Bibliography on the EU budget (Update 2009

Transcription

THE FINANCES OF THE EUROPEAN
UNION
A bibliographic survey
Update 2009-2014
Library
(Stand: 10 September 2014)
The following is an update of the bibliography « The Finances of the European Union : April 2009 ». As in the previous
editions, this bibliographic survey deliberately does not contain any standard press articles, nor official documents from the
Institutions, which would alone have been sufficient subject matter for a large bibliography. Its aim is primarily to record the
"academic" and "scientific literature", but it also does not neglect the more "partisan" publications, reflecting the positions
of certain political circles or interest groups. The theme of the budget is, in fact, far from being a purely "academic" subject,
and this bibliography also contains some more political contributions.
THE FINANCES OF THE EUROPEAN UNION - GENERAL
BACHTLER John, MÉNDEZ Carlos, WISHLADE Fiona.
« Ideas for budget and policy reform : Reviewing the
debate on Cohesion Policy 2014+ ». 2009. 47 p.
(European Policy Research Paper ; 67).
http://www.eprc.strath.ac.uk/eprc/documents/PDF_files/EPRP
_67_Ideas_for_Budget_and_Policy_Reform.pdf
BARBIER-GAUCHARD Amélie, GROUPEMENT D'ÉTUDES
ET DE RECHERCHES "NOTRE EUROPE" (Paris). « Penser le
budget communautaire et les dépenses publiques en
Europe : la nécessité d’une approche agrégée ». Paris :
Notre Europe, 2011. 8 p. (Les Brefs ; 29).
http://www.notreeurope.eu/uploads/tx_publication/Bref29_ABarbierGauchard_F
R.pdf
BAUD Marie-France (dossier coordonné par M.-F. B.).
« Coopérer ou se disloquer: finances publiques
nationales et budget communautaire ». Confrontations
Europe : La revue, 2010, n. 90, avril-juin, p. 21-35.
Contents note : Le pire n'est pas toujours certain / Olivier
Lacoste − « Au fondement des trajectoires de finance
publique : la croissance » : entretien avec Agnès BénassyQuéré / propos recueillis par Olivier Lacoste − L'énigme
de la stratégie allemande pour la consolidation / Thomas
Hanke − La Hongrie n'en a pas fini avec les restrictions /
Zsolt Becsey − La Pologne, un îlot de tranquillité
trompeur / Dariusz Rosati − Sortir du « budget
impossible » / Carole Ulmer − La proposition d'Alain
Lamassoure : entretien avec Alain Lamassoure / propos
recueillis par Carole Ulmer − Refonder le budget
européen / Jacques Le Cacheux − Des pistes pour
favoriser la coopération / Olivier Lacoste. Également
disponible en anglais.
http://www.confrontations.org/fr/nospublications/confrontations-europe-la-revue/154-cooperer-ouse-disloquer-n90-avril-juin-2010
BECKER Peter, PRIMOVA Radostina. « Die Reform des EUBudgets zwischen Modernisierung und Pfadabhängigkeit
: aus Gutachten, Studien und Aufsätzen der Jahre 2006
bis 2008 ». Berlin : Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik
http://www.swp(SWP),
2009.
8
p.
berlin.org/common/get_document.php?asset_id=5776
BEGG Iain. « Fiscal federalism, subsidiarity and the EU
budget review ». Stockholm : Swedish Institute for
European Policy Studies (SIEPS), 2009.
68 p. (Reports /
Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies (SIEPS);
2009:1).
http://www.sieps.se/en/publikationer/fiscal-federalismsubsidiarity-and-the-eu-budget-review-20091
BEGG Iain. « Mollifying everyone, pleasing no-one? : An
assessment of the EU budget review ». Stockholm :
Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies (SIEPS),
2010. 10 p. (European Policy Analysis / Swedish Institute
for European Policy Studies (SIEPS) ; 2010:14).
http://www.sieps.se/publikationer/european-policyanalysis/mollifying-everyone-pleasing-no-one-an-assessmentof-the-eu-budget-review-201014epa.html
BLAVOUKOS Spyros, PAGOULATOS George. « Accounting
for coalition-building in the European Union : budget
negotiations and the South ». European Journal of
Political Research, 2011, v. 50, n. 4, June, p. 559-581.
Abstract: "Which parameters affect coalition building in
budgetary negotiations? In this article, three distinct
levels of analysis are identified to account for coalition
building patterns, associated with domestic politics,
domestic socioeconomic structures and EU politics. At
the level of domestic politics, ideology points to crossgovernmental affinity of a partisan nature; at the level of
socioeconomic structures, similarity of policy interests,
generated by cross-national socioeconomic convergence
with EU policy standards, informs coalition formation
patterns; at the EU politics level, the intergovernmental
European Court of Auditors | Library
1
power balance influences the political aspirations of each
Member State in the integration process and coalitionbuilding decisions. Two sets of parameters affect the
evolution of EU coalition patterns, corresponding to the
integration impact on the EU (new cleavages) and on the
Member States (the impact of Europeanisation). This
analytical framework is used to examine the southern
coalition (Spain, Greece, Portugal) in the four multiannual financial frameworks (1988, 1992, 1999 and
2005)."
BREHON Nicolas-Jean. « La crise sur le budget 2011 : le
choc des intransigeances ». Paris : Fondation Robert
Schuman, 2010. 6 p. (Questions d’Europe ; n° 187).
http://www.robert-schuman.eu/doc/questions_europe/qe187-fr.pdf
BUONANNO Laurie, NUGENT Neill. «The budget ». In:
Policies and policy processes of the European Union,
London : Palgrave Macmillan, 2013, p. 296-318.
CHIARELLI Giuseppe, URICCHIO Antonio Felice (a cura di).
