VOLUME II

Transcription

VOLUME II

VOLUME II
Non corrigé
Uncorrected
CR/2013/ 12 - 17
International Court
of Justice
Cour internationale
de Justice
THE HAGUE
LA HAYE
YEAR 2013
Public sitting
held on Tuesday 2 July to Monday 8 July 2013, at the Peace Palace
President Tomka presiding,
in the case concerning Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v.Japan:
New Zealand intervening)
____________________
VERBATIM RECORD
____________________
ANNÉE 2013
Audience publique
tenue le mardi 2 juillet à le lundi 8 juillet 2013, au Palais de la Paix,
sous la présidence de M. Tomka, président,
en l’affaire relative à la Chasse à la baleine dans l’Antarctique
(Australie c. Japon ; Nouvelle-Zélande (intervenant))
________________
COMPTE RENDU
Kobe University Centre for International Law 2014
This document is especially produced for
Kobe University Centre for International Law
On the occasion of International Symposium on
Whaling in the Antarctic Case, May 31 – June 1, 2014
Volume I
Volume II
Volume III
Volume IV
Australia, 1st round
CR 2013/7
Wednesday 26 June 2013, at 10 a.m
CR 2013/8
Wednesday 26 June 2013, at 3 p.m
CR 2013/9
Thursday 27 June 2013, at 10 a.m
CR 2013/10
Thursday 27 June 2013, at 3 p.m
CR 2013/11
Friday 28 June 2013, at 10 a.m
Japan, 1st round
CR 2013/12
Tuesday 2 July 2013, at 3 p.m
Japan, 1st round
CR 2013/13
Wednesday 3 July 2013, at 10 a.m
Japan, 1st round
CR 2013/14
Wednesday 3 July 2013, at 3 p.m
Japan, 1st round
CR 2013/15
Thursday 4 July 2013, at 10 a.m
Japan, 1st round
CR 2013/16
Thursday 4 July 2013, at 3 p.m
New Zealand
CR 2013/17
Monday 8 July 2013, at 10 a.m
Australia, 2nd round CR 2013/18
Tuesday 9 July 2013, at 4.30 p.m
Wednesday 10 July 2013, at 10 a.m
Wednesday 10 July 2013, at 3 p.m
Japan, 2nd round
CR 2013/21
Monday 15 July 2013, at 10 a.m
Japan, 2nd round
CR 2013/22
Monday 15 July 2013, at 3 p.m
Japan, 2nd round
CR 2013/23
Tuesday 16 July 2013, at 10 a.m
New Zealand
Other
Written responses, 12 July 2013
Australia
Other
Written comments, 19 July 2013
English translation
When original is in French
Non corrigé
Uncorrected
CR 2013/12
International Court
of Justice
Cour internationale
de Justice
LA HAYE
THE HAGUE
YEAR 2013
Public sitting
held on Tuesday 2 July 2013, at 3 p.m., at the Peace Palace,
in the case concerning Whaling in the Antarctic (Australia v. Japan:
____________________
VERBATIM RECORD
____________________
ANNÉE 2013
Audience publique
tenue le mardi 2 juillet 2013, à 15 heures, au Palais de la Paix,
________________
COMPTE RENDU
________________
-2Present:
President Tomka
Vice-President Sepúlveda-Amor
Judges Owada
Abraham
Keith
Bennouna
Skotnikov
Cançado Trindade
Yusuf
Greenwood
Xue
Donoghue
Gaja
Sebutinde
Bhandari
Judge ad hoc Charlesworth
Registrar Couvreur

-3Présents : M.
M.
MM.
Tomka, président
Sepúlveda-Amor, vice-président
Owada
Abraham
Keith
Bennouna
Skotnikov
Cançado Trindade
Yusuf
Greenwood
Mmes Xue
Donoghue
M.
Gaja
Mme Sebutinde
M.
Bhandari, juges
Mme Charlesworth, juge ad hoc
M.
Couvreur, greffier

-4The Government of Australia is represented by:
The Honourable Mark Dreyfus Q.C., M.P., Attorney-General of Australia,
as Counsel and Advocate;
Mr. Bill Campbell, Q.C., General Counsel (International Law), Attorney-General’s Department,
as Agent, Counsel and Advocate;
H.E. Mr. Neil Mules, A.O., Ambassador of Australia to the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
as Co-Agent;
Mr. Justin Gleeson, S.C., Solicitor-General of Australia,
Mr. James Crawford, A.C., S.C., F.B.A., Whewell Professor of International Law, University of
Cambridge, member of the Institut de droit international, Barrister, Matrix Chambers, London,
Mr. Henry Burmester, A.O., Q.C., Special Counsel, Australian Government Solicitor,
Mr. Philippe Sands, Q.C., Professor of Law, University College London, Barrister, Matrix
Chambers, London,
Ms Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, Professor of International Law at the University of Geneva,
as Counsel and Advocates;
Ms Kate Cook, Barrister, Matrix Chambers, London,
Dr. Makane Mbengue, Associate Professor, University of Geneva,
as Counsel;
Ms Anne Sheehan, Acting Assistant-Secretary, Attorney-General’s Department,
Mr. Michael Johnson, Principal Legal Officer, Attorney-General’s Department,
Ms Danielle Forrester, Principal Legal Officer, Attorney-General’s Department,
Ms Stephanie Ierino, Acting Principal Legal Officer, Attorney-General’s Department,
Ms Clare Gregory, Senior Legal Officer, Attorney-General’s Department,
Ms Nicole Lyas, Acting Senior Legal Officer, Attorney-General’s Department,
Ms Erin Maher, Legal Officer, Attorney-General’s Department,
Mr. Richard Rowe, Senior Legal Adviser, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade,
Dr. Greg French, Assistant Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade,
-5Le Gouvernement de l’Australie est représenté par :
L’honorable Mark Dreyfus, Q.C., M.P., Attorney-General d’Australie,
comme conseil et avocat ;
M. Bill Campbell Q.C., General Counsel (droit international), services de l’Attorney-General
d’Australie,
comme agent, conseil et avocat ;
S. Exc. M. Neil Mules, A.O., ambassadeur d’Australie auprès du Royaume des Pays-Bas,
comme coagent ;
M. Justin Gleeson, S.C., Solicitor-General d’Australie,
M. James Crawford, A.C., S.C., F.B.A., professeur de droit international à l’Université de
Cambridge, titulaire de la chaire Whewell, membre de l’Institut de droit international, avocat,
Matrix Chambers (Londres),
M. Henry Burmester, A.O., Q.C., Special Counsel, Solicitor du Gouvernement australien,
M. Philippe Sands, Q.C., professeur de droit au University College de Londres, avocat,
Matrix Chambers (Londres),
Mme Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, professeur de droit international à l’Université de Genève,
comme conseils et avocats ;
Mme Kate Cook, avocat, Matrix Chambers (Londres),
M. Makane Mbengue, professeur associé à l’Université de Genève,
comme conseils ;
Mme Anne Sheehan, secrétaire adjoint par intérim, services de l’Attorney-General,
M. Michael Johnson, juriste principal, services de l’Attorney-General,
Mme Danielle Forrester, juriste principal, services de l’Attorney-General,
Mme Stephanie Ierino, juriste principal par intérim, services de l’Attorney-General,
Mme Clare Gregory, juriste hors classe, services de l’Attorney-General,
Mme Nicole Lyas, juriste hors classe par intérim, services de l’Attorney-General,
Mme Erin Maher, juriste, services de l’Attorney-General,
M. Richard Rowe, juriste hors classe, ministère des affaires étrangères et du commerce,
M. Greg French, secrétaire adjoint, ministère des affaires étrangères et du commerce,
-6Mr. Jamie Cooper, Legal Officer, Department of Foreign Affairs and Trade,
Ms Donna Petrachenko, First Assistant Secretary, Department of Sustainability, Environment,
Water, Population and Communities,
Mr. Peter Komidar, Director, Department of Sustainability, Environment, Water, Population and
Communities,
Dr. Bill de la Mare, Scientist, Australian Antarctic Division, Department of Sustainability,
Environment, Water, Population and Communities,
Dr. David Blumenthal, Senior Adviser, Office of the Attorney-General,
Ms. Giulia Baggio, First Secretary, Senior Adviser, Office of the Attorney-General,
Mr. Todd Quinn, First Secretary, Embassy of Australia in the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
as Advisers;
Ms Mandy Williams, Administration Officer, Attorney-General’s Department,
as Assistant.
The Government of Japan is represented by:
Mr. Koji Tsuruoka, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs,
as Agent;
H.E. Mr. Yasumasa Nagamine, Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of Japan to the
Kingdom of the Netherlands,
as Co-Agent;
Mr. Alain Pellet, Professor at the University of Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense, President of the
Société française pour le droit international, associate member of the Institut de droit
international,
Mr. Vaughan Lowe, Q.C., member of the English Bar, Emeritus Professor of International Law,
Oxford University, associate member of the Institut de droit international,
Mr. Alan Boyle, Professor of International Law at the University of Edinburgh, member of the
English Bar,
Mr. Yuji Iwasawa, Professor of International Law at the University of Tokyo, member and former
Chairperson of the Human Rights Committee,
Mr. Payam Akhavan, LL.M., S.J.D. (Harvard), Professor of International Law, McGill University,
member of the Bar of New York and the Law Society of Upper Canada,
Mr. Shotaro Hamamoto, Professor of International Law, Kyoto University,
Ms Yukiko Takashiba, Deputy Director, ICJ Whaling Case Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
as Counsel and Advocates;
-7M. Jamie Cooper, juriste, ministère des affaires étrangères et du commerce,
Mme Donna Petrachenko, premier secrétaire adjoint, ministère du développement durable,
de l’environnement, de l’eau, des populations et des communautés,
M. Peter Komidar, directeur, ministère du développement durable, de l’environnement, de l’eau,
des populations et des communautés,
M. Bill de la Mare, scientifique, division de l’Antarctique australien, ministère du développement
durable, de l’environnement, de l’eau, des populations et des communautés,
M. David Blumenthal, conseiller principal, services de l’Attorney-General,
Mme Giulia Baggio, conseiller principal, services de l’Attorney-General,
M. Todd Quinn, premier secrétaire, ambassade d’Australie au Royaume des Pays-Bas,
comme conseillers ;
Mme Mandy Williams, administrateur, services de l’Attorney-General,
comme assistant.
Le Gouvernement du Japon est représenté par :
M. Koji Tsuruoka, ministre adjoint des affaires étrangères,
comme agent ;
S. Exc. M. Yasumasa Nagamine, ambassadeur extraordinaire et plénipotentiaire du Japon auprès du
Royaume des Pays-Bas,
comme coagent ;
M. Alain Pellet, professeur à l’Université Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense, président de la Société
française pour le droit international, membre associé de l’Institut de droit international,
M. Vaughan Lowe, Q.C., membre du barreau d’Angleterre, professeur émérite de droit
international à l’Université d’Oxford, membre associé de l’Institut de droit international,
M. Alan Boyle, professeur de droit international à l’Université d’Edimbourg, membre du barreau
d’Angleterre,
M. Yuji Iwasawa, professeur de droit international à l’Université de Tokyo, membre et ancien
président du Comité des droits de l’homme,
M. Payam Akhavan, LL.M., S.J.D (Harvard), professeur de droit international à l’Université
McGill, membre du barreau de New York et du barreau du Haut-Canada,
M. Shotaro Hamamoto, professeur de droit international à l’Université de Kyoto,
Mme Yukiko Takashiba, directeur adjoint à la division chargée de l’affaire de la chasse à la baleine
devant la CIJ, ministère des affaires étrangères,
comme conseils et avocats ;
-8Mr. Takane Sugihara, Emeritus Professor of International Law, Kyoto University,
Ms Atsuko Kanehara, Professor of International Law, Sophia University (Tokyo),
Mr. Masafumi Ishii, Director-General, International Legal Affairs Bureau, Ministry of Foreign
Affairs,
Ms Alina Miron, Researcher, Centre de droit international de Nanterre (CEDIN), University of
Paris Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense,
as Counsel;
Mr. Kenji Kagawa, Director-General, Resources Enhancement Promotion Department, Fisheries
Agency,
Mr. Noriyuki Shikata, Minister, Embassy of Japan in the United Kingdom of Great Britain and
Northern Ireland,
Mr. Kenichi Kobayashi, Director, International Legal Affairs Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Joji Morishita, Director-General, National Research Institute of Far Seas Fisheries,
Mr. Akima Umezawa, Ph.D., Director, Fishery Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Ms Yoko Yanagisawa, Director, ICJ Whaling Case Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Naohisa Shibuya, Deputy Director, ICJ Whaling Case Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Ken Sakaguchi, ICJ Whaling Case Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Ms Akiko Muramoto, ICJ Whaling Case Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Masahiro Kato, ICJ Whaling Case Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Mr. Takaaki Sakamoto, Assistant Director, International Affairs Division, Fisheries Agency,
Mr. Shigeki Takaya, Assistant Director, Fisheries Management Improvement Division, Fisheries
Agency,
Mr. Toshinori Uoya, Assistant Director, Fisheries Management Division, Fisheries Agency,
Mr. Shinji Hiruma, Assistant Director, International Management Division, Fisheries Agency,
Mr. Sadaharu Kodama, Legal Adviser, Embassy of Japan in the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
Mr. Nobuyuki Murai, LL.D., First Secretary, Embassy of Japan in the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
-9M. Takane Sugihara, professeur émérite de droit international de l’Université de Kyoto,
Mme Atsuko Kanehara, professeur de droit international à l’Université Sophia (Tokyo),
M. Masafumi Ishii, directeur général du bureau des affaires juridiques internationales, ministère
des affaires étrangères,
Mme Alina Miron, chercheur, Centre de droit international de Nanterre (CEDIN), Université Paris
Ouest, Nanterre-La Défense,
comme conseils ;
M. Kenji Kagawa, directeur général du département de la promotion de la valorisation des
ressources, agence des pêcheries,
M. Noriyuki Shikata, ministre à l’ambassade du Japon au Royaume-Uni de Grande-Bretagne et
d’Irlande du Nord,
M. Kenichi Kobayashi, directeur à la division des affaires juridiques internationales, ministère des
affaires étrangères,
M. Joji Morishita, directeur général de l’Institut national de recherche sur les pêcheries en eaux
lointaines,
M. Akima Umezawa, Ph.D., directeur à la division des pêcheries, ministère des affaires étrangères,
Mme Yoko Yanagisawa, directeur à la division chargée de l’affaire de la chasse à la baleine devant
la CIJ, ministère des affaires étrangères,
M. Naohisa Shibuya, directeur adjoint à la division chargée de l’affaire de la chasse à la baleine
devant la CIJ, ministère des affaires étrangères,
M. Ken Sakaguchi, division chargée de l’affaire de la chasse à la baleine devant la CIJ, ministère
Mme Akiko Muramoto, division chargée de l’affaire de la chasse à la baleine devant la CIJ,
ministère des affaires étrangères,
M. Masahiro Kato, division chargée de l’affaire de la chasse à la baleine devant la CIJ, ministère
M. Takaaki Sakamoto, sous-directeur à la division des affaires internationales, agence des
pêcheries,
M. Shigeki Takaya, sous-directeur à la division de l’amélioration de la gestion des pêcheries,
agence des pêcheries,
M. Toshinori Uoya, sous-directeur à la division de la gestion des pêcheries, agence des pêcheries,
M. Shinji Hiruma, sous-directeur à la division de la gestion internationale, agence des pêcheries,
M. Sadaharu Kodama, conseiller juridique à l’ambassade du Japon au Royaume des Pays-Bas,
M. Nobuyuki Murai, LL.D., premier secrétaire de l’ambassade du Japon au Royaume des
Pays-Bas,
- 10 Ms Risa Saijo, LL.M., Researcher, Embassy of Japan in the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
Ms Héloïse Bajer-Pellet, member of the Paris Bar,
as Advisers;
Mr. Douglas Butterworth , Emeritus Professor, University of Cape Town,
Ms Judith E. Zeh, Ph.D., Researcher Professor Emeritus, University of Washington,
Mr. Dan Goodman, National Research Institute of Far Seas Fisheries,
Mr. Luis Alberto Pastene Perez, Ph.D., Director, Survey and Research Division, Institute of
Cetacean Research,
as Scientific Advisers and Experts;
Mr. Martin Pratt, Professor, Department of Geography, Durham University,
as Expert Adviser;
Mr. James Harrison, Ph.D., Lecturer in International Law, University of Edinburgh,
Ms Amy Sander, member of the English Bar,
Mr. Jay Butler, Visiting Associate Professor of Law, George Washington University Law School,
member of the New York Bar,
as Legal Advisers.
The Government of New Zealand is represented by:
The Honourable Christopher Finlayson Q.C., M.P., Attorney-General of New Zealand,
as Counsel and Advocate;
Dr. Penelope Ridings, International Legal Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade,
as Agent, Counsel and Advocate;
H.E. Mr. George Troup, Ambassador of New Zealand to the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
as Co-Agent;
Ms Cheryl Gwyn, Deputy Solicitor-General, Crown Law Office,
Ms Elana Geddis, Barrister, Harbour Chambers, Wellington,
as Counsel;
Mr. Andrew Williams, Legal Adviser, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade,
- 11 Mme Risa Saijo, LL.M., chercheur à l’ambassade du Japon au Royaume des Pays-Bas,
Mme Héloïse Bajer-Pellet, membre du barreau de Paris,
comme conseillers ;
M. Douglas Butterworth, professeur émérite de l’Université de Cape Town,
Mme Judith E. Zeh, Ph.D., chercheur, professeur émérite de l’Université de Washington,
M. Dan Goodman, Institut national de recherche sur les pêcheries en eaux lointaines,
M. Luis Alberto Pastene Perez, Ph.D., directeur à la division des enquêtes et de la recherche,
Institut de recherche sur les cétacés,
comme conseillers et experts scientifiques ;
M. Martin Pratt, professeur au département de géographie de l’Université de Durham,
comme conseiller expert ;
M. James Harrison, Ph.D., chargé de cours en droit international à l’Université d’Edimbourg,
Mme Amy Sander, membre du barreau d’Angleterre,
M. Jay Butler, professeur associé invité de droit à la faculté de droit de l’Université George
Washington, membre du barreau de New York,
comme conseillers juridiques.
Le Gouvernement de la Nouvelle-Zélande est représenté par :
L’honorable Christopher Finlayson, Q.C., M.P., Attorney-General de Nouvelle-Zélande,
comme conseil et avocat ;
Mme Penelope Ridings, conseiller juridique pour le droit international, ministère des affaires
étrangères et du commerce,
comme agent, conseil et avocat ;
S. Exc. M. George Troup, ambassadeur de Nouvelle-Zélande auprès du Royaume des Pays-Bas,
comme coagent ;
Mme Cheryl Gwyn, Solicitor-General adjoint, Crown Law Office,
Mme Elana Geddis, avocat, Harbour Chambers (Wellington),
comme conseils ;
M. Andrew Williams, conseiller juridique, ministère des affaires étrangères et du commerce,
- 12 Mr. James Christmas, Private Secretary, Attorney-General’s Office,
Mr. James Walker, Deputy Head of Mission, Embassy of New Zealand in the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,
Mr. Paul Vinkenvleugel, Policy Adviser, Embassy of New Zealand in the Kingdom of the
Netherlands,
as Advisers.
- 13 M. James Christmas, chef de cabinet, services de l’Attorney-General,
M. James Walker, chef de mission adjoint, ambassade de Nouvelle-Zélande au Royaume des
Pays-Bas,
M. Paul Vinkenvleugel, conseiller politique, ambassade de Nouvelle-Zélande au Royaume des
Pays-Bas,
comme conseillers.
- 14 -
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. Good afternoon. The sitting is now open. This
afternoon the Court will hear Japan begin its first round of oral argument.
I give the floor to Mr. Koji Tsuruoka, Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs and Agent of
Japan. You have the floor, Sir.
Mr. TSURUOKA: Thank you, Mr. President.
1. Mr. President, Members of the Court, this is the first time that Japan appears before the
Court, the principal judicial organ of the United Nations. I am honoured to be the first ever
Agent representing my Government before this august body. Please allow me to be a bit personal
before proceeding. My late father, Senjin Tsuruoka, devoted much of his life to international law,
serving as a Member of the International Law Commission for 20 years. He would have been
terrified to see me standing in front of the Court. I must humbly admit that I may not satisfy all
the requirements of an Agent, but I am determined to do my best.
2. Mr. President, Members of the Court, I cannot but be struck by an irony of history. It was
this very subject, whaling, that forced Japan to open itself to the world after 300 years of isolation.
Major maritime powers engaged in a massive scale whaling in the nineteenth century demanded
that Japan open up its ports to supply their whalers. And now whaling is testing whether we are
indeed a good global citizen, complying with international law, or whether we have manipulated
the law to circumvent our international obligations.
3. Although we strongly question the jurisdictional basis for Australia’s claim, if the Court
is to rule on the merits of the case, we wish to emphasize that the case concerns the legality of
Japan’s activities under international law and not ethical values or the evaluation of good or
bad science. The question put to the Court is the interpretation of Article VIII of the International
Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (ICRW) regarding special permit whaling.
4. Japan is fully committed to upholding international law and we take Australia’s
allegations very seriously. When a sovereign State is accused of breaching international law, the
accusation must be supported with convincing legal evidence. Australia failed to prove such an
allegation last week. We intend to present our case clearly so that there will be no room to
doubt our faithful observation of our international obligations.
- 15 -
5. Mr. President, Members of the Court, Japan has lived in harmony with nature throughout
her long history. Surrounded by sea, Japan would be the last to misuse whales as resources because
we know we benefit from the fruits of the sea. Sustainable use of living resources is indeed at the
very heart of the Japanese ethos precisely because Japan has scarce resources and has always
relied for her survival on what nature can provide. Japan is deeply aware of the duty to pass on
to future generations a clean environment and rich biological diversity.
Japan regards the
environment as one of the important global issues that requires the whole international
community to work co-operatively and inclusively. Japan has a long history of participation in
wildlife conservation treaties.
6. It was in this spirit that Japan joined the ICRW in 1951. As stated in its preamble, the
ICRW is a régime that provides “for the proper conservation of whale stocks and thus make
possible the orderly development of the whaling industry”, which is fully consistent with the
Japanese understanding of natural resource utilization.
7. Mr. President, Members of the Court, we have witnessed substantial development of
international environmental law on the management of living resources arising out of serious
reflection on the effect of human activities on the unmanaged fishing and hunting on the species.
Japan has embraced such development including the conservation and management of all living
species. And it welcomes the tangible progress of implementation of such multilateral management
mechanisms.
8. We agree that animal protection, including the prohibition of unnecessary killing and the
preservation of biodiversity, is an essentially good cause. The ICRW was established to remedy
the whaling practice prevalent before 1946 with a view to ensuring conservation and management
based on science.
9. We are conducting the scientific research in a manner such that no harm to stocks
will occur in full application of the precautionary approach. Australia’s own expert confirmed last
week that the catch of 850 minke whales a year does not endanger this population. Little is
known of the ecosystem in the Antarctic Ocean. It is required by the ICRW that management of
whales as marine living resources be conducted based on the best scientific advice.
It is
precisely to supply the Scientific Committee with necessary scientific data that Japan is
- 16 pursuing research whaling and, combined with other nations’ contribution, conservation and
management based on science under the IWC has been making progress.
10. Australia was engaged in commercial whaling until 1979 and used the ICRW to
conduct sustainable whaling1. In 1979, however, it drastically changed its position, when Prime
Minister Malcom Fraser announced a total ban on Australia’s whaling and vowed to work for the
prohibition of whaling by other countries, saying,
“The Government upholds . . . that Australia should pursue a policy of
opposition to whaling and that this policy should be pursued both domestically and
internationally through the International Whaling Commission and other
organizations.”2
Australia has the sovereign right to decide its position. But Australia cannot impose its will on
other nations nor change the IWC into an organization opposed to whaling. Since 1979, Australia
persistently continued its efforts to transform the ICRW and the IWC to a régime of total ban
on whaling. As transformation requires entirely rewriting the ICRW, Australia to this day remains
unsuccessful.
11. Why does Australia take such a position? Are all cetaceans sacred and endangered? I
can understand the emotional background to this position, but fail to understand how it can be
translated to a legal or scientific position. The basic objective of a multilateral convention is to
bring States of widely differing social, economic and political systems with diverse interests to
co-operate for agreed global interests under an agreed framework.
Inclusiveness in any
multilateral régime can only be ensured through encouraging harmony amongst States by
concentrating upon agreed, basic principles and objectives. A unilateral attempt at changing the
agreed rule seriously disrupts the effective operation of a multilateral convention.
12. Mr. President, Members of the Court, throughout the IWC process devoted to agreeing
on methods of better management, Australia opposed any whaling and blocked consensus. When
anti-whaling member States constituted three quarters of the IWC membership, the moratorium on
commercial whaling, as embodied in the Schedule paragraph 10 (e), was adopted. When that
1
The IWC Summary Catch Database, Version 5.3.
2
Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debate, House, 4 April 1979, pp. 1481-1482, CMJ Ann. 163.
- 17 -
three-fourths majority could not be maintained, Australia pushed for resolutions reflecting its own
policy which required a simple majority for adoption. These resolutions are not binding.
13. Failing to surmount the necessary threshold required to amend the Convention in the
direction Australia wished to see, it came to the Court. After many years of hard negotiation, the
IWC was at last at the culminating point of the “Future of the IWC” process; that is to say,
normalization process undertaken with a view to saving the IWC from complete derailment. Since
the increase in the membership in the 1980s of anti-whaling nations, the IWC suffered from
polarization that stood in the way of constructive discussions. The situation could only be put to
an end when a compromise was reached. Australia’s intransigence aborted an agreement that
was about to be reached. Australia took the lead in opposing the consensus that would have
produced the rules acceptable to all member States of the IWC on the management of cetacean
resources. Japan finds it disturbing that a State, while refusing to make sincere efforts and engage
in co-operation in the most prominent multilateral framework in this field, brings disagreements to
the Court.
14. Another aspect of the case pertains to confining the geographic coverage of Japan’s
special permit whaling in the area of Australia’s self-proclaimed Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ)
in the Antarctic Ocean. As amply demonstrated by numerous actions, Australia attempts to
exercise its jurisdiction in this area. Japan does not recognize the Australian position on the EEZ in
relation to the Antarctic. By limiting the geographic coverage of the case to its claimed area in the
Antarctic Ocean and adjacent areas, is Australia attempting to give legitimacy to its self-proclaimed
position on the EEZ? Or is Australia trying to avoid putting its Antarctic claim to the test, as it
would if it imposed a ban on whaling within its claimed Antarctic EEZ, which it has not done.
We have serious doubts about the jurisdiction of the Court in light of Australia’s reservation
attached to its acceptance of the jurisdiction of the Court.
15. Japan, for its part, has acted in good faith and has achieved tangible scientific results
by presenting its findings to the Scientific Committee. Japan has continued to contribute to the
development of new management methods and painstakingly co-operated with a view to ensuring
conservation and management of whales. Even when, as a sovereign country, Japan could have left
- 18 -
the ICRW and the IWC to resume commercial whaling outside this régime, Japan chose to work
with other members within the given framework.
16. Although the moratorium on commercial whaling was adopted originally on a temporary
basis up to 1990, we are faithfully implementing the moratorium despite its practically indefinite
extension. Since Australia cannot argue scientific whaling is illegal, it claims Japanese special
permit whaling is commercial. The drastic change of the whaling conducted by Japan after its
acceptance of the moratorium on commercial whaling will be presented in detail by counsel and
will amply demonstrate that such whaling is not commercial, but scientific.
17. Mr. President, Members of the Court, let me now address the fundamental question
presented to the Court. The difference between Japan and Australia is whether sustainable use of
marine resources may be permitted both in light of law and science.
18. Why is Japan engaged in research whaling? Is it because there is a moratorium on
commercial whaling and Japan needs to continue commercial whaling in disguise as Australia
alleges? Not at all. Japan is conducting a comprehensive scientific research program because
Japan wishes to resume commercial whaling based on science in a sustainable manner.
19. The IWC needs scientific advice because Article V requires that regulations “shall be
based on scientific findings” and because the language of the moratorium says that “this provision
will be kept under review based upon the best scientific advice”. This means that the lifting of
the moratorium requires that convincing scientific data be presented to the Scientific Committee
of the IWC to demonstrate that safe catch limits can be recommended for the resumption of
sustainable commercial whaling.
This position is not unique.
For example, Norway stated
recently, “[c]ontinued gathering of scientific data may also prove to be relevant in the context of
the moratorium on commercial whaling . . . due to such moratorium essentially being a temporary
suspension pending further decisions as to future management”3.
20. Why was JARPA started when Japan accepted the moratorium? Because the justification
for the moratorium was that data on whale stocks was inadequate to manage commercial whaling
properly. In these circumstances it was best to start the research program as soon as possible.
3
Written question from Terje Aasland (A) to the Minister of Fisheries and Coastal Affairs, Answered:
20 June 2013
by
the
Minister
of
Fisheries
and
Coastal
Affairs,
Lisbeth
Berg-Hansen;
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fkd/Whats-new/News/2013/scientific-research-on-whales.html?id=731449.
- 19 -
21. Why is JARPA II conducted around the same waters as commercial whaling had been
conducted? This is because we know from past experience and current scientific data on whale
abundance that this is where whaling could be conducted in a commercially viable way, and
unless it is established that whaling is sustainable in those waters, Japan cannot resume commercial
whaling in those waters.
22. Should Japan be ashamed of trying to resume commercial whaling? As long as
commercial whaling is conducted in a sustainable manner and in accordance with agreements about
humane killing, it is legitimate use of marine living resources and this is precisely what the ICRW
is about.
23. Mr. President, Members of the Court, we know only too well that there are countries
that are opposed to whaling as a matter of principle. This makes it even more important that we
present to the Scientific Committee evidence that resuming commercial whaling is possible so that
the Commission’s decisions can be based on science as required by the Convention. If Japan’s
scientific research whaling is terminated, there will be no data for the Scientific Committee that
will demonstrate that the resumption of commercial whaling on a sustainable basis is possible, and
a lack of data will extend the moratorium for commercial whaling indefinitely. That is why we
scrupulously abide by the rules of ICRW. Had there been doubt concerning our observance of
the ICRW, we would have jeopardized our most important goal of resuming sustainable commercial
whaling.
24. Australia, however, bases its arguments on its policy of absolutely no killing of whales.
This is demonstrated by the statement of the Australian Commissioner, stating that “Australia’s
view is that we are opposed to any research that involves the killing of whales…”4 (emphasis
added). By contrast, Japan is committed to science. We rest our case not on an opinion of one
scientist but on requirements of the ICRW and Annex P, which was agreed by the Scientific
Committee of the IWC.
The scientific achievements of our special permit whaling are
recognized, appreciated and used by the Scientific Committee of the IWC, composed of over
150 experts in whale studies.
4
Verbatim Records of the IWC, 1998, p. 131.
- 20 -
25. In
spite
of
the
literal
interpretation
of
Article VIII
of
the
Convention
“[n]otwithstanding anything contained in this Convention . . .”, we are not advocating an “absolute
discretion”. Our position is clearly based on efforts to respect the highest precautionary approach.
We have fully complied with the procedural requirements5. It is scientifically demonstrated that
there is no harm to stock of the targeted species under JARPA/JARPA II. Japan has always
been present in the negotiations through the IWC, has accepted what was agreed and faithfully
complied with it. It is solely on these solid bases that Japan wishes to resume sustainable
whaling based on the best scientific advice as clearly stipulated in the ICRW.
26. In our pleadings to follow my speech, we will deal with both the jurisdictional question
as well as the merits. Our counsel will explain that our special permit whaling for purposes of
scientific research is founded in law and based on science, as recognized by the Scientific
Committee of the IWC. In doing so, we will explain why Australia’s arguments of last week are
without merit and cannot substantiate such a serious allegation as a breach of the international
convention.
27. Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs les juges, le droit évolue.
Mais
seulement par voie d’accord entre les Etats. On ne peut juger de la portée de ce qui a fait l’objet
d’un accord  ou non  qu’en recourant aux règles bien établies de l’interprétation des traités. Le
Japon a respecté le principe fondamental pacta sunt servanda, en respectant en toute bonne foi ce
qui était convenu et nous nous présentons aujourd’hui devant vous dans l’espoir que votre arrêt
contribuera au renforcement de la stabilité des relations internationales. Il va de soi que si la Cour
devait introduire une révolution dans le droit des traités, cela serait lourd de conséquences à long
terme pour le droit international. Mais nous sommes convaincus que la Cour, principal organe
judiciaire des Nations Unies, fera respecter le principe fondamental du respect de la parole donnée
dans les termes où elle l’a été.
28. Il appartient à la Cour de se prononcer sur la licéité des actes des Etats ; pas sur
leur moralité ou leur valeur éthique. Pour certains, les baleines sont des animaux sacrés,
comme les vaches le sont pour les Hindous. Les religions et les cultures perçoivent les animaux
5
Article VIII, Schedule, para. 30, Ann. P.
- 21 -
de manière différente. Nous vivons dans un monde où vivent plus de sept milliards d’êtres
humains répartis entre les cinq continents ; et la seule manière de leur permettre de coexister
pacifiquement est de respecter leurs différences, et de ne pas imposer les vues de certains aux
autres.
29. Après avoir lu et écouté avec attention les arguments de l’Australie, je suis convaincu
qu’il s’agit d’une tentative unilatérale de ce pays pour imposer l’interdiction de toute chasse
baleinière en se fondant sur ses propres valeurs plutôt que sur une argumentation juridique relative
à la chasse scientifique autorisée par le Japon. Certes, dans ce cadre, le Japon capture et tue des
baleines. Devons-nous en être honteux ? Même si cela peut être l’avis de certains, cela ne veut
pas dire que nous violons le droit international. Si l’on parle en termes de culture, le Japon est
fier de son histoire, qui remonte très loin dans le temps, et de sa tradition de proximité avec la
nature et de préservation de l’environnement pour les générations à venir. Nous ne critiquons pas
les autres cultures. Monsieur le président, je le dis clairement : s’il fallait établir la supériorité de
telle culture sur telle autre, le monde ne pourrait pas être en paix.
30. Pacta sunt servanda, j’y reviens ... Tel est le fondement du droit qui a permis la
coexistence entre les nations durant des siècles et il serait fort regrettable d’écarter ce principe de
sagesse pour la mauvaise raison que les actes de certains Etats semblent moralement répréhensibles
à d’autres.
31. Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs les juges, je vous remercie de votre
attention et je vous prie, Monsieur le président, de bien vouloir appeler à cette barre
M. le professeur Pellet. Merci beaucoup.
Le PRESIDENT : Merci beaucoup, Monsieur l’agent, et je donne la parole au
professeur Pellet. Vous avez la parole, Monsieur.
- 22 -
M. PELLET :
L’incompétence de la Cour
1. Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs les juges, l’agent de l’Australie l’a dit
sans fard : l’affaire que ce pays vous a soumise fait partie de sa campagne en faveur de
l’interdiction générale et définitive de toute chasse commerciale à la baleine6.
Faisant mine
8
d’emprunter à la Nouvelle-Zélande7 le concept de «réglementation collective» , l’Australie lui
substitue sa vision unilatérale et relaie le slogan de ses activistes en se faisant la championne
de la «tolérance-zéro» à l’égard de toute recherche baleinière utilisant des méthodes létales.
Pour cela,
1) elle modifie l’objet et le but de la convention de 1946 «sur la réglementation»  pas
l’interdiction, Monsieur le président, la réglementation  «de la chasse à la baleine» que
l’Australie transforme en un instrument de pures «conservation et reconstitution»9  c’est sa
nouvelle formulation, alors que l’objectif de cet instrument, clairement défini dans le
préambule, est la sauvegarde de la ressource naturelle que constituent les baleines en vue
de «donner à l’industrie baleinière la possibilité de se développer d’une manière
méthodique» ;
2) L’Australie interprète l’article VIII de cette convention d’une façon incompatible avec son
texte, son contexte, ses travaux préparatoires et la pratique dont cette disposition a fait l’objet ;
en particulier, elle entend soumettre le recours à certaines méthodes de recherche à des
conditions telles qu’elles deviennent complétement inutilisables  alors même qu’elles sont
expressément prévues par cette disposition clef. Ce faisant, l’Australie entend réduire à néant la
portée de cet article VIII qui laisse expressément une très large marge d’appréciation aux
gouvernements contractants, et ceci alors qu’aucun texte juridiquement contraignant, limitant
6
CR 2013/7, p. 19, par. 4 (Campbell).
7
Voir OEN, par. 6, 7, 14-32.
8
CR 2013/7, p. 20, par. 7, p. 22, par. 12 (Campbell).
9
CR 2013/7, p. 29, par. 20 (Gleeson) ; p. 40, par. 1-2, p. 41, par. 6-7, p. 43, par. 13, p. 45, par. 20, p. 46, par. 22,
p. 49, par. 33-34, p. 51, par. 35 (Boisson de Chazournes).
- 23 ou, a fortiori, excluant le recours à de telles méthodes, n’a jamais été adopté au sein de la
commission baleinière internationale (la «CBI»).
3) Tout ceci au nom de «La Science», présentée comme une religion révélée, qui correspondrait à
une vérité indiscutable et dont l’Australie se fait le zélateur ; le propre de toute attitude
scientifique me paraît pourtant être la conscience de la relativité des approches, la modestie, la
confrontation des points de vue ; on est loin du compte, Monsieur le président : «Moi,
Australie» ou «Moi, professeur Mangel, je sais : il n’est qu’une science et j’en détiens seul(e) la
vérité. «La vraie science», disait Montaigne, «est une ignorance qui se sait»10 ; on ne peut pas
dire que l’Australie et ses experts aient la science modeste.
4) Et pourtant, Monsieur le président, les réactions de la communauté scientifique  y compris au
sein du comité scientifique de la CBI  sont loin de conforter le mépris dans lequel l’Australie
semble tenir le programme JARPA II : certes, il a fait l’objet de critiques  parfois vives 
dans certains cercles liés aux Etats hostiles par principe à la chasse baleinière ; mais, si l’on
veut bien ne pas s’en tenir à quelques citations sorties de leur contexte et émanant de ces
milieux, le tableau est nettement moins sombre que nos amis australiens veulent le dépeindre ;
il existe une grande diversité de points de vue à cet égard, et cette diversité témoigne de
l’absence de toute certitude en ce domaine ; il paraît difficile, pour dire le moins, qu’une
juridiction internationale, pour éminente qu’elle soit, puisse trancher entre ces vues divergentes
et fasse prévaloir «une» vérité scientifique controversée sur une autre.
5) Enfin, il est certainement vrai que les Etats doivent agir de bonne foi et ne pas abuser des droits
que leur reconnaît le droit international ; mais, outre que «la mauvaise foi ne se présume pas»11,
où est l’abus ?
 dans le fait que le Japon, après avoir accepté le moratoire, ait, dans l’esprit de l’article VIII,
paragraphe 4, de la convention, pris des mesures pour compenser (en partie) la perte des
données scientifiques que fournissaient traditionnellement la chasse commerciale ? Ou qu’en
10
11
Michel de Montaigne, Pensées, 1580.
Affaire du lac Lanoux (Espagne, France), sentence arbitrale du 16 novembre 1957, Recueil des sentences
arbitrales, vol. XII, p. 305. Voir également l’affaire Tacna Arica (Chili/Pérou), sentence arbitrale du 4 mars 1925,
Recueil des sentences arbitrales, vol. II, p. 929-930 et Concessions Mavrommatis à Jérusalem, arrêt no 5, 1925, C.P.J.I.
série A no 5, p. 43 ; Certains intérêts allemands en Haute-Silésie polonaise, fond, arrêt no 7, 1926, C.P.J.I. série A no 7,
p. 30.
- 24 vertu du moratoire lui-même, le Japon ait cherché à obtenir l’information scientifique qui
donne à la CBI l’assurance qu’elle peut, sans risque, reviser le moratoire ? Assurément pas :
JARPA et JARPA II ne sont pas des moyens de contourner le moratoire12 ; la montée en
puissance des méthodes de recherche létales est la conséquence du moratoire et de
l’assèchement des données en résultant ;
 l’abus serait-il alors dans le simple fait de recourir à ces méthodes ? Mais, je l’ai dit, elles sont
expressément envisagées par l’article VIII, et même les experts de l’Australie ont dû concéder
qu’il n’existait pas de méthodes alternatives raisonnablement utilisables et susceptibles de
fournir des informations équivalentes13 ; comme l’a également reconnu M. Gales en réponse à
une question de Mme la juge Donoghue, la connaissance de l’âge des baleines, qui, on peut le
regretter, ne peut être obtenue que par ce moyen, est indispensable pour évaluer leur mortalité
et établir un modèle de distribution des âges14  ce qui est l’un des buts de JARPA II15 ; cela
explique aussi le nombre relativement élevé de petits rorquals capturés à cette fin, car
l’établissement de ce modèle suppose des statistiques portant sur un assez grand nombre
d’animaux ; qu’il y ait, entre les experts, des divergences d’appréciation sur des problèmes de
ce genre, c’est certain (et naturel)  mais que la Cour puisse trancher ces querelles de
spécialistes, voilà qui est beaucoup moins évident ;
 l’abus serait-il dans le fait que les produits obtenus à partir des baleines capturées sont,
conformément aux directives du Gouvernement japonais, dans la mesure du possible, mis en
vente sur le marché afin de couvrir les frais entraînés par la recherche ?
Mais ceci est
conforme aux dispositions du paragraphe 2 de l’article VIII et aux bonnes pratiques actuelles
communément suivies en matière de financement de la recherche ;
 ou y aurait-il abus parce que le Japon ne respecterait pas certaines résolutions adoptées par la
CBI  souvent à d’étroites majorités ? Mais ces textes ne sont pas juridiquement obligatoires
et, en revanche, le Japon s’est toujours scrupuleusement conformé à toutes les obligations
12
CR 2013/7, p. 25, par. 4, p. 27, par. 11, p. 30, par. 25 ; CR 2013/11, p. 30-31, par. 21 (Gleeson).
13
Voir CR 2013/9, p. 65 (Mangel).
14
CR 2013/10, p. 31 (Gales).
15
Voir Government of Japan, «Plan for the Second Phase of the Japanese Whale Research Program under Special
Permit in the Antarctic (JARPA II)  Monitoring of the Antarctic Ecosystem and Development of New Management
Objectives for Whale Resources», SC/57/O1(2005), p. 2, 6-7 [CMJ, annexe 150].
- 25 -
procédurales lui incombant en vertu de la convention ou du paragraphe 30 du règlement qui lui
est annexé ; et il est même allé très au-delà en coopérant de bonne foi avec les organes de la
convention dont il a toujours considéré les points de vue avec attention  il n’est pas sûr que
l’on puisse en dire autant de l’Australie qui s’est, pour sa part, servie de ces organes pour tenter
d’obtenir une interprétation de la convention de 1946 contraire à sa lettre et à son esprit.
2. Mes collègues et moi-même développeront ces points  et d’autres  plus tard cette
après-midi et dans les deux jours qui viennent. Mais nous ne le feront que par précaution ou,
comme l’on dit, pour surplus de droit, car nous avons la ferme conviction que la Cour n’est pas
compétente pour se prononcer sur la requête dont l’Australie a cru pouvoir vous saisir.
3. En effet, bien que le Japon n’ait pas exercé son droit de soulever des exceptions
préliminaires, il n’en objecte pas moins à la compétence de la Cour.
C’est cette exception
d’incompétence  dont l’Australie ne conteste pas la recevabilité et qu’elle a dit prendre très au
sérieux16  qu’il m’appartient de vous présenter aujourd’hui.
4. Toutefois, Monsieur le président, le Japon se trouve dans une position assez particulière
et, à vrai dire, fort inconfortable. L’Australie n’a pas cru devoir demander un second tour de
plaidoiries écrites et la Cour ne l’a pas ordonné. Du coup, jusqu’à vendredi dernier  l’Australie a
pris soin d’attendre la toute dernière minute pour plaider ce point liminaire...  nous étions dans
l’ignorance complète de la position du demandeur sur cet aspect, à nos yeux essentiel, de l’affaire.
5. Tout ce que nous savions concernait un point annexe relatif à la portée de sa requête
 qui a son importance, il est vrai. En effet, durant les réunions de procédure menées avec le
président de la Cour, l’agent du demandeur a pris l’engagement formel de ne pas étendre la portée
de ses réclamations, ni ratione materiae (à d’autres conventions), ni ratione loci (au Pacifique Nord
en particulier). Dans sa lettre au greffier de la Cour en date du 22 mai 2012, M. William Campbell,
agent de l’Australie, écrivait en effet :
«I confirm, as I did at the meeting of the President of the Court with the Agents
of the Parties on 23 April 2012, that Australia’s claim in these proceedings concerns
Japan’s JARPA II programme in the Southern Ocean (see Australia’s Application
Instituting Proceedings, paragraph 2)».
16
CR 2013/7, p. 38, par. 60 (Gleeson) et CR 2013/11, p. 41, par. 2 (Burmester).
- 26 Ce dernier détail est significatif, dans la mesure où il établit que l’Australie ne saisit pas la Cour
d’un programme similaire à JARPA II17, mais qui se déploie dans une zone maritime sur laquelle
l’Australie n’a pas de prétentions.
6. La Cour est donc saisie de la compatibilité avec la convention de 1946 du programme
JARPA II, qui se déroule dans l’océan Austral, à l’exclusion de toute autre question. Et, je le
rappelle, c’est la requête, telle qu’interprétée par les Parties qui fixe et limite la compétence de la
Cour18. Or il se trouve, Monsieur le président, que la requête ainsi définie n’entre pas dans sa
juridiction telle que l’établissent les déclarations facultatives d’acceptation de la juridiction
obligatoire de la CIJ en vertu de l’article 36, paragraphe 2, du Statut, faites respectivement par
l’Australie et le Japon. Ces déclarations figurent sous l’onglet no 16 du dossier des juges. L’une et
l’autre comportent un certain nombre de réserves.
7. La prétendue coïncidence de ces déclarations constitue en l’espèce la seule base sur
laquelle l’Australie entend fonder la compétence de la Cour19. Aucune autre n’est invoquée. Je
note en particulier que la convention de 1946 dont l’Australie invoque la violation  à l’exclusion
de tout autre traité  ne contient pas de clause de règlement des différends.
8. Conformément à l’article 36, paragraphe 2, du Statut, la déclaration du Japon précise
qu’elle est faite «à l’égard de tout autre Etat acceptant la même obligation». Au nom du principe
de réciprocité, que vous avez rappelé, par exemple, dans votre arrêt du 11 juin 1998 relatif aux
exceptions préliminaires dans l’affaire Cameroun c. Nigéria20 et que la Cour a mis en œuvre à
17
CR 2013/8, p. 57, par. 7 (Sands).
18
Voir l’article 40, paragraphe 1 du Statut et l’article 38, paragraphe 2, du Règlement ; voir aussi Administration
du prince von Pless, ordonnance du 4 février 1933, C.P.J.I. série A/B no 52, p. 14 ; Certaines terres à phosphates à
Nauru (Nauru c. Australie), exceptions préliminaires, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1992, p. 267, par. 69 ; Différend territorial et
maritime entre le Nicaragua et le Honduras dans la mer des Caraïbes (Nicaragua c. Honduras), arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 2007 (II), p. 695, par. 108 ; Certaines questions concernant l’entraide judiciaire en matière pénale
(Djibouti c. France), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2008, p. 205-206, par. 66-70 ; Immunités juridictionnelles de l’Etat (Allemagne
c. Italie ; Grèce (intervenant), arrêt du 3 février 2012, C.I.J., par. 37-39.
19
20
Requête, par. 4 ; MA, par. 1.10 ; CR 2013/11, p. 41, par. 5 (Burmester).
Frontière terrestre et maritime entre le Cameroun et le Nigéria (Cameroun c. Nigéria), exceptions
préliminaires, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1998, p. 298-299, par. 43. Voir aussi la jurisprudence citée et Phosphates du Maroc,
arrêt, 1938, C.P.J.I. série A/B no 74, p. 22 ; Licéité de l’emploi de la force (Yougoslavie c. Espagne), mesures
conservatoires, ordonnance du 2 juin 1999, C.I.J. Recueil 1999 (II), p. 23, par. 25 et Licéité de l’emploi de la force
(Yougoslavie c. Belgique), mesures conservatoires, ordonnance du 2 juin 1999, C.I.J. Recueil 1999 (I), p. 135, par. 30.
- 27 plusieurs reprises, le Japon peut invoquer les réserves de l’Australie  en tout cas l’une d’elles 
pour s’opposer à ce que la Cour exerce sa juridiction. L’Etat requérant ne le conteste pas21.
[Projection no 1 : La deuxième réserve australienne.]
9. Permettez-moi, Monsieur le président, de lire cette réserve, incluse dans la déclaration
australienne du 22 mars 2002, et qui exclut la compétence de la Cour en la présente espèce ; je le
ferai dans le texte original anglais car la traduction française est étrange à certains points de vue.
Telle qu’on la trouve dans le Recueil des Traités, elle est assez bizarre.
«This declaration does not apply to :
................................................................
(b) any dispute concerning or relating to the delimitation of maritime zones, including
the territorial sea, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf, or arising
out of, concerning, or relating to the exploitation of any disputed area of or
adjacent to any such maritime zone pending its delimitation;
...............................................................»
10. Interprétée conformément aux intentions de l’Australie, cette réserve couvre l’objet de la
requête et prive la Cour de compétence pour se prononcer.
I. La portée de la réserve b) de l’Australie
11. Lorsqu’elle doit interpréter une déclaration facultative de juridiction obligatoire, la Cour
met l’accent sur la volonté de l’Etat déclarant, telle qu’elle ressort des termes de la déclaration.
Ainsi, dans l’affaire de la Compétence en matière de pêcheries (Espagne c. Canada), elle a estimé
qu’
«étant donné qu’une déclaration en vertu du paragraphe 2 de l’article 36 du Statut est
un acte rédigé unilatéralement, la Cour n’a pas manqué de mettre l’accent sur
l’intention de 1’Etat qui dépose une telle déclaration. Aussi bien, dans l’affaire de
l’Anglo-Iranian Oil Co., la Cour a-t-elle jugé que les termes restrictifs choisis dans la
déclaration de l’Iran étaient «une confirmation décisive de l’intention du
Gouvernement de l’Iran, lorsqu’il a accepté la juridiction obligatoire de la Cour»
(ibid., p. 107).
49. La Cour interprète donc les termes pertinents d’une déclaration, y compris
les réserves qui y figurent, d’une manière naturelle et raisonnable, en tenant dûment
21
Voir CR 2013/11, p. 41, par. 6 (Burmester).
- 28 compte de l’intention de 1’Etat concerné à l’époque où ce dernier a accepté la
juridiction obligatoire de la Cour»22.
Mon vieil ami Henry Burmester, que je suis heureux de retrouver ici, même si nous ne sommes pas
cette fois du même côté de la barre, admet que ces principes sont ceux qu’il convient d’appliquer
dans notre espèce23.
12. Pour répondre à la question de savoir si le présent différend relève ou non de la
compétence de la Cour, il convient donc de se placer du point de vue de l’Australie et de se
demander si celle-ci pourrait s’opposer avec succès au règlement du différend par la Cour dans
l’hypothèse où elle serait défenderesse dans une affaire du même type que celle qu’elle vous a
soumise.
13. Les termes de la seconde réserve australienne sont très larges et, visiblement, ils ont été
rédigés délibérément de façon à couvrir tout différend lié aux zones maritimes qu’elle vise. Malgré
les dénégations de nos amis australiens24, la réserve b) de l’Australie ne se limite pas à exclure les
différends relatifs à la seule délimitation d’un territoire maritime. Elle y ajoute ceux qui sont «en
rapport» avec une telle délimitation et, surtout pour ce qui nous concerne, ceux «découlant de
l’exploitation de toute zone faisant l’objet d’un différend adjacente à une telle zone maritime en
attente de délimitation ou en faisant partie» ou encore, «concernant une telle exploitation ou en
rapport avec celle-ci». Je note au passage que, dans son arrêt du 28 mai dernier dans l’affaire du
Louisa invoqué par M. Burmester25, le Tribunal international du droit de la mer s’est fondé sur
«l’emploi du terme «relatifs» dans la déclaration» de Saint-Vincent-et-les Grenadines en vertu de
l’article 287 de la convention de Montego Bay pour conclure que «l’interprétation étroite de [cette]
déclaration ... ne peut être retenue»26.
14. La formule adoptée par l’Australie dans la réserve b) n’est pas sans rappeler celle dont le
Canada avait assorti son acceptation de la compétence obligatoire de la Cour, qui a fait l’objet
22
Compétence de la Cour, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1998, p. 454, par. 48-49 ; les italiques sont de nous ; voir aussi
Plateau continental de la mer Egée (Grèce c. Turquie), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1978, p. 32, par. 77.
23
CR 2013/11, p. 43, par. 12 (Burmester).
24
CR 2013/7, p. 38-39, par. 62 (Gleeson) et CR 2013/11, p. 42, par. 10, p. 44, par. 18, 21 (Burmester).
25
CR 2013/11, p. 49-50, par. 38.
26
T.I.D.M., arrêt du 28 mai 2013, Affaire du navire «Louisa» (Saint-Vincent-et-les Grenadines c. Royaume
d’Espagne), par. 83.
- 29 d’une interprétation par la CIJ dans l’affaire de la Compétence en matière de pêcheries. Dans son
arrêt du 4 décembre 1998, la Haute Juridiction a commencé :
«par relever qu’en excluant de sa juridiction les «différends auxquels pourraient
donner lieu» les mesures de gestion et de conservation qu’elle mentionne et leur
exécution, la réserve ne réduit pas le critère d’exclusion au seul «objet» du
différend»27.
Il en va de même dans la présente espèce : du fait de la formulation de la réserve australienne, la
Cour ne doit pas avoir égard seulement à l’objet du différend strictement entendu. La formule
large de la réserve l’autorise et lui impose même d’aller au-delà. Comme la Cour le remarque dans
ce même arrêt de 1998 :
«La version anglaise «disputes arising out of or concerning» laisse plus
clairement apparaître le caractère large et englobant de la formule. Aux termes de la
réserve sont exclus non seulement les différends qui auraient directement pour «objet»
les mesures envisagées et leur exécution, mais aussi ceux qui y auraient «trait»
(«concerning») et, plus généralement, tous ceux qui y trouveraient leur «origine»
(«arising out of»), c’est-à-dire les différends qui, en l’absence de telles mesures, ne
seraient pas nés.»28
15. Or, si l’on compare les deux déclarations  celle de l’Australie, d’une part, et celle du
Canada qui était applicable dans l’affaire de 1998, d’autre part, on constate que la première - celle
de l’Australie - est plus large encore, puisqu’aux expressions «différend ... découlant de
l’exploitation» (dispute ... arising out of the exploitation) de l’une des zones concernées ou
«concernant une telle exploitation» (concerning [such] exploitation), l’Australie a ajouté les
différends «en rapport avec celle-ci» (relating to [such] exploitation). «[L]e caractère large et
englobant de la formule» est encore plus frappant donc : aux termes de la réserve b) sont exclus
non seulement les différends qui auraient directement pour «objet» l’exploitation d’une zone
contestée, mais aussi, pour paraphraser votre arrêt de 1998, non seulement ceux qui auraient «trait
à» (concerning) une telle exploitation ; non seulement, plus généralement, tous ceux qui
trouveraient leur «origine dans» (arising out of) une telle exploitation ; mais aussi tous ceux qui,
d’une manière ou d’une autre, seraient «en rapport avec» (would relate to) une telle exploitation.
27
Compétence en matière de pêcheries (Espagne c. Canada), compétence de la Cour, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1998,
p. 458, par. 62.
28
p. 458, par. 62. Voir aussi Plateau continental de la mer Egée (Grèce c. Turquie), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1978, p. 36,
par. 86 ; Certains biens (Liechtenstein c. Allemagne), exceptions préliminaires, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2005, p. 25, par. 46.
- 30 -
Sur ce point, nous sommes tout à fait d’accord avec M. Burmester même si, curieusement, il nous
fait dire le contraire29.
16. La présence cumulative d’expressions comme «ayant leur origine dans» (arising out of)
ou «ayant trait à» (concerning) fait d’ailleurs observer à la Cour, dans l’affaire des Pêcheries, que :
«[L]a portée de la réserve canadienne semble même plus large que celle de la
réserve dont la Grèce avait assorti son adhésion à l’Acte général d’arbitrage de 1928
(«différends ayant trait au statut territorial de la Grèce») et que la Cour avait été
amenée à interpréter dans l’affaire du Plateau continental de la mer Egée[30]»31.
Dans cette dernière affaire d’ailleurs, mer Egée, l’expression «relates to» est systématiquement
traduite en français par «a trait à»32.
17. Au surplus  et là, par contre, je ne suis plus d’accord avec mon contradicteur,
l’utilisation répétitive de la conjonction «ou» (employée pas moins de quatre fois dans la seule
réserve b)) établit l’intention australienne d’exclure largement la compétence de la Cour : les cinq
hypothèses visées ne sont pas cumulatives, mais bien alternatives, ou, ou, ou, ou. En aucune
manière, la réserve ne porte exclusivement sur les différends relatifs à la délimitation de l’une des
zones qui y sont mentionnées et qui serait «en rapport» avec celle-ci, pas davantage qu’elle ne
porte exclusivement sur un différend «découlant» de son exploitation et la concernant, et en rapport
avec celle-ci (ce qui serait d’ailleurs assez absurde) : il n’y a que des «ou» (or) ; il suffit donc que
l’on se trouve dans l’un de ces cas de figure pour que la Cour doive décliner sa compétence. Et
comme M. Burmester33 s’en ait aperçu in extremis durant sa plaidoirie, le «ou» primordial est le
deuxième, celui qui sépare la séquence «délimitation» de la séquence «exploitation». Il ne ferait
d’ailleurs aucun sens de répéter deux fois dans le texte original anglais : «concerning or relating
to» la délimitation d’une part et l’exploitation d’autre part, si l’on devait lire les deux «blocs»
d’exclusion de la compétence de la Cour comme identiques et ne concernant que la délimitation.
29
CR 2013/11, p. 47-48, par. 32 (Burmester).
30
«(C.I.J. Recueil 1978, p. 34, par. 81 et p. 36, par. 86)».
31
p. 458, par. 62.
32
Voir Plateau continental de la mer Egée (Grèce c. Turquie), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1978, p. 34, par. 81 et p. 36,
par. 86 in fine et p. 37, par. 90. Voir aussi l’article 102, paragraphe 2 du Règlement de la Cour ; Juridiction territoriale
de la Commission internationale de l’Oder, arrêt no 16, 1929, C.P.J.I. série A no 23, p. 16.
33
- 31 18. J’admets volontiers qu’il ne s’agit pas de délimitation34. Mais rien dans le texte de la
reserve b) n’implique qu’elle vise exclusivement un différend de délimitation maritime.
Au
contraire et plusieurs observations peuvent être faites à cet égard :
1) Il n’est pas inintéressant de noter que la déclaration australienne de 1954 contenait une réserve
concernant les droits sur les eaux et les zones marines revendiquées par l’Australie35 ; cette
réserve était nettement moins large que celle figurant dans la déclaration actuelle ; elle avait, au
surplus, été abandonnée en 197536. C’est donc tout à fait délibérément que le Gouvernement
australien a modifié à nouveau sa déclaration en 2002 en l’assortissant d’une réserve largissime
en ce qui concerne les différends en rapport avec une délimitation maritime ou (et j’insiste sur
le «ou», Monsieur le président !)  ou avec l’exploitation d’une zone maritime faisant l’objet
d’un différend ou d’une zone adjacente à une telle zone dans l’attente de la délimitation. Je
note au passage que l’Australie ne conteste pas en l’espèce l’applicabilité ratione loci de cette
large réserve37  dont acte.
2) La séquence des «ou» dont je viens de parler est parfaitement claire : elle exclut la compétence
de la Cour, d’une part en matière de délimitation des espaces maritimes contestés, de l’autre au
sujet leur exploitation ; et l’expression «en attente de délimitation» (pending delimitation) ne
change rien à l’affaire : elle décrit un moment, un état de fait, mais pas, ici, l’objet du différend
exclu ; la Cour ne peut se prononcer ni sur la délimitation ni, tant que la délimitation n’a pas eu
lieu, sur l’exploitation des zones contestées ou des zones adjacentes. Je fais une pause pour les
interprètes. J’ai dû rajouter in extremis un petit passage puisque nous n’avons reçu que ce
matin un document fort intéressant et important.
Du reste, telle est très exactement la
présentation qu’a donnée l’Attorney-General de l’Australie, dans un document officiel,
analysant au moment de son adoption la nouvelle déclaration australienne, que M. Burmester
avait mentionné au paragraphe 32 de sa plaidoirie, et donc, comme je l’ai dit, nous avons reçu
le texte à 11 heures ce matin. Je cite ce texte :
34
Sur la distinction, voir, par exemple, Plateau continental (Jamahiriya arabe libyenne/Malte), arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 1985, p. 41, par. 50.
35
Nations Unies, Recueil des traités, 6 février 1954, I- 2484, vol. 186, p. 82-83.
36
Nations Unies, Recueil des traités, 17 mars 1975, I-13809, vol. 961, p. 183.
37
Voir CR 2013/11, p. 41-51, passim (Burmester).
- 32 «The new declaration limits Australia’s acceptance of the compulsory
jurisdiction of the I.C.J.. This means that an action cannot be commenced against
Australia in the following circumstances:
................................................................
[and you have it on your screens]
(b) where disputes involve maritime boundary delimitation, or disputes
concerning the exploitation of an area in dispute, or adjacent to an area in
dispute.» (Les italiques sont de nous.)
C’est limpide.
3) L’interprétation contraire avancée par l’Australie conduit à un résultat parfaitement absurde et
prive de signification toute la seconde partie de la réserve : elle signifierait que la Cour ne peut
trancher un différend relatif à la délimitation mais qu’une fois celui-ci résolu, elle pourrait se
prononcer sur l’exploitation... Si telle était la signification de la seconde partie de la phrase, elle
la rend totalement superflue et l’Australie aurait dû se contenter d’exclure la compétence de la
Cour en matière de délimitation  «point-barre» ! Pour que la référence à l’exploitation ait un
sens utile, il faut admettre que, dans l’attente de la délimitation (pending limitation), la Cour ne
peut se prononcer ni sur la délimitation des zones visées, ni sur leur exploitation.
4) Les discussions au sein du Parlement australien (qui sont relatées dans un document produit par
le Japon  il s’agit de l’annexe 167 à notre contre-mémoire) et dont M. Burmester s’est efforcé
de tirer le moins mauvais parti possible, confirment cette interprétation et montrent que la
réserve b) concerne non seulement la délimitation des frontières maritimes, mais plus largement
les différends ayant «une connotation maritime»38.
L’expression a été employée par
M. Campbell durant ces débats, à propos de l’affaire des Essais nucléaires, dont je suis prêt à
admettre qu’elle peut être présentée comme étant «partiellement maritime» (a «semi-maritime
matter», he said) mais dont l’aspect «délimitation» ne m’avait, je dois dire, jamais frappé. Un
autre exemple d’affaires ayant un aspect maritime donné par M. Campbell lors de cette
discussion avec les parlementaires est celle du Timor Oriental, à propos de laquelle
M. Burmester a très justement fait remarquer qu’elle ne concernait pas une délimitation
maritime mais qu’elle «put at risk existing resource exploitation by Australia», because
38
Voir Parliamentary Debates, Joint Standing Committee on Treaties, 12 July 2002 (William Campbell), TR 49,
CMJ. [annexe 167], p. 217.
- 33 -
«American oil companies, with interest in exploiting areas off Timor-Leste, were telling anyone
who would listen that they had legal advice that Timor-Leste could properly claim not just a
share of the resources within the former joint zone but also in areas which lay outside its
boundaries, including areas already being exploited by Australia»39. C’est bien ce que nous
disons, Monsieur le président : en rédigeant sa déclaration, l’Australie a voulu échapper à la
compétence de la Cour en matière d’exploitation des ressources naturelles de zones maritimes
contestées ou adjacentes à celles sur lesquelles elle a des revendications. Pourquoi pourrait-elle
se prévaloir de cette exclusion lorsque le pétrole qu’elle convoite est en cause et en
refuserait-elle le bénéfice au Japon à propos de l’exploitation d’une autre ressource naturelle ?
5) Et pour en finir avec la fable de la réserve exclusivement relative à la délimitation maritime, un
mot sur l’analogie esquissée par M. Burmester avec la déclaration, faite au même moment par
l’Australie en vertu de l’article 298, paragraphe 1, de la convention des Nations Unies sur le
droit de la mer.
Mon contradicteur laisse entendre que cette «réserve» (je lui laisse la
responsabilité du mot...) aurait la même portée que celle figurant dans la déclaration facultative
australienne40. Il est intéressant de lire cette déclaration et de la confronter au texte de la
réserve b). Vous avez la réserve b) sur l’écran, je lis en anglais la déclaration australienne en
vertu de l’article 298 :
«The Government of Australia further declares, under paragraph 1 (a) of
article 298 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (…), that it does
not accept any of the procedures provided for in section 2 of Part XV (including the
procedures referred to in paragraphs (a) and (b) of this declaration) with respect of
disputes concerning the interpretation or application of articles 15, 74 and 83 relating
 relating, c’est çà qui nous intéresse  to sea boundary delimitations as well as
those involving historic bays or titles.»41
Si réserve il y a, Monsieur le président, elle porte, en effet dans cette déclaration, exclusivement,
sur la délimitation (de la mer territoriale, de la zone économique exclusive et du plateau
continental) mais il n’y est pas question d’exploitation des ressources naturelles de ces zones ;
moins encore de l’exploitation des ressources naturelles de zones adjacentes dans l’attente de la
39
CR 2013/11, p. 45, par. 23-24 (Burmester).
40
Ibid., p. 43-44, par. 17.
41
Declarations of States Parties Relating to Settlement on Disputes in Accordance with Article 298 (Optional
Exceptions to the Applicability of Part XV, Section 2, of the Convention), disponible en ligne:
http://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/basic_texts/298_declarations_June_2011_english.pdf.
- 34 délimitation. Et pour une raison bien simple : cela eût été contraire à l’article 309 de la convention,
qui prohibe toute réserve et exception non prévues expressément  en matière de règlement des
différends : celles qui ne sont pas autorisées par l’article 287, paragraphe 1, disposition qui ne
concerne que le règlement des différends relatifs à la délimitation des zones maritimes. Dans cette
déclaration-là, l’Australie ne pouvait pas ajouter à l’exclusion de la délimitation celle de
l’exploitation des ressources naturelles. En revanche, elle le pouvait dans sa déclaration facultative
de l’article 36  et elle l’a fait : cette exclusion est exprimée par la réserve b).
19. Exploitation  le mot est sans grand mystère. Il inclut l’ensemble des utilisations des
ressources de la mer et, du reste, le mot «exploitation», qui figure dans le texte anglais de
l’article 65 de la convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer consacré aux mammifères
marins, est traduit en français par «utilisation optimale». Et l’article 120, qui renvoie à l’article 65,
montre qu’il faut intégrer dans cette notion «la conservation et ... la gestion des mammifères
marins».
20. Comme on l’a écrit, le mot «exploitation»  «exploitation» :
«is a broad term which covers the utilization of animals for reasons such as pure
commercial gain, subsistence or in the interests of conservation or control. The means
by which it is carried out can be consumptive, either permanently removing animals
from the population by hunting or live-trapping or harvesting products from wild
individuals under management regimes.»42
21. Clairement, Monsieur le président, les activités que l’Australie reproche au Japon de
mener concernent l’exploitation des ressources d’une zone maritime. Ratione materiae, elles
relèvent de la réserve b) de la déclaration australienne de 2002 ; elles sont au centre du différend ;
elles en constituent l’objet même.
22. Voici, Monsieur le président, pour l’interprétation de la deuxième réserve australienne ;
la Cour ne peut se reconnaître compétente si la requête porte sur un différend découlant de
l’exploitation d’une zone maritime en attente de délimitation ou d’une zone adjacente à une telle
zone  arising out of, concerning, or relating to the exploitation, of any disputed area or adjacent
42
Victoria J. Taylor and Nigel Dunstone, «The exploitation, sustainable use and welfare of wild mammals», in
V. J. Taylor and N. Dunstone (eds.), The Exploitation of Mammal Populations, Chapman & Hall, Bury St Edmunds,
Suffolk, 1996, p. 3-4  les italiques sont de nous.
- 35 -
to any such maritime zone pending its delimitation. Il en va sans aucun doute ainsi en la présente
espèce.
[Fin de la projection no 1.]
II. La réserve b) s’applique en l’espèce
23. Il me semble que, d’une certaine manière, on peut dire, Monsieur le président, que le
différend qui nous occupe «découle de l’exploitation» (arises out of the exploitation) puisqu’il
porte sur les activités menées par le Japon en vue d’assurer l’exploitation durable d’une ressource
naturelle d’une zone maritime. En tout cas, il n’y a aucun doute qu’il la «concerne» et est «en
rapport avec elle».
24. Comme l’a indiqué l’Australie dans sa requête43, comme elle l’a répété dans son
mémoire44, comme son agent l’a redit durant la réunion de concertation du 23 avril 2012 avec le
président de la Cour et confirmé dans sa lettre du 22 mai suivant que j’ai citée tout à l’heure45, et
comme le conseil de l’Australie l’a dit à nouveau la semaine dernière46, «Australia’s claim in these
proceedings concerns Japan’s JARPA II programme in the Southern Ocean»  «la demande
australienne dans la procédure en cours concerne le programme JARPA II dans l’océan Austral»47.
Le programme JARPA II dans l’océan Austral, pas donc, le programme, pourtant jumeau, JARPN,
mais qui, lui, se déroule dans le Pacifique Nord, dans lequel l’Australie n’a pas d’intérêts
particuliers à préserver48. Voici qui confirme, Monsieur le président, que, tout en donnant des
gages à son opinion publique, l’Australie n’agit pas en défenseur altruiste de la légalité
internationale mais bien plutôt pour préserver ses revendications maritimes.
25. Quelle que soit la perspective que l’on adopte  que l’on interprète à la lettre la
définition que le Japon lui-même en donne ou que l’on se réfère aux allégations de l’Australie,
JARPA II, qui constitue de l’aveu insistant du demandeur l’unique objet du différend, est,
43
Requête, par. 40-41.
44
MA, par. 1.3-1.7.
45
Voir supra, par. 5.
46
CR 2013/7, p. 22, par. 13 (Campbell).
47
Voir supra, par. 5.
48
Voir ibid.
- 36 -
indiscutablement, un programme concernant l’exploitation d’une ressource marine et en rapport
avec elle.
26. Le Japon a toujours fait savoir que JARPA était destiné à collecter de l’information qui
permette la reprise de la chasse commerciale à certaines espèces de baleines. Le but du programme
est d’établir si cette chasse est durable  sustainable. Il s’agit de recherche scientifique appliquée,
liée à l’exploitation des ressources naturelles de la mer.
27. Ainsi, la mise en place du programme JARPA I partait de la volonté du Japon de
participer à «l’examen régulier» de la limite de chasse zéro prévue par le paragraphe 10 e) du
règlement annexé à la convention, examen fondé sur «les meilleurs avis scientifiques», qui devait
permettre à la CBI de procéder, au plus tard en 1990, à une «évaluation exhaustive des effets» du
moratoire49. Les objectifs de ce premier programme étaient ainsi tournés vers une meilleure
gestion des stocks baleiniers dans l’océan Austral50 afin d’établir la possibilité de leur exploitation.
L’objectif numéro 1 visait une «estimation of the biological parameters required for stock
management of the Southern Hemisphere minke whale»51. Pour sa part l’objectif 4 portait sur «the
elucidation of the stock structure of Southern Hemisphere minke whales to improve stock
management»52. JARPA II, initié en 2005, s’inscrit dans la lignée de JARPA I. Ses objectifs sont
étroitement associés à la «procédure de gestion revisée» («RMP» selon le sigle anglais), méthode
que la CBI a définie en vue de calculer le niveau raisonnable des prises53, et que le
professeur Hamamoto présentera de manière plus précise demain matin. L’ambition de JARPA II
est de «ultimately lead to the improvement of the whale stock management procedures» 54.
«Looking to the future, the IWC will need to consider a multi-species management approach in the
49
Voir CMJ, par. 4.1-4.2, 4.40.
50
Voir CMJ, par. 4.18, 4.25-4.37.
51
Gouvernement du Japon, «The Program for Research on the Southern Hemisphere Minke Whale and for
Preliminary Research on the Marine Ecosystem in the Antarctic», SC/39/O4 (1987) p. 3-4 [CMJ, annexe 135].
52
Gouvernement du Japon, «The 1996/97 Research Plan for the Japanese Whale Research Program under Special
Permit in the Antarctic», SC/48/SH3 (1996), p. 2 [CMJ, annexe 146].
53
54
CMJ, p. 50, par. 5.20.
Gouvernement du Japon, «Plan for the Second Phase of the Japanese Whale Research Program under Special
Objectives for Whale Resources», SC/57/O1 (2005), p. 12 [CMJ, annexe 150].
- 37 Antarctic Ocean, which has the world’s largest whale resources, for the conservation and
sustainable use of these resources»55.
28. Certes, le programme JARPA II est un programme scientifique, il n’en fait pas moins
partie d’un processus dont la finalité est l’exploitation durable de certains stocks de baleines dans
l’océan Austral. Ayant comme objectif ultime d’établir si et dans quelle mesure les conditions
d’une reprise de la chasse à la baleine sont réunies et quelles précautions doivent être prises pour
que cette activité soit durable grâce à une gestion raisonnable des stocks, JARPA II est, à
l’évidence, «en rapport» avec l’exploitation des ressources marines. Il la concerne même très
directement.
29. Pour le montrer, je me suis fondé, Monsieur le président, sur ce que j’appellerais «la
vérité sur JARPA II». Mais, pour les besoins de la discussion, je peux aussi bien me référer aux
allégations  erronées  de la Partie australienne, qui veut voir dans le programme japonais des
actes de chasse commerciale à la baleine. Elle prétend que : «the whales are killed for commercial
exploitation of the whale meat and to sustain the Japanese whaling industry»56, ou encore que : «the
Convention contemplates three types of whaling. The only one that fits JARPA II is commercial
whaling that is exploitation»57. Je relève d’ailleurs qu’en soutenant que «la conservation des
baleines même à des fins économiques requiert un système collectif, prévisible et contraignant de
supervision»58, l’Australie caractérise les activités de chasse à la baleine sous le régime de la
convention comme relevant de l’exploitation (ou parfois de la surexploitation) du stock59.
30. Monsieur le président, je ne concède en aucune manière que JARPA II serait un
programme déguisé de chasse commerciale à la baleine60. Ce que je dis simplement est que, s’il
l’était comme le prétend l’Australie, il s’agirait à l’évidence de l’exploitation des ressources des
55
Gouvernment du Japon, «Plan for the Second Phase of the Japanese Whale Research Program under Special
Permit in the Antarctic (JARPA II)-Monitoring of the Antarctic Ecosystem and Development of New Management
Objectives for Whale Resources», SC/57/O1 (2005), p. 6 [CMJ, annexe 150].
56
CR 2013/7, p. 26, par. 6 (Gleeson).
57
CR 2013/11, p. 15, par. 45 (Crawford).
58
CR 2013/7, p. 43, par. 11 (Boisson de Chazournes) ; voir aussi, par exemple, ibid., p. 26, par. 6 (Gleeson).
59
Voir aussi MA, chap. 2, sect. IV, passim. Voir aussi MA, par. 1.2 ou par. 2.125 et Expert Opinion, p. 294,
par. 2.15, ou p. 318, par. 6.12. Parmi les auteurs qui font la même assimilation, voir Elle Hey, The Regime for the
Exploitation of Transboundary Marine Fisheries Resources, Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, 1989, p. 237-244.
60
Voir CR 2013/11, p. 48, par. 33 (Burmester).
- 38 -
zones maritimes dans lesquelles il se déroule. En d’autres termes, que l’on retienne la description
 exacte  qu’en donne le Japon ou celle  erronée  qu’avance l’Australie, le résultat est le
même : JARPA II, qui est l’objet même du différend que celle-ci a soumis à la Cour, est «en
rapport» étroit avec l’exploitation de la zone maritime dans laquelle il se déroule et «concerne»
cette exploitation très directement.
31. De toute manière, l’Australie ne peut avoir raison à la fois sur la compétence et sur le
fond. En effet, de deux choses l’une : soit elle a raison sur le fond  JARPA II est de la chasse
commerciale  mais alors le différend est évidemment exclu de votre compétence car il s’agit
évidemment d’exploitation ; soit la raison sur la compétence  l’affaire ne concernerait pas
l’exploitation stricto sensu des baleines  mais alors elle a nécessairement tort sur le fond.
32. Dès lors, il importe peu que le Japon n’ait pas de différend de délimitation avec
l’Australie61, au sens étroit défini vendredi par le conseil de l’Etat requérant comme portant sur des
«prétentions maritimes concurrentes»62. Les deux pays ont un différend relatif à l’exploitation
d’une zone maritime que l’Australie considère comme relevant de sa zone économique exclusive,
ce que le Japon conteste, et de la zone adjacente à cette zone en litige.
33. En résumé, Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs de la Cour, le différend que
l’Australie a cru pouvoir vous soumettre est couvert par la réserve b) de sa propre déclaration
facultative  dont le Japon peut se prévaloir au titre du principe de réciprocité. La réserve
australienne couvre les différends
 découlant de l’exploitation de toute zone (maritime) objet d’un différend, qui est en attente de
délimitation, ou d’une zone qui lui est adjacente ;
 concernant une telle exploitation ; ou
 en rapport avec elle.
Le différend soumis à la Cour, à propos du programme JARPA II, qui vise à permettre
l’exploitation durable des baleines dans l’océan Austral, peut rentrer dans chacune de ces
catégories. A tous ces points de vue, vous ne pouvez, Mesdames et Messieurs les juges, que
décliner l’exercice de votre compétence et il serait fort injuste que l’Australie puisse se prévaloir de
61
62
Ibid, p. 47, par. 30 (Burmester).
- 39 -
sa déclaration facultative après avoir fait en sorte de se mettre à l’abri de requêtes comparables à
celle qu’elle a elle-même formée pour complaire à son opinion publique.
34. Un dernier mot relatif à l’intervention de la Nouvelle-Zélande : si, comme nous le
croyons, vous vous déclarez incompétents pour connaître de l’affaire que l’Australie vous a
soumise, il va de soi que la demande en intervention de ce pays sera sans objet. En effet, nous nous
trouverons dans une situation comparable à celle créée par la demande d’intervention d’El Salvador
dans l’affaire des Activités militaires entre le Nicaragua et les Etats-Unis à la suite de laquelle la
Cour a relevé :
«que la déclaration d’intervention de la République d’El Salvador … porte en fait
aussi sur des questions, y compris l’interprétation de conventions, qui présupposent
que la Cour a compétence pour connaître du différend entre le Nicaragua et les
Etats-Unis d’Amérique et que la requête du Nicaragua contre les Etats-Unis
d’Amérique concernant ce différend est recevable»63.
De même, dans les affaires des Essais nucléaires, la Cour a considéré, suite à l’adoption de ses
arrêts constatant que les demandes de l’Australie et de la Nouvelle-Zélande étaient «désormais sans
objet», «qu’en conséquence il n’exist[ait] désormais plus d’instance sur laquelle la requête à fin
d’intervention [de Fidji] puisse se greffer». Et la Cour a conclu : «que la requête par laquelle le
Gouvernement fidjien demande à intervenir dans l’instance introduite par l’Australie [ou la
Nouvelle-Zélande] contre la France tombe et que la Cour n’a plus aucune suite à lui donner»64. Il
doit en aller de même de la demande en intervention de la Nouvelle-Zélande dans l’affaire qui nous
occupe.
Mesdames et Messieurs les juges, je vous remercie de votre écoute. Mon successeur à cette
barre sera le professeur Payam Akhavan  si, bien sûr, vous voulez bien lui donner la parole,
Monsieur le président  mais peut-être considérerez-vous que c’est le moment approprié pour
notre sacro-sainte (et toujours bienvenue !) pause-café surtout après une plaidoirie fort technique ?
63
Activités militaires et paramilitaires au Nicaragua et contre celui-ci (Nicaragua c. Etats-Unis d’Amérique),
déclaration d’intervention, ordonnance du 4 octobre 1984, C.I.J. Recueil 1984, p.216, par. 2 (les italiques sont de nous).
Voir aussi : Essais nucléaires (Nouvelle-Zélande c. France), requête à fin d’intervention, ordonnance du 12 juillet 1973,
C.I.J. Recueil 1973, p. 325, par. 1-3 ; Essais nucléaires (Nouvelle-Zélande c. France), requête à fin d’intervention,
ordonnance du 20 décembre 1974, C.I.J. Recueil 1974, p. 535-536.
64
Essais nucléaires (Australie c. France), requête à fin d’intervention, ordonnance du 20 décembre 1974,
C.I.J. Recueil 1974, p. 530-531 ; Essais nucléaires (Nouvelle-Zélande c. France), requête à fin d’intervention,
ordonnance du 20 décembre 1974, C.I.J. Recueil 1974, p. 535-536.
- 40 Le PRESIDENT : Merci, Professeur Pellet, je crains qu’il n’y ait plus rien de sacro-saint
dans ce monde d’aujourd’hui mais il faut respecter quand même les traditions et, avant de déclarer
la pause, quand même, j’ai une petite demande à la délégation japonaise. Vous avez cité un
document que vous avez reçu, comme vous l’avez déclaré, ce matin à 11 heures. Ce document
 si je me souviens bien  s’appelle National Interest Analyses. Ce document ne fait pas partie
du dossier de l’affaire ni du dossier des juges de ce matin, est-ce que vous pourrez transmettre au
Greffe le texte avec l’indication des sources. Merci beaucoup.
M. PELLET : Je le fais immédiatement.
Le PRESIDENT : Et maintenant, je déclare une pause de 15 minutes.
The Court adjourned from 4.30 p.m. to 4.55 p.m.
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. The hearing is resumed and I give the floor to
Professor Payam Akhavan. You have the floor, Sir.
Mr. AKHAVAN:
SCIENCE VERSUS POLITICS AT THE IWC
I. Introduction
1. Mr. President, distinguished Members of the Court, it is a great honour to appear before
you today on behalf of Japan.
2. I will be addressing the factual background of this dispute. In particular, I will focus on
the characteristics of Australia’s anti-whaling policy, how it has shaped the relationship between
science and politics at the IWC, and what this context says about the merits of this case.
3. Australia’s allegations are serious and far-reaching. Japan stands accused of 30 years of
deception and defiance against the IWC. Its programme of scientific research is disparaged as
“commercial whaling” in disguise, in violation of Article VIII of the Convention. But prior to this
case, Australia expressly admitted before the IWC that despite its opposition, “Japan’s programme
- 41 is strictly legal under Article VIII of the Convention”65. So, what is this case really about? Why
has Australia now come before this Court?
4. The question is best answered by considering what Australia insists the case is not about.
The Agent’s opening speech emphasized that while “Australia is totally opposed to any form of
commercial whaling” this “is not relevant to the resolution of the case before the Court”66. This is
a rather curious remark given the subject of this dispute. Why would Australia say that its
opposition to commercial whaling is irrelevant? Mr. Campbell insisted that this case is only about
Japan’s “unlawful misuse of the scientific exception under Article VIII”.
But what if that
exception is used to gather scientific data for the resumption of sustainable commercial whaling?
That, after all, is exactly the programme of scientific research contemplated by the 1982
moratorium. If Australia is “totally opposed” to lifting the moratorium, then is it not also totally
opposed to the scientific purpose of JARPA II?
5. But what the Agent’s speech left unsaid goes much further. Moments after the conclusion
of his opening speech, Mr. Campbell told journalists, outside this very courtroom, that: “You don’t
even need to kill one whale to conduct scientific research.”67 The following day, Australia’s own
expert witness, Professor Mangel, admitted that “lethal take” may indeed be “appropriate” for
scientific research68. So what is the Australian position on whether lethal sampling may ever be
justified? The answer may be gleaned from the statement of another Mr. Campbell, the former
Environment Minister of Australia, who stated categorically that Australia opposes  “all
forms”  “all forms of scientific and commercial whaling”69. Minister Campbell clarified that, for
Australia, Article VIII is merely a “loophole” that must be closed70.
65
Counter-Memorial [CMJ], para. 7, referring to Chairman’s Report of the Forty-Ninth Annual Meeting, Rep. Int.
Whal. Commn 48, 1998, p. 39, CMJ, Ann. 57; emphasis added.
66
CR 2013/7, p. 24, para. 18 (Campbell); emphasis added.
67
Associated Press, “Australia to World Court: Ban Japanese Whaling”, 26 June 2013, available at:
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/australia-world-court-ban-japanese-whaling (last checked on 1 July 2013).
68
CR 2013/9, p. 61.
69
Australian Antarctic Division, “Australia taking strong action to protect whales,” Press Release, 16 Feb. 2006,
available at: http://www.antarctica.gov.au/media/news/2006/australia-taking-strong-action-to-protect-whales (last
checked on 1 July 2013).
70
Australian Antarctic Division, “Australia Appeals to Japan to Reconsider its ‘Scientific’ Whale Slaughter,”
Press Release, 8 Nov. 2005, available at: http://www.antarctica.gov.au/media/news/2005/australia-appeals-to-japan-toreconsider-its-scientific-whale-slaughter (last checked on 1 July 2013).
- 42 -
6. As I will show, for Australia, the scientific purpose of lethal sampling is largely irrelevant.
It is a mere afterthought to what the Agent called a “strongly-held” anti-whaling policy. This
policy is based on the fundamental belief in Australian public opinion that, unlike other inferior
members of the animal kingdom, whales are unique, sacred, charismatic mammals that should
never be killed. Since 1979, Australia has pursued an express policy of using the IWC, against its
stated purpose, to ban all whaling. It has politicized science in order to impose Australian values
on Japan, in disregard of international law. Having failed to achieve its objective, it now comes
before this Court and makes arguments that manifestly contradict its earlier positions on the
legality of JARPA. To borrow a phrase from the Agent’s speech, Australia seeks to cloak its
political and cultural preferences “in the lab-coat of science”71. Having put an end to commercial
whaling for the past 30 years through the moratorium, it now also seeks to end scientific whaling.
It seeks to apply the Whaling Convention as if it were the anti-Whaling Convention.
7. Mr. President, Members of the Court, my presentation will be divided into five parts.
First, I will briefly situate Japan’s scientific research in the global context of contemporary
whaling. Second, I will examine the origins and assumptions of Australia’s anti-whaling policy.
Third, I will show how this “no compromise”, “zero tolerance” policy has politicized science at the
IWC and brought the organization to the brink of collapse. Fourth, I will discuss the evidentiary
significance for this case of the Scientific Committee’s findings on JARPA. I will then conclude
with some observations about the circumstances surrounding Australia’s decision to initiate this
proceeding, circumstances that shed light on what this case is really about.
II. The IWC and Global Whaling in Context
8. Turning first to the global context of whaling, the IWC was established in 1946 because of
over-exploitation of whale species, mainly for oil rather than food. The International Convention
for the Regulation of Whaling was adopted  to quote its preamble  in order “to establish a
system of international regulation for the whale fisheries”72. Its fundamental object and purpose
was and remains sustainable whaling.
71
CR 2013/7, p. 24, para. 18 (Campbell).
72
CMJ, Ann. 6, Preamble, The International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (entered into force
10 Nov. 1948) 161 UNTS 72, amended by Protocol of 19 Nov. 1956, 338 UNTS 336 (Whaling Convention).
- 43 -
9. By the 1970s, the combination of IWC regulation and the collapse of the whale-oil market
had significantly reduced commercial whaling. According to the IWC Secretariat, because of “the
improved management of whaling that began in the mid-1970s” many species “are now in the
process of recovering”. There are now at least three “highly precautionary scientific ‘management
procedure’ approaches developed by the IWC’s Scientific Committee for commercial and
aboriginal subsistence whaling in order to ensure that past mistakes will not be repeated”73.
