm?subjectid=7933596&story_id=10492732
MY C0MMENT. R-concern about to break the 500 ceiling: had the trend to continue for a
quarter, weʼd be back to a 2000-01 level, right into the 2nd Greenspan Global Recession
(GGR2). Most forecasters say the R odds are 40%, Greenspan 50%, Americans in polls
60%, Chesnais 90% and www.finanacialarmaggedon.com 110% (if the last two are right,
itʼs 100%). IMAGE: Copyright © 2008 The Economist Newspaper and The Economist Group
Data source: http://www.factiva.com/
2008\01\09
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7177397.stm
China boom 'cushions world slump'
By Steve Schifferes
Economics reporter, BBC News
Global economic growth will slow in 2008 as the credit crunch hits the richest
nations, the World Bank says.
(...) The World Bank's Global Economic Prospects (..) follows other international
organisations like the IMF and the OECD in suggesting a relatively benign scenario, with
11
january 2008 - august 2007 deeprecession BLOG
swift action by central banks limiting the damage caused by the credit crunch to the US
economy.
It expects US growth to slow sharply to 1% in the first half of 2008, but recover quickly by
2009. Overall, the industrialised countries are expected to grow by 2.2% this year, down
around 0.5% compared with the previous year.
In contrast, China is expected to grow by more than 10% over the next two years, with
India not far behind.
Overall, the two biggest emerging market countries give a strong boost to total growth in
developing nations.
Without their contribution, developing country growth would be a much more modest 5.5%,
and substantially less on a per capita basis, Professor Jim Rollo of Sussex University
pointed out.
He warned that the World Bank might be too optimistic about the ability of policy markers
to respond to the highly uncertain economic situation.
2008\01\04
US unemployment rises sharply as job report sparks fall in stock market
Read the full story http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7171728.stm
Unemployment in December at a 2-year high: 5% average. This will urge the Fed.
2007\12\12
According to http://dictionary.reference.com/features/words_of_2007.html
the best online dictionary (quoted ) subprime mortgage is the last word of the year.
December: subprime mortgage
"Andy Weissman, publisher of the weekly Energy Business Watch, said the current
focus in Congress on housing market woes and the subprime mortgage meltdown are
understandable, but both parties need to refocus on energy policy." — Fox News
2007\12\18
ECB lends European commercial banks $500bn over the Christmas period to help ease
the credit crisis.
Read the full story http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/7149329.stm
Euro money market rates tumbled after the ECB injected an unprecedented $500 billion
equivalent into the banking system on December 18, 2007 as part of a global effort to ease
gridlock in the credit market. The amount banks charge each other for two-week loans in
euros dropped a record 50 basis points to 4.45%. The rate had soared 83 basis points in
the previous two weeks as banks hoarded cash in anticipation of a squeeze on credit
through year-end. The ECB loaned a record 348.6 billion euros ($501.5 billion) for two
weeks at 4.21% on that day, almost 170 billion euros more than it estimated was needed.
Bids were received from 390 banks, ranging from 4% to 4.45%. (HK Liu,
http://www.atimes.com/atimes/Global_Economy/JA30Dj06.html )
12
january 2008 - august 2007 deeprecession BLOG
A COMMENT: ECB carries on the policy started last Summer at bubble implosion, but at
a scale with no precedent in the short ECB history: i.e. Frankfurt carries on injecting veryshort term liquidity and subtracting short term one at the same time, hoping to save banks
(with our money, of course) and also repress inflation (opposite to the US Fed that, even
for its institutional difference, has to take into account rising unemployment as well).
With this Xmas gift (circa €1 bn per bank), a 15-days loan, ECB helps euro banks to make
fake end year budgets, but in 15 days time all the problems will be back and worst. The
problem is not one of liquidity, but banks solvency in a recession scenario.
2007\12\12
a table to be updated later on by banks compelled to tell it bigger
MAIN SUB-PRIME LOSSES SO FAR
UBS: $13.5bn
Citigroup: $11bn
Merrill Lynch: $8bn
Morgan Stanley $9.4bn
HSBC: $3.4bn
Bear Stearns: $3.2bn
Deutsche Bank: $3.2bn
Bank of America: $3bn
Barclays: $2.6bn
Royal Bank of Scotland: $2.6bn
Freddie Mac: $2bn
Credit Suisse: $1bn
Wachovia: $1.1bn
IKB: $2.6bn
Source: BBC, from Company reports
2007\11\13
Compare with actual results to come and further expectations changes; surveyed fʼcasters
show two professional bad habits: over-optimism and slackness, slowness in adjustments.
http://www.philadelphiafed.org/files/spf/survq407.html
Survey of Professional Forecasters
Fourth Quarter 2007
Another Round of Cuts to the Outlook for Short-Term Growth
The forecasters are cutting their estimates for growth over the remainder of this year and
the first half of 2008. This marks the third survey in which the outlook for growth appears
weaker. The largest downward revision (1.2 percentage points) is for the current quarter,
when real GDP will grow at an annual rate of just 1.5 percent, down from the previous
projection of 2.7 percent. Downward revisions of about 0.5 percentage point characterize
the outlook for the first two quarters of 2008, when growth will average 2.2 percent and 2.3
percent, respectively. On an annual-average over annual-average basis, real GDP will
grow 2.1 percent in 2007 and 2.5 percent in 2008. Notably, the forecasters have revised
downward their estimates for annual growth continually since the survey of 2007 Q1, when
they thought growth would be 2.8 percent in 2007 and 3.0 percent in 2008.
13
january 2008 - august 2007 deeprecession BLOG
Slightly weaker conditions in the labor market accompany the outlook for growth.
Projections for the unemployment rate are higher in each quarter of 2008 than they were
in the previous survey. On an annual-average basis, unemployment will be 4.6 percent in
2007, unchanged from the previous survey, and 4.9 percent in 2008, up from 4.7 percent
previously. Gains in nonfarm payroll employment will average 152,000 jobs per month in
2007 and 104,000 per month in 2008, both down somewhat from the last survey.
Upward Revisions to the Risk of a Downturn
A slightly higher risk of a negative quarter accompanies the forecast. The forecasters have
revised upward the chance of a quarter of negative growth over the next four quarters.
That chance now hovers around 20 percent or more in each quarter of 2008.
2007\10\26
Paul K jumps on The Economistʼs shoulders, calling for further analysis. We follow him
with enthusiasm.
http://www.nytimes.com/2007/10/26/opinion/26krugman.html?_r=1&oref=slogin
Op-Ed Columnist
A Catastrophe Foretold
By PAUL KRUGMAN (My free resumé here, not always his wording).