« Elementi di finanza pubblica comunitaria ». Roma :
Aracne, 2011. (Scienze giuridiche ; 333). 184 p. Abstract
"Il riordino degli assetti finanziari dell'Unione, disposta
nell'ambito di un più vasto disegno ispirato dall'esigenza
di rafforzare gli spazi di democraticità delle istituzioni
comunitarie è il tema affrontato dai saggi contenuti nel
presente volume, che approfondiscono e sviluppano le
complesse tematiche della finanza comunitaria,
ricondotte "a sistema" da una lettura dei fenomeni
finanziari sorretta da competenze e sensibilità
europeista. L'approccio proposto è quello della
presentazione didattica non scevra, però, da
approfondimenti e riflessioni che tengono conto delle
esigenze e dei percorsi dell'integrazione europea. In
questa prospettiva, i contributi proposti muovono dalla
consapevolezza che l'Unione europea, in quanto
organizzazione sovranazionale chiamata ad operare
secondo precise responsabilità finanziarie, necessita di
una piena autonomia finanziaria sia sotto il profilo
dell'entrata che della spesa."
http://www.lex.uniba.it/ta/testo%20elementi%20di%20finanza
%20pubblica%20comunitaria%20chiarelli.pdf
CIESLUKOWSKI Maciej. « The European Union general
budget, policy of stabilization and economic crisis ».
Economic Research Guardian, 2012, v. 2, n. 2, p. 225-240.
Abstract: “Since the Lehman Brothers Bank has declared
bankruptcy and launched the world financial crisis, many
governments and international institutions have taken
different actions in order to counteract negative effects
of the crisis. European Union introduced the European
Economic Recovery Plan for the years 2009 and 2010 and
boosted the borrowing and lending operations outside
the general budget. The article tries to assess the role EU
general budget in countering the 2008 crisis. Before the
crises and presently the EU general budget has been a
weak instrument of macroeconomic stabilization policy.
The borrowing and lending operations and EFSF
mechanism play the crucial role in stabilization”.
CIPRIANI Gabriele. « The EU budget : responsibility
without accountability? ». Brussels : Centre for European
Policy Studies, 2010. 145 p. (CEPS paperback books).
Contents note: 1. Responsibility and accountability − 2.
The EU budget: many hands, many eyes − 3. The EU
budget and accountability − 4. The accountability gap − 5.
Squaring
the
circle.
Abstract: "How, for what and to whom can citizens hold
accountable the expenditure of some €120 billion each
year by the EU budget? This book highlights three main
factors that lie at the root of an accountability gap:
opaque revenue arrangements making citizens unaware
of their contribution, the setting of numerous and grand
objectives whose vague expectations are hard to account
for and, finally, the delegation of the main management
to member state bodies that are not accountable at EU
level. Amidst the on-going review of the EU budget, the
author argues the need to combine a definition of
European added-value based on limited and achievable
objectives with one single accountability framework. This
should follow a political mandate given to the
Commission, which would then assume the role of
'programme manager' having both the authority over
trustful delegated bodies and the legitimacy to
implement the necessary measures to achieve the
intended objectives."
http://www.ceps.eu/book/eu-budget-responsibility-withoutaccountability
COMMISSION EUROPÉENNE. « Les finances publiques de
l'Union européenne ». 4. éd. Luxembourg : Publications
Office, 2009. 455 p.
http://ec.europa.eu/budget/library/biblio/publications/public_f
in/EU_pub_fin_fr.pdf
COPENHAGEN ECONOMICS. « EU budget review : options
for change ». Copenhagen : Copenhagen Economics,
2009. 105 p. General note: Study prepared for The Dutch
Ministries of Finance, Economics Affairs and Agriculture.
Contents note : 1. Main findings of the overview study −
2. A primer on principles for funding policy at the EU
level − 3. Structural funds − 4. Natural Resource
Management − 5. Growth oriented policies − 6. Internal
and external security including development assistance −
7. A small note on administrative expenditure.
http://ec.europa.eu/budget/reform2008/library/focus/study_o
ptions_for_change_June09.pdf
CROMBEZ Christophe. « The political economy of EU
enlargement: impact on decision-making and budget ».
Review of Business and Economic Literature, 2013, v. 58,
n. 1, pp. 81-97. Abstract: “The eastward enlargement of
the European Union in the past ten years arguably
represents the EU's principal foreign policy achievement.
The economic merits of this accomplishment were,
however, hotly contested. In this article I focus on the
political-economic consequences of the eastward
enlargement. Specifically I study its impact on EU
2
decision-making and the EU budget. It was feared that
the enlargement would bring the EU legislative process
to a standstill and would wreck the EU budget. In this
article I argue that the legislative process slowed down,
but not nearly as significantly as expected, and that the
impact on the EU budget was limited.”
DÉVOLUY Michel. « Les voies de réforme du budget de
l’UE ». Bulletin de l'Observatoire des politiques
économiques en Europe, 2007, n. 17, p. 6-11.
http://www.apr-strasbourg.org/docs/20071204-fiches.pdf
DULLIEN Sebastian, SCHWARZER Daniela. « Making
macroeconomic stabilization work : Lessons from the
crisis for the EU budget debate ». Europe in Dialogue,
2011,
n.
2,
p. 95-118.
http://www.bertelsmannstiftung.de/bst/de/media/xcms_bst_dms_34259_34260_2.pdf#
page=95
EGENHOFER Christian [et al.]. « The ever-changing Union
: an introduction to the history, institutions and decisionmaking processes of the European Union ». Brussels :
Centre for European Policy Studies, 2011. 108 p. (CEPS
paperback books).
http://www.ceps.eu/book/ever-changing-union-introductionhistory-institutions-and-decision-making-processes-europeanun
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT (Directorate General for
Internal Policies). « Creating greater synergy between
European and national budgets ». Brussels : European
Parliament, 2010. 122 p. (Study / EP ; PE 411.277).