10. Today, most whale species are no longer endangered. For example, the IWC notes that
“humpback whales have shown evidence of strong recovery . . . with annual increase rates of about
10 per cent”74. The graph at tab 19-1 of your folders demonstrates the dramatic drop in global
whaling beginning in the early 1970s, at least a decade prior to the 1982 moratorium. Fortunately,
the days of over-exploitation and unsustainable whaling are long over.
11. The Antarctic minke whale is the smallest and most abundant of the “great whales”. The
IWC’s most recent “best estimate” of this population in the Southern Ocean is 515,00075. The next
largest abundance in the Antarctic is the humpback whale estimated by the IWC at 42,00076. Thus,
the Antarctic minke whale exceeds the next largest population by a magnitude of 12.
12. As indicated in tab 19-2, the IWC observes that: “there are several hundred thousand
Antarctic minke whales and thus they are clearly not endangered”77. “Clearly not endangered”.
This stands in stark contrast to the alarmist assertions of impending catastrophe in Australia’s
pleadings.
13. To further put matters in perspective, the sample size of Antarctic minke whales under
JARPA II is less than 0.3 per cent  or three tenths of 1 per cent  of the relevant population.
Even Australia’s own expert witness, Professor Mangel, readily admitted that what he called a
“very small take of whales” will not “in any way endanger this stock”78.
73
International Whaling Commission, “A Brief Overview of the ‘Status’ of Whale Populations,” available at:
http://iwc.int/status#overview (last checked on 1 July 2013).
74
International
Whaling
Commission,
“The
http://archive.iwcoffice.org/conservation/status.htm (last checked on 1 July 2013).
75
Status
of
Whales”,
International Whaling Commission, “Whale Population Estimates,” available at: http://iwc.int/estimate (last
76
Ibid.
77
Ibid., emphasis added.
78
CR 2013/9, p. 63 (Mangel).
- 44 -
14. Japanese scientific research may further be situated in the broader context of global
whaling. The IWC recognizes three categories of whaling: commercial, aboriginal subsistence,
and special permit whaling. The illustrative map in tab 19-3 demonstrates in dark blue Norway and
Iceland, both of which engage in commercial whaling in the North Atlantic.
15. The IWC Contracting States engaging in aboriginal subsistence whaling are indicated in
purple. These are Denmark in Greenland, the Russian Federation, St. Vincent and the Grenadines,
and the United States of America.
16. The map also indicates in red whaling nations that are not members of the IWC. This
includes Canada, which withdrew from the IWC in the 1980s when the moratorium was adopted,
as well as Indonesia. Such whaling activity is outside the scope of the Convention.
17. Finally, the map indicates in green, Japan, as the only country committing resources to
special permit whaling. Japan withdrew its objection to the moratorium on commercial whaling in
1986.
18. Japan has complied with the moratorium despite a 2,000 year tradition of subsistence
whaling.
It has done so although the IWC anti-whaling block has opposed even small-type
community-based whaling in Japan’s own waters. These coastal communities have been anguished
because they can no longer practise their ancestral traditions. The Australian Environment Minister
once remarked in this regard that “many cultures and traditions . . . don’t belong in a modern
world”79. IWC resolutions, and even United Nations human rights declarations however, recognize
an inextricable link between sustainable “customary resource use” and cultural survival80. For the
anti-whaling moral crusaders, saving whales that are clearly not endangered outweighs saving
foreign cultures and communities.
III. Australia’s anti-whaling policy and the 1982 moratorium
19. I will now turn to the origins and characteristics of Australia’s anti-whaling policy and
the adoption of the 1982 moratorium. At its inception in 1946, the IWC consisted of a cartel of
15 whaling nations. Japan joined in 1951, at a time when, amidst the devastation of the war, whale
79
ECO,
St.
Kitts
Vol.
LVIII,
No.
1
(16
June
2006),
p.
http://www.earthisland.org/immp/ECO2006/2006EcoNo1.pdf (last checked on 1 July 2013).
80
IWC Resolution 2000-1.
4,
available
at:
- 45 -
meat helped prevent starvation.
Despite the Convention’s purpose, and despite improved
management procedures in the 1970s, from the 1980s onwards, anti-whaling nations would take
over the IWC, intent on banning all whaling, irrespective of science-based sustainability.
20. Article V (2) of the Convention specifically provides that Schedule catch quotas “shall
be based on scientific findings”81. The right of Contracting Governments under Article VIII (1) to
issue special whaling permits clearly contemplated the necessity of such “scientific findings” for
sustainable commercial whaling82.
21. In this regard, the Scientific Committee plays a pivotal role. It was established to
provide independent scientific advice to the Commission. State representatives may participate in
the Committee’s deliberations. But unlike the Commission, the Committee is not a political organ.
It is composed of some 150 of the world’s leading scientists in the fields of ecology, marine
biology, population dynamics, statistics, genetics, modelling, and other relevant disciplines. It is an
independent expert body.
22. Given the politicization of science in the Commission, it should come as no surprise that
the Commission and the Scientific Committee may express different views on scientific matters. A
useful illustration, which may be found at tab 19-4 in your folders, is Professor Sands’s
considerable emphasis on IWC resolution 2003-2 calling for scientific research to be limited to
“non-lethal methods only”83. The contrary view of the Scientific Committee is that despite the
availability of non-lethal methods, “logistics and abundance of minke populations . . . precluded
their successful application”84. The contrast between these two views is the contrast between
science and politics.
23. Japan has been a leader in cetacean research since the establishment in 1941 of the
Nakabe Foundation for Whale Science85. It has played a crucial role in the International Decade of
Cetacean Research (IDCR) and the Southern Ocean Whale and Ecosystem Research (SOWER),
81
Article V (2), The International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling.
82
Article VIII (1), The International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling.
83
CR 2013/9, p. 29, para. 50 (Sands).
84
SC/49/Rep. 1, Rep. Int. Whal. Commn. 48, 1998, p. 386.
85
The
Institute
of
Cetacean
Research,
“Overview
http://www.icrwhale.org/abouticr.html (last checked on 1 July 2013).
and
Purpose”,
available
at:
- 46 recognized as the largest whale research program in the Southern Ocean86. Survey cruises were
conducted under IWC auspices for more than 30 years, covering 216,000 miles and
43,000 sightings. The Scientific Committee noted in 2009 that “[w]ithout the generous provision
of vessels by the Government of Japan . . . the success of this programme would never have been
possible”87.
24. Australia’s politicization of science at the IWC can best be understood through
examining the origins of its anti-whaling policy. In the 1970s, the protest group Project Jonah led a
highly publicized anti-whaling campaign against Australia’s last whaling company, Cheynes
Beach. In the 1977 federal elections, whaling became an important political issue, and in 1978, the
Australian Government appointed Sir Sydney Frost to conduct an inquiry into whales and whaling.
The resulting report was submitted to Parliament in February 1979 and Prime Minister Malcolm
Fraser endorsed its recommendations on 4 April 1979. This report would have a fundamental and
lasting impact on Australia’s policy towards the IWC.
25. The Frost Report’s findings were based on Australian “community attitudes to
whaling”88. This included numerous petitions and opinion polls, demonstrating that “the killing of
whales is wrong in the eyes of the Australian community” and that its continuation “would outrage
a significant proportion of the population”89.
26. One “ethical” argument was avoidance of “pain and suffering . . . irrespective of whether
the being is a human or nonhuman animal”90. But Australia was the world’s largest exporter of
beef, much of it to Japan. A more appealing argument was that whales were unique. The Frost
Report thus emphasized that whales are unlike other animals “such as cattle, sheep and pigs that are
traditionally bred for slaughter” in abattoirs or “kangaroo species” and wild camels that are killed
in the millions because they are “a nuisance to farmers”91.
86
Elwen S. H., et al 2011. “Cetacean research in the southern African subregion: a review of previous studies and
current knowledge”, African Journal of Marine Science 2011, 33(3): pp. 469-493.
87
http://iwc.int/sower (last checked on 1 July 2013).
88
Whales and Whaling, Vol. 1: Report of the Independent Inquiry conducted by The Hon. Sir Sydney Frost,
(Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra 1978) [Frost Report], p. 183.
89
Id., p. 193.
90
Id.
91
Id., p. 186.
- 47 -
27. In brief, the Frost Report was based on the premise that whaling was of no economic or
cultural significance for Australians. In contrast to other animals sacrificed to Australia’s giant
meat industry, Australians had a special, emotional attachment to whales. As the Report explained,
“reasonable Australian citizens would conclude that . . . it is wrong to kill an animal of such special
significance as the whale”92. The Report even referred to whales as “sacred animals”93.
28. It should thus come as no surprise that Australia is categorically opposed to lethal
sampling. The Frost Report explicitly recognized that a whaling ban would result in the loss of
scientific data. It concluded however that, “the loss of data for research . . . is not a consideration
which can outweigh the matters of principle upon which the Inquiry’s views are based”94.
Opposition to lethal sampling was based on belief in the uniqueness of the whale. It had nothing to
do with scientific merit.
29. In this light, the Frost Report recommended that “Australia should remain a member of
the [IWC] which is the forum where its anti-whaling policy can best be pursued”95. In other words,
Australia would remain in the IWC for the purpose of defeating its purpose.
30. The Frost Report’s conclusions and recommendations were adopted unconditionally and
became Government policy.
On 4 April 1979, in his statement to the Australian House of
Representatives, Prime Minister Fraser referred to whales as a “special and intelligent” species and
indicated that:
“The Government is to prohibit all whaling within the impending 200 mile
Australian Fishing Zone, including . . . the Australian Antarctic Territory.”96
He further
emphasized that “Australia should pursue a policy of opposition to whaling . . . both domestically
and internationally through the International Whaling Convention”97.
31. In July 1979, the Australian IWC Commissioner announced a policy shift from “the
conservative utilisation of whale stocks to . . . banning [all] whaling”. Pointing to the Frost Report,
92
Id., p. 204.
93
Id., p. 189.
94
Id., p. 205.
95
Id.
96
“Ministerial Statement on Whales and Whaling, Australia, House of Representatives, 4 April 1979, available at:
http://www.unimelb.edu.au/malcolmfraser/speeches/parliamentary/whaling.html (last checked on 1 July 2013).
97
Id.
- 48 he explained that this new policy was based on the belief that “whales have the potential of high
intelligence”98.
32. It was obvious that Australia could not force whaling nations to adopt a new
Anti-Whaling Convention. Thus, the most expedient strategy was to ban whaling by hijacking the
IWC. This could be achieved by imposing a permanent ban disguised as a temporary moratorium.
The Scientific Committee was of the view that some stocks could be sustainably harvested based
on improved management procedures.
But the anti-whaling nations pushed for a blanket
moratorium. The Schedule amendment procedure could be used to achieve this because it was
legally binding. But this required a three-quarters majority of those Contracting States voting.
33. Having failed to get sufficient votes between 1972 and 1974, some of the anti-whaling
nations and non-governmental organizations initiated a takeover of the IWC through a sudden
expansion of its membership. Greenpeace explains that from 1979 “more and more countries
joined the IWC which had never been involved in whaling” and that “[t]his influx of membership
allowed the IWC to adopt a series of conservation measures”99.
One scholar observes that
Greenpeace “added at least six new anti-whaling members from 1978 to 1982 through the paying
of annual dues . . . [and] naming of commissioners to represent these countries, at an annual cost of
more than $150,000”100.
34. The illustration at tab 19-5 shows the progression of this takeover by anti-whaling
nations. The first pie-chart shows IWC membership in 1970. It may be recalled that the 1970s
coincided with both a significant decrease in commercial whaling and increased IWC regulation.
Nations in favour of sustainable whaling are indicated in green and anti-whaling nations of course
in red, together with numbers and percentages of each relative to the total membership. The second
pie-chart shows the membership in 1979, when anti-whaling nations had a slight majority but not
the three-quarters required for Schedule amendments. And finally, the third pie-chart shows the
98
Opening statement by the Australian Commissioner, 31st Annual Meeting of the IWC, London, July 1979;
CMJ, Ann. 164.
99
Greenpeace, “The International Whaling Commission considers reopening commercial whaling”, available at:
http://www.greenpeace.org/usa/en/campaigns/oceans/whale-defenders/iwc/ (last checked on 1 July 2013)
100
Elizabeth de Sombre, “Distorting Global Governance: Membership, Voting, and the IWC”, in
Robert L. Friedheim (ed.), Toward a sustainable whaling regime (2001), p. 187.
- 49 -
membership in 1982, when anti-whaling nations had more than doubled, giving them the
three-quarters majority required for imposing the moratorium.
35. In 1980, in view of this impending take-over, Canada protested that “a moratorium on all
commercial whaling, not based on scientific grounds, is inconsistent with the express purposes and
with Article V of the Convention”101. Canada withdrew its membership the following year, citing
“the changing composition and operations of the IWC”102.
36. In 1982, the commercial whaling moratorium was adopted by just one vote over the
required majority as an amendment contained in paragraph 10 (e) of the Schedule. It provided that
“catch limits for the killing for commercial purposes of whales from all stocks for the 1986 coastal
and the 1985/86 pelagic seasons and thereafter shall be zero”103. It expressly stated however, that
“[t]his provision will be kept under review, based upon the best scientific advice, and by 1990 at
the latest the Commission will . . . consider modification of this provision and the establishment of
other catch limits” (emphasis added). Some anti-whaling nations emphasized that this was not “a
total ban” but just “a temporary interruption of the activity”104. But Australia had a different
agenda.
37. Japan, Norway, Peru, and the Soviet Union, exercised their right to object against the
moratorium under Article V (3) (a) of the Convention. Japan however, removed this objection,
believing in good faith that the moratorium was a temporary measure that would be reviewed by
1990 “based upon the best scientific advice”. Japan focused instead on contributing to scientific
research, consistent with paragraph 10 (e) of the Schedule and the Scientific Committee’s work. It
resolved to collect scientific data for estimating biological parameters required for stock
management of the Antarctic minke whale. Thus, scientific whaling in the context of the Schedule
was for the specific purpose of resuming commercial whaling on a sustainable basis.
38. This however, would not come to pass for the 30 years that followed. Science-based
sustainable whaling, the very purpose of the Convention, became increasingly politicized. For
101
Verbatim Record of the 32nd IWC Annual Meeting, pp. 59-61.
102
Department of External Affairs Communique, “Canada withdraws from the International Whaling Convention
and Commission” 26 June 1981.
103
Schedule, The International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, para. 10 (e)
104
Verbatim Record, 34th IWC Annual Meeting, p. 82.
- 50 -
Australia, there was no room for compromise. The moratorium had to become a permanent ban.
By extension, lethal sampling in support of sustainable whaling also had to stop. Both the purpose
and the means of scientific whaling had to be defeated.
39. The former United States IWC Commissioner, Professor William Aron noted that the
moratorium “marked a significant change: instead of trying to force the IWC to comply with the
convention and support only sustainable whaling, the anti-whaling majority was trying to force the
commission to flout it”105.
IV. Australia’s policy of defeating science-based sustainable
whaling at the IWC
40. I will now turn to Australia’s policy, post-moratorium, of defeating the resumption of
science-based sustainable whaling. As I will explain, this policy of “no compromise” has brought
the IWC to the brink of collapse.
41. Allow me first to address the claim in Australia’s Memorial that:
“[i]t was no
coincidence that Japan only started to issue special permits . . . immediately after the moratorium
on whaling for commercial purposes came into effect . . . in May 1987”106. Japan agrees with
Australia that it was no coincidence. JARPA was necessary exactly because scientific data could
no longer be acquired incidental to commercial whaling. The Scientific Committee had opposed a
blanket moratorium in the 1970s because it would “bring about a reduction in the amount of
research whereas there was a prime need for a substantial increase in research activity” 107. It had
called instead for “a decade of intensified research on cetaceans” in support of sustainable whaling.
Even the Frost Report had noted that a ban on commercial whaling would result in “the loss of data
for research”108.
42. The Court may recall that on two occasions, Australia used this graph, at tab 19-6, in
support of its case. But it only tells half the story. If it is contrasted with this graph, at tab 19-7, of
105
William Aron, William Burke, and Milton Freeman, “Flouting the Convention”, The Atlantic (May 1999).
106
MA, para. 1.4.
107
Chairman’s Report of the 24th IWC Annual Meeting in 1972, pp. 5-6.
108
Frost Report, Vol. 1, p. 205.
- 51 -
the pre-moratorium catch, it starkly demonstrates the sequence and difference in scale, between
commercial and scientific whaling. Australia’s conspiracy theory is wholly without merit.
43. But what is a truly remarkable distortion of the facts is Australia’s statement in these
hearings that “Japan does not like the RMP” whereas Australia endorses it as “a robust and widely
supported management procedure”109. Australia completely ignores its long-standing and explicit
policy of blocking the RMP’s adoption.
Its implementation is tantamount to lifting the
moratorium, which Australia totally opposes. Assuming it is not merely a litigation tactic, Japan
welcomes Australia’s new policy.
44. The RMP was developed over a decade from 1982 to its unanimous adoption by the
Scientific Committee in 1992. The Chair of the Commission later described it as: “the most
advanced method for the conservation and management of a natural resource”, concluding that it
would allow “catches of some stocks of minke whales”110. However, when it came before the IWC
in 1992 and 1993, it was squarely rejected by the IWC anti-whaling majority, including Australia.
45. The whaling nations that had complied in good faith with the moratorium felt betrayed.
In 1992, Iceland withdrew from the IWC. Its Fisheries Minister explained that while “the IWC was
set up both to conserve and exploit whales . . . in recent years it has switched solely to conserving
them. This change gives Iceland the right to leave”111. Iceland would re-join the IWC ten years
later.
But it would do so with a reservation to the moratorium on commercial whaling.
Furthermore, having realized in 1992 that the anti-whaling majority would not allow the IWC to
manage sustainable whaling, Iceland joined Norway, Greenland, and the Faroe Islands, to establish
a parallel regional organization: the North Atlantic Marine Mammal Commission, or NAMMCO.
46. The fallout escalated further. A year after Iceland’s withdrawal, in 1993, the Chair of the
Scientific Committee, Professor Philip Hammond of the United Kingdom, resigned in protest. He
bluntly asked:
“what is the point of having a Scientific Committee if its unanimous
109
CR 2013/9, p. 22, para. 30 (Sands).
Extract from the Chair’s Proposals for a way forward on the RMS  Preface to Chair’s Proposals: Why an
RMS is needed. http://iwc.int/cache/downloads/tihtvmq9n6880gco0okssgsk/56-26%20Preface.pdf (last checked on
1 July 2013).
110
111
“Iceland
goes
it
alone
on
whaling”,
New
Scientist
http://www.newscientist.com/article/mg13318081.300-iceland-goes-it-alone-on-whaling-.html
(last
1 July 2013).
(15 Feb. 1992):
checked
on
- 52 recommendations on a matter of primary importance are treated with such contempt?”112 His
resignation symbolized the open confrontation between science and politics at the IWC.
47. In 1994, the anti-whaling nations finally relented and allowed the Commission to accept
the RMP but with qualifications that made the seeming compromise an illusion. In 1992, Australia
had co-sponsored a resolution calling for “additional steps” before the RMP’s implementation113.
This so-called Revised Management Scheme or RMS imposed onerous requirements114. The
resolution demanded that until there is agreement on all its aspects, “the Catch Limit Algorithm
should not be implemented”. In 1997, Australia suddenly reversed course, stating that “its position
is one of seeking an end to whaling, and [that] it will not support the RMS or engage in the
debate”115. Between the adoption of the RMP in 1994 and 2006, the RMS was discussed at no less
than 52 meetings. Although Australia was absent from most of this scientific work, it was active in
deprecating it before the Commission.
48. Of course, Australia’s withdrawal from the RMS deliberations in 1997 was not a
coincidence. It was in May of that year that a National Task Force on Whaling established by the
Government had issued its much publicized Report entitled: “A Universal Metaphor: Australia’s
Opposition to Commercial Whaling”116. Building on the Frost Report, its premise was that “there
is no need for whales to be killed to provide food” based on the belief that “whaling is inherently
cruel and inhumane”117.
49. The Task Force had recommended that: “Australia should oppose and vote against any
proposal to adopt the Revised Management Scheme (RMS) by resolution or to incorporate the
RMS or Revised Management Procedure (RMP) into the Schedule.”118 It also called on Australia
to seek a prohibition against “special permit (scientific) whaling” 119. Like the 1979 Frost Report,
112
CMJ, para. 3.82.
113
114
115
CMJ, Ann. 57; Chairman’s Report of the 49th Annual Meeting, p. 36.
116
A Universal Metaphor: Australia’s Opposition to Commercial Whaling: Report of the National Task Force on
Whaling, (Canberra: Environment Australia, 1997) http://155.187.3.82/coasts/publications/whaling/index.html (last
117
Id., p. vii.
118
Ibid., p. xi.
119
Ibid., p. x.
- 53 -
the 1997 Task Force Report was adopted as policy by the Government. It was thus no surprise that
Australia would undermine both the RMP and the RMS. Perhaps this brief history explains why
Japan was astonished at Australia’s sudden endorsement of the RMP at this hearing. If this reflects
a genuine change in policy, it is certainly welcomed by Japan.
50. By 2004, ten years after the adoption of the RMP, and more than 20 years after the
adoption of the moratorium, the IWC Chair, Henrik Fischer of Denmark, finally presented an RMS
“package” to the Commission. He explained that its adoption “is essential for the credibility of the
IWC”120. His plea for compromise fell on deaf ears. Having ignored the RMS deliberations since
1997, Australia suddenly reappeared in 2004, only to state categorically that it “will not endorse a
Revised Management Scheme should one be agreed”121.
Australian Environment Minister,
Senator Ian Campbell, made it clear that even defeating the RMS was not enough. In 2005, just
before the launching of JARPA II, he stated that Australia wanted to close the “loophole in the
[Convention] which allows whales to be killed for ‘science’”122. Thus, while admitting that Japan
was allowed to pursue scientific whaling, Minister Campbell made clear Australia’s strong
objection to “all forms”, “all forms of scientific and commercial whaling”123.
51. Amidst this assault on Japan’s scientific research, the Scientific Committee’s exasperated
Chair, Professor Judy Zeh of the United States, openly complained that “she was disturbed by the
way the Scientific Committee’s deliberations were misrepresented” by some IWC delegations124.
Australian intransigence and IWC’s possible collapse
52. Australia’s intransigence and politicization of science has brought the IWC to the brink
of collapse.
Australia has made much of the IWC resolutions adopted by the anti-whaling
Extract from the Chair’s Proposals for a way forward on the RMS  Preface to Chair’s Proposals: Why an
RMS is needed http://iwc.int/cache/downloads/tihtvmq9n6880gco0okssgsk/56-26%20Preface.pdf, last checked on
1 July 2013.
120
121
“Responses to the questionnaire related to the ‘call for comments/positions on key issues in relation to the
Chair’s proposals for a way forward on the RMS’”, IWC/N04/RSWG4, p. 6.
122
Australian Antarctic Division, “Australia Appeals to Japan to Reconsider its ‘Scientific’ Whale Slaughter,”
Press Release, 8 Nov. 2005, available at: http://www.antarctica.gov.au/media/news/2005/australia-appeals-to-japan-toreconsider-its-scientific-whale-slaughter, last checked on 1 July 2013; emphasis added.
123
Australian Antarctic Division, “Australia taking strong action to protect whales”, available at:
http://www.antarctica.gov.au/media/news/2006/australia-taking-strong-action-to-protect-whales,
last
checked
on
1 July 2013.
124
CMJ, Ann. 60, Chairman’s Report of the 52nd Annual Meeting, p. 44.
- 54 -
majority. But it omits to mention those adopted when the anti-whaling block was a minority
amidst the shifting sands of IWC politics. For instance, the 2006 St. Kitts and Nevis Declaration125
stated rather bluntly that “the IWC can be saved from collapse” only by adopting the RMP. It
called for “normalising the functions of the IWC”, “respect for cultural diversity and traditions of
coastal peoples”, and “the need for science-based policy and rulemaking”.
53. In 2007, it was agreed to discuss “The Future of the IWC” with a view to achieving a
consensus solution. In 2009, a Support Group was established as part of a confidence-building
process aimed at adopting a consensus solution. Its distinguished Chair was Sir Geoffrey Palmer,
IWC Commissioner and former Prime Minister of New Zealand, and its members included
Australia, Japan, Antigua and Barbuda, Brazil, Cameroon, Germany, Iceland, Mexico, St. Kitts and
Nevis, Sweden and the United States.
54. On 20 February 2010, just as a consensus proposal was within reach, Australian
Prime Minister Rudd warned visiting Japanese Foreign Minister Okada that if special permit
whaling continued, Australia would take Japan to the Court. Given the timing, it was difficult not
to conclude that this threat was intended to kill any hope of an IWC consensus.
55. Australia filed its Application on 31 May 2010, 20 days before the IWC’s 2010 Annual
Meeting in Agadir, Morocco.
Some days earlier, on 11 May 2010, the IWC Chair,
Cristian Maquieira of Chile and the Vice-Chair, Anthony Liverpool of Antigua and Barbuda, had
presented a “Proposed Consensus Decision to Improve the Conservation of Whales”126. They had
also issued a Press Release127 with the rather explicit title of: “If you really care about whale
conservation  give our proposal a fair reading”. In a desperate plea, they warned of “the possible
collapse of the IWC” and emphasized that the confrontational “status quo is not an option for an
effective multilateral organisation”.
56. The consensus proposal however, was dead on arrival. Almost immediately after it was
circulated by the IWC Chair, the new Australian Environment Minister Peter Garrett said that “it
125
CMJ, Ann. 60, “St. Kitts and Nevis Declaration”, Resolution 2006-1, Ann. C, Chair’s Report of the
58th Annual Meeting, Annual Report of the International Whaling Commission 2006, p. 68.
126
“Proposed Consensus Decision to Improve the Conservation
http://iwc.int/index.php?cID=752&cType=document, last checked on 1 July 2013.
of
Whales”,
available
at:
Revised Press Release: IWC Chair and Vice-Chair; “If you really care about whale conservation  give our
proposal a fair reading”, http://iwc.int/index.php?cID=50&cType=document&download=1, last checked on 1 July 2013.
127
- 55 was now time to close the door on the Proposed Consensus Decision”128.
He rejected the
compromise because it failed to close what he described as the Article VIII “loophole” and
demanded that Japan “immediate[ly] halt” scientific whaling129. Amidst the ruins of his hard work,
the Chair of the Support Group, Sir Geoffrey Palmer of New Zealand, “paid tribute” to the United
States “for its . . . leadership” and I quote, “to Japan for their huge commitment and their
willingness for compromise”130. It was against this backdrop that Australia came before the Court
in 2010, accusing Japan of bad faith.
57. It is opportune to say a word here about “collective regulation”, which is a theme in both
Australia and New Zealand’s pleadings. Japan accepts, of course, the obligations that flow from
membership in a treaty-based multilateral organization. The important question is what those
obligations are. The IWC is empowered to decide on certain issues, just as Contracting States are
permitted, by Article V (3), to opt out of the binding effect of such decisions. Yes, Contracting
States collectively consider what steps are appropriate for the proper conservation and the orderly
development of the whaling industry. But this is not a system in which the majority is empowered
to impose its will upon the minority, not least if the majority is intent on defeating the fundamental
object and purpose of the treaty. It would be as if an anti-navigation majority took over the
International Maritime Organization and banned all navigation on the seas.
58. Mr. President, Members of the Court, the main victim of Australia’s “no compromise”
“zero tolerance” policy has been the IWC. The attempt to impose what the Agent described as
Australia’s “total” opposition to science-based sustainable commercial whaling has alienated
whaling nations and undermined future regulation. A notable example was the anti-whaling
block’s rejection in 2012 of Denmark’s request to slightly adjust Greenland’s aboriginal
subsistence catch131. In response, the exasperated Inuit people of Greenland decided to set their
128
Peter Garrett,
“Whales
worth
more
alive
than
dead”,
available
at:
http://www.theage.com.au/opinion/politics/whales-worth--more-alive-than-dead-20100428-trc1.html, last checked on
1 July 2013.
129
Ibid.
130
IWC Chair’s Report of the 62nd Annual Meeting, p. 8.
131
Chair’s Report of the 64th Annual meeting 2-6 July 2012, p. 30.
- 56 own quota in defiance of the IWC132. They did so with the support of Denmark. They took their
business elsewhere, to a sustainable whaling organization that functions, to the North Atlantic
Marine Mammal Commission, NAMMCO, that, as I explained earlier, was established in 1992
when anti-whaling nations sabotaged the RMP and Iceland withdrew from the IWC. The report of
a 2006 workshop in Denmark explains why these whaling communities are creating an alternative
organization. In the words of the participants:
“NAMMCO is a totally different organisation with a very different attitude and
debate than what we have experienced in the International Whaling Commission
(IWC). The tendency in IWC has been that the hunter in some quarters is looked upon
as the ‘enemy’, whereas in NAMMCO the hunter has always been an important
co-player.”133
59. It may be asked whether Australia is “Saving the Whales” by bringing the IWC to the
brink of collapse? Even the former United States IWC Commissioner spoke of the “intransigence
of anti-whaling nations” that has degenerated the IWC into what he called “a science-free forum
for eco-posturing”. He warned that in a world with far more serious challenges, “the example of an
international environmental agency politicizing itself into irrelevance is alarming”134.
60. Surely, other nations may look at Australia’s IWC campaign against Japan and wonder if
the treaty that they sign in good faith today will come back to haunt them tomorrow. Surely, even
more whaling nations will consider withdrawing from an increasingly dysfunctional organization.
Australia can best save the whales by saving the IWC. The choice is not between sustainable
whaling and no whaling at all. The choice is between sustainable whaling and no regulation at all.
V. The Scientific Committee’s view on the scientific
merit of JARPA
61. I now turn to the fundamental question before the Court; namely, whether Japan is
acting in bad faith when it asserts that JARPA has a scientific purpose. In this regard, we agree
with Professor Sands that in line with its jurisprudence, the Court should draw on “findings of fact
132
Government
of
Greenland,
“Greenland
Quotas
for
Big
Whales”,
available
http://naalakkersuisut.gl/en/Naalakkersuisut/Press-Statements/2013/01/Whales, last checked on 1 July 2013.
at:
133
Report of the NAMMCO Workshop to Address the Problems of “Struck and Lost” in Seal, Walrus
and
Whale
Hunting,
North
Atlantic
House,
Copenhagen,
Denmark,
14-16 Nov. 2006,
p. 12:
http://www.nammco.no/webcronize/images/Nammco/818.pdf, last checked on 1 July 2013.
134
William Aron, William Burke, and Milton Freeman, “Flouting the Convention”, The Atlantic, May 1999.
- 57 made by third bodies, independent third bodies, third parties with no direct interest in the case” 135.
We agree further with him that the Scientific Committee is exactly such an “independent third
body”. It is after all established for the specific purpose of providing independent scientific advice
to the IWC. Where we disagree is his assertion that the Scientific Committee, and I quote, “has
never  never  offered any positive assessment of either program’s contribution to the
conservation and management of whales”136.
62. Mr. President, Members of the Court, English is not my mother tongue, but it would
seem that “never” is a rather categorical word. “Never say never” Charles Dickens wrote,
especially if an assertion is patently false.
Professor Hamamoto will address the Scientific
Committee’s findings at greater length. For present purposes, I will provide just a few illustrative
examples of what are clearly positive assessments of JARPA’s scientific merit, shown at tab 19-8.
63. These are some conclusions from the 1997 Mid-Term Review:
 “JARPA . . . has provided substantial improvement in the understanding of stock structure.”137
 “JARPA data . . . would allow estimation of the biological parameters with reasonable levels of
precision.”138
 “There was general agreement that the data presented on stock structure, particularly the new
genetic data, were important contributions to the objectives of JARPA and stock
management.”139
64. These are some conclusions from the 2006 Review:
 “[T]he JARPA dataset provides a valuable resource.”140
 “The results of analyses of JARPA data could be used . . . to increase the allowed catch of
minke whales in the Southern Hemisphere, without increasing depletion risk.”141
135
CR 2013/8, p. 62, para. 16 (Sands).
136
CR 2013/8, p. 63, para. 19 (Sands).
137
CMJ, para. 4.159; “Report of the Scientific Committee”, Rep.int.Whal.Commn 48, 1998, p. 103.
138
Ibid.
139
CMJ, para. 4.34; SC/49/Rep1, 3.5.
140
CMJ, para. 4.132; “Report of the Intersessional Workshop to Review Data and Results from Special Permit
Research on Minke Whales in the Antarctic”, SC/59/O1, J. Cetacean Res. Manage. pp 411-445, 5.5.
141
CMJ, para. 4.161; ibid., 8.1.
- 58  “considerable progress has been made in addressing the issue of stock structure”142.
 “[T]he JARPA dataset provides a valuable resource to allow investigation of some aspects of
the role of whales within the marine ecosystem.”143
65. There is yet more:
 “[JARPA] has also resulted in a number of publications in the IWC Journals and in other
international peer-reviewed journals.”
 “[T]here have been 22 articles in Rep. Int. Whal Commn and J. Cetacean Res Manage., and
58 articles in English language journals.”
 “[A] total of 182 scientific documents based on JARPA data have been presented to the IWC
Scientific Committee meetings.”144
66. And if this is not enough, at tab 19-9, here is a statement of the Scientific Committee
Chair from 2008:
 “The Japanese input into cetacean research in the Antarctic is significant, and I would say
crucial for the Scientific Committee.”145
67. Against this record, it is difficult to understand how Professor Sands could stand before
this Court and assert that there has “never  never been any positive assessment” of JARPA by an
independent body. Indeed, the Scientific Committee reports are fatal to Australia’s contention that
JARPA has had “no or negligible scientific results”146.
68. It should be noted further that JARPA II will be reviewed by the Scientific Committee
next year, in 2014, under its enhanced Annex P procedure, unanimously endorsed by the IWC.
Perhaps Australia’s haste in coming before the Court is to try and pre-empt yet another positive
review.
69. It is telling that even staunchly anti-whaling IWC members recognize the scientific merit
of JARPA. A notable example is United States Ambassador David Balton, who testified before a
142
CMJ, para. 4.53; ibid., 8.1.1.
143
CMJ, para. 4.132; ibid., 5.5.
144
Ibid.
145
Arne Bjørge, President of the Scientific Committee at the time of this statement, 2008, quoted in CMJ,
para. 4.166.
146
MA, para. 5.132.
- 59 Congressional committee on 6 May 2010 that, and I quote: “Japan does perform scientific research
on the whales they take, and probably have the best whale science as a result.”147
70. Instead of reliance on these unambiguous scientific reviews, Australia’s oral pleadings
resembled an introductory seminar on scientific methodology. There were musings on hypotheses
about hypotheses, a quaint book on scientific masonry from 1905, an NGO-sponsored open letter in
the New York Times signed by environmental activists, and two expert witnesses whose authority
must be weighed against that of some 150 independent experts comprising the Scientific
Committee.
71. Mr. President, Members of the Court. We are not here to determine if JARPA should
win the Nobel Prize for science. We are here only to determine if it falls within the Article VIII
exception. We submit that no third party independent body is better situated than the Scientific
Committee to assess JARPA’s scientific merit. We therefore invite the Court, consistent with the
line of cases referred to by Professor Sands  Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo, Pulp
Mills, and the Genocide Convention case  to rely substantially on the factual findings of the
Scientific Committee, as reflected in its official records. Those findings, we submit, leave no
doubt, no doubt whatsoever, as to the scientific merit of Japan’s research program.
VI. Australia’s case is about neither science nor
the Whaling Convention
72. Mr. President, Members of the Court, Australia’s case can best be described as “science
fiction”. It is perplexing to understand why it would bring such a manifestly untenable case against
Japan, a case that can easily be refuted by the Scientific Committee’s official record.
73. It cannot go unnoticed in this regard that Professor Crawford went to great lengths to
distance Australia from Sea Shepherd’s violent actions. He explained that “it is of no relevance to
the present case” and that “[t]he real reason for the Japanese Government’s decision to reduce
target catches is . . . the sharp decrease in domestic demand for whale meat in Japan”148. Of course,
147
U.S. Leadership in the International Whaling Commission and H.R. 2455, the International Whale
Conservation and Protection Act of 2009: Joint Hearing before the Subcommittee on International Organizations, Human
Rights and Oversight and the Subcommittee on Asia, the Pacific and the Global Environment of the Committee Foreign
Affairs, House of Representatives, One Hundred Eleventh Congress, Second Session, May 6, 2010, Serial No. 111–95, p.
29.
148
CR 2013/11, p. 20, para. 68 (Crawford).
- 60 once again, the Scientific Committee would disagree. Its 2013 Report recognized that “research
activities were interrupted several times by the Sea Shepherd, which directed violent sabotage
activities against Japanese research vessels”149. The so-called “business model” argument is also
easily refuted as Professor Iwasawa will explain in his presentation. The Japanese chef in the
Tokyo restaurant would tell Professor Crawford that under Article VIII (2) of the Convention,
Japan is obligated to sell the meat rather than dumping it into the sea. The Australian tourist seated
in the next table would add that his Government uses the same self-financing model for its fisheries
scientific research. Leaving these issues aside, the insistence that Sea Shepherd is irrelevant to this
case is rather intriguing.
74. Sea Shepherd’s violent actions have been repeatedly condemned by the IWC and the
International Maritime Organization.
The United States Federal Bureau of Investigation has
labelled it as “eco-terrorism”150. On 25 February 2013, the United States Court of Appeal for the
Ninth Circuit held that the Sea Shepherd attacks against Japanese research vessels are, and I quote,
“the very embodiment of piracy” under international law151. There is currently an Interpol Red
Notice against its notorious founder, Paul Watson, for multiple criminal charges in different
countries152.
75. A quick glance at the Sea Shepherd website demonstrates what is a private army used to
wage war against Japanese research vessels on the high seas, using Australia as a base. The image
before you, and at tab 19-10, is entitled “Operation Zero Tolerance” and refers to a fleet of “four
ships”, “drones”, “helicopters”, and “new tactics”. A little below you will see that this year’s
“Operation Zero Tolerance” was launched from the Australian port of Williamstown, using ships
registered in Australia and the Netherlands. This sample photo, at tab 19-11, demonstrates one
such ship, named after the Hollywood celebrity Bob Barker, attacking Japanese research vessels in
February of this year in Antarctic waters.
149
SC, 2013, para 17.2.2; JARPA II, p. 79.
150
Federal
Bureau
of
Investigations,
“The
Threat
of
Eco-Tourism”,
http://www.fbi.gov/news/testimony/the-threat-of-eco-terrorism, last checked on 1 July 2013.
available
at:
151
Institute of Cetacean Research et al v Sea Shepherd Conservation Society, Opinion, US Court of Appeals for
the Ninth Circuit, 25 Feb. 2013, p. 6, available at: http://cdn.ca9.uscourts.gov/datastore/general/2013/02/25/1235266.pdf,
last checked on 1 July 2013.
152
“INTERPOL Red Notice issued for Paul Watson at Japan’s request”, available
http://www.interpol.int/News-and-media/News-media-releases/2012/N20120914, last checked on 1 July 2013.
at:
- 61 -
76. Now I would imagine that Sea Shepherd would be very disappointed at
Professor Crawford’s suggestion that they are of no relevance to Japan’s reduced catch this year.
As shown at tab 19-12, their website triumphantly states: “[t]his was Japan’s most disastrous
whaling season ever. Congratulations to Sea Shepherd Australia for leading such a successful
Antarctic whaling campaign.”153 Just below you will see a red tab inviting supporters to “Donate
Now”. Minimizing Sea Shepherd’s relevance as Professor Crawford has done is clearly unhelpful
for their fund-raising campaign.
77. It would seem that Sea Shepherd’s influence in Australia is considerable.
In a
22 May 2012 statement, former Environment Minister, Ian Campbell, hailed the fugitive
Mr. Watson, as “one of the world’s greatest environmental activists”. Remarkably, as indicated at
tab 19-13, he admitted on the Sea Shepherd website that: “I was proud to support Captain Watson
when I was a Cabinet Minister in the national government of Australia”154. Senator Campbell is
currently on the Advisory Board of Sea Shepherd, together with other influential Australian
political figures. It would seem that Australia has outsourced Antarctic maritime enforcement to
Sea Shepherd.
78. This brings me to Sea Shepherd’s broader relevance to this case. On the first day of this
hearing, a Sea Shepherd representative spoke to journalists outside this courtroom. He proudly
claimed that the opening of this case “was a vindication of the group’s controversial tactics” in
attacking Japanese ships155.
79. In 2009, Mr. Watson had made what he called “an offer” to the Australian Government
“to take legal action against the Japanese whalers”. He had stated publicly that “[i]f Australia or
New Zealand . . . can agree to take legal action, Sea Shepherd will agree to back off our aggressive
153
“Sea Shepherd Commentary on the Cruise Report of the Japanese Whale Research Program Under Special
Permit
in
the
Antarctic 
Second
Phase
(JARPA II)
in
2012/2013”,
available
at:
http://www.seashepherd.org.au/commentary-and-editorials/2013/06/13/sea-shepherd-views-on-the-cruise-report-of-thejapanese-whale-research-program-613 (last checked on 1 July 2013).
154
“Letter From the Former Minister of the Environment of Australia Senator Ian Campbell to the President and
Environment Minister of Costa Rica”, available at: http://www.seashepherd.org/news-and-media/2012/05/22/letter-fromthe-former-minister-of-the-environment-of-australia-senator-ian-campbell-1383 (last checked on 1 July 2013).
155
Mike Corder, “Japanese Whaling Ban Urged By Australia in Highest U.N. Court”, available at:
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/06/26/japanese-whaling-ban_n_3502842.html?utm_hp_ref=green (last checked on
1 July 2013).
- 62 tactics . . .”156. He had also “urged thousands of Australians to vote for [Prime Minister] Rudd” in
the August 2010 federal elections because he “promised to take Japan to court”157. Indeed, on
29 April 2010, just a month before the Application was filed, an opinion poll had asked whether
“the Rudd government has done enough to stop commercial whaling?” Eighty-seven per cent
responded “no” and agreed that “it’s time for the government to finally take international legal
action”158.
80. Now Australia’s motives for bringing this case may or may not be legally relevant. But
it cannot go unnoticed that prior to this case, senior Australian officials openly admitted that
Japan’s scientific whaling was within its rights under Article VIII. When asked about potential
litigation in 2006, the Environment Minister of the previous Government, Senator Ian Campbell,
endorsed the view of New Zealand’s IWC Commissioner, Sir Geoffrey Palmer, as follows  and I
quote here from the Australian Antarctic Division website, which is at tab 19-14:
“We have been looking at the legal theories that are available against the
Japanese for some months . . . and there is no legal theory that is available that can
prevent, in our view, the Japanese from doing what they are doing.”159
81. Minister Campbell and Sir Geoffrey were by no means alone in this assessment. The
following year, in August 2007, the Australian Minister of Defence, Dr. Brendan Nelson, stated in
the House of Representatives that:
“although we find it objectionable, scientific whaling is
permissible under the Whaling Convention”160. Perhaps it was put best by Australia’s former IWC
Commissioner, Peter Bridgewater, who wrote in a 2012 Opinion Editorial that: “[i]t may not feel
good but the Japanese are largely right”161.
156
“Sea Shepherd Urges Australia to Take Legal Action against Japanese Whalers”, available at:
http://www.seashepherd.it/news-and-media/news-090120-3.html (last checked on 1 July 2013).
157
Paul Watson, “The Sea Shepherd Dilemma Down Under”, available at: http://www.seashepherd.org/news-andmedia/2009/10/06/the-sea-shepherd-dilemma-down-under-293 (last checked on 1 July 2013).
158
Peter
Garrett,
“Whales
worth
more
alive
than
dead”,
available
at:
http://www.theage.com.au/opinion/politics/whales-worth--more-alive-than-dead-20100428-trc1.html (last checked on
1 July 2013).
159
http://www.antarctica.gov.au/media/news/2006/australia-taking-strong-action-to-protect-whales (last checked
on 1 July 2013).
160
House of Representatives, Question No. 5013, 7 August 2007, p. 167.
161
Peter Bridgewater, “Australia's anti-whaling lobby is missing the point”, 2 March 2012, available at:
http://www.smh.com.au/opinion/australias-antiwhaling-lobby-is-missing-the-point-20120301-1u5nr.html?skin=text-only
(last checked on 1 July 2013).
- 63 -
82. So, it may be asked, what new theory emerged from one Government to the next to
justify a case against Japan? As I have explained, this case is plainly not about the scientific merit
of JARPA.
It is about an emotional anti-whaling moral crusade that in the name of “zero
tolerance”, tolerates Sea Shepherd’s violent extremism, the politicization of science, the collapse of
the IWC, and now before this Court, baseless accusations of bad faith against Japan.
83. Mr. President, Members of the Court, Australia’s position on lethal sampling is
absolutely clear. Its IWC Commissioner has stated in categorical terms that Australia is “opposed
to any research that involves the killing of whales”162. Its Agent in this proceeding has said, just
beyond the confines of this hall, that: “You don’t even need to kill one whale to conduct scientific
research.”163 This position cannot possibly be reconciled with the plain terms of Article VIII of the
Convention.
84. Mr. President, Members of the Court, the days of civilizing missions and moral crusades
are over. In a world with diverse civilizations and traditions, international law cannot become an
instrument for imposing the cultural preference of some at the expense of others.
Whether
JARPA II offends Australian public opinion or not, it is clearly within Japan’s rights under
Article VIII of the Convention.
85. That concludes my presentation and Japan’s pleadings for today. I thank the Court for its
patience and indulgence.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Professor Akhavan.
However, today’s sitting does not
conclude with your presentation. Two Members of the Court have questions to put to Australia or
Japan. To that end, I shall now give the floor to Judge Greenwood. Judge Greenwood, if you
please.
Judge GREENWOOD: Thank you very much, Mr. President. Mr. President, my question is
for Australia but also for New Zealand.
162
Verbatim Records of the IWC, 1989, p. 131.
163
Associated Press, “Australia to World Court: Ban Japanese Whaling”, 26 June 2013, available at:
http://bigstory.ap.org/article/australia-world-court-ban-japanese-whaling (last checked on 1 July 2013).
- 64 “What is the precise legal basis on which it is said that Japan has a legal
obligation arising from the recommendations contained in resolutions of the IWC, and
what is the precise content of that obligation?”
Mr. President, obviously I do not expect an answer from Australia until its second round
presentation, but I ask the question now so that New Zealand has a chance to give its observations
and also, of course, I look forward to any comment Japan wishes to make in their second round.
The PRESIDENT:
Thank you, Judge Greenwood.
I shall now give the floor to
Judge Donoghue. Judge Donoghue, you have the floor.
Judge DONOGHUE: Thank you, Mr. President. I have two related questions and they are
both addressed to Japan. My first question is:
“What analysis of the feasibility of non-lethal methods did Japan conduct prior
to the setting of sample sizes for each year of JARPA II?”
And my second question is:
“How did any such analysis bear on those sample sizes?”
Thank you, Mr. President.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you. Japan is invited to reply orally to the question if possible
during the first round of oral argument, and Australia will be free during its second round of oral
argument to comment on the reply of Japan. Should Japan require more time to prepare the answer
to the question, and answers the question during the second round of oral argument, then the Court
will determine the procedure for Australia having the opportunity to comment.
As there is no more business for today, this meeting is closed and the Court will meet again
tomorrow on Wednesday 3 July at 10.00 a.m. to hear the continuation of Japan’s first round of oral
argument. The sitting is closed.
The Court rose at 6 p.m.
___________
Non corrigé
Uncorrected
CR 2013/13
International Court
of Justice
Cour internationale
de Justice
LA HAYE
THE HAGUE
YEAR 2013
Public sitting
held on Wednesday 3 July 2013, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace,
____________________
VERBATIM RECORD
____________________
ANNÉE 2013
Audience publique
tenue le mercredi 3 juillet 2013, à 10 heures, au Palais de la Paix,
________________
COMPTE RENDU
________________
-2Present:
President Tomka
Judges Owada
Abraham
Keith
Bennouna
Skotnikov
Cançado Trindade
Yusuf
Greenwood
Xue
Donoghue
Gaja
Sebutinde
Bhandari
Registrar Couvreur

- 14 -
The PRESIDENT : Please be seated. Good morning. The sitting is now open. This
morning, the Court will hear the continuation of Japan’s first round of oral argument and I invite to
the rostrum Professor Hamamoto. You have the floor, Sir.
M. HAMAMOTO :
JARPA II : SES ACTIVITÉS, SES OBJECTIFS, SES ÉVALUATIONS
Introduction
1. Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs les juges, c’est un grand honneur pour moi
de me présenter devant votre Cour et un grand privilège d’être chargé d’illustrer les activités
scientifiques que les chercheurs mènent dans l’océan Antarctique dans le cadre du programme
scientifique JARPA II dont la licéité à la lumière de l’article VIII de la convention internationale
pour la réglementation de la chasse à la baleine est en cause dans le présent litige.
2. [Dossier des juges, onglet no 25-1.] Monsieur le président, je vous invite à regarder ces
photos. Elles montrent ce que font les chercheurs à bord. Le Japon considère ces activités comme
scientifiques, mais l’Australie ne partage pas cette manière de voir.
3. Nous sommes ici devant vous pour discuter la licéité d’un programme de recherche
scientifique, qui comprend des éléments de chasse baleinière dans l’océan Antarctique. Ma tâche
ici, devant votre Cour, est d’expliquer en quoi consiste le programme de recherche JARPA II.
4. En revanche, je ne tenterai pas d’expliquer comment et pourquoi JARPA II est conforme à
l’article VIII de la convention.
Les professeurs Alain Pellet et Vaughan Lowe traiteront
ultérieurement de cette question juridique cruciale.
5. D’après nos contradicteurs, il y a deux raisons pour lesquelles JARPA II n’est, à leurs
yeux, pas un programme de recherche scientifique. La première consiste en un argument soi-disant
«factuel» qui, en réalité, ne se base pas sur les faits et c’est de cette question que je vais traiter. Le
deuxième argument australien est un procès d’intention pur et simple : selon l’Australie, il y a un
objectif secret et caché derrière JARPA II, objectif non pas scientifique mais commercial. Le
professeur Yuji Iwasawa
«conspirationniste».
viendra
demain
à
la
barre
pour
déconstruire
cette
théorie
- 15 -
6. Sur la base des informations scientifiques amplement fournies dans le contre-mémoire,
notamment dans son chapitre 5, et en réponse à la plaidoirie australienne de la semaine dernière,
j’expliquerai que JARPA II est un programme de recherche scientifique. Et je le ferai en trois
parties. D’abord et avant tout, j’illustrerai ce que font les chercheurs sur la mer. La deuxième
partie de ma plaidoirie traitera des objectifs de recherche de JARPA II. Et enfin dans la troisième
et dernière partie, je parlerai des résultats de recherche réalisés dans le cadre de JARPA II et de
JARPA, son prédécesseur.
7. Mme la juge Donoghue a posé deux questions au Japon hier. Le professeur Alan Boyle
répondra à ces deux questions demain.
8. Donc, Monsieur le président, avec votre autorisation, je voudrais entamer ma première
partie : qu’est-ce que le programme de recherche JARPA II ?
I. Qu’est-ce JARPA II ?
9. JARPA II n’est qu’une partie récente d’une longue histoire des contributions japonaises à
la recherche scientifique sur les ressources marines vivantes et sur l’écosystème marin (1.). Il
s’agit du programme de recherche le plus complet sur les baleines dans l’océan Antarctique (2.).
1. La longue histoire des contributions japonaises à la recherche scientifique sur les
ressources marines vivantes et l’écosystème marin
10. Entouré par la mer, le Japon s’implique depuis longtemps et de manière très active dans
les recherches sur les ressources marines vivantes et sur l’écosystème marin. On sait que les
baleines sont des ressources marines vivantes, comme le disposent la convention des Nations Unies
sur le droit de la mer1 et notre convention, la convention internationale pour la réglementation de la
chasse à la baleine2. Toute utilisation de ressources marines vivantes a besoin d’être réalisée de
manière durable suivant le meilleur avis scientifique.
11. Comme le professeur Payam Akhavan l’a fait remarquer3, la recherche scientifique
japonaise sur les baleines remonte à l’avant seconde guerre mondiale. Déjà bien avant la période
de JARPA, un très grand nombre de résultats de recherche ont été publiés dans une revue
1
Art. 120.
2
Préambule.
3
CR 2013/12, p. 45, par. 23 (Akhavan).
- 16 scientifique qui s’appelle Scientific Reports of the Whales Research Institute, publiée par un des
prédécesseurs de l’institut de recherche des cétacés d’aujourd’hui, ainsi que dans beaucoup d’autres
revues scientifiques.
On ne peut que constater le sérieux avec lequel le Japon menait des
recherches sur les baleines déjà dans cette période.
12. JARPA, le prédécesseur de JARPA II, n’est pas quelque chose que l’on a brusquement
fabriqué à la hâte en 1987. Au contraire, JARPA, ainsi que JARPA II, doit être situé dans le
contexte d’une longue histoire des activités de recherche qu’a menées le Japon au sujet des
baleines.
2. Le programme de recherche le plus complet sur les baleines dans l’océan Antarctique
13. JARPA II, dont la licéité est mise en cause devant votre Cour, est sans aucun doute le
programme de recherche le plus complet sur les baleines et sur l’écosystème de l’océan
Antarctique, au point de vue : des zones géographiques couvertes (a), des navires et de
l’équipage (b), des méthodes de recherche (c), et enfin de la période de recherche (d).
a) Zones de recherche
14. [Onglet no 25-2.] JARPA II couvre les zones de l’océan Antarctique qui sont projetées à
l’écran. L’Australie indique le fait que ces zones correspondent grosso modo aux zones de la
chasse commerciale conduite jusqu’en 19874. Dans son contre-mémoire, le Japon a déjà fait
remarquer que ces zones ont été choisies en vue de l’«évaluation exhaustive» et de l’«examen»
prévus au paragraphe 10 e) du règlement de la convention, c’est-à-dire du moratoire sur la chasse
commerciale. L’«examen» ou l’«évaluation exhaustive» aura lieu pour étudier la question de
savoir si le moratoire sur la chasse commerciale peut être levé. Les recherches doivent donc être
effectuées dans les zones qui étaient auparavant un important terrain de chasse commerciale 5 et
c’est ce que dit le contre-mémoire. Il est regrettable que l’Australie n’ait fait aucun commentaire
sur le contre-mémoire à ce sujet.
4
CR 2013/8, p. 56, par. 5 (Sands) ; CR 2013/11, p. 16, par. 49 (Crawford).
5
Contre-mémoire du Japon (CMJ), par. 4.40, 5.38.
- 17 b) Navires et équipage
15. [Onglet no 25-3.]
Dans ces vastes zones de recherche opèrent un navire-base de
recherche, deux ou trois navires d’observation et d’échantillonnage et un navire spécialisé
d’observation. Sur ces navires travaillent à peu près 200 membres d’équipage. Un ou plusieurs des
chercheurs engagés dans la croisière de recherche participent à la réunion du comité scientifique de
la commission baleinière internationale, la CBI. Ces chercheurs rendent compte des résultats
obtenus et échangent des avis avec d’autres membres du comité.
Le niveau scientifique et
technique de ces navires et de l’équipage à bord, ainsi que leur aptitude à la recherche sont bien
appréciés par le comité scientifique, comme l’a fait remarquer hier le professeur Akhavan6.
c) Période de recherche
16. S’agissant de la période de recherche, l’Australie soutient que JARPA II est conçu pour
permettre la poursuite de la chasse à titre permanent7. Pour répéter ce qui a été déjà dit dans le
contre-mémoire, parce que l’Australie n’a adressé, encore une fois, aucune critique à son encontre,
JARPA II est conçu par phases de six ans et soumis à un examen scientifique périodique en
fonction de ces phases de recherche de six ans. Le programme de recherche sera revisé comme il
se doit, sur la base de cet examen8. Le premier examen périodique sera organisé par le comité
scientifique l’année prochaine.
d) Méthodes de recherche
17. JARPA II emploie des méthodes non létales et létales pour atteindre ses objectifs de
recherche de la meilleure manière. Les activités de recherche de JARPA II sont conduites comme
suit.
1. Trajectoires prédéterminées
18. La zone de recherche est divisée en plusieurs zones plus petites. Une ligne en zigzag est
tracée par chaque dix degrés de longitude.
6
CR 2013/12, p. 45-46, par. 23.
7
CR 2013/9, p. 18, par. 20 (Sands) ; CR 2013/11, p. 17, par. 54 (Crawford).
8
CMJ, par. 5.43-5.44.
- 18 19. [Onglet no 25-3.] C’est le navire spécialisé d’observation qui prend la tête. Il s’occupe
de l’observation visuelle des baleines. Il conduit également des observations océanographiques et
plusieurs autres activités.
20. [Onglet no 25-3.]
Les navires d’observation et d’échantillonnage suivent le navire
spécialisé d’observation. Lorsqu’une ou plusieurs baleines sont trouvées, un navire d’observation
et d’échantillonnage s’approche de la position de la baleine ou des baleines trouvées, en s’écartant
de la trajectoire prédéterminée. Il y revient dès que le processus d’observation visuelle et de
capture éventuelle s’achève.
21. Maintenant, Monsieur le président, permettez-moi d’entrer dans les détails de chaque
méthode.
2. Emploi étendu des méthodes non létales
22. [Onglet 25-4.] L’Australie soutient que JARPA II se concentre sur les méthodes létales
de manière disproportionnée9. Bien au contraire, JARPA II emploie des méthodes non létales de
manière très étendue pour obtenir les meilleures données et informations.
23. Par exemple, l’observation visuelle des baleines constitue une partie importante de
JARPA II.
Elle a lieu chaque jour, pour douze heures pendant la journée.
Les chercheurs
identifient l’espèce des baleines repérées et comptent leur nombre dans le banc. Sont également
décrits et notés, la longueur approximative des baleines, le nombre des baleineaux présents et le
comportement des baleines.
24. Dans JARPA II, le prélèvement par la biopsie et le marquage par balise pour le suivi par
satellite sont effectués, notamment la biopsie à l’égard des baleines de taille large, comme la
baleine à bosse, la baleine franche ou la baleine bleue.
Ce sont certainement d’excellentes
méthodes, qui ne sont pourtant pas des panacées, contrairement à ce que l’Australie semble
soutenir10. Le professeur Boyle expliquera demain que cette allégation australienne n’a aucun
fondement scientifique. Je me limiterai, pour ma part, à des aspects techniques du problème. Il
s’agit de l’impraticabilité de la biopsie ou du marquage par balise dans des zones offshore ou au
9
Mémoire de l’Australie (MA), par. 3.64. Voir aussi CR 2013/9, p. 57, par. 7 (Sands).
10
Voir MA, par. 5.69.
- 19 -
large contre les espèces baleinières qui nagent rapidement, telles que le petit rorqual de
l’Antarctique. Comme le contre-mémoire l’a fait remarquer, cette question d’impraticabilité a été
mise en exergue par le groupe de travail chargé par le comité scientifique de la CBI de l’examen
des données et des résultats obtenus dans le programme JARPN II, un autre programme de
recherche conduit dans le Pacifique Nord-Ouest11.
Dans leurs plaidoiries orales, nos amis
australiens n’ont pas mentionné ce qui avait été dit par ce groupe de travail ou réalisé par le comité
scientifique.
25. L’Australie, qui néglige ainsi le comité scientifique, se tourne vers deux experts qui
affirment que la biopsie est possible dans l’océan Antarctique12. Deux exemples ont été donnés.
Le premier est la pratique australienne récente de la biopsie pendant la saison 2012/201313. Mais,
encore une fois, l’Australie s’abstient de se référer aux documents officiels pertinents du comité
scientifique. Un des sous-comités a examiné la pratique australienne en question le mois dernier.
Selon ce comité :
«As to why this study was so successful while other attempts in the past have
failed, the author [that is Dr Gales] suggested that the use of small boats, operating
close to the ice edge on groups that were feeding or seemed relaxed, had been a crucial
factor; trying to deploy tags on solitary animals in the high seas would likely result in
a low success rate.»14
Et je répète «low success rate». Oui, la biopsie ou le marquage par balise serait praticable près de
la glace, si les conditions météorologiques le permettent, mais il ne le serait pas «in the high seas»
ou au large. C’est précisément ce qu’a déjà fait remarquer le contre-mémoire du Japon15 avec
lequel s’accorde M. Gales, selon le témoignage qu’il a apporté jeudi dernier devant la Cour16.
11
CMJ, par. 4.75.
12
CR 2013/9, p. 22, par. 28, p. 31, par. 57 (Sands) ; CR 2013/9, p. 47 (Mangel) ; CR 2013/10, p. 23-24 (Gales) ;
CR 2013/10, p. 46, par. 18 (Crawford).
13
«Statement by Dr Nick Gales BVMS phD », 15 avril 2013, par. 6.15-6.16 ; «Statement by Dr Nick Gales in
Response to the Expert Statement by Professor Lars Walløe », 31 mai 2013, par. 4.4. Voir aussi Marc Mangel,
«Supplement to An Assessment of Japanese Whale Research Programs under Special Permit in the Antarctic (JARPA,
JARPA II) as Programs for Purposes of Scientific Research in the Context of Conservation and Management of Whales»,
15 avril 2013, par. 5.11.
14
«Report of the Sub-Committee on In-depth Assessments », Annex G, Report of the Scientific Committee,
IWC/65a/Rep1 (2013), p. 5,
15
CMJ, par. 4.75.
16
CR 2013/10, p. 28 (Gales).
- 20 -
26. M. Gales, dans sa deuxième observation écrite, se réfère également à la pratique de la
biopsie conduite dans le cadre de IDCR/SOWER, un programme de recherche organisé par la
CBI17. Mais M. Gales se garde de se référer aux rapports soumis au comité scientifique par le chef
de croisière sur les recherches effectuées dans ce cadre. Selon ces rapports soumis au comité
scientifique, la biopsie sur le petit rorqual de l’Antarctique «s’est avérée difficile»18.
27. Il s’ensuit qu’aucun des exemples sur lesquels s’appuie l’Australie ne contredit la
position japonaise. Bien au contraire, les documents officiels du comité scientifique viennent
réaffirmer la conclusion japonaise que la biopsie ou le marquage par balise n’est pas praticable
dans des zones offshore ou au large.
28. Jusqu’ici, j’ai parlé de trois méthodes non létales : l’observation visuelle des baleines, la
biopsie, et le traçage par satellite. Il y a encore d’autres méthodes de recherche non létales
employées dans JARPA II, comme par exemple l’observation océanographique.
29. Monsieur le président, comme je viens de l’expliquer, JARPA II emploie des méthodes
non létales sur une grande échelle.
3. Méthodes létales
30. JARPA II consiste aussi en études biologiques qui nécessitent des méthodes létales.
31. Lorsqu’une baleine ou un banc de baleines cibles est trouvé par un navire d’observation
et d’échantillonnage à moins de trois milles marins de la trajectoire prédéterminée, le navire
d’observation et d’échantillonnage s’approche de la baleine ou du banc de baleines. Si le navire
trouve une seule baleine, elle sera capturée. S’il trouve un banc de baleines, deux baleines seront
capturées de manière aléatoire en fonction d’une table de nombres au hasard.
32. En ce qui concerne la capture de baleines dans JARPA II, j’aimerais bien attirer
l’attention de la Cour sur les deux points suivants. D’abord, le nombre de baleines capturées, par
exemple 850 petits rorquals de l’Antarctique, est déterminé selon des exigences scientifiques et
17
«Statement by Dr Nick Gales in Response to the Expert Statement by Professor Lars Walløe», 31 mai 2013,
par. 2.10.
18
«Report of the Scientific Committee», J. Cetacean Res. Manage. 11 (Suppl. 2), 2010, p. 47 ; voir aussi «Report
of the Sub-Committee on the Comprehensive Assessment of Whale Stocks  In-Depth Assessments», Annex G, Report
of the Scientific Committee, J. Cetacean Res. Manage. 4 (Suppl.) 2002, p. 192-193.
- 21 statistiques. Deuxièmement, les activités de recherche de JARPA II n’affectent pas l’état du stock.
Ces deux points importants seront discutés en détail demain par le professeur Boyle.
33. Après la capture, l’étape suivante est l’observation, l’examen et l’analyse des baleines.
Chaque baleine est d’abord mesurée et pesée. Les chercheurs font ensuite des prélèvements de
sang, mesurent l’épaisseur de graisse et ramassent les contenus stomacaux 19.
L’Australie,
s’appuyant sur l’avis de M. Gales20, soutient que l’analyse des contenus stomacaux est inutile21. Il
est intéressant que l’Australie se garde de se référer à une étude publiée dans une revue scientifique
à comité de lecture d’ailleurs et citée dans le contre-mémoire22. Cette étude analyse des contenus
stomacaux obtenus dans JARPA pour examiner l’habitude de nourrissage et la consommation de
proie. La valeur scientifique d’une analyse de contenus stomacaux est ainsi reconnue par les
membres du comité de lecture de cette revue. En outre, plusieurs autres études ont été également
effectuées sur la base des contenus stomacaux23. Quant aux données relatives à l’épaisseur de
graisse obtenues dans JARPA, l’Australie soutient qu’elles ne sont pas fiables 24. Il est à noter que
M. Gales montre une prudence remarquable sur cette question. Il a dit jeudi dernier que :
«at this stage there is no agreed evidence that there has been a change in the blubber
thickness itself, that it remains an open question in terms of the statistical tools that
have been used so far»25.
En effet, deux rapports du comité scientifique, cités dans la deuxième observation écrite de
M. Gales26, nous fait remarquer que le comité a décidé de poursuivre l’analyse des données
19
CMJ, par. 4.48, 4.72 ; Cruise Report 2012/13, SC/65a/O09, table 3.
20
par. 4.7.
21
CR 2013/9, p. 19, par. 23, p. 33, par. 64 (Sands).
22
Tamura, T. and Konishi, K. «Feeding habits and prey consumption of Antarctic minke whale (Balaenoptera
bonaerensis) in the Southern Ocean» (2009) 42 J. Northw. Atl. Fish. Sci., p. 13-25, cité dans CMJ, p. 173, note 447.
23
Tamura, T., Konishi, K., Nishiwaki, S., Taki, K., Hayashi, T. and Naganobu, M.. 2010. «Feeding ecology of
the Antarctic minke whales in the Ross Sea, Antarctic», Jpn Soc Fish Oceanogr 74: 46-47; voir aussi Tamura, T.,
Konishi, K., Nishiwaki, S., Taki, K., Hayashi, T. and Naganobu, M. 2006. «Comparison between stomach contents of
Antarctic minke whale and krill sampled by RMT net in the Ross Sea and adjacent waters», SC/D06/J20, presented to the
Intersessional Workshop to Review Data and Results from Special Permit Research on Mike Whales in the Antarctic
(December 2006), cité dans CMJ, p. 200, note 554 ; Murase, H., Tamura, T., Matsuoka, K., and Hakamada, T. 2006.
«First attempt of estimation of feeding impact on krill standing stock by three baleen whale species (Antarctic minke,
humpback and fin whales) in Area IV and V using JARPA data», SC/D06/J22, presented to the Intersessional Workshop
to Review Data and Results from Special Permit Research on Mike Whales in the Antarctic (décembre 2006).
24
CR 2013/9, p. 32, par. 63.
25
CR 2013/10, p. 20 (Gales).
26
par. 4.11.
- 22 obtenues et ainsi confirmé la valeur scientifique des recherches relatives à l’épaisseur de graisse 27.
Il s’agit en fait d’une réaffirmation, parce que le comité scientifique avait déjà reconnu en 1993 que
les informations relatives à l’épaisseur de graisse pourraient jouer un rôle important dans la RMP28.
34. L’étape suivante consiste en la dissection de la baleine pour mesurer certains organes et
en prendre des échantillons29. Un très grand nombre d’échantillons sont pris pour obtenir des
données variées. Un des plus importants échantillons pris à cette étape est le bouchon de cérumen.
La seule analyse du bouchon de cérumen donne l’âge exact de la baleine. Ceci a été confirmé par
deux experts, MM. Mangel et Gales. Je n’ai besoin d’y rien ajouter.
35. Outre le bouchon de cérumen, des tissus d’organes internes sont prélevés : par exemple,
ceux des ovaires et des testicules sont nécessaires pour évaluer la maturité sexuelle et ceux du foie
et des reins pour mesurer le degré de contamination de polluants.
36. Lorsque tous les échantillons sont prélevés, les membres de l’équipage commencent à
«traiter» la baleine conformément bien sûr au paragraphe 2 de l’article VIII de la convention.
37. Les échantillons prélevés sont transportés à un laboratoire à Tokyo, où les chercheurs les
analysent au moyen de différents appareils.
38. Monsieur le président, JARPA II est conduit comme je viens de l’expliquer.
e) Examen en 2014 et données obtenues rendues accessibles
39. Le premier examen périodique de JARPA II aura lieu en février ou mars 2014
conformément aux lignes directrices pour l’examen des propositions de permis spécifiques et des
résultats de recherche30. Suivant ces lignes directrices adoptées par le comité scientifique en
200831, le Japon est en train de se préparer à présenter des données et des informations nécessaires
au comité scientifique32.
27
«Report of the Scientific Committee», J. Cetacean Res. Manage. Vol. 13 (Suppl.), 2012, p. 40 ; «Report of the
Scientific Committee», J. Cetacean Res. Manage, vol. 14 (Suppl.), 2013, p. 66.
28
Rep. Int. Whal. Commn 43 (1993), p. 61.
29
CMJ, p. 167, tableau 4-1.
30
«Process for the review of Special Permit Proposals and Research Results from Existing and Completed
Permits», CMJ, annexe 116.
31
CMJ, par. 4.92.
32
«Data Available for the JARPA II Review Workshop (JARPA II Surveys 2005/06-2010/11) through the Data
Availability Group (DAG) and Procedure B», Annex P5, Annex P: Scientific Permits, Report of the Scientific
Committee, IWC/65a/Rep1 (2013), p. 11.
- 23 -
40. Monsieur le président, la question dont je traiterai dans la deuxième partie de ma
plaidoirie porte sur les objectifs de la recherche.
II. Objectifs de recherche de JARPA II
Introduction
41. JARPA, le prédécesseur de JARPA II, a débuté à la saison 1987/1988. Comme l’a fait
remarquer hier le professeur Akhavan33, ce n’est pas une coïncidence si JARPA a été lancé durant
la saison 1987/1988, c’est-à-dire immédiatement après l’entrée en vigueur pour le Japon du
moratoire sur la chasse commerciale. Les termes mêmes du paragraphe 10 e) du règlement rendent
compte de la nécessité de recherches scientifiques. Le paragraphe 10 e) prévoit «une évaluation
exhaustive» ou un «examen» «fondé sur les meilleurs avis scientifiques». Il s’ensuit que des
recherches scientifiques sont indispensables.
42. [Onglet no 25-5.] JARPA II, dont la licéité est mise en cause dans la présente procédure
devant la Cour, est lui aussi conçu et élaboré conformément aux termes explicites du
paragraphe 10 e) du règlement.
D’un autre côté, puisqu’il a pu bénéficier de dix-huit ans
d’expérience de son prédécesseur, JARPA II est un programme de recherche beaucoup plus
sophistiqué. Le projet de JARPA II soumis à la CBI en 2005 présente quatre objectifs de recherche
concrets, c’est-à-dire : 1) suivi de l’écosystème de l’Antarctique ; 2) modélisation de la compétition
entre les espèces baleinières et élaboration de nouveaux objectifs de gestion ; 3) meilleure
compréhension de l’évolution spatio-temporelle de la structure des stocks ; et 4) amélioration de la
procédure de gestion des populations de petits rorquals de l’Antarctique.
43. Le projet de JARPA II affirme également que «les objectifs de recherche de JARPA II
conduiront en définitive à l’amélioration des procédures de la gestion des stocks baleiniers» «pour
gérer les stocks de manière plus efficace»34. [Onglet no 25-6.] Ceci est évidemment conforme à la
convention, qui dispose dans son article V 2) que : «les amendements de l’annexe [règlement]
33
34
CR 2013/12, p. 50, par. 41 ; voir aussi CMJ, par. 4.18.
Government of Japan, «Plan for the Second Phase of the Japanese Whale Research Program under Special
Objectives for Whale Resources», SC/57/O1 (2005), p. 12.
- 24 devront a) s’inspirer de la nécessité … d’assurer … l’utilisation optimum des ressources
baleinières [et] b) se fonder sur des données scientifiques».
44. L’Australie prétend, dans son mémoire, que «JARPA II ne poursuit pas d’objectif
scientifique»35.
En ce qui concerne les prétentions australiennes portant sur les objectifs de
JARPA II, je me limite à traiter de deux questions essentielles : 1) JARPA II n’a ni d’objectifs
précis, ni d’hypothèses vérifiables, d’après nos amis australiens ; et 2) JARPA II n’est pas pertinent
pour la procédure de gestion révisée «Revised Management Procedure (RMP)».
1. Objectifs vagues ou précis ?
45. D’abord, le caractère vague ou précis des objectifs et des hypothèses. L’Australie
continue à prétendre que les objectifs de recherche de JARPA II ne sont pas scientifiques parce
qu’ils ne reposent pas sur des hypothèses vérifiables36 ou vagues37. Elle affirme également que les
objectifs de JARPA II eux-mêmes sont trop vagues pour être scientifiques38.
46. S’agissant des hypothèses de recherche, le professeur Walløe a remarqué, dans son avis
d’expert, que les hypothèses de recherche sont souvent vagues et ne sont pas forcément faciles à
formuler dans un langage scientifique39. Le professeur Walløe viendra expliquer son avis cet
après-midi. Je voudrais donc me concentrer sur le caractère vague ou précis des objectifs de
recherche ; pour cela, il me suffit de citer juste un seul exemple : celui de programme de recherche
scientifique sur les ressources marines vivantes bien sûr. Il s’agit de IWC-POWER, qui est un
programme de la CBI consistant en l’observation visuelle dans le Pacifique Nord.
[Onglet no 25-7.] Le rapport du comité scientifique de l’année 2012 dit que le comité et la CBI
s’accordent sur les objectifs à long terme de IWC-POWER, qui sont décrits comme suit :
«The programme will provide information to allow determination of the status
of populations (and thus stock structure is inherently important) of large whales that
are found in North Pacific waters and provide the necessary scientific background for
appropriate conservation and management actions.»
35
MA, chap. 5, sect. II, A. (par. 5.35 ff)).
36
CR 2013/9, p. 23, par. 32-33 (Sands).
37
MA, par. 5.43.
38
CR 2013/8, p. 56, par. 4, Sands.
39
Lars Walløe, «Scientific review of issues raised by the Memorial of Australia including its two Appendices»,
avril 2013, p. 5 ; voir aussi Judy Zeh, courriel daté du 31 décembre 2012, lignes 417-431, cité dans la lettre de
M. Koji Tsuruoka, agent du Japon, adressée à M. Philippe Couvreur, greffier de la Cour, le 31 mai 2013.
- 25 «The programme will primarily contribute information on abundance and trends
in abundance of populations of large whales and try to identify the causes of any
trends should these occur.»40
Je vous prie maintenant de prendre un peu de temps pour comparer le premier objectif de
IWC-POWER avec le premier objectif de JARPA II [onglet no 25-8].
[JARPA II] «1) Monitoring of the Antarctic ecosystem: . . . JARPA II will
monitor the changes over the years of various environmental variables, prey density
and abundance, and abundances and biological parameters of three baleen whales: the
Antarctic minke, humpback and fin whales. The obtained data will be indicators of
changes in the Antarctic ecosystem, and the observations and records will have a great
significance in themselves. Appropriate utilization and management of whale stocks
will become possible by understanding how whales respond and adapt to changes in
the environment and the ecosystem structure.»
Comment est-il possible de prétendre que cet objectif de JARPA II est trop vague pour être
scientifique, alors que la CBI et le comité scientifique ont retenu un tel objectif  aussi vague ou
aussi précis ? La prétention australienne est ainsi contredite par la pratique de la CBI, à laquelle,
bien sûr, l’Australie se garde de se référer.
2. Les données obtenues dans le cadre de JARPA II sont pertinentes pour la RMP
47. La prétention portant sur les hypothèses ou les objectifs de recherche mise à part,
l’Australie avance une autre allégation pour dire que JARPA II n’est pas un programme de
recherche scientifique. D’après nos contradicteurs, les objectifs de recherche de JARPA II ne sont
pas pertinents au regard de la procédure de gestion revisée41, à laquelle je me référerai par le sigle
anglais RMP. RMP ! Cela nous rappelle quelque chose… Oui bien sûr, «Japan does not like the
RMP», nous a dit le professeur Sands42.
Cet énoncé, qui a surpris mon collègue le
professeur Akhavan hier43, me laisse un peu perplexe, non pas tout à fait parce que le
contre-mémoire du Japon a déjà dit que JARPA II était conçu et élaboré pour obtenir des données
et des informations pour mettre en œuvre et améliorer la RMP44. Il me laisse perplexe, car il cite
l’avis du professeur Walløe, la page 11 plus précisément, où cet éminent expert norvégien ne dit
40
«Report of the Scientific Committee », J. Cetacean Res. Manage. 14 (Suppl.), 2013, p. 39.
41
MA, par. 5.44-5.48.
42
CR 2013/9, p. 30, par. 55 (Sands).
43
CR 2013/12, p. 51, par. 43 (Akhavan).
44
CMJ, par. 4.165, 5.36.
- 26 point que le Japon n’aime pas la RMP. Mais, heureusement, le professeur Walløe viendra à cette
barre cet après-midi et la Cour peut lui poser des questions.
48. L’Australie soutient que JARPA II n’est pas pertinent pour la RMP45. Cette prétention
ne pourrait être tenable que si l’on ne regarde qu’une seule partie d’un processus entier, qu’est la
[Onglet no 25-9.]
RMP.
Le contre-mémoire du Japon fait remarquer que l’Australie oublie
complètement les deux premières étapes du processus46. L’Australie, dans sa plaidoirie orale, n’a
formulé aucune critique à l’encontre du contre-mémoire à ce sujet. Elle l’a oublié encore une fois.
49. Monsieur le président, cette position australienne, ou plutôt l’absence de position
australienne, est en contradiction palpable avec à la fois les termes de la convention et la pratique
du comité scientifique. On ne peut pas oublier  et le Japon n’oublie pas  le fait que la RMP a
été adoptée dans le cadre de la convention. Comme je l’ai déjà fait remarquer47, la convention
dispose, dans son article V(2) que «[l]es modifications [du Règlement] devront … s’inspirer de la
nécessité … d’assurer … l’utilisation optimum des ressources baleinières». Cette nécessité a été
réitérée à plusieurs reprises, par exemple en 1989, où la CBI était en train d’élaborer la RMP48, et
aujourd’hui [onglet no 25-10] sur le site Internet de la CBI, comme vous le voyez sur votre écran.
M. Gales admet qu’«[i]n scenarios where knowledge is good … catch limits need not be highly
cautious and may, as a result, be higher»49. Il s’ensuit que, pour suivre fidèlement les termes
explicites de la convention, donc pour «assurer … l’utilisation optimum des ressources
baleinières», il faut avoir une bonne connaissance (good knowledge), et en d’autres termes, il faut
avoir des données et des informations aussi complètes que possible. Lorsqu’elle prétend que
JARPA II n’est pas pertinent pour la RMP, l’Australie oublie, à son habitude, les termes mêmes de
la convention, en l’occurrence, l’article V(2).
50. Monsieur le président, la prétention australienne est en contradiction non seulement avec
le texte de la convention mais encore avec la pratique du comité scientifique. De quelle pratique
s’agit-il ? Alors maintenant, Mesdames et Messieurs les juges, je vous invite aux archives du
45
MA, par. 5.5.
46
CMJ, p. 221, figure 4-12.
47
Par. 0.
48
«Chairman’s Report of the Forty-First Annual Meeting», Rep. int. Whal. Commn 40, 1990, p. 18.
49
Gales, annexe 2, par. 14.
- 27 comité scientifique. Une recherche aux archives prend toujours du temps, c’est fatiguant, mais
pour comprendre ce qui se passe réellement, on n’a pas d’autre moyen. Et c’est très intéressant et
révélateur, comme vous allez voir. Je commence donc et me permets d’attirer votre attention sur le
rapport du comité scientifique de l’année 2004, qui expose les données et les informations
nécessaires pour mettre en œuvre la RMP pour assurer l’utilisation optimum des ressources
baleinières. [Onglet no 25-11.] Et voici, à l’écran, l’annexe D du rapport de 2004. C’est un
rapport du sous-comité sur la RMP.
Parmi les membres, on trouve M. Gales et le
professeur Walløe [onglet no 25-12]. Le sous-comité a créé un sous-groupe dont la mission a été
d’identifier «Levels of information required for pre-implementation assessments and for
proceeding to an Implementation». Alors qu’est-ce que les pre-implementation assessments et
Implementation ? [Onglet no 25-9.] Ce sont, respectivement, la première et la seconde étape de la
RMP. Se pose alors la question de savoir quelles informations sont nécessaires pour ces deux
étapes de la RMP. [Onglet no 25-12.] Il faut revenir à ce texte qui j’espère, apparaît à l’écran,
c’est-à-dire le rapport du sous-groupe créé par le sous-comité.
Le sous-groupe a établi des
conditions et des lignes directrices, qui apparaissent dans l’appendice 2 (Appendix 2) du rapport du
sous-comité sur la RMP. [Onglet no 25-13.] Et voici l’appendice 2, qui s’intitule «Requirements
and Guidelines for Implementations». Dans la section «1.1 Information required to initiate a
pre-implementation assessment», vous voyez «(iv) stock structure and movement». Alors de
quelles sortes d’informations a-t-on besoin, plus précisément ? Il faut alors regarder l’«Adjunct 2».
[Onglet no 25-14.] Voici l’Adjunct 2. Sous le titre «Stock structure and dispersal rates», on trouve
genetic data, morphometric data, biological parameters et ecological data. Monsieur le président,
ces données sont obtenues  et ne peuvent être obtenues que  par des méthodes létales. C’est
un fait que le professeur Boyle expliquera demain de manière plus précise. Je me limite ici donc à
faire remarquer juste un point. M. Burmester et le professeur Crawford soutiennent que la RMP a
été conçue pour éliminer le besoin de paramètres biologiques50 et, sur ce point, s’accordent
M. Gales51 et le professeur Mangel52.
Tout au contraire, le sous-groupe considère que les
50
CR 2013/8, p. 24, par. 38 (Burmester) ; CR 2013/10, p. 46, par. 21 (Crawford).
51
«Statement by Dr Nick Gales BVMS phD», 15 avril 2013, annexe 2, par. 13.
- 28 paramètres biologiques sont nécessaires et utiles pour l’opération de la RMP. Ce rapport du
sous-groupe s’est fait approuver par le sous-comité, lequel l’a ensuite recommandé pour être adopté
par le comité scientifique53. Le comité scientifique, dans son rapport, a recommandé l’adoption du
rapport du sous-groupe54. M. Gales était présent au comité scientifique55, qui a recommandé
l’adoption du rapport du sous-groupe. Et, enfin, le rapport du comité scientifique a été approuvé et
adopté par la CBI56.
51. Monsieur le président, je suis désolé mais on n’a pas encore achevé la recherche aux
archives. Et jusqu’ici, j’ai parlé de la première étape de la RMP, c’est-à-dire de l’évaluation
préparatoire. La même analyse s’applique à la seconde étape, au processus de mise en œuvre ou
celui d’Implementation, Implementation avec un I majuscule. [Onglet no 25-15.] Voici à nouveau
le rapport du sous-groupe crée par le sous-comité sur la RMP. Son rapport signale clairement que
la décision d’entamer ou de ne pas entamer le processus d’Implementation doit se baser sur les
informations comprenant «Any data (e.g. values for biological parameters such as productivity and
fishery selectivity)». Je m’arrête ici pour ce qui est de la seconde étape, pour sortir des archives.
[Onglet no 25-9.] Les documents officiels du comité scientifique font remarquer ainsi que les
données et les informations obtenues par des méthodes létales seront certainement utilisées dans la
première et la seconde étape de la RMP. De plus, le rapport du sous-groupe auquel je me suis
référé est reproduit dans le Journal of Cetacean Research and Management, la revue de la CBI, en
201257 [vous le trouverez sous l’onglet no 25-16 du dossier des juges]. Le document s’intitule
«Requirements and Guidelines for Implementations under the Revised Management Procedure
(RMP)». Je répète : «under the Revised Management Procedure (RMP)». Faisant fi de ces
52
Marc Mangel, «Supplement to An Assessment of Japanese Whale Research Programs under Special Permit in
the Antarctic (JARPA, JARPA II) as Programs for Purposes of Scientific Research in the Context of Conservation and
Management of Whales», 15 avril 2013, par. 4.10.
53
«Report of the Sub-Committee on the Revised Management Procedure», Annex D, Report of the Scientific
Committee, J. Cetacean Res. Manage.7 (Suppl.), 2005, p. 79.
54
«Report of the Scientific Committee», J. Cetacean Res. Manage.7 (Suppl.), 2005, p. 8.
55
«Report of the Scientific Committee», J. Cetacean Res. Manage.7 (Suppl.), 2005, p. 63.
56
Annual Report of the IWC 2004, p. 21, par. 6.1.3.
57
«Requirements and Guidelines for Implementations under the Revised Management Procedure (RMP) »,
J. Cetacean Res. Manage 13 (Suppl.), 2012, p. 497-505.
- 29 documents officiels du comité scientifique, l’Australie soutient que JARPA II n’est pas pertinent
pour la RMP58.
52. Monsieur le président, dans la troisième et la dernière partie de ma plaidoirie,
j’expliquerai que JARPA et JARPA II ont produit des résultats de recherche qui sont bien
positivement appréciés.
III. Comment JARPA/JARPA II sont-ils évalués ?
Introduction
53. Comme je l’ai déjà fait remarquer, le premier examen périodique de JARPA II aura lieu
l’année prochaine, en 2014, conformément aux lignes directrices de l’annexe P. Dans cette partie
de ma plaidoirie, je parlerai d’abord des résultats de recherche obtenus dans JARPA, puisque
JARPA II, dont la licéité est en question ici devant vous, a été conçu et élaboré sur la base des
résultats de JARPA, son prédécesseur (1.).
Ensuite, j’expliquerai des résultats de recherche
obtenus dans JARPA II jusqu’à présent (2.).
1. Résultats de recherche de JARPA hautement appréciés
54. Monsieur le président, comme le professeur Akhavan l’a fait remarquer hier, le
professeur Sands nous a dit ce qui suit : «the Scientific Committee … has never never  offered
any positive assessment of either program’s contribution to the conservation and management of
whales»59.
Karl Popper félicitera certainement le conseil de l’Australie pour cette thèse ou
hypothèse qui n’est pas vérifiable mais réfutable. «Never  never». Il suffit donc d’indiquer un
seul fait contradictoire pour démolir sa thèse ou son hypothèse. Et voici un exemple : «[L]es
membres du groupe de travail conviennent que l’ensemble de données du programme JARPA
constitue une ressource utile dans le cadre de recherches sur certains aspects du rôle des baleines
dans l’écosystème marin.»60
58
MA, par. 5.5.
59
CR 2013/8, p. 63, par. 19 (Sands).
60
«Report of the Intersessional Workshop to Review Data and Results from Special Permit Research on Minke
Whales in the Antarctic, Tokyo, 4-8 December 2006 », J. Cetacean Res. Manage. 10 (Suppl.) 2008. p. 431 ; CMJ,
par. 4.132.