Fed official Ed Gramlich, who recently died, had urged Greenspan to increase
oversight on Farwest, unregulated subprime as early as 2000, but got nowhere.
Why was nothing done to avert the fiasco? The answer is laissez faire ideology, to which
Greenspan belongs, that choose mortgage lending as a social laboratory, a great mental
experiment. They made the mad choice and now we got a theorem proof, although at
some experimental cost for the rats: “maybe the subprime catastrophe will be enough to
remind us why financial regulation was introduced in the first place”, Paul concludes. As for
costs:
“In fact, both borrowers and investors got scammed.
Iʼve written before about the way investors in securities backed by
subprime loans were assured that they were buying AAA assets, only to
suddenly find that what they really owned were junk bonds. This shock has
produced a crisis of confidence in financial markets, which poses a serious
threat to the economy.
But the greater tragedy is the one facing borrowers who were offered what
they were told were good deals, only to find themselves in a debt trap.”
My objection: The “debt trap” calls to my mind what Marx once wrote as an op-ed in
another NY newspaper 150 years ago, and Mike Davis describes that actually happened
to the Chinese peasantry a bit later. So, there is also a third dimension, besides the laissez
faire - regulation ones. The subprime system actually was “regulated”: by a strict
Hegelian-Marxian-Drakulan logic; to enlarge finance K circulation, through metamorphoses
across money-things and different forms of K. 1 The victims were just asked to supply their
fresh blood to the circuit: money - rich savings for junk bonds, low wages - poor savings
for fake houses (a new, but also very ancient form of expropriation among many, without
necessarily increasing absolute or relative surplus labour, i.e. without putting more
technology or more slavery into the labour process).
No. 3 is a sacrificial dimension of the experiment-and-katastrophè, à la René Girard.
1
More on this, applied to global climate change or the sacrifice of Gaia, in: EF Arcangeli (2007)
14
january 2008 - august 2007 deeprecession BLOG
2007\10\18
In real time, in the middle of the US subprime outburst and world credit panic, a usually
authoritative and always independent source as The Economist dedicates a Special report
to the issue. It goes straight to some key points, although the “Only human” Report
opening is too mild, and not so structuralist but “anthropological” (i.e. scientifically weak,
even in a social science communication and divulgation perspective) vis a vis the
necrophile Central Banks - Finance K connection. This is a sort of style of the
magazine: a mixed tactique of a caresse and a strike into the balls.
After all, Marx didnʼt miss an issue (itʼs a good thing to imitate him), but they never were
the kind of Marxists, in their coherence through decades that makes the magazine
identity ! Nonetheless, since from Ricardo and Marx, The Economist and Marx, Buster
Keaton and Groucho, some Dostoevsky-Levinas-Girard kind of specularity, similarity of the
opposites, links two people facing reality with irony, realism and some degree of
materialism, therefore crossing their regards in a similar mood.
The dodgy dentist metaphor is great, open to even tougher versions, once we move from
its first to the second sense (open-dictionary.com, my bold characters) of adj. "dodgy" :
1. chancy, chanceful, dicey, dodgy -- (of uncertain outcome; especially fraught with risk;
"an extremely dicey future on a brave new world of liquid nitrogen, tar, and smog"- New Yorker).
2. crafty, cunning, dodgy, foxy, guileful, knavish, slick, sly, tricksy, tricky, wily -- (marked
by skill in deception; "cunning men often pass for wise"; "deep political machinations"; "a
foxy scheme"; "a slick evasive answer"; "sly as a fox"; "tricky Dik"; "a wily old attorney").
A no-pity cartoonist like Zapiro should design Greenspan, Bernanke and Mishkin
like three Machiavellian foxes stealing money from poor three little saving-pot pigs.
Lessons from the credit crunch
Oct 18th 2007
From The Economist print edition
Leader (that is, one of the initial unsigned articles expressing The Economistʼs view):
Central banks have worked miracles for 30 years. Don't count on that continuing
15
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AFTER a sudden market panic, all is well. Prices
dropped precipitately, but investors have come to see
that the Federal Reserve, under its new chairman,
will not let the economy slide. Normality has been
restored.
That was 20 years ago. Black Monday, October 19th
1987, was the day stockmarkets plunged; and Alan
Greenspan, who won his central-banking spurs in
that crisis, was the Fed chairman (see article). Two
decades on, in the wake of this summer's subprime
squeeze, stockmarkets are showing similar faith in Ben Bernanke, Mr Greenspan's
successor. Despite bad news from the housing market and warnings from the treasury
secretary, America's equity markets are still higher than they were in May. Amazingly,
investors have been buying both on good news (don't worry, the economy is fine) and on
bad (don't worry, the Fed will come to the rescue by cutting rates).
16
january 2008 - august 2007 deeprecession BLOG
[image: Copyright © 2008 The Economist Newspaper and The Economist Group. Fair use rationale:
illustrating, with the original The Economist magazine cover page, the source of
quotations strictly relevant to our scientific communication and discussion tasks. Source:
http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/en/e/e4/The_Economist_2007_10_20issue.jpg ]
But the parallel with Black Monday does not work as well as investors might hope, for two
reasons. First, this financial crisis is centred on the debt markets, not equities. Debt is
more dangerous and in its current securitised form much harder to isolate. Interestingly,
the money markets seem more worried about how the credit crunch may end than equity
investors are. Interbank rates, though they have eased, are still high: not knowing which
institutions might be on the hook for subprime losses and spooked by their own exposures,
banks remain wary of lending to one another. And the repricing of mortgage-backed
securities looks likely to be a protracted business. The news that big American banks,
prodded by the Treasury, plan to set up a “super-conduit” in which to park instruments
once valued at dozens of billions of dollars is a sign of how gummed up that market still is.
The more important flaw in the parallel concerns the role of central banks. The Fed
emerged from the crisis 20 years ago with its reputation not just unscathed but also
enhanced. This time round, the central banks' faults are painfully visible.
Dodgy dentists
(...) as our special report in this issue argues, the past couple of months have
demonstrated the limitations of central bankers and financial supervisors (they are not
always under the same roof). This is so in at least three respects: monetary policy,
economic modelling and bank supervision.
Loose monetary policy is partly responsible for the mess the central bankers are now
trying to clear up. Other factors contributed to the crunch, including rash lending,
securitisation and globalisation: when American subprime loans went bad, banks in
Leipzig (which had bought the stuff) and in Newcastle upon Tyne (which hadn't—see
article) were caught out. But whichever way you look at it, central banks kept interest rates
too low for too long. That is most true of the Fed, which slashed rates between 2001 and
2003, held them at 1% for a year and then raised them in slow, predictable quarter-point
steps, fuelling the housing boom. The results of that are plain to subprime borrowers
facing the loss of their homes and to investors who ended up with subprime debt.