Summary: “This study analysed spending at both EU and
national levels in the following policy areas: education
and training, social policy, research and development,
humanitarian aid and common and foreign security
policy. It also reviewed the mechanisms and processes
aiming at ensuring budget coordination between the two
levels. While the policy priorities of the Member States
under scrutiny are congruent with those of the EU, the
overall synergy between strategic EU policy objectives
and budgetary policies is weak. Recommendations are
made that could enhance budgetary coordination
between
the
two
levels.”
http://www.europarl.europa.eu/activities/committees/studies/
download.do?language=en&file=31276
EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT, DIRECTORATE GENERAL
INTERNAL POLICIES OF THE UNION. « EU budget and
national budgets: facts, figures and impact ». Brussels :
European Parliament, 2014. 101 p. Abstract: “This note
presents investigations on the relations between national
budgets and the European budget. How are the EU level
and the national levels interlinked? What is the current
situation of public expenditure in the EU? How are other
forms of multi-level governance of public expenditure,
such as the US or Canada, organised and can they be
compared to the EU? What are the added values of the
EU budget? In particular, what is the impact of the main
investment tools of the EU budget? These are some of
the crucial questions which are dealt with in this
document”. http://bookshop.europa.eu/en/eu-budget-and-
national-budgets-pbQA0214412/
FIGUEIRA Filipa. « How to reform the EU budget? : a
methodological toolkit ». Stockholm : Swedish Institute
for European Policy Studies (SIEPS), 2009. 75 p. (Reports
/ Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies (SIEPS) ;
2009:5).
http://www.sieps.se/en/publikationer/how-to-reform-the-eubudget-a-methodological-toolkit-20095
GROOT Loek, ZONNEVELD Erik. « European Union budget
contributions and expenditures: a Lorenz curve approach
». Journal of Common Market Studies, 2013, v. 51, n. 4, p.
649-666. Abstract. “This article investigates the
(in)equality of the European budget with respect to
financial contributions and expenditures across Member
States. Standard tools from the measurement of income
inequality, including the Lorenz curve and the Gini
coefficient, are applied to the distribution of European
Union contributions and expenditure. In addition, the
inequality in the allocation of the budget is juxtaposed
against the distribution of voting power within the
Council of Ministers. Redistribution from rich to poor
members can mainly be attributed to unequal per capita
contributions in funding the EU budget, while voting
power rather than the needs of individual members
dominates with respect to expenditure. The accession to
the EU of relatively smaller eastern European countries in
2004 and 2007 delivered more voting power to poorer
countries with relatively small population shares. This
change reinforced the voting power effect in
expenditures”.
GRZESZCZYK Tadeusz Adam. « Ocena projektów
Europejskich 2007-2013 ». Warszawa : Wydawnictwo
Placet, 2009. 344 p.
HÄDE Ulrich. « Das Finanzsystem der Europäischen Union
». Handbuch Föderalismus, Bd. IV (2012), p. 477-499.
HEINEMANN Friedrich, MOHL Philipp, OSTERLOH Steffen.
« Reforming the EU budget : reconciling needs with
political-economic constraints ». European Integration,
2010, v. 32, n. 1, p. 59-76.
KAUPPI Heikki, WIDGRÉN Mika. « The excess power
puzzle of the EU budget ». 2009. 29 p. (Aboa Centre for
Economics / Discussion Paper ; 45). Summary: “It is a
constant topic of debate how the European Union (EU)
spends the money it collects from its member states. This
paper supports the idea that the EU budget battle
involves one-shot games that have persistent impacts on
the budget allocations. In one way or the other, the
member states are able to establish rules or contracts
that restrict the budget allocation in advance. In the
current status quo, France and Spain are the clearest
3
winners of these restrictions, while Austria, Finland and
Sweden, not to mention the new member states, suffer
largest losses.”
http://www.ace-economics.fi/kuvat/dp45.pdf
LAMASSOURE Alain. « The budget: for a European
Solidarity Pact ». In: Schuman Report on Europe: State of
the Union 2012, New York and Heidelberg: Springer,
2012, p. 69-71.
LAMASSOURE Alain. « Crise budgétaire : comment
préserver l'avenir européen? ». Paris : Fondation Robert
Schuman, 2010. 7 p. (Questions d’Europe ; n° 181).
http://www.robertschuman.eu/question_europe.php?num=qe-181
LAMASSOURE Alain. « The financial crisis: what kind of
recovery is possible? An outlook on the European
budget: from financial solidarity to budgetary solidarity?
». In: Schuman Report on Europe: State of the Union
2011, New York and Heidelberg: Springer, 2011, p. 61-64.
MATTHIJS Herman. « De begroting van de Europese Unie
». S.E.W.: tijdschrift voor Europees en economisch recht,
2009, v. 58, n. 2, p. 51-60.
MOLINO Elisa, ZULEEG Fabian. « The EU budget in an era
of austerity: setting the example or compensating for
national spending cuts? ». 2011. 12 p. Presented at: “The
post 2013 financial perspectives: rethinking EU finances
in times of crisis : Turin Workshop – Villa Abbeg - 7-8 July
2011 (Notre Europe, Paris)”.
http://www.notreeurope.eu/fileadmin/IMG/pdf/Fabian_Zuleeg__Elisa_Molino_FINAL_VERSION.pdf
OSTERLOH Steffen, HEINEMANN Friedrich, MOHL Philipp.
«EU budget reform options and the Common Pool
problem». Public Finance and Management, 2009, v. 9, n.
4, p. 644-685.
PARLIAMENT. HOUSE OF LORDS. « The EC Budget 2010 :
report with evidence ». London : HMSO, 2009. 44 p.
(House of Lords, European Union Committee ;
2008/2009.
Report
20).
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld200809/ldselect/l
deucom/146/146.pdf
PATTERSON Ben. « Understanding the EU Budget ».
London : Searching Finance, 2011. 100 p.
PETIT Yves. « Les oppositions entre États membres et
institutions de l’Union européenne ». Revue française de
finances publiques, 2014, n. 125, p. 3-13. Abstract :
“L'adoption du cadre financier pluriannuel (CFP) 20142020 a été à l'origine d'oppositions fortes entre États
membres et institutions. Le CFP, dont le volume global
est en diminution par rapport au précédent, a mis aux
prises les «Amis du mieux dépenser» et les «Amis de la
cohésion ». Les priorités du CFP, tout comme le lien entre
les ressources propres et les dépenses programmées
jusqu'en 2020, ont également divisé les États membres”.