- 30 -
Monsieur le président, vous voulez peut-être que je termine ma plaidoirie ici, puisque ma
démonstration est déjà achevée. Mais permettez-moi de poursuivre un peu plus, parce que ma
tâche ici ne se limite pas à dire que nos contradicteurs ont eu tort. C’est désormais quelque chose
d’évident. Ma tâche ici dans cette partie de ma plaidoirie va bien au-delà et consiste à mettre en
exergue que les résultats de recherche de JARPA ont été hautement appréciés. En effet, les
résultats de recherche de JARPA sont cités et utilisés largement par des scientifiques61 et il a fallu
au Japon une trentaine de pages de son contre-mémoire pour expliquer de nombreux commentaires
positifs addressés à JARPA62. Mais ici, je me borne à présenter les commentaires donnés par le
comité scientifique (a)) et par de nombreux Etats (b)).
a) Résultats de recherche de JARPA hautement appréciés par le comité scientifique
1) Le rôle primordial du comité scientifique
55. Le contre-mémoire du Japon fait remarquer que le programme JARPA a été très apprécié
par le comité scientifique63. C’est sans doute la raison pour laquelle le professeur Sands tente de
minimiser le rôle du comité scientifique. D’après le conseil de l’Australie, «the function of the
Scientific Committee is not to provide the peer review of JARPA II»64. Monsieur le président, ici,
il y a un malentendu profond, sinon un mépris aussi involontaire soit-il. JARPA ou JARPA II est
un programme de recherche appliquée. La recherche appliquée a pour objectif d’enrichir les
connaissances scientifiques afin de les appliquer dans certaines activités humaines, telles que la
gestion des ressources baleinières, dont il s’agit ici. Comme je l’ai déjà dit, JARPA avait été lancé
pour obtenir des données et des informations nécessaires pour l’«examen» ou l’«évaluation
exhaustive», envisagé dans le paragraphe 10 e) du règlement, c’est-à-dire le moratoire sur la chasse
commerciale. Or, cet «examen» ou cette «évaluation exhaustive» doit être fondé, selon le texte
même du paragraphe 10 e), «sur les meilleurs avis scientifiques». Dans le cadre de JARPA ou
JARPA II, les chercheurs qui travaillent pour donner de «meilleurs avis scientifiques» ne le font
61
Institute of Cetacean Research, Scientific Contribution from JARPA/JARPA II, décembre 2012,
http://www.icrwhale.org/scJARPA.html.
62
CMJ, partie IV, sect. 3 et 4 (par. 4.90ff)).
63
CMJ, chap. 4, sect. 3 et 4.
64
CR 2013/9, p. 35, par. 72 (M. Sands).
- 31 -
pas forcément pour faire accepter leurs articles par les revues comme Science ou Nature. Ils
mènent leurs recherches pour obtenir des données et des informations nécessaires pour la meilleure
gestion des ressources baleinières et pour les fournir au comité scientifique, qui joue un rôle
primordial dans un examen ou une évaluation exhaustive qui sont conduits conformément au
paragraphe 10 e) du règlement65. Il est fondamental, essentiel et indispensable de fournir les
résultats de recherche au comité scientifique. Ce n’est pas de la science, nous a-t-on dit. Alors,
que font les organisations régionales de gestion de la pêche ?
Elles font des recherches,
accumulent des données et les analysent pour obtenir des connaissances nécessaires pour la pêche
durable. En ce qui concerne la gestion des ressources baleinières, l’importance primordiale du
comité scientifique de la CBI ne peut pas être mise en cause, et c’est donc d’abord à lui, au comité
scientifique, que les chercheurs impliqués dans JARPA ou JARPA II soumettent des résultats de
recherche.
2) L’examen à mi-parcours en 1997
56. En 1997, le groupe de travail chargé de l’examen à mi-parcours de JARPA a présenté
son rapport au comité scientifique. Le comité scientifique, après avoir examiné ce rapport, a
déclaré comme suit : «Le comité note que le programme JARPA est à mi-chemin de son
déroulement et a permis d’améliorer considérablement la compréhension de la structure des
stocks.»66
Ensuite, «La plupart des membres sont optimistes sur le fait que les données du
programme JARPA, associées aux travaux supplémentaires prévus, permettront d’obtenir une
estimation des paramètres biologiques présentant un degré raisonnable de précision.»67
57. Il est intéressant de comparer ces phrases avec le mémoire de l’Australie, en particulier
avec ses paragraphes 5.8 et 5.9. L’Australie fait remarquer que deux scientifiques ont prévu
l’échec de JARPA. Il va sans dire que nos amis australiens se gardent de se référer à ces phrases
du rapport du comité scientifique que vous regardez maintenant, selon lesquelles «la plupart des
membres du comité étaient optimistes.
65
«Report of the Special Meeting of the Scientific Committee on Planning for a Comprehensive Assessment of
Whale Stocks », Rep. Int. Whal. Commn 37, 1987, p. 147 ; voir aussi Judy Zeh, courriel daté du 19 mai 2013, lignes
129-132, cité dans la lettre de M. Koji Tsuruoka, agent du Japon, adressée à M. Philippe Couvreur, greffier de la Cour, le
31 mai 2013.
66
«Report of the Scientific Committee », Rep. int. Whal. Commn 48, 1998, p. 103 ; CMJ, par. 4.159.
67
«Report of the Scientific Committee», Rep. int. Whal. Commn 48, 1998, p. 103 ; CMJ, par. 4.159.
- 32 58. Les deux prochains paragraphes du mémoire australien, c’est-à-dire les paragraphes 5.10
et 5.11, ne sont pas moins intéressants. Le mémoire dit que «l’absence de pertinence scientifique
du programme JARPA a … été confirmée en 1994, lorsque la CBI est convenue d’une nouvelle
procédure de gestion, la RMP …, qui élimine délibérément le recours aux données relatives aux
paramètres biologiques»68 et que JARPA a été lancé «[e]n dépit de l’adoption de la RMP»69.
Monsieur le président, j’ai déjà fait remarquer, en faisant un petit détour pour rendre visite aux
archives du comité scientifique, que cet argument australien échoue face à des documents officiels.
Ici, je voudrais attirer votre attention sur ce que le comité scientifique a dit en 1997, lors de
l’examen à mi-parcours de JARPA. Voici ce qu’a dit le comité scientifique : «Les participants
conviennent tous que les informations [c’est-à-dire les données sur la structure des stocks] sont
pertinentes pour des Essais de simulation de mise en œuvre améliorés et, à long terme, pour une
RMP améliorée.»70 Comment ces données sur la structure des stocks ont-elles été obtenues dans
JARPA ? Le comité scientifique se réfère au rapport du groupe de travail71. D’après ce rapport :
«Les participants conviennent tous que les données présentées sur la structure des stocks, en
particulier les nouvelles données génétiques, ont largement contribué à la réalisation des objectifs
du programme JARPA et des objectifs de gestion des populations.»72 Comme vous le voyez,
Monsieur le président, il s’agit des «nouvelles données génétiques». Ces données ont été obtenues
au moyen des méthodes létales73. [Onglet no 25-20.] Il a été également dit :
«Tous les participants ont noté que les récents travaux par Pastene, Goto et
d’autres nous ont permis de bien mieux comprendre la taxonomie et la structure des
stocks des petits rorquals. Les résultats qui ont été communiqués par ces auteurs lors
de cette réunion et lors des précédentes réunions du comité scientifique démontrent
sans conteste la nécessité d’obtenir des informations complémentaires pour déterminer
la structure des stocks des petits rorquals dans l’hémisphère Sud.»74
68
MA, par. 5.10.
69
MA, par. 5.11.
70
«Report of the Scientific Committee», Rep. int. Whal. Commn 48, 1998, p. 104.
71
Ibid.
72
«Report of the Intersessional Working Group to Review Data and Results from Special Permit Research on
Minke Whales in the Antarctic, Tokyo, 12-16 May 1997 », SC/49/Rep1, Rep. Int. Whal. Commn. 48, 1998, p. 382 ; CMJ,
par. 4.34.
73
74
CMJ, par. 4.82.
«Report of the Intersessional Working Group to Review Data and Results from Special Permit Research on
Minke Whales in the Antarctic, Tokyo, 12-16 mai 1997», SC/49/Rep1, Rep. int. Whal. Commn. 48, 1998, p. 381.
- 33 Les études menées par Pastene et autres75 se trouvent dans la liste d’une annexe du rapport du
groupe de travail, où on trouve également un grand nombre d’études préparées sur la base des
données obtenues dans JARPA76. Les études de Pastene et autres indiquent clairement que les
données utilisées ont été obtenues au moyen des méthodes létales77. «Tous les participants»,
Monsieur le président, «tous les participants» au groupe de travail de 1997 ont apprécié les valeurs
scientifiques des résultats de JARPA. Mais bien sûr, l’Australie s’abstient de se référer à cette
partie particulière du rapport. Décidément, on ne peut pas sortir des archives. Fouiller des
documents aux archives, c’est un travail de fourmi. Oui bien sûr, quelqu’un a dit que les Japonais
travaillent comme des fourmis. On est très bons aux archives et on en est fiers.
59. Monsieur le président, il me reste quand même une chose à dire à l’égard de l’examen à
mi-parcours de 1997. L’Australie soutient, dans le paragraphe 5.12 de son mémoire, que «les
prévisions initiales des [deux experts], qui avaient annoncé que le Japon ne parviendrait pas à
réaliser son «principal objectif», à savoir estimer le taux de mortalité naturelle, se sont révélées
exactes»78. [Onglet no 25-11.] Le comité scientifique, pour sa part, a déclaré en 1997 que : «Il a
également été convenu que le programme fournit des informations précises sur plusieurs
paramètres biologiques (recrutement, mortalité naturelle, abaissement de l’âge de la maturité
sexuelle et de l’âge de reproduction).»79 Encore une fois, l’Australie s’appuie sur les avis d’un ou
75
Pastene, L. A. et Goto, M. 1997. «A review of the studies on stock/species identity in the minke and other
baleen whale species, conducted under the Japanese Whale Research Program under Special Permit in the Antarctic
(JARPA)», SC/M97/3 presented to the Intersessional Working Group to Review Data and Results from Special Permit
Research on Minke Whales in the Antarctic, Tokyo, 12-16 mai 1997 ; Pastene, L., Kobayashi, T., Fujise, Y. et Numachi,
K. 1993. «Temporal variation in mitochondrial DNA haplotypes composition in minke whales from Antarctic Area IV»,
Paper SC/45/SHBa13 presented to the IWC Scientific Committee, avril 1993. 16p ; Pastene, L. A., Kobayashi, T., Fujise,
Y et Numachi, K. 1993. «Mitochondrial DNA differentiation in Antarctic minke whales», Rep. int. Whal. Commn. 43,
p. 349-355 ; Pastene, L. A., Fujise, Y. et Numachi, K. 1994. «Differentiation of mitochondrial DNA between ordinary
and dwarf forms of southern minke whale», Rep. int. Whal. Commn. 44, p. 277-282 ; Pastene, L. A., Goto, M., Fujise, Y.
et Numachi, K. 1994. «Further analysis on the spatial and temporal heterogeneity in mitochondrial DNA haplotype
distribution in minke whales from Antarctic Areas IV and V», Paper SC/46/SH13 presented to the IWC Scientific
Committee, mai 1994. 25p : Pastene, L. A., Goto, M., Abe, H. et Nishiwaki, S. 1996. «A preliminary analysis of
mitochondrial DNA in humpback whales (Megaptera novaeangiliae) from Antarctic Areas IV and V», Paper SC/48/SH10
presented to the IWC Scientific Committee, juin 1996. 17p; Pastene, L. A., Goto, M., Itoh, S. et Numachi, K. 1996.
«Spatial and temporal patterns of mitochondrial DNA variation minke whales from Antarctic Areas IV and V», Rep. int.
Whal. Commn. 46, p. 305-314.
76
«Annex E1 : List of Scientific Papers Arising out of JARPA», Rep. Int. Whal. Commn. 48, 1998, p. 395.
77
Par exemple, Pastene, L. A. et Goto, M. 1997. «A review of the studies on stock/species identity in the minke
and other baleen whale species, conducted under the Japanese Whale Research Program under Special Permit in the
Antarctic (JARPA)», SC/M97/3 presented to the Intersessional Working Group to Review Data and Results from Special
Permit Research on Minke Whales in the Antarctic, Tokyo, 12-16 mai 1997, p. 3.
78
MA, par. 5.12.
79
«Report of the Scientific Committee», Rep. Int. Whal. Commn. 48, 1998, p. 104 ; CMJ, par. 8.75.
- 34 deux experts, tandis que la position japonaise se base sur l’avis du comité scientifique. Et encore,
l’Australie se garde de se référer à ces phrases que j’ai citées des documents officiels du comité
scientifique. La même observation s’applique à l’égard de l’examen final, conduit en 2006.
3) L’évaluation finale de 2006
60. Un des résultats clefs du JARPA porte sur la structure des stocks. [Onglet no 25-22.] A
ce sujet, le groupe de travail chargé de l’évaluation finale organisé par le comité scientifique
en 2006 a dit ce qui suit, et vous le voyez à l’écran : «Sur la base des analyses des données
génétiques et morphométriques présentées, les membres du comité de travail conviennent qu’au
moins deux stocks de petits rorquals de l’Antarctique sont présents.»80 La valeur de ce résultat a
été également soulignée par le distingué délégué de la France, qui a déclaré dans la CBI que :
«Cette information est très intéressante et très importante parce que, de manière générale, ce sont
précisément des stocks qui doivent constituer les unités retenues pour la gestion.»81
61. L’Australie, quant à elle, s’efforce de minimiser cet exploit remarquable, s’appuyant sur
l’avis d’un expert, M. Gales. M. Gales affirme en effet qu’il n’y a rien de nouveau ici, car la
structure des stocks avait été déjà identifiée bien avant le lancement de JARPA82. Il s’agit, d’après
l’expert australien, d’une étude effectuée par deux chercheurs japonais83.
62. C’est un bel exemple de citations hautement sélectives, sinon tronquées. Il est vrai que
ces deux chercheurs sont arrivés à une telle conclusion en 1979.
Et pourtant, l’Australie et
M. Gales s’abstiennent curieusement de se référer à une autre étude soumise au comité scientifique
en 1982, trois ans après, qui a démontré la fausseté de l’étude citée par M. Gales84. Les deux
chercheurs, auteurs de l’étude critiquée, Wada et Nakamichi, ont alors conduit des recherches
supplémentaires pour arriver en 1991 à la conclusion qu’il n’existait aucun élément pour identifier
80
«Report of the Intersessional Workshop to Review Data and Results from Special Permit Research on Minke
Whales in the Antarctic, Tokyo, 4-8 décembre 2006», J. Cetacean Res. Manage. 10 (Suppl.) 2008, p. 422 ; CMJ,
par. 4.144.
81
CMJ, par. 4.145.
82
CR 2013/10, p. 20 (Gales).
83
«Statement by Dr Nick Gales BVMS phD», 15 avril 2013», par. 4.8 ; «Statement by Dr Nick Gales in
Response to the Expert Statement by Professor Lars Walløe», 31 mai 2013, par. 2.18.
84
Van Beek, J. G. et Van Biezen, J. B. 1982. «A review of the morphological and biochemical research on
population identification of southern minke whales» Rep. Int. Whal. Commn. 32, p. 753-758.
- 35 les unités de stocks85. Nous ignorons complétement pourquoi M. Gales se garde de se référer à ces
deux études, mais, en tout cas, ce qui est important est le fait que JARPA a produit des résultats
remarquables à l’égard de l’identification de la structure des stocks, exploit apprécié par exemple
par le distingué délégué de la France.
63. [Onglet no 25-23.]
Maintenant, je voudrais examiner une partie très importante du
rapport du groupe de travail de 2006, qui cite et s’accorde avec celui de 199786. Je ne lirai pas ces
phrases projetées à l’écran, car elles sont reproduites dans le contre-mémoire, au
paragraphe 4.16287.
[Projection : «While not required for management under the RMP».]
L’Australie a affirmé à maintes reprises que JARPA n’était pas requis pour la gestion des
ressources baleinières, en se référant directement ou indirectement à la première phrase de cette
citation. Et pourtant, cette phrase ne conforte pas la thèse australienne. Je viens d’expliquer, aux
archives du comité scientifique, que la RMP se compose de trois étapes et que les résultats de
JARPA sont très utiles pour les deux premières étapes88. Il est vrai que les résultats de JARPA ne
sont pas requis pour la troisième étape de la RMP, et c’est ce que signifie cette phrase soulignée en
ce moment à l’écran.
[Projection : «The potential».]
Ensuite, l’Australie prétend que le fait que le groupe de travail de 2006 emploie le terme «the
potential» «équiv[aut] à un lamentable constat d’échec»89. Non, ce n’est pas une interprétation
correcte. Comme le fait remarquer le contre-mémoire du Japon90, que l’Australie n’a même pas
essayé de réfuter à cet égard, le groupe de travail de 2006 répète le terme «the potential»
simplement parce que la RMP n’avait pas encore été mise en œuvre en ce qui concerne les petits
85
Wada, S. et Numachi, K. 1991. «Allozyme analyses of genetic differentiation among the populations and
species of the Balaenoptera» Rep. Int. Whal. Commn. (special issue 13), p. 125-54.
86
MA, par. 5.15.
87
CMJ, par. 4.162.
88
Par. 50-51. Voir aussi CMJ, par. 4.164-4.165.
89
MA, par. 5.15. Voir aussi «Statement by Dr Nick Gales BVMS phD », 15 avril 2013, par. 1.6.
90
CMJ, par. 4.140, no 578 ; par. 4.161, no 608.
- 36 rorquals de l’Antarctique. Le potentiel reste un potentiel jusqu’à la mise en œuvre de la RMP.
[Projection : «The results of analyses of JARPA…».]
Et enfin, l’Australie oublie, comme par hasard, de souligner la dernière phrase. Il faudrait
peut-être lire cette phrase très importante à haute voix, pour réveiller la Belle oublieuse au bois
dormant australien :
«Les résultats des analyses de JARPA pourraient permettre d’augmenter le
nombre de prises de petits rorquals autorisées dans l’hémisphère Sud sans augmenter
le risque d’épuisement, au-delà du niveau indiqué par les actuels Essais de simulation
de mise en œuvre réalisés pour ces petits rorquals.»
64. Monsieur le président, comme je viens de le montrer, les documents officiels du comité
scientifique font remarquer que le comité apprécie hautement les résultats de recherche de JARPA.
[Onglet no 25-24.] En effet, le président de l’époque du comité scientifique a dit : «La
contribution du Japon à la recherche sur les cétacés en Antarctique est considérable, et je dirais
qu’elle est cruciale pour le comité scientifique.»91 Et qu’est-ce qu’elle a dit, l’Australie ? Et oui,
elle a dit : «the Scientific Committee … has never  never  offered any positive assessment».
b) Résultats de recherche de JARPA appréciés par des Etats
65. Les résultats de JARPA ont été appréciés également par des gouvernements contractants
de la convention. Le mémoire de l’Australie se réfère à la résolution 2007-1 de la CBI qui note
qu’aucun des objectifs de JARPA n’a été achevé92. Mais l’Australie, à son habitude, s’abstient
soigneusement de se référer à la vérité qui la dérange.
Il s’agit ici du résultat de vote.
Le professeur Pellet va expliquer demain les résultats de vote de différentes résolutions de la CBI,
mais permettez-moi de faire remarquer que cette résolution, celle de 2007-1 a été adoptée par une
majorité de 40 voix pour, 2 voix contre et 1 abstention, tandis que 27 gouvernements contractants
refusaient de participer au vote. [Onglet no 25-25.] Par exemple, le distingué délégué du Maroc a
déclaré que : «Nous sommes devant une situation où on est en train d’essayer de pénaliser un pays,
qui s’investit dans des programmes de recherche qui sont de l’intérêt particulier pour l’évaluation et
le suivi de ressources baleinières.»93
91
Arne Bjørge, président du comité scientifique au moment de l’intervention (2008), cité dans CMJ, par. 4.166.
92
MA, par. 5.17.
93
CMJ, par. 4.154.
- 37 -
66. De nombreux gouvernements ne se sont pas bornés à critiquer le projet de résolution,
mais ont soutenu le Japon et JARPA avec enthousiasme.
Le contre-mémoire du Japon cite
plusieurs Etats94. [Voir onglet no 25-26.] Mais pour n’en citer qu’un exemple, le délégué de la
République de Corée a déclaré que : «Le programme JARPA a grandement contribué à la
compréhension de l’écosystème marin de l’Antarctique.»95
67. Il est également à noter que certains Etats qui ont critiqué JARPA en ont tout de même
reconnu la valeur scientifique. [Onglet 25-27.] Permettez-moi de me référer ici à ce qui a été dit
par M. David A. Balton du département d’Etat des Etats-Unis au Congrès américain en 2010 : «Le
Japon effectue bien des recherches scientifiques sur les baleines qu’il capture et est probablement,
de ce fait, le pays le plus avancé en la matière.»96
2. Résultats obtenus dans JARPA II jusqu’à présent
68. Pour ce qui est des résultats de recherche obtenus dans JARPA II, il n’existe pour le
moment aucune évaluation effectuée par le comité scientifique, puisque c’est en 2014 que le comité
examinera les résultats de JARPA II.
69. D’après M. Gales, il a déjà été convenu que les données obtenues dans JARPA II ne
seraient pas utilisées parce qu’elles s’étaient avérées peu fiables97. Le professeur Sands déclare,
quant à lui, que ces données n’ont révélé «absolutely nothing at all»98. Monsieur le président, le
Japon a déjà expliqué les contributions de JARPA dans son contre-mémoire. C’est quand même
beaucoup trop pour être «absolutely nothing at all». Et M. Gales, quant à lui, s’appuie sur un
rapport d’un groupe de travail organisé en 200999. Laissons de côté pour le moment la question de
savoir si cette lecture du rapport du groupe de travail de 2009 est correcte [voir onglet no 25-28]
car, tout simplement, le comité scientifique a annoncé en 2011 que tous les problèmes ont été
94
CMJ, par. 4.152-4.155.
95
CMJ, annexe 41, p. 307.
96
CMJ, par. 4.166.
97
par. 3.6 ; voir aussi «Statement by Dr Nick Gales BVMS phD », 15 avril 2013, par. 5.9, p. 25.
98
99
CR 2013/9, p. 32, par. 61 (Sands).
«Report of the Intersessional Workshop on MSYR for Baleen Whales», J. Cetacean Res. Manage. 11
(Suppl. 2), 2010, p. 502, cité [par erreur technique ?] comme «IWC. 2010a. Report of the Scientific Committee, Journal
of Cetacean Research and Management 11:493-508» dans «Statement by Dr Nick Gales in Response to the Expert
Statement by Professor Lars Walløe», 31 mai 2013, par. 3.6, et p. 18.
- 38 réglés : «it has resolved the issues»100. De plus, depuis 2003, le comité affecte des fonds au
développement continu d’un modèle statistique de prises par âge qui a pour objet d’utiliser à plein
les données sur l’âge et les autres données pertinentes obtenues dans JARPA et JARPA II101. La
prétention australienne est, une fois de plus, contredite par la pratique du comité scientifique.
70. L’Australie prétend que «Le programme JARPA n’est pas conçu pour faire progresser la
connaissance scientifique»102. Henri Poincaré est certes un grand scientifique et pour lire son
ouvrage La science et l’hypothèse, on n’a pas besoin d’aller chez Amazon et payer, car on peut le
lire gratuitement sur le site Internet de la bibliothèque nationale de France. Ce savant français nous
a dit : «On ne doit … jamais dédaigner de faire une vérification, quand l’occasion s’en présente.
Mais toute expérience est longue et difficile, les travailleurs sont peu nombreux ; et le nombre des
faits que nous avons besoin de prévoir est immense.»103
L’occasion se présentera en 2014.
L’Australie n’est pas en mesure de déterminer de manière unilatérale la valeur scientifique de
JARPA II, sans attendre l’examen que conduira le comité scientifique, quand l’occasion s’en
présentera l’année prochaine.
71. Le Japon est bien évidemment prêt à modifier JARPA II si les considérations
scientifiques l’y amènent. C’est ce qu’a fait le Japon pendant la période de JARPA104 et le projet
de 2005 énonce clairement que le Japon est prêt à faire de même105. Mme Takashiba expliquera
demain l’attitude japonaise toujours coopérative à ce sujet. Cependant, Monsieur le président, tout
dialogue scientifique et constructif ne serait possible que si l’Australie acceptait de faire face à la
réalité, même si celle-ci la dérange.
72. Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs les juges, ceci termine ma plaidoirie. Je
vous remercie beaucoup de votre attention et surtout de votre patience, et je vous prie, Monsieur le
président de bien vouloir donner maintenant la parole au professeur Boyle.
100
«Report of the Scientific Committee», J. Cetacean Res. Manage. 13 (Suppl.), 2012, p. 23.
101
«Report of the Scientific Committee», 2013, p. 89, <http://iwc.int/>.
102
MA, par. 5.48.
103
Henri Poincaré, La science et l’hypothèse, Paris, Flammarion, 1902, p. 171, <http://gallica.bnf.fr/>.
104
CMJ, par. 4.110-4.111.
105
Government of Japan, «Plan for the Second Phase of the Japanese Whale Research Program under Special
Permit in the Antarctic (JARPA II) – Monitoring of the Antarctic Ecosystem and Development of New Management
Objectives for Whale Resources », SC/57/O1 (2005), p. 13.
- 39 -
Le PRESIDENT : Merci beaucoup, professeur Hamamoto.
And I give the floor to
Professeur Boyle. You have the floor, Sir.
Mr. BOYLE:
THE OBJECT AND PURPOSES OF THE ICRW HAVE NOT CHANGED
1. Mr. President, Members of the Court, it is a pleasure to appear before you again today,
and an honour to do so on behalf of Japan. You have heard a lot about whales and whaling in the
past few days. It is my pleasure to give you some law and I am sure you will probably feel very
content with that. I have three submissions to make this morning. First, that the objects and
purposes of the Whaling Convention include the “proper conservation” and “recovery” of whale
stocks for the purposes set out in the Convention, and that those purposes include “optimum
utilization”.
2. Secondly, that “proper conservation” and “optimum utilization” necessarily include
sustainable use of whales. Evolutionary developments in international environmental law since
1946 do not alter this conclusion  rather, they confirm it.
3. Thirdly, and consistently with the objects and purposes of the Whaling Convention, as
provided for by Article V of that Convention, the function of the International Whaling
Commission is “to carry out the objectives and purposes of this Convention and to provide for the
conservation, development and optimum utilization of the whale resources”.
A. First submission: The objects and purposes of the Whaling Convention include
“the proper conservation and recovery” of whale stocks for the purposes
set out in the preamble
4. In her oral submissions at the outset of this case, counsel for Australia devoted a lot of
time and energy to arguing that the “exhaustive” object and purpose of the Whaling Convention is
the “conservation and recovery” of whale stocks106. These objectives constitute, in her words,
“ends in themselves in the régime established by the 1946 Convention”107. But responding to
Japan’s Counter-Memorial, however, she said that Australia has never claimed that “conservation
106
CR 2013/7, pp. 41, para. 7 (de Chazournes).
107
CR 2013/7, p. 46, para. 22 (de Chazournes).
- 40 and commercial hunting cannot co-exist” or that the object and purpose of the Convention had
changed since 1946108. You may also recall her saying that: “It is evident that the ordinary
meaning of the terms [conservation and recovery] implies that whatever utilization there may be
can only be sustainable”, or in French “utilisation durable”109. We can only conclude from this that
if conservation may be an end in itself, it also includes sustainable use of whale stocks and even
commercial whaling.
5. Australia’s Memorial paints a more coherent picture. The key argument concerns the
subsequent practice of the Contracting Governments to the Convention. In Australia’s words, this
practice “has committed the IWC to the conservation of whale species as an end in itself” 110. It
also refers to developments in international environmental law since 1946, which it says inform the
interpretation of Article VIII by recognizing “the intrinsic value of all living things”111.
6. Australia’s Memorial had the merit of clarity and coherence, even if it was misconceived:
it provided at least a plausible foundation from which to articulate the object and purpose of the
Whaling Convention and to attack the continuation of scientific research whaling under
Article VIII. Its revised position in oral argument has no such logic. It is at best confused and
contradictory. Is it for or against sustainable whaling?
7. Japan readily agrees that conservation and recovery of whale stocks are indeed important
in understanding the objects and purposes of the Whaling Convention. How could it not agree?
Japan has no interest in the destruction of whale stocks or in unregulated and unsustainable
whaling. It has no wish to endanger the survival of the blue whale, the right whale, or any other
species of whale, nor is it reasonable to imply that it has. The Agent of Japan has made Japan’s
position on that abundantly clear in his opening remarks. So we agree with the proposition that the
object and purpose of the Whaling Convention, as agreed in 1946, was “to establish a
comprehensive regime to provide for the proper and effective conservation and recovery of all
whale stocks”112, subject of course to the special position occupied by Article VIII.
108
CR 2013/7, p. 48, para. 31 (de Chazournes).
109
CR 2013/7, pp. 51-52, para. 36 (de Chazournes).
110
MA, para. 4.118.
111
MA, para. 4.86.
112
MA, para. 2.20.
- 41 -
8. But to say that we are all in favour of conservation and recovery of whale stocks begs two
rather important questions that counsel for Australia carefully left unanswered in her oral
submissions. The first is the obvious one: what for? What is the reason for conserving whale
stocks and promoting their recovery if conservation is not “an end in itself”? I will try to answer
that question in a moment. The second question is more of a lawyer’s one: what do we mean by
conservation in this context, and how should it influence interpretation of the Convention? That
question will be the subject of my second submission. And hopefully you should see the preamble
coming up, yes.
9. The answer to the first question is straightforward. We are not here to conduct a seminar
on international environmental law so we have no need to debate all the possible reasons why we
might want to save the whale or promote its renewed abundance. As lawyers, we look to the
preambles of treaties to indicate the purposes for which the parties have decided to do whatever
they have agreed upon. What do we find in the preamble to the Whaling Convention, you can see
it on the screen, it is also tab 1 in your folders? It talks about “protecting whales from further
over-fishing”113. It notes that “increases in the size of whale stocks will permit increases in the
number of whales which may be captured without endangering these natural resources”114. It
recognizes a common interest in achieving “the optimum level of whale stocks as rapidly as
possible without causing widespread economic and nutritional distress”115. It says that “whaling
operations should be confined to those species best able to sustain exploitation in order to give an
interval for recovery to certain species of whales now depleted in numbers”116. And finally it refers
to the parties “[h]aving decided to conclude a convention to provide for the proper conservation of
whale stocks and thus make possible the orderly development of the whaling industry”117.
10. Mr. President, Members of the Court, all of these phrases point to one clear and
self-evident conclusion: the States that negotiated the Whaling Convention of 1946 were not
113
Preamble, The International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (entered into force 10 Nov. 1948) 161
UNTS 72, amended by Protocol of 19 Nov. 1956, 338 UNTS 336 (Whaling Convention); CMJ, Ann. 6.
114
Ibid.; emphasis added.
115
Ibid.
116
117
- 42 attempting to save the whale “as an end in itself”  the argument that Australia made in its
Memorial and has now partially abandoned. Their purpose was more prosaic: they wanted
exploitation of whales to continue but at a level that would be sustainable in the long term 
thereby “safeguarding for future generations the great natural resources represented by the whale
stocks”. You will note how the preamble uses the words “natural resources” here  a category
that international lawyers normally employ when they envisage utilization rather than preservation.
11. You will note also  and I will come back to this point in my third submission  that
Article V of the Convention empowers the International Whaling Commission to make such
amendments to the Schedule “as are necessary to carry out the objectives and purposes of this
Convention and to provide for the conservation, development and optimum utilization of the whale
resources” (emphasis added). Yes, optimum utilization  those are the words. Conservation and
recovery of whale stocks are necessary in order to promote the development and optimum
utilization of whale resources. That is what the Convention is all about, it is not about conservation
as an end in itself.
12. Australia would have you ignore all these inconvenient elements of the preamble to the
Convention. It would also have you believe that JARPA II may lead to “a total collapse of whale
stocks”118 even though it has offered no evidence of any such risk and its own expert has
contradicted counsel’s more apocalyptic visions119.
Obviously Japan does not support “the
limitless resumption of commercial whaling” to which counsel for Australia referred in her opening
speech120. How would it benefit from doing so? But Japan does say  and with good reason 
that sustainable catches of abundant whale stocks, whether for commercial or scientific purposes,
are entirely consistent with the objects and purposes of the Whaling Convention as agreed in 1946.
They would remain so even when that Convention is interpreted by reference to today’s standards;
and I will develop that point shortly.
13. New Zealand’s position on the object and purpose of the Convention is subtly but
significantly different from Australia’s.
118
CR 2013/7, p. 51 (de Chazournes).
119
CR 2013/9, p. 63 (Mangel).
120
CR 2013/7, p. 50 (de Chazournes).
It makes no reference to any other conservation
- 43 conventions relied upon by Australia. It does not say that conservation is an “end in itself”.
Instead it argues that: “All parties, whether they have a whaling industry or not, are placed on an
equal footing under the Convention because all parties share an interest in the proper conservation
and management of whales.”121 New Zealand then goes on to emphasize: “The Convention’s
objective of collective regulation [which] is in turn achieved by a process of collective decision
making.”122 New Zealand accepts that the parties “decided to conclude a convention for the proper
conservation of whale stocks and thus make possible the orderly development of the whaling
industry”123, but it envisages the parties collectively regulating the pursuit of those objectives.
14. The logical deduction, Mr. President, from its Written Observations is that for New
Zealand, unlike Australia, commercial whaling on a sustainable basis is not per se illegal. Rather,
in New Zealand’s view it is for the parties to decide whether to allow whaling, and how much
whaling, for any purpose, including scientific purposes. Japan does not entirely agree with New
Zealand’s collectivist view of the Convention’s regulatory structure, especially with respect to the
position of Article VIII, but I will leave that point to Professor Pellet to deal with.
(a) Negotiation of the 1946 ICRW
15. Let me say something very briefly about the negotiation of the Whaling Convention.
The 1946 Convention, including its preamble, is based on a draft by the United States124, which
drew on “its experience with fisheries and other similar treaties concerned with management of
shared resources”125. The United States draft “described itself as a Convention to provide for the
orderly conservation and development of whale fisheries”126. Delegates had among their materials
the text of the 1942 Fur Seal Treaty, the 1943 Halibut Treaty, the 1930 Salmon Treaty, and even
the 1946 Great Lakes Treaty127. All of this history was set out by my good friend and former
121
Written Observations of New Zealand (WON), para. 27.
122
WON, para. 28.
123
WON, paras. 25 & 33.
124
“United States Proposals for a Whaling Convention”, IWC/3, 29 Oct. 1946. pp. 1-3, 11-12; CMJ, Ann. 14;
International Whaling Conference, Minutes of Second Session, IWC/14, 20 Nov. 1946, paras. 113ff; CMJ, Ann. 17.
125
P. W. Birnie, International Regulation of Whaling (Oceana, 1985), Vol. I, p. 167.
126
Ibid.; see, Preamble, “United States Proposals for a Whaling Convention”; CMJ, Ann. 14.
127
“List of Reference Material Available”, IWC/8, 19 Nov. 1946; CMJ, Ann. 15.
- 44 colleague Professor Patricia Birnie in her classic work, International Regulation of Whaling128.
Professor Birnie sadly died earlier this year, but she was the leading authority on the Whaling
Convention. With regard to its object and purpose she was uncharacteristically blunt: “Although
its objectives are also directed to conservation and optimum utilization . . . the Preamble makes it
clear that the ultimate aim is to develop the industry.”129
16. The relevance of sustainable use was well understood in 1946. When discussing the
draft preamble, the Chairman of the negotiating Conference explained its intent as follows, and you
can see it on the screen. He said:
“The Preamble . . . points out specifically and primarily that the purpose of this
Convention is to develop a sound conservation program which will maintain an
adequate and healthy breeding stock. By restoring depleted stocks . . . and by wise
management of the existing stocks a maximum sustained yield of this natural resource
can be assured.”130
Well, there is no doubt that the Chairman clearly regarded the Convention as a convention
about sustaining whaling.
17. Australia supported this understanding. The Australian Minister for Shipping and Fuel
explained in Parliament that the Whaling Convention:
“consolidated a number of earlier international agreements aimed at regulating
whaling activities in order to avoid the extinction of whaling as an industry . . .
international action is necessary to preserve the whaling industry, and it is desirable
that Australia should co-operate with other countries in that direction”131.
And you will see that statement at tab 29 in your folder.
18. Australia concedes in its Memorial that “[a]t the time of the conclusion of the
Convention, the ICRW’s objective  the conservation and recovery of all whale stocks  was
seen as a means to achieve the orderly development of the whaling industry”132. So there is no
disagreement about the Convention’s object and purpose in 1946: it was a convention for the
exploitation of whales as a resource, not a convention for the preservation of whales as a species.
128
Birnie, International Regulation of Whaling, pp. 166-167.
129
Ibid., p. 172.
130
“Minutes of the Second Session”, IWC/14, 20 Nov. 1946, p.13; CMJ, Ann. 17.
131
Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debate, Senate, 1 Dec.1948, p. 3695 (Bill Ashley, Minister for Shipping and
Fuel); emphasis added; CMJ, Ann. 161.
132
MA, para. 2.98; emphasis added.
- 45 -
19. Mr. President, that is the background against which the Court should construe the objects
and purposes of the Whaling Convention at the time of its adoption. Yes, of course it was, and
remains, a convention designed to promote conservation and recovery of whale stocks. But it is
also a convention designed to promote sustainable exploitation of whale stocks, however much
Australia might now wish it were something else. In reality, Australia has conceded that point133.
Mr. President, you may wish to break for coffee at this moment, or I’m happy to continue as
you wish.
The PRESIDENT: Perhaps you can continue and complete your first submission. As I
understand you have three submissions to make and you can complete the first submission. Thank
you.
Mr. BOYLE:
(b) Evolution of the ICRW since 1946
20. I now turn to the evolution of the Whaling Convention since 1946. My colleague
Professor Pellet will explain later this morning that subsequent resolutions of the IWC have not and
cannot have amended the Convention or altered its object and purpose. Nor does the adoption of a
moratorium on commercial whaling or the establishment of the Southern Ocean Sanctuary alter
that conclusion.
21. The commercial whaling moratorium adopted in 1982 amends the Schedule by setting a
zero quota for commercial whaling of all stocks, but it does not otherwise amend the Convention
nor does it permanently ban commercial whaling. Neither does the Southern Ocean Sanctuary. On
their own terms they are temporary conservation measures subject to review, and they say nothing
about special permit whaling. They are not there to ensure protection of whales “as an end in
itself”. They both serve strictly utilitarian purposes: they could be repealed tomorrow by a vote of
the Commission.
133
CR 2013/7, para. 36 (de Chazournes).
- 46 22. I also draw to the Court’s attention a resolution adopted by the 58th Annual Meeting of
the Whaling Commission in 2006  known as the St Kitts and Nevis Declaration134. I think your
attention was drawn to that yesterday and you will see it at tab 30 in your folder. You will see one
interesting paragraph on the screen now: quite obviously the States parties who adopted this
declaration thought that the object and purpose of the Whaling Convention was to ensure that
whales are not over-harvested rather than protecting all whales irrespective of their abundance.
23. Australia says that “the international legal regime for the regulation of whaling has
evolved from a system primarily designed to manage the exploitation of a natural resource to an
increasingly conservation-oriented regime.”135 But Australia is really setting up a rather false
dichotomy here between sustainable exploitation and conservation. All of the other conservation
treaties referred to by Australia understand “conservation” to include sustainable use of resources,
not their preservation or protection from use, regardless of the conservation status of the species or
stock.
24. Australia claims also that “the interpretation of the ICRW today is not to be carried out
by reference to the conditions that pertained in 1946 . . . when the ICRW was adopted, but rather
by reference to the conditions and values that prevail today”136.
But the Law of the Sea
Convention, the Biological Diversity Convention, and the other treaties to which it briefly refers,
demonstrate, as I will show, that “the values of today” are those advocated by Japan, not those put
forward by Australia. I will develop that point in my second submission, but before I do that, let
me first make some preliminary remarks about the concept of evolutionary interpretation of treaties
to which Australia makes reference.
25. In the Pulp Mills and Gabčíkovo cases this Court considered how far older treaties
concerned with natural resources should be reinterpreted in the light of modern environmental
norms137. Within limits the Court has been sympathetic to arguments in favour of a systemic
134
Resolution 2006-1, Ann. C, Chair’s Report of 58th Annual Meeting, 2006, p.68; CMJ, Ann. 72.
135
MA, para. 2.125.
136
MA, para. 4.82.
137
Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2010 (I), p.14;
Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1997, p.78, para. 141. See also, Iron Rhine
Railway Arbitration, Award, 24 May 2005, PCA Award Series (2007), para. 59; Indus Waters Treaty Arbitration, Partial
Award, 18 Feb. 2013, PCA, para. 452.
- 47 interpretation of these treaties.
While accepting “the primary necessity of interpreting an
instrument in accordance with the intentions of the parties at the time of its conclusion”, the Court
has also acknowledged that treaties are to be “interpreted and applied within the framework of the
entire legal system prevailing at the time of the interpretation”138.
26. But Professor Campbell McLachlan reminds us in his article on The Principle of
Systemic Integration that “it is always essential to keep in mind that Article 31 (3) (c) [of the
Vienna Convention] is only part of a larger interpretation process in which the interpreter must first
consider the plain meaning of the words in their context and in the light of the object and purpose
of the provision” 139.
27. Now, I am sure that we can all see the wisdom of evolutionary interpretation as applied
in the Pulp Mills and Gabčíkovo cases. But it is an altogether different and quite unprecedented
argument to say that the object and purpose of the Whaling Convention can change so
fundamentally that, regardless of the plain and ordinary meaning of the text, it is no longer a treaty
about sustainable whaling but has become a treaty to eliminate whaling, without reference to any
conservation status of the stocks in question.
28. This argument, Mr. President, has no basis in the jurisprudence, nor does it serve the
needs of “systemic integration” nor coherence in the legal system. Instead it requires us to
reinterpret radically the whole tenor of the Whaling Convention in order to serve the particular
policy objectives of only some of the parties to that treaty. Such a radical reversal surely requires
the agreement of all parties to the Convention, not simply the insistence of a few. And even if such
a radical reinterpretation of a treaty is in theory possible, we would still have to identify some basis
in existing law and practice in order to invoke Article 31 (3) (c).
29. In the present case there are no norms and principles of international law to support
Australia’s evolutionary reading of the Whaling Convention.
On the contrary  existing
international law supports Japan’s interpretation. So, let me then take you rather more closely to
138
Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa)
notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971, p.31, para. 53.
139
C. McLachlan, “The Principle of Systemic Integration and Article 31 (3) (c) of the Vienna Convention”,
54 ICLQ (2005), p. 279. See also Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 2003; separate opinion of Judge Higgins, pp. 236-240, paras. 40-54; separate opinion of Judge Kooijmans,
pp. 253-262, paras. 21-52.
- 48 look at Australia’s central but fallacious contention  that “conservation” of whales, read in the
light of more modern treaties, requires the Court to order an end to scientific research whaling in
the Southern Ocean.
B. Second submission: “conservation” of whale stocks has always implied
and continues to imply sustainable use of whales, not their protection
and preservation from any use
30. That brings me to my second submission, that “conservation” of whale stocks has always
implied and continues to imply sustainable use of whales, including whaling for scientific purposes
and not their protection and preservation from any use whatsoever.
The PRESIDENT: Mr. Boyle, perhaps you will continue with this submission after the
coffee break.
Mr. BOYLE: I will be delighted to do that, Mr. President.
The PRESIDENT: So, I now declare a 15 minute break. The sitting is suspended for
15 minutes.
The Court adjourned from 11.35 a.m. to 11.50 a.m.
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. The hearing is resumed and Professor Boyle, you may
continue please.
Mr. BOYLE: Thank you, Mr. President.
B. Second submission: “conservation” of whale stocks has always implied
and continues to imply sustainable use of whales, not their protection
and preservation from any use
30. I was about to begin my second submission, that “conservation” of whale stocks has
always implied and continues to imply sustainable use of whales, including whaling for scientific
purposes and not their protection and preservation from any use whatsoever. What this submission
will show is that the long-established definition of “conservation” in international law is rather
different from the one suggested by Australia. We can see that if we look at the Court’s own case
law. The 1974 Fisheries Jurisdiction cases refer to the duty of the parties “to have . . . regard to the
- 49 rights of other States and the needs of conservation for the benefit of all”140. But, since the Court
went on to find that Iceland, the United Kingdom and Germany were entitled to share in catches of
Icelandic fish stocks, it is obvious that the Court’s references to “conservation for the benefit of all”
did not imply that exploitation was prohibited or that fish stocks must be preserved for their own
sake. This judgment recognizes the importance of optimum and sustainable utilization. It does not
support Australia’s position.
31. Neither does the other leading case on fisheries conservation, the Southern Bluefin Tuna
case. This was the first case brought by Australia and New Zealand against Japan. They relied on
the high seas fisheries conservation provisions of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law
of the Sea, but also on the Convention on the Conservation of Southern Bluefin Tuna, so this was
obviously a case about conservation. Both States argued that Japan must “negotiate and co-operate
in good faith . . . with a view to agreeing future conservation measures and the total allowable catch
necessary for maintaining and restoring the tuna stock to levels which can produce the maximum
sustainable yield”141. In its provisional measures order the ITLOS accepted that argument and it
referred to the duty of the parties to co-operate “with a view to ensuring conservation and
promoting the objective of optimum utilization of highly migratory species” 142. Whales are of
course also listed as highly migratory species in Annex I of the 1982 Convention.
32. Let me pause here to emphasize the words “promoting the objective of optimum
utilization”  those are the words you find in Article V of the Whaling Convention. The same
phraseology is also used by this Court in its decision in the Pulp Mills case. In its judgment on the
merits in that case the Court emphasized that “the attainment of optimum and rational utilization
requires a balance between the Parties’ rights and needs to use the river for economic and
commercial activities on the one hand, and the obligation to protect it from any damage to the
140
Fisheries Jurisdiction (United Kingdom v. Iceland), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J Reports 1974, p. 31, para. 72;
Fisheries Jurisdiction (Federal Republic of Germany v. Iceland), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J Reports 1974, p. 200, para. 64;
emphasis added.
141
Southern Bluefin Tuna Cases (New Zealand v. Japan; Australia v. Japan), Order of 27 August 1999, ITLOS
Nos. 3 & 4, paras. 28 (2) and 29 (2).
142
Ibid., para. 48.
- 50 environment that may be caused by such activities, on the other”143. The Court’s formulation in this
case is indistinguishable from sustainable use of natural resources.
33. In its Counter-Memorial144 Japan drew attention to the use of the term “conservation” in
various treaties, and I will briefly draw your attention to those treaties and the relevant provisions.
First let me emphasize that none of these treaties have been invoked by Australia in the present
dispute. My purpose in referring to them now is simply to show the Court that they do not support
Australia’s account of how the Whaling Convention has evolved since 1946. On the contrary:
they show that conservation and sustainable use not only co-exist, they are but two sides of the
same coin.
1992 Convention on Biological Diversity
34. Mr. President, the Convention on Biological Diversity fully supports an interpretation of
the Whaling Convention which permits States to capture whales sustainably, and to carry out
scientific research for the purpose of keeping the conservation status under review.
35. Article 1 treats conservation and sustainable use of biological resources no differently
from the Whaling Convention. It provides that “[t]he objectives of this Convention . . . are the
conservation of biological diversity, [and] the sustainable use of its components . . .” Articles 8
and 9 deal with “conservation”, Article 10 sets out in more detail the parameters for sustainable
use.
36. So, while addressing conservation of biological resources, the Convention on Biological
Diversity does not prohibit their exploitation, whether for scientific or commercial purposes.
Indeed it envisages and encourages their use in a sustainable manner145. The underlying idea is that
there will be greater incentives to conserve biological resources where they can also be put to some
beneficial use. In 2004, the Parties adopted the Addis Ababa Principles and Guidelines for the
Sustainable Use of Biodiversity  I will just emphasize the obvious points  refers to the:
“[S]ustainable use is a valuable tool to promote conservation of biological
diversity, . . . provides incentives for conservation and restoration . . . sustainable use
143
Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2010 (I), p. 74, para. 175.
144
CMJ, Ch.6.
145
1992 CBD, Arts. 10-12; 15-20.
- 51 cannot be achieved without effective conservation measures.”146 (CBD, Addis Ababa
Principles and Guidelines for the Sustainable Use of Biodiversity, COP
Decision VII/12, Ann. II.)
37. The Convention on Biological Diversity was drafted in 1992, not 1946. It is one of the
key instruments adopted by the Rio Conference on Environment and Development  it is part of
the basic architecture of modern international environmental law. Article 2 refers to sustainable
use as use “in a way and at a rate that does not lead to the long-term decline of biological diversity,
thereby maintaining its potential to meet the needs and aspirations of present and future
generations”. The preamble to the Whaling Convention expresses the same idea slightly differently
and at greater length  but it is the same idea: resources may be exploited, but only at a rate that
will not endanger longer-term viability for present and future generations.
38. As my speech tomorrow will try to show, and as Professor Mangel accepted in his
evidence147, even if Japan’s current whaling activities were for commercial purposes, rather than
scientific, the taking of 850 minke whales a year envisaged by JARPA II would be sustainable in
these terms, but of course JARPA II is not commercial whaling. It is whaling for scientific
purposes, at a level far below previous commercial whaling. In that context Australia’s argument
is doubly inconsistent with modern environmental treaties. Instead of outlawing it, contemporary
international law promotes the conduct of scientific research as an integral component of the duty
to conserve and sustainably use natural resources.
39. We can see this once again in the Biological Diversity Convention, which necessarily
envisages scientific research148 if you look at various provisions. IUCN’s Guide to the Convention
[on Biological Diversity] makes the following point:
“[a]ccurate information is the foundation upon which decision-making is premised.
Therefore, as a pre-condition to adopting appropriate sustainable use measures, Parties
need generally to gather information on species and ecosystems, their relationships,
146
COP Decision VII/12, Ann. II, para. 2, available at: http://www.cbd.int/decision/cop/default.shtml?id=7749
(last checked on 1 July 2013). The reference is to paragraph 44 of the Plan of Implementation adopted
at the World Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002 which calls on states to “[p]romote the
ongoing work under the Convention on the sustainable use on biological diversity.” Available at:
http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/documents/WSSD_POI_PD/English/WSSD_PlanImpl.pdf (last checked on 1 July 2013)
147
CR 2013/9, p. 63 (Mangel).
148
CBD, Arts. 7, 12, 17, 18. See also CBD, Addis Ababa Principles and Guidelines for the Sustainable Use of
Biodiversity, COP Decision VII/12, Ann. II, para. 2.
- 52 their uses and the social, cultural and economic factors affecting their use.”149
(L. Glowka et al, A Guide to the Convention on Biological Diversity, IUCN
Environmental Policy and Law Paper No. 30 (IUCN, 1994).)
Mr. President, JARPA II is designed to do exactly that  gather information on species and
ecosystems. Far from its true purpose being the continuation of commercial whaling, as Australia
alleges150, JARPA II provides scientific information related to the conservation and management of
whale stocks. I will return to this point tomorrow and develop it in considerably more detail.
40. Let me conclude this brief exploration of biological diversity by quoting what the parties
to the Convention have said about the role of scientific research in the present context:
“Science should, inter alia, provide knowledge on key processes and influences
in the marine and coastal ecosystems which are critical for the structure, function and
productivity of biological diversity. Research should focus on understanding the
natural factors outside human influence, including intrinsic factors influencing
ecosystems themselves, as well as on human interference with ecosystems.”151 (CBD,
Conservation and sustainable use of marine and coastal biological diversity,
including a programme of work, Decision IV/5, Ann.)
41. My speech tomorrow will show that the research objectives of JARPA II conform to this
view of the role of science in the present context. If the Court were to accept Australia’s arguments
to the contrary that would have serious implications not merely for the permissibility of scientific
research under the Whaling Convention but also for research under the Convention on Biological
Diversity or under the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea. We can now turn to
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea and the United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement.
1982 UNCLOS and 1995 United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement
42. Much could be said about conservation of marine living resources in these two treaties.
All of it would support Japan’s position on conservation and sustainable use. It hardly needs
emphasis that the fisheries conservation provisions of the Law of the Sea Convention 
Articles 61-63 and 116-119  refer to “proper conservation and management measures” in a
context that necessarily envisages commercial exploitation  albeit sustainably  of fish stocks in
the exclusive economic zone and on high seas. Even if the Law of the Sea Convention were
149
L. Glowka et al, A Guide to the Convention on Biological Diversity, IUCN Environmental Policy and Law
Paper No. 30 (IUCN, 1994) p. 58, available at: http://data.iucn.org/dbtw-wpd/edocs/EPLP-no.030.pdf (last checked on
1 July 2013).
150
For example, MA, para. 1.8.
151
CBD, Conservation and sustainable use of marine and coastal biological diversity, including a programme of
work, Decision IV/5, Ann., para. 5.
- 53 applicable in this case  and it is not  it does not support Australia’s view of conservation as an
end in itself.
43. The 1995 United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement goes further than UNCLOS by
adopting a precautionary and more environmentally focused approach to conservation and sustainable
use of fish stocks152. As explained in Japan’s Counter-Memorial153, States are required by Article 5
to adopt measures designed to ensure “long-term sustainability . . . and optimum utilization”. Those
conservation measures must protect not only the fish, but also their associated ecosystems, and marine
biodiversity154. This is certainly a more progressive conservation convention than UNCLOS, but it too
does not promote conservation as an end in itself. Its references to sustainability and optimum
utilization look remarkably similar to Japan’s interpretation of the Whaling Convention.
44. Science is obviously integral to the conservation and management of marine living
resources under the Law of the Sea Convention. Not only does Article 238 give all States a “right
to conduct marine scientific research”155, they are also under an obligation to do so in accordance
with Article 239156. Research serves a practical function in this context. Whether on the High Seas
or in the exclusive economic zone, the Law of the Sea Convention requires States to base
conservation and management measures on the “best scientific evidence available” 157. And that
requirement is reiterated by the 1995 Fish Stocks Agreement158  particularly Articles 5 (b)
and 14 (3).
45. Thus, the collection of scientific information is necessary in order to fulfil the
conservation and management obligations imposed on fishing States under Parts V and VII of the
Law of the Sea Convention and under the 1995 Fish Stocks Agreement. But, Mr. President,
Members of the Court, Article V of the Whaling Convention likewise provides that
152
Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish
Stocks, 2167 UNTS 3 (1995), 1995 Fish Stocks Agreement, Arts. 5 and 6.
153
CMJ, Chap. 6.
154
1995 Fish Stocks Agreement, Art. 5 (e) and (g).
155
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1833 UNTS 3 (1982), 1982 UNCLOS, Art. 238.
156
1982 UNCLOS, Art. 239; M. Nordquist et al. (eds.), The United Nations Convention on the Law of the
Sea 1982  A Commentary, Vol. IV, Martinus Nijhoff, 1991, para. 239.4.
157
1982 UNCLOS, Arts. 61 (2) and 119 (1) (a).
158
1995 Fish Stocks Agreement, Arts. 5 (b) and 14 (3).
- 54 IWC regulations on conservation and utilization of whales “shall be based on scientific findings”.
There is nothing here that distinguishes whales from other marine living resources covered by the
Law of the Sea Convention or the Fish Stocks Agreement. You will also notice that the terms used
are “scientific evidence”/“scientific findings”, not “scientific hypotheses”.
46. The need for States to base their conservation and management decisions on scientific
evidence is also expressed in other relevant international instruments. The Code of Conduct on
Responsible Fisheries, adopted unanimously by the 28th Conference of the Food and Agricultural
Organization in 1995, explicitly provides  and you can see the text in front of you that:
“States should recognize . . . responsible fisheries require the availability of a
sound scientific basis to assist . . . [the] parties in making decisions . . . Therefore
States should ensure that appropriate research is conducted into all aspects of
fisheries . . . [and so on].”159
I will come back to the question of what is meant by “scientific research” tomorrow, but it is
already I hope clear that in the context of treaties on conservation and sustainable use of marine
living resources, that concept means rather less than what Australia’s experts have tried to suggest
it means.
47. Mr. President, Members of the Court, I have taken you through all of the relevant
provisions of the Law of the Sea Convention, the Fish Stocks Agreement, and related FAO soft
law. There is nothing I have referred to which supports an interpretation of “conservation” which
is in any way inconsistent with the sustainable use of whale stocks for purposes of scientific
research.
1980 Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR)
48. Let me drive that point home by referring you now to the 1980 Convention for the
Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources  sometimes known as “CCAMLR” 
Australia also relies on this Convention160.
“Conservation” under Article II (2) of CCAMLR
“includes rational use”161. So the CCAMLR Commission for that reason allocates commercial
159
1995
FAO
Code
of
Conduct
on
Responsible
Fisheries,
http://www.fao.org/docrep/005/v9878e/v9878e00.HTM, last checked on 1 July 2013.
160
para. 12.1,
available:
Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, 1329 UNTS 47 (1980), in force
7 April 1982 (CCAMLR).
161
Ibid., Art. II (2).
- 55 -
fishing quotas in the Southern Ocean. All conservation and management measures taken by the
Commission are based on principles designed to ensure “stable recruitment” to harvested
populations of the resources in question and the “maintenance of the ecological relationships
between harvested, dependent and related populations of Antarctic marine living resources”162.
Mr. President, these are also matters that are covered in JARPA II research, as you will see
tomorrow.
49. Mr. President, Members of the Court, here again, even in their own backyard, in a treaty
to which Australia and New Zealand are parties, conservation does not mean what Australia would
like it to mean. But if you were to accept Australia’s arguments on the meaning of “conservation”
or “scientific research”, there would inevitably be broader systemic impacts on a range of other
treaty régimes. The Whaling Convention does not exist in a vacuum.
1973 Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species
50. The final convention to which Australia refers in its Memorial is the 1973 Convention on
International Trade in Endangered Species  otherwise known as “CITES”. Australia has not
argued that CITES is applicable in these proceedings, and again its relevance is simply to show that
it, too, does not support Australia’s conception of “conservation” in international law.
51. CITES, according to its preamble, was concluded for “the protection of certain species of
wild fauna and flora against over-exploitation through international trade”163, but it nevertheless
adopts sustainable use as an overarching element of the Convention. CITES Resolution 13.2
recognizes that “[a]lthough CITES does not have a definition of sustainable use, the case studies
show that the elements of the Addis Ababa Principles and Guidelines for the Sustainable Use of
Biodiversity are either already implicit in the language of CITES or are promoted by CITES”164.
52. Under this Convention, even the most strictly protected Appendix I and Appendix II
species may be traded under various conditions165. In the case of Appendix II species they may be
162
Ibid., para. 3.
163
Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora, 993 UNTS 243 (1973),
Preamble (CITES).
164
Sustainable Use of Biodiversity, CITES Resolution Conf. 13.2 (Rev. CoP 14), Ann. 2.
165
See, CITES, Art. III (2) (a).
- 56 -
commercially traded provided that the State of export has issued an export permit and determined
inter alia that trade will not be detrimental to the survival of the species166. Where the conservation
status of a species improves so that it is no longer threatened by international trade, it should be
downgraded from Appendix I to Appendix II167, or removed altogether from protected status.
Now, Mr. President, the point of this is that none of what I have referred to in the CITES
Convention is consistent with Australia’s assertion that international law has evolved to the point
where “conservation” in this or any other treaty is an end in itself. CITES does not prohibit
sustainable use of marine living resources; it regulates their conservation and protection.
Conservation Conventions  conclusions
53. As all the examples I have just discussed show, there is no contradiction between
conservation and sustainable use of natural resources, whether they are whales, or fish or any other
exploitable living resource. The Whaling Convention’s objective of optimum or sustainable use of
whale resources is fully in line with modern treaties on conservation.
And an interpretation
pursuant to Article 31 (3) (c) of the Vienna Convention supports Japan’s reading of “conservation”
in the Whaling Convention. It also supports Japan’s interpretation of Article VIII.
C. Third submission: the IWC remains a resource
management organization
54. My final submission this morning is that the IWC remains a body whose primary
function  whose very raison d’être  is the management of whaling on a sustainable basis.
Japan accepts of course that over the past 67 years, since its creation, the IWC has rightfully and
properly become more involved in conservation and sustainable use of whale stocks.
The
development by the IWC of the Revised Management Procedure (RMP) is evidence of the
evolution of a more sophisticated approach to conservation and management of whale stocks than
was the case in 1946. Japan fully supports this development.
166
CITES, Art. IV.
167
Criteria for amendment of Appendices I and II, CITES
http://www.cites.org/eng/res/all/09/E09-24R14.pdf, last checked 1 July 2013.
Resolution
Conf. 9.24,
available
at:
- 57 55. What Japan does not accept is Australia’s assertion that the Whaling Commission’s role
has changed from the management of whaling to the protection of whales168. The most obvious
answer to Australia’s argument is simple:
why would the Scientific Committee have put
substantial effort into developing the Revised Management Procedure and continuing to work on
implementing and improving it if whaling is now in all circumstances contrary to the Whaling
Convention? It would make no sense to maintain a programme that is specifically directed at
managing whaling on a sustainable basis if Australia’s characterization of the Commission’s
current functions is correct. You will also note that New Zealand does not support Australia’s
reading of the Whaling Convention in this respect.
56. Mr. President, Members of the Court, the underlying philosophy of the Whaling
Convention, reflected in Articles IV, V, VII and VIII, is to regulate whaling on the basis of
science169. The Whaling Commission was created to pursue the “conservation, development and
optimum utilization of whale resources” in accordance with the best scientific findings available
and as circumstances change over time. And the mandate of the Commission, in particular under
Articles IV, V and VI, is to implement these objectives.
57. As Professor Pellet will argue shortly, the Whaling Commission has no power to redefine
the objectives of the Convention by adopting resolutions or regulations, nor has it the authority to
turn itself into a body devoted to protection of whales per se. The role of the Commission is to
adopt regulatory measures from time to time, responding to the demands of scientific evidence, by
amending the Schedule in accordance with Article V of the Convention.
It may also issue
non-binding recommendations to Contracting Governments. But it cannot reinvent itself as a
wildlife preservation body unless the parties are in agreement on a new convention or an amending
protocol.
58. Nor was the moratorium on commercial whaling adopted in 1982 intended to stop
scientific research or special permit whaling. On the contrary it was intended to allow the Whaling
Commission and the parties time to accumulate the scientific data required for comprehensive
assessment of whale stocks, leading then to a revision of the existing management procedure, and
168
MA, paras. 2.98-2.99.
169
See CMJ, paras. 3.11-3.103.
- 58 -
thereby making possible the resumption of commercial whaling on a sustainable basis. Moratoria
on commercial exploitation, and the creation of wildlife sanctuaries, are standard management tools
for conservation and sustainable use of living resources. You can find them in fisheries agreements
such as the North Pacific Halibut Convention170, and the Northeast Atlantic Fisheries Agreement171.
A moratorium is precisely that: it is not a permanent prohibition or ban aimed at protecting a
species or population per se. It is simply a temporary cessation for conservation reasons, even if, as
in this case, it may have lasted an excessively long time, essentially for political reasons rather than
anything to do with the needs of conservation.
59. Japan takes the view that the Revised Management Procedure adopted by the Whaling
Commission in 1994 is very much improved over previous practice and that it now provides a
template for a sustainable catch of minke whales. And Professor Gales agreed in his evidence last
Thursday that “we have a good mechanism, and in all likelihood, the RMP would deliver catch
limits for abundant species”172.
60. But neither the RMP nor the 1982 moratorium changes the mandate of the International
Whaling Commission into something different from what was agreed in 1946. Far from becoming,
by stealth, a whale protection organization, the IWC remains a body whose mandate is to promote
conservation and recovery of whale stocks in order to facilitate sustainable whaling at an agreed
level consistently with the regulations adopted from time to time by the Commission.
D. Conclusions
61. Mr. President, happily that brings me to my conclusions. It would of course be possible
to prolong this speech by addressing you on the subject of charismatic mega-fauna in international
law or the rights and wrongs of scientific research on animals. But Australia has not made those
arguments and that is a debate is for the seminar room, or the pages of peer-reviewed academic
journals. The issue now before the Court is a legal one: what is the object and purpose of the
170
Article III (3) (g), 1953 Convention for the Preservation of the Halibut Fishery of Northern Pacific Ocean and
Bering Sea, as amended by 1979 Protocol, 2167 UNTS 3, in force 11 Dec. 2001.
171
1980 Convention on Future Multilateral Cooperation in the Northeast Atlantic Fisheries, 1285 UNTS 129, in
force 17 March 1982. See in particular Article 7 (a), which allows for the establishment of closed seasons and closed
areas.
172
CR 2013/10, Gales, p. 29.
- 59 Whaling Convention in today’s world, and how should the term “conservation” as used in that
Convention be defined, taking into account both the law in force when it was adopted, and the law
as it stands today?
62. Australia appears unwilling to accept the logic of sustainable use as the corollary of
conservation. Its own policy is hostile to any whaling by Japan in the Southern Ocean in almost
any circumstances, sustainable or otherwise, and regardless of any scientific evidence. Indeed,
regardless of advice it received on the conservation status of minke whale stocks. Australia invites
the Court to rewrite the Whaling Convention accordingly, notwithstanding that any formal
amendment of the Convention would otherwise require Japan’s agreement and the agreement of all
the other parties. Australia can offer the Court no cogent or credible basis in international law or in
the objects and purposes of the Whaling Convention for the interpretation it has advanced in these
proceedings. In truth, its arguments on conservation appear confused and illogical, out of touch
with the whole thrust of contemporary international environmental law.
63. Let me therefore conclude, Mr. President, Members of the Court, by reiterating that, in
Japan’s view, the objects and purposes of the Whaling Convention remain proper conservation,
development and optimum or sustainable utilization of whale stocks, as New Zealand rightly
recognizes in paragraph 33 of its Written Observations.
The IWC remains responsible for
managing conservation, development and sustainable use of whales, whatever Australia may say.
The protection of whales is indeed provided for in the Convention, but it is not an objective per se:
it is an appropriate means to facilitate sustainable whaling in appropriate circumstances. The
objective of sustainable use of whale stocks is fully in line with the Law of the Sea Convention, the
United Nations Fish Stocks Agreement, the Convention on Biological Diversity, and all the other
modern treaties concerned with conservation of living resources that I have referred to, and that’s
how the term “conservation” as used in the Whaling Convention should continue to be defined and
applied. Mr. President, Members of the Court, that is the context in which it falls to the Court to
interpret and apply Article VIII and I invite you to call Professor Pellet to the Bar to assist you in
that purpose. Thank you.
- 60 -
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Professor Boyle. Je passe la parole au Professeur Pellet.
Vous avez la parole, Monsieur.
M. PELLET : Merci beaucoup, Monsieur le président.
Interprétation de l’article VIII
1. Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs les juges, l’interprétation de l’article VIII
de la convention internationale pour la réglementation de la chasse à la baleine signée à
Washington le 2 décembre 1946 est sans doute l’un des points clefs sur lesquels repose la solution
de l’affaire que l’Australie vous a soumise. Cela justifie qu’on l’examine avec attention. Tel est
l’objet de ma plaidoirie de ce matin  que je devrai  alors, j’avais d’abord écrit
«peut-être»  mais en écoutant mes collègues, j’ai mis «sans doute» et puis maintenant je peux
dire «certainement» - que je devrai certainement poursuivre cet après-midi, voire demain matin,
après le contre-interrogatoire du professeur Walløe et, encore, M. Boyle a-t-il renoncé à disserter
sur le charisme des baleines.
2. Bien que le texte de cette disposition essentielle, l’article VIII, soit limpide et se suffise à
lui-même (I.), je m’emploierai également à montrer que toutes les autres méthodes d’interprétation
auxquelles on peut songer à recourir  et l’Australie ne s’en prive pas  conduisent à lui donner
le même sens (II.).
I. L’interprétation textuelle de l’article VIII lui donne un sens parfaitement clair
[Projection no 1.1 : Article VIII, paragraphe 1, de la convention sur la chasse à la baleine (1946).]
3. Le texte de cette disposition cruciale pour notre affaire se trouve à l’onglet no 1 du dossier
des juges.
Il convient de l’interpréter conformément aux prescriptions de l’article 31 de la
convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités  ce qui veut dire qu’il faut d’abord le lire  «Un
traité doit être interprété de bonne foi suivant le sens ordinaire à attribuer aux termes du
traité ...»  le lire de bonne foi, sans idées préconçues  ces idées dont nos contradicteurs ont tant
de mal à se débarrasser. C’est peut-être pour çà que M. Boyle a eu tort de nous priver de sa
- 61 dissertation sur le charisme des baleines. Et pourtant, quelque sympathie que l’on puisse éprouver
pour la gent baleinière  ces animaux «iconiques» a dit le professeur Sands173,
«[L]e premier devoir d’un tribunal, appelé à interpréter et à appliquer les
dispositions d’un traité, est de s’efforcer de donner effet, selon leur sens naturel et
ordinaire, à ces dispositions prises dans leur contexte. Si les mots pertinents,
lorsqu’on leur attribue leur signification naturelle et ordinaire, ont un sens dans leur
contexte, l’examen doit s’arrêter là.»174
Une lecture, même cursive de l’article VIII (j’en ferai tout de même une glose plus approfondie),
suffit, à vrai dire, à disposer des principaux points en litige entre les Parties. [Faire clignoter les
passages en italiques au fur et à mesure de la lecture.]
4. Paragraphe 1, donc : «Nonobstant toute disposition contraire de la présente
Convention, ...»
L’Australie n’aime pas beaucoup cette partie, pourtant essentielle, de notre
article : quand il a projeté le paragraphe 1, à l’appui de son analyse du «texte de l’article VIII dans
le contexte de la convention dans son ensemble»175, le professeur Crawford en a, curieusement,
excisé l’accroche. Disparu le «Nonobstant toute disposition contraire...»  pfuitt ! ...
5. Pourtant, cette expression est doublement intéressante : d’une part, il s’en déduit que cette
disposition  l’article VIII (en tout cas son paragraphe 1er)  déroge à toutes les autres et doit se
lire en elle-même (le texte anglais est encore plus catégorique me semble-t-il : «Notwithstanding
anything...»  «anything», n’importe quel aspect ou élément de la convention) ; d’autre part et du
même coup, le rôle du «contexte» dans l’interprétation de ce premier paragraphe de l’article VIII
est réduit, sinon à néant, du moins à fort peu de choses. Il apparaît donc que les permis spéciaux
délivrés à des fins scientifiques échappent au mécanisme de la convention : ni celle-ci, ni les textes
dérivés tels que les amendements au règlement, ni, à plus forte raison, les instruments non
obligatoires, ne limitent le droit appartenant au gouvernement contractant d’octroyer des permis
spéciaux. Leur délivrance relève d’un régime spécial, qui échappe au système de régulation par les
organes établis par la CBI. Il s’agit d’un régime spécial réservé par la convention aux permis
spéciaux («spéciaux»  c’est le mot qu’emploie la convention, et non pas «exceptionnels» comme
173
CR 2013/8, p. 55, par. 1 (Sands).
174
Compétence de l’Assemblée générale pour l’admission d’un Etat aux Nations Unies, avis consultatif,
C.I.J. Recueil 1950, p. 8. Voir aussi Sentence arbitrale du 31 juillet 1989 (Guinée-Bissau c. Sénégal), arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 1991, p. 69, par. 48.
175
CR 2013/8, p. 30, (b) et p. 30-31, par. 15.
- 62 le professeur Crawford le voudrait176  spéciaux donc parce qu’ils échappent à l’application des
dispositions contraires de ce traité particulier  nothwithstanding anything in the Convention).
Mais cela ne signifie pas qu’ils ne sont pas soumis à l’application des principes généraux du droit
international177. Le professeur Lowe et moi aurons l’occasion d’y revenir plus tard sous des angles
différents.
6. La Nouvelle-Zélande réduit considérablement la portée du régime spécial établi par
l’article VIII : elle estime que l’expression «Nonobstant toute disposition contraire de la présente
Convention» a seulement pour effet de faire échapper la chasse à des fins scientifiques aux règles
sur la chasse commerciale. Elle écrit : «Without such a provision, a «Special Permit» could not be
issued ; the rules relating to commercial whaling would continue to apply»178. C’est ignorer que
les règles sur la chasse commerciale n’ont jamais été appliquées aux permis spéciaux 179. Du reste,
les règles relatives, par exemple, à la chasse aborigène de subsistance ne s’appliquent pas non plus
aux permis spéciaux. Dans sa lettre comme dans sa pratique, l’article VIII a toujours été entendu
comme soustrayant la chasse à des fins scientifiques au pouvoir normatif de la commission. En
témoignent également les travaux préparatoires du paragraphe 30 du règlement et, notamment,
l’importante consultation rédigée à l’époque par le professeur Bowett180, sur laquelle j’attire tout
particulièrement votre attention et sur laquelle Mme Takashiba reviendra demain.
7. Ainsi, s’il est vrai qu’à d’autres points de vue la convention a établi un mécanisme de
régulation de la chasse à la baleine, celui-ci n’affecte pas le droit des Etats d’autoriser la prise de
baleines à des fins scientifiques, dans les conditions laissées à leur appréciation. Comme l’a
expliqué de manière limpide la ministre norvégienne des pêches et des affaires côtières, dans une
réponse récente à une question parlementaire :
«The terms of Article VIII are unambiguous. The decision-making powers in
this matter rest with the State party concerned. As opposed to other mechanisms
176
Voir CR 2013/8, p. 28, par. 5, et p. 29, par. 8 (Crawford).
177
Voir CR 2013/7, p. 20-21 (Campbell).
178
WON, par. 39.
179
Voir ci-dessous par. 64 et le tableau statistique inclus dans la Circular Communication to Commissioners and
Contracting Governments, 5 janvier 1987, RG/VJH/16365 (annexe 3 à la réponse du Japon sur les observations écrites de
la Nouvelle-Zélande, 31 mai 2013).
180
Derek Bowett, «Legal Opinion on Schedule Provision for Prior Review of Scientific Permits and Prohibition
of Whaling by Operations Failing to Supply All Data Stipulated», IWC/31/9 (CMJ, annexe 78).
- 63 under the 1946 Convention, the taking of whales for scientific purposes is therefore
not the object of multilateral decision-making in the International Whaling
Commission or other Convention organs»181.
8. Je continue la lecture cursive de l’article VIII : « ... chaque Gouvernement contractant
pourra accorder à ses ressortissants un permis spécial...» ou, en anglais, qui est la langue originale,
«any Contracting Government may grant to any of its nationals a special permit,…». L’indicatif
futur de la traduction : «pourra» confirme la faculté ouverte par le mot «may» dans le texte
anglais ; il en va de même, plus loin, de l’insistance mise sur la compétence du Gouvernement pour
prescrire restrictions et conditions éventuelles. C’est donc bien un pouvoir discrétionnaire que
l’article VIII reconnaît aux Etats parties. Sur ce point, la Nouvelle-Zélande affiche une position
similaire à celle du Japon182. La CBI, pas davantage qu’aucun des organes subsidiaires de la
convention, y compris le comité scientifique, n’a pas compétence pour autoriser les permis
spéciaux qui sont délivrés en vertu de ce pouvoir ; elle ne peut ni les restreindre, ni les annuler.
9. Le permis spécial est défini comme « ... autorisant [son bénéficiaire] à tuer, capturer et
traiter des baleines en vue de recherches scientifiques, ...» On ne saurait dire plus clairement que le
recours à des moyens létaux est autorisé par la convention dans le cadre des recherches
scientifiques, dès lors qu’un gouvernement accorde un permis spécial.
10. Cette autorisation peut cependant, « ... être subordonnée aux restrictions, en ce qui
concerne le nombre, et à telles autres conditions que le Gouvernement contractant jugera
opportunes». Donc, c’est clair aussi : c’est au seul gouvernement contractant qu’il appartient de
fixer les restrictions quant au nombre de baleines tuées ou traitées selon ce qu’il juge
opportun  as it thinks fit. Et cette formule va très au-delà du «certain pouvoir d’appréciation»
(«some discretion in the setting of those conditions») que concède la Nouvelle-Zélande183. Ceci
contraste de manière très frappante avec la compétence que l’article V, paragrahe 1 e) de la
convention reconnaît à la CBI pour fixer «l’époque, les méthodes et l’intensité des opérations de
chasse (y compris le nombre maximum de prises autorisées pendant une saison donnée)» s’agissant
de la chasse commerciale, ou avec celle qu’exerce la CBI pour la chasse aborigène de subsistance
181
Written question from Terje Aasland (A) to the Minister of Fisheries and Coastal Affairs, Answered:
20 June 2013 by the Minister of Fisheries and Coastal Affairs, Lisbeth Berg-Hansen, disponible en ligne:
182
OEN, par. 38.
183
OEN, par. 40 (les italiques sont de nous).
- 64 -
conformément au paragraphe 13 du règlement. Les auteurs de la convention ont donc considéré
que les Etats membres étaient seuls à même  parce que les mieux à même  d’apprécier
l’opportunité et les conditions pour l’octroi des permis scientifiques ; c’est que, comme l’a souligné
la Cour permanente :
«[T]oute attribution législative comporte généralement la faculté discrétionnaire
d’apprécier la nécessité et l’urgence de son exercice ... Il s’agit de l’appréciation
d’éléments de politique et de fait, à laquelle seul le gouvernement, possédant une
connaissance suffisante de la situation..., est à même de procéder ;»184
11. «[D]ans ce cas [je parle des permis spéciaux], les baleines  je continue ma lecture 
pourront être tuées, capturées ou traitées sans qu’il y ait lieu de se conformer aux dispositions de la
présente Convention.» Ceci  que le professeur Crawford n’a pas non plus jugé utile de projeter,
ni même de mentionner  est la conséquence logique de tout ce qui précède ; et cette conclusion
renforce la proposition initiale : tout ceci est «[n]onobstant toute disposition contraire de
la ... convention» [«[n]otwithstanding anything contained in [the] Convention»].
12. Bien que moins fondamentale, la suite de cette disposition clef n’en apporte pas moins
quelques précisions pertinentes aux fins du présent litige.
13. «Chaque gouvernement contractant devra porter immédiatement à la connaissance de la
commission toutes les autorisations de cette nature qu’il aura accordées» ; il s’agit d’une obligation
pure et simple de notification  que le Gouvernement japonais a toujours scrupuleusement
respectée.
14. On peut aussi noter au passage que c’est aux seuls gouvernements contractants qu’est
reconnu le droit inconditionnel de révocation du permis octroyé.
15. Le paragraphe 2 est moins anodin qu’il y paraît : «Dans toute la mesure du possible, les
baleines capturées en vertu de ces permis spéciaux devront être traitées conformément aux
directives formulées par le gouvernement qui aura délivré le permis, lesquelles s’appliqueront
également à l’utilisation des produits obtenus». Il en résulte que la commercialisation des baleines
ainsi traitées ne saurait être contraire à la convention en dépit de ce que prétend l’Australie185. Il y
184
Affaire franco-hellénique des phares, arrêt, 1934, C.P.J.I. série A/B no 62, p. 22.
185
MA, par. 5.113-5.117, 5.119, 6.8-6.9.
- 65 -
a là non seulement un droit, mais bien une obligation, de ne pas gaspiller la viande des baleines
chassées. Et l’expression «dans toute la mesure du possible» ne diminue en rien le caractère
obligatoire de cette prescription, tout en mettant, elle aussi, en lumière le pouvoir d’appréciation
laissé aux gouvernements, auxquels il appartient d’apprécier cette mesure.
16. Le paragraphe 3 impose au gouvernement concerné de transmettre à un organisme
désigné par la commission  en l’espèce le comité scientifique  les informations scientifiques
dont il dispose  y compris en application du paragraphe 1er de l’article VIII. Le Japon s’est
également toujours scrupuleusement acquitté de cette obligation, qui ne pèse, au demeurant, sur les
Parties que «dans toute la mesure du possible». Il est en tout cas assez absurde d’interpréter cette
disposition comme conférant à la CBI «the authority to determine the proper scope and application
of the special permit exception under Article VIII»186. «L’obligation de notifier est destinée, selon
la Cour, à créer les conditions d’une coopération fructueuse entre les Parties ...»187, rien de plus.
17. Et c’est en cela que l’article VIII fait partie intégrante du système de la
convention  non pas, comme le prétend la Nouvelle-Zélande188, en soumettant la chasse à des
fins scientifiques au mécanisme de régulation «de droit commun», mais en obligeant les Etats
contractants à fournir l’information scientifique qui doit être à la base, qui doit être à la base, des
recommandations de la commission relatives à la gestion des stocks. Cette obligation d’informer
est le seul élément de «régulation collective» introduit dans la convention s’agissant de la chasse à
des fins scientifiques.
18. Il a d’ailleurs toujours été entendu que les Etats, tout en se soumettant à l’obligation
d’information et de dialogue prévue par le paragraphe 3 de l’article VIII, n’entendaient pas
abdiquer leurs droits souverains tels que les paragraphes 1 et 2 les reconnaissent. Ainsi, dès 1957,
en réponse à un mémorandum norvégien recommandant que les gouvernements donnent des détails
sur les recherches effectuées en vertu de permis spéciaux, le sous-comité scientifique a souligné :
186
187
MA, p. 146, par. 4.19.
Usines de pâte à papier sur le fleuve Uruguay (Argentine c. Uruguay), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2010, p. 58,
par. 113.
188
OEN, par. 7, 37, 43, 90-93.
- 66 «These recommendations should not interfere with the objects sought to be
achieved by the issue of permits and they would of course not involve any alteration of
Article VIII of the Convention, which could only be achieved by the issue of a
Protocol.»189
19. Le paragraphe 4 de l’article VIII enfin est intéressant en ce qu’il impose (il ne
recommande pas  il impose : «il est indispensable ...») aux gouvernements contractants de
recueillir et d’analyser d’une manière continue les données biologiques. Et dans un but précis :
«pour assurer une gestion saine et profitable de l’industrie baleinière». Cette disposition reflète
toute l’économie de la convention, dont l’objectif est d’assurer une chasse durable sans
compromettre le renouvellement des stocks des différentes espèces de baleines190, comme
le professeur Boyle l’a établi il y a quelques instants.
Le paragraphe 4 de l’article VIII est
important aussi en ce qu’il fait le lien entre la recherche scientifique (biologique) et la chasse
commerciale réglementée par la CBI, qui doit se fonder notamment sur l’information scientifique
recueillie par les Etats dans le cadre de leurs activités sur la base de l’article VIII.
20. Les dispositions du paragraphe 4 peuvent être décomposées en deux éléments. En
premier lieu, il reconnaît qu’il est indispensable de recueillir et analyser de manière continue
(«constamment») les données biologiques obtenues à l’occasion des opérations de chasse  et je
dis bien (ou je lis bien !) : «constamment» («continuously») ; le mot «constamment» est dans la
convention, même si le professeur Crawford, qui a décidément une lecture bien sélective de
l’article VIII, l’oublie également191. En second lieu, le paragraphe 4 impose aux gouvernements
contractants l’obligation de prendre toutes les mesures disponibles pour obtenir de telles données.
Il va de soi que cette nécessité et cette obligation s’imposent avec une force particulière lorsqu’un
moratoire (par définition, une suspension provisoire) sur la chasse commerciale a été décrété,
puisqu’il en résulte l’indisponibilité (qui doit être temporaire) des données résultant de la chasse
commerciale.
21. On a d’ailleurs souligné très tôt les difficultés soulevées par l’instauration du moratoire et
la nécessité de programmes de recherche susceptibles d’informer la commission sur l’état des
189
Huitième Rapport annuel de la CBI, 1957, p. 26-27 (les italiques sont de nous) ; voir aussi, ci-dessous, par. 46.
190
Voir les alinéas 3 et 4 du préambule.
191
CR 2013/8, p. 30, par. 12-14 (Crawford).
- 67 différents stocks de baleines du fait qu’il en résultait (qu’il résultait du moratoire) une diminution
considérable de l’information disponible192.
22. Ainsi, sous les seules réserves, peu contraignantes, d’obligations de notification et de
communication sur lesquelles reviendra le professeur Boyle, les gouvernements des Etats parties à
la convention de 1946 sont en droit d’accorder des permis spéciaux de chasse à la baleine à des fins
de recherche scientifique dans les conditions qu’ils déterminent librement (y compris quant au
nombre de baleines concernées), et ceci nonobstant toute disposition éventuellement contraire de la
convention.
Et le produit de cette chasse peut  que dis-je «peut» ? : «doit»  être utilisé
conformément aux instructions gouvernementales, y compris en étant mis sur le marché, pour
permettre le financement de recherches ultérieures  le professeur Iwasawa reviendra plus
longuement sur cet aspect demain.
[Projection no 2 : CBI  Manuel du comité scientifique.]
23. Cette interprétation est confirmée par celle que l’on pouvait trouver encore tout
récemment sur le site Internet officiel de la commission baleinière internationale (CBI)193 ; cet
intéressant document - que l’on peut toujours trouver mais en fouillant beaucoup - figure sous
l’onglet no 40 de votre dossier :
«Le droit de ... délivrer [des permis scientifiques] est consacré par l’article VIII
de la convention de 1946. Si les pays membres doivent soumettre des propositions à
l’examen, conformément à la convention, c’est le pays membre [j’insiste, c’est le pays
membre] qui décide en dernier ressort de l’opportunité de délivrer un permis et ce
droit prime sur les autres règlements de la commission, y compris le moratoire et les
sanctuaires»194.
La commission précisait en outre que «[l]’article VIII exige ... que les animaux soient utilisés une
fois les données scientifiques collectées»195. Et les rapports de la CBI confirment ceci en tout
cas196.
Voir, par exemple, le 38e Rapport annuel de la CBI, 1988, p. 11 (URSS). Voir aussi CR 2013/ ??  JARPA II
draft [SH], par. 12 A.V. ; «JARPA II is conducted «for purposes of scientific research» and causes no harm to whale
stocks» [AEB], par. 56 A.V.
192
193
http://iwc.int/scientific-committee-handbook (consulté le 2 juillet 2013).
194
http://iwcoffice.org/permits-fr (consulté le 28 octobre 2012 ; les italiques sont de nous).
195
Ibid.
196
Voir CBI., Rapport annuel, 2002, p. 2 ; Rapport annuel, 2005, p. 36 ; ou Rapport annuel, 2006, p. 30.
- 68 -
[Fin de la projection n° 2.]
24. À vrai dire, Monsieur le président, je pourrais presque m’arrêter là : CQFD. Mais ne
vous réjouissez pas trop tôt, Mesdames et Messieurs de la Cour : il me faut justifier mes honoraires
et surtout la confiance du Gouvernement japonais  et réfuter tout de même l’interprétation
contra scriptum que l’Australie voudrait vous convaincre d’accepter.
Je précise d’emblée
cependant que c’est seulement dans le souci de ne laisser aucun argument australien sans réponse
que j’examinerai le contexte de l’article VIII  que son texte même invite à écarter aux fins de son
interprétation nonobstant toute disposition contraire.
Même remarque au sujet des «autres
méthodes d’interprétation», comme le recours aux travaux préparatoires ou à la pratique ultérieure
des Parties. Comme le précisent les articles 31 et 32 de la convention sur le droit des traités et
comme la Cour l’a souligné, il n’y a lieu de recourir à ces méthodes subsidiaires d’interprétation
que si, et seulement si, ces «mots, lorsqu’on leur attribue leur signification naturelle et ordinaire,
sont équivoques ou conduisent à des résultats déraisonnables»197. Les mots de l’article VIII ne sont
pas équivoques et leur «signification naturelle et ordinaire» ne conduit à aucun résultat
déraisonnable.
II. Les autres méthodes d’interprétation confirment
la signification limpide de l’article VIII
25.
Il
n’est
donc,
Interpretatio cessat in claris198.
Monsieur
le
président,
nul
besoin
d’aller
plus
loin :
Selon la célèbre formule de la Cour dans l’affaire de
l’Interprétation des traités de paix, elle «est appelée à interpréter les traités, non à les reviser»199.
197
Compétence de l’Assemblée générale pour l’admission d’un Etat aux Nations Unies, avis consultatif,
C.I.J. Recueil 1950, p. 8. Voir aussi Sentence arbitrale du 31 juillet 1989 (Guinée-Bissau c. Sénégal), arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 1991, p. 69-70, par. 49 ; ou Interprétation des traités de paix conclus avec la Bulgarie, la Hongrie et la
Roumanie, deuxième phase, avis consultatif, C.I.J. Recueil 1950, p. 229
198
Lotus, arrêt no 9, 1927, C.P.J.I. série A no 10 p. 16 ; Interprétation du statut du territoire de Memel, fond,
arrêt, 1932, C.P.J.I. série A/B no 49, p. 294 ; Différend territorial (Jamahiriya arabe libyenne/Tchad), arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 1994, p. 25,par. 51 ; ou LaGrand (Allemagne c. Etats-Unis d’Amérique), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2001, p. 494,
par. 77.