(...) No doubt central bankers will work at these shortcomings. But consider a paradox: the
credit crunch has been caused by their successes as much as their failures. Low, stable
inflation and strong, steady growth created an incentive for investors to go hunting for risk.
The returns were tempting and with wise central bankers in charge, who could lose? Too
many investors and bankers have outsourced risk measurement to the likes of Mr
Greenspan and Mr Bernanke. Given the complexity of their job, that was truly irrational
exuberance. If there is one lesson everybody should take away from the credit crunch it is
that central bankers, no less than dentists, are only human.
Copyright © 2008 The Economist Newspaper and The Economist Group. All rights reserved.
Special report
THE WORLD ECONOMY
Opening report article:
17
january 2008 - august 2007 deeprecession BLOG
Only human
Oct 18th 2007
From The Economist print edition
The turmoil in financial markets has posed hard questions for central banks.
Their reputations are now staked on their answers
(...)
A question of credibility
Central banks' success in controlling inflation has won them credibility as economic
managers. But that credibility is now at risk in two ways. First, those banks, and in
particular the Fed, must take some of the blame for their part in stoking the appetite for
risk. Monetary policy was too loose for too long, helping to pump up housing markets in
America and elsewhere.
The second threat to credibility rests on how central banks use monetary policy to help
clear up the credit mess. In America, where growth and jobs are most at risk, Alan
Greenspan, chairman of the Fed until last year, has put the chance of recession at more
than one in three. Amid the anxiety, interest-rate increases in Canada, Europe and Japan
have been shelved.
The central banks have a difficult balance to strike. If policy is too tight, they will be held
responsible for creating recessions. If it is too loose, their grip on inflation could slip, as
markets and the public cease to believe that prices will remain stable.
The great paradox is that the central banks' mastery of inflation has made the task of
keeping financial markets safe all the harder. When people are confident that inflation is
low and will remain so, they may be more prepared to take on debt. That leads to an
expansion of credit and the pursuit of more exotic rewards by lenders. It feeds price rises
in assets such as housing and securities. It encourages excessive risk-taking. If so, how
can you contain inflation without sparking occasional but dangerous bouts of insanity in
asset markets? That is a riddle likely to test central bankers for a long time to come.
The central banks' unprecedented public standing, which helped them in the fight against
inflation, has also proved a double-edged sword. Blind faith that the Fed will always save
the day encourages people to take even greater risks. Greed, unless it is reined in by fear,
reaches out towards the calamitous moment when the central bankers' defences fail.
Central bankers themselves are realistic about their knowledge and their powers. Donald
Kohn, a Fed governor, put it with admirable honesty in December last year: “In informal
terms, we are uncertain about where the economy has been, where it is now and where it
is going.” But many financial speculators cling to the idea that central banks are
omnipotent. For the sake of everyone else, they should be disabused before they venture
into even greater excess.
Copyright © 2008 The Economist Newspaper and The Economist Group. All rights reserved.
Special report
THE WORLD ECONOMY
Sources
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january 2008 - august 2007 deeprecession BLOG
Oct 18th 2007
From The Economist print edition
“Housing and Monetary Policy”, by John Taylor
http://www.kc.frb.org/PUBLICAT/SYMPOS/2007/PDF/2007.09.04.Taylor.pdf
“Housing, Credit and Consumer Expenditure”, by John Muellbauer
http://www.kc.frb.org/publicat/sympos/2007/PDF/2007.09.17.Muellbauer.pdf
“Housing and the Monetary Transmission Mechanism”, by Frederic Mishkin
http://www.kc.frb.org/publicat/sympos/2007/pdf/2007.09.20.mishkin.pdf
“The Financial Accelerator and the Credit Channel”, speech by B. Bernanke, 2007\06\15
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/bernanke20070615a.htm
“Inflation Dynamics”, by Frederic Mishkin (speech, March 23rd 2007)
http://www.federalreserve.gov/newsevents/speech/mishkin20070323a.htm
“Why has US Inflation Become Harder to Forecast?” by James Stock and Mark Watson,
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 2007
http://www.nber.org/papers/w12324.pdf
“Do Markets Care Who Chairs the Central Bank?”, by Kenneth Kuttner and Adam Posen,
NBER Working Paper no 13101
http://www.nber.org/papers/w13101.pdf
“Interest and Prices”, by Michael Woodford. Princeton University Press, 2003
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/asin/0691010498/theeconomists-20
“Monetary and Prudential Policies at a Crossroads? New Challenges in the New Century”,
by Claudio Borio
http://www.bis.org/publ/work216.pdf
“Inflation Targeting: Lessons from the International Experience”, by Ben Bernanke,
Thomas Laubach, Frederic Mishkin and Adam Posen. Princeton University Press, 2001
http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/asin/0691086893/theeconomists-20
“Agency Costs, Net Worth and Business Fluctuations”, by Ben Bernanke and Mark Gertler,
American Economic Review, 1989
http://links.jstor.org/sici?sici=0002-8282%28198903%2979%3A1%3C14%3AACNWAB
%3E2.0.CO%3B2-U&origin=repec
“Has Globalisation Changed Inflation?” by Laurence Ball, NBER Working Paper no 12687
http://www.nber.org/papers/w12687
2007\09\20
“Housing and the Monetary Transmission Mechanism”, by Frederic Mishkin, member of
Fed Board http://www.kc.frb.org/publicat/sympos/2007/pdf/2007.09.20.mishkin.pdf
19
january 2008 - august 2007 deeprecession BLOG
Abstract
The housing market is of central concern to monetary policy makers. To achieve
the dual goals of price stability and maximum sustainable employment, monetary policy
makers must understand the role that housing plays in the monetary transmission
mechanism if they are to set policy instruments appropriately. In this paper, I examine
what we know about the role of housing in the monetary transmission mechanism and
then explore the implications of this knowledge for the conduct of monetary policy. I
begin with a theoretical and empirical review of the main housing-related channels of the
transmission mechanism. These channels include the ways interest rates directly
influence the user cost of housing capital, expectations of future house-price movements,
and housing supply; and indirectly influence the real economy through standard wealth
effects from house prices, balance sheet, credit-channel effects on consumer spending,
and balance sheet, credit-channel effects on housing demand. I then consider the
interaction of financial stability with the monetary transmission mechanism, and discuss
the ways in which the housing sector might be a source of financial instability, and
whether such instability could affect the ability of a central bank to stabilize the overall
macroeconomy. I conclude with a discussion of two key policy issues. First, how can
monetary policy makers deal with the uncertainty with regard to housing-related
monetary transmission mechanisms? And second, how can monetary policy best respond
to fluctuations in asset prices, especially house prices, and to possible asset-price
bubbles?