PINI Paolo. « Europe's austerity budget for 2014-2020: a
comment over an anti-keynesian budget ». Economia
Politica, 2013, v. 30, n. 3, p. 301-312. Abstract: “The
budget for 2014-2020 is unsatisfactory due to both
method and content. To method, because it is a deficit
budget which leaves the European Commission with little
margin of flexibility for anti-recession measures. To
content, because it favours redistributive policies
between European countries rather than policies
encouraging growth and employment throughout the
European Union. It is an austerity budget which is deeply
anti-Keynesian in a period of serious economic crisis
analogous to the great depression of the 1930s. A policy
of growth at a European level is needed in order to cope
with the economic depression, yet a policy of rigour and
austerity was proposed”.
RUBIO Eulalia, GROUPEMENT D'ÉTUDES ET DE
RECHERCHES "NOTRE EUROPE" (Paris). « La "valeur
ajoutée" dans les débats budgétaires européens : un
concept, quatre sens ». Paris : Notre Europe, 2011. 6 p.
http://www.notre(Les
Brefs
;
28).
europe.eu/uploads/tx_publication/Bref28_ValeurAjoutee_FR.p
df
SAARILAHTI Ilkka, GHIGNONE Piera. « Les innovations des
procédures budgétaires communautaires : sixième partie
: le budget général pour 2009 : une année de
modification de l'accord interinstitutionnel du 17 mai
2006 ». Revue du Marché commun, 2009, n. 533, p. 670691.
SAARILAHTI Ilkka, KRAŠOVEC Boštjan. « Les innovations
des procédures budgétaires communautaires : septième
partie : le budget général pour 2010 : une année de
relance économique au niveau européen ». Revue du
Marché commun et de l'Union européenne, 2010, n. 540,
p. 451-471.
SAARILAHTI Ilkka. « 40 vuotta Euroopan unionin
budjetointia : yleisen talousarvion kehitys vuosina 19682008 = 40 years of EU budgeting : the development of
the general budget from 1968 to 2008 = 40 ans de
budgets communautaires : le développement du budget
général de 1968 à 2008 ». Florence : European Press
Academic Publishing, 2009. 159 p. In Finnish; with
summaries in English and French.
SANTOS Indhira, NEHEIDER Susanne. « A better process
for a better budget ». Brussels : Bruegel, 2009. 8 p.
(Bruegel Policy Brief ; 4). Summary: “European Union
budget negotiations often focus on member states'
financial net balances, rather than on spending with EUlevel added value. But net positions are an unreliable
guide to sound EU policy. Changing the budget process is
a precondition for any significant reform; the stubborn
4
link between net balances and spending decisions will
not be broken until the decision-making procedure
changes. This will improve the quality of EU budget
spending.”
http://www.bruegel.org/publications/publicationdetail/publication/317-a-better-process-for-a-better-budget/
SAUREL Stéphane. « Le budget de l'Union européenne ».
Paris : Documentation française, 2010. 211 p. (Collection
Réflexe Europe). Contents note : L'établissement,
l'adoption et l'exécution du budget de l'Union
européenne: Les grands principes du droit budgétaire de
l'Union européenne − La procédure d'adoption du budget
de l'Union européenne − Le cadre financier de l'Union
européenne pour la période 2007-2013 − L'exécution du
budget − Le développement des contrôles interne et
externe du budget de l'Union européenne − Les dépenses
de l'Union européenne: Les politiques de compétitivité −
La politique de cohésion − La politique agricole commune
− Liberté, sécurité et justice − Citoyenneté − L'Union
européenne, partenaire mondial − Les dépenses
administratives − Les recettes de l'Union européenne: Le
système des ressources propres − L'évolution du système
des ressources propres − La question des soldes nets −
Les réflexions sur l'avenir du financement de l’Union
européenne.
SZEMLÉR Tamás [edited by]. « The new EU budget and
the new Member States ». Presented at: “Preparing for
the EU Council Presidencies of the Visegrad Countries”.
2010. 53 p. Contents note: The EU budget – Before a new
chapter of an evergreen story − The EU budget after the
global financial crisis − EU budget review: the position of
Poland’s Government and of Polish experts − The EU
budget reform – Upcoming debate from the Czech
perspective − Hungary and the new EU budget − From
damage limitation to red lines: Slovak position to the
reform of the EU budget.
http://www.mkt.hu/docs/2010-05-04-22-09-09CENS_MKT_EUBudget_March2010.pdf
VANDEN ABEELE Michel. « Le budget de l'Union
européenne : instrument de pouvoir du Parlement
européen? ». In: Réalisations et défis de l'Union
européenne : mélanges en hommage à Panayotis
Soldatos, Bruxelles: Bruylant, 2012, p. 61-67.
WILDE Pieter de. « Contesting the EU budget and
euroscepticism : A spiral of dissent? ». Oslo : Advanced
Research on the Europeanisation of the Nation-State
(ARENA), 2010. 27 p. (Working Paper/ ARENA ; 02/10).
http://www.sv.uio.no/arena/english/research/publications/are
na-publications/workingpapers/workingpapers2010/WP02_10.pdf
WILDE Pieter de. « How politicisation affects European
integration : Contesting the EU budget in the media and
Parliaments of the Netherlands, Denmark and Ireland ».
Oslo : Advanced Research on the Europeanisation of the
Nation-State (ARENA), 2010. 220 p. (Report / ARENA ;
06/10).
ZULEEG Fabian. « The rationale for EU action : what are
European public goods? ». 2009. 19 p. General note:
Prepared for the “BEPA Workshop on the political
economy of EU public finances: designing governance for
change”.
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/policy_advisers/docs/eu_public_goods
_zuleeg.pdf
LEGAL FRAMEWORK AND STRUCTURE OF THE BUDGET
AKSOY Deniz. « Who gets what, when, and how revisited
: Voting and proposal powers in the allocation of the EU
budget ». European Union Politics, 2010, v. 11, n. 2, p.
171-194.
ANDREASEN Martha. « Brussels laid bare ». Yelverton :
St Edwards Press Ltd, 2009. 128 p. Varying title: “Brussels
laid bare : how the EU treated its chief accountant when
she refused to go along with its fraud and waste ». I.