199
Interprétation des traités de paix conclus avec la Bulgarie, la Hongrie et la Roumanie, deuxième phase, avis
consultatif, C.I.J. Recueil 1950, p. 229 ; voir aussi : Acquisition de la nationalité polonaise, avis consultatif, 1923,
C.P.J.I. série B no 7, p. 20 ; Droits des ressortissants des Etats-Unis d’Amérique au Maroc (France c. Etats-Unis
d’Amérique), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1952, p. 196, ou Sud-Ouest africain (Ethiopie c. Afrique du Sud ; Libéria c. Afrique du
Sud), deuxième phase, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1966, p. 48, par. 91. Voir aussi : Question du régime fiscal des pensions
versées aux fonctionnaires retraités de l’UNESCO résidant en France, R.S.A., sentence arbitrale du 14 janvier 2003
vol. XXV, p. 247, par. 40.
- 69 26. Or c’est très exactement ce que vous demande l’Australie, qui voudrait vous convaincre,
Mesdames et Messieurs les juges, d’inventer une interprétation contra textum de l’article VIII, au
prétexte de la prétendue inadaptation des dispositions de la convention aux réalités
contemporaines200. Ce faisant, elle invite la «Cour à sortir de son rôle judiciaire sous prétexte de
remédier à une carence à laquelle les traités auraient omis de pourvoir»201. Vous ne pouvez que
vous y refuser.
27. L’Australie et la Nouvelle-Zélande font pourtant feu de tout bois :
 en suggérant une interprétation téléologique (A) ;
 en invoquant les travaux préparatoires (B) ;
 ou en se fondant sur la pratique ultérieure C).
Non seulement, Monsieur le président, aucune de ces tentatives ne fait mouche, mais encore elles
se retournent contre leur auteur et viennent conforter la thèse du Japon.
A. Une interprétation téléologique fondée sur le préambule ?
[Projection n° 3 : Préambule de la convention de 1946 (extraits)]
28. Alan Boyle a présenté de manière détaillée l’objet et le but du traité. Il n’est donc pas
nécessaire que je m’étende longuement sur l’interprétation téléologique que nos amis australiens
prétendent tirer du préambule de la convention (dont je le dis en passant je ne saurais admettre qu’il
est «décisif» face à un texte clair, contrairement à ce qu’a affirmé ma contradictrice  je ne suis
pas sûr que le mot soit entré au Dictionnaire de l’Académie française  mais la Cour et le Greffe
savent combien je suis attaché à la féminisation des mots...202)  donc ma contradictrice et amie,
Laurence Boisson de Chazournes203).
Au demeurant, en l’espèce, le préambule ne fait que
confirmer l’interprétation textuelle de l’article VIII.
200
Voir CR 2013/7, p. 47, par. 24-25 (Boisson de Chazournes) ; CR 2013/8, p. 51-52, par 87-88 ; voir aussi :
MA, par. 2.20, 2.98-2.99, 4.80.
201
Interprétation des traités de paix conclus avec la Bulgarie, la Hongrie et la Roumanie, deuxième phase, avis
consultatif, C.I.J. Recueil 1950, p. 230.
202
Voir Application de la convention pour la prévention et la répression du crime de génocide
(Bosnie-Herzégovine c. Serbie-et-Monténégro), CR 2006/8, p. 39 ; Délimitation maritime en mer Noire (Roumanie
c. Ukraine), CR 2008/18, p. 32.
203
CR 2013/7, p. 48, par. 30 (Boisson de Chazournes) ; voir aussi MA, p. 17, par. 2.20, p. 52, par. 2.98 ou
p. 158-159, par. 4.49-4.51
- 70 29. Selon l’Australie, «... la conservation et (...) la reconstitution des peuplements baleiniers
(...) constituent des fins en soi  c’est Laurence Boisson de Chazournes qui le dit  dans le
régime mis en place par la convention de 1946»204, sans que les Etats aient leur mot à dire205. Oui,
comme l’a dit la professeure Boisson de Chazournes206, il y a une relation de cause à effet entre la
conservation et la reconstitution de ces «grandes ressources naturelles représentées par l’espèce
baleinière» d’une part et l’objectif de «donner à l’industrie baleinière la possibilité de se développer
d’une manière méthodique» [(on dirait aujourd’hui «durable») d’autre part. Mais cette relation ne
«marche» pas dans le sens qu’elle indique : la reconstitution des stocks (au pluriel  ce qui
implique la diversification des recherches pour tenir compte de la multiplicité des réserves). La
reconstitution des stocks est la condition de la chasse baleinière durable ; mais c’est celle-ci qui
constitue le but ultime  et non la conservation des baleines «en soi».
30. Certes, comme Alan Boyle l’a montré, la Nouvelle-Zélande a une approche plus nuancée
que l’Australie de l’objet et du but du traité. Elle n’en postule pas moins, au mépris du texte de
l’article VIII, que la chasse à des fins scientifiques est soumise au système de régulation collective,
faute de quoi, selon elle, l’objectif même de la convention serait en péril207. C’est oublier que :
«Selon la Cour, on ne peut prétendre qu’un acte est de nature à priver un traité
de son but et de son objet ou à en empêcher la bonne exécution si la possibilité d’un
tel acte était prévue dans le traité lui-même, et s’il a été stipulé que le traité n’y «fera
pas obstacle», de telle sorte qu’il ne violera pas les termes exprès du traité»208. En
l’espèce, nonobstant toute disposition contraire de la présente convention.
Ce qui est vrai, c’est que le système de régulation mis en place par la convention requiert la
connaissance de l’état du stock de chaque espèce, de son cycle de reproduction, des risques
pouvant affecter sa survie (pollution, captures accidentelles par des engins de pêche, ou activités
industrielles dans des zones de reproduction), etc.
CR 2013/7, p. 46, par. 22 (Boisson de Chazournes)  les italiques sont de nous. Voir aussi notamment : ibid.,
p. 48-49, par. 33; et MA, p. 17, par. 2.19 (citant P. Birnie, «Legal Aspects of Non-Consumptive Utilisation of
Cetaceans» (1983), unpublished paper presented at the Global Conference on the Non-Consumptive Utilisation of
Cetacean Resources, 7-11 June 1983, p. 5 (MA, annexe 74).
204
205
CR 2013/7, p. 59-61 (Boisson de Chazournes) ; CR 2013/11, p. 52, par. 2 (Gleeson) ; voir aussi MA, p. 17,
par. 2.21, p. 18, par. 2.22-2.24, p. 141, par. 4.4, p. 159, par. 4.51, p. 253, par. 5.122.
206
CR 2013/7, p. 51-52, par. 35-36.
207
OEN, par. 54 ; voir aussi ibid., par. 45, 80, 90.
208
Activités militaires et paramilitaires au Nicaragua et contre celui-ci (Nicaragua c. Etats-Unis d’Amérique),
fond, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1986, p. 136, par. 272.
- 71 31. Le recours au préambule n’est sûrement pas indispensable pour éclairer le sens de
l’article VIII ; mais cela ne nuit pas et permet de confirmer l’interprétation à laquelle conduit la
simple lecture du texte clair de l’article VIII. Mutatis mutandis, nous sommes dans la situation
décrite par la Cour à propos d’une autre convention dans l’affaire des Droits des ressortissants des
Etats-Unis d’Amérique au Maroc :
«Les buts et l’objet de cette convention sont indiqués dans le préambule …
Dans ces conditions, la Cour ne saurait adopter une interprétation par implication des
dispositions de la convention ... qui dépasserait la portée de ses buts et de son objet
explicites. De plus, cet argument entraînerait dans les dispositions de la convention
des modifications radicales et des additions.»209
B. Le recours aux travaux préparatoires
32. Monsieur le président, en présence d’un texte clair, il n’est pas davantage utile
d’interroger les travaux préparatoires, qui ne sont, comme le rappelle l’article 32 de la convention
de Vienne de 1969, qu’un moyen complémentaire d’interprétation.
En tout cas, le sens de
l’article VIII n’étant ni ambigu ni obscur, le recours aux travaux préparatoires et aux circonstances
dans lesquelles le traité a été conclu, ne peut guère que «confirmer le sens résultant de l’application
de l’article 31». Et tel est le cas.
[Projection n° 4 : Convention de 1946 (art. VIII 1)) et accord de 1937 (art. 10).]
33. Le premier paragraphe de l’article VIII de la convention de 1946 reprend en termes
quasi identiques les dispositions de l’article 10 de l’accord international pour la réglementation de
la chasse à la baleine qui avait été conclu le 8 juin 1937210. Son texte est reproduit à l’onglet no 37
du dossier des juges. Il résulte de cette disposition que, dès 1937 :
 les Parties avaient inclus dans un accord de régulation de la chasse à la baleine, une
réglementation dérogatoire en matière de recherche ;
 les permis spéciaux prévus par cette disposition pouvaient autoriser le bénéficiaire à tuer et
traiter les baleines ; et
209
Droits des ressortissants des Etats-Unis d’Amérique au Maroc (France c. Etats-Unis d’Amérique), arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 1952, p. 196.
210
Accord international pour la réglementation de la chasse à la baleine, Londres, 8 juin 1937 (CMJ, annexe 2).
- 72  ils étaient délivrés et retirés par les gouvernements contractants qui pouvaient les subordonner
«à telles restrictions, en ce qui concerne le nombre, et à telles autres conditions que le
gouvernement contractant jugera opportun de prescrire».
La similitude est tout à fait frappante211.
34. On peut tirer des conclusions intéressantes de ce précédent :
 En premier lieu, il serait aberrant de prétendre que ce dispositif relatif à la recherche
scientifique avait été conçu pour la protection des baleines «en soi» (per se) : nul ne songeait à
cela en 1937 (non plus qu’en 1946 d’ailleurs).
 En deuxième lieu, il est remarquable qu’alors que la convention de 1946 est caractérisée par
une «institutionnalisation» très marquée de la mise en œuvre de la convention par rapport au
traité de 1937, cette «institutionnalisation» reste particulièrement modeste en ce qui concerne
l’article VIII.
35. Il n’est pas sans intérêt de rappeler que l’article VIII a été l’une des dispositions les plus
consensuelles et les moins débattues à la conférence de Washington212. On peut en conclure qu’il
ne faisait pas problème et était, dans toutes ses composantes, parfaitement clair aux yeux des
négociateurs. Au demeurant, les discussions éparses et limitées qui y ont été consacrées ne font
que confirmer ce que la simple lecture de son texte enseigne213 et en particulier :
 que la recherche scientifique envisagée (et encouragée) par cette disposition est un processus
continu ; et
 que c’est aux gouvernements contractants de délivrer les permis spéciaux et d’en assurer la
supervision.
Monsieur le président, quoi qu’il arrive, je ne peux espérer terminer ma présentation avant le
déjeuner. Je peux continuer ou m’arrêter ici si vous pensez que c’est plus raisonnable.
211
Voir CR 2013/8, p. 28-29, par. 6-10 ; comp. : CR 2013/7, p. 43, par. 12, p. 44, par. 16, ou p. 45-46, par. 20-21
(Boisson de Chazournes).
212
213
CMJ, p. 333-340, par. 7.27-7.44.
Voir MA, p. 330-340, par. 7.25-7.42 ; CMJ, p. 336-338, par. 7.33-7.36 et les actes de la conférence de
Washington, Minutes of the Third Session, doc. IWC/20, 21 novembre 1946, p. 11 (CMJ, annexe 18) ; voir aussi
l’intervention du délégué des Etats-Unis, actes de la conférence de Washington, Minutes of the Second Session,
doc. IWC/14, 20 novembre 1946, p. 28 (CMJ, annexe 17).
- 73 -
Le PRESIDENT : Vous avez encore quelque 7, 8 minutes.
M. PELLET : Je vais utiliser mes 7 minutes. Vous m’arrêtez quand …
Le PRESIDENT : Si vous pensez que la présentation sera plus efficace si vous reprenez cet
après-midi, on peut s’arrêter ici. On a une question d’un membre de la Cour à ce moment-là, mais
la question n’est pas au Japon, mais à l’Australie.
M. PELLET : J’abandonne 5 minutes pour laisser le temps à la question d’être posée et ne
pas retarder la pause-déjeuner.
Le PRESIDENT : Merci beaucoup.
So, before adjourning, there is a question from
Judge Bhandari to Australia. Judge Bhandari, you have the floor.
Judge BHANDARI: Thank you, Mr. President. This question is just to Australia.
“What injury, if any, has Australia suffered as a result of Japan’s alleged
breaches of the ICRW through JARPA II?”
The PRESIDENT: Thank you very much, Judge Bhandari. The written text of this question
will be transmitted to the Parties and intervening State as soon as possible. Australia is invited to
reply orally in the course of its second round of argument, while Japan may wish to present
comments on the answer during its second round of oral argument.
This morning’s sitting is about to be closed. The Court will meet again this afternoon from
3 p.m. to 6 p.m. in order to hear the statement from the expert  examination, cross-examination
and re-examination  and subsequently Japan, if time allows, will resume its pleadings.
Thank you very much. The sitting is adjourned.
The Court rose at 12.55 p.m.
___________
Non corrigé
Uncorrected
CR 2013/14
International Court
of Justice
Cour internationale
de Justice
LA HAYE
THE HAGUE
YEAR 2013
Public sitting
held on Wednesday 3 July 2013, at 3 p.m., at the Peace Palace,
____________________
VERBATIM RECORD
____________________
ANNÉE 2013
Audience publique
tenue le mercredi 3 juillet 2013, à 15 heures, au Palais de la Paix,
________________
COMPTE RENDU
________________
-2Present:
President Tomka
Judges Owada
Abraham
Keith
Bennouna
Skotnikov
Cançado Trindade
Yusuf
Greenwood
Xue
Donoghue
Gaja
Sebutinde
Bhandari
Registrar Couvreur

- 14 -
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. Good afternoon. The sitting is open. This afternoon
the Court will hear the examination of the expert called by Japan.
The procedure for this
examination is the same as that for the examination of Australia’s experts last week so I will not
repeat it. I now give the floor to the Agent of Japan. You have the floor, Sir.
Mr. TSURUOKA:
Mr. President, Japan calls as its expert
Professor Lars Walløe, Professor Emeritus of the University of Oslo and the President of the
Academia Europaea. Professor Walløe will be examined by Professor Vaughan Lowe. Thank you,
Mr. President.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Mr. Agent. Mr. Walløe may now take his place at the
rostrum.
Good afternoon and welcome Mr. Walløe.
I call upon you to make the solemn
declaration for experts as set down in Article 64, subparagraph (b), of the Rules of Court. Please,
you have the floor.
Mr. WALLØE: Thank you, I solemnly declare upon my honour and conscience that I will
speak the truth, the whole truth and nothing but the truth and that my statement will be in
accordance with my sincere belief.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you very much and I now give the floor to Professor Lowe to
begin the examination of Mr. Walløe. You have the floor, Sir.
Mr. LOWE: Thank you, Mr. President. First of all I thank you for coming to give us your
evidence. You are Japan’s solitary expert witness. Can you confirm that you wrote the expert
report that is in front of you at the end of the day bundle and that you stand by it, please? We can
hand you a copy of Japan’s day bundle here.
Mr. WALLØE: Yes, I can confirm that this is my expert statement.
Mr. LOWE: Thank you. Your C.V. is attached to the report. Will you please explain
briefly to the Court what the Academia Europaea is, of which you are currently President?
- 15 -
Mr. WALLØE: Academia Europaea is a pan-European academy of science and letters. It is
25 years old. It was established on the initiative of the European Commission at the time, but
includes also countries like Switzerland and Norway.
The idea was that Europe needed an
academy independent of the European political institutions, a kind of academy like we have in most
European countries, but a pan-European academy.
Mr. LOWE:
Thank you.
Would you please explain briefly your experience in the
International Whaling Commission and its Scientific Committee?
Mr. WALLØE: My experience with whales and whaling in Norway started in 1986, when
the pressure was put on Norway, like on Japan and Iceland, to give up its objections to the
moratorium and where I was called upon to examine first the Norwegian research and then the
statements made by scientists in the Scientific Committee.
I participated in the Scientific
Committee, first briefly in a meeting without being part of any delegation but then, from 1988, as a
member of the Scientific Committee and then from the next year also as part of the Norwegian
delegation to the Commission.
Mr. LOWE: Thank you. Your C.V. does not refer explicitly to two major projects that you
undertook at the invitation of the Ms Brundtland, who became Prime Minister of Norway. Will
you please tell the Court briefly what they are?
Mr. WALLØE: I was head of the Norwegian programme on acid rain, which was a conflict
at that time between Norway/Sweden on one side and the UK and, at that time, West Germany on
the other side, on the reason for changes especially in freshwater fish and the acidification of rivers
in Norway and Sweden. So I was head of that Norwegian research programme which ended in
1980. In this time Ms Brundtland, who was and still is a friend of mine  that was the reason I
was asked  I supervised what was going to be her PhD. at the time, never finished because she
became a politician. But then I was also engaged by the following research programme, which was
a joint programme between the Royal Society in the UK, the Swedish Academy of Science and the
Norwegian Academy of Science and Letters, started theoretically or formally in 1984 but really
started in 1986.
- 16 -
Mr. LOWE: And the other work you did, the drafting?
Mr. WALLØE: I was also, like Ms Brundtland, involved in the work leading to the so-called
Brundtland Commission, the book of our common future, so I was part of a small Norwegian
editorial group established by Ms Brundtland at the time.
The other member was
Johan Jørgen Holst, he was a social scientist: he later became Foreign Minister of Norway, now
dead.
Mr. LOWE: Thank you. I know that I should ask you to speak slowly and I should remind
myself not to intervene as soon as you have answered so as to leave a pause for the translators to
make the translation. In accordance with the Court’s letter of 21 June, you have prepared a short
statement of your evidence. Would you please make that statement to the Court?
Mr. WALLØE: Sorry, I am not sure I understand the question.
Mr. LOWE: In accordance with the Court’s letter of 21 June, which related to the manner in
which expert evidence would be handled, you have prepared a statement of your evidence. Would
you give that statement, please?
Mr. WALLØE: Are you referring to the introduction?
Mr. LOWE: Yes.
Mr. WALLØE: The paragraph is on the third page of my statement.
“I have been asked by the Government of Japan to prepare an independent
report providing a scientific review of certain issues raised by the Memorial of the
Government of Australia dated 9 May 2011 in the case Whaling in the Antarctic
(Australia v. Japan) before the International Court of Justice. I was in particular
asked to consider certain questions relating to Appendix 2 of the Memorial. This
contains an independent report by Dr. Marc Mangel of the University of California
Santa Cruz, bearing the title An Assessment of Japanese Whale Research Programs
Under Special Permit in the Antarctic (JARPA, JARPA II) as Programs for Purposes
of Scientific Research in the Context of Conservation and Management of Whales.
The Government of Japan also asked me to provide this independent Expert Opinion
in preparation for possible appearance as an expert witness under Article 57 of the
Rules of Court in the above case.”
- 17 -
Mr. LOWE: Rather than me ask you questions about that, I asked you if you would prepare
a statement of about 20 minutes which you would give to the Court now. So would you give that
statement to the Court, please?
Mr. WALLØE: Thank you. Mr. President, Members of the Court, last week I listened with
interest to the presentations given by the lawyers representing Australia and especially, of course,
to the cross-examination of my two colleagues, the expert witnesses of Australia. Of course, I have
comments to what they said with regards to my expert statement. However, I cannot cover
everything in the 20 minutes Professor Lowe has given me. Let me first state that nothing of what I
have heard in this Court and nothing I have read in the different written statements by
Professor Mangel and Dr. Gales have made it necessary for me to change any part of my written
statement.
I shall start with the issue of scientific methods and hypotheses, although I shall not spend
much time on it. My main point is that, in spite of the comments by Professor Mangel in his last
document, I still think my two examples, the Mendel genetic example and the acid rain example are
perfectly valid. Mendel worked for a long time without hypothesis. For the acid rain example, I
was a little imprecise on the exact timing when things happened.
As I told, a little earlier now, the Norwegian acid rain programme was finished in 1980 and
the joint Swedish, Norwegian and British programmes started officially in 1984, but in reality in
1986. The searching without hypothesis I described in my statement took place in the years
between the two programmes. It is easy to find other examples, both from the old history of
science, Alexander Humboldt from Germany and his research in South America, could be one
example. And from modern science, for instance genetic and DNA, and connections to diseases in
humans could be another example, a modern example, as pointed out by Judge Donoghue, if I
understood her questions correctly last week.
I am not a geneticist, but I do have quite detailed information about the current research in
this field. Since Professor Mangel in his statement writes, “data mining is not science” and further
“most exploratory data analysis do no lead anywhere meaningful and do not contribute to scientific
knowledge or understanding”, I cannot resist the temptation to mention that Dr. Gales’ institution,
- 18 the Australian Antarctic Division on its website has a page called “data mining enhances scientific
knowledge”. There, a scientist with a somewhat curious title, “data miner”, Ben Raymond “uses a
variety of techniques to help scientists to make the most of their data”. And he presents a very
good example of just that on that webpage.
Over to more serious matters. Why lethal sampling? Is lethal sampling necessary? In the
strict theoretical sense it is possible to obtain the genetic information by biopsy sampling. After I
received Dr. Gales’s comment on this point in his last written document, I went back to my
Norwegian colleagues who operate in the field in the North Atlantic and the Barents Sea. They still
supported my written statement that it is much more easy and thus much more efficient to obtain
samples, genetic samples, from killing of whales, than by biopsy sampling. The first issue dealt
with by information obtained from genetic samples, but also from morphometrics, which can only
be obtained from killed whales, is the question about stock structure of minke whales in the
Antarctic Ocean.
One important result from the JARPA program was that there is at least two stocks of minke
whales in the investigated area, and that they mix during feeding, south of Australia. Dr. Gales
said, as a response to a question from Mr. Gleeson, that this was known before JARPA started. It
is correct that two Japanese scientists, Wada and Numachi, in 1979 published an article, claiming
two stocks based on morphology, that it colour pattern on the body, and allozymes, which is the
difference between different proteins. This paper was heavily criticized and was never accepted by
the IWC Scientific Committee.
A later paper, by the same two Japanese authors, failed to find any difference between minke
whales east and west of Australia, as mentioned by Professor Hamamoto this morning. The fact is
that the result that the Antarctic minke whales were composed of at least two stocks was first
presented to the JARPA review meeting in 2006 and was first accepted by the Scientific
Committee in 2007. This is contrary to Dr. Gales’s claim.
But there is another, and more important aspect of the stock structure question. There is no
indication of any sub-stock structure in any of these two regions, which is of great importance for a
possible future implementation of RMP. To be able to state this conclusion with high certainty, a
very large sample is necessary, which is obtained by the JARPA and JARPA II programs. Age
- 19 -
can only be determined by killing of whales. Age is important for at least three different types of
investigations. The first is the catch at age, which will show, for instance, how the abundance has
changed with time. An increase up to approximately 1970, then a decline, a little steeper in the
beginning, the decline. Especially the exponentially like increase in the 1960s is interesting,
because the uncertainty here is not large and it shows that the minke whales may increase by about
3 per cent per year, which has obvious implications for a possible future revision of the RMP. The
second use of the age data is that it tells the age at sexual maturity, which gives important
information about changes in the food availability for minke whales. The age at sexual maturity
declined from 11 years by 1945 to approximately 7 years by 1970. It is a large decline. The
question now is whether it increases again. Possibly, as I expect, with a substantial time delay.
There is also a methodological question here, because some have claimed, in the Scientific
Committee, that the so-called “transition zone”, which can be observed in the earplug data, does
not indicate puberty.
The Japanese now have the possibility to check this assumption, by
comparing, because they are catching also younger whales, while the old commercial catches took
only, or mainly, old and large whales. The third use of the age data is that makes it possible to get
information about cohort productivity and cohort mortality. I don’t have time to go more into the
use of these data.
My next issue is the blubber thickness and its changes over time. I first got involved during
a preparatory meeting for the JARPA review meeting, to which I was invited by Japan. I think it
was in 2005. To me the results indicated that some important changes were happening in the
Antarctic ecosystem, but if I may say so, without insulting my Japanese scientific colleagues too
much, it was very poorly analysed and presented. So from then on I participated in the analysis.
The results were presented at the review meeting itself, and at the Scientific Committee meetings in
2006 and 2007. It was lengthy critical discussions in the Scientific Committees both years. Many
scientists from anti-whaling countries asked critical questions.
Among them the prominent
scientist, Tom Polaschek, from Australia.
But, during these two years we managed to reanalyse the data and convince the Committee
of the reality of the findings, of the decline. The manuscript was later, in 2008, published in a
- 20 journal of reasonably high standing, “Polar Research”, after thorough peer review process, since
this term has been a theme last week, peer review.
Then for three years the results remained accepted by, not only the Scientific Committee of
IWC, but the larger scientific community. Then in 2011 questions were asked by an Australian
scientist, who came back to the Scientific Committee after having been away from the Committee
for many years. And he asked about the results and he suggested additional analyses, which were
performed during the same Scientific Committee meeting by a Norwegian colleague of mine  I
think to the surprise of the Australian scientist that he was able to do it in that short period of time.
I myself realized the data using a robust different method called jack-knife. All these analyses
gave the same results as the original, a decline in blubber thickness over the JARPA years.
Dr. Gales on Thursday told Mr. Gleeson “it is a very small change”. That depends of course on
what we mean by a small change. It is a 9 per cent decline over the 18 JARPA years. All the
different analyses showed the same decline.
We also investigated two related measurements which gave the same result. The two other
variables were the circumference of the thickest part of the body and the amount of fat, total store
of fat in the whale body which we analysed in a sub-set of the total sample.
The Australian scientist asked to get the primary data. Japanese authorities were reluctant to
give them the data, but I convinced them that he should get access to them. But then he decided
not to use them. My interpretation is that he had expected not to get the data and he was surprised
to get the offer.
Maybe he regarded that it was better for him, and Australia, to keep the
uncertainty floating.
In the Scientific Committee this year, he again asked me new questions. To me this is
similar to what, in a political context, would be called “filibuster techniques”. In observational
study, where it is not possible to randomize groups, it is always possible to ask new questions and
that is what the Australian scientist does.
On the stomach contents issue, Dr. Gale said to Mr. Gleeson: “Well, the stomach content
data has added in similar ways to the earplug nothing to what we already knew. We know the
Antarctic minke whales eat Antarctic krill almost exclusively; we already knew that.” I am afraid
that this answer shows that Dr. Gales either has not read the paper presented to the Scientific
- 21 -
Committee last year, or has misunderstood it completely. The main point in the paper is that the
amount of it in the fore-stomach of Antarctic minke whales has declined over the JARPA years
when all other variables which influence the amount of food in the stomach has been taken care of.
The manuscript is now under editorial review of a reasonably good scientific journal. I am
confident that it will also be published.
My last issue will be all the statements made by Professor Crawford and Professor Sands last
week, for example, statements like “Professor Walløe has nothing to say on these resolutions”.
There are a number of these statements presented last week. My easy way out would be that the
Government of Japan did not ask me about resolutions. But I would like to add an additional
explanation.
When I first got involved in the IWC matters and attended meetings in the late 1980s, my
Norwegian Commissioner at the time was Head of the Legal Office in our Foreign Ministry. His
name was Per Tresselt;
I think he was Agent for Norway to this Court in the
Jan Mayen-Greenland case. Mr. Tresselt told me,
“Don’t mind the resolutions, they are not legally binding. The group of
anti-whaling countries has a simple majority in the IWC”  he told me  “but they
don’t have three quarters majority anymore. They cannot change the Schedule. And
if they manage to get the three quarters majority in the future, we may lodge an
objection. But at present”  he said  “they can pass as many resolutions as they
like, that will not change the Convention.”
And indeed the following years, Japan and Norway were subject  and Iceland  were subject to
resolutions every year. We heard the number in one of the Australian presentations last week. I
am not speaking on the legal issue. I am just explaining why I did not deal with the resolutions in
my Expert Statement.
In a similar way, the different Annexes from L to P are specifying what special permit
proposals should contain and how they should be dealt with in the Scientific Committee. Again I
cannot speak on the legal interpretation but I can speak on how these documents have been
understood and dealt with both in the Scientific Committee and in the Commission. The texts of
these documents have always first been proposed by the Scientific Committee, then accepted by the
Commission in both bodies by consensus. The reason consensus was possible, was always that the
list of possible objectives included a possibility for research which was not connected to
- 22 -
conservation or management of whales.
The Annexes were always understood both in the
Scientific Committee and the Commission as self-contained, not dependent on any additional
resolutions as claimed by Professor Crawford.
In my Written Statement, I used Annex O to illustrate this point, because Norway had to
argue in relation to Annex O when it, Norway, was preparing a proposal for a three-year special
permit catch in 1991. We made it clear in the proposal that the research was not intended to
address management questions or contribute towards a comprehensive assessment, as it was called
at the time, but questions related to the management of fish stocks. Norway regarded that as a
critically important research need, to use the words in Annex O. Both the Scientific Committee
and the Commission accepted that was a relevant argument for a special permit catch. The words
used in the current Annex P are, as you may read, that
“three possible objectives, either to improve the conservation and management of
whales stocks, or improve the conservation and management of the living marine
resources or the ecosystem to which the whale stocks are an integral part, or test
hypotheses not directly related to the management of living marine resources”.
And in the Scientific Committee and in the Commission, this third objective has always been
understood as independent of management or conservation of whales. This is the background for
my Statement that the claim by Professor Mangel that all special permit catches must be motivated
by its importance to the conservation and management of whales, is a fundamental
misunderstanding. That is a strong word I used. To me, it was reassuring that one prominent
member of the Scientific Committee agrees with me on this point, but not only on this point but all
main points in my Expert Statement, as you can read in the documents from Japan.
Mr. President, Members of the Court, let me conclude. JARPA II is definitely a scientific
research program. Two: both JARPA and JARPA II have given valuable information for the
possible implementation of the current version of RMP and for possible future improvements of
RMP. Three: for me even more important, is that the programs are giving critical information
about the ongoing changes in the Antarctic ecosystem. Thank you for your attention.
Mr. LOWE: Thank you, Professor Walløe. I have no other questions.
- 23 -
The PRESIDENT: Thank you very much, at the end of 30 minutes period. So I thank you,
Professor Lowe, for this less interactive than usual examination of expert. I now give the floor to
Mr. Gleeson, who I understand is going to cross-examine Mr. Walløe. Mr. Gleeson, you have the
floor.
Mr. GLEESON:
Mr. Walløe, when did you write your
interesting non-interactive presentation we just heard?
Mr. WALLØE: When I wrote it?
Mr. GLEESON: Yes.
Mr. WALLØE: Most of it, I wrote the two last days after I heard the Australian presentation
last week.
Mr. GLEESON: Did you have any assistance in writing it?
Mr. WALLØE: No, absolutely not.
Mr. GLEESON: All right.
Mr. WALLØE: Neither did I have any assistance in writing my own original statement.
Mr. GLEESON: I think you told the Court twice this afternoon, when you read out the first
paragraph from your report, that you are an independent expert. Do you remember saying that?
Mr. WALLØE: Yes.
Mr. GLEESON:
And you told the Court about your experience as a Norwegian
representative to the Commission, do you remember that?
Mr. WALLØE: Yes.
Mr. GLEESON: Is it also the case that you have received one of the highest available
honours which Japan gives to a foreigner?
- 24 -
Mr. WALLØE: Yes.
Mr. GLEESON: And that happened in 2009?
Mr. WALLØE: Yes.
Mr. GLEESON: And could you confirm for us that the citation for that honour was for the
services you rendered in the promotion of Japan’s policy in the field of fisheries? Is that accurate?
Mr. WALLØE: I do not remember, but it could be accurate. I would like to add that I have
had additional influence on the Japanese earlier and I think that is also important. That was for an
issue not related to the Scientific Committee, but on the killing of whales issue, which was my
main interaction with the Japanese. Not with the scientists but with a Japanese delegation to the
Commission.
Mr. GLEESON: Well, in terms of your interaction with JARPA II scientists, is this accurate:
Japan invited you in 2005 to participate in a domestic Japanese review of the original JARPA
project to assist Japan in the presentation of the results of JARPA to the wider scientific
community. Is that accurate?
Mr. WALLØE: That is accurate, but I would like to add that it is not the only time. You
will probably come back to that. But it is not the only time I have been invited to consultation
meetings where I have been presented results from ongoing research and giving comments on it.
But I would also like to say that I have similar interaction with scientists from the United States for
aboriginal hunt of bowhead whales in Alaska.
Both with scientists in Seattle, scientists in
Anchorage and scientists in Barrow. So, I believe in scientific co-operation, and Japan is only one
of the countries. I have interacted with scientists from Russia. on their hunt in the eastern part,
with scientists from Denmark, or rather Greenland, on the aboriginal hunt in Greenland. And, as I
said, most importantly, also with the United States scientists in Seattle and in the other countries in
Alaska.
- 25 -
Mr. GLEESON: I would ask for you to turn to the statement you have provided to the
Court  if you have a copy of it with you?
Mr. WALLØE: Yes, I have a copy.
Mr. GLEESON: To page 7 please. In the last two paragraphs on page 7, you referred to
work which has been done on JARPA in the area of, firstly, the number of stocks, secondly,
blubber thickness, and thirdly, stomach contents. Would you confirm that, although you do not
provide any references  as we see on the screen  three of the references which underpin this
paragraph, are joint publications, present or proposed, between you and scientists from the ICR? Is
that accurate?
Mr. WALLØE: I am not quite sure I understand the question. But, if the question is whether
my name is on the publication, that is true.
Mr. GLEESON: And the three publications we see on the screen in the areas of stock
mixing, blubber thickness and stomach contents which, you say on page 7, provide useful results
from JARPA, are in part your own work? Is that accurate?
Mr. WALLØE: It is accurate that I did the first statistical analysis using different methods
from what the Japanese had done. I have not been involved in the preparation of the collection of
data, I have just been involved in the analysis. Because, as I said, I saw some difficulties with the
analysis carried out by the Japanese, but I still thought that it contained relevant information. That
was my background for helping, whether I was a member, and my name appears on the publication
or not. That is, sometimes I do, sometimes I do not, when I do this kind of collaboration. For me it
is important that when I reach, not only my age, but my scientific  what shall I say  I feel
secure in my science. It is not always necessary to be a member of the list of authors; I often give
advice without being.
publication.
But here, the Japanese insisted that my name should appear on the
- 26 -
Mr. GLEESON: Thank you for that explanation. Would you confirm that the three joint
publications involving you that we see on the screen, are some of the publications which underpin
the statements you make on page 7 in the last two paragraphs? Is that accurate or not?
Mr. WALLØE: Sorry, I have to read it first to be sure. As far as I can see, I still have that
statement, yes.
Mr. GLEESON:
Is there a reason you did not tell the Court, or Australia, that the
publications you were commending on page 7 were your work done together with scientists from
the ICR?
Mr. WALLØE: No, I did not think that was necessary. But, yes, I have no reason to try to
hide it. That was not my reason and, of course, especially the first publication is in the public
domain.
Mr. GLEESON: Thank you. Now, let me turn to a topic you spoke about this afternoon to
the Court  which is the work done by Japanese scientists and yourself, on the topic of blubber
thickness. I will ask for you to be provided with a folder of documents which the Court has, and
Japan has. And, would you turn please to tab 7 of that folder? And do you recall in your
evidence-in-chief, you made what might be unkindly described as an attack upon a scientist from
Australia as engaging in the equivalent of a “filibuster”? Do you remember offering the Court that
word?
Mr. WALLØE: I used that word, I agree that it is a strong word. And I think that it is
sometimes appropriate to use a strong word.
Mr. GLEESON: And, do you recall telling the Court that, in effect, your work on blubber
thickness, done with Japan, has been as it were, accepted, as valid and helpful by the scientific
community?
Mr. WALLØE: I told that a few minutes ago, yes. For three years.
- 27 -
Mr. GLEESON: If you go to the document at tab 7, this is the meeting of the Scientific
Committee this year, which you attended. Is that correct?
Mr. WALLØE: Tab 7? Yes, the report of the working group of the ecosystem modelling?
Mr. GLEESON: And, on page 4 of tab 7, under Section 4.1, the first statement of the
Scientific Committee, is that at meeting 63  that is several years ago  the variance of the trend
in blubber thickness reported by Mr. Konishi and others  that includes you  was found to have
been underestimated for a number of reasons given. Now, do you accept that is a finding that the
Scientific Committee came to about two years ago in respect to the usefulness and reliability of
your work on blubber thickness? Do you accept that?
Mr. WALLØE: I accept that this was at the 2011 meeting, and that the question was raised
by the Australian scientists, and we realized that the reference here is to Skaug. He was recruited
as statistician in my team, so reanalysed the data which I brought to the meeting, using the methods
suggested by the Australian scientists. And, he got the same result, the same decline, as also my
jackknife analysis. Same decline, but the variance was a little larger. But it was still scientifically
significant at the 5 per cent level.
Mr. GLEESON: Professor Walløe, in order that I don’t lose my entire hour, I’m going to try
and make my questions as precise as I can and I would invite you, if possible, to also keep the
answers as precise as you are capable of, if you would. If you go to the next paragraph on page 4,
the Scientific Committee recalls that the analyses requested by the Committee in 2011 had not been
conducted, but instead Dr. Butterworth, a member of this Japanese delegation, produced certain
jackknife estimates. Do you see that?
Mr. WALLØE: Yes.
Mr. GLEESON: And I won’t read the detail but the following paragraphs on that page and
the first two paragraphs on the next page record discussion in detail about the jackknife estimates
and do you see that in the third paragraph on page 5, Dr. Butterworth considered the evidence and
- 28 -
candidly said to the Scientific Committee that the conclusions of the paper were invalidated. Do
you recall that happening just a few weeks ago in your presence, Dr. Walløe?
Mr. WALLØE: Yes. I agree, but I would like to add that this jackknife is not the same
jackknife analysis I was talking about which happened two years ago. It is a different jackknife
analysis. I was invited to be a co-author on that paper and I declined because I was uncertain about
the results. So I think this was done in too much of a hurry, so I have no problems with the third
paragraph on page 5. But the difficulty, that you referred back to on the last page, that the question
asked two years ago, when the Australian scientists did not accept to re-analyse the data himself,
which to me was, I argued for it, just for the Japanese Government at the time, and for him. I said
you should re-analyse and see what you can get. Now he comes back and says what is important is
for each whale to have the distance from the ice edge, which is a difficult question because then
you have for each year of the JARPA years, to have the ice edge and then measure for each whale
the position, and then measure the distances. It is a huge work to work that out. That was the
reason it had not been done.
Mr. GLEESON: Do you see, Professor Walløe, that in the next two paragraphs that follow,
there is a record of you and Dr. Solvien presenting a new analysis and the conclusion of the
Scientific Committee’s Working Group in the last paragraph is, in effect, they encouraged
everyone to go away, do some analyses and the matter would be considered next year.
Mr. WALLØE: I agree, and of course the analyses of Solvein and myself was what I
mentioned, one of the other variables, not blubber thickness but the total contents of the fat in the
whale body which was analysed, not on every whale but only on the first whale caught every day,
in the JARPA period. So it was a much lower number but still we got the same decline then in fat
content of the total body. And I agree that we should continue, but to me, when we do a large
amount of different analysis, and the Scientific Committee includes some people who are interested
in not saying that this is an interesting result, we always end up  this is a kind of what I refer to
as filibuster technique  we always get, well, the only thing we can agree on is that we need more
analysis. This is not uncommon in the Scientific Committee. But I still think that our findings of a
- 29 -
decline in blubber thickness is a valid result, the original papers have not been retracted; it still is
in the public domain, a result. And I am quite sure that when we do all these analyses, we will still
get the same result. But I agree that we shall do this work or the Japanese fellows shall do this
work before the next year’s meeting.
Mr. GLEESON: I want to ask you two questions to conclude on the topic of blubber
thickness and if possible could you see whether you are capable of either answering them yes or no.
The first question is: after 26 years of data from JARPA and JARPA II, is it a fact that to date,
neither the IWC nor the Scientific Committee has confirmed that the data allows reliable
conclusions on trends in blubber thickness?
Mr. WALLØE: Well, my personal opinion is not. But it is the conclusion of the Scientific
Committee. My own scientific conclusion is that the data is not only marginally sufficient but that
they are strongly indicating a decline. But I agree that this is a Scientific Committee and we heard
from Dr. Gales the other day that the Scientific Committee is not a political body, it is a purely
scientific body which is not my recollection and impression. It’s much politics going on in the
Scientific Committee when the issue is about politically-sensitive issues.
Mr. GLEESON: I’m going to ask you the second of the two questions, and again if possible,
a yes or no answer would be helpful. The question is: would you agree that after 26 years of data
from JARPA and JARPA II, neither the Commission nor the Scientific Committee has affirmed
that investigations of blubber thickness are required for the conservation or management of whales
or for any other critical research need. Do you agree with that proposition ?
Mr. WALLØE: On the first question, I agree. It is not necessary for the management of
whales or whaling.
On the second question, I think we have indications that something is
happening in the Antarctic ecosystem and to me as a scientist, it is important. So I think that that is
an important question.
- 30 Mr. GLEESON: I take it from your last answer that you think it’s important, but you would
agree with me that neither the Commission nor the Scientific Committee has affirmed that
investigations into blubber thickness are required as a critical research need. Is that accurate?
Mr. WALLØE:
No.
Because the Scientific Committee two years ago made a
statement  and I can find the reference  that it is important to get an answer to the question
about blubber thickness. And I can get the reference, I don’t have it in my head. That was two
years ago. In the Scientific Committee and all people in that Subcommittee and later in the
Scientific Committee, including the Australian scientists I refer to, and Dr. Gales, were present in
that meeting and supported that statement.
Mr. GLEESON: Let met turn to the second of the three areas where you are a joint
researcher on the JARPA II project which is the topic of stomach contents that you mentioned this
afternoon. I am going to ask for you to be shown by Australia’s Agent, Dr. Gales’s report of
31 May which I believe you have read.
And if you that report, could you please go to
paragraph 4.9.
Mr. WALLØE: Yes. I have it. To 4.9. Yes, I have it.
Mr. GLEESON:
Would you accept as accurate that the extract there given from the
2007 Scientific Committee represents the current position which the Committee has taken, on
whether JARPA data on stomach contents is useful or relevant.
Mr. WALLØE: I would have to read it first. It is a long paragraph so, please excuse me for
a few minutes.
Mr. GLEESON: Please do.
Mr. WALLØE: I have read it and I agree that this was from the report of the Scientific
Committee meeting. I am not sure I agree on all the contents of it, but of course, as I have
indicated, there are differences of opinion in the Scientific Committee and also in the
Subcommittee here. But for the last bold face thing, I agree that at the time we have a much better
- 31 -
manuscript being considered for publication now than we had at that time, and I agree that we had
some unresolved questions at that time.
Mr. GLEESON: My question, Professor Walløe was, do you agree that the statement of the
Scientific Committee in 2007, reproduced here, is at present the last word of the Scientific
Committee on stomach contents investigations? Is that accurate?
Mr. WALLØE: It is accurate that this is the last statement from the Scientific Committee
and I did not in my statement say that we have any more recent statement. I said I have a
manuscript under editorial review; that is what I stated.
Mr. GLEESON: Would it be fair to conclude that in giving your evidence this afternoon and
in your report you are in part defending your own scientific work or not?
Mr. WALLØE: It is true that I am part of this team who have investigated this. The primary
results, data, are obtained independent of my advice and with methods I have not had any influence
on. But it is true that I am taking part in the analysis.
Mr. GLEESON: In the light of the questions I have asked you this afternoon, would you
wish to withdraw the claim that you are an independent witness?
Mr. WALLØE: No, I would not. I think I am an independent witness in the sense that 
much more so than, for instance, Doctor Gales is an independent witness. So, my main concern is
science and that is why I co-operate with Japanese scientists, with American scientists, with
Russian scientists, and on other fields, not whaling, all scientists from many other countries. I
believe in scientific international collaboration.
Mr. GLEESON: Let me move to the topic of testable hypotheses. You have clarified for the
Court this afternoon in relation to the acid rain project that you worked on that in two stages.
Firstly up to 1980, in Norway and subsequently, from the mid-1980s as part of the joint
UK/Swedish/Norwegian project. Correct?
Mr. WALLØE: Yes.
- 32 -
Mr. GLEESON: You also corrected an imprecision in your statement and said that the
period during which there was no testable hypotheses was between 1980 and, you said, about 1986.
Do you remember saying that?
Mr. WALLØE: Yes.
Mr. GLEESON: Now, I would like to show you first a document at tab 8, which was written
by the head of the joint project where he confirmed the methodology identified at the outset of the
joint project and you will see highlighted that aluminium was identified as one of the possible
culprits from the very beginning of the joint project. Do you remember that?
Mr. WALLØE: I do not remember that. I see it here, it was not in 1986, it may have been
already, that is my small correction. In 1980 it was certainly not accepted.
Mr. GLEESON: Let me take you, Professor Walløe to the next document, which is at tab 9,
on the screen. The authors, in a publication you also wrote, Messrs. Morris and Reader, said that
the effects of aluminium on the salmonids had been demonstrated by fieldwork and experimental
studies and they gave references, three of which were from the year 1980. Does that cause you to
recall that by 1980, if not earlier, the work done by various people in the field, including yourself,
had identified that aluminium was a possible culprit?
Mr. WALLØE: No. I am not agreeing on that because, as I remember it now, I should have
been more precise on my timing.
Mr. GLEESON: Let me take you then, Sir, to tab 10, which is an extract from your article in
this same publication where you reflected back on your valuable contribution to this project. And
you recorded that previous analyses had pointed to concentrations of inorganic aluminium species
as the main determinants and the work you did, which was valuable statistical work, was to conduct
a regression analysis on 14 variables, including aluminium and you concluded aluminium was one
of three main causal factors. Is that accurate?
- 33 -
Mr. WALLØE: It is accurate, but not with the year 1980. It was published much later. As
you see, it was published in 1990.
Mr. GLEESON: What I would like to suggest for your consideration, Sir, is that your work
in collaboration with international scientists on the acid rain project is a sound demonstration of the
scientific method at work. And let me put to you three aspects of that to consider. Firstly, there
was a clearly-identified problem at the outset. True?
Mr. WALLØE: That the acid rain was a hypothesis? That is true. It was a hypothesis from
the beginning.
Mr. GLEESON: The problem, Sir, that I put to you was that the fish were dying and one
needed to know whether it was the sulphur emissions from the U.K. and German factories or
whether geology was the cause. Was not that the identified problem?
Mr. WALLØE: Yes.
Mr. GLEESON: And, in addressing that identified problem, a range of potential causal
factors were identified, one of which was aluminium, was it not?
Mr. WALLØE: No! Aluminium was not identified at that stage.
Mr. GLEESON: Yes, and if the author of the project recorded that in his book you would
say he was simply mistaken, would you?
Mr. WALLØE: It is difficult, I have not that book in front of me now but 1990 was when
the book was written, and even the paper, so we may have been imprecise in specifying. But I am
quite sure, since I am involved in this, that after we finished our project in 1980, this was not even
a hypothesis, it was not. No indication of aluminium at the time, although in some of the analysis
we would go back afterwards and saw that aluminium was present.
Mr. GLEESON: Let me ask you more generally on this topic. Before a scientist embarks on
a large-scale field project, including one involving the killing of species, do you accept that there
- 34 -
are any minimum criteria which must be addressed to establish the scientific validity of the project?
And, if so, what are those criteria?
Mr. WALLØE: I agree that you must have a question. Some field of interest and something
you would like to investigate, but not necessarily to the level specified by Professor Mangel, that
you should have an hypothesis which is not vague hypothesis but is an hypothesis where you can
design an experiment or an observational study and you can decide at which significance level and
what should be the power of the test and all the rest of it; all the whole statistical instrumentarium
of modern statistics. I do not accept that part, but I accept that you should have some indication of
what you would like to study. And I agree with Doctor Mangel and some of you citing Poincaré
that a pile of stone is not science  although sometimes a pile of stone in this meaning could be of
importance for later scientists when they suddenly discover that there is information here. But I
agree that you should have some idea why you are studying this, why you are collecting this data.
Mr. GLEESON: Do you accept that a literature review is a standard scientific step to take
before embarking on a large-scale fieldwork project?
Mr. WALLØE: That you should investigate the literature? Yes. But the problem with the
Antarctic Ocean is, of course, that there is not so much precise literature available, at least at the
point when the project was started.
Mr. GLEESON: Do you accept that the scientist would formulate the hypotheses as clearly
and specifically as possible given the limits of the subject-matter?
Mr. WALLØE: Not necessarily. I mean it’s possible sometimes to formulate a hypothesis,
but that is when I, in my statement, referred to Professor Tukey. He said that sometimes it is
possible to formulate the specific hypothesis, but that is asking the wrong question, instead of being
more vague and discover something.
So, yes, I like Professor Tukey’s statement on this
methodological question which is also supported by the person who is a prominent person in the
Scientific Committee.
- 35 -
Mr. GLEESON: Do you accept that there is a connection between the formulation of the
hypothesis and questions such as the selection of methods, the choice of sample sizes, and so on?
Mr. WALLØE: Yes.
Mr. GLEESON: And the hypothesis may inform the degree of precision required in the
selection of the sample sizes?
Mr. WALLØE: Yes.
Mr. GLEESON: And would you also agree that before embarking on the large-scale field
project, the scientist would give real consideration to choices between different available methods?
Mr. WALLØE: I am not quite sure I understand the question.
Mr. GLEESON: Before a scientist embarks on a field work project, the scientist would ask
“what alternatives do I have to that project in order to advance the knowledge I am seeking?”
Mr. WALLØE: In a general sense, yes, I agree.
Mr. GLEESON: And if a prior extensive field work project has already been conducted,
would you agree that the scientist would very carefully monitor and review the results and the
lessons from the prior project in order to understand how that informs the question before the
scientist?
Mr. WALLØE: Yes, in a general sense, I agree. But I think I know where you are going
and I am not sure I will agree with your next question.
Mr. GLEESON: Your evidence leaves me with two impressions, Professor Walløe. The
first is that you are more humorous than me, but the second, more seriously is, you do appear to
me, and I must put it to you, to be presenting your evidence in the fashion of an advocate and not a
witness. What do you say to that?
- 36 Mr. WALLØE: Well I don’t know whether I should regard that as an insult, or an honour.
But I’m trying to explain why I’m doing this, and being an expert witness, it’s not obvious that any
person in the Scientific Committee, even if they agree with the general background from the
JARPA II program that they would be willing to appear as a witness here, outside this court room
what kind of harassment you could be subject to.
Mr. GLEESON: Well I trust I’m not harassing you. What was the extra matter that you
wished the President to give you the opportunity to say to the Court, at this stage?
Mr. WALLØE: Sorry, I’m not.
Mr. GLEESON: You said you wanted to say something more, you knew where I was going,
what did you want to tell the Court, please tell the Court now.
Mr. WALLØE: No, I’m not sure what you are referring to, I’m referring to what I didn’t
have time to say in my 20 minutes I was given by Professor Lowe, is that what you’re referring to?
Mr. GLEESON: I’ll move on Professor Walløe. I’m now going to ask you in the folder
before you to go to tab 14 please.
Mr. WALLØE: Yes.
Mr. GLEESON: And go to page 10, this is the JARPA proposal.
Mr. WALLØE: This is JARPA II proposal.
Mr. GLEESON: Yes, and at tab 10, under the heading “Research Objectives”, the first
objective is the monitoring of the Antarctic ecosystem.
Mr. WALLØE: Yes.
Mr. GLEESON: Has the IWC, or the Scientific Committee, identified that it considers such
a project is a critical research need?
- 37 Mr. WALLØE:
I must admit I’m not sure exactly what the Scientific Committee 
although I participated in all these meetings  I’m not quite sure about the statements which have
been made on this. It’s quite clear that some of us in the Scientific Committee regard monitoring
the Antarctic ecosystem as an important  whether you should say critically important  it is an
important research need.
Mr. GLEESON: But I think you’re confirming that the Committee as a whole, and for that
matter the Commission has not identified that a long-term project to monitor the Antarctic
ecosystem is a critical research need. Is that accurate?
Mr. WALLØE: I think that is accurate. But you have, again, to remember that the Scientific
Committee is not like a scientific committee in my other scientific fields, in physiology or in
statistics. There are close connections here with politics, especially for some of the members.
Mr. GLEESON: Could I then ask you to go to page 11 of JARPA II where about halfway
down you find the second objective, which is to model competition among whale species, and at
this point, the proposal refers to a series of hypotheses having been developed and those hypotheses
are spelt out on page 61 of the document you might agree.
Mr. WALLØE: Page 61 of the document?
The PRESIDENT: At tab 14. You are on page 11, now you have to move to page 61.
Mr. WALLØE: Yes. Sorry. I now see it. Yes.
Mr. GLEESON: Now, you said in your report that you disagree with Professor Mangel
because he said he could only find one hypothesis in JARPA, and you said there were some more.
Are the hypotheses that you found the ones before you, on pages 61 and 62?
Mr. WALLØE: I agree that some of these hypotheses are related to the krill surplus
hypothesis. But they are not different versions of it. Some of them are also independent of that.
But I agree on that point: these are many of them, connected to that.
- 38 -
Mr. GLEESON: What I am putting for your consideration, Sir, is that to the extent one can
find any hypothesis in JARPA II, we find them at pages 61 and 62. That’s the first point. And the
second point is: if you go back to page 11, the hypotheses relate to only one of the four objectives,
namely, the objective of building an ecosystem model. Do you agree with that?
Mr. WALLØE:
I agree, but first I would like to comment on the first hypothesis in
Appendix 5 on page 61. The hypothesis of the constant overall carrying capacity is not related to
the krill surplus hypothesis. That could be related to climate change, for instance.
Mr. GLEESON: Yes. Thank you. Now, looking at these hypotheses and the goal of
building a model, do you understand from JARPA II the model is designed to explore competition
between whale species?
Mr. WALLØE: Yes. I realize some of it is dependent upon competition. But you have to
have the right understanding of what is meant by competition here: competition is not necessarily
the competition that the animals are in the same area eating on the same krill at the same time. It
could be that humpback whales were eating krill at one point in the ocean and minke whales at
another time in another area, but still the krill abundance is limited, so if the humpbacks eat much,
then it will be less left over for the minke whales, even if they don’t see each other, they are not
competing in the sense that lions and hyenas are competing over a killed animal in Africa.
Mr. GLEESON: Could you tell the Court, Sir, whether the second objective that we are
looking at together with the hypotheses and the model-building exercise reveals what data is
necessary to collect in order to build the proposed model.
Mr. WALLØE: No, I am not agreeing on that point because to measure krill, which I think
is what you are . . .
Mr. GLEESON: So, you may not understand my question. My question was whether, when
we read objective 2, on pages 11 and 12, do the JARPA scientists tell us what data they propose to
collect in order to test the hypotheses and build a model?
- 39 -
Mr. WALLØE: I am not sure I understand your questions but . . .
Mr. GLEESON: It is a simple question, Sir. Can you read from these pages what data Japan
proposes to collect to test the hypotheses and to build the model. Can you tell us whether you can
read that on these pages or not?
Mr. WALLØE: Sorry but it will take me some minutes to read these pages and I have not
read them now, so I am not sure I can answer the question without either being given time to read,
if it is page 11 and then page 61, or shall I try to answer without having read?
Mr. GLEESON: No Sir, if you need time to read, please do, but I understand you told the
Court earlier this afternoon that you have read every report from Australia, you have heard all the
evidence last week and nothing causes you to change your mind. Is that your position?
Mr. WALLØE: That is my position but I do not recollect every word of what I have read in
these reports.
The PRESIDENT: Maybe Mr. Gleeson, you can identify the paragraph which Mr. Walløe
has to read now? Not the full two pages but the relevant paragraphs.
Mr. GLEESON: Yes. I am inviting you to read Sir, on page 11, the second half of the
page . . .
Mr. WALLØE: “The monitoring of cetacean habitat”, is that the part?
Mr. GLEESON: Commencing with the heading, the heading is the next one: “The second
objective is modelling competition”, I invite you to read that and read over to page 12.
Mr. WALLØE: To No. 3 there, five lines?
Mr. GLEESON: To No. 3, and then I will ask you the question again.
Mr. WALLØE: Yes, I will read this paragraph. Yes, I have read these paragraphs.
- 40 -
Mr. GLEESON: Now, to be fair to you, I am also going to ask you to go to page 15, near the
bottom of the page you see the same heading, “Modelling competition” and you see more detail on
the model over on page 16, so if you read the bottom of page 15 and then most of page 16 and then
tell us when you are ready.
Mr. WALLØE: So I read down to II, is that what you are . . ? I have done.
Mr. GLEESON: Yes, my question is, having refreshed your memory on objective 2 and the
model building exercise, does the JARPA II proposal tell us what data needs to be collected to
carry out this exercise?
Mr. WALLØE: I take it that it is not specified here in these pages? I agree. But I take it in
the context that they would first of all like to have abundance data on minke whales but also maybe
abundance data on the two other species mentioned, or three, humpbacks, fin whale is of course
difficult, so but that is stated here, and blue whales, and in the Scientific Committee we have at
least now some numbers on not only the abundance but also the rate of increase of especially
humpback but also blue whales. Fin whales are more difficult.
Mr. GLEESON: Apart from that inference, does the document tell us what data is needed to
build the model?
Mr. WALLØE: No, but I assume . . .
Mr. GLEESON: Thank you, Sir. Could I ask you the next question. If we are not told what
data is needed for the model, does that mean that we do not have any statistical basis for knowing
how many whales must be killed in order to build the model?
Mr. WALLØE: No, not necessarily because there is a reference to a model here which I
know fairly well, the Mori and Butterworth 2004 model, which of course was a model developed
with less data, but it is an interesting model and I think that something starting from that model
would be interesting and you have abundance data and especially for minke whales you would get
- 41 -
more abundance data, not only from JARPA II but also from the other research programs going on
in the Southern Ocean.
Mr. GLEESON: You know, do you not, Sir, that the Mori and Butterworth model is
referenced here as an example of a model tried in the past. JARPA II does not say it seeks to
populate that model. Is that accurate?
Mr. WALLØE:
It does not say it here, no.
I do not know whether it is mentioned
somewhere else but it is quite clear that in the Scientific Committee the Mori and Butterworth
model has been discussed many times and in many different contexts. And it has also been agreed
in discussions in the Scientific Committee that to measure krill abundance in itself by acoustic
means or by other means is very difficult because they are patchy in their distribution, they can
hide somewhere where you do not get access to them by the acoustic methods, so to use the
abundance of whales and especially changes in the abundance of whales is a good way to also get
hold of, is anything changing by the primary production, for instance, of krill.
Mr. GLEESON: Let me ask you to go back to your statement to the Court, at page 9 of your
statement to the Court. And this is on the topic of sample size.
Mr. WALLØE: Page 9?
Mr. GLEESON: You say on page 9, in the middle paragraph, you have repeated some
calculations for a few variables making assumptions and you believe the results in JARPA II are of
the right order of magnitude. Why did you not include those calculations in your report so that the
Court and Australia could consider them?
Mr. WALLØE: The reason is, and that is one of the, as I state here, weaknesses of the
JARPA II documents, that I do not really know how they have calculated the sample sizes. I have
to make guesses and that is what I state. Somewhere here I write that the explanation has not
always . . . I mean that is my criticism of the JARPA II program. I had to make a number of
assumptions which may or may not agree with the Japanese scientists but the basic is, if you should
detect changes over a six-year period, and of course a six-year period is arbitrary, you could choose
- 42 -
12 years or something else, but I think the Japanese scientists wanted to see if they could detect
changes over six years. And then it is not only the higher per cent significance level but also the
power of the test, with what probability should they be able to detect any changes, the lower degree
of changes. So I calculated, for instance, because it had special interest to me for the change in age
and sexual maturity and I found that to get any detectable you would need in the order of
magnitude 900 whales.
Mr. GLEESON: Professor Walløe, this seems to be your evidence: firstly, when you read
JARPA and tried to make sense of the statistical calculations of sample size, you have found great
difficulty doing so. Is that accurate?
Mr. WALLØE: Yes.
Mr. GLEESON: And secondly, you have done a piece of work, which is somewhere, but not
before this Court, where you have attempted to see whether you can understand the JARPA II
calculations. Is that accurate?
Mr. WALLØE: That is accurate and I think that is what I am writing in my report. I note
the numbers that I found difficulties in.
Mr. GLEESON: These calculations that you did Professor Walløe, where are they?
Mr. WALLØE: Well, I think they are in my desk back in Norway. I do not have them in my
mind here now.
Mr. GLEESON: No. Was there a reason why you chose not to include them in your report
so that the Court and Australia could consider your opinion properly?
Mr. WALLØE: I think that to say that it was not sufficiently clear. I think that the Japanese
have given a table, which I think is based on my interpretation and I have not discussed this with
my Japanese colleagues but I think what they have done is to look up in a textbook of statistics and
they have seen that some of these calculations have been done in that textbook. I think I also know
- 43 -
which textbook it is but without having better evidence, I would not like to present it. I do not
think that they are guessing, they are using some statistical textbook.
Mr. GLEESON:
I will just ask you again, Mr. Walløe, why did you not bring your
calculations to this Court and to Australia so that we could assess the work you were doing? Is
there a reason or not?
Mr. WALLØE: There is no other reason that I did not think that was, when I made the
criticism  and of course I have, you have, Australia also had the documents  where they
present this table, so I thought that was sufficient to say that I did not really understand it but that is
my answer.
Mr. GLEESON: Let me take this a step further. If we go to tab 15, and it is on the screen
shortly, the calculation in JARPA for humpback whales, in order to get a sample size somewhere
near the 50 which is in JARPA, required two assumptions; firstly a project running for 12 years,
and secondly seeking to detect a change in the relevant parameter of either 3 per cent up or
3 per cent down. Do you recall analysing that?
Mr. WALLØE: Yes.
Mr. GLEESON: And the parameter here we are looking at is the proportion of pregnant
female whales. Do you recall that?
Mr. WALLØE: Yes.
Mr. GLEESON: Now, would you agree that an assumption of a change of 3 per cent per
annum, or 36 per cent over the 12 years, is biologically implausible, based on what we know about
humpback whale pregnancy?
Mr. WALLØE: I am not sure I can answer that question because I think we have had that
kind of discussion, but 3 per cent per year for a humpback whale, I am not sure that that is
unrealistic.
- 44 -
Mr. GLEESON: I do not wish to be unfair to you, perhaps I should ask you this question:
when you read the JARPA proposal, did you find a justification in JARPA for thinking that a
36 per cent change, up or down, over 12 years, was a plausible hypothesis worth testing? Did you
find that in JARPA?
Mr. WALLØE: No, but I am a little uncertain.
Mr. GLEESON: Thank you. Could I ask you my next question? My time is very short.
Mr. WALLØE: My comments in my Expert Statement are not on humpback whales but on
minke whales.
Mr. GLEESON: Bear with me for one moment, Sir. I will now ask you to be shown tab 16
which is where with the fin whales, putting it briefly, would you agree that the exercise of sampling
50 whales assumed a 12-year project and a 36 per cent change up or down over that period.
Mr. WALLØE:
I think, before you continue, that what I did not write in my Expert
Statement, but what I was prepared to say, is that during the consultations I had with Japan,
Japanese scientists, I never liked the, especially, the fin whale proposal which is what I said to the
Japanese before they . . . I never liked the fin whale proposal because I think, and especially with
18 whales caught, it is no information you can get from it. And also there are difficulties with the
humpback proposal, although I think that is better presented and justified than the fin whale
proposal.
Mr. GLEESON: Thank you for that candid statement. Just my question though was, would
you agree that in terms of what JARPA tells us, the fin whales are approached the same way as the
humpbacks, namely the sample size of about 50 assumes a 12-year collection program and a
36 per cent increase up or down over that 12 years.
And if you do not make those two
assumptions, the whole statistics are worthless, are they not?
Mr. WALLØE: Yes.
- 45 -
Mr. GLEESON: Now I will ask for you to be shown at tab 17 the equivalent table for the
minke whales. If one carried through the same assumptions  12 years and a 3 per cent change 
the JARPA proposal indicates you would only need to kill 18 whales. Is that correct?
Mr. WALLØE: Well . . .
Mr. GLEESON: Is that correct as far as that goes? I will ask you the next question after
that.
Mr. WALLØE: I agree that this table shows this, but then I would like to point out that in
my Expert Statement I say that most of these calculations  and it is not only for whale research,
my experience is from medical research  is that the power calculations in giving these kind of
small numbers, never is justified in practise because you do not know the distribution, you do not
know the shape of the distribution, and for this reason in medical research I have been involved in,
I mentioned it in my Expert Statement, there is always reason to have fairly large additional
number of patients in the medical research and in this case I do not believe these small numbers
when you rely on polar analysis.
Mr. GLEESON: You would agree, though, if one applied the principles of the humpback
and the fin whales to the minke whales  that is 12 years and 3 per cent change  you would only
need a small number of whales?
Mr. WALLØE: Yes.
Mr. GLEESON: However, what JARPA II does is make two changes to assumption. Firstly
it looks for a smaller change, namely 1 to 1.5 per cent, and secondly it changes to six years and not
12 years. That is what allows JARPA II to get a number somewhere in the range of 850, isn’t it?
Mr. WALLØE: Yes.
Mr. GLEESON: When you read the proposal, did you find a scientific explanation for
choosing 12 years for humpback and fin, but only six years for minke whales?
- 46 -
Mr. WALLØE: As I said a moment ago, I was not that much concerned about the fin and
humpback whales because I did not really like that part of the JARPA program.
Mr. GLEESON: Did you find a scientific justification for choosing 12 years in two cases
and six years in the other case?
Mr. WALLØE: No, I did not consider the 12 years in the two first cases but I did consider
six or 12 years in the minke whale case. The argument, as I understood it, was that because
implementation reviews in RMP take place every six years, that was the period the Japanese
scientists or maybe even the Government, had chosen because of the six-year implementation
review period of the RMP.
Mr. GLEESON: Then why choose 12 years for humpback and fin, Sir?
Mr. WALLØE: As I said, I never considered humpback and fin because I did not like the
proposal to catch, especially fin whales, but also humpback whales.
The PRESIDENT: Mr. Gleeson, you have three or four minutes remaining. I would say
three.
Mr. GLEESON: Thank you, Mr. President. If you go back to your report, Sir, to page 10.
Mr. WALLØE: Excuse me, I have to remove this then. To page 10?
Mr. GLEESON: In the second paragraph you say you often had the impression that sample
sizes were also influenced by funding considerations. Could you explain what you mean by that?
Mr. WALLØE: I meant that funding considerations are also considered when funding
bodies, like research councils and so on, are considering costly research projects or a research
program, and in this case this is of the order of, what, 850 is what one such vessel could cope with
in one season and bring back to Japan. So I think these kinds of considerations were part of the
number 850. But I would also like to say that for some of the questions, even larger sample sizes
than are written here, would be necessary.
- 47 -
Mr. GLEESON: Two final questions, Sir. If you have problems with the humpback and fin
aspect of the proposal, do you consider that undermines the credibility, scientifically, of a proposal
which says it is seeking to model competition between the various whale species?
Mr. WALLØE: I consider especially the proposal of fin whales not very well conceived
because the main part of the fin whale population are outside the area of JARPA, further to the
north, and again this . . . cannot be random because of the lengthy limit, they only could catch small
fin whales.
But for humpbacks, I am sorry to say this because I know that humpbacks are, well it has
been used the word “sacred” animals here previously, I understand that it would be emotionally
very difficult, but it is a better scientific justification for taking humpbacks, because they operate in
the same area and it would be interesting, even with a small number, to see whether there are
changes in, for instance, the amount of krill in the stomach of the humpbacks or whether there are
changes in the blubber, and so on. There are many questions you could ask the humpback but I
understand also that it is emotionally difficult and I think it is possible, even without sampling
humpbacks, to get the information about the changes in the ecosystem and perhaps about the
competition. One such example is . . .
Mr. GLEESON: Professor Walløe, could I interrupt you there, without being rude, I am at
my final time. My last question is this. Have you formed the view that the Norwegian chair of the
IWC, that is the first chair, Mr. Birger Bergersen, now deceased, had in mind that Article VIII
would be appropriate under science for taking less than ten whales and he never intended for
hundreds of whales to be killed for this purpose and, if you did, what was the source of your
statement?
Mr. WALLØE: I agree and I expected this question, because I know I was interviewed, that
is quite a while ago but I was at the time, that was after I was engaged in the whaling, I was asked
to write an article about Mr. Birger Bergersen for the Norwegian Encyclopedia of Prominent
Persons  you know, you have it in the UK, you have it in other countries, a national biography 
I was asked to write his biography so I went to the National Archives, looked into his papers and I
- 48 -
had a somewhat different picture from what we heard from the Australian side about the history of
the Convention because much of the work occurred not in 1946 but in the 1930s, resulting in the
agreement of 1937. And I read Birger Bergersen’s old, everyday notes from the meeting in London
in 1937, I read all of them, and it is also true that the concept of what is now Article VIII which had
a different number at that time, appeared on the very last day of that long meeting in London. It
was introduced without any explanation and in his notes at that time, Birger Bergersen, he was an
anatomist, Kellogg from the United States was an archaeologist, they were not whale scientists, but
Birger Bergersen in a letter to Kellogg wrote that it could be necessary to even if there was a new
species of whale and, remember at that time, Bryde’s whales was discovered not many years
before. It was discovered that it was a species separate from the Sei whale. That was in the 1920s.
So ten years later, Bergersen as an anatomist argued that we need this paragraph which is now
Article VIII to be sure that we could kill whales if we needed. So that was his science and that was
his . . . but I said so in an interview and I expected this question to come because of that.
Mr. GLEESON: I am not sure you have explained why you have concluded he thought no
more than ten would be necessary.
Mr. WALLØE: If you are an anatomist, you would probably in some cases only need one
animal but what he said was a low number and here wrote in that note, for example, less than ten.
Mr. GLEESON: Thank you. Thank you, Mr. President.
The PRESIDENT: You would like to re-examine, Mr. Lowe, please?
Mr. LOWE: Thank you, Mr. President, I have no other questions.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you very much. The Court will now retire for ten minutes but the
Parties and experts should remain in the vicinity of the Main Hall of Justice and after ten minutes’
break we will return and my understanding is that a few judges will have questions for Mr. Walløe.
The sitting is suspended for ten minutes.
- 49 -
Certainly I expect that Mr. Walløe will enjoy these ten minutes to refresh and not to be
engaged in conversation either with members of the Japanese delegation or Australian or some of
his colleagues from the Scientific Committee.
Mr. LOWE: Yes, no contact with counsel during this break.
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. The hearing is resumed. The first judge to put a
question or questions to Mr. Walløe is Judge Greenwood. You have the floor.
Judge GREENWOOD: Thank you very much, Mr. President. Professor Walløe, I think it
would save time if you had a copy of your own report open in front of you, because I want to ask
you a couple of questions.
Mr. WALLØE: I have it here.
Judge GREENWOOD: Would you look at page 10, please?
Mr. WALLØE: Yes.
Judge GREENWOOD: In the second paragraph there you say “it must be admitted that the
Japanese scientists have not always given completely transparent and clear explanations of how
sample sizes were calculated or determined, and on reading the research proposals for JARPA and
JARPA II submitted to the IWC Scientific Committee, I often had the impression that sample sizes
were also influenced by funding considerations”. Would you just explain to the Court please which
sample sizes you are referring to there, in relation to JARPA II?
Mr. WALLØE: I am referring to the sample size of what I consider 850.
Judge GREENWOOD: So the minke whales?
Mr. WALLØE: The minke whales. I am not commenting on the sample size of humpbacks
or fin whales.
- 50 -
Judge GREENWOOD: Right. Thank you very much. And do you understand the scientific
rationale, from reading the paper to the IWC Scientific Committee which you were asked about
earlier, do you understand the scientific rationale for the change from the sample size under JARPA
to the much larger sample size, I think it is twice what was being caught, twice the sample size in
the last couple of years of JARPA and nearly three times the initial JARPA size?
Mr. WALLØE: I was not at all involved in the beginning of the JARPA but I consider it as
it was explained to me that it was partly a feasibility study, although of course it was not only ten
whales, it was a large number even then. But what I am considering in my expert statement was
only the sample size for the JARPA II. JARPA itself is a much more difficult program and I must
admit I had some reservations on some parts of JARPA, but my expert statement is only for
JARPA II.
Judge GREENWOOD: Thank you very much. Well, perhaps I can just ask one follow-up
question about that. When JARPA II was first put to the IWC Scientific Committee as a proposed
program, part of that proposal was a move from the figure of 300 to 400 minke whales, which had
been the sample size for some 16 years in JARPA, to a figure that was more than twice as high. Do
you see a scientific rationale for why the original figure had been too small and therefore a new
higher figure was said to be necessary?
Mr. WALLØE: I think I saw the reasons for the larger number but I did of course at that
time not calculate the way I tried to do when writing this expert statement. But it was also obvious
that some of the objectives for JARPA were not met during the JARPA period, partly because the
sample sizes were too small. Not the only reason, but that was one of the reasons.
Judge GREENWOOD: Thank you very much.
The PRESIDENT:
Thank you very much.
The next judge to put a question is
Judge Cançado Trindade.
Judge CANÇADO TRINDADE: Thank you, Mr. President. As specialized knowledge in
the most diverse domains is seen nowadays as not self-sufficient, if not unsatisfactory, when kept
- 51 -
in isolation, there have been in recent years some wishful expressions of support for a relinking of
distinct areas of knowledge (reliant les connaissances), also  I would add  in relation to the
work of international tribunals, in their endeavours to instruct better the process, of cases brought
to their attention.
Keeping this in mind, I have three interrelated questions to put to
Professor Lars Walloe.
 First: in your opinion, would the utilization of lethal methods for the purpose of JARPA-II, as
opposed to alternative methods of “research”, lead to major or important “scientific” results? Are
those methods essential to obtain these results, or could such results be achieved by the means of
the utilization of non-lethal methods?
Mr. WALLØE: As I think I at least tried to say in my first 20 minutes here, I consider that it
is in theory possible to obtain the genetic information and some other information on pollution and
so on by biopsy sampling alone but my collaborators in Norway, we have experience from Barents
Sea and not from the Antarctic Ocean, it was much more efficient to obtain it by lethal sampling.
But there are other questions that could not be answered only by biopsy sampling. So really I
accepted the Japanese argument why lethal sampling was necessary.
Judge CANÇADO TRINDADE: Secondly, retaking a point already referred to: as to the
lines of the “scientific research” conducted under JARPA-II, and the objectives pursued thereunder,
can one determine the total of whales to be killed to attain such objectives?
Mr. WALLØE: No, you mean over a long period?
Judge CANÇADO TRINDADE: Yes, such as JARPA-II’s.
Mr. WALLØE: No, I cannot. I think that is difficult and it depends on which of the
different questions you are focusing on. I think for the time being for some more years it will be
justified to kill 850 but you must also remember that my background is, as I state, although it is not
relevant for this case, I consider that the killing of whales, as long as we are quite sure that it is
done in a humane way, like we kill other animals, and as long as we are quite sure that it is
sustainable, I do not see any argument to use the killing of whales as a scientific method?
- 52 -
Judge CANÇADO TRINDADE: And thirdly, and lastly: in your experience, can you think
of other programmes where the use of lethal methods has been deemed essential? And, if so, how
do you compare the use of lethal methods in other programmes to those in JARPA-II?
Mr. WALLØE: Sorry, but are you talking about whale research or research on animals in
general, because then it is although not necessarily, I mean I do not have it in my head, but it is
obvious that there are other examples in . . .
Judge CANÇADO TRINDADE: I am asking about whale research, since, as you yourself
referred, minutes ago,  before our brief break , to the exercise which will take place next year,
on evaluation of JARPA-II.
Mr. WALLØE: Of course, as I mentioned in the early 1990s, Norway was conducting
special permit research to get the amount of stomach contents but, in contrast to the Antarctic
where one or two species of krill is the main food for the whales, in the North Atlantic and the
Barents Sea there are three or four potential species and we had to show at that time how much
does our minke whales in the North Atlantic eat of the different species dependent on the
abundance of these species in the area around the minke whales. So we had to do lethal research to
get this and that was used in a computer model called Maltspec, which was presented then in
fisheries associations and published in fisheries journals. So for that research, it was necessary.
Judge CANÇADO TRINDADE:
Thank you, Professor Lars Walloe;
thank you,
Mr. President.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you very much. The next judge to put a question is Judge Yusuf.
Judge YUSUF: Thank you, Mr. President. Professor Walløe, I would like to understand
better your position with regard to the criteria put forward by Dr. Mangel, on the characteristics of
a program for scientific research. I understand that you disagree with those criteria? Did you say
you disagree with those criteria?
- 53 Mr. WALLØE: If you are referring to the four criteria  and I do not have the text of them
in front of me, so then I have to ask to have them here  but I think I agree with much of it, but
not all of it. That is my recollection now, but I would like to see the statements before.
Judge YUSUF: They are on page 5 of your report.
Mr. WALLØE: In my report? Then I should be able to, I thought you were talking about
some other, sorry. Oh, yes. In addition, which I did not mention here, it is the fourth criteria that
it should not endanger the stock, which was one in addition to the three here. The fourth one I
agree completely with, so that is the reason I did not mention it. But for these three here, I agree 
that was what I tried to say in the beginning  I agree that there should be some questions,
something the scientists would like to explore, but not necessarily focused questions. That is where
I disagree: the focused question, if that is meaning in the sense that Mangel uses it, it is a
hypothesis which is as precise that you can tell which kind of observation and how many will you
need to get the 5 per cent level and the power of 80 per cent or 95 per cent  to use the statistical
terms  then I do not agree. But I agree on the first part; concerning the second one, yes, if you
employ the correct set of empirical tools, I agree, but to answer the question, including setting
sample sizes, with sound statistical reasoning, yes. But as I already wrote in this statement and also
explained more in detail, I have serious concerns about the use of statistical way to calculate
sample sizes, because it very often fails and the reason is statistical, that you never know what kind
of distributions you will have of the variables you are investigating. And that is one reason why
one of my other scientific fields has been to investigate the robustness of the statistical methods and
I have even developed, by computer simulation with one of my graduate students, methods which
can be used in clinical studies where you do not need to calculate sample sizes beforehand. That is
called sequential methods which cannot be used in this kind of whale research, but is now being
very much used in clinical trials on new drugs or new treatments.
Judge YUSUF: Thank you. You have been a member of the Scientific Committee for a
very long time. Has this issue of defining the characteristics of a program for purposes of scientific
- 54 -
research, establishing criteria for such scientific research, ever come up in the Scientific
Committee  at least as long as you have been a member of that Committee?
Mr. WALLØE: It has come up, yes, in the context of JARPA and JARPAN and JARPA II,
the three research programs of which only two are mentioned here. It has been discussed in the
Scientific Committee and there has been a fair amount of disagreement in the Scientific Committee
on these issues.
Judge YUSUF: So, the Scientific Committee has never established any criteria as far as you
can recollect?
Mr. WALLØE: Not more than you can read out of the different Annexes which were
agreed, proposed by the Scientific Committee then to the Commission and then come back, as I
understand, legally in the form of a resolution. It needs only a simple majority, but it was always
passed with consensus both in the Scientific Committee and in the Commission. And for this
reason, of course that is what I meant by, we have this fourth possible objective which is different
from management, the whales and so on. To that extent we have these Annexes which have
changed a little over time, we have agreement in the Scientific Committee.
Judge YUSUF: And my last question actually which is always on the same subject is: are
you aware of any criteria, or set of criteria, that have been established or adopted by professional
bodies in your areas of scientific research, for the definition of a scientific research project?
Mr. WALLØE: Yes, I am aware but it depends a little on what you mean by criteria, but for
instance in the area of medical research you have a set of criteria which will go both to the ethics of
the study about, for instance, that it is unethical to perform a study without sufficient power
because then you throw away, you use patients for things which will give no useful knowledge. So
in the area of medical research especially concerning patients you have a defined set of criteria,
yes.
Judge YUSUF: Thank you very much, Professor Walløe. Thank you, Mr. President.
- 55 -
The PRESIDENT: I next call upon Judge Bennouna to put his question. Vouz avez la
parole, Monsieur.
Judge BENNOUNA: Thank you, Mr. President.
I have one question for you,
Professor Walløe. While I will do it step by step, and probably you will see where I am going 
what I mean, what will finally be my question. Professor Walløe, can you say to the Court for how
long are you personally involved or active in scientific research in whaling, particularly in the
Antarctic?
Mr. WALLØE: In the Antarctic, that is a little difficult to say, but my interest in the whaling
issue, as I responded to a question by Professor Lowe, I can give the date even  it was in 1986, in
May, when the Commission meeting ended, it was in Sweden that year, and it was shown on the
television how the Norwegian Commission at the time was interviewed  Per Tresselt, I
mentioned him earlier  and also a major figure on the anti-whaling body, Dr. Sidney Hoult, and
these two were talking against each other. Immediately afterwards I got a telephone call from
Mrs Brundtland and then my engagement started. But for the Antarctic, it started with killing
methods and that was both for the North Pacific and for the Southern Ocean, because it was a
question whether the killing methods were efficient. The Japanese at that time used the secondary
killing method, that is when the harpoon does not killing the whale, how can you then kill it? They
used the method called the “electric lance”. It was very heavily criticized in the Commission, it
was not the topic for the Scientific Committee. At one point in time, that was in 1996, I was asked
or I offered  that is more correct  because I thought the Japanese had good evidence that the
electric lance was efficient although I thought that the Norwegian method, of shooting by rifle was
better, so I offered to do the calculations. After some time I was given the data and that was my
first involvement with  that was ten years after I started in the Commission and in the Scientific
Committee  I had no contact with the Japanese except for pleasantries in the Commission, during
the first ten years, but then it started.
Judge BENNOUNA: Thank you very much. I imagine that Japan was concerned by
scientific research in whaling before the launching of JARPA?
- 56 -
Mr. WALLØE: Yes.
Judge BENNOUNA: In 1987. You know also that in 1987  this is an important date
because you started yourself, you said, in 1986  is concomitant with the acceptance by Japan of
the moratorium on whaling for commercial purposes. My question, or what I would like, or the
Court, would like to know from you is first how Japan conducted its research in this field before
JARPA? If you know?
Mr. WALLØE: I know some of it, but maybe my information is not sufficiently precise.
But, they obtained samples and data from the commercial whaling. And that is for instance, what
gave the information about the decline in age of sexual maturity from the year 1945 to 1970 which
I referred to. That is in total based on the commercial catches. So evidence obtained. I do not
know whether they had scientists on board the vessels or whether their samples were collected after
the vessels came to port. So I do not have detailed information. But it was conveyed, in the
Antarctic, from the commercial catches.
Judge BENNOUNA: That is interesting. So the samples were taken from commercial
catches? So my following question, perhaps it is the final one  do not worry  do you know
exactly why, is it by pure chance, why Japan decided precisely with the moratorium, the end of
commercial catching, to launch this program of JARPA for scientific research in 1987? Why, do
you know exactly why, Japan decided at that time, in 1987, to launch this program called JARPA?
Mr. WALLØE: I have two comments. Because I was, as you understood, close to my
Prime Minister at the time, Ms Brundtland, I was involved; not part of the negotiations, but I was
observing and giving her information on what was happening. And, what was happening was, as
we have heard the other day, the United States put strong pressure on three countries: Japan,
Iceland and Norway. And the two other countries gave in to the pressure. Well, Ms Brundtland
was stubborn, and said we are a loyal member of NATO, we are doing everything according to
United States wishes, I do not want to be put under pressure here. So, she decided not to withdraw
the moratorium. But of course, we had contacts. But, I was not involved, I only heard about it
from my Prime Minister that the Japanese were considering to withdraw the objection, because
- 57 -
they expected that in 1990 there would be a reconsideration. And, as there were many whales in
the Antarctic Ocean  but this is indirect, I did not hear this from the Japanese, I heard it from
Ms Brundtland and her people at the Prime Minister’s office. So, I think that was the background,
but also, and that was part of why we managed  the Norwegians managed  to resist the
pressure, was that we then decided at least we have to collect scientific evidence. And I was first
put in as a Chair of a small group of scientists  the United Kingdom and one American scientist.
The American, later, was not allowed by his Government to take part, so it ended up by two
Norwegian and two British scientists  prominent British scientists  Roy Anderson and
Ray Beverton. As a result, the next year, was that there was no strong evidence that the minke
whale abundance in the North Atlantic was declining but that if Norway wanted to continue its
catch of minke whales, we should have better scientific evidence. And then the science started on
our part. I know that the Japanese needed better and more research, but now I am guessing, I guess
that there is a reason why they started this JARPA program immediately. But that is what I heard
from the Japanese.
Judge BENNOUNA: Thank you very much.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you. And the next judge is Judge Keith. Please, you have the
floor.
Judge KEITH: Thank you, Mr. President. Thank you, Professor Walløe. Could I take you
back to your initial document and the bottom of page 13 and the top of page 14, where you are
commenting about the purpose of monitoring the Antarctic ecosystem? And I take your point that
the area that the Japanese said they were monitoring was half the circumference of the Antarctic, a
very large area. As a matter of scientific method  and this a question very much from the
position of ignorance  there were, I understand, or there are I understand, a number of other
research projects related to that very broad matter going on in your part of the world as well, as
well as my part of the world, although where I live we are only halfway to the Antarctic, but as
thinking of SORP, Pacific and CCAMLR and the Scientific Committee for Antarctic Research.
And I think there are two Japanese institutes for Polar Research and for Far Eastern Fisheries. And
- 58 -
my question is whether it would make good scientific sense in the case of a project like JARPA and
JARPA II for there to be linkages, because I have not noticed that there are any linkages into such
other projects which have the broad Antarctic ecosystem in mind? Thank you.
Mr. WALLØE: I am not quite sure I understand the question. But was the question whether
my opinion on a possible co-operation between the CCAMLR science and the JARPA II program?
Judge KEITH: Yes.
Mr. WALLØE: And because that covers the whole circumference of the Antarctica? Of
course I would consider that valuable if it was possible. But, and this brings me back to the
political issue, there are strong opinions in the Scientific Committee about the value of the lethal
research. And some of the same scientists are from the CCAMLR Scientific Committee. One of
them is the scientist I referred to in my earlier speech. So, we have Norwegian scientists on the
CCAMLR, because Norway has some political interests in the Antarctic. But I think it would be
difficult for personal and political reasons. But I would like to add that, to my personal meaning, it
would be helpful and, since this was not asked by the Australian examiner of me previously, I
would like to state that I am now also entering into collaboration with Australia on the SORP
program, in collaboration with Dr. Gales. Because I consider, as you suggest, that co-operation
will be useful.
Judge KEITH: Two of the bodies I mentioned  and I realized that was a big wrapped up
question  but two of the bodies were Japanese institutes, and there would not be the same
political problem there, would there? But do you have any reaction in terms of the Japanese
Institute for Polar Research and for Far Eastern Fisheries? Maybe their fields do not sufficiently
overlap, I do not know?
Mr. WALLØE: Again, I have some difficulties in hearing what you were saying. But are
asking “Are there other scientific institutions in Japan that we could have a better collaboration
with?” Yes, I agree.
Judge KEITH: Thank you.
- 59 The PRESIDENT: Thank you. And, Judge Charlesworth’s question. You have the floor,
Madam.
Judge CHARLESWORTH: Thank you, Mr. President. Thank you, Professor Walløe. My
question is also just one of scientific method, like Judge Keith’s. I am just wondering how do
scientists assess whether the sample of minke whales it has taken under JARPA II is representative
of the minke population as a whole? How do you know you are not just catching the slow whales,
for example?
Mr. WALLØE: Of course it is, in a statistical sense, not representative of minke whales
from the other half of the circumference of Antarctica. We do not know where the outer borders of
the two main stocks are. They could meet on the other side of the Antarctica or there could be one
or more other stocks with different biological characteristics. But, we, at present, do not know that.