Quotations:
I. Basic Monetary Transmission Mechanisms
(...)
Evidence on the Differential Effect of Housing versus Nonhousing Wealth
Given the contrasting views outlined above, the question of whether consumption
is affected more by changes in housing wealth than by changes in other sources of wealth
is inherently empirical. Unfortunately, the evidence is not clear cut. Evidence from
time-series data on the differential consumption effects of housing and nonhousing
wealth is inconclusive. (..) The Board staffʼs standard consumption models—which
restrict the propensity to consume out of housing wealth to equal the propensity to
consume out of nonhousing wealth—continue to track aggregate consumption spending
well, even when the models are estimated with data ending in 1995. Thus, these models
do not suggest that an increased sensitivity of consumption to housing wealth is needed to
explain the low rates of personal saving in recent years.(...) In my view, the evidence is
too mixed to confidently contradict the standard life-cycle view that the long-run effects
from housing and financial wealth are about the same size. (...)
Finally, let me turn to the empirical research on mortgage equity withdrawals and
consumer spending, which some have interpreted as indicating that house price
movements have very large effects on consumer spending. (...)
However, there are reasons to be skeptical of large estimated effects. Mortgage
equity withdrawals are clearly not exogenous. Indeed, homeowners who decide to
increase spending are more likely to tap the equity in their homes by engaging in a
mortgage equity withdrawal. Thus, the high correlation between spending and mortgage
equity withdrawals likely reflects a causation that goes from spending to withdrawals
20
january 2008 - august 2007 deeprecession BLOG
rather than the other way around—in short, mortgage equity withdrawals are not likely a
driving force behind consumer spending. The survey results also tell us little because the
issue is not whether a household is engaging in a mortgage equity withdrawal to get the
cash for spending but rather whether they are making purchases with the extracted equity
that they otherwise would not have made.
(...)
II. Financial Stability and the Monetary Transmission Mechanism
So far, I have discussed monetary transmission mechanisms working through the
housing sector when the financial system is operating normally. However, exceptionally
unfavorable conditions in the housing sector have the potential to create instability in the
financial system—instability that could magnify problems for the overall economy. Two
questions thus arise: Through what channels might the housing sector at times be a
source of financial instability? And could such instability affect the operation of the
transmission mechanism, affecting the ability of a central bank to stabilize the overall
macroeconomy?
(..) From 1996 through 2005, nominal prices for existing homes in the United States
doubled, rising at an average annual rate of 7 percent.17 Not only was the average rate of
increase high from a historical perspective, but house prices were actually accelerating
rather steadily over most of that ten-year period—indeed, the annual rate of increase
peaked near 11 percent at the end of 2005. As you know, since early 2006, house prices
in the U.S. have decelerated sharply (..).
(..) the recent U.S. house-price experience was far from unique—many industrialized
countries experienced historically rapid price appreciation in the late 1990s and early
2000s, and have seen sharp decelerations recently. Even with the recent decelerations,
however, the levels of house prices still appear to be very high relative to rents. Moreover,
with the notable exception of Germany and Japan, the ratios of house prices to disposable
income in many countries remain above levels that would have been predicted based on
prior trends. Because prices of homes, like other asset prices, are inherently forward
looking, it is quite difficult to conclude firmly whether they are above their fundamental
values, and researchers have come to conflicting conclusions. Nevertheless, an
explosive rise in asset prices always generates concern that a bubble may be developing
and that its bursting might lead to broad and deep economic distress.
(...) Subprime loans are made to borrowers who are perceived to have high credit
risk. This sector of the U.S. mortgage market had been a small portion of the overall
market through the mid-1990s, but it expanded appreciably thereafter and really picked up
steam from 2004 through the end of last year. As home prices were accelerating rather
steadily in the first half of this decade, subprime mortgages performed quite well, with
delinquency rates trending down to historically low levels by the middle of 2005 (figure 3
[p.28]). In light of the rapid home-price appreciation and overall housing market activity (in
terms of both home sales and residential construction) and the strong performance of
sumbprime mortgages through this phase, borrowers appeared to be more willing to take
on more mortgage debt and investors appeared to be more willing to fund new mortgage
originations.
Consequently, underwriting standards for subprime mortgages were loosened quite a
bit and some borrowers stretched pretty far. (..) Indeed, the share of subprime variable
rate mortgages extended to borrowers with second liens, or so-called piggyback loans, at
origination appears to have jumped late in 2005 and in 2006.
Over the past two years, the performance of subprime variable-rate mortgages has
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january 2008 - august 2007 deeprecession BLOG
deteriorated substantially—the delinquency rate climbed to 13½ percent in June 2007
from about half that rate in mid-2005 (figure 3). Although we certainly do not have a
complete understanding of all of the factors that contributed to the surge in delinquencies
for subprime variable-rate mortgages, it now seems very likely that at least some
borrowers and lenders had come to expect a continuation of rapid home-price
appreciation. (...)
As these events illustrate, under certain conditions the housing sector can be a
source of financial instability. But this leads to the second question I posed at the start of
this section: Does financial instability necessarily alter the functioning of the monetary
transmission mechanism in a marked way? One can conceive of cases in which financial
instability could seriously limit the normal functioning of the monetary transmission
mechanism, but in my view these should be rare. Barring cases in which the zero bound
on nominal policy rates is a constraint, as it was in Japan, the modern era contains few, if
any, clear examples of a breakdown in the monetary transmission mechanism.
III. Policy Issues
The discussion of the role of housing in the monetary transmission mechanism
raises two key policy issues: (1) How can monetary policy makers deal with the
uncertainty with regard to housing-related monetary transmission mechanisms? (2) How
can monetary policy best respond to fluctuations in asset prices, especially house prices,
and to possible asset-price bubbles? (...)
Monetary Policy Response to Possible Bubbles
Because fluctuations in house prices affect the economy, we have seen that
managing the economy well requires that the monetary policy authorities respond to
changes in house prices. The issue of how central banks might respond to house price
movements is therefore not whether they respond at all but whether they respond over
and above the response called for in terms of objectives to stabilize inflation and
employment. The issue here is the same as the one that applies to potential bubbles in
asset prices in general: Should monetary policy try to pop, or slow the growth of,
developing house-price bubbles to minimize damage to the economy when these bubbles
burst? (...)