Recruitment − II. My first month in office − III. Expressing
my views − IV. The pressure to sign increases − V. My
responsibility as chief accountant is removed − VI.
Suspended for 18 months and my disciplinary procedure
− VII. Appealing to the European Court of First Instance −
Epilogue.
BIONDI Yuri, SOVERCHIA Michela. « Reforming the
European Union financial disclosure: a theoretical
analysis of the “new” accounting rules ». 32 p. Presented
at: “32nd EGPA Annual Conference, 8-10 September
2010, Toulouse, France - EGPA Permanent Study Group
on EU Administration and Multi-Level Governance”.
Abstract: A theoretical analysis is provided of the
accounting framework and rules applied to the annual
accounts of the European Communities (EC) since 2004.
This accounting system draws upon International Public
Sector Accounting Standards (IPSAS) and is based on
accrual accounting, under a dual integrated accounting
process with the cash accounting that is maintained. It
purports to shape the financial accounting and reporting
of the supranational entity that are the EC. This entity
carries out a wide range of policies and programmes
through the financial resources provided by the
European Union Member States, making it accountable
for incurred expenditure to these constituents. By
analysing the accounting conceptual framework and the
sixteen specific rules, the paper assesses the capacity of
its accounting system to provide a true and fair
representation of the economy of the EC entity featured
by that expenditure-sharing purpose, under the overall
no-profit motive that is typical of every public
administration.
http://egpa2010.com/documents/PSG14/Biondi-Soverchia.pdf
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1627666
5
BOUDET Jean-François. « Les compétences budgétaires
du Parlement européen relèvent-elles d'une démarche
constitutionnelle? : éléments pour un débat européen ».
Les Petites affiches, n. 116, 11 juin 2009, p. 65-73.
BREHON Nicolas-Jean. « Le budget européen : quelle
négociation pour le prochain cadre financier de l’Union
européenne ? ». Paris : Fondation Robert Schuman, 2010.
30 p. (Questions d’Europe ; n° 170 et 171).
http://www.robertschuman.eu/question_europe.php?num=qe-170
BUX Udo. « Das Haushaltsrecht und die neue
Haushaltsordnung der EU ». Zeitschrift für Europarecht,
internationales Privatrecht und Rechtsvergleichung,
2013,
v.
54,
n.
2,
p.
54-62.
http://europaunion.files.wordpress.com/2013/07/zfrv-201302-54-udo-bux.pdf
BUX Udo. « Was ändert sich im Haushaltsverfahren der
EU durch den Vertrag von Lissabon ». Zeitschrift für
Rechtsvergleichung, internationales Privatrecht und
Europarecht, 2009, v. 50, n. 6, p. 244-249.
CHAMBON Nadège, RUBIO Eulalia. « In search of the
“best value for money”: analyzing current ideas and
proposals to enhance the performance of CAP and
cohesion spending ». 25 p. Presented at: “The post 2013
financial perspectives: rethinking EU finances in times of
crisis : Turin Workshop – Villa Abbeg - 7-8 July 2011
(Notre Europe, Paris)”.
http://www.notreeurope.eu/fileadmin/IMG/pdf/Nadege_Chambon__Eulalia_Rubio_FINAL_VERSION.pdf
DELON DESMOULIN Corinne. « Droit budgétaire de
l'Union européenne ». Paris : LGDJ, 2011. (Systèmes.
Droit). 258 p. Contents : Introduction : La spécificité des
finances de l'Union européenne − 1. La construction du
droit budgétaire de l'Union européenne − 2. Le budget de
l'Union européenne − 3. Le contenu du budget de l'Union
européenne − 4. L'encadrement du budget de l'Union
européenne − 5. Les principes budgétaires de l'Union
européenne − 6. L'exécution du budget de l'Union
européenne − 7. Le contrôle budgétaire et financier de
l'Union européenne − Conclusion : Les futurs enjeux :
quel budget pour l'Europe ?
DELON DESMOULIN Corinne. « La sincérité en droit
budgétaire de l'Union européenne : à la recherche de la
vérité budgétaire ». Revue française de finances
publiques, septembre 2010, n. 111, p. 75-83.
DÜR Andreas, MATEO GONZÁLEZ Gemma. « Bargaining
power and negotiation tactics : the negotiations on the
EU's financial perspective, 2007-2013 ». Journal of
common market studies, 2010, vol. 48, n. 3, p. 557-578.
Summary: “We argue that in intergovernmental
negotiations in the European Union, large Member
States, countries with a good alternative to negotiated
agreement and governments facing domestic constraints
are more likely to resort to a hard bargaining strategy
than less powerful Member States. We test this
prediction with data from a survey with high-level
officials from all EU Member States for the case of the
negotiations concerning the EU Financial Perspective
2007–13. The evidence provides support for our
argument and casts doubt on studies that suggest either
that there are no differences in bargaining strategies
across EU member countries or that the main differences
exist between old and new EU Member States.”
INTERNAL POLICIES OF THE UNION. « The implications of
EIB and EBRD co-financing for the EU budget ». Brussels :
European Parliament, 2011. 128 p. Summary: “Recent
years have seen the growth of a number of EU cofinancing instruments designed to enhance the leverage
of the EU budget by working more closely with the
European Investment Bank and the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development. However, the growth
of such instruments raises potential concerns in relation
to financial control and liability, in relation to
governance, transparency and visibility and in relation to
the extent to which such activity helps the deliverability
of EU objectives.”
download.do?language=en&file=37031
HOUBÉ-MASSE Marie-Liesse. « La procédure budgétaire à
l'épreuve du traité de Lisbonne ». Revue de l'Union
européenne, 2012, No. 559, p. 370-374
HOUSER Matthieu. « La fédéralisation du budget de
l'Union européenne : une étape décisive vers
l'émergence
d'une
politique
budgétaire
communautaire ». Revue du droit de l'Union européenne,
2009, n. 4, p. 681-701.
HOUSER Matthieu. « Les fondements du budget de
l'Union européenne. Tome 1 - Comprendre le
fonctionnement des institutions et du droit ». Paris :
Editions Eska, 2011. 190 p.