But, I still think that the information collected will be of great value for the two stocks. And also
the problem of their sub stocks, of which there are no evidence, so far.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you very much.
This completes the examination of
Professor Walløe. I thank him, on behalf of the Court, for appearing before us and he can now
leave the rostrum. And as we have some 45 minutes left, I call on Professor Pellet to continue in
his pleading.
Mr. WALLØE: Before I leave, may I say thank you, Mr. President, and thank you to the
Members of the Court for the interesting questions.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you very much, Professor.
M. PELLET : Merci beaucoup, Monsieur le président. Je pense que ça tombe bien et que je
ne devrais pas du tout dépasser les 45 minutes.
Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs de la Cour, ce matin, j’ai montré que
l’article VIII était limpide ; «crystal clear», c’est bien plus poétique. Dans ces conditions, il n’est
pas nécessaire de recourir à des méthodes complémentaires ou auxiliaires d’interprétation, comme
je l’ai dit, cela ne nuit pas et ces méthodes, en fait, confirment en tout point ce que la lecture du
- 60 texte enseigne lorsque l’on s’en tient au sens clair et naturel de ces termes. C’est vrai s’agissant du
préambule, des travaux préparatoires ou de la pratique ultérieure et c’est à cette pratique ultérieure
que j’en suis arrivé, à la fin de la session de ce matin.
C. La pratique ultérieure
36. Monsieur le président, l’Australie fait grand cas de la pratique ultérieure des Parties1.
Elle ne sert pas davantage sa thèse que le recours au contexte ou aux travaux préparatoires. Au
contraire, la pratique pertinente  et je me permets d’insister sur ce mot, Monsieur le président, la
pratique pertinente  confirme que l’article VIII, qui constitue une exception au regard des autres
règles applicables à la chasse à la baleine, contenues dans la convention, confère un pouvoir
discrétionnaire aux gouvernements contractants pour délivrer les permis spéciaux et fixer leur
contenu, y compris l’autorisation de «tuer, capturer et traiter des baleines» et le nombre d’animaux
concernés conformément à ce qu’il juge «opportun».
37. Trois constatations peuvent être faites :
1. les textes de droit dérivé ayant une valeur obligatoire qu’invoque l’Australie ne sont pas
applicables en l’espèce ou n’ont pas la signification qu’elle leur prête ;
2. s’il est exact que d’autres semblent conforter la thèse australienne, il s’agit exclusivement
d’instruments qui constituent de pures recommandations ; et
3. c’est bien pour cela que l’Australie et d’autres Etats «antichasse» ont tenté d’obtenir la revision
de la convention, et en particulier de l’article VIII  et ceci en vain à ce jour.
1. La valeur juridique variable des textes adoptés par la Commission
38. L’usage massif que fait l’Australie des textes adoptés par la CBI 2 conduit à s’interroger
sur le rôle que ceux-ci peuvent se voir attribuer dans la présente affaire.
39. Le paragraphe 2 de l’article III de la convention, qui précise les compétences appartenant
à la CBI et les conditions de leur exercice, pose le principe de l’adoption des «décisions» de la
1
2
MA, p. 164-170, par. 4.65-4.80 ; CR 2013/8, p. 35-41, par. 35-52 (Crawford).
Voir surtout p. 27-52, par. 2.47-2.98, p. 147-152, par. 4.20-4.30, p. 160-161, par. 4.53-4.56, p. 164-170,
par. 4.65-4.80.
- 61 commission «à la majorité simple des membres votants», mais il précise qu’«une majorité des trois
quarts des membres votants sera requise pour les décisions prises en vertu de l’article V».
40. Cette différence dans le système de vote se traduit par une différence de valeur normative
entre les deux types d’actes que la CBI peut adopter : les amendements au règlement d’une part et
les actes recommandatoires d’autre part.
L’article V de la convention donne en effet à la
commission le pouvoir de modifier le règlement annexé à la convention, qui a la même valeur que
celle-ci3. En conséquence, les amendements adoptés par la CBI selon la majorité renforcée des
trois quarts4 sont obligatoires pour les parties, sauf dans le cas où «un gouvernement présente à la
commission une objection à un amendement, avant l’expiration [d’un] délai de quatre-vingt-dix
jours»5, auquel cas il ne s’impose pas  cet amendement ne s’impose pas  à ce gouvernement.
Par contraste, les actes adoptés par la commission selon la règle de la majorité simple n’ont pas de
valeur obligatoire, qu’un gouvernement y objecte ou non.
41. Parmi les amendements au règlement adoptés par la CBI, un seul concerne la matière
régie par l’article VIII de la convention : il s’agit du paragraphe 30 du règlement adopté en
19796  son texte figure sous l’onglet no 2 du dossier des juges. Les autres amendements auxquels
l’Australie fait référence comme étant des «mesures supplémentaires de conservation»7
(«additional conservation measures», écrit-elle)  à savoir : l’instauration des sanctuaires de
l’océan Indien8 et de l’océan Antarctique9, ou le moratoire de la chasse commerciale10 ou le
moratoire sur les usines flottantes11  tous ces autres règlements sont applicables à la seule chasse
commerciale, mais non aux permis spéciaux. Ils ne peuvent donc en aucune manière informer
l’interprétation de l’article VIII.
3
Voir art. 1er, par. 1.
4
Art. III, par. 2.
5
Art. V, par. 3 a).
6
CMJ, annexe 6.
7
MA, p. 160, par. 4.53. Voir aussi CR 2013/11, p. 34-35, par. 35 (Gleeson).
8
CMJ, annexe 6, par. 7 a).
9
Ibid., par. 7 b).
10
Ibid., par. 10 e).
11
Ibid., par. 10 e).
- 62 42. L’Australie déduit du paragraphe 30 du règlement que celui-ci a eu pour effet de réduire
le pouvoir discrétionnaire dont les gouvernements contractants bénéficient en vertu de
l’article VIII. Selon elle, l’introduction de cette disposition aurait eu pour effet d’amender cet
article, pour établir «detailed criteria that had to be addressed before a Contracting Government
could issue a permit under Article VIII»12. Bien qu’elle soit plus nuancée, la Nouvelle-Zélande
estime pour sa part que le paragraphe 30 a été introduit pour permettre à la commission de
surveiller l’application de l’article VIII, impliquant ainsi, sans doute, mais sans vraiment oser le
dire, que la CBI pourrait se prononcer sur la validité des permis octroyés pour, éventuellement, en
empêcher l’octroi13. Je relève tout de même que, prudemment, le professeur Crawford affirme que
«là n’est pas la question»  «that is not the point»14. J’ai connu mon ami moins circonspect  et
il faut sans doute que «la question» lui paraisse bien embarrassante pour qu’il botte ainsi en
touche...
43. En réalité, le paragraphe 30 guide un pouvoir qui demeure discrétionnaire, mais n’en
contraint pas l’exercice. Il en va de même des lignes directrices, qui sont des documents adoptés
par le comité scientifique15 afin de guider l’application du paragraphe 30 en ce qui concerne
l’examen des permis spéciaux. Ces documents, qui sont appelés annexes (L, O ou P)16, ont été par
la suite endossés par la CBI, à travers une série de résolutions. Ni l’un ni les autres ne transforment
un pouvoir discrétionnaire en une compétence liée. Mme Takashiba reviendra plus longuement sur
ce point demain matin.
44. Il me suffira donc de dire que le Japon ne conteste pas la valeur obligatoire du
paragraphe 30, mais il n’en résulte pas pour autant que cette disposition puisse être réputée avoir
modifié la convention comme nos amis de l’autre côté de la barre le prétendent17. Nulle part dans
la convention, il n’est envisagé que la commission pourrait modifier les dispositions mêmes de
12
MA, par. 4.30.
13
Voir OEN, par. 86 ou 105.
14
CR 2013/8, p. 33, par. 29.
15
Voir CMJ, par. 8.31. Voir aussi CR 2013/8, p. 21-22, par. 28-30.
16
Voir CMJ, par. 8.68.
17
Voir CR 2013/7, p. 61, par. 66 (Boisson de Chazournes).
- 63 celle-ci par le biais d’amendements au règlement en vertu de l’article V18. Certes, le règlement est
partie intégrante de la convention, mais les amendements que la commission peut lui apporter de
temps à autre font l’objet  en vertu de l’article V  de règles spécifiques, qui ne s’appliquent pas
à la revision du corps même de la convention. Et ceci montre bien que les Parties ne sauraient
amender la convention par le biais de cette procédure simplifiée.
45. Du reste, la pratique ultérieure des Etats parties confirme qu’ils n’ont pas investi la CBI
d’un tel pouvoir de modification. Ainsi, dans l’unique hypothèse dans laquelle ils ont amendé le
texte même de la convention, ils l’ont fait par le biais d’un protocole, lui-même soumis à signature
et à ratification19.
46. Les conditions de l’adoption, en 1956, du seul protocole à la convention sont révélatrices
à plus d’un égard. Il s’agissait de modifier des dispositions du texte même de la convention afin
d’étendre les compétences de la CBI. Les gouvernements contractants s’accordaient à considérer
que ceci ne pouvait se faire à la sauvette, en se bornant à insérer dans le règlement des dispositions
modifiant le corps de la convention, si bien qu’il a été entendu que le protocole n’entrerait en
vigueur que lorsque tous les Etats parties l’auraient ratifié. Ceci montre bien qu’il ne suffit pas que
la commission adopte des textes votés à la majorité, même renforcée, pour modifier la convention
elle-même20. L’Australie et la Nouvelle-Zélande en sont bien conscientes et cela aussi fait partie
de la pratique ultérieure puisque c’est sous la forme de protocoles formels d’amendements qu’elles
se sont efforcées, sans succès jusqu’à présent, d’obtenir des modifications de la convention et en
particulier de son article VIII  je vais y revenir dans quelques instants, et plus longuement
demain.
47. Contrairement au paragraphe 30 du règlement, dont les dispositions sont obligatoires
pour les gouvernements contractants, les avis du comité (et les positions que la CBI pourrait être
conduite à adopter sur les permis spéciaux notifiés par les gouvernements) n’ont nullement valeur
obligatoire. Il s’agit d’actes purement recommandatoires, facilitant la coopération entre un Etat
18
Voir, en ce sens, «Written question from Terje Aasland (A) to the Minister of Fisheries and Coastal Affairs»,
Answered: 20 June 2013 by the Minister of Fisheries and Coastal Affairs, Lisbeth Berg-Hansen, disponible en ligne:
19
20
Voir le protocole du 19 novembre 1956, amendant les articles II et V de la convention (MJ, annexe 6).
Voir article III, paragraphe 2, du protocole du 19 novembre 1956, amendant les articles II et V de la convention
(CMJ, annexe 6).
- 64 -
octroyant un permis spécial et les organes de la convention, notamment le comité
scientifique  organes qui n’ont pas vocation à restreindre les droits que les Etats tiennent de
l’article VIII ; la CBI n’est pas une organisation supranationale. Et ceci me conduit à répondre aux
questions que M. le juge Greenwood ne nous a pas posées ... ; mais je pense qu’il ne m’en voudra
pas de m’y essayer tout de même :
First question: «What is the precise legal basis on which it is said that Japan has
a legal obligation [I suppose, Judge Greenwood that you mean binding legal
obligation?] arising from the recommendations contained in resolutions of the IWC»;
answer: there is no such legal basis;
Second question: «and what is the precise content of that obligation»; answer:
no legal basis, no obligation, no content at all…
48. Ceci n’a pas empêché le Japon d’adopter une attitude extrêmement constructive à l’égard
de ces recommandations, comme je le montrerai demain, dans ma prochaine  et
dernière  intervention. Mais ça ne les rend pas juridiquement obligatoires.
49. Ceci me conduit, Monsieur le président, à examiner brièvement le rôle que peuvent jouer
(ou que ne peuvent pas jouer) un certain nombre d’instruments de droit mou (de soft law) sur
lesquels s’appuie l’Australie pour tenter de faire dire à l’article VIII le contraire de ce qu’il dit.
2. La valeur du droit dérivé soft
50. L’Australie invoque en effet une série de résolutions de la CBI portant sur les permis
spéciaux21, les lignes directrices du comité scientifique22 et certains commentaires des Etats
parties23, qui constitueraient selon elle une pratique ultérieure pertinente pour l’interprétation de
l’article VIII.
51. Dès lors que l’Australie affirme qu’il résulte de cette «pratique» une interprétation de
l’article VIII allant à l’encontre du texte clair de cette disposition, ce n’est que si elle démontrait
que cette prétendue pratique avait modifié la convention  ce qui serait possible  que cet
argument aurait un semblant de pertinence. Or, il n’en est rien.
21
MA, par. 4.68, par. 4.70-4.80. Voir aussi CR 2013/8, p. 19-21, par. 21-27 (Burmester) ; CR 2013/8, p. 37-38,
par. 40-45 (Crawford) ; CR 2013/11, p. 33-35, par. 30-35 (Gleeson).
22
MA, par. 4.67. Voir aussi CR 2013/8, p. 21-22, par. 28-31 (Burmester) ; CR 2013/8, p. 34-35, par. 31-34
(Crawford) ; CR 2013/11, p. 25, par. 2 ; p. 32, par. 25-26 (Gleeson).
23
MA, par. 4.78-4.79.
- 65 52. Les conditions pour que l’on puisse reconnaître une pratique ultérieure modificatrice sont
extrêmement strictes. Dans son projet de convention sur le droit des traités, la CDI avait envisagé
la possibilité qu’une pratique ultérieurement suivie modifie les dispositions expresses d’un traité.
Dans le commentaire du projet d’article 3824, la commission insistait sur la nécessité d’un
consentement unanime des parties «en vue d’appliquer le traité d’une manière différente de celle
qui est prescrite dans certaines de ses dispositions» pour qu’une telle pratique puisse «avoir pour
effet de modifier le traité»25.
53. Comme l’a rappelé avec clarté une sentence arbitrale récente :
«[P]our qu’il y ait une pratique telle que celle visée par le paragraphe 3 c) de
l’article 31 de la Convention de Vienne sur le droit des traités, il est nécessaire qu’il y
ait une concordance indiscutable entre les positions des parties et que ces positions
aient été susceptibles d’avoir fixé le sens d’une disposition du traité.»26
Ce n’est pas le cas de la «pratique» invoquée par l’Australie.
54. En premier lieu, aucun des éléments supposés la constituer (on ose à peine utiliser le mot
«instruments» tant cette soi-disant «pratique» est disparate)  aucun de ces éléments donc ne
présente par lui-même la moindre valeur contraignante. C’est évidemment le cas pour les prises de
position de certains Etats ou groupes d’Etats ; mais ce l’est aussi en ce qui concerne les résolutions
adoptées par les organes de la convention.
55. Selon les termes de l’article VI :
«La Commission pourra, de temps à autre, faire des recommandations à l’un, à
plusieurs ou à l’ensemble des gouvernements contractants, portant sur toutes questions
relatives aux baleines ou à la chasse à la baleine et aux objets de la présente
convention.»
Par elles-mêmes, de telles recommandations ne peuvent être considérées comme un élément de la
pratique ultérieure ni aux fins de l’interprétation de la convention, ni, moins encore, pour établir
24
Rapport de la Commission du droit international à l’Assemblée générale, Annuaire 1966, vol. II, p. 257.
25
Ibid., p. 257, par. 1 du commentaire du projet d’article 38. Voir aussi Conséquences juridiques pour les Etats
de la présence continue de l’Afrique du Sud en Namibie (Sud-Ouest africain) nonobstant la résolution 276 (1970) du
Conseil de sécurité, avis consultatif, C.I.J. Recueil 1971, p. 22, par. 22 ; Souveraineté sur Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu
Puteh, Middle Rocks et South Ledge (Malaisie/Singapour), arrêt,C.I.J. Recueil 2008, p. 50, par. 120 ou Différend relatif
à des droits de navigation et des droits connexes (Costa Rica c. Nicaragua), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2009, p. 242, par. 64.
26
Question du régime fiscal des pensions versées aux fonctionnaires retraités de l’UNESCO résidant en France,
sentence arbitrale du 14 janvier 2003, RSA, vol. XXV, p. 259-260, par. 74 ; voir aussi p. 258, par. 70.
- 66 l’existence d’une modification s’imposant aux gouvernements contractants27. Et je rappelle que
l’article VIII doit s’entendre et s’interpréter nonobstant les autres dispositions de la convention.
56. Or, en l’espèce, bien souvent, ces recommandations vont à l’encontre du texte même de
la convention, et en particulier de notre article VIII. Tel est le cas des résolutions qui requièrent
que toute recherche scientifique soit menée par des méthodes non létales. Il va de soi que ces
recommandations ne sauraient être appelées à l’appui d’une interprétation de l’article VIII, qu’elles
contredisent et qu’elles ne sauraient dans ces conditions être considérées comme des «directives
particulièrement convaincantes [ou] autorisées» «highly persuasive, [or] authoritative guidance»28.
Et si la Cour a eu l’occasion de se référer dans le passé à des résolutions non obligatoires (de
l’Assemblée générale ou du Conseil de sécurité des Nations-Unies)29, elle ne l’a jamais fait pour
infirmer un texte. A moins que les conditions d’une modification coutumière de l’acte constitutif
soient remplies. Ce n’est pas le cas en l’espèce.
57. A cet égard, avec tout le respect que j’ai et pour le professeur Crawford et pour les
Lauterpacht, père et fils, je crois que le premier fait dire aux seconds quelque chose d’inexact 30 :
bien sûr qu’il peut se former une pratique de l’organisation ; et bien sûr que cette pratique peut
servir à interpréter l’acte constitutif de l’organisation ; mais on ne saurait tirer de la seule
accumulation de résolutions sans valeur obligatoire et adoptées dans des conditions souvent
marquées par un très fort antagonisme entre les Etats membres, la conclusion qu’une telle pratique
établit «l’accord des parties à l’égard de l’interprétation du traité» au sens de l’article 31,
paragraphe 3 b), de la convention de Vienne. Ce n’est même pas le cas lorsque de telles résolutions
sont adoptées par consensus  marque souvent de résignation plus que de volonté positive  ou
même à l’unanimité : voter pour une recommandation, par définition non obligatoire, ce n’est pas
s’engager à l’appliquer  même si une telle recommandation, comme toute résolution d’ailleurs,
27
Voir, par exemple, Affaire Cruz Varas et autres c. Suède, Requête no 15576/89, CEDH, arrêt du 20 mars 1991,
par. 100.
28
CR 2013/7, p. 31, par. 28 (Gleeson) ; voir aussi CR 2013/8, p. 35, par. 35 (Crawford).
29
Voir Conséquences juridiques de l’édification d’un mur dans le territoire palestinien occupé, avis consultatif
du 9 juillet 2004, C.I.J. Recueil 2004 (I), p. 176, par. 98-99.
30
CR 2013/8, p. 36-37, par. 36-37 (Crawford).
- 67 doit être prise de bonne foi en considération par leurs destinataires31 ; mais c’est un autre problème,
sur lequel je reviendrai demain.
[Projection no 5 : Les votes sur les résolutions concernant JARPA.]
58. Au demeurant, les résolutions qu’invoquent l’Australie et la Nouvelle-Zélande sont loin
d’être consensuelles. La Nouvelle-Zélande force donc très abusivement le trait lorsqu’elle affirme
 et je cite sa demande en intervention : «These resolutions serve as an expression of the
collective views of the parties…»32 De la même manière et pour la même raison, l’Australie a tort
de prétendre que ces résolutions reflètent  je cite son mémoire ; non, je cite M. Burmester : «the
widespread view of the Convention’s Contracting Governments»33, ou  et cette fois, je cite de
nouveau M. Burmester : «the collective view of the Commission»34. Elles ne représentent que les
vues communes à certains Etats membres (pour l’instant majoritaires) et, à ce titre, doivent être
dûment prises en considération par tous les gouvernements ; rien de moins, certes, mais rien de
plus : il ne s’agit pas de traités, de pacta qui seraient servanda.
59. Le Japon a dressé un tableau illustrant les conditions d’adoption des résolutions visant les
programmes japonais de recherche35 ; il est reproduit dans le dossier des juges sous l’onglet no 38 et
est projeté en ce moment. Il en ressort que, dans la plupart des cas, ces résolutions non obligatoires
n’ont nullement recueilli l’assentiment de l’ensemble des Etats parties, bien qu’elles aient toujours,
bien sûr, obtenu la majorité simple nécessaire à leur adoption : comme M. Gales l’a relevé, les
positions au sein de la commission aussi bien que du comité scientifique sont terriblement
«polarisées»36 et M. Walløe l’a aussi redit tout à l’heure.
Et ceci constitue une raison
supplémentaire pour laquelle ces recommandations ne sauraient être opposables en tant que textes
obligatoires aux Etats de la minorité et ne peuvent guère éclairer l’interprétation du traité37.
31
Voir Procédure de vote applicable aux questions touchant les rapports et pétitions relatifs au Territoire du
Sud-Ouest africain, avis consultatif, C.I.J. Recueil 1955, Opinion individuelle de M. Lauterpacht, p. 118-119 ; voir aussi
Chittharanjan Felix Amerasinghe, Principles of the Institutional Law of International Organizations, 2e éd., Cambridge
University Press, 2005, p. 179.
32
WON, par. 31.
33
34
CR 2013/8, p. 20, par. 26 (Burmester) ; p. 41, par. 52 (Crawford).
35
CM, p. 403-40.
36
CR 2013/9, p. 26.
37
Voir T.I.D.M., affaire no 14, Hoshinmaru (Japon c. Fédération de Russie), prompte mainlevée, arrêt du
6 août 2007, par. 86-87.
- 68 -
60. En outre, le contenu de ces résolutions ne témoigne pas de la conviction des Etats parties
selon laquelle elles viendraient limiter leurs droits en vertu de l’article VIII. Un épisode est
particulièrement révélateur à cet égard.
61. Peu après l’adoption du moratoire et avant même l’entrée en vigueur de celui-ci, certains
Etats au sein de la commission ont essayé d’en étendre les effets à la chasse à des fins scientifiques.
Une première résolution a été adoptée en 1985, dans laquelle la commission avait, sans la moindre
preuve, laissé entendre que certains permis spéciaux octroyés en vertu de l’article VIII pourraient
relever, en réalité, de la chasse commerciale38. (Les tenants de cette résolution reconnaissaient au
demeurant «les droits souverains des Parties contractantes»39).
62. Mais l’année suivante, en 1986 donc, la commission a adopté, et cette fois par
consensus40, une résolution sur les permis spéciaux recommandant aux Etats de collaborer
étroitement avec le comité scientifique, sur la base du paragraphe 30 du règlement41. L’Australie
insiste sur l’adoption consensuelle de cette résolution42, signe, selon le professeur Crawford, que
«all Contracting Governments, including Japan, accepted the principles embodied in this
Resolution»43. C’est oublier que nombre d’Etats, parmi lesquels le Japon justement, ont exprimé
d’importantes réserves44 et que, je l’ai dit, le consensus est loin de valoir acceptation.
Au
demeurant, le ralliement au consensus des Etats qui avaient émis des objections au moratoire, y
compris le Japon, signifiait de réelles concessions de leur part et était fondé sur la prémisse que la
CBI allait entreprendre, au plus tard en 1990, «l’évaluation exhaustive» prévue par le moratoire.
Toutefois, après la clôture de la session durant laquelle cette résolution a été adoptée, le
commissaire des Etats-Unis a cru pouvoir envoyer au secrétaire de la CBI une lettre demandant que
des modifications soient apportées à la résolution de 1986, afin de tenter de restreindre l’exercice
38
CBI, résolution 1985-2, «Resolution on Scientific Permits» (MA, annexe 7).
39
CBI, comptes rendus de la 37e réunion annuelle, 1985 (Australie).
40
«Chairman’s
Report
at
the
Thirty-Eight
Meeting»,
p. 12,
disponible
http://iwc.int/cache/downloads/b5vill4sd5kckwkc04socw804/CHAIRS%20REPORT%201986.pdf.
en
ligne :
41
CBI, résolution 1986-2, «Resolution on Special Permits for Scientific Research», disponible en ligne :
http://iwc.int/cache/downloads/5q49gv1uutssss4sgksocsg8o/Resolution%201986.pdf.
42
CR 2013/8, p. 38, par. 42 (Crawford).
43
CR 2013/8, p. 38, par. 42 (Crawford).
44
«Chairman’s Report of the Thirty-Seventh Annual Meeting», 1985, p. 11-12 ; voir aussi CBI, Verbatim
Records of the Thirty-Seventh Annual Meeting, 1985.
- 69 des droits des Etats parties en vertu de l’article VIII45  preuve a contrario que ce n’est pas ce que
fait cette résolution de 198646. Les Etats opposés par principe à la chasse baleinière ont néanmoins
eu gain de cause l’année suivante et, revenant sur le difficile consensus réalisé par la
résolution 1986-2, celle de 1987 a été adoptée après une suite de discussions très conflictuelles, par
19 voix contre 6, et 7 abstentions47. D’autres résolutions sur lesquelles s’appuie plus spécialement
l’Australie ont été adoptées à des majorités encore bien plus serrées. Telles sont, Monsieur le
président, les «majorités considérables»48 sur lesquelles s’appuie l’Australie pour prétendre à
l’existence d’une pratique représentant «l’action collective des gouvernements contractants»49.
63. En tout état de cause, la seule existence de résolutions critiques de JARPA ou JARPA II
n’équivaut pas à une pratique. Pour qu’il en aille autrement, il faudrait que ces recommandations
traduisent l’accord unanime des Parties, soient suivies d’actes matériels d’exécution de la part des
Etats, et que ces Etats aillent tous dans le sens de la pratique alléguée. Ce n’est pas le cas comme
le montre un examen de la pratique suivie par les Etats en matière de recherche scientifique après
l’adoption du moratoire.
64. Dans la période précédant le moratoire, tous les Etats ayant une industrie baleinière,
Australie incluse, avaient octroyé des permis scientifiques, comme le montre le tableau statistique
inséré à l’onglet no 39 du dossier des juges50. Tel était aussi le cas du Japon, dont je relève
qu’entre 1976 et 1978, il avait autorisé la prise de 660 baleines au titre de permis scientifiques
 un chiffre non négligeable si l’on tient compte du fait qu’il n’y avait pas alors de moratoire sur
la chasse commerciale et que l’on pouvait donc recueillir des données biologiques également par le
moyen de la chasse commerciale  et ceci confirme qu’il n’y a, décidément, rien d’arbitraire dans
les quotas de chasse actuels. Si ces activités n’ont pas soulevé à l’époque  je parle d’avant le
45
Lettre de M. Calio, du 26 août 1986, reproduite dans la «Circular Communication» du 29 août 1986
(doc. RG/VJH/16202) (annexe 2 aux observations du Japon sur l’intervention de la Nouvelle-Zélande).
46
Voir notamment CR 2013/8, p. 37, par. 40, ou p. 38, par. 72 (Crawford) ; CR 2013/11, p. 25, par. 44 (Gleeson).
47
Voir aussi le tableau retraçant le vote des résolutions à l’onglet no 57 du dossier des juges de l’Australie.
48
Voir CR 2013/8, p. 41, par. 53 ; p. 50, par. 79 (Crawford) ; CR 2013/11, p. 27, par. 8 (Gleeson).
49
Voir ibid. ; CR 2013/8, p. 41, par. 53 ; p. 50, par. 79 (Crawford) ; CR 2013/11, p. 27, par. 8 (Gleeson).
50
Voir le tableau statistique inclus dans la «Circular Communication to Commissioners and Contracting
Governments», 5 janvier 1987, RG/VJH/16365 (annexe 3 à la réponse du Japon sur les observations écrites de la
Nouvelle-Zélande, 31 mai 2013).
- 70 moratoire  de difficultés particulières, comme d’ailleurs la Nouvelle-Zélande le remarque51, ce
n’est pas parce qu’elles étaient fondamentalement différentes de ce qu’elles sont aujourd’hui, mais
parce que la composition de la commission était différente et que certains des Etats ayant eu une
industrie baleinière, comme l’Etat demandeur et l’Etat intervenant, ne s’étaient pas encore
convertis à la nouvelle religion de la préservation des baleines «en soi».
65. L’Australie et la Nouvelle-Zélande52 brocardent l’augmentation du nombre de baleines
tuées au titre de permis spéciaux que le Japon a octroyés après l’adoption du moratoire 53. Ce
persiflage n’est pas de mise.
Certes, après l’entrée en vigueur du moratoire, durant la
saison 1987-1988, le Japon a dû développer des programmes plus ambitieux en termes de prises,
pour pallier l’absence des informations que l’on pouvait tirer auparavant des prises commerciales.
Mais, loin d’être la preuve d’un quelconque abus des droits reconnus par l’article VIII, cela
corrobore au contraire qu’il y avait là un impératif lié à la recherche scientifique : il a fallu
compenser la perte des données que procurait la chasse commerciale54.
66. Au demeurant, le Japon n’est pas le seul Etat à avoir émis des permis scientifiques
après 1986 : la République de Corée, l’Islande et la Norvège ont fait de même55. Assurément, ces
pays ont autorisé la prise de moins de baleines que le Japon ; mais, il faut garder à l’esprit que les
deux derniers de ces pays, l’Islande et la Norvège, disposent toujours d’informations scientifiques
obtenues dans le cadre de la chasse commerciale : la Norvège a émis une objection au moratoire, et
M. Walløe a rappelé dans quelles conditions elle l’a maintenue, et l’Islande qui, après avoir
dénoncé la convention suite à son adoption, est redevenue partie, mais en formulant une réserve à
ce même moratoire.
51
OEN, par. 93.
52
OEN, par. 78.
53
Voir MA, p. 34-35, par. 2.66-2.67.
54
Voir les statistiques de permis scientifiques pour la période 1987-2011 sur le site de la CBI, à l’adresse :
http://iwc.int/table_permit.
55
Voir les statistiques de permis scientifiques pour la période 1987-2012 sur le site de la CBI, à l’adresse :
http://iwc.int/table_permit.
- 71 3. Les tentatives infructueuses de revision de l’article VIII
67. Monsieur le président, il existe une preuve décisive de l’inexistence de toute pratique
modificatrice et, au-delà, de la fausseté de l’interprétation de l’article VIII qu’invoque l’Australie :
à plusieurs reprises en effet, les Etats opposés à toute forme de chasse à la baleine ont fait savoir
qu’ils souhaitent modifier l’article VIII ou le supprimer de la convention56.
68. L’Australie est l’un des, sinon le, chef(s) de file de ce courant et n’a pas caché que la
suppression de l’article VIII est l’axe majeur de sa politique relative à la CBI. Je n’en donne qu’un
exemple  il date de 2010 :
«Australia has been clear that we consider any new approach must include an
agreement to bring an immediate end to this form of whaling and must put in place a
mechanism and timetable to address the reform of Article VIII of the ICRW to
permanently end this practice.»57
69. L’Australie n’en a pas moins conscience qu’une modification du texte de la convention,
n’a aucune chance d’aboutir, dans l’état actuel des choses et je vais citer une autre brochure
australienne en français, ce qui marque l’importance que l’Australie devait lui accorder parce qu’on
ne peut pas dire que les documents australiens soient très fréquemment traduits en français :
« Une majorité des membres actuels de la Commission baleinière internationale
s’oppose à l’utilisation de l’article VIII sous forme de «chasse à la baleine
scientifique» à l’échelle commerciale et la plupart de ces membres ne soutiendraient
pas une reprise immédiate de toute forme de chasse commerciale. Toutefois, cette
majorité ne se traduit pas nécessairement par une capacité à modifier l’article VIII de
la convention. Modifier la convention requiert la convocation d’une conférence
diplomatique, et l’accord de toutes les parties [à] tous les changements afin de les
rendre efficaces. Il est peu probable que cela se produise dans le moyen à court
terme.»58
56
Voir notamment Chair’s Report of the 58th Annual Meeting, Annual Report of the International Whaling
Commission 2006, p. 23 (CMJ, annexe 65) ; voir aussi Royaume-Uni (Department for Environment, Food and Rural
Affairs, The International Whaling Commission : the way forward, 208, disponible en ligne :
http://archive.defra.gov.uk/wildlife-pets/wildlife/protect/whales/documents/iwc-wayforward.pdf), par. 23. Voir aussi la
position de la Nouvelle-Zélande, The Conservation of Whales in the 21st Century , disponible en ligne :
http://doc.org.nz/documents/conservation/native-animals/marine-mammals/conservation-whales-c21.pdf, p. 21.
57
Gouvernement d’Australie, The Future of the International Whaling Commission: An Australian Proposal,
2 mars 2010,
doc.
IWC/M10/SWG
5,
disponible
en
ligne:
http://archive.iwcoffice.org/_documents/commission/future/IWC-M10-SWG5.pdf.
Voir aussi Gouvernement
d’Australie, Conservation et gestion des baleines. Un avenir pour la CBI, doc. IWC/M08/INFO 11-FR, p. 7, document
présenté à la réunion intersessions de la CBI en 2008, également disponible en ligne:
http://www.environment.gov.au/coasts/publications/pubs/iwc-future-paper.pdf. Voir aussi Chair’s Report of the 61st
Annual Meeting, Annual Report of the International Whaling Commission 2009, p. 8 (CMJ, annexe 68).
58
Gouvernement d’Australie, Conservation et gestion des baleines. Un avenir pour la CBI, doc. IWC/M08/INFO
11-FR, p. 12, document présenté à la réunion intersessions de la CBI en 2008, disponible en ligne :
http://www.environment.gov.au/coasts/publications/pubs/iwc-future-paper.pdf. (les italiques sont de nous).
- 72 Les deux documents que je viens de citer sont reproduits respectivement sous les onglets nos 41
et 42 de vos dossiers.
70. Faute d’amendement, l’Australie a lancé des appels à un changement volontaire dans la
pratique des permis spéciaux. Ainsi, elle a proposé qu’à l’avenir (et c’est bien d’un changement
futur par rapport au droit et à la pratique existants qu’il s’agit)  qu’à l’avenir «Governments
should commit to activities only when authorised by the Commission»59. Ce faisant, l’Australie
reconnaît que ce qu’elle plaide devant vous est souhaitable sans doute à ses yeux, mais que cela ne
correspond pas au droit en vigueur. L’interprétation qu’elle donne de l’article VIII répond à ses
vœux  c’est ce qu’on appelle du wishful thinking ; mais la réalité, même juridique, est têtue.
71. Sans avoir le temps d’y insister, j’indique au passage que la Nouvelle-Zélande avait
également produit, en 2005, un document de discussion en vue de l’adoption d’un protocole
modifiant plusieurs dispositions de la convention, à commencer par l’article VIII60. Ce document
spécifiait qu’une telle modification ne pouvait être envisagée que par le biais d’un instrument
obligatoire, ayant la même valeur que la convention elle-même, donc par un protocole. On ne
saurait, Monsieur le président, envisager plaidoyer (a contrario) plus convaincant en faveur de
l’interprétation que fait le Japon de l’article VIII, tel qu’il continue de figurer dans la convention.
72. Certains Etats membres de la CBI ne se sont d’ailleurs pas fait faute de rappeler la
nécessité d’un amendement formel lorsqu’ils ont exprimé leur désaccord avec le contenu des
résolutions contraires à l’article VIII, ainsi qu’à toute tentative directe ou indirecte visant à
soumettre les permis scientifiques à un régime de contrôle par la CBI61. Ces désaccords, exprimés
par des Etats particulièrement intéressés tant à cette pratique prétendue qu’à l’opinio juris alléguée,
59
Chair’s Report of the 61st Annual Meeting, Annual Report of the International Whaling Commission 2009,
p. 11 (les italiques sont de nous) (CMJ, annexe 68) ; voir aussi Government of Australia, «Addressing Special Permit
Whaling and the Future of the IWC», IWC/61/9 (2009) (CMJ, annexe 178).
60
Voir Cover page for protocol, v1, 24 mars 2005 (annexe 4 aux observations du Japon sur l’intervention de la
Nouvelle-Zélande).
60
Nouvelle-Zélande, Discussion Document, Protocol Amending the International Convention for the Regulation
of Whaling, 24 mars 2005 (annexe 5 aux observations du Japon sur l’intervention de la Nouvelle-Zélande).
61
p. 11.
Voir Chair’s Report of the 61st Annual Meeting, Annual Report of the International Whaling Commission 2009,
- 73 -
empêchent la formation de tout accord ultérieur sur une interprétation contra scriptum de
l’article VIII62.
73. Aussi longtemps que les Etats membres de la CBI, partagés en deux camps antagonistes,
ne parviendront pas à un accord pour modifier la convention, les résolutions invoquées par
l’Australie resteront l’expression de la position des Etats ayant, pour l’instant, la majorité à la CBI ;
mais cette position est sans influence sur l’interprétation des dispositions conventionnelles. Cette
expression est, d’une certaine manière, unilatérale, puisqu’elle ne reflète que les intérêts
homogènes  ou hégémoniques ?  de ce «camp». C’est une demande, une réclamation de la
majorité, mais non pas l’expression du droit positif. Et ce n’est pas parce que les Etats opposés à la
chasse à la baleine ont, pour l’instant, acquis la majorité dans l’organe conventionnel que la
convention est devenue «leur chose» et que vous pouvez, Mesdames et Messieurs de la Cour,
retenir l’interprétation que deux d’entre eux (non sans quelques nuances d’ailleurs) tentent de vous
faire endosser.
Mesdames et Messieurs les juges, je vous suis très reconnaissant d’avoir écouté avec
attention cette longue plaidoirie - mais il était peut-être opportun qu’elle soit coupée en deux -, qui
a porté sur un problème que nous tenons pour central dans notre affaire. Mon successeur à cette
barre sera le professeur Lowe, mais je suppose que vous préférerez ne lui donner la parole que
demain matin même s’il est à votre disposition.
Le PRESIDENT : Merci beaucoup Monsieur le professeur. Certainement je donnerai la
parole au professeur Lowe demain matin à 10 heures. Before closing this afternoon’s session, I
will give the floor to Judge Bhandari, with a question for Japan. Judge Bhandari, you have the
floor.
62
Voir Pêcheries (Royaume-Uni c. Norvège), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1951, p. 131 ou Plateau continental de la mer
du Nord (République fédérale d’Allemagne/Danemark) (République fédérale d’Allemagne/Pays-Bas), arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 1969, p. 43, par. 74 ; voir aussi Ile de Kasikili/Sedudu (Botswana/Namibie), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1999 (II),
p. 1087, par. 63.
- 74 -
Judge BHANDARI: Thank you, Mr. President. I have two questions for Japan.
“Paragraph 5.108, page 244, of Australia’s Memorial indicates that the
Director-General of the Japan Fisheries Agency stated that ‘[t]he implementation of
scientific whaling was viewed as the only method available to carry on with the
traditions of whaling’. I would like to request your comments on this statement, in the
context of the good faith doctrine.”
My additional question for Japan is:
“Before launching JARPA II, did Japan establish that it is carrying out lethal
scientific research on such a large scale because it is critical and there is no other
available method?”
Thank you.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Judge Bhandari. The written text of these questions will be
sent to the Parties as soon as possible. Japan is invited to answer questions orally, preferably
tomorrow during the first round of oral argument. Australia is free during its second round of oral
argument to comment on the reply of Japan. The Court will meet tomorrow morning at 10 a.m. to
hear the continuation of Japan’s first round of oral argument. Thank you, the Court is adjourned.
___________
Non corrigé
Uncorrected
CR 2013/15
International Court
of Justice
Cour internationale
de Justice
LA HAYE
THE HAGUE
YEAR 2013
Public sitting
held on Thursday 4 July 2013, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace,
____________________
VERBATIM RECORD
____________________
ANNÉE 2013
Audience publique
tenue le jeudi 4 juillet 2013, à 10 heures, au Palais de la Paix,
________________
COMPTE RENDU
________________
-2Present:
President Tomka
Judges Owada
Abraham
Keith
Bennouna
Skotnikov
Cançado Trindade
Yusuf
Greenwood
Xue
Donoghue
Gaja
Sebutinde
Bhandari
Registrar Couvreur

- 14 -
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. Good morning. The sitting is open. The Court meets
this morning to hear the continuation of Japan‟s first round of oral argument. Thus I shall now give
the floor to Professor Vaughan Lowe. You have the floor, Sir.
Mr. LOWE:
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Introduction
1. Thank you, Mr. President, Members of the Court, Australia has put before you its account
of Japan‟s actions in relation to JARPA II, and it has put before you the terms of the Whaling
Convention, as it interprets them. What it has not done is explain the legal reasoning as to how
precisely it reaches the conclusion that Japan‟s actions amount to a breach of the Convention.
Australia appears to assume that that is self-evident: but it is not.
2. Australia has said that it accepts that lethal whaling is sometimes justified1; but, it will no
doubt say, not on the scale of JARPA II. So the question is, what is the Court‟s role where
Contracting Governments disagree over an Article VIII research program?
3. If one of the Contracting Governments to the Whaling Convention thinks that catching
300 or 600 minke whales is enough for scientific purposes, is that a matter for the Court to decide?
If one Government thinks that the importance of determining the age structure of a whale stock
requires lethal stock sampling now, but another Government thinks that the age-data is not required
this year, is the Court to decide if a delay is necessary?
4. Such questions arise in all international organizations and under all treaties where States
have powers to act for certain purposes or in certain contexts. The question is, what is the Court‟s
role in reviewing a State‟s decisions regarding the exercise of its powers?
5. The essence of my submission on behalf of Japan in this round of the oral pleadings lies in
two propositions:
1
CR 2013/7, pp. 33-34, para. 38 (Gleeson); CR 2013/8, p. 49, para. 77 (Crawford); CR 2013/9, p. 15, para. 5
(Sands); CR 2013/9, pp. 40, 46, 61, 64, 65, 71 (Mangel); CR 2013/10, p. 45, para. 17 (Crawford).
- 15 -
(i) First, that the Court can review the exercise of a State by its powers, but only in
circumstances where that exercise is alleged to violate an identified obligation of that
State under international law;
(ii) Second, that the result of the applicable obligations in this case is that the question for the
Court is whether Japan, as a Contracting Government to the Whaling Convention, has
acted in bad faith in establishing the JARPA II program.
Australia must show that Japan has violated a legal duty
6. As to the first proposition, it is in our submission axiomatic that the Court cannot be called
upon to review an exercise of governmental power by a State unless that exercise is alleged to
violate an obligation of that State under international law. An applicant cannot, for example,
properly call upon the Court to review and condemn the provisions of another State‟s tax laws or
criminal laws just because it does not like those provisions. It must allege that the other State is
legally obliged not to maintain the provisions in question. That point is obvious, but important.
7. What is the obligation that Australia says is violated here? Japan has pointed out that the
right to issue special permits is not created or given by the Whaling Convention: whaling, whether
for commercial or scientific reasons, was an undisputed exercise of the freedom of the high seas for
generations before the 1946 Whaling Convention and its predecessors were even conceived. There
is no suggestion that Japan could not have issued permits for JARPA II in the past as an exercise of
the high seas freedom of fishing and/or high seas freedom of research.
8. Whaling for scientific purposes was a freedom that pre-existed the Whaling Convention,
and Article VIII stipulates that it is exempt from the operation of the Whaling Convention. So, the
question here is not, “what are the limits of a power given by a treaty?”, but rather “what limits on
the exercise of a freedom have been imposed by a treaty?” And our friends on the other side have
not addressed that point.
9. My colleagues will address that point. They have already explained, and will explain
further, that the limits imposed by Article VIII do no more than require that Japan comply with the
procedural obligations set out in the Convention, and that Japan has, most assuredly in fact,
complied with all those procedural obligations.
- 16 -
10. The question therefore is whether any other provision in the Convention forbids the
activities involved in JARPA II.
Australia says that JARPA II violates the moratorium on
commercial whaling in paragraph 10 (e) of the Schedule, and in the case of fin whales the provision
on the Southern Ocean Sanctuary in paragraph 7 (b), and again in the case of fin whales, the
moratorium on catching by means of factory ships in paragraph 10 (d). Australia sometimes slides
over the facts that Japan is not bound by the Southern Ocean Sanctuary provisions as regards minke
whales, and that the moratorium on factory ship whaling is a moratorium rather than an outright
prohibition, and that it is stated  twice, in the 47 words of paragraph 10 (d)  that it does not
apply to minke whales.
11. Australia says that these provisions are violated because Japan cannot rely upon its
Article VIII right to conduct scientific whaling because it is acting in bad faith, and that its reliance
on that right is an abuse of right.
12. Australia and New Zealand also hint at the proposition that the Convention extinguished
all the pre-existent rights under customary international law to conduct whaling, for whatever
purposes, except for “whaling for scientific purposes” within the particular meaning that they give
to it under the Convention; a hint that Japan must prove that JARPA II falls within the scope of the
“scientific purposes” provision. The proposition that the Convention extinguished all customary
international law rights relating to whaling has not been argued before you, and we cannot see any
basis for it. So we leave that point there.
13. The claim that we have to answer is, essentially, that JARPA II is not an exercise of the
right to carry out whaling for purposes of scientific research, but is commercial whaling.
Professor Iwasawa will explain shortly how the aims and methods of catching whales under
JARPA II is quite different from the practice of commercial whaling, and that JARPA II is not
commercial whaling.
14. Japan authorized JARPA II as a scientific expedition, and it has described the scientific
methods and purposes of JARPA II. Australia carries the burden of persuading the Court that
Japan‟s considered determination that JARPA II is a scientific research program that can properly
be authorized under the Whaling Convention‟s Article VIII, is legally invalid and must be set aside.
- 17 The importance of the standard of review
15. The question that immediately arises is, what is the standard of review? How should the
Court approach the task of deciding whether an exercise of discretion by a State  the exercise of
a legal freedom or right that undoubtedly exists  is invalid and without legal effect on the plane
of international law?
16. Australia has given no clear indication of what its case is on this point. The Memorial
did not make clear whether Australia thought that this was close to an appeal against Japan‟s
decision on JARPA II, in which the Court could consider the matter de novo and substitute its own
view on the desirability of JARPA II for the view of Japan; or whether the Court should, for
example, overturn a Contracting Government‟s determination under Article VIII only if it could be
shown to be manifestly arbitrary or capricious; or whether the Court could look only at the process
by which the determination was made and not at its substance.
17. We are still not clear what Australia‟s position is. Professor Crawford rejected the idea
that there was any margin of discretion or appreciation allowed to Contracting Governments 2,
presumably with the result that what the Court decides what is, or what was  and there is an
important question between those two formulations  “necessary” for the purposes of scientific
research; and the question is then whether JARPA II does or does not get over that line. It does
not matter how far or how close it is to that line; and it does not matter that other Governments,
other tribunals, and other scientists might have drawn the line in a different place.
18. The Solicitor-General, on the other hand, spoke in terms of the “departure from standards
of reasonableness and bona fides” by Japan in the exercise of its right3, which seems rather closer
to Japan‟s position than to Professor Crawford‟s. The Solicitor-General vigorously advanced the
argument that Japan had indeed been “arbitrary and capricious” in its action, and he identified the
arbitrary and capricious action as a breach of the procedural requirements to give real consideration
to the Whaling Commission‟s views, and a failure to “show” the compelling need to kill so many
of the objects of study  both of which Japan equally vigorously denies4.
2
CR 2013/8, p. 45, paras. 63-64 (Crawford).
3
CR 2013/11, p. 38, para. 43 (Gleeson).
4
CR 2013/11, p. 40, para. 51 (Gleeson).
- 18 -
19. In our submission the question of the standard to which Japan is being held accountable
is of central importance in this case. Professor Pellet will set out our submissions on the legal
requirements of the doctrine of good faith under international law. My preliminary task is to
address the standard of review more broadly.
20. I referred some moments ago to some of the standards of review: appeals and de novo
reviews; reviews based on the manifest arbitrariness or capriciousness of decisions; attacks based
on the procedures by which decisions were adopted; and so on.
21. De novo review is clearly not appropriate, or even practicable, here. Tribunals engage in
de novo review in circumstances where the procedures by which cases come before those tribunals
are designed so as to bring the case in a manner that enables the tribunal to act effectively in
conducting a full de novo review.
22. That requires, for example, the presentation to the tribunal of all of the evidence on
which the original decision was  or should have been  based. The Solicitor-General outlined
on Friday the matters that he said Japan should have addressed in good faith, and these would
necessarily have had to be supported by evidence presented to the Court5. He referred to the
questions, how might the objectives of JARPA be revised so that they align with the critical
research needs, identified by the Whaling Commission and the Scientific Committee, and how
might the methods of JARPA be adjusted to have a real likelihood of achieving the objectives so
tailored?
23. He said “rather than start with a pre-determined view that a certain number of whales had
to be killed each year, how might non-lethal means  existing or reasonably capable of
development  provide a partial or complete alternative?”6 We have yet to see what evidence
Australia thinks it may have for the accusation, which Japan emphatically rejects, that it started
with a pre-determined view that a certain number of whales had to be killed each year; and we
hope that Australia might think of rephrasing its claims so that they stay closer to the evidence that
it has adduced. But the question of how far non-lethal means, which currently exist or are
5
CR 2013/11, p. 27, para. 9 (Gleeson).
6
CR 2013/11, p. 27, para. 9 (Gleeson).
- 19 -
reasonably capable of development, provide for a partial or complete alternative to lethal takes is
certainly another question to be addressed in a de novo review.
24. The Solicitor-General‟s fourth question was, should JARPA be suspended or deferred
until those other questions could be answered? That looks like a policy question; and it is not clear
what criteria or supporting evidence the decision-makers should use. But again, it adds to the
evidence that must, in Australia‟s submission, be considered before the necessity or propriety of
JARPA II as an Article VIII research program can be decided.
25. That decision would require a survey of the existing data, an analysis of the questions left
unanswered by that data and of the importance of that data and of the alternative ways in which that
data might be obtained, and of the levels of accuracy needed. It would involve the determination of
the necessary sample size, and of the frequency and duration of the data collection. Crucially, it
would be premised upon a determination of what are the proper questions that people  biologists,
oceanographers, ecologists, resource managers, environmentalists or whatever  should be asking,
or perhaps are entitled to ask  it is not clear how much freedom Australia would permit in
framing research aims  whether these question be classical hypotheses such as “whale abundance
is related to krill abundance” and “krill abundance in Antarctic waters is declining”, or broader
questions within a scientific framework such as “given that we know that the Antarctic climate is
changing, what are the effects upon whale populations?”
26. But Australia has not put before the Court the information that is necessary for the
making of decisions on these questions. And, with respect, it is not obvious that the Court has the
necessary expertise to enable it to analyse such information, even if it were put before it.
27. That is not to say that the Court cannot question  and in appropriate cases, declare to
be in contravention of international law  decisions taken by national authorities. Let me be clear.
Japan does not argue that there should be complete deference to decisions taken by Contracting
Governments.
28. But there is a great deal of intermediate ground between de novo review and total
deference. We are all familiar with the concepts in domestic law: the quashing of decisions
because they are arbitrary, or are decisions that no reasonable person could possibly have reached,
or that rest upon incorrect facts; the distinction in administrative law in civil law countries between
- 20 -
le pouvoir discrétionnaire, and la compétence liée. And, the question is, what is the test in
international law?
The different roles of courts in relation to international organizations
29. Well, that question arises here under the International Whaling Convention, and in our
submission, it must be answered in that specific context.
A comparison with other treaty
organizations established around the same time shows that different bodies were set up to work in
different ways.
30. For instance, the constitutions of both the World Health Organization (1946) (Art. 75)
and the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization (1945) (Art. XVII) give this Court the
key role in the settlement of disputes concerning the interpretation of those constitutions. The
Whaling Convention gives the ICJ no role.
31. Neither the FAO nor the WHO Constitution provides for the imposition of binding
substantive measures upon Member States by majority vote, although the WHO (Art. 20) does
oblige Member States to furnish a statement of the reasons for the non-acceptance of any
convention or agreement adopted by a two-thirds vote in the WHO Health Assembly. The Whaling
Convention provides for the adoption by a three-quarters majority vote of amendments to its
schedule; but those amendments do not bind objecting States. Moreover, the Whaling Convention
does not require any reasons to be given for objections  a point which was regarded as significant
by President Klaestad in the Constitution of IMCO case7.
32. The 1958 Convention on Fishing and the Conservation of Living Resources on the High
Seas provides for a Commission to decide disputes,  and specifically, in Articles 7, 9, and 10,
disputes over the need for the urgent application of conservation measures and the existence of a
basis for such measures in “appropriate scientific findings”. That Commission, whose members
would be drawn from those specialized in administrative or scientific questions relating to fisheries
(not only from lawyers), would decide by majority vote with binding effect on the parties in
dispute.
7
See Constitution of the Maritime Safety Committee of the Inter-Governmental Maritime Consultative
Organization, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1960, p. 150; dissenting opinion of President Klaestad, p. 175.
- 21 33. These four examples  the IWC, the WHO, the FAO and the 1958 Convention on
Fishing  illustrate something of the range of institutional arrangements that there might be. The
point is that one needs to look at the specific terms of a convention in order to determine the role of
the Court in relation to determinations which are made by the contracting parties under that
convention.
The specific procedural requirements under the ICRW
34. Article VIII of the Whaling Convention preserves the right of Contracting Governments
to authorize whaling by special permit for research purposes. The Convention does not require the
Government to give a reasoned decision on authorization; it does not require the consent of the
International Whaing Commission or its Scientific Committee to such authorization; it does not
even require that the authorization be given by the Government “acting on the advice” of the
Scientific Committee, as do many provisions in European Union law.
35. The Whaling Convention requires (in paragraph 30 of the Schedule) only that members
of the Scientific Committee have the opportunity to “review and comment” on permits that a
Government proposes to issue.
36. Japan accepts that the provision for “review and comment” implies that the comments
are to be considered through a process which enables an informed expert view on the merits of any
comments received to be put before the officials taking the final decision on the issue of the permit,
and that the comments and the appraisal of them be taken into account by the officials when taking
the final decision.
37. Japan has done this. Japan is well aware of the controversy concerning lethal whaling;
and it studies and considers views from the Whaling Commission and its Scientific Committee with
the greatest care.
The duty to act in good faith
38. Japan accepts, too, that the discretion which Contracting Governments have under
Article VIII is not unrestricted. As a matter of international law, if Australia proved that the
decision to issue permits for JARPA II had been taken in bad faith and was manifestly an abuse of
- 22 Japan‟s rights, the Court would be entitled to review the decision and to declare that it contravened
the Convention.
39. It is not uncommon for the Court and other international tribunals to be faced with cases
in which the actions by a State are challenged on the basis that although the action is nominally an
exercise of a power that indisputably exists, the circumstances are such that the action cannot be
regarded as a “proper” exercise of that power.
40. The Court has consistently approached these situations by requiring the applicant State to
prove that the action was taken in bad faith. Let me mention some of the most illuminating
examples.
41. Bad faith arises in two contexts: the interpretation and the application of treaties; and
the exercise of rights in international law in general.
42. The obligation to interpret and apply treaty provisions in good faith is spelled out in
Articles 31 and 26 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties. It has been reiterated in many
cases and I need not take you to them. But I should refer you to the Court‟s decisions in the
Conditions of Admission8 and Peace Treaties9 cases  the latter an instance of a case where the
Court might have introduced a general reference to good faith to override the specific wording of a
treaty, but very firmly refused to do so. In arbitral practice, there are the awards in the North
Atlantic Coast Fisheries case10, and in the La Bretagne arbitration, where the tribunal referred to
the “principle of good faith which is of necessity a principal factor in the performance of treaties”11.
43. What is significant about this body of practice is not so much that there is such a duty in
relation to the interpretation and application of treaties  it is barely conceivable that there should
not be. What is significant is that the duty is tied to the criterion of good faith, and not to some
other standard.
44. The cases do not say that there is a duty to apply the treaty in the manner that the
majority of the other States Parties think it should be applied, or in the manner that the Court
8
Conditions of Admission of a State to Membership in the United Nations (Article 4 of the Charter), Advisory
Opinion, 1948, I.C.J Reports 1947-1948, p. 63.
9
Interpretation of Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary and Romania, Second Phase, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J.
Reports 1950, p. 221.
10
United Nations Reports of International Arbitral Awards (UNRIAA), Vol. XI, p. 188.
11
82 ILR 591, at p. 614, para. 27.
- 23 -
determines would be the ideal implementation. They say that there is a duty to apply the provisions
of a treaty in good faith.
45. As far as the doctrine of good faith in the exercise of rights in international law more
generally is concerned, the principle is again well established in international jurisprudence. In the
case concerning Rights of United States Nationals in Morocco, the Court referred to the exercise of
a power (there, of making customs valuations), saying that “it is a power which must be exercised
reasonably and in good faith”12. In Anglo-Norwegian Fisheries, the Court referred to its power to
review the drawing of a baseline in a particular locality in cases of “manifest abuse”13.
Good faith under ICRW Article VIII
46. Taking the procedural obligations under the Whaling Convention and the duty of good
faith together, Japan fully accepts that it is bound to consider and take account of any comments
received from the Scientific Committee under paragraph 30 of the Schedule to the Convention
when it decides upon the issuance and terms of any special permit.
47. But Japan does not accept that it is under any obligation to agree with, or to implement,
every comment that it receives.
48. It was no part of the agreement made in 1951 by Japan that research related to whales
conducted by any individual State or group of States should be subjected to collective control by
IWC Contracting Governments, or to control by the IWC itself. We explained that in Chapter 2 of
the Counter-Memorial; and we have developed that point in paragraphs 26 to 36 of our response to
New Zealand‟s Written Observations.
49. New Zealand tries to portray the IWC as a prototype for the subjection of high seas
resources to a system of collective management by an international organization  and that
achieved almost 70 years ago. But in Japan‟s submission, that view is not borne out by the
examination of the travaux préparatoires, to which New Zealand barely refers, or by the reading of
the 1946 Convention itself. The International Whaling Commission has the powers that it is given
under the Convention: no less, and no more.
12
Case concerning Rights of Nationals of the United States of America in Morocco (France v. United States of
America), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1952, p. 212.
13
Fisheries (United Kingdom v. Norway), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 142.
- 24 -
50. If Japan formulates a plan for the conduct of scientific research into whaling and, if it
involves a lethal take, it submits to the Scientific Committee the proposal to issue whaling permits,
and it gives the necessary consideration to the reviews and comments that it receives, and it reaches
a decision in good faith as to how to proceed, and that includes an informed consideration of those
reviews and comments, then Japan says that it validly exercises its rights to authorize the killing,
taking and treating of whales for purposes of scientific research under the Convention. And
Japan‟s decisions arrived at in this way cannot be overturned by the Whaling Commission or, in
our respectful submission, by this Court.
51. So, in Japan‟s submission, a Contracting Government fulfils the requirement when it
exercises its Article VIII rights in good faith if, in issuing a special permit, it considers:
(a) whether there is a need for data of the kind that it is proposed to collect;
(b) what are the appropriate methods for the collection of that data;
(c) the number of whales that, according to good scientific practice, should be caught, and the
length of time over which they should be caught, in order to generate a sound database; and
(d) whether that number of whales can be taken without damaging the health and sustainability of
the stocks from which they are taken.
52. And as that procedure was modified in 1979 with the adoption of paragraph 30 of the
Schedule, also Japan accepts the duty to submit proposed permits for review and comment by the
53. That is what Japan agreed to. That is the procedure on which the functioning of the
Whaling Commission is based. And that is the procedure that Japan in fact adopted in relation to
JARPA II. And Japan submits that in doing so it fulfilled its obligations under the Whaling
Convention.
54. The role of the Court, in our submission, is to secure the integrity of the process by
which the decision is made, and not to review the decision itself. Unless there is evidence that
Japan acted in bad faith, there is no basis for holding that Japan‟s decision to authorize JARPA II
amounts to a violation of the Convention.
- 25 Australia’s argument
55. Last Friday, counsel for Australia said that “Japan has never opened its mind to a
consideration of making the slightest change to the core aspects of its lethal methodology; scale,
continuity and indefinite period, have never been the subject of reconsideration by Japan”14.
“Japan”  whichever individuals are to be counted under that label  “never opened its mind to a
consideration of making the slightest change”. There is no evidence offered in support of that
astonishing, categorical assertion, one of several made by Australia in its pleadings. It was not
supported by Professor Mangel; and it may be that Australia thinks it appropriate to come back
with a more carefully articulated statement of its position next week.
56. But the point is that Australia has produced no evidence of bad faith. It seems to regard
the very fact that Japan and Australia are in profound disagreement on this matter as indicating that
Japan must be acting in bad faith. But that is not so. As a matter of fact Japan has not acted in bad
faith. And as a matter of law, as the tribunal in the Lac Lanoux case observed, “there is a general
and well-established principle of law according to which bad faith is not presumed”15.
57. Australia‟s experts were frank and helpful. Professor Mangel made it clear that his views
on the indicia of “scientific research” were not aimed at the term “scientific research” as a legal
term in a treaty. He was providing:
“a general assessment of what it means to do a program for purposes of scientific
research and then by reference to the IWC‟s writings, the activity of the Commission
and the Scientific Committee, to try to make it in some sense more operational for the
context of conservation and management of whales”16.
58. He accepted that there is a difference in meaning between the term “for purposes of
scientific research”, which is what the Convention says, and “for the purposes of scientific research
in the context of conservation and the management of whales”, which is the term upon which he
focused17.
Professor Mangel‟s testimony gave a clear view of his own understanding of the
desiderata of scientific research in a specific context, but he did not purport to address the legal
requirements imposed under the Convention, which refer to scientific research in a different
14
CR 2013/11, p. 36, para. 36 (Gleeson).
15
24 ILR, p. 126; XII UNRIAA, p. 305.
16
CR 2013/9, p. 53 (Mangel).
17
CR 2013/9, p. 52 (Mangel).
- 26 -
context. Even in its own terms, Professor Mangel accepted that his approach does not produce a
bright-line test: there may be border-line cases where some scientists think that a project falls on
one side of his criteria, whilst others think that it falls on the other side18.
59. Dr. Gales accepted that there have been a number of divisive issues in the Scientific
Committee and that there are times when it is quite legitimate to have disagreement within that
Committee19. His criticism was that the divisions of opinion over JARPA II have not been able to
advance in the Scientific Committee so as to enable it to advise the Commission on how it should
understand that division of views. His criticism is that it has impeded the development of a unified
message from the Scientific Committee.
60. It is evident that Japan and Australia disagree fundamentally over JARPA II. But the
fact that Japan takes a different view on certain technical matters does not entail the conclusion that
Japan is acting in bad faith. In the field of science and scientific debate, bad faith is the refusal to
listen, not the refusal to agree. Listening and disagreeing, and exploring the reasons for the
disagreement and the evidence bearing upon it, is how science progresses.
Conclusion
61. Mr. President, Members of the Court, my submission is that Japan has fulfilled all of the
requirements set out in the Whaling Convention in respect of the issuance of the JARPA II permits,
and that there is no legal basis upon which the Court can find that the issuance of those permits
violated Japan‟s legal obligations under that Convention. Unless I can be of further assistance,
Mr. President, I would ask you now to invite Ms Takashiba to take the floor.
The PRESIDENT:
Thank you very much, Professor Lowe.
Ms Takashiba. You have the floor.
Mme TAKASHIBA : Thank you Mr. President.
18
CR 2013/9, p. 59 (Mangel).
19
CR 2013/10, p. 27 (Gales).
I give the floor to
- 27 La portée et la pratique du paragraphe 30
Introduction
1. Mr. President, distinguished Members of the Court. It is a great honour for me to appear
before you today. To represent one‟s country is a privilege, but for me it is a particularly humbling
moment.
2. Monsieur le président, il m‟incombe de vous exposer le cadre procédural de la mise en
œuvre de JARPA II. En particulier, je me propose de montrer que la procédure d‟«examen et de
commentaires» du comité scientifique conformément au paragraphe 30 du règlement ne revient pas
à un «examen et approbation» préalables à la chasse scientifique, comme le suggèrent l‟Australie et
la Nouvelle-Zélande.
Pour en arriver là, l‟Australie a tenté la semaine dernière de réécrire
unilatéralement des observations du comité scientifique en fonction de ses intérêts20 et a prétendu
que les résolutions adoptées21 par la commission baleinière internationale (CBI), en dépit de ses
divisions, se fondaient sur de telles observations qui n‟existaient pas pour dire que le Japon rejette
tout mécanisme prévu par la convention22. Or cette construction n‟informe guère sur les exigences
exactes des colonnes du paragraphe 30. Je me propose donc de remettre le paragraphe 30 dans son
contexte véritable dans lequel le comité scientifique joue un rôle central et de montrer que le Japon
se conforme pleinement aux exigences du paragraphe 30.
3. La Cour a déjà longuement entendu parler du paragraphe 30. Il exige des gouvernements
contractants qu‟ils notifient les propositions de permis au comité scientifique de la CBI avant leur
délivrance pour que ce dernier puisse «les examiner et formuler un avis»23. Les gouvernements
doivent aussi présenter les résultats préliminaires de toute recherche issue des permis au comité.
Le paragraphe 30 établit donc un mécanisme pour faciliter l‟échange des renseignements de
caractère scientifique nécessaire pour accomplir les buts de la convention. Le comité n‟étant pas
lui-même muni de ses propres vaisseaux ou d‟équipes de recherche, il dépend des recherches
scientifiques effectuées par les gouvernements contractants.
20
CR 2013/8, p. 25, par. 44 (Burmester) ; CR 2013/8, p. 63, par. 19 (Sands) ; CR 2013/9, p. 21, par. 27.
21
CR 2013/11, p. 35, par. 36 (Gleeson).
22
23
Paragraphe 30 du règlement annexé à la convention.
- 28 4. L‟Australie a beaucoup insisté sur la première exigence du paragraphe 30 dans ses
plaidoiries24. Elle a, en revanche, très peu mentionné l‟échange de renseignements scientifiques,
alors que c‟est le but même de cette disposition. Au lieu de le faire, l‟Australie a tenté d‟avancer
deux arguments : premièrement, elle suggère que l‟adoption du paragraphe 30 atteste que la
convention restreint le pouvoir discrétionnaire des Etats pour octroyer des permis scientifiques en
vertu de l‟article VIII25 ; et deuxièmement, que, dans la pratique, le Japon se trouve en violation des
exigences procédurales du paragraphe 30 au mépris de la CBI26.
5. Avant de traiter de ces deux arguments, force est de constater que l‟Australie invoque ce
paragraphe 30 d‟une manière fort curieuse. Pendant les décennies de négociations, l‟Australie n‟a
jamais prétendu que le Japon avait violé cette disposition. A fortiori, le comité scientifique n‟a
jamais discuté une telle réclamation. Cette disposition a fait l‟objet de controverses uniquement
après que l‟Australie eut saisi la Cour de la présente affaire.
6. Monsieur le professeur Pellet a déjà expliqué pourquoi l‟amendement du règlement ne
peut pas restreindre le pouvoir discrétionnaire des gouvernements contractants d‟octroyer des
permis scientifiques sans autorisation préalable en vertu de l‟article VIII.
En conséquence,
j‟expliquerai maintenant, primo, la portée exacte du paragraphe 30 et la conformité de l‟attitude du
Japon à celle-ci (I.) ; secundo, je démontrerai que le Japon est allé bien au-delà de l‟exigence
minimum du paragraphe 30 en s‟engageant de manière continue dans un dialogue scientifique (II.).
I. La portée de l’exigence procédurale selon le paragraphe 30 du règlement
et le respect de cette disposition par le Japon
A. Notification préalable de propositions de permis scientifiques au comité scientifique
7. En ce qui concerne mon premier point, Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs de
la Cour, la question est assez simple.
Le paragraphe 30 se réfère à l‟«examen» et aux
«commentaires». Le sens ordinaire de ces termes ne peut être plus clair. Il s‟en déduit, d‟une part,
une obligation de notifier des propositions qui s‟impose aux gouvernements contractants et, d‟autre
part, la possibilité pour le comité de formuler un avis. Il n‟est fait mention nulle part d‟une
24
MA, par. 4.20-4.24 ; CR 2013/8, p. 33, par. 26-30 (Crawford).
25
MA, par. 4.22 ; CR 2013/8, p. 32, par. 23-24 et p. 34, par. 30 (Crawford) ; CR 2013/11, p. 34, par. 33-35
(Gleeson).
26
MA, par.5.127.
- 29 procédure d‟examen et d’approbation.
Le texte entier du paragraphe 30 se trouve sous
l‟onglet no 45 de vos dossiers et s‟affiche en ce moment à l‟écran. Comme cette disposition vous
est familière, nul besoin pour moi de la lire.
[Projection no 1.]
«Il appartient à tout gouvernement contractant de fournir au Secrétaire de la
commission baleinière internationale ses propositions de permis scientifiques avant
leur délivrance et dans un délai suffisant pour permettre au comité scientifique de les
examiner et de formuler un avis à ce sujet.»
Ensuite, cette disposition identifie les quatre types de renseignement à spécifier dans les
propositions, comme vous le voyez à l‟écran :
«a) les objectifs de la recherche ; b) le nombre, le sexe, la taille et la population des
animaux à capturer ; c) les possibilités de participation aux recherches de scientifiques
provenant d‟autres pays ; et d) les effets potentiels de cette chasse sur la conservation
de la population concernée»27.
8. L‟adoption du paragraphe 30 en 1979 ne fut nullement «une date historique dans
l‟évolution du système de délivrance de permis spéciaux»28, comme l‟affirme l‟Australie
aujourd‟hui. [Début de la projection no 2.] En effet, la disposition n‟a fait que préciser l‟obligation
découlant déjà de l‟article VIII, paragraphe 3, de la convention de transmettre les renseignements
de caractère scientifique29, obligation qui se reflète déjà dans la règle F du règlement intérieur du
comité scientifique30. [Fin de la projection no 2.]
9. M. Gleeson a prétendu que le Japon «avait systématiquement refusé de se plier» à cette
exigence «en ne soumettant pas ses propositions de permis scientifiques à l‟examen de la
commission avant de lancer ses campagnes de chasse»31. Mais l‟élément de preuve qu‟il a voulu
apporter ne l‟amène nulle part. M. Gleeson se réfère à des permis que le Japon a soumis à la
commission après les avoir délivrés alors que le Japon a soumis la proposition avant de délivrer
des permis, comme l‟exige le paragraphe 3032. La prétendue méconnaissance de cette exigence par
27
Paragraphe 30 du règlement.
28
MA, par. 4.22.
29
Derek Bowett, «Avis juridique sur une disposition du règlement annexé à la convention de 1946 qui prévoirait
l‟examen préalable des permis scientifiques et l‟interdiction de la chasse à la baleine dans le cadre d‟opérations pour
lesquelles toutes les données requises n‟auraient pas été fournies», IWC/31/9, p. 4 (CMJ, annexe 78).
30
Adoptée en 1977. Disponible à l‟adresse http://iwc.int/index.php?cID=2385&cType=document&download=1.
31
MA, par. 5.127. CR 2013/11, p. 34, par. 33 (Gleeson).
32
CR 2013/11, p. 34, par. 33 (Gleeson).
- 30 le Japon n‟a jamais été invoquée au sein du comité scientifique. Au contraire, il est incontestable
que le Japon n‟a jamais délivré ses permis scientifiques sans avoir au préalable donné au comité
scientifique la possibilité d‟examiner les projets de permis et de formuler un avis à ce sujet bien
avant l‟expiration des délais, et ceci tout au long des périodes de JARPA et JARPA II.
B. La procédure d’«examen et de commentaire» du comité scientifique
10. Une fois soumise, [projection no 3] la proposition fait l‟objet d‟un examen et de
commentaires du comité scientifique lors des réunions annuelles, conformément aux lignes
directrices du comité scientifique, incluses dans les annexes à ses rapports.
11. Quant à la portée des commentaires, absolument rien n‟indique qu‟ils aient un caractère
contraignant ni qu‟ils constituent une condition préalable à la chasse scientifique. La fonction du
comité scientifique n‟a pas pour fonction de valider, modifier ou révoquer les permis proposés.
Ceci n‟est pas seulement l‟interprétation du Japon. Avant d‟adopter le paragraphe 30, la CBI avait
sollicité l‟avis du professeur Derek Bowett. Celui-ci avait précisé que la licéité de l‟amendement
envisagé était conditionnée à l‟interprétation stricte de celui-ci, qui ne pourrait être conçue comme
ajoutant des conditions à l‟article VIII, ou comme conférant au comité scientifique le pouvoir
d‟autoriser ou de censurer les permis notifiés par les gouvernements contractants [début de la
projection no 4] :
“The function of the Scientific Committee must therefore be retained as one of
„review and comment‟. There can be no question of the Scientific Committee
assuming a power to authorise or disallow a permit. Even the fixing of the number of
whales to be taken, and any other conditions, rests in the discretion of the Contracting
Governments („as the Contracting Government thinks fit‟), so that the most the
Scientific Committee can do is to comment on these conditions, and this by way of
reports and recommendation to the Commission as the Rule J 3 recognizes.”33
Je note au passage que l‟Australie, qui cite cette consultation34, se garde d‟en reproduire ce passage
crucial dans le corps de son mémoire, ou dans ses annexes.
12. Dans le même sens, le commissaire de l‟Islande a insisté : «Paragraph 30 of the
Schedule … is carefully drafted so as not to question the right granted by the Convention.»35
33
Bowett, D., voir ci-dessus, (CMJ, annexe 78).
34
MA, par. 4.66.
- 31 Cette interprétation est bien celle de la CBI. Elle l‟a affirmé à plusieurs reprises que : «the
ultimate responsibility for issuing [proposed scientific permits] lies with the member nation»36.
M. le professeur Crawford a soutenu la semaine dernière que la question de savoir si le
comité scientifique assumait un pouvoir d‟autorisation ou de désapprobation n‟était pas la question
et que seul compte le caractère obligatoire du paragraphe 3037. Avec tout le respect dû, cela n‟est
pas la question. Le Japon est d‟accord avec l‟Australie en ce que le paragraphe 30 s‟impose à lui.
Mais c‟est sur l‟apport exact de cette disposition que les Parties divergent.
13. Dans ses écritures, la Nouvelle-Zélande transforme de manière arbitraire la procédure
d‟examen et de commentaires en «système de réglementation collective». Pourtant, rien dans la
disposition ne subordonne la délivrance des permis à l‟examen par la CBI des recommandations du
comité scientifique38. Elle est encore moins soumise à l‟approbation des autres gouvernements
contractants.
14. Il est aussi instructif d‟examiner la portée du paragraphe 30 à la lumière du rôle des
comités scientifiques dans d‟autres organisations internationales et régionales pour la pêcherie,
telles que l‟Organisation des pêches de l‟Atlantique Nord-Ouest (OPANO) et la Commission
internationale pour la conservation des thonidés de l‟Atlantique (ICCAT). Dans le cadre de ces
mécanismes, similaires à celui prévu par le paragraphe 30, le rôle des comités scientifiques n‟est
pas celui d‟un organe qui a pour but de juger des actions des Etats contractants. Il s‟agit également
d‟organes consultatifs39 constituant des forums de consultation et de coopération avec les
gouvernements contractants40.
35
Procès-verbal de la CBI, 1986, p. 24.
36
Rapport du président sur les travaux de la 57e Réunion annuelle de la CBI, 2005, p. 48, par. 10.1.1 (onglet no 47
du dossier des juges) ; Rapport du président sur les travaux de la 58e Réunion annuelle de la CBI, 2006, p. 40, par. 11.1.2.
37
CR 2013/8, p. 33, par. 29 (Crawford).
38
Answer by the Minister of Fisheries and Coastal Affairs of Norway, Lisbeth Berg-Hansen to Written Question
from Terje Aasland dated 20 June 2013, disponible à l‟adresse (http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fkd/Whatsnew/News/2013/scientific-research-on-whales.html?id=731449). Voir observations écrites de la Nouvelle-Zélande
(OEN, par. 105).
39
Voir, par exemple, OPNA, art. IX ; SEAFO, art. 10 ; CCAMLR, art. XIV ; CCSBT, art. 9 ; CGPM, règles de
procédure, règle X ; CITT, art. XI ; CICTA, art. IV ; CTOI, règles de procédure, règle X ; CPAPN, règles de procédure,
par. 11 ; WCPFC, art. 11.
40
Voir, par exemple, OPNA, art. IV. OPNA, art. VI ; SEAFO, art. 10, 13 ; CCAMLR, art. XV; CCSBT, art. 5 ;
CGPM, règle de procédure, règle X; CITT, annexe 4 ; CICTA, art. IX ; CTOI, règle de procédure, règle X ; CPAPN,
règle de procédure, par. 11 ; WCPFC, art. 12, 13.
- 32 -
15. Le comité scientifique établi par la CBI ne se distingue guère à cet égard.
Il a
exclusivement pour fonction de servir d‟organe consultatif conformément à la règle M (4) des
règles de procédure41.
C. La proposition de JARPA II a dûment fait l’objet d’examen et de commentaires par le
comité scientifique
16. Je vais maintenant expliquer comment la procédure d‟«examen et de commentaires» a
été mise en œuvre dans le cadre de JARPA II.
M. Gleeson prétend encore une fois que la
proposition de JARPA n‟aurait pas été soumise au comité de sorte que les renseignements requis
par le paragraphe 30 n‟auraient pas été soumis. Mais c‟est inexact car [début de la projection no 5]
le Japon a bien soumis la proposition de JARPA II en mars 2005 et a exposé des types de
renseignements conformément au paragraphe 3042. Le comité scientifique a reconnu que «The
proposal provides the information under Paragraph 30 of the Schedule.»43 Après un échange de
questions et réponses entre les membres du comité et les scientifiques participant à JARPA II44, le
comité scientifique, conformément à son mandat, s‟est acquitté de la tâche de l‟examiner et de
formuler des avis sur la méthodologie, les effets de captures sur la population concernée et sur les
possibilités de participation aux recherches, conformément à la ligne directrice du comité dans
l‟annexe Y dans son rapport de 200145. [Fin de la projection no 5.]
17. Afin de mettre en cause l‟examen du comité scientifique, l‟Australie se réfère à la
résolution de la CBI 2005-1 qui condamne JARPA II46. Cependant, la résolution n‟a rien à voir
avec la procédure du paragraphe 30 : seul le comité scientifique peut examiner le mérite
scientifique de la proposition. Comme on l‟a déjà vu, les discussions au sein de la commission au
sujet des constatations du comité scientifique à l‟égard des permis scientifiques sont dominées par
une autre dynamique. La résolution de la CBI, elle-même à peine adoptée à une faible majorité de
41
Voir règle M (4) des règles de procédure du comité scientifique.
http://iwc.int/index.php?cID=2385&cType=document&download=1.
42
CMJ, Annexe 150.
43
JCRM 8 (Suppl.), 2006, p. 50 (onglet no 48).
44
Ibid.
45
Disponible à l‟adresse
Lignes directrices pour l‟examen de propositions des permis scientifiques, annexe Y, JCRM 3 (Suppl.), 2001
[MA, annexe 48] ; rapport du comité scientifiquee (SC Report) 2005 (JCRM 8 (Suppl.), 2006), p. 49. Tous les rapports
du comité scientifique cités ici sont disponibles à l‟adresse http://iwc.int/scientifc-committee-reports.
46
MA, par. 5.16 ; CR 2013/11, p. 32, par. 28 (Gleeson).
- 33 30 Etats contre 2747, ne peut pas annihiler la procédure suivie par le comité scientifique sur la base
de critères scientifiques.
18. Tant M. le professeur Sands que M. Gleeson ont souligné en outre le fait que
63 membres  sur 195  du comité scientifique ont été absents lorsque la proposition de
JARPA II a été examinée par le comité, pour ainsi réfuter la validité de sa procédure48. En réalité,
l‟absence de 63 scientifiques, y compris les membres australiens, atteste plutôt du manque de
coopération dans le cadre du paragraphe 30 par les scientifiques qui s‟opposent à la chasse. Leur
absence ne prouve certainement pas un manque de conformité du Japon. L‟Australie ne peut pas
s‟appuyer sur le boycottage de délibérations au sein du comité scientifique par des scientifiques qui
s‟alignent à sa politique et prétendre devant la Cour maintenant que ces membres n‟ont pas eu la
possibilité de participer aux délibérations. Les choses sont claires. Après la soumission, par les
63 scientifiques, d‟une déclaration d‟objection à l‟examen de la proposition49, et d‟une réfutation
écrite de cette objection50, le comité s‟est acquitté de sa fonction.
Le comité n‟a jamais
recommandé de changer les méthodes de recherche. En revanche, lorsque le comité scientifique
avait estimé qu‟une proposition de permis  soumise par des autres Etats  ne répondait pas à ses
critères, il avait recommandé spécifiquement de ne pas délivrer les permis demandés51. Ce fut le
cas, par exemple, lorsqu‟il avait estimé que le programme d‟observation prévu n‟était pas assez
aléatoire ou que les impacts sur la population suscitaient des préoccupations. Ce n‟était pas le cas
pour JARPA II.
19. Les 63 scientifiques se sont retirés de la salle en 2005, en déclarant qu‟il serait
inapproprié de présenter une critique détaillée avant que l‟évaluation de JARPA ne soit achevée52.
En décembre 2006, l‟évaluation finale des résultats de JARPA a été effectuée par le comité. Ses
conclusions ont été ensuite appuyées par le comité scientifique dans sa réunion annuelle de
47
JCM, par. 5.88.
48
MA, par. 5.86 ; CR 2013/9, p. 33, par. 66-67 (Sands) ; CR 2013/11, p. 32, par. 25-27 (Gleeson).
49
JCRM 8 (Suppl.), 2006, p. 260, annexe O1, appendice 2 (JCM, annexe 108).
50
JCRM 8 (Suppl.), 2006, p. 262, annexe O1, appendice 3 (JCM, annexe 152).
51
Voir, par exemple, Rep. Int. Whal. Commn 37, 1987, p. 29 ; ibid. 38, 1988, p. 54 (onglet no 49).
52
SC Report 2005 (JCRM 8 (Suppl.) 2006), p. 49.
- 34 mai 200753. Cependant, personne parmi ces 63 scientifiques n‟a saisi l‟occasion de formuler une
critique détaillée de la proposition de JARPA II à cette occasion54. Voici ce que le comité a dit
en 2010 [projection no 6] : «the chair noted that both JARPA II and JARPN II are continuing on the
basis of plans already submitted and reviewed in the Scientific Committee»55. Pour le comité, la
procédure prévue a donc été pleinement suivie.
II. L’engagement continu du Japon dans le dialogue scientifique
A. Le Japon a été à l’écoute du comité scientifique
20. Ceci m‟amène à ma deuxième partie. L‟Australie soutient maintenant que le Japon
n‟était pas à l‟écoute des préoccupations soulevées par les membres du comité scientifique56.
21. A la lumière du but du paragraphe 30, les échanges entre le comité scientifique et un
gouvernement contractant sont évidemment de nature scientifique. La disposition n‟impose pas
d‟exigence de coopération entre les gouvernements contractants eux-mêmes. L‟Australie déforme
le sens du paragraphe 30 en suggérant que les vues d‟autres Etats de la CBI puissent intervenir dans
la procédure du paragraphe 3057.
22. En tant que membres de la CBI, les gouvernements contractants doivent coopérer afin de
s‟acquitter de bonne foi de leurs engagements pour la réalisation du but de la convention. Lorsque
le comité scientifique examine la proposition, le gouvernement concerné doit tenir compte
sérieusement des discussions qui ont eu lieu en son sein et de ses éventuelles conclusions.
23. Cependant, premièrement, la mauvaise foi ne peut pas être présumée58 mais doit être
prouvée59.
Deuxièmement, les moyens spécifiques de coopération demeurent largement à la
discrétion des Etats60.
53
SC Report 2007 (JCRM 10 (Suppl.) 2008), p. 58.
54
SC Report 2007 (JCRM 10 (Suppl.) 2008), annexe O, p. 342-345, 347-350.
55
SC Report 2010 (JCRM 12 (Suppl.), 2011), p. 57 (onglet no 50).
56
MA, par. 5.84-5.93 ; CR 2013/8, p. 26, par. 45 (Burmester) ; CR 2013/9, p. 33, par. 74-76 (Sands) ;
CR 2013/11, p. 14 (Crawford).
57
MA, par. 5.88 ; OEN, par. 86 ; CR 2013/8, p. 34, par. 30 (Crawford).
58
Voir également, Essais nucléaires (Nouvelle-Zélande c. France), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1974, p. 473, par. 49 ;
Différend relatif à des droits de navigation et des droits connexes (Costa Rica c. Nicaragua), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2009,
p. 267, par. 150 ; Application de l’accord intérimaire du 13 septembre 1995 (ex-République yougoslave de Macédoine
c. Grèce), arrêt du 5 décembre 2011, par. 168.
59
Application de l’accord intérimaire du 13 septembre 1995 (ex-République yougoslave de Macédoine c. Grèce),
arrêt du 5 décembre 2011, par. 138.
- 35 -
24. Les arguments de la Nouvelle-Zélande à cet égard sont erronés. En se fondant sur sa
propre interprétation de la convention en tant que système (complet) de réglementation collective,
la Nouvelle-Zélande prétend, sans fondement, que la coopération effective dans le cadre du
paragraphe 30 exige que «le gouvernement contractant prenne en compte les vues exprimées par
les autres parties, dans le respect de leurs intérêts, et soit prêt à modifier sa proposition de permis
scientifique en conséquence»61. Et bien évidemment, pour la Nouvelle-Zélande, le seul moyen de
s‟acquitter de ce devoir consisterait à se plier aux avis des Etats hostiles à la chasse à la baleine62.
C‟est là une interprétation assez originale du terme «coopération». Elle tente en outre de renverser
la charge de la preuve, en soutenant qu‟il appartient au gouvernement contractant octroyant les
permis spéciaux de «démontrer qu‟il a dûment tenu compte des vues du comité scientifique et de la
commission»63. La Nouvelle-Zélande part de la position selon laquelle un Etat est présumé agir de
mauvaise foi sauf s‟il peut démontrer le contraire64.
Il s‟agit d‟une théorie fort nouvelle et
indéfendable.
25. Dans la mesure où la convention impose un devoir particulier de coopération, la question
se pose de savoir si le Japon a tenu compte de bonne foi des commentaires du comité scientifique.
Comme la Norvège l‟a indiqué récemment : «The … party concerned will also have to take into
account any advice provided by the Scientific Committee under Article VI  such advice,
however, being recommendations as opposed to decisions or injunctions.»65 Dans le cadre de la
consultation préalable avec le comité scientifique, et non du consentement préalable de la
CBI  que rien n‟impose, la question n‟est pas de savoir si le Japon a modifié sa proposition en
postulant, à tort, que les commentaires constituent une décision contraignante ou conformément
60
Murase, Shinya, International Law: An Integrative Perspective on Transboundary Issues, Sophia Univ. Press,
2011, p. 114.
61
OEN, par. 106.
62
Ibid.
63
OEN, conclusion e), p. 66.
64
Application de l’accord intérimaire du 13 septembre 1995 (ex-République yougoslave de Macédoine c. Grèce),
arrêt du 5 décembre 2011, par. 132.
65
Answer by the Minister of Fisheries and Coastal Affairs of Norway, voir ci-dessus.
- 36 aux «vues exprimées par les autres parties»66. A cet égard, la pratique du comité scientifique est
claire et c‟est sur ce dernier point que je me pencherai maintenant.
B. Dialogue scientifique continu même après l’examen et les commentaires par le comité
scientifique
26. La procédure que j‟ai eu l‟honneur d‟exposer fait partie d‟un dialogue scientifique plus
Comme je l‟ai mentionné tout au début de ma présentation [projection no 7], le
large.
paragraphe 30 exige aussi la présentation de «résultats préliminaires de toute recherche issue des
permis»67. Le Japon a tenu le comité scientifique au courant des progrès de JARPA II68, et d‟abord
en lui présentant annuellement des rapports de mission69.
27. L‟Australie soutient que le Japon n‟a pas répondu aux points soulevés lors de
l‟évaluation finale de JARPA par le comité scientifique70.