Despite the clear dangers of house-price bubbles, the question remains as to
whether central banks should do anything about them. Some economists—such as
Cecchetti and others (2000), Borio and Lowe (2002), Borio, English, and Filardo (2003),
and White (2004)—argue that central banks should at times “lean against the wind” by
raising interest rates to stop bubbles from getting out of hand. They argue that if a bubble
has been identified, then raising interest rates will produce better outcomes. Bernanke,
Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) and Bernanke and Gertler (2001) counter these arguments
by showing that monetary policy that optimally stabilizes inflation is likely to produce
better outcomes.
LATER COMMENT. Compare Fed show off with a leader by the Economist (2007\10\18):
“But whichever way you look at it, central banks kept interest rates too
low for too long. That is most true of the Fed, which slashed rates between
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january 2008 - august 2007 deeprecession BLOG
2001 and 2003, held them at 1% for a year and then raised them in slow,
predictable quarter-point steps, fuelling the housing boom.”
2007\09\03
Financial crises: Lessons from
history
Analysis
By Steve Schifferes
Economics reporter, BBC News
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/
6958091.stm
*
THE DOT.COM CRASH, 2000
During the late 1990s, stock markets became beguiled by the rise of internet companies
such as Amazon and AOL, which seemed to be ushering in a new era for the economy.
Their shares soared when they listed on the Nasdaq stock market, despite that fact that
few of the firms actually made a profit.
The boom peaked when internet service provider AOL bought traditional media company
Time Warner for nearly $200bn in January 2000.
But in March 2000, the bubble burst, and the technology-weighted Nasdaq index fell by
78% by October 2002.
The crash had wider repercussions, with business investment falling and the US economy
slowing in the following year, a process exacerbated by the 9/11 attacks, which led to the
temporary closure of the financial markets.
But the Federal Reserve, the US central bank, cut interest rates throughout 2001,
gradually lowering rates from 6.25% to 1% to stimulate economic growth.
LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, 1998
The collapse of hedge fund Long-Term Capital Market (LTCM) occurred during the final
stage of the world financial crisis that began in Asia in 1997 and spread to Russia and
Brazil in 1998.
LTCM was a hedge fund set up by Nobel Prize winners Myron Scholes and Robert Merton
to trade bonds. The professors believed that in the long run, the interest rates on different
23
january 2008 - august 2007 deeprecession BLOG
government bonds would converge, and the hedge fund traded on the small differences in
the rates.
But when Russia defaulted on its government bonds in August 1998, investors fled from
other government paper to the safe haven of US Treasury bonds, and interest rate
differences between bonds increased sharply.
LTCM, which had borrowed a lot of money from other companies, stood to lose billions of
dollars - and in order to liquidate its positions it would have to sell Treasury bonds,
plunging the US credit markets into turmoil and forcing up interest rates.
So the Fed decided that a rescue was needed. It called together the leading US banks,
many of whom had invested in LTCM, and persuaded them to put in $3.65bn to save the
firm from imminent collapse.
The Fed itself made an emergency rate cut in October 1998 and markets soon returned to
stability. LTCM itself was liquidated in 2000.
THE CRASH OF 1987
US stock markets suffered their largest peacetime one-day fall yet on 19 October 1987,
when the Dow Jones Industrial Average index of shares in leading US companies dropped
22% and European and Japanese markets followed suit.
The losses were triggered by the widespread belief that insider trading and company
takeovers on borrowed money were dominating the markets, while the US economy was
entering into an economic slowdown.
There were also worries about the value of the US dollar, which had been declining on
international markets.
These fears grew when Germany raised a key interest rate, boosting the value of its
currency.
Newly-introduced computerised trading systems exacerbated the stock market declines,
as sell orders were executed automatically.
Concerns that major banks might go bust led the Fed and other major central banks to
lower interest rates sharply.
"Circuit-breakers" were also introduced to limit program trading and allow the authorities to
suspend all trades for short periods.
The crash seemed to have little direct economic effect and stock markets soon recovered.
But the lower interest rates, especially in the UK, may have contributed to the housing
market bubble of 1988-89 and to the pressures on the pound sterling which led to the
devaluation of 1992.
The crash also showed that global stock markets were now closely linked, and changes in
economic policy in one country could affect markets around the world. Laws on insider
trading were also tightened up in the US and UK.
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US SAVINGS AND LOAN SCANDAL, 1985
(..)
THE CRASH OF 1929
The Wall Street crash of 1929, "Black Thursday," was an event that sent the US and
indeed the global economy into a tailspin, contributing to the Great Depression of the
1930s.
After a huge speculative rise in the late 1920s, based partly on the rise of new industries
such as radio broadcasting and carmaking, shares fell by 13% on Thursday, 24 October.
Despite efforts by the stock market authorities to stabilise the market, stocks fell by
another 11% the following Tuesday, 29 October.
By the time the market had reached bottom in 1932, 90% had been wiped off the value of
shares. It took 25 years before the Dow Jones industrial average recovered to its 1929
level.
The effect on the real economy was severe, as widespread share ownership meant that
the losses were felt by many middle-class consumers.
They cut their purchases of big consumer goods such as cars and homes, while
businesses postponed investment and closed factories.
By 1932, the US economy had declined by half, and one-third of the workforce was
unemployed.
The whole US financial system also went into meltdown, with a shutdown of the entire
banking system in March 1933 by the time the new President, Franklin Roosevelt took
office and launched the New Deal.
Many economists on both left and right have criticised the response of the authorities as
inadequate.
The US central bank actually raised interest rates to protect the value of the dollar and
preserve the gold standard, while the US government raised tariffs and ran a budget
surplus.
New Deal measures alleviated some of the worst problems of the Depression, but the US
economy did not fully recover until World War II, when massive military spending
eliminated unemployment and boosted growth.
The New Deal also introduced extensive regulation of financial markets and the banking
system through the creation of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) and the
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), and the separation of commercial and
retail banking through the Glass-Steagall Act.
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january 2008 - august 2007 deeprecession BLOG
2007\08\25
Note sur lʼéclatement de la bulle immobilière américaine
JOHSUA Isaac
25 août 2007
Cette note a servi de base à lʼexposé fait par lʼauteur à lʼUniversité dʼété de la LCR, les
24-29 août 2007.
Sommaire
* A) Les effets de lʼéclat
* B) Dʼoù vient la (...)
* C) Quelles leçons en tirer
* ANNEXES
A) Les effets de lʼéclatement dʼune bulle immobilière
Une bulle spéculative peut porter sur des actifs réels (logements, terrains, etc.) ou
financiers (actions, etc.) ; elle se manifeste par une montée des prix de ces actifs de plus
en plus rapide. Ceux-ci finissent par atteindre des niveaux tels quʼils paraissent excessifs
même si on fait une évaluation optimiste des profits futurs quʼon peut en attendre.