HOUSER Matthieu. « Les fondements du budget de
l'Union européenne. Tome 2 - Identifier les ressources et
utiliser les dépenses ». Paris : Editions Eska, 2011. 190 p.
KAISER Robert, PRANGE-GSTÖHL Heiko. « Die
Überprüfung
des
EU-Haushalts
2009
:
Reformperspektiven für eine zukunftsorientierte
Ausgabenstruktur ». Integration, 2010, n. 1, p. 36-49.
LAFFINEUR Marc. « Rapport d'information sur le projet
de budget de l’Union européenne pour l’exercice 2011 (E
5167, E 5168, E 5175 et E 5392) ». Paris : Assemblée
nationale, 2010. 51 p. (Les Documents d'information.
Délégation pour l'Union européenne. 2701).
http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/13/pdf/europe/rapinfo/i2701.pdf
6
MOLINIER Joël. « La décision budgétaire ». In: La prise de
décision dans le système de l'Union européenne,
Bruxelles : Bruylant, 2011, p. 257-274.
POTTEAU Aymeric. « Les finances publiques de l'Union
européenne en 2007 ». Revue trimestrielle de droit
européen, 2009, v. 45, n. 1, janv.-mars, p. 635-663.
NEHEIDER Susanne. « Die Kompensationsfunktion der
EU-Finanzen ». Baden-Baden : Nomos, 2010. 172 p.
(Europäische Schriften zu Staat und Wirtschaft ; Bd. 29).
Contents note: 1. Problemstellung und Aufbau − 2. Die
Entwicklung der EU-Finanzen unter besonderer
Berücksichtigung politökonomischer Aspekte und der
Entscheidungsverfahren − 3. Theoretische Grundlagen
von
Stimmentausch
und
package
deals
−
4. Reformvorschläge vor dem Hintergrund der
erforderlichen Kompensation − 5. Vorschlag für eine
effizientere Kompensation − 6. Zusammenfassung − 7.
Literaturverzeichnis.
POTTEAU Aymeric. « La mise en œuvre des nouvelles
prérogatives budgétaires du Parlement européen ». In:
Le Parlement européen après l'entrée en vigueur du traité
de Lisbonne, Bruxelles : Larcier, 2013, p. 49-75.
NEHEIDER Susanne, SANTOS Indhira. « Reframing the EU
budget decision-making process ». Journal of Common
Market Studies, 2011, v. 49, n. 3, May, p. [631]-651.
Abstract: "This article analyses the institutional
constraints for European Union finances reform and
proposes a decision-making process that incorporates
these constraints and provides incentives to reorient the
budget towards more EU public goods. The authors
propose separating the budget into a redistributive and a
public good category. In order to reveal common
interests, the decision of what is to be considered an EU
public good is left to the negotiation process. In addition,
while public goods should be financed proportionally to
GNI shares, this is not necessarily the case for
redistributive policies. Net balances resulting from the
proposal are calculated."
PARLIAMENT. HOUSE OF LORDS. « EU financial
framework from 2014 ». London : HMSO, 2011. 77 p.
2010/2011. Report 13).
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201011/ldselect/l
deucom/125/125.pdf
PIRIS Jean-Claude. « The EU budget ». In: The Lisbon
Treaty : a legal and political analysis, Cambridge :
Cambridge University Press, 2010, p. 288-301.
européen, 2013, v. 49, n. 3, p. 629-650.
POTTEAU Aymeric. « Finances publiques de l'Union
européenne : 2011 ». Revue trimestrielle de droit
européen, 2012, v. 48, n. 2, p. 411-435.
européen, 2011, v. 47, n. 2, avril-juin, p. 375-398.
européenne en 2008-2009 ». Revue trimestrielle de droit
européen, 2010, v. 46, n. 2, avril-juin, p. 347-388.
POTTEAU Aymeric. « La régressivité de la procédure
budgétaire introduite par le Traité de Lisbonne ». Revue
Europe, 2011, vol. 21, n. 4, p. 5-10. Summary:
"Contrairement aux apparences, la procédure budgétaire
introduite par le Traité de Lisbonne est de nature à
amoindrir l’efficacité et/ ou la démocratisation du
processus décisionnel au détriment de l’intégration
européenne, ce que semble bien confirmer la procédure
budgétaire pour 2011."
RAKOTONDRAHASO Faneva Tsiadino. « La transparence
du budget de l'Union européenne, un préalable à toute
idée d'impôt européen? ». Revue du Marché commun,
2010, n. 542, p. 574-581.
RANT Vasja, MRAK Mojmir. « The 2007-13 financial
perspective : domination of national interests ». Journal
of common market studies, 2010, vol. 48, n. 2, p. 347372. Summary: “This article confirms the validity of the
hypothesis that national interests were the driving force
behind the process and outcome of negotiations for the
EU's next financial perspective for 2007-13. The
hypothesis is tested by comparing hypothetical coalitions
based on quantified national interests (partial net
budgetary balances) and the actual (documented)
coalitions. Based on these results, the article also
discusses implications of the 'net balances problem' for
the 2008/09 EU budget review.”
ROSA Audrey. « La rénovation de l’architecture financière
de l'Union européenne : entre volontarisme et
pragmatisme ». Revue française de finances publiques,
2011, n. 115, p. 117-134. Abstract : “La présente étude
vise à proposer une analyse de la rénovation de
l'architecture financière de l’UE. Les nouveautés
introduites par le traité de Lisbonne exigent une nouvelle
articulation entre différents instruments normatifs,
rendue
possible
grâce
à
une
collaboration
interinstitutionnelle renforcée”.
SAÏDJ Luc. « Budget de l'Union européenne et théorie
budgétaire : brèves réflexions ». In: Réalisations et défis
de l'Union européenne : mélanges en hommage à
Panayotis Soldatos. Bruxelles: Bruylant, 2012, p. 117-127.