JARPA II est un programme de
recherche devant se dérouler sur six ans, après lesquels la première évaluation périodique est
prévue pour le début 201471. Le Japon est prêt à modifier le programme, si nécessaire, sur la base
des résultats de ladite évaluation72. Il a en outre déjà accepté d‟y apporter des modifications. Le
comité scientifique a d‟ailleurs noté :
[Début de la projection no 8.]
«Although there is no formal requirement for Special Permit holders to report
on what changes have been made to their research plans as a result to any comments
or suggestions received from the Scientific Committee, the Committee agrees that it
would be good practice to do so. This would help speed up future review process and
would constitute an act of good faith.»73
66
MA, par. 5.88 ; OEN, par. 95. Answer by the Minister of Fisheries and Coastal Affairs of Norway, voir
ci-dessus.
67
Paragraphe 30 du règlement.
68
Voir par exemple, SC Report 2012, p. 86 ; SC Report 2011 (JCRM 13 (Suppl.), 2012), p. 54 ; SC Report 2010
(JCRM 12 (Suppl.), 2011), p. 57.
69
Voir par exemple, SC Report 2012, p. 85. Tous les rapports de croisière de JARPA/JARPA II sont disponibles
à l‟adresse : http://www.icrwhale.org/CruiseReportJARPA.htm.
70
MA, par. 5.87 ; CR 2013/9, p. 36, par. 75 (Sands). Voir aussi CMJ, par. 5.18.
71
Rapport du président de la CBI, 2012, p. 52.
72
Projet de recherche JARPA II (SC/57/O1), p. 13 (CMJ, annexe 150) : «At the end of this phase, a review will
be held and revisions made to the program if required».
73
MA, par. 5.90 ; SC Report 2005, (JCRM 8 (Suppl.), 2006), p. 48 (onglet no 51).
- 37 28. C‟est donc dans cet esprit que le Japon, depuis l‟époque de JARPA, a continuellement
participé, en toute bonne foi, aux débats scientifiques avec la communauté scientifique de la CBI,
en exposant ses résultats à l‟analyse et à la critique. Il a très attentivement pris en considération les
vues exprimées par les membres du comité scientifique74.
29. Ce dernier a reconnu à de nombreuses reprises que le Japon avait accepté d‟adapter son
programme de recherche75.
[Début de la projection no 9.] : «The Committee welcomed the
presentation of this report in response to a request from last year.» 76 C‟est d‟ailleurs en réponse à
des avis du comité scientifique que les méthodes de collecte de données ont été modifiées pour
renforcer la composante d‟observation77.
Les scientifiques ayant fait des propositions de
modification concrète ont exprimé leur appreciation : un membre américain «noted, with
appreciation, that many of the concerns he had expressed last year had been addressed in papers to
the meeting78». La CBI a en outre reconnu que «the programme had been revised to try to take into
account comments made by the Scientific Committee in the previous year»79. Depuis 1987, le
Japon s‟est employé à développer des outils spéciaux pour l‟échantillonnage des biopsies80.
30. L‟Australie et le Dr Gales prétendent que le Japon ne s‟est pas montré disposé à accepter
les changements81. Cela n‟est tout simplement pas exact. Le débat sur les méthodes de substitution
des méthodes létales ainsi que sur l‟utilité de données de JARPA/JARPA II pour la mise en œuvre
de la RMP pour les petits rorquals antarctiques est très révélateur. Et ce débat doit être apprécié
74
CMJ, p. 375-380, par. 8.68.
75
SC/44/SHB14 (JCM, annexe 143) ; voir également : «Report of the Intersessional Workshop to Review Data
and Results from Special Permit Research on Minke Whales in the Antarctic», Tokyo, 4-8 décembre 2006,
(onglet no 15) ; SC/64/IA4, disponible à l‟adresse : http://iwc.int/sc64docs ; SC Report 2002 (JCRM 5 (Suppl.), 2003),
p. 35) ;
(JCRM 10
(Suppl.),
2008,
p. 423 ;
SC/59/O8,
disponible
à
l‟adresse :
http://www.icrwhale.org/pdf/SC-59-O8.pdf ;
SC/62/IA11,
disponible
à l‟adresse : http://iwc.int/sc62docs ;
SC Report 2010 (JCRM 12 (Suppl.), 2011), p. 26).
76
Rep. Int. Whal. Commn 46, 1996, p. 78
77
Rep. Int. Whal. Commn 43, 1993, p. 75.
78
Rep. Int. Whal. Commn 42, 1992, p. 73 (comments by Smith (USA)). Voir également ibid., 1992, p. 73 et
p. 76 ; Rep. Int. Whal. Commn 44, 1994, p. 61.
79
Rep. Int. Whal. Commn 42, 1992, p. 13.
80
SC/42/O16 (Rep. Int. Whal. Commn 41, 1991, p. 555-557) ; Kasamatsu et al. 1989 (SC/41/SHMi16),
disponible à l‟adresse : http://www.icrwhale.org/pdf/SC-41-SHMi16.pdf ; Nishiwaki et al. 1990 (SC/42/ShMi21),
disponible à l‟adresse : http://www.icrwhale.org/pdf/SC-42-SHMi21.pdf.
81
Déclaration du Dr Gales, en date du 15 avril 2013, par. 3.28-3.29 ; CR 2013/11, p. 36, par. 36 (Gleeson).
- 38 -
dans son contexte. En 1997, le président de la CBI a demandé aux tenants de deux positions
opposées de présenter leur vues de façon succincte pour éviter que le débat ne s‟éternise 82. La
nécessité de l‟échantillonnage létal a été expliquée de façon exhaustive, sous des angles multiples :
besoin de grands nombres d‟individus pour les études d‟identification de stocks, succès limité
d‟élaboration de techniques de prélèvement de biopsies sur les petits rorquals, importance de
disposer de données précises sur l‟âge et la morphométrie, par exemple, que les méthodes
non létales ne fournissent pas83. A la même occasion, l‟utilité des résultats de JARPA pour la
gestion fut expressément reconnue par le groupe de travail de mi-parcours84. Pourtant, plusieurs
années plus tard, en 2005, lorsque le comité scientifique a examiné la proposition de JARPA II, les
63 scientifiques évoqués tout à l‟heure ont à nouveau soutenu qu‟«il avait été démontré que le
recours à des méthodes non létales permettait de suivre les changements temporels et spatiaux dans
la structure des stocks», sans apporter d‟élément de preuve scientifique à l‟appui de cette
affirmation85. Deux ans plus tard, en 2007, le Japon a présenté au comité scientifique un document
scientifique détaillé dans lequel il mettait en relief les avantages et les inconvénients des deux
méthodes86. Cependant, les mêmes scientifiques opposés aux méthodes létales sont revenus à la
charge, en affirmant que «la description qui y était faite des moyens offerts par les méthodes non
létales et de leurs limites était très inexacte»87, sans pourtant produire le moindre élément probant
concernant l‟utilisation de ces méthodes pour les petits rorquals88. Les scientifiques qui s‟opposent
à la chasse n‟ont pas présenté de propositions concrètes pour atteindre les objectifs de recherche
visés par JARPA II dans son ensemble uniquement par des méthodes non létales pouvant être
utilisées de manière réaliste.
82
Rep. Int. Whal. Commn 48, 1998, p. 382 (sommaires dans le rapport du groupe de travail intersessions,
annexe H, p. 412).
83
Ibid.
84
Rapport du groupe de travail intersessions chargé d‟examiner les données et les résultats obtenus dans le cadre
de la chasse au petit rorqual dans l‟Antarctique au titre d‟un permis spécial en vue de recherches scientifiques, Tokyo,
12-16 mai 1997, Rep. Int. Whal. Commn 48, 1998, SC/49/Rep1, p. 386 (CMJ, annexe 95).
85
JCRM 8 (Suppl.), 2006, p. 260, annexe O1, appendice 2, p. 261 (CMJ, annexe 108).
86
SC/59/O2, disponible à l‟adresse : http://www.icrwhale.org/pdf/SC-59-O2.pdf ; sur JARPN II, voir également
SC/J09/JR1(Rev1.), disponible à l‟adresse : http://www.icrwhale.org/pdf/SC-J09-JR1.pdf ; SC/61/JR1, disponible à
l‟adresse : http://iwc.int/index.php?cID=1785&cType=document.
87
JCRM 10 (Suppl.), 2008, annexe O, p. 343 (onglet no 53).
88
Ibid.
- 39 31. Le refus de l‟Australie de reconnaître les efforts d‟adaptation du Japon n‟est guère
étonnant à la lumière de ce que l‟Australie a répété au sein de la CBI, à savoir qu‟elle s‟oppose à
toute recherche qui comporte la capture de baleines89. Ceci ne laisse d‟emblée aucune place pour la
discussion.
32. Les débats au sein du comité scientifique sont polarisés, comme M. le professeur Walløe
l‟a dit hier, quand il s‟agit de débat sur les méthodes létales ou non létales, entre les membres qui
croient que les baleines ne doivent être tuées sous aucun prétexte et d‟autres qui considèrent que
l‟utilisation durable des baleines est un but légitime. Dans cette situation, l‟évaluation de la
recherche dépend des positions respectives de chacun par rapport à l‟une de ces positions opposées.
L‟Australie prétend que le Japon n‟est pas prêt à ajuster JARPA II en fonction des commentaires et
recommandations présentées lors de l‟évaluation finale de JARPA en 200690 alors même que c‟est
précisément à cet égard que la bonne foi du Japon et sa volonté d‟adaptation se révèlent de façon
manifeste. Les scientifiques engagés dans JARPA II ont incorporé les recommandations de ladite
évaluation de JARPA91 dans leur mise en œuvre de JARPA II.
Le document figurant sous
l‟onglet no 53, pages 349 et suivantes, de vos dossiers est un tableau récapitulatif des
recommandations présentées lors de l‟évaluation finale de JARPA en 2006, maintenant aussi à
l‟écran. [Début de la projection no 10.] Les recommandations ont été sérieusement examinées, des
articles scientifiques ont été présentés au comité et publiés dans des revues après examen par des
pairs92.
33. S‟agissant des paramètres biologiques importants de l‟échantillonnage létal,
deux exemples parmi d‟autres illustrent bien le processus de dialogue scientifique : l‟épaisseur de
la graisse et la structure des stocks. Comme montré à l‟écran, sur deux questions essentielles, le
dialogue entre le comité scientifique et les spécialistes sur les recommandations  dans les
colonnes à gauche  a donné lieu à des mesures concrètes  dans les colonnes à droite.
Premièrement, en ce qui concerne l‟analyse de l‟épaisseur de la graisse  en haut à gauche  qui
89
Procès-verbal de la CBI, 1998, p. 131 (onglet no 52).
90
MA, par. 5.90-5.91 ; CR 2013/9, p. 36, par. 75 (Sands).
91
Appendice 3, «Summary of Recommendations from the JARPA Review Workshop», in JCRM 10 (Suppl.),
2008, p. 349-350 (CMJ, annexe 112, onglet no 53).
92
CMJ, par. 5.18 ; SC Report 2010 (JCRM 12 (Suppl.), 2011), p. 26.
- 40 indique l‟état corporel de baleines à partir duquel on peut détecter les changements dans
l‟écosystème, le comité scientifique a recommandé en 2006 d‟inclure dans l‟étude des facteurs tels
que l‟âge et la latitude des prises93. L‟année suivante, un document a été présenté au comité
scientifique lors de sa réunion annuelle94 et, après un travail de refonte, publié dans une revue à
comité de lecture en 200895. Deuxièmement, pour ce qui est de l‟information sur la structure des
stocks  en bas à gauche , les scientifiques ont proposé comme hypothèse d‟étude deux stocks
de petits rorquals antarctiques dans la zone de recherche et une zone mixte96.
Le comité
scientifique a appuyé cette hypothèse et a recommandé l‟élaboration d‟un modèle spécifique pour
étudier d‟une manière plus approfondie la zone de transition97 des deux stocks. Ledit modèle a été
présenté à la réunion annuelle du comité scientifique de 2012 ; voilà un exemple récent de mise en
œuvre des recommandations du comité scientifique par les responsables scientifiques de
JARPA II98. [Fin de la projection no 10.]
34. L‟analyse des changements dans l‟épaisseur de graisse fut d‟ailleurs reconnue comme un
élément très important par le groupe de travail sur la modélisation de l‟écosystème, car il est utile
dans l‟interprétation des interactions entre les espèces et l‟écosystème de l‟océan Antarctique99.
Les discussions sur ce point continuent au sein du comité scientifique100. Ce dernier a noté que le
modèle de structure des stocks employé était «simple and potentially powerful» et que, «[a]side
from the general relevance of the results to understanding [of] Antarctic minke whale dynamics, it
might in the future prove useful in allocating historical catches to stocks101.
35. Avec votre indulgence, j‟aimerais donner encore un dernier exemple, étant donné son
importance dans ce litige. Il s‟agit d‟une analyse réalisée au moyen de bouchons auriculaires. Une
93
JCRM 10, 2008, annexe O, p. 350 (onglet no 53).
94
SC/59/010, disponible à l‟adresse http://www.icrwhale.org/pdf/SC-59-O10.pdf..
95
Konishi, K., Tamura, T., Zenitani, R., Bando, T., Kato, H., et Walloe, L. «Decline in energy storage in the
Antarctic minke whale (Balaenoptera bonaerensis) in the Southern Ocean», 2008, Polar Biology, p. 1518.
96
SC/59/REP1, disponible à l‟adresse http://iwc.int/index.php?cID=1565&cType=document&download=1.
97
JCRM 10, 2008, annexe O, p. 349 (onglet no 53).
98
SC/64/IA4, disponible à l‟adresse http://iwc.int/sc64docs.
99
JCRM 10 (Suppl.), 2008, annexe K1, p. 299.
100
SC Report 2013,
annexe K1,
iwc.int/index.php?cID=3308&cType=document&download=1.
101
SC Report 2012, p. 35.
disponible
à
l‟adresse
http://
- 41 question de compatibilité des données commerciales et des données JARPA concernant l‟âge des
baleines a été soulevée lors de l‟examen de 2006 ; c‟est le point 2 des «paramètres
biologiques (BP)» sur la même liste des recommandations qui figure dans votre dossier. [Début de
la projection no 11.] Les résultats des expériences menées par la suite ont été communiqués aux
scientifiques, qui «welcomes this study as an important advance» et en conclusion «no further
experiments or analysis on age reading errors are needed to resolve ageing related problems raised
in JARPA review»102. Cette année, d‟autres travaux de compatibilité des données JARPA II
concernant l‟âge des baleines avec celles de la chasse commerciale et JARPA103 ont été présentés
au comité scientifique, qui est à nouveau convenu que «the approach and results provide useable
input data for Scatch at Age Analysis»104. Grâce à ces données, le comité scientifique dispose
d‟estimations fiables sur le taux de mortalité naturelle et le ratio de rendement maximum de
renouvellement.
Pour ce qui est de l‟utilité de ces analyses pour le comité scientifique,
permettez-moi de vous renvoyer à l‟explication donnée par M. le professeur Walløe. [Fin de la
projection no 11.]
36. Ces exemples montrent que le Japon a pris en compte les recommandations formulées
afin d‟observer l‟écosystème antarctique et d‟élucider les changements temporels et spatiaux
intervenus dans la structure des stocks de petits rorquals antarctiques, et que ces efforts ont été
hautement appréciés par le comité scientifique105.
37. Enfin, l‟engagement de bonne foi du Japon se traduit également par son ouverture à la
participation de scientifiques d‟autres pays à la recherche, dans le cadre du paragraphe 30 c) et par
l‟accessibilité des données obtenues. A la différence d‟un autre programme de chasse scientifique
dans le Pacifique Nord, JARPN et JARPN II, auquel des scientifiques coréens et russes ont
participé106, dans l‟océan Antarctique, aucun scientifique autre que ceux de JARPA et JARPA II
102
JCRM 12 (Suppl.) 2011, p. 26.
103
Kitakado, T., Lockyer, C. et Punt, A.E., «A statistical model for quantifying age-reading errors and its
application to the Antarctic minke whales», SC/65a/IA04, p. 18 (in review in the JCRM), disponible à l‟adresse
http://events.iwc.int//index.php/scientific/SC65a/paper/view/283/274.
104
SC Report 2013, p. 39, disponible à l‟adresse http://iwc.int/index.php?cID=3318&cType=document&download=1.
105
Pour l‟épaisseur de graisse, voir SC Report 2011, annexe K1 (JCRM 13, 2012), p. 259 ; pour la structure de
stocks, voir SC Report 2012 (JCRM 14, 2013), p. 26.
106
SC/55/O7 ; SC/56/O13 ; SC/57/O3 ; SC/58/O8 ; SC/60/O5, disponible à l‟adresse http://www.icrwhale.org/
CruiseReportJARPN.html.
- 42 n‟a accompagné la mission de recherche, alors que le Japon a lancé la même invitation ouverte aux
participants extérieurs, comme le dit le projet de JARPA II107. Malgré l‟absence de scientifiques
extérieurs, les données ont été rendues accessibles en vertu de l‟accord sur la disponibilité des
données du comité scientifique108 et ont été utilisées par des scientifiques non japonais109.
Conclusion
38. Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs de la Cour. En conclusion, [début de la
projection no 12] je voudrais appeler votre attention sur le tableau illustrant le grand nombre de
documents scientifiques présentés par des scientifiques engagés dans JARPA. La contribution du
Japon est marquée en bleu foncé, celle de l‟Australie en jaune, et celle des autres pays en bleu clair.
Ces scientifiques participent aussi à différents sous-comités chargés d‟études approfondies sur des
thèmes spécifiques, pour lesquelles les résultats de JARPA ont été particulièrement importants 110.
C‟est là une indication du rôle de premier plan que joue le Japon dans la recherche sur les cétacés
et de sa contribution considérable à la conduite et au financement de grands projets de recherche.
39. Le comité scientifique a rappelé à maintes reprises que «seules les questions
scientifiques, et non les questions d‟éthique, devaient être examinées» en vue de la délivrance des
permis scientifiques111. Mais la tâche du comité est ardue face à des déclarations comme celle qu‟a
faite, par exemple, la Nouvelle-Zélande devant lui en 1997 :
“Under our Convention science is rightly the province of the Scientific
Committee but there are occasions when it is proper for this body [Commission] to
give guidance to the Committee on its scope and that is particularly true where
scientific research programmes raise moral and ethical questions.”112
40. La controverse politique autour de la méthode létale a souvent affaibli le rôle du comité
au sein de la CBI. A la différence du comité scientifique, la CBI est clairement un organisme
107
JARPA II research plan (SC/57/O1), p. 20 (JCM, annexe 150).
108
JCRM 6 (Suppl.), 2004, annexe T, p. 406-408 (CMJ, annexe 99).
109
La liste de recherches scientifiques utilisant les données de JARPA/JARPA II est disponible à l‟adresse
http://icrwhale.org/pdf/ScientificContributionJARPA.pdf.
110
In particular, subcommittees on Stock Structure, In-depth Assessment, Southern Hemisphere Ecosystem
Modeling, Stock Definition, BRG (bowhead, right and grey whales) and Standing working group on environmental
concerns.
111
SC Report 2005 (JCRM 8 (Suppl.), 2006), p. 48. Procès-verbal de la CBI, 1997, Nouvelle-Zélande, p. 133.
112
Procès-verbal de la CBI, 1997, p. 133.
- 43 politique113. Ainsi, malgré le fait que la convention exige que les décisions de l‟organisation soient
basées sur des connaissances scientifiques, certains Etats membres s‟en désintéressent en faveur de
résolutions politisées114.
[Début de la projection no 13.]
Le comité scientifique n‟est jamais
parvenu à un consensus pour dénoncer JARPA et JARPA II. Les résolutions de la CBI sur
lesquelles l‟Australie et la Nouvelle-Zélande s‟appuient tant sont éloignées de toute considération
scientifique. Elles ne reflètent certainement pas les vues du comité scientifique dans son ensemble.
Elles ne reflètent pas non plus celles d‟un grand nombre d‟Etats qui ne sont pas catégoriquement
opposés à la chasse à la baleine. Ces résolutions ne sauraient manifestement pas être assimilées à
«l‟expression claire des attentes des gouvernements contractants», comme le laissent entendre
l‟Australie et la Nouvelle-Zélande115. [Fin de la projection no 13.]
41. Monsieur le président, l‟on ne saurait raisonnablement interpréter le processus d‟examen
et de commentaires prévu par le paragraphe 30 comme équivalant à une obligation d‟accepter
inconditionnellement les vues des autres gouvernements contractants.
Selon l‟Australie et la
Nouvelle-Zélande, si le Japon ne modifie pas ses propositions de recherche pour tenir compte des
vues exprimées par certains membres du comité scientifique qui correspondent à leur politique
d‟opposition systématique à la chasse à la baleine, le Japon agit au mépris du comité. Ceci est fort
éloigné de ce qu‟envisage le paragraphe 30116.
42. Il ne peut y avoir de doute que le Japon respecte pleinement le paragraphe 30 et qu‟il est
allé bien au-delà des exigences minimales de cette disposition, pour contribuer de manière
importante à un dialogue scientifique continu. Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs les
juges, je vous remercie très sincèrement de votre attention. Mr. President, may I ask you to give
the floor to Professor Boyle or maybe you would prefer to have a break now.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you very much. I think it is time for a pause of 15 minutes.
Afterwards I will give the floor to Professor Boyle. Thank you very much.
113
CMJ, par. 4.31. Propos de la France dans le procès-verbal de la CBI (12-16 juin 1989), p. 116 (CMJ,
annexe 36).
114
Voir, par exemple, résolutions CBI 1987-4 (MA, annexe 10) ; 1989-3 (MA, annexe 16) ; 1990-2 (MA,
annexe 18) ; 1991-2 (MA, annexe 19) ; 1994-10 (MA, annexe 25) ; 1996-7 (MA, annexe 28) ; 1997-5 (MA, annexe 29) ;
2003-3 (MA, annexe 39).
115
OEN, par. 31, 98.
116
OEJ, par. 42.
- 44 -
The hearing is suspended for 15 minutes.
The Court is adjourned from 11.25 a.m. to 11.40 a.m.
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. The hearing is resumed and I give the floor to
Professor Boyle. You have the floor, Sir.
Mr. BOYLE: Thank you, Mr. President.
JARPA II IS CONDUCTED “FOR PURPOSES OF SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH”
1. Mr. President, Members of the Court, my task today is to explain to the Court why
JARPA II is a program of scientific research carried out under Article VIII of the Whaling
Convention. Australia‟s arguments to the contrary, in our view, lack substance and they are not
founded in the applicable law or in common sense. They are also wrong in certain respects. I will
address five matters.
2. Firstly, I will deal with the question what is meant by scientific research. I will explain to
the Court that this is not a matter to be answered by reference to expert scientific evidence from
eminent scientists. It can only be answered by looking at the specific context of the Whaling
Convention and at the guidelines for special permits laid down by that Convention.
3. Secondly, I will explain why, contrary to Australia‟s insistence last week, JARPA II is
indeed a program of scientific research. For that purpose I will take the Court through the
2005 JARPA II research plan submitted to the IWC Scientific Committee by the Government of
Japan. In doing so, I will underline the point made by Professor Hamamoto that JARPA II has
legitimate research objectives that are relevant to the conservation and management of Antarctic
whale stocks, to the implementation of the Revised Management Procedure (RMP), and to the
future development and improvement of the RMP. These objectives are materially different from
the previous program JARPA, and they explain the difference in sample sizes between the two
programs. It is not right, as I think I will demonstrate, to characterize JARPA II as simply a
seamless continuation of the earlier program.
4. Perhaps I might seize this moment to point out that the 2005 research plan is the key
document in these proceedings, not the special permit issued by the government and to which
- 45 -
Australia drew your attention last week. The permit merely authorizes what is in the plan, nothing
more.
5. Thirdly, I will take you to the applicable guidelines in order to show you the basis on
which the Scientific Committee reviews and comments on proposals for special permits.
Ms Takashiba has already explained that procedure, but I need to look at the details of the
guidelines. The JARPA II research plan was reviewed by the Scientific Committee in 2005.
Contrary to Australia‟s assertions it met all of the agreed guidelines at that point and, in our view, it
continues to do so. For that purpose it will be necessary to look in particular at Annex P, adopted
by consensus in the Scientific Committee and endorsed by the Commission in 2008 117. And it is
here, in Annex P, that the parties to the Convention have set out what information they agree
should be provided when special permit proposals are reviewed by the Committee. And it replaces
all of the highly controversial resolutions and guidelines adopted in the 1980s and 1990s and on
which Australia has rather pointlessly sought to rely. In our view these resolutions are no longer
relevant.
6. Fourthly, I will explain why some lethal research is a necessary component of JARPA II
and why Japan concluded that no harmful effects on whale stocks were likely to result from a very
modest catch level far below the many thousands of minke whales and other whales taken annually
by commercial whaling operations more than 30 years ago.
7. Fifthly, I will also explain how the sample sizes were determined. It is probably worth
saying at this point that sample size was not determined by the capacity of the ship as suggested by
Professor Sands last week.
While it is true that the capacity of the Nisshin-Maru is indeed
3,200 cubic metres, that does not translate into 3,200 tonnes of whale meat. Once the meat is
packed in containers and placed in freezers with appropriate space between the containers, the
actual capacity is closer to 1,650 tonnes  which is equivalent to approximately 400 minke
117
“Revised Annex P, Process for the Review of Special Permit Proposals and Research Results from Existing
and Completed Permits”, attached to the Circular Communication to Members of the Scientific Committee IWC.SC.169,
11 Oct. 2012 (hereafter “Revised Annex P (2012)”). This latest version is the one up-dated by the Secretariat.
- 46 whales118. To transport 850 minke whales would require two ships or two voyages. So the
inference drawn by Professor Sands about the sample size is very neat  and very wrong119.
8. Finally, I will draw your attention to a few of the favourable comments made by the
Scientific Committee on the utility of JARPA and JARPA II, in order to demonstrate that Australia
has in this respect painted a misleading picture of Japanese research. Far from constituting a
program to accumulate body parts over 26 years, JARPA and JARPA II have contributed
significant scientific data that has informed, and will continue to inform, Antarctic research over
many years.
I should say that I have also been asked to respond to Judge Donoghue‟s two questions and
to one of Judge Bhandari‟s questions and I will do that, with your permission, Mr. President, at the
end.
9. You have also heard a lot about peer review, I will come back to that, but in our view the
only peer review that matters in the context of the Whaling Convention is review by the Scientific
Committee. It is the body empowered to review and comment on special permit research and it
will conduct its first review of the results of JARPA II next year. Until then, in our view, it is
frankly premature even to be considering the utility of JARPA II.
It is that process which
Australia, for reasons best known to itself, seeks to circumvent in these proceedings.
10. I hope the conclusion at the end of my speech will be obvious: however controversial it
may be, and clearly it has been controversial, JARPA II is a legitimate program of scientific
research according to the guidelines for such programs agreed by the Scientific Committee. As
such, JARPA II cannot be regarded as commercial whaling in violation of the Southern Ocean
Sanctuary, the factory ship moratorium, or the moratorium on commercial whaling. And if you are
still in need of further persuasion by the time I finish, Professor Iwasawa will show you this
afternoon what a genuine programme of commercial whaling would look like. It bears little
resemblance to JARPA II.
118
Written response from the President of Kyodo Senpaku, Ltd. to an enquiry by the Agent of Japan, 1 July 2013.
119
CR 2013/8, p. 59, para. 10 (Sands). No authority is given for the carrying capacity of 3,200 tonnes of “edible
product” taken from the whales.
- 47 I. Scientific research
11. Turning first to scientific research, let me begin by recalling the question the Court has to
decide is whether JARPA II is, as Japan argues, a program conducted in accordance with
Article VIII for “purposes of scientific research”, or whether, as Australia argued last week, it is
simply commercial whaling disguised as science.
12. The Whaling Convention does not define what is meant by “scientific research”. This is
a question to which both Parties have clearly given very rather different answers. Australia‟s view
is academic, involving testable hypotheses, independent peer review, and appropriate
methodology120. It was evident from Professor Mangel‟s testimony121 that  not surprisingly 
he answered the question from the perspective of a university professor who has edited
peer-reviewed academic journals and is used to making grant applications to academic research
funding bodies. He did not actually mention winning Nobel prizes, but listening to him one might
easily have concluded that that was the level at which he was accustomed to considering what it
means to do worthwhile science. And rightly so: he is a university professor.
13. Professor Mangel also admitted that he has never been a member of the IWC Scientific
Committee. He very properly accepted that “[he] certainly did not think of the legal interpretation
of what [he] was trying to do as a scientist . . .”122. He was not asked by Australia to consider what
“scientific research” might mean in the context of the Whaling Convention. So his seminar on the
meaning of science was a very interesting diversion, but is it relevant? The question the Court has
to answer is whether JARPA II constitutes “scientific research” for the purposes of the Whaling
Convention, not whether it might win Nobel prizes or research grants from major research funding
bodies. That is a question the good professor has never thought about. He could give you a
hypothesis, but he couldn‟t give you an answer.
14. Japan‟s interpretation of “scientific research” takes a more practical approach, it is
focused on applied research of the kind that would be familiar to the Food and Agriculture
Organization or a regional fisheries commission. Biological data clearly indispensable to the
long-term management of whales, or indeed the management of fish stocks, or any other living
120
CR 2013/9, p. 15, paras. 4-7 (Sands).
121
CR 2013/9, pp. 38-71.
122
CR 2013/9, p. 54 (Mangel).
- 48 -
species. Australia says that JARPA II is simply a program of data collection. But data collection is
important when estimating the sustainable yield of whale stocks or modelling an ecosystem. It is
important when taking any decisions about the management of natural resources.
15. You will recall my references yesterday to the role of “best scientific evidence” in other
conservation treaties, including the Law of the Sea Convention. You will also recall what IUCN‟s
commentary on the Biological Diversity Convention said about scientific research  and I am
hoping that is going to come up on the screen [Slide 1]. I will not read it again but you will recall
the points that I made there [Tab 54-1]123. That is one reason why Japan continues to carry out
special permit whaling for scientific researches pending an end to the moratorium on commercial
whaling. You heard Professor Walløe testify yesterday that JARPA II is “definitely a scientific
research program”124.
16. Mr. President, commercial whaling as practised for much of the twentieth century was
obviously unsustainable, partly for lack of adequate data. The lack of data was a key reason for
adopting the moratorium on commercial whaling in 1982, as Japan has explained in Chapter 3 of
its Counter-Memorial. It was also a reason for starting JARPA. The Revised Management
Procedure adopted by the Whaling Commission in 1994 is intended to ensure that any future
commercial whaling will be sustainable, but it can work effectively only if it is supported by
adequate data, and that data must be kept up-to-date in accordance with Article VIII of the
Convention.
17. Does this kind of scientific research need hypotheses? I hope that is the last time that we
talk about hypotheses. What kind of hypothesis does a conservation scientist need to have in order
to give advice on catch limits, maximum sustainable yield, or the recovery of stocks? This is not
science at the grand level of Professor Mangel. It is nuts and bolts, it is not E=mc2. At most, the
only testable hypothesis required is that catching X fish, Y whales or Z rabbits for W years is
sustainable given the data we have now. Of course, with more data we might conclude that it is
123
“[a]ccurate information is the foundation upon which decision-making is premised. Therefore, as a
pre-condition to adopting appropriate sustainable use measures, Parties need generally to gather
information on species and ecosystems, their relationships, their uses and the social, cultural and
economic factors affecting their use.” (L. Glowka et al., A Guide to the Convention on Biological
Diversity, IUCN Environmental Policy and Law Paper No. 30 (IUCN, 1994), p. 58
<http://data.iucn.org/dbtw-wpd/edocs/EPLP-no.030.pdf> accessed 1 July 2013.
124
CR 2013/14, p. 22.
- 49 -
less than could have been sustained, that we could take more rabbits. But without the data, we can
conclude nothing, however many hypotheses we invent.
18. You will also recall the questions put to Professor Mangel, including his discussion with
Judge Donoghue about the human genome. Even Professor Mangel accepted that there is at least
one hypothesis in JARPA II, together with eight sub-hypotheses.125 How many hypotheses and
sub-hypotheses does a scientific research program require? Even Galileo only had one hypothesis
about the Earth and the Sun. And what is wrong with the krill surplus hypothesis? Given the
availability of more krill, do we have more minke whales or fewer minke whales? Does the
population go up or go down?
19. Mr. President, Members of the Court, I think I have probably said enough about science.
As I indicated at the beginning, this is a question that can only be answered in the specific context
of the Whaling Convention by reference to the Guidelines for Special Permits laid down by the
Scientific Committee. I will come to those Guidelines in a moment but, before we do, it is now
time, I think, to have a closer look at the 2005 JARPA II research plan126. You will find this
document, with its accompanying appendices at tabs 4 to 13 in your bundles; the research plan is
itself at tab 4. It is also Annex 150 in the Counter-Memorial. I am certainly not going to take you
through all of it, but we can look at some of the highlights. I would suggest the full document does
repay careful attention.
II. 2005 JARPA II Research Plan
20. Japan established JARPA II because its four research objectives and the data which will
be gathered are directly relevant to the rational management and conservation of whales, to the
implementation of the Revised Management Procedure, to the future development and
improvement of the RMP, and to other related research needs. The details are all set out in the
research plan, and that is the plan that was reviewed by the Scientific Committee, and commented
upon, in 2005. This 99-page document including nine appendices gives a comprehensive account
125
CR 2013/9, p. 61 (Mangel).
126
Government of Japan, “Plan for the Second Phase of the Japanese Whale Research, Program under Special
Permit in the Antarctic (JARPA II) - Monitoring of the Antarctic Ecosystem and Development of New Management
Objectives for Whale Resources” (2005) IWC SC/57/O1, and Appendices 1-9 (hereafter “JARPA II Research Plan
(2005) IWC SC/57/O1”) (CMJ, Ann. 150).
- 50 of JARPA II‟s research objectives and methodology, sample size, and an assessment of the effect
on whale stocks.
21. Section II of the plan begins by outlining the results of the previous research program,
JARPA, and it summarizes the interim review conducted by the Scientific Committee in 1997.
You will see excerpts from the Committee‟s report at pages 7 and 8 of the JARPA research plan.
The key point here is the Committee‟s recognition that the science of JARPA was valuable and that
more research was needed. Here are some of those comments: [Tab 54-2/Slide 2]
(i) “JARPA has already made a major contribution to understanding . . . biological
parameters.”
(ii) “Data on the status of minke whale stocks “are likely to be useful in testing various
hypotheses . . . the „krill surplus‟ model.”
(iii) “More effort is needed to develop meso-scale studies to integrate physical and biological
oceanography and prey distribution with minke whale studies.”127
22. At page 8 the plan then explains why it was thought desirable to embark on a new study
of the impact of global environmental changes on the Antarctic. That is one of the new features of
JARPA II. It notes that “major environmental changes such as global warming may greatly affect
krill reproduction in the Antarctic Ocean and thus change the carrying capacity of cetacean
species”. It also addresses the need to improve management procedures for minke whales,
including multi-species management. There are research questions here, possibly even latent
hypotheses. The most obvious point is the underlying hypothesis that the research is relevant to
conservation and management of whales. That relevance is disputed by Australia and its experts.
But Australia‟s experts are very clearly contradicted by Professor Walløe in his Written Statement
and in his testimony yesterday128.
23. The four research objectives have been outlined for you by Professor Hamamoto and
they are set out in Section III  and I will not go through those again in any detail  and you can
see those on the screen at tab 54-3. [Slide 3]
127
JARPA II Research Plan (2005) IWC SC/57/O1, pp. 7-8.
128
Lars Walløe, “Scientific review of issues raised by the Memorial of Australia including its two Appendices”,
9 April 2013, pp. 11-12, (hereafter “Walløe, Expert Statement”); CR 2013/14, pp. 18-19.
- 51 -
24. Section IV of the research plan then describes the research methods and other
parameters. Australia told you that the research plan had no end date. In reality the plan explains
at page 13 under the heading “Research period” that JARPA II will start in the 2005/2006; that the
first two years are a feasibility study; that full-scale research will commence from 2007/2008; and
that “a period of six years… has been established as the research phase”. So it will last for six
years and, at the end of that period, “a review will be held and revisions [will be] made to the
program if required”. That review, as I have indicated, has been scheduled to take place in 2014.
25. That does not mean that JARPA II will not be extended thereafter, but it is plainly wrong
to say that it will inevitably go on indefinitely or that it was designed to do so.
26. You will also see in Section IV of the plan how the four research objectives are to be
addressed. There is particular emphasis on whale abundance trends and biological parameters, krill
abundance and the feeding ecology of whales, the effects of contaminants on cetaceans, a model of
competition among whales, restoration of the cetacean ecosystem and other new management
objectives. Australia says these are all too broad and poorly defined to constitute real science, but
pages 14-17 of the plan cannot be dismissed in that way. If the criticism had any validity it would
surely be apparent in the Scientific Committee‟s review of the JARPA II proposal in 2005. No
such critique was offered.
27. I will discuss sample sizes and the effects on the whale stock in more detail later, but I
will simply draw to your attention that at pages 17 and 19 of the plan you will see the methodology
explained. Both matters are more fully dealt with in Appendices 4, 6, 7, 8 and 9. You will find
those beginning at tab 8 in your folder. But I will come back to those issues shortly.
28. Moving on, however, it is also worth, I think, pausing just to look briefly at the subjects
that are covered in the appendices.
(i) Appendix 1 at tab 5: Deals with the composition of baleen whale species in the JARPA
research area.
The appendix explains some of the findings of JARPA and gives
distribution and abundance estimates for minke, humpback, blue and fin whales in the
Antarctic.
(ii) Appendix 2 at tab 6: Deals with what has happened to the Antarctic minke whale stocks.
It gives a further interpretation of results from JARPA and the summary notes that the
- 52 paper “rearranges the results reflecting possible changes in the Antarctic minke whale
stocks, examines what has happened to these stocks, and predicts possible future changes”
(p. 37). To my reading it sets out a series of hypotheses about the stock. Appendix 3 at
tab 7 pursues the same line of enquiry.
(iii) Appendix 4 at tab 8: Covers the monitoring of environmental pollutants in cetaceans and
in the marine ecosystem. It also deals with organochlorine compounds, heavy metals and
chemicals. This part of the research also links in with the JARPAN II program in the
North Pacific.
(iv) Appendix 5 at tab 9: There, hypotheses on abundance changes of krill predators in the
Antarctic ecosystem.
(v) Appendix 6 at tab 10:
Deals with sample sizes for trends in biological parameters.
Appendices 7 and 8 at tabs 11 and 12 do the same for the monitoring of blubber thickness
and genetic marking. And, finally,
(vi) Appendix 9 at tab 13: This provides an analysis of effects on the whale stock of catches
during JARPA II. At the bottom of page 82 you will see that for minke whales, “it can be
concluded that there would be no negative effect on the minke whale stocks of these
future catches”. You will recall that Professor Mangel agreed in his oral evidence129.
Over the page the same conclusion is reached for humpback whales.
29. Now I will come back to some of those issues but, Mr. President, Members of the Court,
I have probably tried your patience by taking you through all this material that is not immediately
appealing to lawyers.
But it is important to show you that JARPA II was not a
back-of-the-envelope, ill-conceived, exercise in mere data collection. This is a serious research
plan, which builds on JARPA‟s incomplete results, but extends that research into new dimensions
involving broader questions about global environmental change and ecosystem modelling. Of
necessity this requires consistent, reasonably long term, data collection and analysis.
30. In concluding this part, let me draw your attention once again to the quotation that I
referred you to yesterday from the Code of Conduct on Responsible Fisheries, and you will find
129
CR 2013/9, p. 63 (Mangel).
- 53 that at tab 54-4, and hopefully it is about to come up on the screen130. The JARPA II plan does not
do everything that this commentary refers to, but it seems to do quite a lot. I will simply leave that
on the screen. [Tab/slide 54-4]
III. Preliminary review by the Scientific Committee
31. Let me now come to the preliminary review of the JARPA II research plan by the
Scientific Committee. It is clear from what Ms Takashiba said this morning that that review did
indeed take place, but I also need to say something about the applicable guidelines used by the
Committee.
32. First, let us recall that point. The JARPA II research plan was submitted to the Scientific
Committee for preliminary review as required by paragraph 30 and Ms Takashiba has dealt with
that.
33. Second, the applicable guidelines in 2005, when Japan submitted the JARPA II research
plan to the Scientific Committee, are set out in Annex Y. Let me invite you to take a quick look at
this document. You will find it at tab 55. It is very short; it is just one page. You will see that
Annex Y is simply a compendium of non-binding Whaling Commission resolutions on special
permits compiled by one author. Some of those resolutions were, of course, opposed by Japan.
34. Third, it is clear that the Scientific Committee did indeed review the research plan as
submitted by Japan. And if you can look at their report, which you will find at tab 56 in your
folder: this is the Report of the Scientific Committee, a meeting at which the JARPA II plan was
reviewed131. The review starts at paragraph 16.2. Now, if you read it, obviously there was dissent
in the Committee about whether to proceed with the review. There were 63 scientists who took the
view that it should not go ahead and you have heard from Ms Takashiba the outcome of that
dispute.
Nevertheless, without 63 scientists, the remainder of the Committee, still a lot of
scientists, undertook the review. The review went ahead, and you will see the comments made by
130
“States should recognize that responsible fisheries require the availability of a sound scientific
basis to assist fisheries managers and other interested parties in making decisions. Therefore, States
should ensure that appropriate research is conducted into all aspects of fisheries including biology,
ecology, technology, environmental science, economics, social science, aquaculture and nutritional
science.” (Paragraph 12.1, FAO, Code of Conduct for Responsible Fisheries, Rome, FAO, 1995
<ftp://ftp.fao.org/docrep/fao/005/v9878e/v9878e00.pdf> accessed 1 July 2013.)
131
“Report of the Scientific Committee”, J. Cetacean Res. Manage. 8 (Suppl.) 2006, pp. 48-52.
- 54 -
those members at page 50. They include the following comments; hopefully those are coming up
on the screen [tab 54-5/slide 5]:
(i) “They stressed the importance of preserving the continuity of the research
programme . . .”
(ii) “Some other members stressed the importance of JARPA II as an approach towards
ecosystem management of the Antarctic.”
(iii) “One member also expressed the view that . . . large parts of the proposed JARPA II have
objectives that are virtually independent of the JARPA objectives and results.”132
35. Well, those seem fairly positive comments. Clearly it was discussed. You will also see
if you read the document that, after discussion, the Committee offered its comments on the
proposal and that was all. As far as we can tell they were satisfied that Annex Y had been
complied with.
IV. Annex P
36. I now come to Annex P. Annex P is the currently applicable set of guidelines. It was
adopted in 2008 by the Scientific Committee and it was revised in 2012. You will see that there is
an extensive list of matters set out there that have to be considered by the Committee during its
review of special permit proposals133. The fact that Annex P was agreed by consensus in the
Scientific Committee and then endorsed by the IWC itself134 is a significant indication of
agreement on what a scientific research program submitted pursuant to the Schedule must address.
Unlike earlier resolutions, and unlike Annex Y, that agreement includes Japan, Australia and New
Zealand. You will find a copy of Annex P at tab 3 in your folder.
37. Now, in so far as it sets out the matters to be addressed in a special permit proposal
pursuant to paragraph 30 of the Schedule, Annex P replaces the more controversial elements of the
Commission resolutions adopted in the 1980s and 1990s, on which Australia relied in its Memorial
132
Ibid., p. 50.
133
Revised Annex P (2012).
134
“Chair‟s Report of the 60th Annual Meeting”, Annual Report of the International Whaling Commission 2008,
p. 26.
- 55 and in its oral arguments135.
These non-binding resolutions were opposed at the time and
consistently thereafter by Japan and a number of other States136.
38. The equally non-binding Annex P thus represents a deliberate and considered attempt by
the Scientific Committee to move beyond the disagreements that had surrounded earlier
IWC recommendations by finding a formulation that commanded support from all member States,
including Japan and Australia. Once Annex P was adopted by consensus and endorsed by the
IWC, the older resolutions and guidelines ceased to be relevant.
39. Japan‟s position is that it is for the Scientific Committee to review and comment on
whether JARPA II complies with Annex P in 2014, and that it is inappropriate for Australia to
bring its allegations of non-compliance before this Court. Nevertheless, Japan sees no difficulty in
demonstrating that JARPA II is indeed consistent with the letter and spirit of Annex P.
40. Let me therefore spend a little bit of time focusing on that Annex because it gives a good
sense of what the Scientific Committee currently expects to see in a programme of scientific
research under Article VIII. In its Written Observations, I should perhaps point out, New Zealand
quotes a summary of Annex P taken from the IWC website137, but I think we should probably refer
to the actual terms of the Annex as adopted by the Scientific Committee.
41. Annex P stipulates that research objectives  and you will see them coming up there 
are to be “quantified to the extent possible” and should briefly indicate how far the research will,
and it sets out there the various objectives [tab 54-6/slide 6]:
(i) “improve the conservation and management of whale stocks,”
(ii) “improve the conservation and management of other living marine resources or the
ecosystem of which the whale stocks are an integral part or”,
(iii) “test hypotheses not directly related to the management of living marine resources”. [End
slide 6]
135
Resolution 1987-1, Resolution 1995-9 and Resolution 1999-2.
136
Resolution 1987-1 was adopted by 19 votes in favour, 6 against, 7 abstentions (Rep. int. Whal. Commn. 38,
998, p. 26); Resolution 1995-9 was adopted by 23 votes in favour, 5 against, 2 abstentions (Rep. Whal. Commn. 46,
1996, p. 30) and Resolution 199-2 was adopted without vote “by a majority, noting the views expressed” (Annual Report
of the International Whaling Commission 1999, p. 28).
137
New Zealand Written Observations (WON), para. 59.
- 56 -
Obvious point there, it does not have to be all concerned with conservation and management of
whales.
42. Research plans should also indicate how far they will contribute to  and you can see
that coming up on the screen [tab 54-7/slide 7]:
(i) “past recommendations of the Scientific Committee”,
(ii) “completion of the Comprehensive Assessment or in-depth assessments in progress or
expected to occur in the future”,
(iii) “the carrying out of Implementations or Implementation Reviews of the RMP”,
(iv) “improved understanding of other priority issues identified by the Scientific Committee”,
(v) “recommendations of other intergovernmental organisations”. [End slide 7]
[Revert to tab 54-6/slide 6]
43. Mr. President, there are, I think, five important points I would like to make with respect
to Annex P. First, there is no requirement to specify research objectives in great detail  they
need be, as it says, quantified only “to the extent possible”.
Japan‟s submission is that the
JARPA II research plan does exactly that.
44. Second, as you can see from this list, improving conservation and the management of
whales is an important possible objective, but not the only one. Japan‟s submission therefore is
that while JARPA II research is relevant to conservation and management of whales it need not be
necessary for that purpose, and it need not all be directed at that purpose.
45. Third, research can include other marine living resources or the marine ecosystem with
which the whales interact. As you will have seen from JARPA II, the plan plainly does include
research of that kind.
46. Fourth, the research may be related to the work of the Scientific Committee or of other
intergovernmental organizations, but it could also cover other general scientific issues. That was a
point that Professor Walløe emphasized yesterday. Again, it will be apparent from the research
plan that JARPA II does all of those things.
47. Fifth, the research can be related to the resumption of commercial whaling: because
carrying out Implementations or Implementation Reviews of the RMP cannot be understood in any
other way.
The RMP‟s sole purpose is to allow sustainable catch limits to be calculated.
- 57 -
Professor Hamamoto and Professor Walløe have both shown that JARPA II is directly related to
this objective and to the further objective of refining and improving the RMP by improving the
information on which it is based. [End slide 6]
48. Nowhere is it suggested in Annex P that any research programme must address all of
these objectives or that it may only be for a limited period. Nowhere is it suggested in Annex P
that the research must be publishable or must address some academically interesting hypothesis.
Rather the context and wording suggests applied research, focused inter alia on improved
management or assessment of whale stocks, or other relevant scientific issues  serving in other
words the objects and purposes of the Convention.
49. The Whaling Commission has endorsed Annex P and those are the criteria by which
JARPA II will be evaluated in 2014. Now Professor Mangel and Professor Gales have given the
Court their own views on what constitutes scientific research for the purposes of Article VIII but,
with all due respect to these eminent scientists, the “essential characteristics” they advocate go
beyond the paragraph 30 of the Schedule and of Annex P.
50. To give you a few examples, nowhere in Annex P is it necessary to show that “the
objectives of the research cannot be achieved by other means”  and I will come back to lethal
means in a moment. New Zealand makes the same erroneous assertion138. Professor Mangel says
that sample sizes must be set using “accepted statistical methodology”, but if you look at Section 1,
paragraph (2), of Annex P, it refers only to the need to include a “sampling protocol for lethal
aspects of the proposal”  something slightly different. The methods used by JARPA II must, in
Professor Mangel‟s words, be “designed to avoid adverse effects on the stocks being studied”, but
if you look again at Annex P, Section 1, paragraph (3), this requires instead that there should be an
“assessment of potential effects of catches on the stocks involved”  not quite the same. So there
are some subtle differences here, and they are rather important, but they are obviously not
something Professor Mangel was ever asked to consider by Australia139.
51. In Japan‟s submission JARPA II is consistent with Article VIII of the Convention, with
paragraph 30 of the Schedule, and with Annex P. These texts provide the only relevant criteria
138
WON, para. 79.
139
CR 2013/9, p. 52 (Mangel).
- 58 when determining whether a special permit is for the “purposes of scientific research” in
accordance with Article VIII.
V. JARPA II research objectives comply with Annex P
52. Let me then say something very briefly about JARPA II research objectives, and their
compliance with Annex P.
The research objectives that are set out in JARPA II, in Japan‟s
submission, conform to the guidance given in Annex P. I will not go through all of them, I will
simply highlight the main points.
53. JARPA II is obviously relevant to improving the conservation and management of
whales, of other living resources or ecosystems, in the various ways that are set out at pages 10 to
17 of the research plan.
54. JARPA II contributes to past recommendations of the Scientific Committee, in particular
through Objective 1: for example the Scientific Committee has also sponsored catch-at-age based
analyses, and has actually recommended the use of age data from JARPA II140. That analysis has
been done and it has been presented to the Scientific Committee and you can read details of that in
this year‟s Scientific Committee report.
55. Professor Walløe‟s evidence is that JARPA II is relevant to the carrying out of
Implementations or Implementation Reviews of the RMP141. The explanation for that is actually set
out in the research plan.
Again you will see this coming up on the screen.
It says
[tab 54-8/slide 8]:
“The RMP, which has been developed as a management procedure, is based on
a single species management model, although it is supposedly applicable even when
carrying capacity increases twofold or declines to half. However, [it goes on to say]
the need to allow for such a wide range of uncertainty renders the RMP overly
conservative in its utilization of whale resources, and this could be improved if good
multi-whale-species models were developed as a basis on which to create a better
RMP.”142
140
“Report of the Scientific Committee”, J. Cetacean Res. Manage. 14 (Suppl.), 2013, p. 29.
141
Walløe, Expert Statement, pp. 11-12.
142
Ibid.
- 59 -
56. Mr. President, Members of the Court, that is probably all I want to say about the review
of Annex P. We can now turn our attention to the need for lethal whaling and the setting of sample
sizes.
VI. Why lethal research is necessary
57. Why then is it necessary to conduct lethal research? The primary reason is to facilitate
an understanding of minke whale population dynamics, in the same way that fisheries scientists use
such information to improve the advice they give on sustainable catch levels. Lethal research
supplements and strengthens the collection of biological data that was previously collected through
commercial whaling. You heard Professor Walløe explain yesterday that it is a necessary element
of the JARPA II program because much of the information it provides cannot be obtained in any
other way, or because it is impractical to use non-lethal methods. Even Professor Mangel accepted
in his evidence that: “There will be cases in which lethal methods are necessary.”143
58. When the JARPA II research plan was first reviewed by the Scientific Committee, the
members  and I will quote the report verbatim  “agreed that while some biological data could
be collected using non-lethal methods, the overall objectives would require lethal sampling”144.
You will find that document at tab 56 in your folder. Dr. Gales gave evidence to the contrary, but
that is not the point. What matters is that this issue was discussed by the Scientific Committee and
you can now see their view. Japan cannot be criticized for doing what the appropriate expert
body  the IWC Scientific Committee  regards as necessary.
59. More recently the report of the 2009 expert workshop on special permit whaling in the
North Pacific  known as JARPN II  concludes: “The Panel recognises that at present, certain
data, primarily stomach content data, are only available via lethal sampling.” 145
As
Professor Walløe testified, stomach content data is essential for building ecosystem models146.
143
CR 2013/9, p. 65.
144
145
“Report of the Expert Workshop to Review the Ongoing JARPN II Programme”, J. Cetacean Res. Manage. 11,
(Suppl. 2), 2010, p. 426, available at: http://www.icrwhale.org/pdf/workshop2.pdf, accessed 1 July 2013.
146
Walløe, Expert Statement, p. 7.
- 60 60. The IWC Scientific Committee‟s own reports147 show that understanding population
dynamics is fundamental to implementation and improvement of the RMP 148. Sighting surveys
alone will not provide sufficient data for this purpose. They merely measure the abundance of
whales at a particular time and in a particular place. They tell us nothing about the existence of
different whale stocks, or the age structure of each stock, or future population dynamics. Minke
whale natural mortality rates and detailed population trends over an extended period of time can
only be estimated if age data are also used. Again, Professor Walløe gave evidence on that.
61. At its most recent meeting, held only last month, the Scientific Committee unanimously
recommended using age data from JARPA II for the minke whale population dynamics model it is
investigating149. This data is derived from analysis of minke whale earplugs, and you have heard
about that. The only way to obtain earplugs from whales is by lethal sampling. Even Professor
Mangel concedes that “there are still no effective non-lethal means of aging whales, so if age
information is absolutely required, then lethal take is also required”150.
And the Scientific
Committee has confirmed that all of the technical problems previously suggested regarding this age
data has been resolved151. Australia‟s references to 7,000 allegedly failed earplugs have to be seen
in that context152.
62. Once again Australia is trying to condemn Japan for using methods which the Scientific
Committee itself evidently found appropriate and reliable. And Japan is supposed to listen to the
63. Australia and New Zealand both take the view that lethal methods are permissible only
where the research could not be carried out in any other way153. They say that all the necessary
147
For example, “Draft Specification for the Calculation of Catch Limits in a Revised Management Procedure
(RMP) for Baleen Whales”, Annex H, Report of the Scientific Committee, Rep. Int. Whal. Commn.43, 1993, p. 148,
para. 3.2.
148
Ibid.
149
150
Mangel, Expert Opinion, MA, App. 2, para. 4.34.
151
“Report of the Scientific Committee”, J. Cetacean Res. Manage. 14(Suppl.), 2012, p. 29.
152
CR 2013/10, p. 19.
153
AM, paras. 4.93, 4.102, 4.119, 5.51, 5.65; WON, para. 79.
- 61 -
information can be obtained through biopsies and satellite tagging. It is obviously not the view of
the expert reports I have just cited, and it is clearly contradicted by Profesor Walløe‟s evidence154.
64. As Professor Walløe explained yesterday, some essential data can only be obtained
through lethal methods155. Other data could be obtained by non-lethal means, in some cases, but it
would not be of the same quality or reliability, or it would take an unrealistic amount of time and
expense to collect. Lethal research therefore might not always be “necessary”, but it would in
some situations be impractical, as Professor Walløe demonstrated, to use other methods. For that
reason, it seems to Japan that necessity is not the right standard here: lethal whaling is appropriate
where it would be impractical to use other methods, so long as catches are within sustainable limits
and hence cause no harm to the stock. And in Japan‟s view it would be impractical to carry out
JARPA II without some lethal research, used in conjunction, of course, with non-lethal methods
where appropriate and available.
65. And Japan has put much effort into non-lethal research methods. Its scientists have even
had some success with biopsy sampling and satellite tagging of large, slow-moving whale species
such as the humpback156. But obtaining biopsy samples or attaching satellite tags from minke
whales in the Antarctic, it is not impossible. But the Japanese scientists have found that it has a
very low success rate, because the whales are swift and agile and the waters of the Antarctic Ocean
are far from calm157. And it is even more difficult to attach a sufficient number of tags or obtain
enough biopsy samples to be statistically representative158. But, even in the unlikely case of
obtaining a large number of biopsies and tagging many minke whales, that information simply will
not respond to all of the key scientific questions from JARPA II, and again you have Professor
Walløe‟s evidence to support that proposition.
154
Walløe, Expert Statement, pp. 10-12.
155
CR 2013/14, pp. 18- 19.
156
See, e.g., “Cruise Report of the Japanese Whale Research Program under Special Permit in the Antarctic Second
Phase
(JARPAII)
in
2009/2010”,
SC/62/O3,
table 6,
p. 9,
available
at
http://www.icrwhale.org/CruiseReportJARPA.html, accessed 1 July, 2013.
157
CMJ, para. 4.75; Walløe, Expert Statement, p. 11.
158
For the sample size estimated as required to find significant differences in mixing proportion, see App. 3,
JARPA II Research Plan (2005), IWC SC/57/O1, p. 55.
- 62 -
66. Australia may have used these techniques successfully in calmer coastal waters to tag or
biopsy less than two dozen whales, and we have seen the pictures, but they do not tell us what the
failure rate is or would be in the far rougher waters of the open ocean. Dr. Gales actually admitted
that the weather matters159. And to show that a technique can work for a limited number of whales
when the conditions are just right is not the same as showing that it is a practical or effective way to
carry out a research programme on the scale of JARPA II.
VII. Sample sizes are determined using established methodology
67. I now come to sample sizes. When taking whales for research purposes the sample size
obviously has to be large enough to meet the objectives of the research program and to ensure that
the results of the analysis are sufficiently accurate. Professor Mangel says that the sample sizes for
lethal research must be set using “accepted statistical methodology”160. But, as I pointed out
earlier, that is not what Annex P, section 1, paragraph (2), actually says. It only refers to the need
to include a “sampling protocol for lethal aspects of the proposal”. The JARPA II plan does that in
Appendices 6-8161.
68. Notwithstanding all this, it is in any event clear, when we look at JARPA II, at the
research plan, that it does set out in detail how the sample size was calculated using “accepted
statistical methodology”, and the evidence is there in black and white in the appendices162. Perhaps
it could have been explained more clearly, or at greater length, that is possible. But it is there, and
as Professor Walløe suggested, a standard textbook, and I actually have a copy of the book here. It
is called Devore and Berk, Modern Mathematical Statistics with Applications, second
edition163  it‟s a heavy tome  and is the one that was actually used by the scientists at the
Institute of Cetacean Research when calculating the sample size.
159
“Report of the Sub-Committee on In-Depth Assessments”, Ann. G, Report of the Scientific Committee,
IWC/65a/Rep1, (2013), pp. 5-6 <http://iwc.int/cache/downloads/dfk3x3g3hy0ckww8k4ogw0kgo/AnnexG.pdf> accessed
2 July 2013.
160
161
JARPA II Research Plan (2005) IWC SC/57/O1, Apps. 6-8.
162
Ibid., App. 6, App., “Estimation of sample size”, pp.73-74, CMJ, Ann. 150.
163
J. L. Devore and K. N. Berk, Modern Mathematical Statistics with Applications (Second Edition, Springer
Science+Business Media, LLC 2012).
- 63 -
69. And here is the formula, reproduced in the Appendix to Appendix VI of the JARPA plan
[Tab 54-9/Slide 9]. Now, Mr. President, I haven‟t the foggiest idea what that means, but that is the
formula. Mathematics was never my strong point. I would never have managed E=mc2.
70. But let us take this problem a little further. In his oral evidence Professor Mangel did not
explain why a figure of 850 minke whales is unjustifiable.
That was the word he used,
“unjustifiable”, but he gave no explanation. And in his written report he merely says the sample
sizes are “not based on solid statistical reasoning”164. Well you can judge for yourselves, it is
certainly there in the report, there is solid statistical reasoning. And we have set it out. Yet the
rationale for the sample size can be explained . JARPA II needs to catch whales in order to
measure biological and demographic changes in the relevant whale stocks over time. In order to be
confident that the data collected gives results that are accurate within acceptable limits, we need a
large enough sample. Now, how large is going to depend on three things It‟s going to depend on:
(i) the level of accuracy we‟re interested in;
(ii) the extent of the biological changes we want to detect; and
(iii) the period of time within which we wish to detect those changes.
71. Determining “the extent of the biological and demographic changes that we want to
detect” is a scientific judgment. So is the level of accuracy that we are prepared to accept. A larger
sample would give greater accuracy. But if we conduct the research over a longer time or are
willing to accept a lower degree of accuracy then a smaller sample size will also give viable results,
but it might delay the ability to detect potentially important changes in a stock‟s dynamics.
72. Now when questioning Professor Walløe yesterday, Mr. Gleeson tried to decry as
implausibly large the change of 36 per cent in the pregnancy rate of humpback whales over
12 years used by Japanese scientists in calculating a sample size for humpback whales. But, in
fact, as our scientists have shown, these whales have been increasing at about 10 per cent per
annum for some time, and last month‟s IWC Scientific Committee Report shows that the stock that
breeds off Western Australia is expected to stabilize at its original size very soon165. It‟s reasonable
164
165
“Report of the Sub-Committee on Other Southern Hemisphere Whale Stocks”, Ann. H, Report of the Scientific
Committee, IWC/65A/Rep1, p. 4.
- 64 -
to hypothesize, in those circumstances, that this drop in the growth rate will be accompanied by a
very large percentage change in a biological parameter such as the pregnancy rate. So Japan‟s
scientists regard their judgement on this question as entirely reasonable and wholly defensible, and
they do not accept Mr. Gleeson‟s criticisms.
73. The figure of 850 minke whales, and 50 of each of the other species, which was adopted
as the JARPA II sample size, obviously represents a compromise between the different parameters,
chosen because it satisfies the statistical conditions for most of the research items, and because
catches at that level will cause no harm to the stock.
74. Given the range of variables there is inevitably a range of possible sample sizes. What
that range may be was established using the accepted statistical formula referred to above  that
none of us understands  and also the 5 per cent level of accuracy which is the norm employed by
the IWC Scientific Committee, and the 6-year period chosen by the Committee between JARPA II
reviews. Mr. Gleeson cannot have it both ways: he was arguing yesterday that 6 years is too short
a period over which to calculate sample sizes. But, last week Australia argued that JARPA and
JARPA II had gone on for far too long.
75. Different scientists could quite reasonably come to different conclusions about any of
these numbers but most importantly in two of the three respects where this is possible, JARPA II
has adopted the norms used by the Scientific Committee.
76. Mr. President, we are all lawyers, and I am sure that many of you, like me, do not
understand mathematical equations, but the scientists do  you do not want to hear me attempting
any further to explain mathematics. But there are fuller accounts of those sample size calculations
set out, in detail, in the JARPA II research plan and in its Appendices 3 to 8, and those are what
was submitted to and reviewed by the Scientific Committee in 2005. Professor Mangel obviously
starts from different assumptions about the objectives of the research, so it is not surprising that he
comes to different conclusions.
77. But let me emphasize this: at no point has the Scientific Committee expressed any
specific concern about the JARPA II sample size or its impact on the stock. Once again, it really is
not for Australia or its experts to come to this Court to criticize what the Scientific Committee has
found acceptable.
- 65 -
78. Moreover, it is worth noticing that New Zealand says nothing about the methodology of
calculating sample sizes. Its main point is that the number of whales taken under a special permit
must be “necessary and proportionate” to the objectives of the research. Japan does not disagree,
but it maintains  for all the reasons set out, in my speech and in earlier speeches  that the
number of whales taken under JARPA II is both necessary and proportionate.
79. True, as New Zealand observes, more whales are now taken under JARPA II than were
taken under special permits issued before 1985, but of course before the 1982 moratorium came
into force most scientific research could be carried out on carcasses taken during commercial
whaling operations. Special permits were not necessary at that point. They are necessary now,
because there is a moratorium on commercial whaling.
VIII. There are no adverse effects on whale stocks
80. Mr. President, we can now come to the question of adverse effects on whale stocks.
Australia‟s Memorial claims that “Japan has not properly assessed the possible adverse effects of
its „research‟ on the targeted stocks” and it says that “as a result JARPA II was not designed to
avoid such adverse impacts”166. You will note that Australia does not allege actual adverse
impacts. In fact, possible effects on whale stocks of JARPA II catches were analysed in the
research plan  and this was submitted to the IWC Scientific Committee in 2005167. I have
already referred you to Appendix 9 of the research plan which evaluates this question in depth, and
to the Scientific Committee‟s satisfaction.
81. That evaluation shows that capture for research will have no deleterious effect on any
cetacean stock: using extremely conservative sustainable yield assumptions, a minke whale growth
trend would continue, and the stock could be maintained at a level close to environmental carrying
capacity.
82. In the case of humpback whales, they are included in the research plan but they have, as
you know, never been taken in practice. The assessment summarized in Appendix 9 of the research
166
MA, paras. 5.99-5.104.
167
JARPA II Research Plan (2005) IWC SC/57/O1, App. 9; CMJ Ann. 150.
- 66 -
plan indicates that the humpback whale population has been showing a rapid recovery, and the
impact of taking 50 whales was studied and showed virtually no effect on that recovery.
83. With regard to fin whales, the abundance estimate referred to in the Memorial of
Australia168 does not cover the entire distribution area so it is likely to be an underestimate169. The
details of the assessment undertaken by Japan are in the research plan at Appendix 1. The catch
figure of 50 whales taken alternately from the Indian Ocean population and the Pacific Ocean
population is less than 1 per cent of their underestimated abundance.
Again, the Appendix
concludes that a reasonable scientific judgment would be that this catch has no adverse effect.
Clearly, possible effects were assessed and avoided.
84. The 2012 IWC Report also contains the following paragraph, which might be interesting
to draw to your attention. It says:
“In the 2011 season 174 minke whales were landed in West Greenland and
6 were struck and lost . . . Based on a negatively biased estimate of abundance . . . and
[the] application of . . . [an] interim approach, the Committee repeated its advice of
last year that an annual strike limit of 178 will not harm the stock.”170
Now of course this report is not about Japanese research whaling, but it puts JARPA II in some
perspective.
85. The recently agreed population estimate for Antarctic minke whales in Areas IV and V,
which are only part of the region from which JARPA II samples whales, is 244,000171  over
10 times greater than West Greenland. The sample size under JARPA II is 850: only five times
more than the West Greenland catch limit. So that would seem to suggest that a catch limit of 850
in the Antarctic is more than safe.
IX. New Zealand’s interpretation of Annex P
86. Now let me come to New Zealand‟s interpretation of Annex P. I am sure we all look
forward to hearing something from New Zealand next week. New Zealand‟s reading of Annex P
168
MA, App. 1, para. 4.11.
169
JARPA II Research Plan (2005) IWC SC/57/O1, App. 1, Fig. 8, p. 34; CMJ Ann. 150.
170
Chair‟s Report of the 64th Annual Meeting, Annual Report of the International Whaling Commission, 2012,
para. 7.4.1.3.
171
“Report of the Scientific Committee”, J. Cetacean Res. Manage. 14 (Suppl.), 2013, table 9, p. 27.
- 67 differs from Australia‟s, but since it relies on a website summary it is not entirely accurate. Briefly,
New Zealand says that special permit research must172:
(i) “be specifically defined”,
(ii) “be essential for rational management under the Convention”,
(iii) “be likely to provide reliable answers”,
(iv) “avoid lethal methods where possible”,
(v) “have no adverse effect on the stock”.
87. As I think I have shown this morning, Japan has more than adequately defined the
research objectives of JARPA II; whether that research has provided reliable answers will be
reviewed by the Scientific Committee next year; lethal methods are only used where non-lethal
methods are impractical or unavailable; and there has been and will be no adverse effect on the
population of any of the whale species.
88. Japan does not accept that special permit research must necessarily be “essential for
rational management under the Convention”  as I have shown, there is no such requirement in
Annex P or in paragraph 30 of the Schedule. On the contrary, Annex P provides expressly that a
special permit may be issued in order to “test hypotheses not directly related to the management of
living marine resources”173.
And as Professor Hamamoto showed in his speech, however,
JARPA II research is directly relevant to the conservation and management of Antarctic whale
stocks and some of its data are essential for implementing the RMP. And as Japan pointed out in
its response to New Zealand‟s Written Observations, “the important question is whether or not the
use of lethal methods can enable a better understanding . . .” of the relevant whale stocks174. In
Japan‟s view, the evidence shows that it can.
X. Review of JARPA II
89. Mr. President, I have only two more issues to deal with  I think we are within sight of
the end. Let me deal now with the review of JARPA II, you have already heard something on that
but I want to deal with it in the context of peer review. Australia says that there must be a system
172
WON, para. 60.
173
Revised Annex P (2012), para. 1 (1) (iii).
174
Written Observation of Japan on New Zealand‟s Written Observations, para. 64.
- 68 -
of independent peer review for JARPA II. But it seems to forget that a system of peer review is
already provided for in paragraph 30 of the Schedule, and Ms Takashiba has dealt with that in
depth this morning. Australia agreed to that system, as did Japan. Australia cannot turn round now
and demand something else. We are not here to debate the merits of that system or the alternatives
you might put in place. The only relevant point for the Court is that JARPA II has already been
scrutinized once by the Scientific Committee  in 2005  and that it will be reviewed again next
year. Japan has complied with the requirements of paragraph 30 and it will go on complying with
the requirements of paragraph 30 of the Schedule. That, with respect, is all that needs to be said on
the matter.
90. But in any event, as Professor Hamamoto showed, the Scientific Committee has already
recognized the value of data from JARPA II, especially with regard to the sighting survey175,
genetic data and age data derived from lethal whaling176. The fact that the Committee is using data
from JARPA and JARPA II is proof of the scientific value of these programs. JARPA II is not
only about lethal whaling: much of the research uses other methods, including sighting surveys.
The IWC itself recognizes that “these surveys now provide the only dedicated cetacean sighting
data in this region and are extremely valuable to the work of the Committee”177.
91. But the Scientific Committee also makes use of the genetic and other biological data
derived from lethal whaling for studies on stock structure, age and abundance data for population
dynamics models178.
The Committee, including Dr. Gales, has unanimously agreed on the
importance of evidence of changes in the body condition of minke whales for the Committee‟s
work179. All of these data will allow trends in whale populations to be identified and thus provide a
basis for estimating sustainable yield. As Professor Walløe has testified, both are important pieces
of information for implementation of the RMP180.
175
“Report of the Scientific Committee”, J. Cetacean Res. Manage. 12 (Suppl), 2011, p. 34.
176
Ibid., p. 26.
177
CMJ, p. 279, para. 5.101.
178
See e.g., “Report of the Sub-Committee on In-depth Assessments”, Ann. G, Report of the Scientific
Committee, IWC/65a/Rep1 (2013), where there are various references to the use of data from JARPA and JARPA II
<http://iwc.int/cache/downloads/dfk3x3g3hy0ckww8k4ogw0kgo/AnnexG.pdf> accessed 1 July 2013.
179
180
Walløe, Expert Statement, pp. 7 and 12.
- 69 -
92. Professor Mangel had a lot to say about the supposed lack of peer-reviewed publications
arising out of JARPA. In his second statement he claims that 12 out of 15 JARPA/JARPA II
peer-reviewed papers published between 2010 and 2012 are “inaccessible to the scientific
community” because they are in Japanese181. He accepts that there are at least 15 reviewed papers,
but he misses the obvious point:
the IWC Scientific Committee is the most relevant and
appropriate peer group to review this research, not peer-reviewed academic journals.
93. Mr. President, there are several Members on the Bench today  and some counsel also
in this room  who have served as special rapporteurs of the International Law Commission and
who in that context have written some outstanding and excellent reports for that body. These
reports are not published in academic journals nor are they peer-reviewed in Professor Mangel‟s
sense. Are they therefore not legal research? Do they have no value? And what would be the
most relevant peer-group in that context? Would it perhaps not be the Sixth Committee of the
General Assembly of the United Nations? There are sometimes better ways of testing the quality
and acceptability of research than sending it to academic journals.
XI. Questions from the Court
94. Now, Mr. President, I can come to my last section, which is an attempt to respond to the
questions from Judge Donoghue, and one of Judge Bhandari‟s questions.
95. Judge Donoghue‟s questions are  I think her first questions is:
(i) What analysis of the feasibility of non-lethal methods did Japan conduct prior to setting
the sample sizes for each year of JARPA II?
And, her second question,
(ii) How did such analysis bear on those sample sizes?
96. Well, as best we can, here is the answer to question (i): the feasibility of using non-lethal
methods was first reviewed by a Scientific Committee working group during the 1997 JARPA
interim review. Annex H of their report contains their analysis; and you will find Annex H,
together with the first page of the report, at tab 57 in your bundle. That review formed the basis of
section IX of the 2005 JARPA II Research Plan which deals with the use of lethal methods and
181
Mangel, 2nd Statement, paras. 3.37, 3.39.
- 70 -
which also contains a review of the literature, or at least a statement of the literature that had been
reviewed182. Of course, a further review of the use of lethal methods  a further review of all
aspects of JARPA II  will be due in 2014.
97. The answer to question (ii): our scientists were not quite sure what this question meant.
So, their tentative answer is that the analysis showed that for certain kinds of data lethal methods
were justified for reasons of necessity or practicality. Sample sizes were then determined in the
manner I have explained. It may help, perhaps, if I try to put it this way. The plan sought various
items of data  for example pregnancy rates, blubber thickness, age data and so on. Taken one by
one, the required sample size for each item of data would be different. The final figure  in this
case 850  therefore represented, as I explained, a compromise, a figure that would be large
enough to give a reasonable level of statistical accuracy overall but small enough to cause no harm
to the stock. You will recall that Professor Walløe testified that for some of those questions, even
larger sample sizes would be necessary. That is at page 46 of yesterday‟s transcript.
98. Judge Bhandari‟s question, which was: before launching JARPA II, did Japan establish
that it is carrying out lethal scientific research on such large scale because it is critical and there is
no other available method.
99. Well, here is the answer. I think let me say first, it is not clear to us that the research can
properly be described as large scale. Compared to the large scale of previous commercial whaling,
JARPA II‟s lethal take is tiny. Professor Walløe indicated in his evidence that the sample size for
the original JARPA program was too small. He also pointed out that how many whales you have
to kill depends on the questions you are asking. And I think my second qualification is that the
phrase “critical research need” appears in Annex Y but not in Annex P. It was one of those
controversial elements of earlier non-binding IWC resolutions that Japan opposed. Annex P refers
to other priority issues of the Scientific Committee. But as my answer to Judge Donoghue‟s
question indicates, JARPA II includes lethal whaling because, for certain critical items of data, no
other method was available or was practical in the circumstances of Antarctica.
182
JARPA II Research Plan (2005) IWC SC/57/O1, p. 20.
- 71 XII. Conclusions
100. Mr. President, I hope the Court will now understand why Japan did not consider it
appropriate to include an expert scientific report in the Counter-Memorial. The relevant expertise
for the purpose of reviewing and commenting on special permit research proposals is the expertise
of the Scientific Committee. That is the body empowered to do the job by the parties to the
Whaling Convention. And they should be allowed to get on with their planed review in 2014,
without interference from Australia.
101. To sum up: JARPA II is not simply more of the same: it is markedly different from,
and more sophisticated than, JARPA. JARPA II was reviewed by the Scientific Committee in
2005 without adverse comment. It met the applicable guidelines at the time, and it meets the
revised consensus guidelines that apply now. The research undertaken in JARPA II is relevant to
the conservation, management and sustainable use of whales in the Antarctic, to the modelling of
the Antarctic ecosystem, and to the implementation and improvement of the RMP and other
relevant research questions. Now, those who are qualified to make this judgment have done so,
and in unambiguous terms. On that basis it cannot plausibly be said that JARPA II is not for the
purposes of scientific research pursuant to Article VIII.
102. Mr. President, Members of the Court, I have probably detained you for far too long this
morning. I thank you for your patience and your courteous attention.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you very much, Professor Boyle. This concludes this morning‟s
hearing. The Court will meet this afternoon between 3.00 and 6.00 p.m. to hear the conclusion of
Japan‟s first round of oral argument. Thank you, this hearing is adjourned.
___________
Non corrigé
Uncorrected
CR 2013/16
International Court
of Justice
Cour internationale
de Justice
LA HAYE
THE HAGUE
YEAR 2013
Public sitting
held on Thursday 4 July 2013, at 3 p.m., at the Peace Palace,
____________________
VERBATIM RECORD
____________________
ANNÉE 2013
Audience publique
tenue le jeudi 4 juillet 2013, à 15 heures, au Palais de la Paix,
________________
COMPTE RENDU
________________
-2Present:
President Tomka
Judges Owada
Abraham
Keith
Bennouna
Skotnikov
Cançado Trindade
Yusuf
Greenwood
Xue
Donoghue
Gaja
Sebutinde
Bhandari
Registrar Couvreur

- 14 -
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. Good afternoon. The hearing is open and I give the
floor to Professor Iwasawa. You have the floor, Sir.
Mr. IWASAWA:
JARPA II IS NOT A CONTINUATION OF COMMERCIAL WHALING
Thank you, Sir. Mr. President, Members of the Court, it is a great honour and privilege to
appear before this Court on behalf of Japan.
Introduction
1. Mr. President, Japan respects law and science. JARPA II is a program of scientific
research.
Nevertheless, Australia alleges that the “real” purpose of JARPA II is to continue
commercial whaling1. My task today is to demonstrate that this allegation is unfounded. To do
this, I will first establish that the specific arguments Australia makes to support this allegation
cannot be sustained in either law or fact. Second, I will point out that Japan‟s special permit
whaling was launched in response to paragraph 10 (e) of the Schedule which recognized the need
for “the best scientific advice”. It is not a continuation of commercial whaling. I will then
demonstrate that JARPA II is totally different from commercial whaling, highlighting some of its
main operational features.
2. At the outset, I wish to recall that Professors Hamamoto and Boyle have already shown
that JARPA II is a program of scientific research.
They have demonstrated that the plan,
implementation and outcome of JARPA II prove that its purpose is undeniably scientific.
3. Nevertheless, Australia alleges that the “real” purpose of JARPA II is to continue
commercial whaling. It claims that the special permit whaling is a “guise”2. In short, Australia
accuses Japan of acting in bad faith.
1
CR 2013/10, p. 41, para. 1; p. 48, para. 24 (Crawford) ; MA, para. 5.107.
2
CR 2013/7, p. 20, para. 8 (Campbell); CR 2013/8, p. 21, para. 26 (Burmester); CR 2013/10, p. 49, para. 26
(Crawford) ; MA, para. 3.4.
- 15 -
4. Japan strongly objects to such a serious allegation. As Professor Pellet will demonstrate
later, bad faith must not be presumed but must be proven by the party making such an allegation 3.
Therefore, Australia bears a very heavy burden to prove Japan‟s bad faith.
I. Australia’s four arguments are unfounded in law and fact
5. Mr. President, Members of the Court, I now move to the first part of my pleading.
Australia has not been able to refute the scientific nature of JARPA II. Instead, it has dismissed
JARPA II as a “business model”4, and alleged that “the design and manner of implementation” of
JARPA II indicate the programme‟s commercial character5. Australia has tried to support these
conclusions with four specific arguments: namely, (1) the “production, sales and distribution” of
by-products6; (2) the “economic use or benefit” of proceeds7; (3) the “scale” of sample size8; and
(4) adjustments to actual catches in response to “market forces”9. These claims lack any basis in
law or fact. The demonstrably scientific nature of JARPA II is itself sufficient to conclude that it is
legal under Article VIII of the ICRW (“the Convention”). Nevertheless, I will prove that the four
arguments Australia has presented are all unfounded. That makes up the first part of my pleading.
A. Australia ignores Article VIII, paragraph 2
6. Australia‟s arguments fail as a matter of law because they ignore Article VIII,
paragraph 2, of the Convention. [Slide 58-1: Article VIII, paragraph 2, of the Convention] As you
can see on the screen, the paragraph provides:
“Any whales taken under these special permits shall so far as practicable be
processed and the proceeds shall be dealt with in accordance with directions issued by
the Government by which the permit was granted.”
3
Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia, Merits, Judgment No. 7, 1926, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 7, p. 30.
4
CR 2013/7, p. 27, para. 10 (Gleeson); CR 2013/11, p.18, para. 59 and p. 24, para.82 (Crawford); MA, Chap. 3.
5
CR 2013/11, p. 18, para. 58 (Crawford); MA, para. 6.7.
6
Ibid., p. 18, paras. 59-61 (Crawford); MA, paras. 6.8-6.9.
7
Ibid., p. 19, para. 62 (Crawford); MA, paras. 6.10-6.13.
88
99
- 16 -
Thus, Japan is under an obligation, I repeat Mr. President, an obligation to ensure that any whales
taken in its special permit whaling are processed and the proceeds are dealt with in accordance with
the Government‟s directions10.
7. Australia attacks JARPA II as a “business model”. But in accordance with this provision,
special permit whaling is bound to have economic dimensions. In other words, they are logical
consequences of the legal requirement of the Convention. Therefore, JARPA II cannot be illegal
because of its economic dimensions, obligated by law. Australia‟s “business model” argument is
thwarted by the clear text of Article VIII, paragraph 2. Moreover, as I will explain in detail later,
JARPA II is totally different from commercial whaling. If JARPA II were a “business model”
pursuing commercial interests, it would not be carried out in this manner.
Commercially,
JARPA II makes no sense.
(a) Sale of by-products is explicitly recognized by Article VIII, paragraph 2
8. Mr. President, Members of the Court, I now turn to my rebuttal of the four arguments
made by Australia. Australia argues that JARPA II is for commercial purposes because it is
directed towards the “production, sale and distribution” of by-products11. Australia claims in
essence that the sale of by-products violates the moratorium on commercial whaling. But how
would the “proceeds” referred to in Article VIII, paragraph 2, be generated other than by sales of
by-products? The processing of by-products is a legal obligation under this provision. Australia‟s
argument is inconsistent with Article VIII, paragraph 2.
The explicit obligation under this
provision distinguishes the Convention from other treaties which Australia alluded to in its oral
pleadings12.
(b) Use of proceeds for research activities is consistent with Article VIII, paragraph 2, and is a
common practice
9. Australia‟s second argument concerns the economic use of the proceeds. Australia claims
that JARPA II is commercial whaling as “funding for JARPA II derives from the sale of its
10
CMJ, para. 5.123.
11
CR 2013/11, p. 18, paras. 59-61 (Crawford); MA, paras. 6.8, 6.9.
12
CR 2013/10, p. 54, para. 43; CR 2013/11, p. 18, para. 58 (Crawford).
- 17 „by-product‟”13. This argument is equally untenable. As you can see on the screen, paragraph 2
provides that “the proceeds shall be dealt with in accordance with directions issued by the
Government”. Two observations may be made. First, the proceeds from special permit whaling
are not to be used without directions from the Government. Second, paragraph 2 does not prescribe
the content of the directions; instead, it entrusts the Government to specify them and allows it a
margin of appreciation. In Japan, the Minister of Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries approved the
Code for Special Research Program issued by the Institute of Cetacean Research (ICR) 14.
Article 14 of the Code stipulates that “[t]he sales proceeds shall be allocated to cover expenditure
associated with conducting research whaling programs”15. In accordance with the Code, proceeds
obtained through JARPA II are used for continuing research activities16. One anti-whaling nation
expressly admitted in 2006 that, and I quote, “this use [of proceeds of JARPA II] is not inconsistent
with the provisions of Article VIII of the Convention”17. [End of slide]
10. The use of proceeds from by-products for research activities is a widely accepted practice
in scientific research. Professor Walløe gave evidence in his written statement that such use is
“generally accepted in fisheries research, where research vessels are often issued with quotas for
the relevant fish species to fund at least part of the research”18. In many scientific research
programmes around the world, the proceeds obtained by the sale of by-products are used to finance
the programme.
11. In fact, Australia‟s criticism contradicts its own practice. The Australian Fisheries
Management Act 1991 provides a legal basis for the issuance of scientific permits authorizing
scientific research activities, including scientific research fishing, and in that Act “the sale” of fish
taken is specifically allowed. [Slide No. 58-2: Fisheries Management Act 1991] As you can see
on the screen, Section 33 (5) (b) of the Act stipulates that conditions in a scientific permit may
13
14
CMJ, para. 5.125.
15
Ibid. See also CMJ, Ann. 138.
16
CMJ, para. 5.125.
17
IWC 58 Verbatim Record, 16 June 2006 (statement of Italy), http://download.iwc.int/verbatim/2006/index.htm
(accessed on 18 June 2013).
18
Lars Walløe, “Scientific review of issues raised by the Memorial of Australia including its two Appendices”
(9 April 2013), p. 9.
- 18 include “the sale or disposal of fish taken during the course of activities carried out under the
permit”19. “[T]he sale” is allowed under Australia‟s scientific permits. [End of slide] And, in
accordance with this Act, the Australian Fisheries Management Authority (AFMA), an organ of the
Government of Australia, set up a specific policy scheme entitled “Research Catch and Effort
Allowance Policy”20. [Slide No. 58-3: AFMA Research Catch and Effort Allowance Policy] As is
shown on the screen, the Policy stipulates that “AFMA may agree . . . to conduct the field
component of a survey using industry vessels with the cost of the survey funded by the sale of any
catch.”21 Research fishing under scientific permits in Australia can be funded by the sale of
by-products. There are numerous other examples22, but I will not bother the Court by listing them
all here. [End of slide]
12. As I have shown, Australia allows research projects under its own scientific permit to sell
the by-products of such research and use the proceeds. They are nevertheless scientific activities,
according to Australia. Thus, Australia‟s second argument must fail. It is in contradiction with a
widely accepted practice in scientific research, including Australia‟s own practice.
13. Australia suggests that the promotion of by-product sales is also contrary to the
Convention23. This claim is baseless. JARPA II is financially supported by the proceeds of its
by-products, and therefore it is reasonable to promote their sales.
14. Australia alleges also that JARPA II is a means to maintain a whaling “industry” and its
skills24. This allegation confuses a means with an end. Scientific research such as JARPA II
cannot be conducted with bare hands. Therefore, it is only natural that Japan has utilized existing
resources to carry out scientific research. Utilization of existing resources does not change the
19
Fisheries Management Act 1991, Australia, http://www.comlaw.gov.au/Details/C2012C00179 (accessed on
18 June 2013).
20
AFMA, Government of Australia, “Research Catch and Effort Allowance Policy”, July 2007, p. 2,
http://www.afma.gov.au/wp-content/uploads/2011/10/Doc.-21-ScallopMAC-4-Apr-2011-Agenda-Item-2.2-Attachment3-Research-Policy-July-2007.pdf (accessed on 18 June 2013).
21
Ibid., p. 3; emphasis added.
22
For example, the International Pacific Halibut Commission established by Canada and the United States
conducted a standardized stock assessment survey in 2011.
The report made it clear that
the by-products were sold to offset the costs of the survey. See International Pacific Halibut Commission,
http://www.iphc.int/data/survey/2012/2012vesseltenderform.pdf (accessed on 25 June 2013).
23
MA, para. 6.20.
24
CR 2013/10, p. 53, para. 38 (Crawford); CR 2013/11, p. 19, para. 63 (Crawford); MA, paras. 3.28, 3.32, 3.80,
3.108, 5.118, 6.11, 6.12.
- 19 -
scientific nature of research. This is evident from the example of the International Decade of
Cetacean Research and the Southern Ocean Whale and Ecosystem Research (IDCR/SOWER).
Japan contributed to these non-lethal research programmes for more than thirty years with the
provision of crews and existing vessels. The scientific nature of these programmes has not been
disputed even by Australia. Indeed, Australia also utilizes existing commercial fishery vessels for
research25. The use of existing resources is a means, not an end.
B. Australia’s arguments cannot be sustained in fact
(a) The sample size is established based on scientific merit and does not make JARPA II
commercial whaling
15. Mr. President, Australia‟s third argument is that the sample size of JARPA II has no
scientific rationale and is commercial26. As Professor Boyle has established, the sample size of
JARPA II is determined based on a scientific methodology with well-established statistical tools.
16. Moreover, neither the Convention, the Schedule, nor Annex P sets a specific sample size
which would distinguish special permit whaling from commercial whaling. What is essential is
that the sample size of special permit whaling has scientific merit while avoiding adverse effects on
the population of the targeted species.