Lʼéclatement de la bulle se manifeste, en sens inverse, par une chute continue, souvent
brutale, de ces prix. Dans le cas de la bulle immobilière, elle sʼaccompagne dʼune chute,
logique, de la construction de logements. Tel est le cas aux Etats-Unis depuis le premier
trimestre de 2006. Le point à souligner est que lʼéclatement dʼune bulle immobilière peut
avoir des effets bien plus graves que lʼéclatement dʼune bulle boursière. Mais, avant
dʼentrer dans le détail, il faut préciser que ces effets ne représentent quʼautant de risques :
ils est impossible de dire sʼils se manifesteront, et, sʼils se manifestent, avec quelle
ampleur.
On peut relever trois effets :
1) Un effet « réel », sur lʼactivité économique.
La surproduction dʼun bien quelconque entraîne une chute du prix de ce bien. La
surproduction se résorbe alors de deux côtés à la fois : du côté de lʼoffre, qui chute
(puisque le prix baisse, cʼest moins rémunérateur dʼoffrir le produit) et du côté de la
demande, qui augmente (puisque le prix baisse, il est plus intéressant dʼacheter). Ces
deux effets sont très longs à se manifester dans le cas de lʼimmobilier. En effet, il est
impossible de réduire lʼoffre tout de suite, tout chantier qui a été entamé devra aller à son
terme, si on ne veut pas perdre toute la mise de fonds. Ce qui veut dire que pendant des
mois, voire des années, de nouveaux logements continueront à arriver sur un marché
encombré, faisant encore chuter les prix (dans la crise américaine actuelle, ce sont des
millions de maisons qui, déjà, ne trouvent pas preneurs). Du côté de la demande, elle ne
va pas nécessairement augmenter, car les acheteurs potentiels peuvent reporter leur
décision, attendant que les prix baissent encore plus. Ce report est possible, car nous ne
sommes pas en présence de biens « quotidiens », dont la consommation sʼimpose jour
après jour, mais de biens dont lʼusure peut sʼétaler sur une durée particulièrement longue.
Si on occupe un vieux logement, on pourra attendre encore un peu avant dʼen occuper un
neuf. Lʼimpact dʼun bulle immobilière est donc très long à se résorber. Or, cet impact est
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january 2008 - august 2007 deeprecession BLOG
important : on connaît la formule : « quand le bâtiment va, tout va », elle donne le ton et
joue aussi en sens inverse.
2) Un effet financier.
En règle générale, il est presque impossible dʼacheter ou de faire bâtir un logement sans
un emprunt : les sommes en jeu sont trop importantes pour quʼun ménage puisse en faire
lʼavance intégrale. Sʼil y a des difficultés pour la construction résidentielle, elles ne peuvent
donc quʼavoir des effets sur le secteur financier. Des organismes (spécialisés ou pas)
accordent ces emprunts, avec comme « garantie » le logement vendu (hypothèque). Ces
organismes peuvent à leur tour emprunter auprès dʼautres, qui les « refinancent ». Le
premier danger financier est là, cʼest « lʼeffet domino » : si ces organismes, alléchés par
les taux dʼintérêt élevés, ont consenti ces prêts de façon laxiste à des ménages peu
solvables, à la moindre difficulté, ces ménages font défaut sur leurs obligations (voir
Annexe 1, sur les crédits subprime). Sʼils sont très nombreux dans ce cas, lʼorganisme
prêteur sʼeffondre et il peut à son tour entraîner dans sa chute celui qui lʼa refinancé. Cʼest
ce qui sʼest passé aux Etats-Unis, où 84 sociétés de crédits hypothécaires ont fait faillite
ou cessé complètement ou partiellement leur activité depuis le début de lʼannée jusquʼau
17 août, contre seulement 17 sur toute lʼannée 2006. En Allemagne la banque IKB et
lʼInstitut public SachsenLB nʼont été sauvés que dʼextrême justesse. Un peu partout sont
annoncées des pertes dʼimportance liées au subprime. Dans la foulée, les procédures de
saisie de logements ont atteint 180 000 en juillet aux Etats-Unis, soit deux fois plus quʼen
juillet 2006, et dépassent la barre du million depuis le début de lʼannée, soit 60% de plus
quʼil y a un an. Il devrait y avoir au total 2 millions de procédures de saisie en 2007.
Lʼeffet domino pourrait se manifester même pour des banques qui nʼaccordent pas de
prêts hypothécaires, car les banques se prêtent les unes aux autres : si une banque a de
graves difficultés dans lʼimmobilier, une autre banque qui nʼen a pas pourra être suspectée
à son tour, si elle a prêté beaucoup dʼargent à la première, qui ne pourra peut-être pas la
rembourser.
Comment distinguer les banques dont il faut se méfier des autres ? Cʼest très difficile, non
seulement parce que les banques dissimulent leur exposition au risque, mais aussi parce
quʼil nʼest pas si facile de dire à lʼavance quel débiteur fera défaut : où faire passer la
frontière entre débiteurs qui ne se distinguent les uns des autres que par un degré plus ou
moins grand dʼinsolvabilité ? Par ailleurs, si la situation économique se dégrade, celui qui
était jusque-là un bon débiteur pourra entrer dans la catégorie des prêts risqués. Cʼest
certainement là un des plus gros problème créé par une bulle immobilière : il est très
difficile de délimiter, dans les actifs des banques, les « mauvaises créances » des autres.
Après lʼéclatement de sa propre bulle immobilière, le Japon a tenté de le faire pendant des
années sans y parvenir. Cela explique la profonde méfiance qui sʼest installée entre
banques, qui empoisonne lʼatmosphère, et contribue très certainement à lʼaggravation de
la crise actuelle. Le vendredi 10 août, en Europe, aux Etats-Unis, il sʼest produit cette
chose inouïe : des banques sont devenues en 24 heures suffisamment méfiantes les unes
à lʼégard des autres pour se refuser tout prêt, quel quʼil soit, contraignant les banques
centrales à des interventions massives. En 4 jours, jusquʼau 14 août 2007, la BCE a dû
fournir au marché près de 230 milliards dʼeuros de liquidités. Il faut cependant souligner
quʼil sʼagit de création monétaire et non de sommes prélevées dans la poche de tel ou tel
pour les transmettre aux banques en difficulté (voir Annexe 2).