SOTTE Franco. « The CAP and the EU budget: Do the exante data tell the true? ». Paper prepared for the 122nd
EAAE Seminar "Evidence-based agricultural and rural
policy: methodological and empirical challenges of policy
evaluation: Ancona, February 17-18, 2011”. Abstract:
7
“The aim of this paper is to suggest the adoption of a
fully informed approach in the analysis of CAP
expenditure. The debate on CAP expenditure is generally
based on ex-ante images of the budget as presented in
the Multiannual Financial Framework and, before each
financial year, on the budget appropriations for
commitments. But this differs significantly from the
actual payments as recorded ex-post in the Financial
Reports. These differences are mainly concentrated on
structural policies (such as regional and rural
development policy), while they do not exist, or are
minimal, in the mere transfer policies (such as in Pillar 1
of the CAP). Based as it is on a partial and distorted
image of the expenditure, the analysis and discussion on
the CAP reform is distorted as well”.
http://ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/99835/2/sotte%282%
29.pdf
VIESSANT Céline. « Le budget de l'Union européenne
après l'entrée en vigueur du Traité de Lisbonne ». Revue
du Marché commun et de l'Union européenne, 2010, n.
541, p. 524-532.
THE OWN RESOURCES SYSTEM
ALVES Rui Henrique. « The reform of the EU budget :
finding new own resources ». Intereconomics, 2009, vol.
44, n. 3, May/June, p. 177-184.
BEGG Iain. « Rethinking how to pay for Europe ».
Stockholm : Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies
(SIEPS), 2010. 12 p. (European Policy Analysis / Swedish
Institute for European Policy Studies (SIEPS) ; 2010:2).
http://www.sieps.se/en/publications/european-policyanalysis/rethinking-how-to-pay-for-europe-20102epa.html
BERNARD-REYMOND
Pierre,
FRANCE.
SÉNAT.
COMMISSION DES AFFAIRES EUROPÉENNES. « Rapport
d'information sur le rabais britannique ». Varying Title :
« Le rabais britannique est-il encore justifié ? ». Paris :
Sénat, 2011. 62 p. (Rapports d'information / Sénat,
Commission des affaires européennes, ISSN:1249-4356 ;
2010-2011. 603).
http://www.senat.fr/rap/r10-603/R10-6031.pdf
BORSELLI Fabrizio. « A sensible reform of the EU VAT
regime for financial services ». Amsterdam: IBFD, 2009.
International VAT Monitor, 2009, n. Sept./Oct., p. 375383.
CATTOIR Philippe. « Options for an EU financing
reform ». Paris : Notre Europe, 2009. 69 p. (Policy Paper ;
38). Summary: “This paper presents a reflection on the
future of the EU budget, with a particular focus on EU
financing. The debate on a reform of the EU financing
system encompasses two main dimensions: the structure
of EU financing and, in particular, whether the Union
should be financed via "genuine own resources" ; the
correction mechanisms and the way to either eliminate
or adapt them. These dimensions are analysed in depth
in the paper. This allows presenting three main mediumto long-term scenarios for a financing reform.”
http://www.notreeurope.eu/uploads/tx_publication/PolicyPaper38_PCattoir.pdf
CONSTANTINESCO Vlad. « Le financement de l'Union
européenne : contributions nationales ou impôt
européen? ». Revue française d'administration publique,
2012, n. 144, p. 1079-1084
DUSSART Vincent. « L'impossible création d'un impôt
européen? ». Revue française d'administration publique,
2012, n. 144, p. 1085-1091
HAUG Jutta, LAMASSOURE Alain, VERHOFSTADT Guy,
GROS Daniel, CEPS. « Europe for growth : for a radical
change in financing the EU ». Brussels : Centre for
European Policy Studies ; Paris : Notre Europe, 2011.
Contents: Introduction − 1. History of the system of
Community own resources: how did the EU budget lose
its financial autonomy? − 2. Pitfalls in the current system
of financing the EU − 3. Financing the European Union:
reform for own resources − 4. European project bonds:
an engine for growth − 5. European financing in times of
austerity: the benefits of the "European dividend" and
budgetary simplification.
http://www.ceps.eu/book/europe-growth-radical-changefinancing-eu
http://www.notreeurope.eu/uploads/tx_publication/Europe_for_Growth__For_a
_Radical_Change_in_Financing_the_EU.pdf
HERWARTZ Helmut, THEILEN Bernd. « Does the EU
financing system contribute to shadow economic
activity? ». Economics and Politics, 2013, 25, n. 2, p. 135161.
HIERNAUX-FRITSCH Sabine, MOONEN Antonius F.W.
« Financiering van de begroting van de Europese Unie ».
Sew Tijdschrift Voor Europees En Economisch Recht,
Zwolle. Jaarg. 58. Nr. 5. Mei 2010. p. 192-197. General
note: English translation available: 'Financing the
European Union's budget'. Summary: “Binnen de
Europese Unie laait regelmatig een discussie op over de
wijze waarop de EU-begroting gefinancierd zou moeten
worden. In beginsel zouden de EU-inkomstenbronnen
aan een aantal criteria, waaronder gelijkheid en eenvoud,
moeten voldoen, maar is dit inderdaad wel het geval?
Wat zijn de kenmerken van het huidige inkomstenstelsel
voor de EU en is de juistheid van de inkomsten wel te
controleren? Wat zijn de mogelijkheden om het stelsel te
verbeteren en met welke adviezen kwam de Nederlandse
Adviesraad Internationale Vraagstukken over de
financiering van de Europese Unie. Dit artikel geeft
hierover een bondige beschouwing en stelt dat op dit
terrein de Barroso II Commissie voor een interessante
uitdaging staat.”
8
HOUSER Matthieu. « La rénovation des ressources de
l'Union : entre sources de financements innovants et
ressources propres ». Revue du Marché commun et de
l'Union européenne, 2011, n. 549, juin, p. 355-360.
Abstract : "La révision du cadre financier 2007-2013
constituera bientôt l'événement politique majeur pour
les années à venir. La Commission européenne
commence à préparer cette révision en proposant des
solutions pour le financement du budget pour les années
2014-2020. Différentes options sont envisageables. La
création de sources de financements innovants (taxe
Tobin, taxe carbone, taxation des activités bancaires) a
été avancée par la Commission. Pourtant, seule
l'émergence d'une 5ème ressource propre revalorisera la
place du budget de l'Union européenne. Mais, cette
possibilité demeure au milieu du gué."