These conditions are fully satisfied in JARPA II, as
demonstrated by my colleagues.
(b) Actual catches have decreased because of the violent sabotage by Sea Shepherd
17. Mr. President, Australia‟s fourth argument is that the actual catches under JARPA II
have been intentionally reduced in recent years in response to “market forces”27. Japan regrets that
Australia is turning a blind eye to the real reason for the downsizing  the violent sabotage
activities by Sea Shepherd. In the oral pleadings, Professor Crawford made a categorical statement
that the violence of Sea Shepherd is “of no relevance to this case”28.
However, as
Professor Akhavan demonstrated, the violence of Sea Shepherd is of great relevance to this case.
25
AFMA, “Research Catch and Effort Allowance Policy”, July 2007, p. 3.
26
CR 2013/8, pp. 57-58, para. 8 (Sands); CR 2013/11, p. 19, para. 63 (Crawford); MA, paras. 6.15, 6.16.
27
28
- 20 -
18. Sea Shepherd has escalated its violence in recent years. It has harassed Japanese
research vessels in the Antarctic Ocean, and has resorted to extreme acts of violence, such as
ramming into research vessels, dragging metal-reinforced ropes in the water to damage research
vessel propellers, and pointing high-powered lasers directly into the eyes of researchers and crew.
This year, Sea Shepherd even rammed into an oil supply tanker during an oil supply operation to a
research vessel, as you can see on the screen. [Slide No. 58-4: Violent Attack by Shepherd] The
Scientific Committee recognized in its Report of this year that “research activities were interrupted
several times by the Sea Shepherd, which directed violent sabotage activities against Japanese
research vessels”29. [End of slide]
19. Sea Shepherd‟s dangerous attacks forced research vessels to divert their time and
resources away from research activities. The graph on the screen was shown by Australia last
week. [Slide No. 58-5: SS, Sabotage ships and Actual Catches] It indicates the target size and
actual catches under JARPA II.
According to Australia, this graph shows that Japan is
intentionally reducing actual catches for commercial reasons30. This allegation is false. To make
the graph simpler, I will show only actual catches. It is true that actual catches are decreasing. But
the reason Australia gave for the decrease is untrue. On the same graph, I will superpose the
number of Sea Shepherd ships which were engaged in violent sabotage activities.
[Slide:
Superposition of Sea Shepherd ships]. Ship symbols on top indicate how many Sea Shepherd ships
sabotaged JARPA II each year. The slide is a graphic illustration of an indisputable relation
between Sea Shepherd attacks and actual catches. The increase of Sea Shepherd ships forced the
reduction of samples. When the research vessels were subjected to life-threatening sabotage by
Sea Shepherd, they had no option but to suspend the research activities and leave the area in order
to protect the lives of researchers and crews. When the number of Sea Shepherd ships reduced, the
research vessels were able to catch more samples. Why would this rebound occur if Australia‟s
allegation were true? The violent sabotage of Sea Shepherd is the real reason why the actual
catches were fewer than planned.
Mr. President, Members of the Court, Japan regrets that
29
SC, 2013, p. 79, para. 17.2.2, JARPA II.
30
- 21 Australia downplayed the violence of Sea Shepherd and made the categorical statement that “it is
of no relevance to this case”31.
20. Australia‟s allegation is also illogical. The research voyage to the Antarctic costs
approximately four billion yen, or forty million US dollars. A smaller amount of catch only adds to
the significant financial losses incurred by the programme. If financial considerations were Japan‟s
prime concern as alleged by Australia32, the best option would be not to go to the Antarctic in the
first place. Why then does Japan send the research vessels to the Antarctic? It is because
JARPA II is for scientific purpose, not commercial purpose. It is true that the violent attacks by
Sea Shepherd have caused financial challenges to the ICR which conducts JARPA II. But Japan
believes that violence must not prevail over science. [End of slide]
21. The so-called “evidence” Australia submits in this case to support its grave allegation of
bad faith is tenuous. Australia‟s allegation that Japan has intentionally reduced actual catches is
specially revealing in this respect. In the Memorial, Australia uses press articles as key documents
supporting its allegation33. Japan regrets that Australia makes a grave allegation of bad faith
relying upon press articles whose evidential value is questionable. I would like to recall the
observations this Court has made in the past in this regard. In the Nicaragua case, this Court
stated:
“A large number of documents has been supplied in the form of reports in press
articles . . . [T]he Court has been careful to treat them with great caution; even if they
seem to meet high standards of objectivity, the Court regards them not as evidence
capable of proving facts.”34
22. Australia has also quoted statements made by Japanese government officials in support
of its allegation. But the statements are taken out of context and misrepresented. For example,
Australia has repeatedly claimed that a statement of a Minister is evidence of intentional reduction
of actual catches35. But Australia misrepresents his statement. I invite you to look at tab 59 in your
31
32
MA, para. 6.21.
33
MA, paras. 3.97-3.99 are based upon Asahi Shimbun and MA, para. 3.103 is based upon Mainichi Shimbun.
Shimbun means newspapers in Japanese. After the opening of the oral proceedings, Australia deposited two additional
Shimbun articles to the Court on 27 June 2013.
34
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits,
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 40, para. 62; emphasis added.
35
CR 2013/9, p.27, para. 45 (Sands); CR 2013/10, p.42, para. 8 (Crawford); MA, paras. 3.81, 5.78.
- 22 folder36. This Minister made remarks in the context of “The Future of the IWC”37. He made the
statements at the height of intensive negotiations in which Japan vigorously pursued progress,
whereas Australia was persistently unwilling to compromise. The transcript of his statements,
especially the parts highlighted in yellow, makes it clear that he was talking about a proposal Japan
would have to consider during the negotiations, and not about JARPA II operations.
His
statements demonstrate how serious Japan was at that time, unlike Australia, about seeking a
consensus in the process of “The Future of the IWC”.
23. Australia‟s misreading of Japanese statements is demonstrated by another example.
Australia alleges that another official‟s statement revealed Japan‟s intentional reduction of actual
catches38. Australia misrepresents his statement too. I invite you to look at tab 61 in your folder39.
As you can see in the part highlighted in yellow, contrary to Australia‟s allegation, this official
explicitly denied that Japan intentionally lowered the actual catches, saying: “No, that is not the
case.” Thus, statements of Japanese officials are taken out of context and misrepresented. I am
sorry it was just pointed out that the tab number is different, the previous one was tab 60, and the
current one is tab 61, I am sorry for this confusion. Thus, statements of Japanese officials are taken
out of context and misrepresented. Australia‟s arguments based upon misquotations of Japanese
officials are inappropriate and unfounded.
II. JARPA II is scientific research as required by paragraph 10 (e),
not a continuation of commercial whaling
24. Mr. President, Members of the Court, I now turn to the second part of my pleading where
I will demonstrate that Japan‟s special permit whaling is scientific research as required by
paragraph 10 (e) of the Schedule, the very provision which established the moratorium on
commercial whaling. It is not a continuation of commercial whaling. In the latter half of this part,
I will focus upon the operational design of JARPA II and demonstrate that JARPA II is totally
different from commercial whaling.
36
For the original version in Japanese, see http://www.maff.go.jp/j/press-conf/v_min/080414.html (accessed on
3 July 2013).
37
CMJ, para. 5.81. See http://www.maff.go.jp/j/press-conf/min/100309.html (accessed on 18 June 2013).
38
MA, para. 3.82.
39
For the original version in Japanese, see http://www.maff.go.jp/j/press-conf/v_min/080414.html (accessed on
3 July 2013).
- 23 -
25. Mr. President, the moratorium on commercial whaling was adopted in 1982 as an
amendment to the Schedule  paragraph 10 (e). [Slide 58-6: paragraph 10 (e) of the Schedule
(only the first sentence)] The slide on the screen is the paragraph shown by Australia last week.
What is important is what Australia did not show. The second statement. And it has three parts.
First, as you can see, after prescribing the moratorium, the paragraph provides: “This provision
will be kept under review, based upon the best scientific advice.” Thus, it explicitly acknowledges
the need for “the best scientific advice” in order for the moratorium to be kept under review.
Second, it also provides that by 1990 “the Commission will undertake a comprehensive assessment
of the effects of this decision on whale stocks”. It obligates the Commission to conduct a
comprehensive assessment of the moratorium based on scientific data. Third, it provides further
that “the Commission will consider modification of this provision and the establishment of other
catch limits”. It clearly foresees possible modification and lifting of the moratorium “based upon
the best scientific advice”. The second sentence thus clearly indicates the temporary nature of the
moratorium and the need for “the best scientific advice”. These aspects of paragraph 10 (e) are
completely bypassed in Australia‟s oral pleadings.
Why did Australia not show the second
sentence? It is because it provides a solid legal basis for Japan‟s special permit whaling.
A. Paragraph 10 (e) of the Schedule prompted Japan to embark on special permit whaling in
the Antarctic
26. Mr. President, I will show that Japan launched special permit whaling in order to provide
the scientific data required by paragraph 10 (e). My explanation will also answer the question that
Judge Bennouna put to Professor Walløe yesterday; namely, why did Japan launch JARPA in
1987?
27. Japan did not suddenly start cetacean studies when paragraph 10 (e) was adopted in
1982. As explained by Professor Hamamoto, Japan has been committed to the advancement of
scientific knowledge on cetaceans and has made significant contributions over half a century. Even
though the moratorium was adopted by the IWC without any agreed advice from the Scientific
Committee40, once Japan accepted it, Japan has faithfully abided by it.
40
CMJ, paras. 3.46-3.55.
- 24 -
28. As I explained, the second sentence of paragraph 10 (e) clearly foresees modification and
lifting of the moratorium. But review “based upon best scientific advice” has to come first. And, a
comprehensive assessment was scheduled by 1990.
Mr. President, Japan wishes to resume
commercial whaling in a sustainable manner, and it was natural for Japan to start special permit
whaling so that its scientific advice would be used in a comprehensive assessment which was
scheduled within a few years.
Japan started JARPA in 1987, believing genuinely that the
moratorium would be reviewed and possibly lifted by 1990. [End of slide]
29. Australia alleges that “Japan chose to use . . . „scientific whaling‟ as a means to continue
the commercial operation”41. Among its purported “evidence” is the statement by a Japanese
official that “scientific whaling was viewed as the only method to carry on with the traditions on
whaling”42. Judge Bhandari asked Japan to comment on this statement, as well. This statement is
misrepresented by Australia. First, the statement reads more properly: “scientific whaling was
viewed as the only method to pass on the tradition of whaling [to future generations]”. He did not
say that special permit whaling was the method to continue commercial whaling in disguise.
Second, under paragraph 10 (e) special permit whaling was indeed the only method available for
Japan to achieve the lifting of the moratorium and pass on the 2,000-year tradition of whaling to
future generations. The statement must be understood in this context.
30. In fact, Mr. Kato, the Minister for Agriculture, Forestry and Fisheries, at that time,
explained the reason for launching special permit whaling more clearly in the Diet:
“Japan thinks that the moratorium established by the International Whaling
Committee (IWC) in 1982 is not based on scientific evidence and illegitimate, and
thus should be reviewed swiftly. Therefore, the Japanese Government is going to
carry out research whaling in an effort to review the decision on the (commercial
whaling) moratorium of the IWC.”43
Japan acted in full accordance with paragraph 10 (e) and made the utmost effort to provide the best
scientific advice. Japan scrupulously upholds law and science. Japan‟s good faith is beyond doubt.
31. In addition to this misleading quotation, Australia quotes a number of other statements of
Japanese officials made in the 1980s, referring in particular to a phrase “in some form or another”
41
CR 2013/7, p. 27, para. 11 (Gleeson). See also MA, para. 3.4.
42
Ibid.
43
House of Representatives, Comm. on Agriculture, Forestry
http://kokkai.ndl.go.jp/, accessed on 3 July 2013, statement of Minister Kato.
and
Fisheries,
25 March 1987,
- 25 time and again44.
The statements are taken out of context again.
Australia boasts that the
statements were made after the moratorium was adopted in 198245. But what Australia ignores is
that the statements were made before 1987 when the moratorium entered into force for Japan.
During the period between 1982 and 1987, different views were expressed as to the future of
Japan‟s whaling. The views supporting the continuation of whaling need to be read in this context.
In 1985 Japan decided to halt commercial whaling and instead to focus upon contributing to
scientific research so that the moratorium would be lifted soon based on scientific data. The
Japanese officials‟ statements are taken out of context and misrepresented.
32. As Professor Akhavan pointed out, Australia is right in saying that it was “no
coincidence” that Japan initiated special permit whaling immediately after the moratorium entered
into force for Japan46.
There was indeed a clear relationship between the adoption of the
moratorium and the launch of special permit whaling. But Australia is wrong about its motive.
Japan started special permit whaling precisely because paragraph 10 (e) recognized the need for
“the best scientific advice” in order for the moratorium to be reviewed and lifted. Japan started
special permit whaling because the moratorium deprived the scientific community of scientific data
which had been collected through commercial whaling. Mr. President, as I have demonstrated,
Japan started JARPA II not despite the moratorium but because of the moratorium, to lift the
moratorium.
B. JARPA II is totally different from commercial whaling
33. Mr. President, now I would like to focus on the operational design of JARPA II to
demonstrate that it is totally different from commercial whaling.
JARPA II has many
characteristics which could not be explained if it were for commercial purpose. Among others, I
will highlight three features of JARPA II: namely, (1) trackline; (2) random sampling; and
(3) non-lethal methods.
44
CR 2013/7, p. 25, para. 4 (Gleeson); CR 2013/10, pp. 50-51, para. 31, p. 53, para. 37, p. 55, para. 44
(Crawford); CR 2013/11, p. 24, para. 82 (Crawford). MA, paras. 3.4, 3.15, 3.118, 5.108.
45
MA, footnote 188.
46
MA, paras. 1.4, 3.4.
- 26 -
34. [Slide 58-7: Trackline] I now draw your attention to the slide on the screen. One of the
most distinct differences between JARPA II and commercial whaling is the vessels‟ trackline. In
JARPA II, research vessels faithfully follow a scientifically predetermined trackline set across
every ten degrees in longitude in zigzags, with a view to obtaining meaningful research data on the
distribution of whales and the whale stock status. As a result, research vessels spend most of the
time in low-density areas and only about 20 per cent of the time in high density areas where
commercial whaling would be viable. In contrast, in commercial whaling, fleets go straight to the
high density areas in the south close to the ice around Antarctica and spend virtually 100 per cent
of their time there. This is only natural because commercial considerations require maximum takes
with a minimum of manoeuvring. If JARPA II were commercial whaling, why would the fleet
spend about 80 per cent of the time outside the high density areas? The contrast in tracklines
between JARPA II and commercial whaling is striking and is further support for the conclusion
that JAPRA II is not commercial whaling. [End of slide]
35. Australia alleges that JARPA II‟s research area is different from that of JARPA due to
commercial considerations47. This is another baseless allegation because there was a scientific
reason for the change of the research area. JARPA II shifted its scientific priority to the area
between 130° E and 175° E in order to investigate the mixing of two stocks in the area based upon
JARPA‟s important findings. In response to the data and analysis provided by Japan, the Scientific
Committee has engaged in discussions about stock structure in this specific area48.
36. I invite you to look at the next slide. [Slide 58-8: Random sampling] Another important
difference between JARPA II and commercial whaling is the selection of individual whales taken.
JARPA II uses random sampling based upon scientific considerations. Research vessels navigate
along a scientifically predetermined trackline and whales to be taken are randomly selected driven
by the statistical requirements for scientific analysis. As a result, smaller whales are also targeted
in contrast to the basic commercial principle of maximizing benefits and minimizing cost. Random
sampling runs counter to commercial considerations, but provides scientists with the reliable
47
48
See, e.g., Report of the Intersessional Workshop to Review Data and Result, 10 J. Cetacean Res. Manage.
(Suppl.) 422 (2008). See also Report of the Scientific Committee, 2012, 14 J. Cetacean Res. Manage (Suppl.) 26 (2013).
- 27 -
unbiased data desirable for their analyses leading to the calculation of sustainable yields. In
contrast, in commercial whaling, whales to be taken are selected based on commercial efficiency,
in other words, the size of the whales. Therefore, large animals are targeted and they tend to make
up a majority of the catch. This is only natural because the purpose of commercial whaling is to
maximize the amount of oil or meat with a minimum of efforts. [End of slide]
37. In the oral pleadings, Australia alleged that “there is an underrepresentation of the
smaller minkes” in JARPA and JARPA II49. This allegation is false, as the next graph will show.
[Slide 58-9: Graph comparing age distribution of whales taken in commercial whaling] The graph
on the screen shows in percentages the age composition of Antarctic minke whales caught in
commercial whaling. The commercial whaling of the past took more larger and therefore older
animals by proportion. On the same graph I will superpose the ages of catches from JARPA.
[Slide 58-10: Superposition of JARPA data] This graph demonstrates that JARPA and JARPA II
use random sampling, with full representation of the younger animals, unlike commercial whaling.
[End of slide]
38. Thirdly, the use of non-lethal methods in JARPA II is uncharacteristic of commercial
whaling. If research methods are dominated by commercial considerations, non-lethal methods
would not exist as options.
Non-lethal methods are used only for scientific purposes.
As
Professor Hamamoto explained, JARPA II has devoted considerable efforts to research with
non-lethal methods, such as sighting surveys, photo-IDs, biopsy sampling and oceanographic
observations. After seven research cruises completed since its beginning, JARPA II has recorded
more than 70,000 nautical miles of sighting distance (or 10,000 nautical miles on average for every
research cruise); nearly 400 photo-IDs; and more than 200 biopsy sampling50. If you compare
these figures with the achievements of the acclaimed IDCR/SOWER, namely an average sighting
distance of 7,000 nautical miles per cruise51, you will understand that a vast effort has been
invested in non-lethal surveys under JARPA II. That non-lethal methods make up no small part in
JARPA II is another indication that JARPA II is scientific research, and not commercial whaling.
49
50
Institute of Cetacean Research, JARPA II Cruise Report, http://www.icrwhale.org/CruiseReportJARPAJp.html
(accessed on 18 June 2013).
51
11 J. Cetacean Res. Manage. (Suppl. 2) 48 (2010).
- 28 -
39. The next slide shows that there are many scientists on board JARPA II research vessels
in contrast to commercial whaling. [Slide 58-11: Number of scientists on board] In order for a
large-scale scientific operation such as JARPA II to be successful, many scientists need to be on
board actively engaged in research. Professor Hamamoto explained with a photo what activities
the scientists are engaged in on board. The presence of many scientists devoted to scientific
research on board is another important feature which distinguishes JARPA II from commercial
whaling. [End of slide]
40. Mr. President, some decades ago, commercial whaling was carried out on a large scale.
[Slide 58-12: Graph of the number of catches/samples since the 1945] As you can see on the
screen, the scale of JARPA and JARPA II is negligible, compared with the heyday of commercial
whaling in the 1960s. Today, the world is in the age of conservation and management based upon
science. Scientific activities provide objective findings which enable the international community
to construct a more solid conservation and management framework. The world will never go back
to the unlimited taking of whales. [End of slide]
Conclusion
41. Mr. President, Members of the Court, I conclude. I have established that Australia‟s
allegation that the “real” purpose of JARPA II is to continue commercial whaling is unfounded.
The four specific arguments Australia makes in support of this allegation are untenable, either in
law or fact. Australia ignores Article VIII, paragraph 2, of the Convention and puts forward a
peculiar argument which is in contradiction with widely accepted practice, including Australia‟s
own practice. JARPA II is scientific research which was launched to provide “the best scientific
advice” as required by paragraph 10 (e) of the Schedule and is not a continuation of commercial
whaling. I have also highlighted some of the main features of JARPA II which could not be
explained if it were for commercial purpose. JARPA II simply is not commercial whaling.
42. Mr. President, Members of the Court, Australia is attempting to portray Japan as acting
in bad faith. This is a serious allegation that Australia has failed to substantiate.
Thank you for your attention, Mr. President and Members of the Court. I now invite you,
Mr. President, to call upon Professor Boyle once again to address the Court.
- 29 -
The PRESIDENT: Thank you very much, Professor Iwasawa, and I invite Professor Boyle
to take his place at the rostrum again. You have the floor, Sir.
Mr. BOYLE:
THE PRECAUTIONARY APPROACH AND THE ICRW
1. Thank you very much, Mr. President. I am conscious of the time; I shall try and be very
brief. I have got three submissions to make this afternoon. First, that Japan . . .
The PRESIDENT: Please speak at such a speed that the interpreters can translate into
French, if you can.
Mr. BOYLE: I apologize. I will slow down.
First, that Japan has acted with prudence and caution in setting sample sizes for special
permit whaling. Secondly, that the precautionary approach does not shift the burden of proof to
Japan, and thirdly, that a precautionary approach requires States to carry out scientific research
rather than prohibiting them from doing so.
The Precautionary Approach
2. Australia argues in its Memorial that the development of the precautionary approach in
international law must be taken into account when interpreting Article VIII52.
So does New
Zealand in its Written Observations53.
3. Principle 15 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and Development  which you see
on the screen  sets out the only universally endorsed version of the precautionary approach in the
following terms (tab 64) and I think the key elements are in the second sentence which talks about
threats of “serious or irreversible damage” and says that where there is “lack of full scientific
certainty” that “shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent
environmental degradation” 54. In its Memorial, Australia says that “this means that the uncertainty
52
Memorial (MA), para. 4.87.
53
Written Observations of New Zealand (WON), paras. 73-75.
54
Declaration of the United Nations Conference on Environment
A/CONF.151/26/Rev.1, Report of the UNCED (New York, 1992), Vol. I.
and
Development,
UN doc.
- 30 -
regarding the status of whale stocks requires Contracting Governments to act with prudence and
caution by strictly limiting the grant of special permits under Article VIII”55.
4. New Zealand argues that a precautionary application of Article VIII “necessarily requires
that no whales be killed unless that is necessary to achieve the objectives of the intended research”,
and that if whales are killed it says, “precaution requires that the number taken must be as low as
necessary to meet those objectives”56. Finally, it says that Japan must be able to demonstrate that
there will be no adverse effect on the stock57.
5. I will argue today that JARPA II meets all of those requirements, so it matters little
whether they represent international law or merely the policy preferences of Australia and
New Zealand. But one point is worth stressing at the outset: there is nothing in the precautionary
approach that reverses the normal burden of proof in international law. I made the same argument
before this Court in 2009 and I am pleased to say that the Court agreed with me . But I will return
to that point later.
A. Japan has acted with prudence and caution
6. The simple answer to the argument that Japan has not acted with prudence and caution is
that it has indeed done so by strictly limiting the number of whales that may be taken so that there
can be no harm to the stock. Even Professor Mangel agreed that “the very small take of whales
will not in any way endanger this stock”58. As the Court has heard earlier, the JARPA II sample
sizes are extremely conservative. Japan reiterates the conclusions of the 2005 research plan which
I drew to your attention this morning.
7. Japan is not alone in believing that prudence and caution do not require a halt to the
limited taking of minke whales under special permits. At the 10th Conference of the Parties to the
CITES Convention in 1997, Japan proposed the transfer of minke whales from Appendix I 
threatened with extinction  to Appendix II  may be threatened  in accordance with the
55
MA, para. 4.90.
56
WON, para. 75.
57
WON, para. 75.
58
CR 2013/9, p. 63 (Mangel).
- 31 criteria set out in Resolution 9.2459 of the CITES Convention. The CITES Secretariat stated “it is
clear that the criteria [for Appendix I listing] are not met and that the stocks concerned should be
transferred to Appendix II, with a quota, provided that effective enforcement is in place”60. Even in
1997 Southern Ocean minke whales were not endangered.
8. Australia has offered the Court no evidence to show that JARPA II‟s very limited level of
special permit whaling has endangered any whale stocks, or that it could do so in the future. It
merely makes reference to the past history of commercial whaling and uncertainty over the total
minke population61. But JARPA II scientific research whaling bears no resemblance to the massive
scale of commercial whaling in the past, while at the IWC‟s 64th Annual Meeting in 2012 the
Scientific Committee agreed abundance estimates for Antarctic minke whales of 720,000 in
1985-1991, and 515,000 in 1992-200462. It is important to observe that the Scientific Committee
concluded that these figures do not represent a statistically significant decline. And even Australia
agreed: it “noted [that] the decline between the two minke whale population estimates was not
statistically significant, and that while a decline was most likely the data included the possibility
that the population remained stable or even increased”63.
It is hard to characterize this as
“uncertainty”.
9. Australia pointed out in oral argument that the number of whales actually taken is
significantly lower than the permitted sample sizes and my colleague, Professor Iwasawa, has just
explained to you why that has come about. Clearly this smaller sample will have even less impact
on the stock. It could have some impact on the research program but that is one of the issues that
will be assessed in 2014 when the next Scientific Committee review of JARPA II takes place. That
is the most appropriate moment at which to evaluate whether any changes in the programme of
59
Criteria for amendment of Appendices I and II, CITES Resolution Conf. 9.24, available at:
http://www.cites.org/eng/res/all/09/E09-24R13.pdf. (last checked on 3 July 2013).
60
CITES, doc. 10.89 (Rev.), available at: http://www.cites.org/eng/cop/10/doc/E10-89.pdf (last checked on
3 July 2013)
61
MA, paras. 5.96-5.98.
62
Report of the Scientific Committee, 64th IWC Meeting (2012),
http://iwc.int/index.php?cID=2893&cType=document (last checked on 3 July 2013).
pp. 36-37,
available
63
IWC
Chair‟s
Report
of
64th
IWC
Meeting
(2012),
para. 6.1.2.
available
http://iwc.int/cache/downloads/2c2s83sna8ro40s0ookoggogk/IWC64%20Chair's%20Report.pdf (last checked
3 July 2013).
at:
at:
on
- 32 -
research are required. Japan will consider the outcome of that review and make such changes if
necessary. That is exactly what the research plan says64.
B. The burden of proof
10. That brings me to my second submission. Australia tries to argue that “[t]he onus is on
the proponents of the research to demonstrate, not merely to assert, that the proposed research will
not put the population or stock being studied at risk”65. New Zealand takes the same position and it
cites Judge Wolfrum‟s separate opinion in the MOX Plant Provisional Measures case for the
proposition “the burden of proof concerning the possible impact of a given activity is reversed”66.
11. Japan has indeed shown in its 2005 research plan, as submitted to the Scientific
Committee, that JARPA II has not and will not create a risk of harm to the stocks being studied67,
but it reiterates that, in the absence of express treaty language to the contrary, the precautionary
principle does not reverse the normal burden of proof in international law. In this respect, with the
utmost respect to Judge Wolfrum, he is quite wrong to say that it does. To take one example, the
burden of proof was quite deliberately not reversed when a precautionary approach to fisheries
conservation was elaborated in some detail by Article 6 of the 1995 United Nations Fish Stocks
Agreement68. There is no reason why the Whaling Convention should be read any differently,
especially so when the jurisprudence is taken into account.
12. This Court has repeatedly held that “in accordance with the well-established principle of
onus probandi incumbit actori, it is the duty of the party which asserts certain facts to establish the
64
Government of Japan, Plan for the 2nd Phase of the Japanese Whale Research Program under Special Permit
in the Antarctic, paper SC/57/O1, May 2005, p. 13; CMJ, Ann. 150.
65MA, para. 4.113.
66
WON, para. 74.
67
Government of Japan, Plan for the 2nd Phase of the Japanese Whale Research Program under Special Permit
in the Antarctic, paper SC/57/O1, May 2005, App. 9; CMJ, Ann. 150.
68
Agreement for the Implementation of the Provisions of the United Nations Convention on
Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982 relating to the Conservation and Management
Straddling
Fish
Stocks
and
Highly
Migratory
Fish
Stocks,
Art. 6,
available
http://www.un.org/depts/los/convention_agreements/texts/fish_stocks_agreement/CONF164_37.htm (last checked
3 July 2013).
the
of
at:
on
- 33 existence of [those] facts”69. In the Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay case, Argentina argued, like
Australia and New Zealand, that the precautionary approach reversed the burden of proof. That
argument was rejected by the Court70. In accordance with the Court‟s consistent jurisprudence it is
thus for Australia to prove the facts that it asserts, and in this case it has not even tried to show that
whale stocks have been harmed by special permit whaling at existing levels.
13. Nor has Australia tried to persuade the Court that the language of the Whaling
Convention reverses the burden of proof with respect to special permits. It would be difficult for it
to do so, given the terms in which Article VIII is drafted. Let me recall that language again:
“any Contracting Government may grant to any of its nationals a special permit
authorizing that national to kill, take and treat whales for purposes of scientific
research subject to such restrictions as to number and subject to such other conditions
as the Contracting Government thinks fit, and the killing, taking, and treating of
whales in accordance with the provisions of this Article shall be exempt from the
operation of this Convention” (emphasis added).
14. This language does not indicate any change in the burden of proof in the present
proceedings. On the contrary, it leaves Contracting Governments with a very wide margin of
appreciation, as Professor Lowe explained this morning. Nevertheless, as I also explained to the
Court this morning, the 2005 JARPA II research plan did include an evaluation of “possible effects
on conservation of the stock” as specified in Annex Y71. The conclusion was that it would have no
harmful impact.
15. In truth Australia‟s attempt to invoke the precautionary principle as a substitute for
proving its case is hopeless.
It bears reiterating that Rio Principle 15 and the precautionary
approach come into play only where it can first be shown that there are “threats of serious or
irreversible damage”. In other words, this kind of damage must be likely to some degree72. That is
69
Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2010, p. 14, para. 162. See
also, Maritime Delimitation in the Black Sea (Romania v. Ukraine), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2009, para. 68;
Sovereignty over Pedra Branca/Pulau Batu Puteh, Middle Rocks and South Ledge (Malaysia/ Singapore), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2008, para. 45; Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide
(Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro),Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007, p. 128, para. 204; Military and
Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Jurisdiction and
Admissibility, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 437, para. 101.
70
Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2010, p.14, para. 162.
71
2005 JARPA II Research Plan, App. 9; CMJ, Ann. 150.
72
European Commission, Communication on the Precautionary Principle, COM (2000) 1, p. 4 (“Recourse to the
precautionary principle presupposes that potentially dangerous effects deriving from a phenomenon, product or process have
been identified, and that scientific evaluation does not allow the risk to be determined with sufficient certainty”).
- 34 a high threshold: serious or irreversible harm requires more than “significant” harm73. JARPA II
has not been shown to cause any harm to whale stocks.
C. Scientific research is consistent with the precautionary principle
16. My last submission concerns the role of scientific research and the precautionary
approach. Australia‟s reliance on the precautionary approach is, in reality, fundamentally flawed.
A precautionary approach necessarily envisages that steps will be taken to illuminate uncertainties,
to provide a sounder scientific basis for conservation and exploitation measures  that is exactly
what Japan is doing in JARPA II. Conservation and management of marine living resources must
normally be based on the “best scientific evidence available”. That is what the 1982 United
Nations Law of the Sea Convention74 and the Fish Stocks Agreement75 provide, as I pointed out
yesterday.
17. Similarly, in WTO law, “a WTO Member must make best efforts to remedy the
insufficiencies in the relevant scientific evidence with additional scientific research or by gathering
information from relevant international organizations or other sources”76. In all of these instances
where the scientific evidence is uncertain, unreliable or inadequate, States must make serious
efforts to do further research.
How then can the issue of special permits for JARPA II be
characterized as inconsistent with the application of a precautionary approach rather than as an
expression of that approach?
18. Given the existence of a 28-year moratorium on commercial whaling, Article VIII of the
Whaling Convention is an essential tool, the only tool, for enabling the Contracting Parties to
conduct important aspects of research on conservation and sustainable use of whales. That is the
73
International Law Commission, 2001 Articles on the Prevention of Transboundary Harm from Hazardous
Activities, ILC Report (2001); General Assembly Official Records (GAOR), A/56/10, p. 366.
74
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 1833 UNTS 3 (1982) (1982 UNCLOS) Articles 61 (2) and
119 (1) (a).
75
One of the duties of regional or subregional fisheries management organizations under the 1995 Agreement is to
“compile and disseminate accurate and complete statistical data, as described in Annex I, to ensure that the best scientific
evidence is available . . .”; 1995 Fish Stocks Agreement, Article 10 (c).
United States  Continued Suspension of Obligation in the EC – Hormones Dispute,
Report
of
Appellate
Body,
WT/DS320/AB/R,
16 October 2008,
para. 679,
available
at:
https://docs.wto.org/dol2fe/Pages/FE_Search/FE_S_S006.aspx?Query=(@Symbol=%20wt/ds320/ab/r*%20not%20rw*)
&Language=ENGLISH&Context=FomerScriptedSearch&languageUIChanged=true# (3 July 2013);
1994 WTO
Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS Agreement), Article 5.7, available at:
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/sps_e/spsagr_e.htm (last checked on 3 July 2013); EC  Measures concerning
Meat and Meat Products, Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS26/DS48/AB/R, 16 Jan. 1998, para. 124, available at:
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/hormab.pdf (last checked on: 3 July 2013).
76
- 35 -
rationale for JARPA II, as the Court heard this morning. Restricting Article VIII, as Australia
argues, would hinder rather than promote conservation and sustainable use of resources.
19. So in reality, JARPA II is consistent with the requirements of a precautionary approach
to whaling, while Australia‟s opposition to it is not. The precautionary approach requires States to
continue to gather scientific evidence in order to make a judgment about whaling based on the best
scientific evidence available. Article VIII must be interpreted in order to permit States to carry out
this key function. Australia has not shown that Japan‟s precautionary approach to special permit
whaling for scientific purposes in any way “undermines the effectiveness of the ICRW regime”77.
On the contrary, we would submit that it sustains the effectiveness of that régime.
20. Australia plainly is not satisfied by Japan‟s caution and prudence in setting sample sizes. It
therefore uses the precautionary approach to argue that the grant of special permits under Article VIII
must be “strictly limited” and that Japan must justify them to other members of the Whaling
Commission. What Australia and New Zealand invite the Court to say is that the IWC  or the
Court  should decide on the grant of special permits, not Japan.
21. But both Australia and New Zealand are trying to rewrite Article VIII so that special permit
whaling is no longer “exempt from the operation of this Convention” but can be controlled by decision
of the parties. Why else would Australia rely on the precautionary principle when it offers no evidence
of potential harm to whale stocks? It has no evidence, but it wants a régime of prior consent, even for
scientific whaling, an outcome which it has not succeeded in achieving through negotiation.
22. It is obvious from paragraph 30 of the Schedule, as explained by Ms Takashiba in her
speech this morning, and from Annex P as explained in mine, that the process of review by the
Scientific Committee allows it to comment on proposals and review them. It does not empower
that Committee, or the Whaling Commission, to approve or reject proposals.
And, as
Professor Pellet explained in his speech, a Contracting Government must co-operate with the
Committee and consider carefully its comments and recommendations, but it is not bound to
respond favourably to every suggestion or criticism.
77
MA, para. 4.117.
- 36 -
23. Mr. President, that is the scheme laid down in Annex P as currently in force. It is a
scheme of prior consultation with the Scientific Committee, not of prior consent by the Whaling
Commission. Australia and New Zealand have tried hard to suggest the contrary, but they cannot
escape the logic of what all parties to the Convention accepted when they adopted paragraph 30 of
the Schedule, which doesn‟t alter the role of the IWC and does not give it control of the issue of
special permits.
24. And nor, Mr. President, Members of the Court, does this Court have power to approve or
disapprove the issue of a special permit. As the Court indicated in the Pulp Mills Case, where it
rejected Argentina‟s argument to the contrary:
“in the event of a disagreement between the parties on the planned activity persisting
at the end of the negotiation period, the Statute does not provide for the Court, to
which the matter would be submitted by the State concerned, according to Argentina,
to decide whether or not to authorize the activity in question. The Court points out
that, while the 1975 Statute gives it jurisdiction to settle any dispute concerning its
interpretation or application, it does not however confer on it the role of deciding in
the last resort whether or not to authorize the planned activities.”78
25. Mr. President earlier this week you heard Australia‟s case described as science fiction. I
recall that the last time I appeared before you I described Argentina‟s case against Uruguay as pulp
fiction. The present case is however different from Pulp Mills in one crucial respect: contrary to
what Australia claims, there is no doubt that Japan has faithfully followed the paragraph 30
procedure for prior notification of its proposals and it has consulted in full as required. But the two
cases are otherwise addressing the same question: whether one government has the right to issue
permits authorized by a treaty notwithstanding the opposition of other governments. In Pulp Mills
the Court declined to interfere with the issue of that permit even after holding that Uruguay had not
notified the River Uruguay Commission as required79. A fortiori, there can be no good reason for
taking a different view of the procedure in the present case where Japan has faithfully followed all
the required procedures.
78
Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay, I.C.J. Reports 2010 (I), p. 69, para.154.
79
Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay, I.C.J. Reports 2010 (I), p. 60, para. 122, pp. 103-104, paras. 273-275.
- 37 Conclusions
26. That brings me, Mr. President, to my conclusions. As we saw yesterday, all of the major
international treaties which govern conservation of living resources emphasize the importance of
scientific research as a basis for conservation and management. In this context, JARPA II serves to
further the conservation and management of whales by improving understanding and knowledge of
whale stocks in the Southern Ocean and the Antarctic ecosystem. The information collected
through this scientific research programme is directly relevant to making decisions concerning an
appropriate conservation and management strategy under the Whaling Convention. JARPA II
therefore contributes to the ability to base conservation and management measures on the best
“scientific findings” available80. Thus, it should not seen only as a means to advance the objectives
of the Whaling Convention, but it also underpins the precautionary approach to sustainable whaling
taken by the IWC‟s Revised Management Procedure.
27. In setting sample sizes, Japan has acted with prudence and caution. The precautionary
approach however does not shift the burden of proof from the Applicant to the Respondent in the
present case and there is nothing in the text of the Whaling Convention to justify any other view.
Before issuing special permits under Article VIII Japan provided the information listed in
paragraph 30 of the Schedule and Annex Y.
28. There is nothing in the Convention or in the practice of the Whaling Commission which
supports the argument that the prior consent of the Commission or its Scientific Committee is
required before issuing special permits. The decision to issue those permits remains one for the
government concerned in accordance with Article VIII, and there‟s nothing in the subsequent
development of international law  or international environmental law  that has changed that
position.
29. Mr. President, that concludes everything I have to say in this phase of the proceedings.
Thank you for listening, I would now invite you to give the floor to Professor Pellet, but you may
wish to break for coffee.
80
1946 ICRW, Article 5 (2).
Agreement, Article 5 (b).
See also 1982 UNCLOS, Articles 61 (2) and 119 (1) (a);
1995 Fish Stocks
- 38 -
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Professor Boyle. Le Professeur Pellet parlera après une
pause de 15 minutes. The hearing is suspended for 15 minutes.
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. The hearing is resumed. J‟invite le professeur Pellet à
continuer les plaidoiries du Japon. Vous avez la parole, Monsieur.
M. PELLET : Merci beaucoup, Monsieur le président.
BONNE FOI ET ABUS DE DROIT
1. Monsieur le président, Mesdames et Messieurs les juges, consciente qu‟en mettant en
œuvre le programme JARPA II, le Japon agit en conformité avec la convention baleinière
internationale de 1946, l‟Australie tente un improbable argument d‟abus de droit de la part du
Japon, argument qu‟elle présente comme étant lié mais distinct du moyen qu‟elle prétend tirer de la
mauvaise foi du Japon dans cette affaire81. Je ne crois pas nécessaire de faire une distinction rigide
entre ces deux moyens. Du reste, l‟accusation de mauvaise foi et celle d‟abus de droit apparaissent
comme largement équivalentes dans l‟argumentation australienne, l‟une conduisant à l‟autre.
2. Avant de montrer que ces griefs ne sont fondés ni en fait ni en droit, quelques remarques
liminaires très rapides sur ces deux principes si vous le voulez bien.
3. En premier lieu, il convient de remarquer que, si le droit international connaît
probablement le principe général de l‟abus de droit, il n‟en reste pas moins que, comme
M. Gleeson le reconnaît d‟ailleurs de bonne grâce82, ce principe n‟a jamais trouvé application dans
la jurisprudence de la Cour. Elle a, au contraire, marqué ses réticences face à une théorie dont elle
mesure l‟effet potentiellement déstabilisateur pour l‟ordre juridique et qu‟elle entend ne pas mettre
en œuvre à la légère. L‟Australie cite, dans son mémoire, un passage de l‟arrêt rendu par la Cour
81
CR 2013/11, p. 24, par. 1 ou p. 39-49, par. 49 (Gleeson).
82
CR 2013/11, p. 37, par. 41 et p. 39, par. 46 (Gleeson).
- 39 permanente83 dans l‟affaire des Zones franches mais en omettant la mise en garde fondamentale qui
conclut ce passage : «Mais la Cour ne saurait présumer l‟abus de droit.»84
4. Il en va d‟ailleurs de même d‟ailleurs de la bonne  ou, plutôt, de la mauvaise foi. Déjà,
dans l‟affaire des Intérêts allemands en Haute-Silésie polonaise, la Cour permanente avait souligné
que la mauvaise foi ne se présume pas, qu‟une partie qui porte une accusation aussi grave doit se
garder de le faire à la légère, et que c‟est à elle qu‟il appartient d‟apporter les preuves concrètes de
la mauvaise foi qu‟elle allègue :«[C]e n‟est qu‟un abus de ce droit ou un manquement au principe
de la bonne foi qui pourraient donner à un acte d‟aliénation le caractère d‟une violation du Traité ;
un tel abus ne se présume pas, mais il incombe à celui qui l‟allègue de fournir la preuve de son
allégation.»85
5. La Cour actuelle elle-même a parfois fait référence à la théorie de l‟abus de droit, sans
pour autant l‟appliquer une seule fois86. Les autres tribunaux internationaux n‟ont pas été plus
enclins à le mettre en œuvre. L‟organe d‟appel de l‟OMC, dans l‟affaire Etats-Unis - crevettes, à
laquelle l‟Australie a fait référence87, n‟a pas non plus appliqué cette théorie, mais a simplement
interprété et appliqué la clause de sauvegarde contenue dans l‟article XX du GATT88.
6. La rareté de ces occurrences de la théorie de l‟abus de droit en droit international et les
réticences des tribunaux à la mettre en œuvre montrent qu‟elle ne peut être appliquée à la légère.
L‟abus de droit est indissociable de l‟exécution de bonne foi des obligations internationales et il
n‟est pas étonnant que l‟article 300 de la convention de Montego Bay, par exemple, les unisse dans
une disposition unique. Par ailleurs, comme l‟a souligné la Cour, le principe de la bonne foi est
83
MA, p. 259, par. 5.135.
84
Zones franches de la Haute-Savoie et du Pays de Gex, arrêt, 1932, C.P.J.I. série A/B no 46, p. 167.
85
Certains intérêts allemands en Haute-Silésie polonaise, fond, arrêt no 7, 1926, C.P.J.I. série A no 7, p. 30.
86
Droits des ressortissants des Etats-Unis d’Amérique au Maroc (France c. Etats-Unis d’Amérique), arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 1952, p. 212 ; Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgique c. Espagne), deuxième
phase, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1970, p. 3, par. 3 ; Incident aérien du 10 août 1999 (Pakistan c. Inde), compétence de la Cour,
arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2000, p. 30, par. 40.
87
88
MA, p. 163, note 435 et p. 259, note 775 ; CR 2013/11, p. 39, par. 45 (Gleeson).
OMC, organe d‟appel, rapport du 12 octobre 1998, Etats-Unis - Prohibition à l’importation de certaines
crevettes et de certains produits à base de crevettes, no WT/DS58/AB/R, par. 158.
- 40 «l‟un des principes de base qui président à la création et à l‟exécution d‟obligations juridiques[89]» ;
il n‟est pas en soi une source d‟obligation quand il n‟en existerait pas autrement»90.
7. Au bénéfice de ces remarques générales, je me propose de montrer, plus concrètement,
que, loin d‟abuser d‟un droit quelconque, le Japon s‟est borné à se prévaloir de ceux que la
convention reconnaît expressément aux Parties et que, si abus de droit il y a, l‟auteur de l‟abus
n‟est pas celui que l‟Australie voudrait croire : c‟est l‟Etat demandeur qui s‟est, avec une belle
constance, efforcé de transformer radicalement la convention en un instrument de pure préservation
(ce qu‟il n‟est pas), et qui, pour cette raison, a empêché l‟adoption définitive et la mise en œuvre
effective de mécanismes efficaces et raisonnables de régulation de la chasse à la baleine qui sont
l‟objectif fondamental de la convention.
I. L’attitude contrastée des parties au sein de la CBI
8. La vérité, Monsieur le président, est que le fonctionnement de la CBI est paralysé par la
polarisation aux extrêmes des positions des gouvernements contractants. Comme nous l‟avons
expliqué, certains Etats, dont l‟Australie s‟est instituée le chef de file, ont essayé, en
instrumentalisant la CBI, de transformer le régime conventionnel en un régime de pure
préservation, qui interdirait la chasse indifféremment de l‟état du stock (à la seule exception,
admise par certains de ces Etats du bout des lèvres, de la chasse aborigène de subsistance)91. Or les
Etats comme le Japon, qui ont, par tradition ou par besoin alimentaire, un intérêt dans la chasse
baleinière, n‟ont aucune raison d‟accepter un tel détournement du régime conventionnel dès lors
que le renouvellement du stock, permettant une chasse durable, est assuré.
9. Toutefois, en dépit de la polarisation à laquelle conduit l‟intransigeance de l‟Australie et
d‟autres Etats «antichasse», le Japon a constamment participé de manière constructive aux travaux
de la CBI  tout en exprimant parfois son découragement, voire son exaspération, face à cette
intransigeance.
89
«(Essais nucléaires (Australie c. France), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1974, p. 473, par. 49)».
90
Actions armées frontalières et transfrontalières (Nicaragua c. Honduras), compétence et recevabilité, arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 1988, p. 105, par. 94.
91
MA, p. 55-56, par. 2.106-2.108.
- 41 A. L’intransigeance de l’Australie dans le cadre des négociationsmenées au sein de la CBI
10. Monsieur le président, ce mot «intransigeance» caractérise particulièrement bien
l‟attitude de l‟Australie dans le cadre des négociations au sein de la CBI. Se calant sur des
positions non négociables, l‟Etat requérant se refuse à tout dialogue et n‟envisage aucune issue aux
négociations autre que le triomphe absolu de ses positions extrêmes.
11. Toute l‟action de l‟Australie au sein de la CBI tend vers un objectif unique : la
transformation de la convention de 1946 en un traité de pure préservation, ce qui passe, selon
l‟Australie, par l‟interdiction de toute forme de chasse (à l‟exception de la chasse aborigène) :
«The Australian Government remains resolutely opposed to commercial
whaling and unilateral «scientific» whaling, and strongly supports the global
moratorium on commercial whaling. The primary objective of the Australian
Government remains the reform of the International Convention on the Regulation of
Whaling (ICRW) 1946 to bring about an effective, permanent international ban on
both commercial and unilateral «scientific» whaling. Australia will continue to argue
vigorously that whaling should be phased down to zero, with total and permanent
elimination of all whaling (other than current aboriginal subsistence whaling), within
a reasonable timeframe.»92
12. Forte de ce principe et bardée de ses certitudes, l‟Australie a fait de l‟exigence de la
revision de l‟article VIII un instrument de pression conditionnant son acceptation de toute réforme
de la CBI et son soutien à l‟adoption du RMS («Revised Management Scheme», le plan de gestion
revisé)93. Campant sur ces positions radicales, l‟Australie a empêché, en 2010, l‟adoption d‟un
texte de consensus proposé par le président et le vice-président de la commission afin d‟améliorer
92
The Future of the International Whaling Commission: An Australian Proposal, 2010, doc. IWC/M10/SWG 5,
(CMJ, annexe 19) (les italiques sont de nous).
93
«Annual Report of the International Whaling Commission 2009, p. 58, disponible à l‟adresse :
http://iwc.int/cache/downloads/a6m3zamxj7k0wc40ko4k8kgck/AnnualReport2009.pdf. Voir aussi Paper Submitted by
the Government of Australia to the IWC61, Discussions on the Future of the IWC, 18 juin 2009, doc. IWC/61/9, p. 2,
disponible à l‟adresse : http://iwc.int/index.php?cID=1744&cType=document ; ou Gouvernement d‟Australie,
Conservation et gestion des baleines. Un avenir pour la C.B.I., 3 mai 2008, doc. WC/M08/INFO 11-FR, p. 14, disponible
à l‟adresse http://iwc.int/index.php?cID=1754&cType=document.
- 42 la conservation des baleines et la gestion des peuplements baleiniers94, et ceci parce qu‟il ne
satisfaisait pas les exigences australiennes relatives à la modification de l‟article VIII95.
«Australia reminded the Commission that its basic position is that it does not
want to see a resumption of commercial whaling and that it will not agree to RMS »96.
Or else:
«Australia will oppose any amendments to the Schedule to the Convention that would
permit commercial whaling to proceed under IWC regulation. Australia will vote
against the adoption of a Revised Management Scheme (RMS).»97
Monsieur le président, qui fait obstacle à toute réglementation collective dans le cadre de
la CBI ? Poser la question c‟est y répondre.
13. Le Japon avait pour sa part accepté cette proposition concernant le RMS comme base de
discussion, alors même qu‟elle prévoyait de «suspendre immédiatement pendant la période de
dix ans les opérations de chasse déterminées unilatéralement, au titre de permis spéciaux,
d‟objections et de réserves». C‟était là une concession considérable de sa part98. L‟intransigeance
australienne est une des principales, probablement la principale cause de l‟échec du processus
concernant l‟avenir de la CBI. Comme l‟a déclaré le délégué australien lors de l‟ouverture de la
session de la CBI en 2010 : «Australia considered that it was now time to close the door on the
Proposed Consensus Decision…»99.
14. Dans le même esprit, il n‟est pas anodin de remarquer que l‟Australie a saisi votre Cour
avant même l‟ouverture de la 62e réunion annuelle de la commission, durant laquelle cette
94
Voir «Proposed Consensus Decision to Improve the Conservation of Whales from the Chair and Vice Chair of
the Commission», annexe E, Chair‟s Report of the 62nd Annual Meeting, Annual Report of the International Whaling
Commission 2010 (annexe 118 du CMJ ; pour une version partielle en français, voir décision de consensus proposée
par le président et le vice-président de la commission afin d‟améliorer la conservation des baleines,
présentée
à
la
commission
le
22 avril 2010,
doc. IWC/62/7rev-FR,
disponible
à
l‟adresse
http://iwc.int/index.php?cID=1740&cType=document.
95
Opening Statement by Australia, 62nd Annual Meeting of the International Whaling Commission, juin 2010,
doc. IWC/62/OS Australia, disponible à l‟adresse : http://iwc.int/iwc62docs. Voir aussi Opening Statement by Australia,
63rd Annual Meeting of the International Whaling Commission, 2011, doc. IWC/63/OS Australia, disponible à l‟adresse :
http://iwc.int/cache/downloads/3lr8xf2jmfeoscg00osccow4c/63-OS%20Australia.pdf.
Voir également CR 2013/12,
p. 54-55, par. 53-58 (Akhavan).
96
Chair‟s Report of the 58th Annual Meeting (16-20 juin 2006), p. 24, (CMJ, annexe 65).
97
Government of Australia, Opening Statement of the Fifty-Eighth Annual Meeting, doc. IWC/58/OS (2006)
(CMJ, annexe 172).
98
Décision de consensus proposée par le président et le vice-président de la commission afin d‟améliorer la
conservation des baleines, présentée à la commission le 22 avril 2010, doc. IWC/62/7rev-FR, disponible à l‟adresse :
http://iwc.int/index.php?cID=1740&cType=document p. 5.
99
Annual Report of the International Whaling Commission 2010, p. 8, disponible à l‟adresse :
http://iwc.int/cache/downloads/1anxqeu1b6ysk0wk4gs4ow0k4/AnnualReport2010.pdf.
- 43 proposition de consensus allait être discutée. Il ne fait aucun doute que, ce faisant, l‟Australie a
entendu court-circuiter le processus de négociation dans le cadre de la CBI.
15. Une telle intransigeance, Monsieur le président, est contraire à l‟obligation de négocier et
de coopérer de bonne foi qui s‟impose aux parties à la convention, comme elle s‟impose à toute
partie à un traité qui prend au sérieux ses obligations conventionnelles100.
16. Comme la Cour l‟a rappelé dans une formule célèbre et souvent reprise : «les parties ont
l‟obligation de [négocier] de telle manière que la négociation ait un sens, ce qui n‟est pas le cas
lorsque l‟une d‟elles insiste sur sa propre position sans envisager aucune modification»101.
17. C‟est très exactement ce que fait l‟Australie, Monsieur le président. En revanche,
quoique celle-ci en dise, ce n‟est pas le cas du Japon qui a toujours participé de façon constructive
au dialogue au sein de la CBI.
B. La participation constructive du Japon au dialogue au sein de la CBI
18. Monsieur le président, nous n‟avons aucune querelle avec l‟affirmation du
Solicitor-General d‟Australie selon laquelle le Japon a l‟obligation «to give a degree of
consideration to the Guidelines and Resolutions of the IWC, and the reports of its Scientific
Committee»102. Il s‟est acquitté de cette obligation. Pour le montrer, je vais simplement  et
rapidement  réfuter pas à pas la démonstration contraire qu‟a entendu apporter M. Gleeson dans
son avant-dernière intervention, vendredi dernier.
Il a imputé au Japon quatre séries de
manquements à la bonne foi  quatre péchés capitaux (il n‟en n‟a pas trouvé sept...), en
100
Voir aussi Resolution 2001-1, Resolution on Transparency within the International Whaling Commission,
disponible à l‟adresse : http://iwc.int/cache/downloads/73xlqdrwx0kkkwc8ook0k0ggo/Resolution%202001.pdf.
101
Plateau continental de la mer du Nord (République fédérale d’Allemagne/Danemark) (République fédérale
d’Allemagne/Pays-Bas), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1969, p. 47 , par. 85 (les italiques sont de nous). Voir aussi Concessions
Mavrommatis en Palestine, arrêt no 2, 1924, C.P.J.I. série A no 2, p. 13 ; Trafic ferroviaire entre la Lithuanie et la
Pologne, avis consultatif, 1931, C.P.J.I. série A/B no 42, p. 116 ; Sud-Ouest africain (Ethiopie c. Afrique du Sud; Libéria
c. Afrique du Sud), exceptions préliminaires, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1962, p. 345-346 ; Personnel diplomatique et
consulaire des Etats-Unis à Téhéran (Etats-Unis d’Amérique c. Iran), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1980, p. 27, par. 51;
Applicabilité de l’obligation d’arbitrage en vertu de la section 21 de l’accord du 26 juin 1947 relatif au siège de
l’Organisation des Nations Unies, avis consultatif, C.I.J. Recueil 1988, p. 33, par. 55 ; Questions d’interprétation et
d’application de la convention de Montréal de 1971 résultant de l’incident aérien de Lockerbie (Jamahiriya arabe
libyenne c. Etats-Unis d’Amérique), exceptions préliminaires, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 1998, p. 122, par. 20 ; Activités
armées sur le territoire du Congo (nouvelle requête 2002) (République démocratique du Congo c. Rwanda), compétence
et recevabilité, arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2006, p. 40-41, par. 91 ; Usines de pâte à papier sur le fleuve Uruguay (Argentine
c. Uruguay), arrêt, C.I.J. Recueil 2010, p. 68, par. 150 ; Application de la convention internationale sur l’élimination de
toutes les formes de discrimination raciale (Géorgie c. Fédération de Russie), exceptions préliminaires, arrêt,
C.I.J. Recueil 2011, par. 156-162.
Voir aussi Utilisation des eaux du Lac Lanoux, sentence arbitrale du
16 novembre 1957, RSA, vol. XII, p. 306-307.
102
CR 2013/11, p. 25, par. 2 (Gleeson).
- 44 -
interprétant de manière passablement biaisée un certain nombre de documents, et en se gardant
bien d‟en présenter d‟autres, pourtant fort éclairants.
Premier péché capital  La période JARPA (1987-2005)
19. En premier lieu, le Japon n‟aurait tout simplement pas dû lancer JARPA.
20. En parcourant les textes que M. Gleeson présente comme «les documents clefs par
lesquels débute cette partie de l‟affaire», je relève que l‟annexe L qu‟il mentionne en premier se
borne à indiquer le type de commentaires que devrait faire le comité scientifique lorsqu‟il est saisi
d‟un permis spécial103  on ne voit pas comment des conclusions quant à la bonne foi du Japon
pourraient en être tirées : ces directives s‟adressent au comité. De toute manière, si l‟annexe L
devait également être lue comme précisant le type d‟information scientifique que les Etats
devraient soumettre pour faciliter la tâche du comité scientifique, le professeur Boyle a démontré
que le Japon a parfaitement suivi ces recommandations quant aux deux résolutions sur les permis
spéciaux de 1987 et 1988.
21. Pour ce qui est des autres textes sur lesquels notre contradicteur a attiré l‟attention de la
Cour, permettez-moi, Monsieur le président, de rappeler le contexte dans lequel ils ont été adoptés.
J‟ai narré hier comment, après l‟obtention d‟un consensus difficile en faveur de la
résolution 1985-2, les Etats anti-chasse, dont l‟Australie, sont revenus à la charge l‟année suivante
pour que la commission revienne elle, sur cette résolution de consensus en vue de restreindre
davantage encore la possibilité de mener des recherches létales104. Les résolutions 1986-2 et
1987-1 sont ces «rétrorésolutions», qui reviennent sur 1985-2 et que nombre d‟Etats ont critiquées
à la fois sur le fond et quant à la stratégie de non-négociation suivie pour leur adoption. Ce sont
ces deux résolutions qu‟invoque essentiellement M. Gleeson pour taxer le Japon de mauvaise foi.
Ces résolutions donnent également des directives au comité scientifique, elles rappellent le contenu
de l‟article VIII, et recommandent aux gouvernements contractants de prendre en considération,
«dans l‟exercice de leurs droits souverains»105 qu‟elles rappellent, les positions de la commission et
du comité scientifique quant à la limitation de la délivrance des permis spéciaux. Et je relève au
103
Dossier des juges de l‟Australie (onglet no 5).
104
Voir CR 2013/14, p. 68, par. 61-62 (Pellet).
105
- 45 -
passage que la résolution de 1987 recommande que les Etats prennent en considération le
paragraphe 2 de l‟article VIII de la convention106.
22. Le Japon s‟est conformé à ces directives comme le comité scientifique le reconnaît
expressément : «Following the guidelines in Annex L last year, the Committee noted that the
proposal had adequately specified the information required under Paragraph 30 of the Schedule»107;
à cette occasion, en outre, le Japon s‟est largement expliqué sur les objectifs et les méthodes de son
programme108. Une fois les commentaires du comité scientifique reçues – pas tous négatifs, loin
s‟en faut, le représentant japonais a répondu d‟une manière particulièrement précise et
argumentée109.
Pour leur part, les conclusions du comité, déjà commentées ce matin par le
professeur Boyle, furent positives, ou nuancées, ou incertaines selon les points :
[Projection n° 1 : Rapport du comité scientifique, 1988.]
I will read this very quickly and I beg the interpreters to forgive me for my speed.
“Although the permits did not address this issue of recruitment rates directly, its
objectives were relevant for this topic. The role of whales in the ecosystem, not a
subject of immediate importance, although it may become so at a later stage in the
comprehensive assessment. This was for relevance to research needs identified by the
Committee. Issue 2: methodology. There was a clear division of opinion, as to the
feasibility theory in practice of the methods of analysis. Issue 3: possible effects on
conservation of the stocks. The Committee recognized that a general approach was a
useful one. Some members proposed catch would have no significant effect on stocks.
Some members expressed concerns about the possible effects. Lethal methods: the
specific objective could not be carried out through non-lethal research. Some
members pointed out that non-lethal methods were available with an exception, the
Committee agreed that the objectives could not be achieved by non-lethal means.”
Ce document se trouve aux onglets 66.1 à 66.3 de vos dossiers.
23. Face à ces appréciations nuancées, le Japon n‟a nullement opposé la fin de non-recevoir
que M. Gleeson voudrait faire croire. De façon très raisonnable, il a indiqué qu‟il ne pouvait
surseoir à la recherche envisagée (sauf à perdre la dotation budgétaire prévue à cet effet - quel
chercheur n‟a pas été affronté à ce genre de problèmes ?). Mais sa réponse ne s‟est pas bornée à
cela : non sans bon sens, le commissaire japonais a relevé «Moratorium was adopted on the reason
by those people that stock situation is uncertain. Then someone should do something to find out
106
107
Report of the Scientific Committee, 1998, dossier des juges de l‟Australie (onglet no 114), p. 58.
108
Ibid., p. 55.
109
Ibid., p. 56.
- 46 real situation»110. Moreover, Japan explained that «[it] was willing to incorporate comments and
suggestions»111.
24. Suite à cet examen par le comité scientifique, la commission, ne tenant aucun compte des
hésitations de celui-ci, et du caractère plutôt positif de son évaluation, adopta à la majorité
de 18 voix contre 8, et 5 abstentions  dans laquelle notre contradicteur voit, non sans
exagération, une «majorité écrasante» («an overwhelming majority»)  une résolution fort critique
en effet mais qui n‟en mettait pas moins l‟accent sur les droits souverains des gouvernements
contractants dont elle souligne que les permis spéciaux  elle étant la commission  demeurent
sous la responsabilité exclusive des gouvernements contractants («remain [...] the responsibility of
each Contracting Government»112).
25. Le Sollicitor-General d‟Australie affirme ensuite avec une grande assurance que «you
will not find in the Counter-Memorial a substantive explanation for why Japan, in good faith,
ignored the Resolution I‟ve taken you to and like resolutions». En réalité le contre-mémoire
japonais consacre à cette question cinq pleines pages113. Mais surtout, il me semble que la réponse
réside :
 dans
celle
fermement
laconique,
que
j‟ai
apportée
hier
aux
non-questions
de
M. le juge Greenwood114 ; et
 dans le fait qu‟il n‟est tout simplement pas exact que «Japan ignores the Commission restated
position». Je crains que ce soit M. Gleeson qui ignore cette position : «the Government of
Japan, through its various modifications to the original research programme (...) has attempted
to address the concerns expressed by the Scientific Committee in its earlier reports»115  et
ceci est une citation extraite de la résolution 1992-5 de la commission, incluse par notre
110
Intervention du Japon, IWC39, Verbatim Record of Fourth Plenary Session, 26 juin 1987, IWC/39/VR, p. 135.
111
Intervention du président du comité scientifique, IWC39, Verbatim Record of Fourth Plenary Session,
26 juin 1987, IWC/39/VR, p. 135-136.
112
Résolution 1987-4, «Resolution on Japanese Proposal on Special Permit», dossier des juges de l‟Australie
(onglet no 116).
113
CMJ, p. 371-375.
114
CR 2013/14, p. 64, par. 48 (Pellet).
115
Résolution 1992-5, «Resolution on Special Permit Catches by Japan in the Southern Hemisphere», dossier des
juges de l‟Australie (onglet no 118).
- 47 contradicteur dans le dossier de plaidoirie de vendredi (et du reste, pour l‟instant, je me fonde
exclusivement sur son dossier).
[Projection no 2 : JARPA - Examen à mi-parcours (1997).]
26. Il est tout à fait exact que la résolution de la Commission de 1997 ne présente pas JARPA
sous un jour favorable116, mais il est remarquable qu‟elle ignore superbement les conclusions du
comité scientifique  sur lesquels elle est cependant censée se fonder. Celui-ci avait, d‟une part,
reconnu la contribution majeure de JARPA dans certains domaines (notamment pour la
compréhension de certains paramètres biologiques ou de la structure du stock) et, d‟autre part,
encouragé la poursuite du programme, comme vous le voyez sur les extraits de l‟examen à
mi-parcours de 1997 figurant à l‟écran. Ces appréciations très positives après dix ans de recherches
dans le cadre de JARPA (et qui contrastent avec les doutes exprimés à l‟origine) levaient ceux-ci en
ce qui concerne les résultats positifs du programme et constituaient un clair encouragement à
poursuivre.
27. Selon M. Gleeson, les choses auraient encore empiré durant les six années suivantes,
1998-2003. C‟est sûrement exact en ce qui concerne le climat au sein de la CBI. Mais le conseil
de l‟Australie passe soigneusement sous silence les controverses ayant entouré l‟adoption de la
résolution 2003-2117, qui a été adoptée par 24 voix pour, 20 contre et une abstention, encore
peut-être une majorité écrasante.
Les Etats minoritaires l‟ont très vivement critiquée cette
résolution 2003-2, à la fois en ce qui concerne la procédure suivie et quant à sa substance118. Et,
même un Etat comme la Suède, qui avait pourtant voté pour la résolution : «regretted that there had
not been sufficient time for wider consultation on the draft Resolution»119.
116
Voir résolution 1997-5, «Resolution on Special Permit Catches in the Southern Ocean by Japan» (onglet
n 124 du dossier des juges de l‟Australie).
o
117
Voir résolution 2003-2, «Whaling under Special Permit» (onglet no 106 du dossier des juges de l‟Australie).
118
Chair‟s Report of the 55th Annual Meeting, 2003, p. 9 (reflétant les points de vue du Danemark et de
l‟Islande) et p. 10 (Norvège, République de Corée, Antigua-et-Barbuda, Chine, Dominique, Fédération de Russie, Japon,
Grenade, Sainte-Lucie et Maroc, disponible à l‟adresse : http://iwc.int/cache/downloads/1lxgckclxbwg8wwco8ks0owc0/
CHAIRS%20REPORT%202003.pdf.
119
Ibid.
- 48 28. Le Sollicitor-General d‟Australie oublie également de signaler que cette résolution a été
adoptée dans le contexte particulièrement tendu de l‟initiative de Berlin120, par laquelle la majorité
étroite des Etats opposés par principe à la chasse à la baleine a, de nouveau, imposé ses vues à la
minorité importante des Etats favorables à une exploitation durable de cette ressource maritime
dans le respect bien sûr de la reconstitution et de la conservation des stocks. Allant au-delà du seul
vote de résolutions totalement orientées, les Etats de la majorité (pour étroite qu‟elle fût) ont mis en
place un nouvel organe, le comité de conservation121, dont le mandat est de s‟éloigner plus encore
de l‟objectif de la convention, pour faire de la CBI un instrument de préservation «en soi», ce
qu‟elle n‟est pas. Et ceci a appelé la réaction de 17 autres Etats qui ont exprimé leur vive
préoccupation :
«„We are deeply concerned that adoption of the Berlin Initiative which
establishes a conservation committee will essentially destroy the already polarized and
dysfunctional IWC,‟ said the statement by 17 member countries of the Whaling
Commission. They consider this „an attempt to change the fundamental objectives‟
and „an attempt to subvert the purpose‟ of the organisation»122.
Pour cette raison, très claire et franchement exprimée, le Japon, qui était parmi les signataires de
cette lettre, s‟est refusé à participer aux travaux de ce comité de la conservation (seul organe de la
commission auquel il ne participe pas).
29. Au demeurant, ce n‟est pas la fin de l‟histoire, et M. Gleeson s‟est également gardé de
reproduire, et même de mentionner, la résolution 2004-6, adoptée l‟année suivante et appuyant les
efforts pour promouvoir le «Revised Management Scheme (RMS)», qui eût été de nature à réaliser
«the dual mandate of the IWC for the conservation of whales and the management of whaling
according to the 1946 International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling»123, et M. Gleeson
ne mentionne pas le fait bien sûr que l‟Australie a tout fait pour torpiller - avec succès d‟ailleurs cette initiative. Vous trouverez la résolution 2004-6 sous l‟onglet no 69 de vos dossiers.
120
CBI, resolution 2003-1, «The Berlin Initiative on Strengthening the Conservation Agenda of the International
Whaling Commission» ; à ce sujet, voir CMJ, par. 2.57.
121
Ibid.
122
Scoop World, «High North Alliance: End in Sight for the IWC?», disponible à l‟adresse :
http://www.scoop.co.nz/stories/WO0306/S00303.htm.
123
Résolution 2004-6, «Resolution on Completion of the Revised Management Scheme (RMS)», disponible à
l‟adresse : http://iwc.int/cache/downloads/dyle2a99exw0o080ss8kkco4w/Resolution%202004.pdf.
- 49 Deuxième péché capital
30. Deuxième atteinte à la bonne foi alléguée par M. Gleeson : le Japon n‟aurait jamais dû
proposer ou adopter JARPA II en 2005 («Japan should never have proposed or adopted JARPA II
in 2005»)  vous noterez, Monsieur le président, la grande souplesse que cette proposition
implique de la part de l‟Australie : elle ne reproche pas seulement au Japon d‟avoir adopté
JARPA II, elle lui fait grief de l‟avoir proposé... C‟est d‟ailleurs assez caractéristique de l‟état
d‟esprit des opposants à la chasse à la baleine : comme l‟a expliqué le Solicitor-General, sans
apparemment en être choqué le moins du monde, lorsque le Japon a présenté le projet JARPA II au
comité scientifique, ceci a aussi été rappelé ce matin, 63 de ses membres, hostiles par principe à la
chasse à la baleine, ont purement et simplement refusé d‟en discuter  bel exemple d‟ouverture
scientifique et d‟ouverture à la discussion... En tout cas, je ne vois pas comment l‟Australie peut
aujourd‟hui rejeter le rapport du comité scientifique au prétexte que les membres «antichasse»
n‟ont pas pris part, et n‟ont pas voulu prendre part, à l‟examen de JARPA II : c‟est vraiment le
pompier pyromane !
31. Il reste que, comme le constate le comité lui-même, «the proposal was reviewed by the
Committee in accordance with the relevant guidelines for reviewing proposals for special
permits»124. La commission n‟a tenu aucun compte de cette revue125. Le Japon n‟était, pour sa
part, pas juridiquement tenu de suivre les recommandations contenues dans la résolution 2005-1, et
il ne les a, en effet, pas suivies  pas de manière capricieuse ou arbitraire, comme voudrait le faire
croire M. Gleeson , mais parce que, comme il s‟en est expliqué abondamment, ces «demandes»
prises sans considération pour les aspects scientifiques, étaient  et sont toujours  incompatibles
avec l‟article VIII de la convention. Je vais revenir sur ce point dans un instant. Ce n‟est pas un
problème de bonne foi, comme l‟allègue trop légèrement l‟Australie ; c‟est une question purement
objective de respect ou non de cet article.
124
JCRM 8 (Suppl.), 2006, p. 50, dossier des juges du Japon (onglet no 48). Voir aussi CR 2013/15, p. 32,
par. 17 (Takashiba).
125
Voir aussi CMJ, par. 3.81-3.84.
- 50 Troisième péché capital
32. Alors, bien sûr, le Japon continue à ne pas respecter les recommandations (décidément
non obligatoires) de la CBI, même s‟il n‟est pas exact qu‟il les «ignore». La Nouvelle-Zélande
insiste sur cette obligation de coopération, qu‟elle met aussi en lien avec l‟obligation de
bonne foi126. Mais comment concrètement le Japon peut-il «prendre en considération» des vues
aussi totalement extrêmes, inspirées par des positions de principe particulièrement rigides et ne
laissant aucune espèce de place à quelque compromis que ce soit, ni même un début de discussion ?
Quatrième péché capital
33. Quant au quatrième péché, celui d‟avoir accordé des permis ne respectant pas les
directives du paragraphe 30, Yukiko Takashiba et Alan Boyle ont suffisamment réfuté cette
accusation non fondée pour que j‟aie besoin d‟y revenir. Comme ils l‟ont montré, le Japon et les
experts japonais ont répondu avec précision à toutes les critiques adressées tant à JARPA qu‟à
JARPA II  et, en particulier, ils ont réagi, quoiqu‟en dise l‟Australie, aux 31 recommandations
faites par le comité scientifique en 2007 et JARPA II a été ajusté en conséquence , ce que notre
contradicteur ne signale pas bien sûr. Je me permets, Mesdames et Messieurs les juges de vous
renvoyer à nouveau à notre contre-mémoire127 et à ce qu‟a dit à ce sujet Mme Takashiba ce matin.
Cela est conforme à la lettre du paragraphe 30 du Règlement (qui est, lui, obligatoire) et à l‟esprit
de la procédure de coopération que ce paragraphe institue. Du reste, ni la commission, ni le
comité scientifique n‟ont critiqué l‟attitude du Japon à cet égard.
34. Telle que l‟Australie la conçoit, l‟obligation de coopération est réduite à une pure
obligation faite aux Etats minoritaires de s‟aligner sur les vues de la majorité, anéantissant ainsi le
pouvoir d‟appréciation des Etats et transformant de simples recommandations en diktats. S‟il n‟a,
en effet, pas donné suite à toutes les recommandations de la commission, en particulier à ses
recommandations conflictuelles, c‟est qu‟elles se présentaient comme des injonctions de cesser
purement et simplement JARPA II  ce que le Japon n‟est, en effet, pas prêt à faire : ceci serait
contraire tant aux objectifs de la convention qu‟à une quelconque logique scientifique.
En
revanche, le Japon a toujours indiqué qu‟il était prêt à discuter et prendre en considération tout avis
126
WON, par. 99, 105, 106.
127
Voir notamment MA, par. 4.110 et 5.18 ainsi que les documents cités.
- 51 -
scientifique pertinent, et il a tenu le plus grand compte des textes consensuels adoptés par la
commission128.
35. Mais ceci me conduit à une remarque plus générale, Monsieur le président. Toutes ces
accusations n‟ont rien à voir avec la bonne foi  sauf à des fins je dirais «tactiques» ou
«psychologiques» : l‟Australie s‟efforce de faire passer le Japon pour le «méchant», le bad guy, qui
agit «en douce», avec dissimulation et hypocrisie et, comme notre agent l‟a dit à l‟ouverture des
audiences, son pays le ressent profondément. Comme dirait James Crawford, «ce n‟est pas la
question !»129
Elle est, et elle est seulement, devant la Cour, dont la mission est de régler
conformément au droit international les différends qui lui sont soumis, de savoir si le Japon a, ou
non, respecté les dispositions de la convention de 1946 par laquelle, comme l‟Australie, il est lié. Il
est regrettable que l‟Etat demandeur s‟efforce d‟esquiver la seule question.
II. La bonne foi déçue du Japon
36. Mesdames et Messieurs de la Cour, le Japon n‟est pas de mauvaise foi, il n‟a pas abusé
des droits qu‟il tient de l‟article VIII et il était (et demeure) en droit de s‟opposer aux résolutions
ultra vires adoptées par la CBI (A.). Et, à vrai dire, s‟il a péché, c‟est peut-être plutôt par naïveté :
il s‟est laissé piéger par des assurances sur lesquelles il croyait pouvoir compter et qui n‟ont, à ce
jour, toujours pas été tenues  en grande partie du fait de l‟action de l‟Etat requérant (B.).
A. Le devoir de coopération et ses limites
37. Monsieur le président, je souhaite que les choses soient très claires  et elles ont été
dites très clairement ce matin par le professeur Vaughan Lowe : il ne saurait faire de doute que les
Etats bénéficient, en vertu de l‟article VIII, d‟un très large pouvoir d‟appréciation quant à
l‟opportunité d‟un programme, ses objectifs scientifiques, le nombre de baleines nécessaires pour
atteindre ces objectifs et les méthodes à employer  qui comportent, par définition, s‟agissant de
l‟article VIII  une composante létale.
Ceci étant, le Japon reconnaît pleinement que cette
compétence discrétionnaire ne saurait être confondue avec un pouvoir arbitraire, exercé à bien
plaire et sans limites. Mais ces limites sont fixées par le droit international général et non par la
128
Voir CMJ, par. 8.68-8.70.
129
CR 2013/8, p. 33, par. 29 (Crawford).
- 52 convention puisque les permis spéciaux sont octroyés en vertu de l‟article VIII, «[n]onobstant toute
disposition contraire» de celle-ci.
38. En soutenant que le Japon a fait preuve de mauvaise foi en n‟appliquant pas ces
résolutions, l‟Australie se fait l‟avocat d‟une interprétation contra scriptum de l‟article VIII. Une
interprétation sans fondement, car, je l‟ai montré hier, on ne saurait soutenir que cette disposition
ait fait l‟objet d‟une modification coutumière130. Du reste, en 1997, l‟Australie elle-même avançait
une interprétation plus orthodoxe de l‟article VIII :
«Australia introduced a Resolution on Special Permit catches in the Southern
Ocean by Japan (…). It recognised that although Japan‟s programme is strictly legal
under Article VIII of the Convention, science should endeavour to adopt the highest
standards and that there are civilised limits to the pursuit of knowledge…»131
39. Cette appréciation sur la licéité des permis spéciaux, même si elle est accompagnée d‟un
regret, est loin d‟être isolée132. Et l‟insistance des Etats opposés à toute forme de chasse à la
baleine à vouloir modifier les termes de l‟article VIII ou à exiger sa suppression par un protocole
formel portant amendement de la convention montre, a contrario mais clairement, qu‟ils sont
convaincus que, dans l‟état actuel des choses, la position du Japon est licite133. En ce qui concerne
l‟exigence d‟une revision de la convention sur ce point, l‟Australie a toujours été en pointe134. Plus
même, comme je l‟ai montré tout à l‟heure, elle a fait de l‟exigence de revision de l‟article VIII une
condition sine qua non de son acceptation de toute réforme de la CBI135.
40. Ceci étant, dans l‟état actuel du droit, le pouvoir discrétionnaire des Etats ainsi entendu
est expressément garanti par les termes de l‟article VIII, et les acrobaties interprétatives de
l‟Australie ne peuvent rien y changer. Dès lors, l‟opposition d‟un Etat aux recommandations de la
130
CR 2013/14, p. 64-83, par. 50-73 (Pellet).
131
Chairman‟s Report of the Forty-Ninth Annual Meeting, Rep. int. Whal. Commn 48, 1998, p. 39 (les italiques
sont de nous) (CMJ, annexe 57). Voir aussi CR 2013/12, p. 62, par. 80 (Akhavan).
132
Voir, par exemple, William T Hogarth (ancient commissaire américain), Written Testimony on the 60th
Meeting of IWC before the Committee on Natural Resources, 100th Congress, 10 juin 2008 [CMJ, annexe 186]. Voir
aussi l‟opinion du secrétaire de la CBI, M. Gambell, interview du 5 juillet 2010, disponible à l‟adresse
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/talking_point/forum/817116.stm (et onglet no 67 du dossier des juges).
133
Voir CR 2013/14, p. 71-73, par. 67-73 (Pellet) ; voir aussi, par exemple, Chair‟s Report of the 58th Annual
Meeting, Annual Report of the International Whaling Commission 2006, p. 23 (CMJ, annexe 65). Voir aussi Revised
Chair‟s Report of the 60th Annual Meeting, Annual Report of the International Whaling Commission 2008, p. 28 (CMJ,
annexe 67).
134
Voir, par exemple, Chair‟s Report of the 61st Annual Meeting, Annual Report of the International Whaling
Commission 2009, p. 8 (les italiques sont de nous) (CMJ, annexe 68).
135
Voir par. 12 ci-dessus.
- 53 -
CBI sur ces questions ne saurait en aucune manière être considérée comme une façon de saper
l‟objectif de la convention136.
Et on voit mal en quoi le refus du Japon d‟appliquer les
recommandations de la commission en limitant ses recherches à des méthodes exclusivement non
létales, pourrait s‟analyser en un manquement à son obligation de bonne foi137.
41. Monsieur le président, nous rejoignons pleinement à cet égard la position récemment
rendue publique par la Norvège :
«The decision-making powers regarding the taking of whales for scientific
purposes rest with the State party concerned and not with any organ under
the 1946 Convention. This is not the same as leaving the issue unregulated. The State
concerned has to issue the appropriate regulations, within its own domestic legal
system while acting in good faith in the application of Article VIII. The State party
concerned will also have to take into account any advice provided by the Scientific
Committee under Article VI  such advice, however, being recommendations, as
opposed to decisions or injunctions.»138
42. C‟est que, et nous ne le méconnaissons nullement, la qualité de membre d‟une
organisation internationale entraîne des obligations pour les Etats membres et, sur le principe, le
Japon n‟a pas de querelle avec l‟affirmation de M. Gleeson selon laquelle il a l‟obligation «to give
a degree of consideration to the Guidelines and Resolutions of the IWC, and to the reports of its
Scientific Committee»139 ; et cela vaut pour tous les Etats membres, y compris d‟ailleurs
l‟Australie. Toutefois, comme le professeur Lowe l‟a rappelé ce matin, on ne saurait confondre ce
devoir de coopérer de bonne foi avec une obligation de se plier à des textes dépourvus de valeur
obligatoire140. Comme sir Hersch Lauterpacht l‟a expliqué en des termes admirables dans son
opinion individuelle jointe à l‟avis de 1954 dans l‟affaire de la Procédure de vote  que
M. Gleeson a mentionnée sans la citer141 :
«[Un] Etat n‟est donc pas tenu de se conformer à une résolution particulière lui
recommandant de prendre ou de s‟abstenir de prendre une mesure législative ou
administrative donnée. ... Ce qu‟on a contesté  et je crois à juste titre  (c‟est
136
CR 2013/7, p. 22, par. 12, p. 22, par. 33 (Campbell) ; ibid., p. 61, par. 65 (Boisson de Chazournes).
137
Voir CR 2013/8, p. 31, par. 19 (Gleeson). Voir aussi CR 2013/11, p. 36, par. 37-38 (Gleeson).
138
Written question from Terje Aasland (A) to the Minister of Fisheries and Coastal Affairs, answered:
20 June 2013 by the Minister of Fisheries and Coastal Affairs, Lisbeth Berg-Hansen (les italiques sont de nous),
disponible
à
l‟adresse
http://www.regjeringen.no/en/dep/fkd/Whats-new/News/2013/scientific-research-onwhales.html?id=731449.
139
CR 2013/11, p. 25, par. 2 (Gleeson).
140
Ibid., p. 27, par. 9 (Gleeson).
141
Ibid., p. 35, par. 36, note 56 ; voir aussi CMJ, p. 375, par. 8.67.
- 54 sir Hersch qui parle mais je pourrais tout à fait me rallier à cela), c‟est son droit
d‟ignorer purement et simplement les recommandations et de s‟abstenir de fournir des
raisons pour ne pas leur donner effet ou pour ne pas les soumettre à examen en vue de
leur donner effet.»142
43. Partie à la convention et membre de l‟organisation, le Japon doit, certainement, coopérer
de bonne foi avec elle  et il l‟a fait comme je l‟ai montré il y a quelques instants en répondant
aux anathèmes de M. Gleeson, et comme cela ressort aussi, plus positivement, de son attitude
constante, dont je ne peux que donner quelques exemples, s‟ajoutant à ceux qu‟a présentés ce matin
Yukiko Takashiba.
44. Monsieur le président, ce n‟est pas un secret : la CBI va mal ; des mots comme
«impasse»143 («deadlock)», ou «effondrement»144 («collapse») sont souvent prononcés à son sujet.
Certains Etats, et non des moindres, ont choisi de sortir du système conventionnel : c‟est le cas de
l‟Islande (même si elle y est revenue, mais dans des conditions particulières) et du Canada ; et,
aujourd‟hui, le Danemark envisage sérieusement de se retirer145. Le Japon a choisi de rester
membre, alors même que ses intérêts ont rarement été pris en considération et ses droits bien
souvent bafoués. Non seulement il est resté partie à la convention, mais encore il a participé
activement et loyalement à la quasi-totalité des activités de l‟organisation. La seule exception
étant, je l‟ai dit, le comité de la conservation dont la création a été imposée suite à l‟initiative de
Berlin.
45. Le Japon est en effet, sans aucun doute, l‟un des membres les plus actifs aussi bien de la
commission elle-même que du comité scientifique.
Il a constamment participé, de manière
constructive, à toutes les discussions sur le RMS (le «Revised Management Scheme»)146, y compris
aux rencontres des groupes techniques et des comités de rédaction, au sein desquels il a
fréquemment soumis des propositions accommodantes147 dans l‟espoir que ce schéma revisé, qui
142
Procédure de vote applicable aux questions touchant les rapports et pétitions relatifs au Territoire du
Sud-Ouest africain, avis consultatif, C.I.J. Recueil 1955, opinion individuelle de M. Lauterpacht, p. 118-119.
143
Voir, par exemple, Cristian Maquieira, Viewpoint: Decision time for whale conservation, 7 juin 2010,
disponible à l‟adresse http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/8726319.stm.
144
Voir, par exemple, résolution 2006-1, «St. Kitts and Nevis Declaration», (onglet no 70 du dossier des juges du
Japon).
145
Letter regarding Aboriginal Subsistence Whaling from the Government of Denmark, 1 er juillet 2013, doc.
IWC.CCG.1064,
disponible
à
l‟adresse
http://iwc.int/cache/downloads/c0mqq34ohp4ck8ccko084ko0k/
Letter%20from%20Denmark%20to%20IWC%20Greenland%20asw.pdf.
146
Voir http://www.iwcoffice.org/rmp.
147
Voir exemples dans le CMJ, p. 386, par. 8.74.
- 55 était menacé d‟enlisement, pourrait être mis en place effectivement 148. Un consensus était en vue
lorsque l‟exercice a été torpillé par l‟Australie dans les conditions que vous savez149.
46. Autre exemple : le Japon est, aussi, l‟un des participants les plus actifs à ce que, dans le
jargon de la CBI, on appelle «the Future of the IWC process»150  «l‟avenir de processus CBI».
Ce processus, qui s‟est poursuivi entre 2007 et 2010, visait à aboutir à des propositions
consensuelles pour faire face aux défis affrontés par la CBI et créer un climat positif en son sein.
Le Japon a participé à tous les groupes de travail créés dans ce cadre et son attitude a été louée
en 2010 par le président du groupe de soutien, l‟ancien premier ministre néo-zélandais,
sir Geoffrey Palmer :
«Sir Geoffrey Palmer, as Chair of the Support Group, reviewed the extensive
work undertaken since 2007 when the diplomatic process to resolve the impasse had
commenced. He particularly paid tribute […] to Japan for their huge commitment and
their willingness for compromise»151.
J‟aimerais bien que l‟on nous trouve des citations du même genre s‟agissant de l‟Australie.
J‟ai dit qu‟il s‟agissait du rapport de sir Geoffrey, mais en fait il s‟agit du rapport de la commission
rapportant les propos de sir Geoffrey.
47. Sur le fond, à maintes reprises, le Japon a fait de réelles concessions, toujours dans le but
de créer une atmosphère propice à un dialogue constructif. Ainsi, depuis 2007, le Japon a décidé
de ne pas prélever de baleines à bosse dans le cadre de son programme scientifique, alors même
qu‟il existe de fortes présomptions que cela n‟aurait en aucun cas pu affecter l‟état du stock152. Et,
cette année encore, le Japon a indiqué que : «it will continue to suspend the capture of humpback
148
Voir les exemples donnés au paragraphe 8.73 du CMJ.
149
Voir par. 12 ci-dessus.
150
Voir http://iwcoffice.org/future.
151
Chair‟s Report of the 62nd Annual Meeting, Annual Report of the International Whaling Commission 2010,
p. 8 (les italiques sont de nous), disponible à l‟adresse http://www.iwcoffice.org/chairs-reports.
152
Chair‟s Report of the 60th Annual Meeting, Annual Report of the International Whaling Commission 2008,
p. 27, disponible à l‟adresse : http://www.iwcoffice.org/chairs-reports. Voir aussi «Japanese Special Permits in the
Southern Ocean: Clarification of suspension of take of humpback whales», IWC Circular Communication to
Commissioners and Contracting Governments IWC CCG 976, SB/JAC/31457 (16 décembre 2011), (CMJ, annexe 125).
Voir aussi CMJ, par. 5.80 et note 740.
- 56 -
whales for the forthcoming season as long as progress is being made with the IWC normalisation
process»153.
48. D‟une manière générale, les concessions du Japon dans le cadre du processus concernant
l‟avenir de la CBI ont été considérables154. Et l‟on peut noter aussi qu‟en 2009, le Japon avait fait
part, au sujet  un autre sujet  de la création du sanctuaire dans l‟Atlantique Sud, qu‟il considère
pourtant comme incompatible avec la convention, puisqu‟elle ne se base pas sur des données
scientifiques relatives au stock155, de sa «willingness to compromise on these activities»156.