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january 2008 - august 2007 deeprecession BLOG
Dans un tel contexte, cʼest chacun pour soi : chaque banque, en tentant de se sauver,
peut contribuer à lʼeffondrement général. Une banque a, dʼune part, des dépôts (elle doit
cet argent aux déposants, particuliers ou entreprises). Dʼautre part, elle a : 1) les crédits
de tous types quʼelle a accordés aux particuliers ou entreprises, crédits qui représentent
pour elle autant de créances 2) les placements quʼelle a réalisés, en actions ou obligations
(lʼaction est un titre de propriété et donne lieu à la distribution de dividendes ; lʼobligataire,
par contre, est un créancier, qui a prêté de lʼargent et attend le versement dʼintérêts). En
cas de difficultés, la banque sera tentée de quitter ce terrain de financement de
lʼéconomie : dʼune part, la suspicion étant généralisée et la prudence sʼimposant, elle va
restreindre la masse des crédits accordés (cʼest le credit crunch dans la terminologie
anglo-saxonne) ; dʼautre part, elle va privilégier dans ses placements les obligations plutôt
que les actions (considérées comme plus risquées). Cʼest là un double mouvement qui
peut avoir de graves conséquences, car délaisser les actions contribue au krach boursier
et la restriction des crédits peut carrément paralyser lʼéconomie et la précipiter dans la
récession. Dans la crise américaine actuelle, on a déjà constaté le glissement en faveur
des obligations ; parallèlement, des organismes ayant subi des pertes sur lʼimmobilier
chercheront peut-être à combler les trous en vendant des titres en leur possession, ce qui
devrait accentuer la chute du cours de ces titres. Quant à la restriction des crédits,
essentielle, elle devrait logiquement se manifester, mais il est impossible dʼen dire
lʼampleur à lʼavance. En tous les cas, lʼeffet sur lʼinvestissement des entreprises ne peut
être que négatif, sans compter la difficulté pour ces dernières à se financer sur une Bourse
orientée à la baisse.
Nombre de banques américaines ont, il est vrai, pris leurs précautions, en transformant les
crédits quʼelles ont accordé en titres de créances, quʼelles ont vendu. Lʼavantage est
dʼéviter la concentration dans les bilans des banques de créances douteuses.
Lʼinconvénient est de disséminer le risque dans toute lʼéconomie nationale, voire
internationale : les milliards et milliards de créances douteuses nʼont pas disparu, ils sont
logés quelque part, mais où ? La méfiance devient universelle. Les fonds spéculatifs sont
tout particulièrement dans le collimateur : or, il y en a 9500 dans le monde, qui gèrent la
bagatelle de 1400 milliards dʼeuros.
3) Un effet, enfin, sur la dépense des ménages américains.
Cet effet est essentiel. Il se décompose en deux :
a) sur lʼinvestissement des ménages, cʼest-à-dire sur leurs achats de logements. Les
ménages américains auront maintenant les plus grandes difficultés à financer lʼachat dʼun
logement, par lʼobtention de prêts hypothécaires auprès de banques rendues super
méfiantes.
b) sur la consommation courante. Ici convergent les effets recensés plus haut. Effet réel :
le bâtiment licencie déjà massivement, ce à quoi sʼajoutent les risques pesant sur
lʼinvestissement des entreprises, le tout entraînant une hausse du chômage (faible pour
lʼinstant) ou une peur du chômage, toutes choses qui peuvent peser sur la consommation.
Effet financier : la restriction des crédits, qui peut peser lourd pour des ménages
américains habitués à consommer à crédit. Encore faut-il y ajouter le comportement de
ménages endettés craignant de perdre leur logement, qui veulent faire face à leurs
engagements et réduisent pour ce faire leur consommation. Nʼoublions pas « lʼeffet
richesse », qui postule que la consommation des ménages ne dépend pas seulement de
leur revenu courant, mais aussi de lʼévolution de leur patrimoine, cʼest-à-dire de la valeur
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january 2008 - august 2007 deeprecession BLOG
des actifs réels et financiers quʼils possèdent. Si cette valeur monte, ils se sentent plus
riches et sont tentés de consommer plus. Mais si (comme cʼest le cas actuellement aux
Etats-Unis), cʼest lʼinverse, et que portefeuille dʼactions et valeur du logement baissent
tous deux, on peut sʼattendre à un impact négatif sur la consommation, surtout pour des
ménages habitués à « adosser » leurs crédits à la consommation sur la valeur de leur
maison. Le risque ne doit pas être sous-estimé : la consommation des ménages occupe
une place exceptionnelle aux Etats-Unis, représentant près de 70% du PIB (55%
seulement en France). Elle est le pilier sur lequel tout repose en définitive, non seulement
pour lʼéconomie américaine, mais même, aussi incroyable que cela paraisse, pour
lʼéconomie du monde entier.
Si lʼéconomie américaine entrait en récession, elle le ferait dans un contexte
particulièrement délicat, car elle a vécu jusquʼici au-dessus de ses moyens, à crédit, en
sʼendettant à tout va. Le taux dʼépargne des ménages américains est pratiquement nul (ce
taux rapporte lʼépargne des ménages à leur revenu disponible), alors que, par exemple,
celui des ménages français sʼélève à 15,5% en 2006. Le taux dʼendettement de ces
ménages américains atteint en 2006 lʼextraordinaire niveau de 140% (ce taux rapporte
leur endettement à leur revenu disponible). Quant au déficit extérieur (financé jour après
jour par le reste du monde), devenu abyssal, il représente 6,5% du PIB en 2006. Autant de
traits qui sont plus ceux dʼune puissance finissante, qui tente coûte que coûte de se
maintenir, que ceux de lʼhyperpuissance habituellement décrite.
Si lʼéconomie américaine entrait en récession, lʼimpact serait très fort pour le monde entier,
car elle joue le rôle de locomotive pour lʼéconomie mondiale, et il nʼy en a pas dʼautre. Du
coup, des pays émergents comme la Chine ou lʼInde, parce quʼils ont choisi lʼinsertion
dans la mondialisation libérale et le modèle « tiré par les exportations », peuvent voir leur
économie sʼeffondrer, étant devenus entièrement dépendants de leurs exportations, en
particulier en direction des Etats-Unis. Ainsi, la part des exportations dans le PIB chinois,
de 10% il y a 20 ans, sʼélève aujourdʼhui à près de 40%.
Sommaire B) Dʼoù vient la bulle immobilière américaine ?