49. Au surplus  et ceci est conforme au devoir de coopération des Etats membres d‟une
organisation internationale, lorsqu‟il a rejeté certaines recommandations et il l‟a fait comme je l‟ai
dit, le Japon s‟en est toujours expliqué.
50. D‟une façon générale, son opposition s‟explique par la conviction que ces résolutions
violent les termes de l‟article VIII.
51. Ainsi, en 1996, le Japon a produit une analyse juridique expliquant de manière précise
les raisons pour lesquelles il considérait certaines résolutions qui condamnaient JARPA ou JARPN
comme ultra vires157. Ce document, qui reste d‟actualité, est reproduit sous l‟onglet no 68 du
dossier des juges. Juste pour donner un autre exemple : en 2005, le délégué du Japon a justifié
l‟opposition de son pays à un projet australien de résolution condamnant JARPA II en faisant valoir
que :
«it contravened certain elements of the Convention, e.g. that science should be the
basis for decision-making and the clear rights provided under Article VIII (…) Japan
considered that denying the right to lethal research was a value judgement and an
153
Simon Brockington, Executive Secretary, Circular Communication to Commissioners and Contracting
Governments, 3 janvier 2013, doc. IWC.CCG.1040, disponible à l‟adresse http://iwc.int/cache/downloads/
acwmk3ii6f40s0sckc4wk8484/IWCCCG1040.pdf.
154
Opening Statement of Japan to the 62nd Annual Meeting of the International Whaling Commission, Agadir,
Maroc, 21-25 juin 2010, doc. IWC/62/OS Japan. Voir aussi Opening Statement of Japan to the 61st Annual Meeting of
the International Whaling Commission, Madeira, Portugal, 22-26 juin 2009, doc. IWC/61/OS Japan).
155
CMJ, p. 123, par. 3.68-3.69.
156
Chair‟s Report of the 61st Annual Meeting, Annual Report of the International Whaling Commission 2009,
p. 11 (CMJ, annexe 68).
157
Doc. IWC/48/36 (CMJ, annexe 145). Voir aussi Verbatim Record (24-28 June 1996), p. 85 (CMJ, annexe 37).
- 57 imposition of others‟ ethical positions and that science and international law should
prevail over emotion.»158
52. Ceci, qui aussi notre thèse ici, me paraît résumer assez bien l‟ensemble des griefs que le
Japon adresse à ce qu‟il n‟est pas exagéré d‟appeler les «résolutions australiennes», qui
condamnent JARPA II, sans se préoccuper des appréciations du comité scientifique, des
explications du Japon, ni de la conformité de ces textes avec la convention.
53. Or ils ne sont pas conformes à la convention, et ce, pour de multiples raisons qu‟il n‟est
peut-être pas inutile de résumer ; elles ont été exposées tout au long de ce premier tour, mais qu‟il
n‟est donc pas inutile de résumer en cette fin de premier tour :
 les résolutions contestées entendent réduire à néant le pouvoir d‟appréciation reconnue aux
gouvernements participants en vertu de l‟article VIII de la convention159 ;
 elles ont été adoptées sans, et souvent contre, l‟avis du comité scientifique ; ces tentatives de
marginalisation des avis scientifiques en général et de ceux du comité scientifique en
particulier ont été relevées et critiquées160 par nombre d‟Etats, et pas seulement ceux qui
pratiquent la chasse à la baleine161 ; or, Monsieur le président, l‟action de la commission doit –
«doit», et pas «peut»  être inspirée exclusivement par des considérations de nature objective
et scientifique, comme cela résulte non seulement des paragraphes 3 et 4 de l‟article VIII, mais
aussi des articles IV, V (paragraphe 2 b) en particulier) et VII, et non pas être fondées sur une
politique d‟hostilité de principe à la chasse baleinière arrêtée en fonction de tous autres
critères ;
158
Chair‟s Report of the 57th Annual Meeting, Annual Report of the International Whaling Commission 2005,
p. 38-39 (CMJ, annexe 64). Pour d‟autres exemples, voir aussi Chairman‟s Report of the 38th Annual Meeting, 1988,
p. 11-15 ; Chairman‟s Report of the 43rd Meeting, 1992, p. 14 (CMJ, annexe 52) ; Verbatim Record (24-28 June 1996),
p. 85 (CMJ, annexe 37) ; Chair‟s Report of the 55th Annual Meeting, Rapport annuel de la CBI, 2003, p. 30 (CMJ,
annexe 63).
Chair‟s Report of the 57th Annual Meeting, 2005, p. 32, 51, disponible à l‟adresse
http://iwc.int/cache/downloads/8xit4w2bpascwowwwokc0kgw8/CHAIRS%20REPORT%202005.pdf ; Chair‟s Report of
the
59th
Annual
Meeting,
2007,
p. 40,
disponible
à
l‟adresse
http://iwc.int/cache/downloads/1tj1d77imcm8cgo8oo8s8w8kg/CHAIRS%20REPORT%202007.pdf ; Chair‟s Report of
the
64th
Annual
Meeting,
2012,
p. 53–54,
disponible
à
l‟adresse
http://iwc.int/cache/downloads/2c2s83sna8ro40s0ookoggogk/IWC64%20Chair%27s%20Report.pdf.
159
Voir CR 2013/13, p. 65, par. 15 (Pellet).
160
Voir CMJ, p. 119, par. 3.58, p. 121, par. 3.64 ; voir aussi l‟analyse du professeur William T. Burke de
l‟Université de Washington, produite par le Japon : «The Legal Invalidity of the IWC Designation of the Southern Ocean
sanctuary», IWC/50/37(1998), p. 316 (CMJ, annexe 147).
161
Chairman‟s Report of the Forty-Sixth Annual Meeting, 1995, p. 29 (CMJ, annexe 54). Voir aussi Verbatim
Record (24-28 June 1996), p. 86 (Japon) (CMJ, annexe 37) ou Chairman‟s Report of the Forty-Ninth Annual Meeting,
1998, p. 38 (CMJ, annexe 57).
- 58  en outre, ces résolutions ont souvent été votées à de courtes ou très courtes majorités, sans
jamais tenir aucun compte de l‟avis des Etats favorables à une chasse durable à la baleine162 ;
54. Lorsque ces résolutions dépassent le cadre tracé à la CBI par la convention, un Etat partie
a non seulement le droit de ne pas la respecter, mais il a également le devoir de s‟opposer à son
adoption, en expliquant bien sûr les raisons de sa position. Chaque Etat partie est gardien de
l‟intégrité de la convention qui ne prévoit pas de mode particulier de règlement des différends et il
lui appartient de défendre et expliquer sa position juridique, ce que le Japon a toujours fait.
B. La bonne foi piégée du Japon
55. Cette position ouverte et tolérante n‟a guère été payée de retour. Et c‟est sur cette note
un peu amère et désabusée que je crois devoir terminer, Monsieur le président. Car, dans cette
discussion sur la bonne foi, il y a un autre aspect qui mérite, je crois, quelque attention : il tient à ce
que la bonne foi du Japon a été abusée. Repassons rapidement en revue la chronologie  si bien
décrite avant hier par Payam Akhavan163 :
 1979, conversion de l‟Australie à la défense des baleines «en soi», marquée notamment par le
rapport Frost164 ;
[Projection n° 3 : Evaluation exhaustive du moratoire (1990 ?).]
 1982 : adoption du moratoire, lequel précise «la présente disposition sera régulièrement
soumise à un examen fondé sur les meilleurs avis scientifiques et, d’ici 1990 au plus tard, la
commission procédera à une évaluation exhaustive des effets de cette mesure sur les
populations de baleines et envisagera le cas échéant de modifier cette disposition pour fixer
d‟autres limites de capture»165 Peut-être n‟est-il pas inutile de rappeler qu‟avant l‟adoption du
moratoire, le comité scientifique a exprimé de forts doutes quant à l‟opportunité et au
bien-fondé scientifique de la mesure ? «The Scientific Committee [a]greed that at the present
time there is no biological requirement for the imposition of a blanket moratorium on all
162
CR 2013/13 (Pellet).
163
CR 2013/12, p. 49-55, par. 36-56 (Akhavan).
164
Whales and Whaling, Vol. 1, Report of the Independent Inquiry conducted by The Hon. Sir Sydney Frost,
(Australian Government Publishing Service, Canberra 1978), Frost Report (dossier des juges du Japon, onglet no 20).
165
Paragraphe 10 e) du règlement annexé à la convention, Onglet no 2 du dossier des juges du Japon.
- 59 commercial whaling (…) A majority further considered that for the same reason there is, at
present, no biological justification for such a blanket moratorium»166.
 1987 : fort de l‟assurance qu‟un réexamen exhaustif aurait lieu au plus tard en 1990, le Japon,
sous la pression des Etats-Unis, renonce à son objection et accepte le moratoire167 ;
 en même temps, et dans l‟esprit du moratoire, dont le maintien, l‟abrogation ou
l‟assouplissement devait être «fondé sur les meilleurs avis scientifiques», le Japon lance
JARPA, indispensable pour compenser la perte de données scientifiques résultant de la
suspension de la chasse commerciale168.
Je vous rappelle que juste avant, alors même
qu‟existait la chasse commerciale, le Japon autorisait, dans le cadre de permis scientifique, la
prise moyenne d‟environ deux cents baleines par an ;
 1990 se passe sans que l‟évaluation exhaustive annoncée ait lieu ;
 certes, afin d‟essayer de trouver un moyen d‟établir des limites de chasse qui ne nuisent pas
aux stocks, le comité scientifique a adopté en 1992, la RMP169 ; mais au sein de la commission,
la majorité a ignoré ce que l‟on pouvait considérer comme un pas en avant et multiplié les
obstacles à sa mise en œuvre, notamment en bloquant l‟adoption du RMS170, j‟en ai déjà
beaucoup parlé ; l‟Australie a joué un rôle de premier plan dans cet échec ;
[Fin de la projection 3.]
 2006 : la résolution 2006-1, appelée la déclaration de Saint-Kitts-et-Nevis, dont on n‟a
peut-être pas suffisamment parlé durant ce premier tour de plaidoiries, tire la sonnette d‟alarme
et souligne l‟impasse à laquelle conduit le maintien indéfini du moratoire et note :
«that the moratorium which was clearly intended as a temporary measure is no longer
necessary, that the Commission adopted a robust and risk-averse procedure (RMP) for
calculating quotas for abundant stocks of baleen whales in 1994 and that the IWC‟s
own Scientific Committee has agreed that many species and stocks of whales are
abundant and sustainable whaling is possible»;
166
IWC, Twenty-Fourth Report of the Commission, 1974, p. 48.
167
CMJ, par. 3.47.
168
Voir aussi CR 2013/14, p. 70, par. 65 (Pellet) et CR 2013/14, p. 56-57 (Walløe).
169
Chairman‟s Report of the Forty-Third Annual Meeting, Rep. int. Whal. Commn 42, 1992, p 18 (CMJ,
annexe 52). Voir aussi résolution 1994-5, Resolution on the Revised Management Scheme, disponible à l‟adresse
http://iwc.int/cache/downloads/f01vgs991uogwg0o0ogws84ss/Resolution%201994.pdf ; (CMJ, par. 3.81-3.84).
170
Voir CR 2013/12, p. 51, par. 43-48 (Akhavan).
- 60 -
Moreover, the Commission declares that it is : «Concerned that after 14 years of discussion and
negotiation, the IWC has failed to complete and implement a management regime to regulate
commercial whaling», and the Commissioners
«Declare [their] commitment to normalising the functions of the IWC based on
the terms of the ICRW and other relevant international law, respect for cultural
diversity and traditions of coastal peoples and the fundamental principles of
sustainable use of resources, and the need for science-based policy and rulemaking
that are accepted as the world standard for the management of marine resources.»171
 Et c‟est à cette condition qu‟a été enclenché le processus sur l‟avenir de la CBI172 ; mais
l‟Australie refuse de s‟engager dans cette voie qui vise pourtant à éviter l‟effondrement de
l‟organisation.
56. Et nous en sommes toujours là. Le moratorium s‟éternise alors qu‟on devait le revoir
en 1990 ; le comité scientifique évalue JARPA puis JARPA II de manière globalement favorable ;
sans égard pour ces avis, la commission exprime, plus ou moins vivement selon les années, des
critiques à l‟encontre de ces programmes ; et ... rien ne se passe ; les engagements de réexamen du
moratoire ne sont pas tenus en dépit des efforts du Japon pour évaluer, scientifiquement, la
possibilité d‟une reprise, limitée, de la chasse commerciale de certaines (ou d‟une) espèce(s) de
baleines. Dans ce refus de toute avancée, l‟Australie a toujours joué un rôle majeur  et sans
doute décisif. Où est la mauvaise foi, Monsieur le président ?
57. Mr. President, this leads me to completing Professor Iwasawa‟s answer to one of the two
questions asked yesterday by Judge Bhandari.
As he explained, the quote from the
Director-General of the Japan Fisheries Agency reported at paragraph 5.108, page 244, of
Australia‟s Memorial must be understood with the context I have just described.
The
Director-General said that, in a proper translation, «[t]he implementation of scientific whaling was
viewed as the only method available to pass on with the traditions of whaling». When this
statement was done, Japan had just accepted the moratorium  which was supposed to be
provisional and the end of which was conditioned by «the best scientific advice».
In this
perspective, it was clear that scientific research establishing that stocks of certain species of whales
were abundant, thus making sustainable whaling possible, was, as the Director-General said, «the
171
Résolution 2006-1, St. Kitts and Nevis Declaration, onglet no 70 du dossier des juges du Japon.
172
Pour une description sommaire, voir le site Internet de la CBI : http://iwc.int/future.
- 61 -
only method available to carry on with the traditions of whaling». I would respectfully suggest that
this is, by no means, in contradiction with the good faith doctrine. On the contrary, this declaration
bears witness of the faith of Japan that its contribution to scientific research would contribute to the
lifting of the moratorium.
Conclusion
58. Monsieur le président, il existe, au sein de la CBI, une fâcheuse tendance à forcer le vote
sans poursuivre la discussion, ou rechercher le consensus. Par le vote de ces résolutions, les Etats
opposés à toute forme de chasse à la baleine ont cherché à imposer leurs vues à l‟importante
minorité ne la partageant pas. C‟est là, pour reprendre la fameuse maxime de Tocqueville, une
forme de «despotisme de la majorité»173, peut-être acceptable, à défaut d‟un moins mauvais
système, dans les pays démocratiques, mais clairement intolérable dans les relations entre Etats
souverains, au sein d‟une organisation internationale à laquelle aucun pouvoir supranational n‟a été
conféré.
59. On ne peut, Monsieur le président, venir reprocher au Japon de ne pas respecter des
textes qui, non seulement ne sont pas obligatoires, mais qui sont au surplus contraires au texte
même de la convention. L‟Australie et, d‟une façon générale, tous les Etats opposés par principe à
la chasse à la baleine l‟ont reconnu, ce qui les a conduits, sans succès d‟ailleurs, à proposer
d‟amender la convention.
En se conformant à celle-ci, qui est la loi des parties et de la
commission, le Japon n‟abuse d‟aucun droit ; il en use.
Ceci, Monsieur le président, conclut les plaidoiries du Japon pour ce premier tour de
plaidoiries. Au nom de toute notre délégation, je tiens, Mesdames et Messieurs de la Cour, à vous
exprimer notre vive reconnaissance pour votre écoute attentive. Avec un peu d‟avance, je vous
souhaite un très bon week-end.
Le PRESIDENT : Merci beaucoup, Monsieur le professeur. Ceci met fin au premier tour des
plaidoiries du Japon, mais pas encore fin à l‟audience de cet après-midi. A few Judges have
173
Alexis de Tocqueville, De la démocratie en Amérique, t.1, Paris, Flammarion, 1981, p. 230.
- 62 -
questions, so I will call them in the order of seniority. First, Judge Greenwood. You have the
floor, Sir.
Judge GREENWOOD: Thank you, Mr. President. I have two questions for Japan. First,
“(1) What emerged from Japan‟s analysis of the results from JARPA that led it to conclude
that the sample size for Antarctic minke whales employed in JARPA was inadequate
and that it was necessary to employ in JARPA II a much larger sample size for
Antarctic minke whales, while the sample size for humpback and fin whales was to
remain unchanged?”
Secondly,
“(2) Why did Japan proceed with the higher JARPA II sample size for Antarctic minke
whales before the Scientific Committee had had the opportunity to study the final
results from JARPA?”
The PRESIDENT:
Thank you, Judge Greenwood.
I shall now give the floor to
Judge Donoghue. You have the floor, Madam.
Judge DONOGHUE: Thank you, Mr. President. My question is for Japan.
“Today, tab 58-12 of the judges‟ folder contains some information about
Japan‟s catch levels before the moratorium. I would like some more precise
information, please, as follows. For the ten years before the commercial moratorium
took effect for Japan, what was the annual commercial catch of each of the three
JARPA II target species (minke whales, fin whales and humpback whales) by
Japanese vessels in the JARPA and JARPA II research areas? If it is not possible to
give a precise answer as to the JARPA and JARPA II research areas, please provide
annual catch figures for each species with respect to a larger area, e.g., the Southern
Hemisphere. In such a case, you are invited to offer any observations about the extent
to which one can extrapolate from catch figures relating to the larger area, in order to
gain an appreciation of the pre-moratorium catch figures relevant to the JARPA and
JARPA II research areas.”
Thank you.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Judge Donoghue, and I give the floor to Judge Gaja. You
have the floor.
- 63 -
Judge GAJA: Thank you, Mr. President. My question is addressed to both Parties and to the
intervening State. It is as follows:
“If a whaling programme is both for purposes of scientific research and for
commercial purposes, what are the applicable rules according to the ICRW?”
Thank you.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Judge Gaja. The written text of these questions will be sent
to the Parties and the intervening State as soon as possible.
With respect to the question put to Australia, Australia is invited to reply orally to the
questions during the second round of oral argument.
New Zealand is invited to reply to
Judge Gaja‟s question orally next Monday. Japan is then free during its second round of oral
argument to comment on the replies of Australia and New Zealand.
With respect to the questions put to Japan, Japan is invited to reply orally to these questions
during the second round of oral argument. Australia is invited to submit any written comments
which it may wish to make on that reply not later than 19 July 2013. Any written comment which
the intervening State may wish to make on the replies provided by the Parties to the question of
Judge Gaja must be submitted not later than 19 July 2013.
This brings to an end today‟s sitting. The Court will meet again on Monday, 8 July between
10 and 11.30 a.m. to hear New Zealand give its oral observations on the subject-matter of its
intervention.
Thank you, the Court is adjourned.
___________
Non corrigé
Uncorrected
CR 2013/17
International Court
of Justice
Cour internationale
de Justice
LA HAYE
THE HAGUE
YEAR 2013
Public sitting
held on Monday 8 July 2013, at 10 a.m., at the Peace Palace,
____________________
VERBATIM RECORD
____________________
ANNÉE 2013
Audience publique
tenue le lundi 8 juillet 2013, à 10 heures, au Palais de la Paix,
________________
COMPTE RENDU
________________
-2Present:
President Tomka
Judges Owada
Abraham
Keith
Bennouna
Skotnikov
Cançado Trindade
Yusuf
Greenwood
Xue
Donoghue
Gaja
Sebutinde
Bhandari
Registrar Couvreur

- 14 -
The PRESIDENT: Please be seated. Good morning. The sitting is open. The Court meets
this morning to hear New Zealand give its oral observations on the subject-matter of its
intervention. Thus I shall now give the floor to Dr. Ridings, the Agent. You have the floor,
Madam.
Ms RIDINGS:
[Slide 1: logo]
1. Mr. President, Members of the Court, it is a great honour and privilege for me to appear
before this Court on behalf of my country.
2. Mr. President, New Zealand appears here today because of our systemic interest in
ensuring that the Convention at issue in this dispute is properly interpreted and applied.
3. New Zealand was a founding member of the International Whaling Commission and
participates actively in its work. We recognize that this Court’s decision will have significant
implications for all members of the IWC. As a party to the Convention we wish to place before the
Court what we believe to be the correct interpretation of the obligations under the Convention. In
doing so, we acknowledge that the points we make may differ in substance or in emphasis from
those of the Parties  that is entirely to be expected.
4. At the same time, we accept that we will be bound by the construction of the Convention
that the Court determines in this case. But we are confident that the Court will be mindful of the
need for the members of the IWC to work together constructively in the future  and, to that end,
that its decision will assist in bringing about a meaningful and effective settlement to this
long-standing issue.
Historical context
5. Mr. President, this case takes place within its distinct historical context. An understanding
of this context is key to the interpretation of the Convention. Whaling in the Antarctic has had a
chequered and controversial past. Rampant over-exploitation, particularly prior to World War II,
led to significant declines in whale stocks. Calls to take international action to address this came in
- 15 -
the early 1930s. [Slide 2: quote] Let me recall the words spoken by the British Minister at the
opening of the International Conference on Whaling in 1937, which is on the screen in front of you:
“The path of conservation is beset by many difficulties, but as we are all
gathered to pursue a common object, I hope that your united efforts will find a way
through or over these difficulties, and that we may reach an agreement which will be
beneficial for all of us, and which because of its reasonableness and its practical
character, may induce those who are not with us today to work with us in the near
future.”1
6. Those words are as true today as when they were spoken in 1937. [Slide 3: logo] While
an Agreement was reached at the 1937 Conference, the Final Act foreshadowed that the purpose of
the agreement could be defeated by unregulated whaling by other countries2. And it was. It was
not until the post-World War II era that the time was ripe for countries involved in whaling to come
together  in the words of its US sponsor  to advance the “international cooperative effort in
whale conservation”3.
The result of their common endeavour was the conclusion of the
Convention and the establishment of the International Whaling Commission.
7. During the initial years of the IWC, the action taken to protect whale stocks may be
characterized as too little, too late. Professor Iwasawa characterized the 1960s as the “heyday of
commercial whaling”4, but it was this insensitivity to conservation that was one of the principal
reasons for New Zealand’s decision to leave the IWC in 19685. The failure to conserve whales led
to strong international concern, not only for whale stocks, but for the conservation and management
of shared resources. The IWC responded positively to these concerns in recognition of the fact that
natural resources are not unlimited. It was this responsiveness, and the confidence that the IWC
could fulfil its objective of collective regulation, that led New Zealand to re-join in 19766.
However the collective sense of optimism that followed the 1982 commercial moratorium, and the
1
Minister’s Speech at the Opening of the Conference, International Conference on Whaling I.C.W./1937/3; CMJ,
Vol II, Ann. 7, p. 101.
2
Final Act of the Agreement for the Regulation of Whaling, 1937, (1940) 34 AJIL, p.112; CMJ, Vol. II, Ann. 13,
p. 119.
3
International Whaling Conference, Washington DC, 1946, Minutes of the Opening Session, IWC/11;
20 Nov. 1946; CMJ, Vol. II, Ann. 16, p. 129.
4
CR 2013/16, p. 28, para. 40 (Iwasawa).
5
International Whaling Commission, Verbatim Records, IWC 28 21-25 June 1976, pp. 10-14, at
http://download.iwc.int/verbatim/pdf/VR_1976_28th.pdf (accessed 29 June 2013).
6
Ibid.
- 16 -
Japanese withdrawal of its objection to the moratorium in 1986, was soon dispelled by the decision
of Japan to initiate the JARPA programme in 1987.
8. Japanese special permit whaling continues to be controversial within the IWC, not least
because of the decision to proceed ahead with JARPA II, without a proper review of JARPA. The
common purpose of those parties, which came together in 1946 to conclude the Convention, has
been overshadowed by this controversy. And it is inhibiting the effective operation of the IWC.
9. Mr. President, this historical context informs the understanding of the object and purpose
of the Convention, and is central to this case. The drafters of the Convention intended to replace
unilateral whaling with a system of collective regulation. This object and purpose will be expanded
upon by the Attorney-General. He will also address the role of Article VIII within this system of
collective regulation, and the central requirement that Article VIII permits whaling only “for
purposes of scientific research”.
10. I will then address two further requirements placed on Contracting Governments which
issue special permits under the Convention. These are that the number of whales to be killed under
special permit must be necessary and proportionate, and that the Convention imposes a duty of
meaningful co-operation upon those Governments.
11. Mr. President, Members of the Court, I thank you for your attention. I now request that
you give the floor to the Attorney-General, the Honourable Christopher Finlayson.
The PRESIDENT:
Thank you very much, Madam.
Now I call on the Honourable
Christopher Finlayson, Attorney-General of New Zealand. You have the floor, Sir.
Mr. FINLAYSON:
THE OBJECT AND PURPOSE OF THE CONVENTION AND THE ROLE OF ARTICLE VIII
FOR SCIENTIFIC RESEARCH
1. Mr. President, Members of this Court, this is the first time I have had the honour to appear
before this Court, and I have the particular privilege to do so as counsel on behalf of my country.
2. Mr. President, Article VIII, and particularly the first paragraph of that Article, is at the
heart of the legal dispute in this case. My task today is to address the role of that provision within
- 17 -
the Convention as a whole. That is, a provision that was created exclusively for, and limited to, the
purposes of genuine scientific research, that forms an integral part of the Convention, and that must
necessarily be interpreted and applied in a manner consistent with the Convention as a whole.
3. I will address three points:
(a) First, the object and purpose of the Convention, which is to establish a system of collective
regulation for the conservation and management of whales;
(b) Second, the role of Article VIII as an integral part of that system of collective regulation; and
(c) Third, the requirement that whaling under Article VIII be conducted exclusively “for purposes
of scientific research”.
The object and purpose of the Convention
4. I turn first to the object and purpose of the Convention.
5. Mr. President, the Agent has outlined the historical context to the development of the
Convention. The Convention arose from the recognition by its negotiating parties that they had a
shared interest in the long-term future of whale stocks. That shared interest could never be secured
by individual States acting alone. As the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries show, the
unrestricted freedoms of the high seas descended into the tragedy of the commons. The negotiating
States recognized that the only way to achieve the long-term future of whale stocks was to work
together. Putting aside their individual interests, the negotiators of the Convention decided to
replace unilateral whaling with a system of collective regulation. They agreed to constrain their
traditional high seas freedoms through a system of joint co-operation, so as to provide for the
proper long-term conservation and management of whales.
The object and purpose recorded in the Preamble to the Convention
6. The object and purpose is clearly recorded in the Preamble to the Convention. [Slide 4:
Preamble]
7. Paragraph 1 begins by recognizing “the interest of the nations of the world in safeguarding
for future generations the great natural resources represented by whale stocks”.
8. The Preamble then records that: “it is essential to protect all species of whales from
further over-fishing”; that whale stocks may be restored “if whaling is properly regulated”; that
- 18 there is a “common interest” in the revitalization of whale stocks; and, therefore, that “whaling
operations should be confined”.
9. The objective of the negotiating parties in light of those considerations was clear. As
stated in paragraph 6, they desired “to establish a system of international regulation for the whale
fisheries to ensure proper and effective conservation and development of whale stocks”.
10. To that end, the Preamble concludes, the parties “decided to conclude a convention to
provide for the proper conservation of whale stocks and thus make possible the orderly
development of the whaling industry”.
11. Mr. President, Japan has tried to make much of that final preambular paragraph. In their
submission everything turns on the final clause and the words “and thus”.
Under Japan’s
interpretation, the object and purpose of the Convention is contained in those ten words, so that the
Convention is solely a vehicle for the “optimum utilization” of whales through commercial
whaling7  nothing more than an industry “cartel”8.
12. To adopt that reading would be to distort the sense of the Preamble as a whole. It
extracts those few words from the Preamble at the expense of everything that comes before  not
least the preceding paragraph, which is clear that the objective of the parties was to “establish a
system of international regulation of the whale fisheries to ensure proper and effective conservation
and development of whale stocks”. “Whale stocks”, that is, not “the whaling industry”. [Slide 5:
logo]
13. The object and purpose of the Convention thus cannot be reduced to the protection of
commercial whaling. States may have, and do have, differing individual interests with respect to
whales and whaling. The purpose of the Convention was to provide a system through which those
individual interests could be managed and resolved in the light of the greater shared interest of the
parties in the long-term future of whale stocks. That shared interest would be achieved not through
unilateral action, but by a comprehensive system of collective regulation.
7
CMJ, para. 6.11; WOJ, para. 19; CR 2013/13, p. 59, para. 63 (Boyle).
8
CR 2013/12, p. 44, para. 19 (Akhavan).
- 19 14. That system is not “super-imposed on a pre-existent freedom of whaling” as Japan seeks
to persuade you9. It represents a conscious and deliberate decision on the part of its parties to
constrain that freedom, so as to secure their shared interest in the long-term future of whale stocks.
The object and purpose reflected in the scheme and structure of the Convention
15. That object and purpose is also reflected in the scheme and structure of the Convention
as a whole.
16. The Convention covers all whaling by its parties, whether it is industrial commercial
whaling, aboriginal subsistence whaling, or whaling for the purposes of scientific research10.
A collective organization is established to set the rules under which whaling may be conducted:
the International Whaling Commission11. Membership of the Commission is universal. It is open
for all countries to join, whether they have a whaling industry or not12. The Commission is
empowered to adopt regulations to control whaling activities13 and to make recommendations “on
any matters which relate to whales or whaling”14. In so doing , the Commission must consider a
wide range of factors15. All decisions of the Commission are taken collectively by a vote of its
members16. And the regulations so adopted are binding on members of the Commission17. This is
far from a “tyranny of the majority” as Japan has repeatedly alleged18. To the contrary, a specific
reservation mechanism has been included in the Convention so that a member may opt out of a
decision where it feels that its individual interests have not been sufficiently protected19. That is
the proper mechanism for a State to use where it disagrees with a decision of the Commission.
9
WOJ, para. 28.
10
Art. I (2) of the Convention and the Schedule to the Convention.
11
Arts. III and V of the Convention.
12
Arts. III and X (2) of the Convention.
13
Art. V (1) of the Convention.
14
Art. VI of the Convention.
15
16
Art. V and VI of the Convention.
17
Arts. V (3) and Art. IX of the Convention.
18
CMJ, para. 8.101. See also: CR 2013/12, p. 55, para. 57 (Akhavan); CR 2013/16, p. 61, para. 58 (Pellet).
19
- 20 -
17. Mr. President, those are all of the hallmarks of a collective regulatory régime established
to manage the interests of States in relation to common shared stocks.
If the goal of the
Convention were to protect the whaling industry rather than whale stocks, it would have been
structured quite differently. Its membership would be limited to States with an established whaling
industry. Decisions under the Convention would be guided solely by industrial considerations.
The Commission’s functions would centre on economic and financial forecasting and analysis. In
short, it would look something like the OPEC Statute20.
18. But the IWC is not OPEC. It does not look like OPEC and it does not make the same
kind of decisions. That is because it is not an industry cartel. To the contrary, the Convention was
the first multilateral instrument to have expressly recognized the “interest of the nations of the
world” in the proper long-term conservation and management of whale stocks.
19. In light of that interest, whatever their individual interests in whales, parties to the
Convention have agreed to work collectively through the Commission and abide by the obligations
they have assumed, whether they see whales as an industrial commodity, or as living beings of
value in their own right.
Role of Article VIII within the Convention
20. Mr. President, those obligations include those contained in Article VIII, to which I now
turn.
21. I will make four points:
(a) First, Article VIII forms an integral part of the system of collective regulation under the
Convention, not a free-standing exemption from it.
(b) Second, it provides for Contracting Governments to issue special permits subject to three
requirements: they must be issued “for purposes of scientific research”; subject to restrictions
as to number; and in accordance with the Convention, including paragraph 30 of the Schedule.
20
Statute of the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (2006 revision), available at:
http://www.opec.org (accessed on 7 July 2013).
- 21 -
(c) Third, the power to issue a special permit must be exercised for the specific purpose for which
it is given, in a reasonable way and consistent with the object and purpose of the Convention.
It cannot be used to undermine or circumvent the other obligations of the Convention.
(d) Finally, whether those requirements have been met is not subject to any margin of appreciation
on the part of the State issuing the special permit, but is a simple question of fact to be
determined by the Court in the ordinary way.
Article VIII forms an integral part of the Convention
22. Special permit whaling under Article VIII is part of the fabric of the Convention. It is
one of several designated mechanisms for the collection of scientific information relevant to the
Commission’s work21. As such, it does not stand alone as a “free-standing” or “self-contained
regime” independent of the Convention as Japan attempts to argue22.
23. Nor is Article VIII simply an “affirmation” of a right existing under the freedom of the
high seas23. The freedoms of the high seas are, without question, principles of the greatest pedigree
and importance. But they are not the principles in question in this case. The freedoms of the high
seas may be exercised only to the extent that they have not been constrained by other, more
specific, rules of international law24. In this case, those rules are found in the Convention and,
specifically, in Article VIII. That is the provision which Japan has repeatedly invoked as the legal
justification for its whaling activities and that is the provision at the centre of this case.
24. As an integral part of the Convention, Article VIII must be interpreted and applied
consistently with the Convention’s other provisions.
It is not a carte blanche allowing a
Contracting Government to side-step the rest of the Convention and the other obligations it has
21
See also Arts. IV, VII and VIII (3) & (4).
22
CMJ, p. 299, para. III.6 and para. 7.8.
23
WOJ, para. 51; CR 2013/15, p. 15, paras. 7-8 (Lowe).
24
See, for example, Art. 87 of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.
- 22 -
assumed. The parties to the Convention have themselves unanimously confirmed their acceptance
of this point25.
25. This is, and always has been, New Zealand’s interpretation of Article VIII26. Consistent
with that interpretation, New Zealand put forward informal proposals for discussion in 2005 to
amend Article VIII27. Those proposals sought to constrain more closely the conditions under which
special permits could be issued, in the interests of the proper operation of the Convention as a
whole.
26. The integral role of Article VIII within the Convention is apparent from the structure of
the Article itself. [Slide 6: Art. VIII] Article VIII has four paragraphs. Only the first two relate to
special permits. Paragraphs 3 and 4 are broader in scope, relating to scientific information acquired
by Contracting Governments more generally. Paragraph 3 includes a specific obligation to report
all scientific information to the Commission. On its own terms Article VIII ties directly into the
work of the Commission and the system of collective regulation established by the Convention.
27. The integral role is also apparent from the obligations in the Convention for a
Contracting Government to submit any special permit to the Scientific Committee for review and
comment before it is issued28, to notify the Commission once the special permit has been issued29,
and to transmit the results of the research to the Commission once it has been completed30.
[Slide 7: logo] Far from being a “self-contained regime”, special permits under Article VIII are
inextricably linked to the role of the Commission and the rest of the Convention. That is further
reflected in the Commission’s active attention to special permits since the earliest days of its work,
monitoring the purpose for which special permits have been issued, the type and the value of the
25
IWC Resolution 1986-2 “Resolution on Special Permits for Scientific Research” at preambular paragraph 5:
“WHEREAS the killing, taking and treating of whales for purposes of scientific research should only be undertaken in a
manner consistent with the principles and in accordance with the provisions of the Convention.”; MA, Ann. 43, Vol. II,
p. 148.
26
Statement by New Zealand, Chairman’s Report of the 40th Annual Meeting, Rep. Int. Whal. Commn. 39, 1989,
p. 11: “It considered that the rights under Article VIII are not unfettered and must be exercised in good faith and in light
of
other
provisions
of
the
Schedule.”
http://iwc.int/cache/downloads/71ca0bcvz44kocs4wgkskggwo/
IWC_1989_Thirty-Ninth%20Report%20of%20the%20Commission.pdf.
27
WOJ, para. 24 and Ann. 4.
28
Paragraph 30 of the Schedule to the Convention.
29
Art. VIII (1) of the Convention.
30
Art. VIII (3) of the Convention.
- 23 research to be conducted, and the number of whales to be killed31. That practice provides critical
context to, and reinforces the interpretation of Article VIII.
Special permits are not an “exemption” from the Convention
28. Japan has put forward a strained interpretation of Article VIII that highlights snippets of
the language of the provision at the expense of the whole. It attempts to sew together three pieces
of language from the first sentence of paragraph 1 of the Article to construct a blanket exemption
from the rest of the Convention, those being the phrases “notwithstanding anything contained in
this Convention”, “as the Contracting Government thinks fit”, and “shall be exempt from the
operation of the Convention”32.
29. Those three phrases need to be given their ordinary meaning in their context. When the
first sentence of paragraph 1 of Article VIII is read in its natural sense, it contains three distinct
elements:
(a) [Slide 8:
Art. VIII (1)]
First, the phrase:
“Notwithstanding anything contained in this
Convention any Contracting Government may grant to any of its nationals a special permit
authorizing that national to kill, take and treat whales for purposes of scientific research.”
Contrary to Professor Pellet’s assertion33, the phrase “notwithstanding anything contained in
this Convention” is not an overarching chapeau to the Article as a whole. It clearly attaches
only to the words that follow it: “may grant to any of its nationals a special permit”. The
phrase enables the Contracting Government to issue a special permit for the specific purposes
of “scientific research” despite the other rules of the Convention. In that sense it forms a
limited exception, as Australia has described to you34. But it provides no greater exemption
from the obligations of the Convention than that.
(b) [Slide 9: Art. VIII (1)] Next, the paragraph reads “subject to such restrictions as to number
and subject to such other conditions as the Contracting Government thinks fit”.
31
WON, paras. 90-93.
32
CMJ, paras. 7.8 and 7.11; WOJ, para. 33; CR 2013/13, pp. 61-62, paras. 4, 10 & 11 (Pellet).
33
CR 2013/13, p. 62, para. 6 (Pellet).
34
CR 2013/8 Corr., pp. 42-46, paras. 54-67 (Crawford).
- 24 This is the second element, the requirement to impose conditions, including “restrictions as to
number”, on any special permit that is issued. Again, it is clear that the words “as the
Contracting Government thinks fit” attach only to this element. They do not create a general
exemption allowing the Contracting Government to do “whatever it thinks fit” under the
Article.
(c) [Slide 10: Art. VIII (1)] Finally, the paragraph provides that “the killing, taking and treating of
whales in accordance with the provisions of this Article shall be exempt from the operation of
this Convention”.
The text does not say that “special permit whaling is ‘exempt from the operation of this
Convention’”, as Japan would read it35. To the contrary, only the killing, taking and treating of
whales “in accordance with the provisions” of Article VIII is exempt from the ordinary rules of
the Convention. Far from creating a blanket exemption, the words create an obligation on the
Contracting Government to act “in accordance with the provisions” of Article VIII when
issuing a special permit. [Slide 11: logo]
Requirements on special permits under Article VIII
30. Article VIII contains three narrowly framed obligations on a Contracting Government
seeking to issue a special permit:
(a) First, it must do so for the specified and articulated “purposes of scientific research”.
(b) Second, it must set restrictions on the number of whales to be taken or killed under that special
permit.
(c) Third, it must issue a special permit only “in accordance with the provisions of [Article VIII]”,
including, as the Agent will outline to you shortly, the provisions of paragraph 30 of the
Schedule to the Convention and the duty of meaningful co-operation they entail.
31. Whether a Contracting Government has met those obligations is a simple question of
compliance with its treaty obligations. As such, it is a question that must be determined by this
Court. The Court made that principle clear in the La Grand case36, among others37.
35
CMJ, para. 7.8.
36
La Grand (Germany v. United States of America), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2001, pp. 485-486, para. 52.
- 25 No margin of appreciation
32. Japan has rightly conceded that Article VIII “does not establish a completely
unreviewable and self-judging right”38. But its observations do not explain what constraint, other
than outright arbitrariness, applies. In fact, Japan suggests that any such review is circumscribed
by deference to “a margin of appreciation in cases such as this”39. What “cases such as this” may
be is left unexplained. Similarly, Japan’s assertion that the margin of appreciation must be a
generally applicable “axiom of international law and relations” is also unsupported. Despite its
reference to “extensive jurisprudence on the subject”, no citation to any decision of this Court is
given in support of the existence of such an “axiom”40.
33. The reason for that is clear. There is no decision of this Court to support Japan’s
proposition. Indeed, outside of the specific context of the European Court of Human Rights, there
is no widespread acceptance of a separate doctrine of “margin of appreciation” as a general
principle of international law.
The one judicial decision cited by Japan  the Hormones
case  does not even use the term. Its reasoning turns on considerations specific to the provision
and Agreement in question in that case41.
Article VIII must be applied for its specific purpose, reasonably, and consistent with the
object and purpose of the Convention
34. Rather than importing a “margin of appreciation”, this Court need only rely on its own
principles of interpretation and application. As a first principle, the Court has stated on numerous
occasions that a provision must be applied in a reasonable manner. That principle is confirmed in
37
See, e.g., Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2003,
p. 161.
38
WOJ, para. 9.
39
WOJ, para. 9.16.
40
Ibid., see also footnote 1104 and para. 9.7.
41
United States – Continued Suspension of Obligations in the EC – Hormones Dispute, WT/DS320/AB/R
(16 Oct. 2008).
- 26 the case of the Rights of Nationals of the United States of America in Morocco42, Barcelona
Traction43, and Gabčíkovo44 to name but a few.
35. Closely linked with the principle of reasonableness, this Court has required that a power
must also be exercised properly, that is, for the purpose for which it has been given45. Similarly,
this Court has repeatedly emphasized the principle of effectiveness  that a power must not be
exercised in a manner that would undermine the object and purpose of provisions of the treaty as a
whole46.
36. On the basis of fundamental principles of interpretation relied upon by this Court,
Article VIII must be applied for its stated purpose, “scientific research”, “in a reasonable way”, and
in such a manner that the purpose of the Convention can be realized. Article VIII cannot be
applied to permit whaling where the effect of that whaling would be to circumvent the other
obligations of the Convention, or to undermine its central objective.
37. Mr. President, that conclusion is a straightforward application of established principles of
interpretation as stated by this Court. To interpret Article VIII as providing a special margin of
appreciation to a Contracting Government, placing it beyond the ordinary review of the Court,
would be inconsistent with this Court’s established jurisprudence.
38. It would also be inconsistent with Article VIII and the Convention itself. Such an
interpretation would have to read something into the language of Article VIII that is not there in the
text. It would be inconsistent with the structure of the Convention, which clearly establishes a link
between the Commission and special permit research. And it would be fundamentally inconsistent
with the object and the purpose of the Convention. Creating such a loophole in the middle of its
42
Rights of Nationals of the United States of America in Morocco (France v. United States of America),
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1952, p. 212.
43
Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v. Spain), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1970,
p. 48, para. 93.
44
Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1997, pp. 78-79, para. 142.
45
Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (Djibouti v. France), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2008, p. 229, para. 145; Dispute regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua),
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2009, p. 241, para. 61.
46
See, for example, Territorial Dispute (Libyan Arab Jamahiriya/Chad), Judgment, I. C. J. Reports 1994, p. 25,
para. 51.
- 27 -
carefully constructed system of collective regulation would effectively destroy the Convention
altogether.
Whaling “for purposes of scientific research”
39. Mr. President, I now turn to the central requirement of Article VIII, that a special permit
must be issued “for purposes of scientific research”. I will address three points:
(a) First, Article VIII requires that whaling be conducted exclusively “for purposes of scientific
research”.
(b) Second, whether a programme of whaling is “for purposes of scientific research” is a factual
question to be objectively determined by the Court in the usual way.
(c) Third, that objective determination can be ascertained from the programme’s scale, its
structure, the manner in which it is concluded and its results.
Scientific research is the only purpose permitted under Article VIII (1)
40. It is clear from the language of the Article that “scientific research” is the only and
exclusive purpose for which a special permit may be issued. Using the words of this Court in the
Navigational and Related Rights case: “expressly stating the purpose for which a right may be
exercised implies in principle the exclusion of all other purposes”47.
41. The test to be met is not whether “scientific research” is a purpose of the whaling
programme. Any whaling programme has the potential to deliver some scientific information,
hence the reporting requirements of Article VIII, paragraphs 3 and 4, and the detailed requirements
of Part VI of the Schedule. The distinction between special permit whaling and other whaling
under the Convention is that special permit whaling is authorized exclusively “for purposes of
scientific research”. The test is whether “scientific research” is the only purpose for which the
whaling is conducted.
42. To respond to the question raised by Judge Gaja on this point48, if a programme of
whaling is designed for, or directed towards, achieving commercial purposes, even in part, it cannot
47
Dispute regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2009,
p. 241, para. 61.
48
CR 2013/16, p. 63.
- 28 -
claim to be special permit whaling under Article VIII. The other rules of the Convention regarding
commercial whaling, including the regulations in the Schedule, would therefore apply.
43. Japan itself has accepted this point49. But it has tried to use the provision in Article VIII,
paragraph 2, to avoid its application. Paragraph 2 can be read to allow the sale of whales killed
under special permit, although it certainly does not require such sale as Japan implies50. But that is
a statement of permitted incidental consequence, not of purpose. Paragraph 2 says nothing about
why whales may be killed. That statement is contained in paragraph 1 of the Article, which states a
single purpose for which whales may be killed under special permit. That purpose is “scientific
research”. If whales are killed for the sale of their meat, then their killing is not exclusively for
“scientific research” and must, on any ordinary meaning of the words, be “commercial”.
Purpose is a matter of fact to be determined objectively
44. The purpose for which a special permit is issued is the first question to be determined
under Article VIII. Whether a special permit is “for purposes of scientific research” cannot be
determined simply by deferring to the stated intention of the Contracting Government issuing it. It
is clear from the language of the provision that Article VIII is not “self-judging” in that sense.
Again, to borrow from the words of the Court, this time in the Nicaragua case, “the text does not
refer to what the party ‘considers necessary’ for that purpose”51.
45. The question is not whether a Contracting Government has determined correctly that its
whaling is “for purposes of scientific research” as Japan would like to frame it 52. The question is
whether the whaling has in fact been conducted exclusively for those purposes.
46. How is the Court to approach that question? The answer is, as it always does, by
assessing the evidence before it. There is nothing special about Article VIII in this respect. The
purpose for which whaling is conducted can be determined by the Court just as it determines any
other question of compliance with international obligations. Science, Professor Pellet says, “est
49
WOJ, para. 9.
50
CR 2013/13, p. 64, para. 15 (Pellet).
51
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America), Merits,
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, p. 141, para. 282.
52
WOJ, para. 53.
- 29 une ignorance qui se sait”53. But there can be little doubting the observation of the Nobel laureate
Sir Peter Medawar that “research is surely the art of the soluble”54. It is in that practical spirit that
the words “scientific research”  like any other words in a treaty  can be interpreted and applied
by this Court. To borrow the Court’s words from the LaGrand case: “The exercise of this
function, expressly mandated by Article 38 of its Statute, does not convert this Court into a court of
appeal . . .”55 Japan seeks to obfuscate the point by raising illusory arguments about standards and
intensity of review56, and issues of “science policy”57, for which it offers no authority. To the same
end, Japan seeks to question the ability of the Court to perform its judicial function58. In short, it
attempts by another means to turn Article VIII into a self-judging provision, despite its disclaimer
of that purpose elsewhere in its observations.
47. Mr. President, Japan further attempts to convert Article VIII into a self-judging provision
by suggesting that New Zealand is seeking to “reverse the burden of proof under international
law”59. But to the contrary, New Zealand leaves the burden of proof where it naturally falls. As
stated in the Nicaragua case: “Ultimately, . . . it is the litigant seeking to establish a fact who bears
the burden of proving it.”60 Consistent with that principle, this Court has also recognized in the
ELSI case that it falls to the party invoking the protection of a provision to establish that provision
properly applies61.
In this case, Australia alleges that Japan has breached the Convention’s
prohibitions on commercial whaling, and Japan has invoked Article VIII in its defence. That
includes the onus to convince the Court that its whaling was, in fact, conducted “for purposes of
53
CR 2013/12, p. 23, para. 1 (3) (Pellet).
54
New Statesman, 19 June 1964, reproduced in Robert Andrews (ed.), New Penguin Dictionary of Modern
Quotations (Penguin, London, 2003).
55
La Grand (Germany v. United States of America), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2001, p. 486, para. 52.
56
WOJ, paras. 54-57; CR 2013/15, p. 15, para. 15 (Lowe).
57
WOJ, para. 58; CR 2013/15, p. 19, para. 24 (Lowe).
58
WOJ, para. 58; CR 2013/15 p. 19, para. 26 (Lowe).
59
WOJ, paras. 43-47.
60
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of America),
Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1984, p. 437, para. 101.
61
Elettronica Sicula S.p.A (ELSI) (United States of America v. Italy), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1989, pp. 47-48,
paras. 62-63. See also Bin Cheng General Principles of Law as Applied by the International Courts and Tribunals, 1953,
pp. 326-335.
- 30 scientific research”. It is the role of the Court, in turn, to reach its own determination as to whether
Japan has done so.
48. The WTO Appellate Body wrestled with the task of determining objectively the purpose
for which a measure had been taken in the Japan Alcohol case62. In that case, the Appellate Body
looked to “the design, the architecture, and the revealing structure of a measure”, giving “full
consideration to all the relevant facts and all the relevant circumstances in any given case”63.
49. That approach provides some useful signposts for the Court to follow. Whether or not a
programme is “for purposes of scientific research” can be determined from its “design, architecture
and revealing structure” or, to put it another way in the scientific context, its “methodology, design
and characteristics”. That determination is made by giving full consideration to all relevant facts
and circumstances.
50. Further signposts can be found in the work of the International Whaling Commission
itself. The IWC has adopted a series of Resolutions in relation to special permit whaling, many by
consensus64.
51. In response to a question from Judge Greenwood65, New Zealand does not assert that
those Resolutions are themselves legally binding texts. But they do have two consequences. First,
they provide valuable guidance as to how the parties themselves have interpreted “scientific
research” under Article VIII. As such, they are legitimate interpretative aids of the kind frequently
relied upon by this Court in accordance with the rules of Articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties66. Together, they describe the conditions that the parties to the
Convention themselves consider that “scientific research” under Article VIII must meet.
52. Second, the duty of meaningful co-operation requires that a Contracting Government
must give due account to those conditions. Japan says it has no quarrel with that proposition67.
Japan  Taxes on Alcoholic Beverages, Report of the Appellate Body, WT/DS8/AB/R, WT/DS10/AB/R,
WT/DS11/AB/R (4 Oct. 1996), p. 29.
62
63
Ibid.
64
WON, paras. 55-60.
65
CR 2013/12, pp. 63-64.
66
WON, para.11 and the authorities cited therein.
67
CR 2013/16, p. 43, para. 18 (Pellet).
- 31 -
Where a proposed special permit programme has not met those conditions, the members of the
Commission are entitled to expect it will not proceed without amendment or further dialogue. That
expectation has been expressed repeatedly by the Commission in numerous Resolutions68.
53. The precise language of the Commission’s Resolutions and guidelines may have changed
over time, but their essence has been consistent throughout. [Slide 12: criteria] That can be
distilled to the following elements:
(a) First, “scientific research” must be specifically defined. The aims, methodology and samples to
be taken must be adequately specified.
(b) Second, the research must be “essential for rational management, the work of the Scientific
Committee or other critically important research needs”.
(c) Third, the research must identify a question and the methodology and sample size used must be
“likely to provide reliable answers” to that question.
(d) Fourth, it must avoid lethal research methods, giving preference to “non-lethal methods”.
(e) Fifth, it must be conducted without having an “adverse effect on the stock”.
54. These elements can be traced through numerous IWC Resolutions, particularly
Resolutions 1986-2, 1987-1, 1995-9, and 1999-2. The language you see in front of you is a useful
distillation prepared by the IWC Secretariat itself69, with references to the original texts. Copies of
the Resolutions themselves are in your judges’ folders at tabs 12 to 15. It is simply not correct to
state that Annex P has revoked those Resolutions as Professor Boyle asserted70. The Commission
made no such statement when it adopted Annex P71, as it has expressly done on other occasions. In
any event, Annex P was adopted in 2008, three years after the commencement of the programme at
the centre of this case.
68
WON, note 195.
69
See website of the International Whaling Commission “Scientific Permit Whaling: Scientific Committee
Review” http://iwc.int/permits (accessed on 7 July 2013).
70
CR 2013/15, p. 55, para. 38 (Boyle).
71
Chair’s Report of the 60th Annual Meeting, Report of the International Whaling Commission, 2008, p. 26,
para. 10.1.2.
- 32 The purpose of a programme of whaling emerges from a consideration of its scale, its structure,
the manner in which is conducted, and its results
55. The Court’s assessment of whether a particular programme of whaling is conducted
exclusively “for purposes of scientific research” can be determined by considering a range of
factors. [Slide 13: factors]
56. A first factor to look at is the scale of the programme. That is, the type and the number
of the whales to be killed. It will be relevant for the Court to consider the evidence before it as to
how that number was arrived at. Likewise, it will be relevant to compare the number of whales to
be killed to the levels of other catch under the Convention, including both commercial and special
permit catch prior to the introduction of the moratorium. Similarly, the Court may find it helpful to
consider any comments made by the scientific experts in relation to the number of whales to be
killed.
57. A second factor to consider is the structure of the programme.
Here, relevant
considerations include the timing of commencement and the stated duration of the programme, its
objectives, and how these relate to the work of the Scientific Committee. Other relevant factors
include the organization that carries out the whaling, how it is funded, what other scientific
research it conducts  if any  and the professional background and qualifications of the
personnel involved.
58. A third factor to consider is the manner in which the programme is conducted. The
Court may question whether a programme has been conducted “for purposes of scientific research”
if it is instituted using lethal research techniques at the expense of available non-lethal alternatives,
particularly where other members of the Commission have demonstrated that those lethal
techniques may be unnecessary and are unlikely to deliver any meaningful results. The Court
should also have regard to the fact that the whaling is carried out in previously valuable
commercial whaling grounds now specifically set aside by the Commission as a sanctuary for the
protection of whales.
59. Finally, it is also important to look at the results of the programme. The utility of the
data obtained will be relevant here. Similarly, a relevant consideration will be what happens to the
whales once they have been killed. For example, are they sold on the commercial market?
- 33 -
60. Full consideration must be given to all these factors. The assessment must be made as a
whole. Those factors that reflect purely scientific requirements must be balanced against those that
reflect commercial considerations. Where there is direct evidence that a programme has been
structured to take account of economic considerations, then that evidence would strongly militate
against the programme being one exclusively “for purposes of scientific research”.
61. For example, serious questions would arise as to whether a programme of special permit
whaling were exclusively “for purposes of scientific research” if:
 it was commenced at exactly the point that the door was closed to commercial whaling;
 it was conducted in the same whaling grounds, using the same vessels, and the same personnel
as prior commercial whaling;
 it was entirely isolated from other research programmes and institutions;
 meat from the whales killed was sold on the commercial market to generate revenue;
 the number of whales to be killed under the special permit was significantly in excess of the
levels set in special permits by other States; and
 expert witnesses had questioned the scientific basis for that number.
[Slide 14: logo]
62. The task of assessing the application of Article VIII to the facts in this case lies beyond
New Zealand’s role as intervener. That is for the Court. I cannot describe the task more clearly
than the members of the Commission have put it themselves: whaling under special permit must be
“conducted solely in accordance with scientific requirements”72 and “in a manner consistent with
the principles and in accordance with the provisions of the Convention”73.
Conclusion
63. Mr. President, Members of the Court, the Convention is a collective enterprise, in
recognition of the shared interest of its parties in the long-term survival of whale stocks. Under
that collective enterprise, parties to the Convention have agreed to conduct all of their whaling
activities in accordance with the Convention’s rules.
72
IWC Resolution 1985-2, “Resolution on Scientific Permits” (adopted by consensus), para. 4.
73
IWC Resolution 1986-2, “Resolution on special permits for Scientific Research (adopted by consensus), at
preliminary paragraph 5; MA, Vol. II, Ann. 43, p. 148.
- 34 -
64. Those rules include specific rules around the provision of special permits for the
purposes of scientific research, set out in Article VIII. Article VIII is not a “stand-alone régime”.
It is not an exemption from the Convention. It is an integral part of the Convention’s system of
collective regulation.
65. To reiterate, Article VIII, paragraph 1, allows for a Contracting Government to issue
special permits subject to three requirements: first, the special permit must be issued exclusively
“for purposes of scientific research”; second, it must be issued subject to restrictions as to number;
and, third, it must be issued consistent with the procedural requirements of paragraph 30 of the
Schedule, and the duty of meaningful co-operation they entail.
66. In accordance with the established principles of interpretation applied by this Court,
Article VIII must be applied in a reasonable way, consistent with its purpose of scientific research,
and in accordance with the object and purpose of the Convention as a whole. No margin of
appreciation exists that allows it to be used to side-step the other rules of the Convention, or to
undermine the management measures that have been adopted under it. Whether Article VIII has
been applied properly in a particular case is a question of fact that is open for the judicial
determination of this Court in the usual way.
67. Mr. President, Members of the Court, thank you for your attention. Mr. President, may I
invite you to call on the Agent to address the two further requirements of Article VIII, and so to
conclude New Zealand’s observations.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Sir. And I give the floor to the Agent of New Zealand. You
have the floor, Madam.
Ms RIDINGS:
NECESSITY, PROPORTIONALITY AND THE DUTY
OF MEANINGFUL CO-OPERATION
1. Mr. President, Members of the Court, the Attorney-General has explained the key
requirement of Article VIII that whaling under special permit must be conducted exclusively “for
purposes of scientific research”. My presentation will address the two remaining elements of
Article VIII:
- 35 -
(a) first, the requirement that a Contracting Government that issues a special permit must restrict
the number of whales to be killed under that permit; and
(b) second, that such a Contracting Government must first discharge its duty of meaningful
co-operation with the IWC.
Setting the number of whales that may be taken
under special permit
2. Turning to the setting of the number of whales that may be killed under special permit,
Article VIII, paragraph 1, requires that special permits are to be granted “subject to such
restrictions as to number and subject to such other conditions as the Contracting Government thinks
fit”. As Japan has accepted, this obliges the Contracting Government to set a limit on the number
of whales to be killed74. Japan also accepts that the number must be set at a level that will not have
an adverse effect on the status of the stocks75. It further concedes that this discretion is “not wholly
unlimited  it is not a blank cheque”76.
3. These points are therefore not in contention. However, what is in contention is how the
number is to be determined, and whether that determination is entirely self-judging and completely
beyond the review of this Court. In light of your decision in the Mutual Assistance case77 that
cannot be so. The number should be determined objectively in accordance with the ordinary rules
of interpretation. As I will explain, this means that the following factors must be taken into
account:
(a) first, the number of whales killed must be the lowest necessary for, and proportionate to, the
purposes of scientific research;
(b) as a consequence, there is an expectation that non-lethal methods of research will be used;
(c) third, the number of whales to be killed must be set at a level which takes into account the
precautionary approach; and
74
WOJ, para. 9.
75
Ibid, para. 9.
76
Ibid, para. 65.
77
Certain Questions
I.C.J. Reports 2008, p. 177.
of
Mutual
Assistance
in
Criminal
Matters
(Djibouti v.
France),
Judgment,
- 36 -
(d) finally, the discretion to set the number of whales to be killed must be exercised reasonably and
consistent with the object and purpose of the Convention.
The numbers killed must be necessary and proportionate
4. Taking the first point: the number of whales to be killed must be the lowest necessary for,
and proportionate to, the purposes of scientific research. That is, there must be a direct relationship
between the number of whales to be taken and the purposes for which a special permit is granted.
There can be no rationale, other than scientific rationale, for determining the number of whales to
be taken under special permit.
5. Japan claimed in its Written Observations that a requirement that the number of whales
killed must be necessary and proportionate cannot be inferred from the obligation in Article VIII to
impose “restrictions as to number”78. Professor Boyle then accepted that “the number of whales
taken must be ‘necessary and proportionate’ to the objectives of the research”79. He could not do
otherwise. The obligation to set a restriction as to number must be interpreted in light of the
express purpose for which special permits may be issued  “scientific research”. However, what
Professor Boyle fails to appreciate is that the obligation must also be interpreted in light of the
context of Article VIII, which creates a mechanism for parties to the Convention to obtain the
scientific research necessary for the IWC to carry out its functions. And it must be interpreted in
light of the object and purpose of the Convention, namely to replace unilateral whaling with
collective regulation in order to provide for the interests of the parties in the proper conservation
and management of whales. In other words, the sample size must be proportionate to the role of
Article VIII within that system of collective regulation. The collective interest means that the
killing of whales must be justified by the utility of the data obtained for the Commission’s needs.
6. The justification for this is clear. Once a whale has been killed it is gone. It cannot be
used in the future by another Government for research, or for any other purpose. In this way,
killing under special permits directly impacts on the interests of the other parties to the Convention.
78
WOJ, para. 65.
79
CR 2013/15, p. 65, para. 78 (Boyle).
- 37 In a system of collective regulation, those impacts should be kept to a minimum  where they can
be justified as both necessary and proportionate.
7. This interpretation is supported by the Guidelines and Resolutions of the IWC.
[Slide 15: quotes]
They provide evidence of the factors that may be taken into account in
determining whether the number of whales to be killed is necessary and proportionate. At its
Fifteenth meeting in 1963, the IWC agreed that “the numbers shown in each permit should be the
lowest necessary for the purposes indicated in that permit”80. In 1986, it agreed that Contracting
Governments should take into account whether the numbers taken are “necessary to complete the
research”81. These show the need for there to be a direct link between the number killed and the
scientific objectives of the research.
8. But the Guidelines and Resolutions also evidence concern for the broader role of
Article VIII as a mechanism which supports the IWC in carrying out its functions.
[Slide 16: quotes] Thus, in 1986, it was agreed that the numbers of whales that are sacrificed for
the scientific good should “contribute information essential for rational management of the
stock”82. And, in 1987 and 1995, that any lethal programme should address “critically important”
research needs83. [Slide 17: logo]
9. Professor Boyle has criticized New Zealand for not saying anything about the
methodology of calculating sample sizes84. We do not wish to try the Court’s patience by delving
into factual matters. That is not our role as an intervener. We would, however, invite the Court to
look at whether, according to the expert evidence that the Court has heard, there is a clear scientific
reason for the number of whales to be taken.
10. The Court may also wish to look at the scientific research being undertaken, and whether
it will contribute to the operation of the IWC, and not just the interests of one of its members.
80
Chairman’s Report of the 15th Meeting, 15th Report of the Commission, 1965, p. 20, para. 17,
http://iwc.int/cache/downloads/drr7ewtgj88c8ggc0kck8c04w/RIWC15.pdf.
81
IWC Resolution 1986-2 “Resolution on Special Permits for Scientific Research” (adopted by consensus); MA,
Ann. 43, Vol. II, p. 148.
82
Ibid.
83
IWC Resolution 1987-1, “Resolution on Scientific Research Programmes”; MA, Ann. 44, Vol. II, pp. 150-156;
IWC Resolution 1995-9, “Resolution on Whaling under Special Permit”; MA, Ann. 46, Vol. II pp. 153-154.
84
CR 2013/15, p. 65, para 78 (Boyle).
- 38 -
Where, for example, a large number of whales is to be killed in order to establish a fact that is not
in dispute, or to collect information which does not contribute to, nor is relevant for, the
Commission’s central management tool, there must be a question mark over whether that is
necessary and proportionate. An indication that the stock might bear the killing of a certain
number is not in itself a licence for failing to place realistic limits on the number killed for science.
11. Setting the number that is necessary and proportionate requires balancing the means
employed against the end sought. Where the means employed are disproportionate to the actual or
anticipated scientific results, or are not necessary to achieve the objective of the scientific research,
the discretion to set a catch limit has been exercised improperly.
12. Japan seeks to evade this point in its Written Observations by suggesting that the number
of whales to be killed is beyond this Court’s review  claiming it is the technical result of the
application of standard algorithms to the identified research objectives of a particular programme85.
At this hearing Japan presented the formula as proof to the Court, even though counsel for Japan
admits that he does not understand it86. Nevertheless he invites the Court to rely on it. But the
research objectives can be reverse engineered to supply a desired sample size. The assessment of
“necessity and proportionality” is not a technical scientific calculation, as Japan seeks to present it.
To the contrary, “necessity” and “proportionality” are established concepts in international law 
which this Court has applied on numerous occasions, in numerous different factual contexts87. To
concede to Japan’s interpretation is to leave Article VIII wide open. It would render meaningless
and ineffective the obligation to restrict the number of whales to be killed. And it would be
inconsistent with the object and purpose to interpret Article VIII as permitting whales to be killed,
even where that is “unnecessary” or “disproportionate”.
85
WOJ, para. 66.
86
CR 2013/15, p. 63, para. 69 (Boyle).
87
See, for example, Gabčikovo-Nagymaros Project (HungarylSlovakia), Judgment, I. C. J. Reports 1997, p. 7;
Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Uganda),Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
2005, p. 168; Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), Judgment, I. C. J. Reports 2003,
p. 161; Legality of the Threat of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1996, p. 244, para. 30.
- 39 There is an expectation that non-lethal methods of research will be used
13. As a consequence of the requirement that the number taken must be necessary and
proportionate, there is an expectation that non-lethal methods of research will be used wherever
possible. In 1986, the Commission recommended by consensus that Contracting Governments
issuing special permits are to take into account whether “the objectives of the research are not
practically and scientifically feasible through non-lethal research techniques”88.
Annex Y,
applicable to JARPA II, repeats this and further asks “whether the research sought could be
obtained by non-lethal means”89. The 2008 Guidelines also require assessments to be made of the
utility of lethal, compared to non-lethal, methods of research90. It is not a question of what is
workable from a practical or financial perspective, as claimed by Japan91. Rather, it comes down to
the simple proposition that you do not kill whales unless you need to. And you only do so if it is
necessary to answer a research question that is important for conservation and management
purposes.
14. This expectation that non-lethal means will be used wherever possible is supported by a
consistent pattern of IWC Resolutions highlighting the importance of obtaining scientific
information without needing to kill the objects of that research92. The reason for this is clear. The
parties to the Convention have a collective interest in ensuring that whales are not killed
unnecessarily.
The Precautionary Approach applies
15. The expectation that non-lethal methods of research are to be used is reinforced when
recourse is made to general principles of international law. It is widely accepted in international
agreements that Contracting Governments should act with prudence and caution when applying
provisions, such as Article VIII, which may have an effect on the conservation of natural
88
IWC Resolution 1986-2 “Resolution on Special Permits for Scientific Research” (adopted by consensus); MA,
Ann. 43, Vol. II, p. 148.
89
Guidelines for the Review of Scientific Permit Proposals, Ann. Y, “Report of the Scientific Committee”,
J. Cetacean Res Manage. 3 (Suppl.) 2001; MA, Ann. 48, Vol. II, pp. 156-157.
90
“Process for the Review of Scientific Permits and Research Results from Existing Permits” Report of the
Scientific Committee, Annex P, J. Cetacean Res. Manage. II (Suppl.), 2009, 398-401 ; MA, Ann. 49, Vol. II
pp. 158-161.
91
WOJ, para. 63; CR 2013/15, p. 61, para. 64 (Boyle).
92
See MA, Vol. II, Anns. 10-14.
- 40 resources93.
The need for prudence and caution, or for the application of the precautionary
approach, is greatest when the information is uncertain, unreliable or inadequate94.
16. Japan “does not dispute that it should act with prudence and caution” in line with the
precautionary approach95. It concedes that the precautionary approach may be invoked “for the
purposes of interpreting and applying Article VIII and in so far as permissible under the law of
treaties”96. It even argues that JARPA II “supports a precautionary approach” because it entails the
collection of more scientific information97  notwithstanding, I might add, the large number of
whales killed in the process. What Japan forgets, however, is that it is still necessary to be
precautionary in that collection of scientific data. And that data should serve some useful scientific
purpose.
17. A “prudent and cautious” approach would ensure that the number to be taken is
necessary and proportionate, and would give preference to the conduct of non-lethal methods of
research. It does not, contrary to what Japan argues, place the onus on a State to prove a risk of
serious or irreversible harm before the precautionary approach can come into play98. Indeed to do
so would be to eviscerate the precautionary approach of any meaning. To first prove risk of serious
or irreversible harm would eliminate any uncertainty. Yet uncertainty is the very reason for acting
with caution.
18. The need to act with prudence and caution conditions the conduct of JARPA and
JARPA II. Japan has made much of the abundance estimate for minke whales that was agreed by
the Scientific Committee in 201299. But it fails to take into account the uncertainty in stock
abundance that prevailed until that time. And it also fails to take into account the continuing
93
See WON, p. 40, footnote 136.
94
See Southern Bluefin Tuna cases (New Zealand v Japan; Australia v. Japan), Provisional Measures Order,
27 August 1999; (1999) 38 ILM 1624 at para. 7. See also Rio Declaration on Environment and Development, adopted at
the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development on 13 June 1992 (UN doc. A/CONF.151/26 (Vol. 1)),
Principle 15.
95
CMJ, Vol. I, p. 424, para. 9.33.
96
CMJ, Vol. I, p. 298, para. III.3.
97
CMJ, Vol. I, p. 424 para. 9.33.
98
CMJ, Vol. I, pp. 424-425, para. 9.34.
99
CR 2013/15, pp. 65-66, paras. 80-85 (Boyle).
- 41 uncertainty in the abundance of humpback and fin whales100. In those circumstances, New Zealand
should not be required to prove a risk of harm to the stocks before asking Japan to act with
prudence and caution.
A discretion must be exercised reasonably and consistent with its purpose
19. As I highlighted earlier, the crucial difference between New Zealand and Japan is that
Japan considers that it is entirely up to the Contracting Government issuing the special permit to
make the determination of the number of whales necessary for the completion of the proposed
research101. It argues that no other Contracting Government has any say in this. Japan even goes
so far as to eschew a role for this Court in reviewing that determination102. Indeed, while it appears
to accept that a Court could criticize a Contracting Government for making a “clearly arbitrary”
decision103, it nullifies this apparent concession by failing to provide any yardstick by which the
Court could make such an assessment.
20. Japan’s contention that the Court is incapable of such an assessment is clearly
inconsistent with the approach you yourselves have taken. This Court dealt directly with the
review of the exercise of discretionary power in the Mutual Assistance case104. In that case, you
found that the question of whether the requirements for the exercise of a discretion have been met
remains open to the Court’s review to ensure that the discretion is exercised in good faith105. That
in turn requires that the discretion must be exercised for the specific purpose for which it is
given106. To use the words of this Court in Gabčíkovo, the requirement of good faith “obliges the
100
See Report of the Scientific Committee and Annex O1, Report of the Standing Working Group on Scientific
Permits, J. Cetacean Res. Manage. 8 (Suppl.), 2006, 48-52; MA, Vol. II, Ann. 52, pp. 172-182.
101
WOJ, paras. 9 and 64.
102
WOJ, para. 66.
103
WOJ, para. 66.
104
Certain Questions of Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters (Djibouti v. France), Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 2008, p. 177.
105
Ibid., p. 229, para. 145.
106
Ibid. See also Dispute regarding Navigational and Related Rights (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua), Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 2009, p. 213, at p. 241 (para. 61).
- 42 -
Parties to apply [the provision] in a reasonable way and in such a manner that its purpose can be
realized”107.
21. Clearly this is a determination for the Court to make based upon the facts before it.
Procedural obligations
22. Mr. President, Members of the Court, I turn now to the procedural obligations which
must be complied with by a Contracting Government which proposes to issue a special permit. In
this part of my presentation I will review:
(a) First, the specific procedural obligations which a Contracting Government must fulfil in such
circumstances;
(b) Second, the duty of meaningful co-operation which is fundamental to an understanding of the
duties of a Contracting Government; and
(c) Then, the nature of this duty of meaningful co-operation.
Specific procedural obligations
23. Paragraph 30 of the Schedule establishes a prior review mechanism under which the
Scientific Committee is to review and comment on proposals that have been notified to it108. It is a
prior review mechanism of proposals, not an ex post facto review of permits already granted.
Under the Rules of Procedure, the Scientific Committee is to submit reports and recommendations
to the Commission109.
According to Article VI, the Commission may in turn make
recommendations to the Contracting Government in relation to the proposed special permit110.
24. This process of notification, review, reporting, and recommendation is, in essence, a
process of dialogue between those parties seeking to issue special permits and the other parties to
the Convention. It is through such dialogue and consultations that the use of special permits can be
monitored, and the interests of the other parties can be protected. Such a requirement of prior
consultation is  in the words of the late Patricia Birnie  “a natural counterpart of the concept of
107
Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1997, p. 79, para. 142.
108
Para. 30 of the Schedule.
109
Rules of Procedure, Rule M (4) (a).
110
Art. VI of the Convention.
- 43 equitable utilization of a shared resource”111. It is not up to the Contracting Government proposing
to issue a special permit to decide what interests of the other parties will be affected by its
proposals. That is essentially the point made in the Lac Lanoux Arbitration112. Nor can those
interests act as a “veto” on the Contracting Government’s actions113. But, as this Court recognized
in Pulp Mills, it is incumbent on the Contracting Government to undertake genuine consultations in
good faith. Such consultations must not be mere formalities114.
25. In this way, the procedural obligations, to use the words of this Court in Pulp Mills:
“enable the parties to fulfil their substantive obligations”115. In other words, they are a safeguard
which ensures the substantive obligations are complied with. Indeed, that is the very reason for
which the paragraph 30 review mechanism was adopted116.
26. Japan has sought to obscure this by citing Pulp Mills to the effect that a breach of
procedural obligations does not automatically entail the breach of substantive obligations117. That
may be so. But in a system of collective regulation, procedure and substance are intrinsically and
necessarily linked. The procedural obligations serve to prevent parties from acting unilaterally
where to do so would be to undermine the object and purpose of the Convention. The failure to
comply with procedural obligations directly effects the performance by the Contracting
Government of its substantive obligations under Article VIII.
Duty of meaningful co-operation
27. I turn now to the duty of meaningful co-operation.
28. The obligations of notification and consultation under paragraph 30 of the Schedule
provide a specific expression of an overarching duty of co-operation. Japan initially sought to
111
Patricia Birnie, Alan Boyle, Catherine Redgwell, International Law and the Environment, 3rd edition, (Oxford
University Press), 2009, p. 177.
112
Lac Lanoux Arbitration, 24 ILR (1957), 101, p. 119.
113
Ibid., pp. 128-130; 140-141.
114
Ibid., p. 119.
115
Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2010 (I), p 49, para. 78.
116
Report of the Scientific Committee to the 29th Meeting of the Commission, Rep. Int. Whal. Commn. 28, 1978,
p. 41, para. 9.3.2. http://www.iwc.int/annual-reports.
117
As indicated in the Court’s decision in Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2010 (I), p. 49, para. 78.
- 44 -
minimize the role of paragraph 30 by claiming that it merely introduced an obligation of
notification118. It then admitted that paragraph 30 is a “mechanism of co-operation” between
Contracting Governments and the organs of the IWC119. Still later it conceded that a duty of
co-operation arises under the Convention120. It would have been difficult for Japan to do otherwise.
The obligation to co-operate permeates international environmental law. It was recognized in
Principle 24 of the 1972 Stockholm Declaration121 and in the 1982 Law of the Sea Convention122.
And the relevance of the duty of co-operation is clear in light of the view of this Court in
Gabčíkovo that treaties should be interpreted in light of other rules of international law, including
developing environmental norms123.
29. Having conceded a duty of co-operation, Japan attempts to eliminate its application by
claiming that the rights of a Contracting Government under Article VIII cannot be diminished by
any procedure of co-operation124. Professor Pellet restated this in his presentation to you last
week125. However Professor Lowe sought to confuse us by accepting that Japan was bound to
consider and take into account comments provided by the Scientific Committee under
paragraph 30126. This attempts to conceal Japan’s failure to have regard to the proper role of
Article VIII as an integral part of the Convention. Furthermore, it is fundamentally at odds with
the object and purpose of the Convention. The negotiators decided to develop a Convention which
would provide for collective regulation in contrast to unilateral action.
118
CMJ, para. 8.28.
119
CMJ, para. 8.29.
120
WON, paras. 9 and 42.
121
Principle 24, para. 2: “Cooperation through multilateral or bilateral arrangements or other appropriate means is
essential to effectively control, prevent, reduce and eliminate adverse environmental effects resulting from activities
conducted in all spheres, in such a way that due account is taken of the sovereignty and interests of all States.”; United
Nations doc. A/CONF.49/14/Rev. 1, 11 ILM 1421 (1972).
122
Art. 65 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea: “States shall cooperate with a view to the
conservation of marine mammals and in the case of cetaceans shall in particular work through the appropriate
international organizations for their conservation, management and study”.
123
Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1997, p. 7, paras. 112 and 140;
Arbitration regarding the Iron Rhine Railway (Belgium v. Netherlands), PCA (2005), pp. 28-29, paras. 57-60.
124
CMJ, para. 8.12.
125
CR 2013/13, p. 65, para. 18. (Pellet).
126
CR 2013/15, p. 23, para. 46. (Lowe).
- 45 -
30. The duty of co-operation requires that co-operation be meaningful.
This Court
recognized in the North Sea Continental Shelf cases that parties under a duty to negotiate must
conduct themselves so that the negotiations are meaningful127. In its Commentary on the Draft
Articles on Prevention, the International Law Commission commented that even though the Court
spoke of “negotiations” in that case, the good faith requirement applied equally to consultations128.
As consultations and negotiations are but two aspects of an overarching duty to co-operate, a duty
of co-operation must itself also be meaningful.
The nature of the duty of meaningful co-operation
31. There are four aspects to the duty of meaningful co-operation.
32. First, consultation procedures must be allowed to run their course129. There cannot be
meaningful co-operation where a party acts without waiting for the consultation process to be
completed. It would be contrary to the fundamental duty of meaningful co-operation for a party to
initiate a new proposal without receiving and considering a proper scientific review of the earlier
proposal. As I mentioned earlier, one of the reasons that JARPA II has come under such criticism
within the IWC is because it was commenced without Japan waiting for a review by the Scientific
Committee of the results of JARPA130. This was contrary to the requirements of paragraph 30, and
the guidelines developed by the Scientific Committee.
33. Second, in its work on prevention, the International Law Commission confirmed that
meaningful co-operation requires that account be taken of the views and legitimate interests of
others131. This includes a willingness to modify one’s approach in light of the views of others.
Indeed, Japan has conceded this132. The requirement for meaningful consultation does not mean
127
North Sea Continental Shelf (Federal Republic of Germany/Denmark;
Germany/Netherlands), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1969, p. 47, para. 85.
Federal Republic of
128
International Law Commission, “Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm”, Commentary on
Art. 9, p. 161, para. 4.
129
Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay) Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2010 (I), p. 67, para. 147.
130
See Chair’s Report of the 57th Annual Meeting, Annual Report of the International Whaling Commission 2005
p. 5, paras. 37-39; CMJ, Vol. II, Ann. 64, pp. 409-412.
131
International Law Commission, “Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm”, Commentary on
Art. 9, at p. 160, para. 2.
132
WOJ, para. 9.
- 46 that the consulted party has a right of veto over the activity133. However, and this has been made
clear by the International Law Commission, while the party may decide to go ahead, it is still
obliged to take into account the interests of others134. It does not merely have to provide an
explanation for its reasons, as claimed by Japan135. Neither is it sufficient for the Contracting
Government to merely state that the comments of the Scientific Committee have been given due
consideration  as Japan indicates in both its Written Observations136, and even more categorically
in its oral presentation137. It requires that the legitimate interests of the parties can be seen to have
been objectively taken into account. To say otherwise would be to deny paragraph 30 of any
meaning. Rather, the duty of meaningful co-operation ensures that the party  in the words of the
Lac Lanoux Arbitral Panel  gives “a reasonable place to adverse interests”138. Ms Takashiba has
misrepresented our position. It is not a question of bending to the views of others 139. Rather, even
if you disagree with them, those views should be seen to have been taken into account.
34. The third aspect of a duty of meaningful co-operation is that, where a discretion is
exercised, due process must be observed in order to avoid encroaching on the rights of others. As
the WTO Appellate Body has said in the Shrimp/Turtle case: there is a “need to maintain a balance
of rights and obligations between the right of a Member to invoke one or other of the
exceptions . . . on the one hand, and the substantive rights of the other Members . . . on the other
hand”140. The Convention and paragraph 30 establish a role for the Scientific Committee in the
issuance of special permits. It is contrary to due process for the rights of other Contracting
Governments, in the effective functioning of an international organization, to be ignored by a
Contracting Government intent on asserting a unilateral, and unregulated, power to issue special
permits under Article VIII.
133
Lac Lanoux Arbitration, 24 ILR (1957), 101 at pp. 128-130; 140-1.
134
International Law Commission, “Draft Articles on Prevention of Transboundary Harm”, commentary, p. 161,
para. 10.
135
CMJ, Vol. I, paras. 8.63 and 8.76.
136
WOJ, para. 9.
137
CR 2013/15, p. 37, para. 28 (Takashiba).
138
Lac Lanoux Arbitration, 24 ILR (1957), 101 at p. 141.
139
CR 2013/15, p. 35, para. 24 (Takashiba).
140
United States – Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Report of the Appellate Body,
WT/DS58/AB/R, (12 October 1998), para. 156.
- 47 -
35. Finally, the duty of meaningful co-operation requires that a party not only to take into
account the interests of other parties, but to increase the level of engagement where the interests of
those other parties are adversely affected141. Where the co-operation is in respect of a shared
resource, as pointed out by the ITLOS Chamber in the Area Advisory Opinion142, the duty to
co-operate must take into account these shared interests. One party alone cannot dictate how that
shared resource is to be utilized. Indeed, the greater the degree of unilateral action, the greater the
expectation that the views of others will be taken into account.
36. It is therefore incumbent on a Contracting Government issuing a special permit to pay
heed to the concerns of parties, where those concerns have been consistently, and unambiguously,
expressed over a number of years. The resolutions of the IWC on special permit whaling, and on
special permits issued by Japan, provide clear evidence of those concerns. Failure to engage with
those concerns, and the exercise of strident unilateralism in a Convention for collective regulation,
would be contrary to the duty of meaningful co-operation.
37. To return to Judge Greenwood’s question, the IWC Resolutions, while not themselves
binding, in this way give content to the duty of meaningful co-operation. In fulfilling this duty, a
Contracting Government must take into account the interests of others as expressed in the
Resolutions. Contrary to the suggestion of Japan143, New Zealand does not seek to reverse the
burden of proof at international law. But where there is prima facie evidence that other parties to
the Convention consider that their legitimate interests have not been taken into account, the onus is
on a Contracting Government to show that it has done so, and that it has properly fulfilled its duty
of meaningful co-operation.
Concluding Observations
38. Mr. President, Members of the Court, I now wish to make some concluding observations
regarding the issues which New Zealand believes are of critical importance to the correct
construction of the Convention.
141
WON, para. 104.
142
Responsibilities and Obligations of States Sponsoring Persons and Entities with respect to Activities in the
Area, Advisory Opinion, 1 February 2011; (2011) 50 ILM 458 at paras. 147, 148 and 150.
143
WOJ, paras. 43-47.
- 48 -
39. Mr. President, the interpretation of the Convention in this case boils down to a question
of stark choices. Is Article VIII to be interpreted as permitting unregulated and unreviewable
unilateral action, or is it to be interpreted within the context of a system of collective regulation? Is
Article VIII to be interpreted as a stand-alone provision, or as part of the fabric of the Convention
as a whole? Is it a self-judging provision, so that it is purely up to the Contracting Government to
determine the nature, scale and purpose of a special permit? Or are there reasonable constraints
placed upon that Contracting Government which may be objectively determined by this Court?
40. Mr. President, the Convention establishes a system of collective regulation for the
conservation and management of whale stocks. Article VIII must be interpreted in light of that
object and purpose.
41. Article VIII permits the grant of special permits only to take whales “for purposes of
scientific research”. Japan has sought to mystify the determination of what is scientific research,
and to accord for itself the right to decide whether a programme of whaling is for that purpose.
Mr. President, Members of the Court, New Zealand rejects this ousting of your interpretative role
in this case.
42. Even where a Contracting Government issues a special permit “for purposes of scientific
research”, it is still required to ensure that the number of whales to be killed under that permit is the
lowest necessary for, and proportionate to, the scientific purpose, and takes into account the
collective interests of the parties. This is a matter for objective determination in light of the facts,
as evidenced through the Guidelines and Resolutions of the Scientific Committee and the
Commission.
43. There is, in any case, a substantive duty of meaningful co-operation on a Contracting
Government which proposes to issue a special permit. This requires it to show that it has taken into
account the legitimate interests of the other parties to the Convention; that it has balanced the
interests of all the parties in the conservation and management of whale stocks.
44. Finally, I wish to recall the historical context of this Convention  the initial optimism
of a common international endeavour, which was eroded by unilateral action.
New Zealand
believes that this Court is the gateway to the resolution of the dispute over the interpretation of
Article VIII of the Convention. It is only through recourse to international dispute settlement that
- 49 -
the fundamental legal issue, which has hampered the effective functioning of the IWC, can be
resolved.
45. Mr. President, Members of the Court, this concludes New Zealand’s observations on this
case. Thank you for your attention.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you very much, Dr. Ridings. Before concluding this morning’s
sitting, I give the floor to two Judges who have questions. I shall now give the floor to
Judge Cançado Trindade. Judge Cançado Trindade, if you please.
Judge CANÇADO TRINDADE: Thank you, Mr. President. After listening to the arguments
of Australia and Japan, as well as of New Zealand, I have questions to put to the three participating
Delegations, in order to obtain written or oral clarifications from them, on their views as to the
interpretation and application of the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling. My
questions are put, first, to Australia, Japan and New Zealand together; secondly, only to Japan; and
thirdly, only to New Zealand.
- So, first, my questions to Australia, Japan and New Zealand together are the following ones:
- How do you interpret the terms “conservation and development” of whale stocks under the
International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling?
- In your view, can a programme that utilizes lethal methods be considered “scientific research”, in
line with the object and purpose of the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling?
- Secondly, my questions only to Japan are the following ones:
- To what extent would the use of alternative non-lethal methods affect the objectives of the
JARPA-II programme?
- What would happen to whale stocks if many, or even all States Parties to the International
Convention for the Regulation of Whaling, decide to undertake “scientific research” using lethal
methods, upon their own initiative, similarly to the modus operandi of JARPA-II?
- And thirdly, my questions only to New Zealand are the following ones:
- In your view, does the fact that the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling is a
multilateral treaty, with a supervisory organ of its own, have an impact on the interpretation of its
object and purpose?
- You have stated in your Written Observations (of 4 April 2013) that the object and purpose of the
International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling is: “to replace unregulated, unilateral
whaling by States with collective regulation as a mechanism to provide for the interests of the
parties in the proper conservation and management of whales” (p. 16, para. 33). In your view, is
- 50 this a widely accepted interpretation nowadays of the object and purpose of the International
Convention for the Regulation of Whaling? Thank you, Mr. President.
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Judge Cançado Trindade. And now I give the floor to
Judge Charlesworth. Judge Charlesworth, you have the floor.
Judge CHARLESWORTH:
My questions are both of
clarification also. My first question is for Australia.
“Is Australia’s argument that Japan’s conduct of JARPA II is an abuse of right
an alternative to its argument about the proper construction of Article VIII of the
Convention, or is it made on a subsidiary basis to the treaty construction argument?”
And my second question of clarification, Mr. President, is for Japan.
“In Japan’s view, are there any objective elements in the phrase ‘for the
purposes of scientific research’ as used in Article VIII of the Convention, or is the
definition of scientific research solely a matter for the determination of those
Contracting Governments that issue special permits under Article VIII?”
The PRESIDENT: Thank you, Judge Charlesworth. The written text of these questions will
be sent to the Parties and the intervening State as soon as possible. The Parties are invited to
provide a reply orally during the second round of arguments. Japan can present its comments on
replies orally next week. Australia, if it wishes, may submit its brief comments on Japan’s replies
in writing not later than on 19 July 2013. New Zealand is invited to answer the questions in writing
by this Friday, 12 July, by 3 p.m., so that Japan can comment on New Zealand’s replies. And
Australia will be entitled to comment on New Zealand’s answers in a written form by the same
deadline of 19 July 2013. This sitting is adjourned.
The Court rose at 11.40 a.m.
___________

VOLUME II

Transcription

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