Elle ne tombe pas du ciel, nʼest pas la conséquence de la spéculation, dʼune mauvaise
gestion ou encore le résultat de lʼirresponsabilité de « ceux qui ont joué avec le feu ». En
réalité, la bulle immobilière américaine, cʼest la crise de la « nouvelle économie », celle de
la bulle des nouvelles technologies (2001) qui continue. En 2000, lʼéclatement de la bulle
boursière a entraîné, comme on pouvait sʼy attendre, une chute particulièrement sévère de
lʼinvestissement des entreprises et une montée rapide des licenciements. Mais la
récession ne sʼest pas transformée en véritable dépression, grâce aux dépenses des
ménages. Dʼénormes moyens ont été mis en œuvre pour y parvenir. Le premier dʼentre
eux a été une baisse extraordinaire du taux de la banque centrale américaine (voir Annexe
2), taux ramené en un temps très court de 6% à 1% (soit un taux réel négatif, si on tient
compte de lʼinflation). Prolongeant une fuite en avant depuis longtemps engagée aux
Etats-Unis, le robinet du crédit a été ouvert à fond, ce qui a grandement facilité le crédit
hypothécaire et lancé la bulle immobilière. Le médicament pour soigner la bulle boursière
est devenu la drogue de la bulle immobilière : on nʼest sortis dʼune bulle que pour tomber
dans lʼautre, et parce quʼon est tombé dans lʼautre. Cʼest ainsi que le taux dʼendettement
des ménages américains a bondi de 107% en 2001 à 140% en 2006, ouvrant la voie à la
crise de surendettement que nous observons aujourdʼhui.
Sommaire C) Quelles leçons en tirer ?
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La succession des bulles (et de leurs effets) est une question de système. A partir du
début des années 1990, on note une succession de crises financières : celle du Mexique
en 1995, de lʼAsie du sud-est en 1997, de la « nouvelle économie » en 2001, et lʼactuelle
enfin. Des crises financières de ce type, on nʼen avait pas connu depuis la grande
dépression. De la même façon, le seul précédent à la bulle boursière des nouvelles
technologies de la fin des années 1990 est celle de 1929 : entre les deux, il nʼy a rien de
comparable. La conclusion coule de source : le grand responsable, cʼest la mise en place
de la mondialisation libérale, guidée par la recherche acharnée du profit. Ce nʼest quʼà
partir de son instauration que tout a commencé (ou, plutôt, recommencé). Ce système est
miné par lʼinstabilité. Quand il marche, cʼest au profit dʼune minorité, aux dépens de ceux
qui produisent les richesses. Quand il ne marche pas, il entraîne toute la population dans
sa chute.
Sʼil y a une récession américaine, il faut agir de toute urgence. Sʼil nʼy en a pas, ce nʼest
pas une raison pour rester les bras croisés : il y a eu suffisamment dʼavertissements pour
que nous en tenions compte avant quʼil soit trop tard. Il faut tout reprendre de A à Z,
balayer la mondialisation libérale, le tout marché, lʼinadmissible liberté laissée à la rapacité
du profit. La banque centrale américaine (la Fed), la BCE, celle du Japon, etc., qui se
scandalisent dès quʼon évoque la moindre intervention sur le terrain économique, nʼont
pas hésité à déverser des milliards dʼeuros ou de dollars pour sauver le système qui leur
tient tant à cœur (Annexe 2). Il y a donc un devoir dʼingérence économique, mais cette fois
en faveur de lʼimmense masse de la population, les travailleurs, de façon à ce quʼils ne
supportent pas les conséquences dʼune crise provoquée par la recherche insatiable du
profit, et que lʼon ouvre enfin la voie à un système tourné vers la satisfaction des véritables
besoins sociaux.
ANNEXES
Annexe 1
Les crédits subprime
Le terme désigne des prêts immobiliers dits « à risque », car consentis (souvent à taux
variables) à des ménages à la solvabilité fragile. Avec lʼaugmentation générale des taux
dʼintérêt, les obligations de versements de lʼemprunteur sont devenues de plus en plus
élevées, certains se retrouvant dans lʼimpossibilité dʼy faire face. Tant que les prix des
logements montaient, il était possible de repousser les échéances, en empruntant à
nouveau avec comme garantie un logement valant plus cher quʼavant. Avec lʼéclatement
de la bulle et la chute du prix des logements, cela nʼa plus été possible, il nʼy avait plus
dʼéchappatoire.
Annexe 2
Injection de liquidités
Le système bancaire est organisé de façon pyramidale : au sommet la banque centrale,
en dessous les banques dites de second rang (par exemple, Société Générale, BNP, etc.).
Aux Etats-Unis, la banque centrale est la Federal Reserve Bank (dite aussi la Fed). En
Europe, il y a un rang supplémentaire : BCE, Banques centrales des divers pays, banques
de second rang. Les dépôts sont pour les banques de second rang des dettes « courtes
» : les sommes quʼils contiennent peuvent être retirées par les déposants immédiatement
ou dans des délais brefs. Par contre, les crédits quʼelles accordent le sont pour un temps «
long » (plusieurs mois, peut-être plusieurs années). Quant aux placements, ils ne sont pas
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january 2008 - august 2007 deeprecession BLOG
faits pour être liquidés du jour au lendemain. En somme, la banque transforme du « court
» (à échéance courte) en du « long » (à échéance longue). On voit tout de suite le
problème quʼil y a dans le décalage entre les deux : bien quʼayant de bons débiteurs et de
bons placements, une banque peut se trouver à court de liquidités (cʼest-à-dire, pour aller
vite, des euros émis par la BCE ou des dollars émis par la Fed). Dans ce cas, elle peut
sʼadresser aux autres banques (marché interbancaire), ou, de façon plus générale, au
marché monétaire (où interviennent aussi les entreprises) ou enfin à la banque centrale.
Celle-ci, si elle le décide, accorde des crédits en sa monnaie aux banques de sa zone.
Elle le fait à un certain taux, fixé à lʼavance. On dit de la banque centrale quʼelle est « le
prêteur en dernier ressort » et quʼelle « refinance » les banques de second rang.
La BCE et la Fed ont été contraintes dʼalimenter ainsi en liquidités, et pour
dʼextraordinaires montants, les banques de leurs zones, parce que le marché
interbancaire a brusquement cessé de fonctionner : la méfiance était telle que les banques
refusaient désormais de se prêter de lʼargent les unes aux autres. Si la crise de liquidité
est écartée, cela ne veut pas dire que toute crise bancaire le soit. Une contrainte de
rentabilité particulièrement lourde pèse sur les banques : les capitaux qui y sont investis
doivent être rémunérés au meilleur taux et tout crédit non remboursé ou tout mauvais
placement sont durement sanctionnés. Les pertes liées à la crise immobilière viendront en
déduction des profits, ou seront couvertes par de nouveaux apports de capitaux (sʼils sont
possibles) ou mèneront à la faillite.
JOHSUA Isaac
* A paraître dans le numéro de septembre 2007 dʼInprecor.
* Mise en ligne le 8 sept. par www.europe-solidaire.org
* Isaac Johsua est économiste, membre du Conseil scientifique dʼAttac.
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