LE CACHEUX Jacques. « Funding the EU budget with a
genuine own resource: the case for a European tax ». In:
Report on the State of the European Union. Vol. 3. Crisis
in the EU Economic Governance, New York: St. Martin's
Press, Palgrave Macmillan, 2010, p. 132-59.
LEEN Auke R. « An EU corporate income tax as a new
own resource to finance the EU budget ». in: “Fulfilling
the worldwide sustainability challenge”. [S.l.] : EBSCO
Publishing, 2011. p. 517-523.
http://media.leidenuniv.nl/legacy/al-2011-03.pdf
PODADERA RIVERA Pablo. « Nuevos recursos para
financiar la Unión Europea : una cuestión de nueva
ingeniera presupuestaria ». Revista Universitaria
Europea, 2011, n. 15, p. 51-73.
SCHRATZENSTALLER Margit. « The EU own resources
system
:
reform
needs
and
options
».
Intereconomics/Review Of European Economic Policy,
2013, v. 48, n. 5, p. 303-313. Abstract: “The most
prominent and debated issues in the negotiations on the
next Multiannual Financial Framework for the EU for the
period 2014-2020 were the overall budget volume, the
structure of expenditures and the continuation of the
rebates for (some) net contributor countries. However,
the system of the EU's own resources was hardly
addressed in the negotiations, although it is one of the
most important obstacles to reform. This article reviews
the most important deficits of the current system of own
resources and assesses the most substantial reform
proposal which has been advocated for years by the
European Commission, namely to finance part of the EU
budget through EU taxes”.
SERRANO LEAL Cristina. « Financiación: el presupuesto ».
In: Tratado de derecho y políticas de la Unión Europea,
Cizur Menor, Navarra: Aranzadi, 2011, T. 3, p. 467-535.
EU BUDGET IMPLEMENTATION
BACHTLER John, MÉNDEZ Carlos, WISHLADE Fiona.
« Challenges, consultations and concepts : Preparing for
the cohesion policy debate ». 65 p. (European Policy
Research Paper ; 74).
_74_ChallengesConsultationsandConceptsPreparingfortheCohe
sionPolicyDebate.pdf
BARZELAY Michael. « Realigning execution of the
European Social Fund Budget: implementing the
European Commission’s integrated internal control
Framework in a EU Structural Fund ». London : London
School of Economics and Political Science, Department of
Management, 2011.
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/32808/
BOISSENIN Angélique. « Le démembrement budgétaire
par les agences européennes ». Revue française de
finances publiques, 2014, n. 125, p. 15-22. Abstract : “Le
développement soutenu des agences de l'Union
européenne au cours de ces vingt dernières années
conduit à en faire l'analyse eu égard à leur rôle croissant
dans I'ordre institutionnel ainsi qu'aux considérations
financières que leur existence implique”.
BOULANGER Pierre H. « Quelle réforme pour la politique
agricole commune et le budget européen? ». Politique
étrangère, 2011, n. 2, p. 343-358.
CHAMBON Nadège. « Renforcer l'action de l'UE par une
réforme audacieuse de la PAC et de son financement ».
Revue du Marché commun et de l'Union européenne,
2011, n. 550, juillet-août, p. 472-475. Abstract : "En
fonction depuis le 1er juillet 2011, le Trio des présidences
polonaise, danoise et chypriote du Conseil de l'UE,
mènera les prochaines négociations financières
pluriannuelles (2014-2020). Cet exercice au potentiel
hautement conflictuel, s'inscrit dans un contexte de
pression à la baisse sur les dépenses publiques qui
pousse l'UE à des arbitrages. L'utilisation des fonds de la
PAC pour financer de nouvelles politiques est à l'étude
car elle représente 40 % du budget de l'UE et la nécessité
de la réformer est communément admise. Mais le gain
potentiel que pourraient retirer les contribuables d'une
réallocation de ces fonds, difficilement mesurable, est
fortement incertain. En effet elle est déjà l'une des plus
faibles dépenses publiques européennes (0,4 % du PIB)
et elle assure la fourniture de biens publics majeurs.
Comment le Trio peut-il orienter le Conseil européen vers
des choix bénéfiques à long terme ?"
CHATELLIER Vincent, GUYOMARD Hervé. « Réformer la
PAC dans un contexte budgétaire difficile ». Problèmes
économiques, 2011, n. 3022, p. 22-26. Abstract : À
l'heure où les Européens débattent de l'avenir de la
Politique agricole commune (PAC) - une réforme doit
être menée d'ici 2013 - et où d'aucuns réclament d'ores
9
et déjà son abandon, l'auteur estime que son budget doit
être maintenu. Mais l'iniquité du système actuel - les
fonds versés bénéficient principalement à un nombre
restreint d'États (quatre pays concentrent 58% du total)
et à certains types d'exploitations agricoles - nécessite
toutefois un redéploiement des soutiens à l'agriculture.
Un meilleur ciblage des aides directes, notamment des
"aides découplées", c'est à dire celles qui ne dépendent
pas du niveau de production, est ainsi devenu
indispensable.
DAVIES Sara, POLVERARI Laura. « Financial accountability
and European Union cohesion policy ». Regional Studies,
2011, 45, n. 5, p. 695-706. Abstract: “Many changes in
European Union Cohesion policy since the late 1990s
have been driven by the need to ensure and
demonstrate financial accountability. This paper
examines how the increased emphasis on financial
management, control and audit in relation to the
European Union budget is reshaping the governance of
Cohesion policy, as well as the instruments of financial
accountability. It also assesses the effects of these new
instruments on financial flows and considers how these
changes are perceived by policy-makers. Lastly, it
explores the difficulties of assessing the impact of
administrative changes on financial accountability in
Cohesion policy”.
DE FILIPPIS Fabrizio, HENKE Roberto, SALVATICI Luca,
SARDONE Roberta. « Agricultural expenditure in the
European Union budget: a graphical analysis ». European
Review of Agricultural Economics, 2013, v. 40, n. 4, p.
659-683. Abstract: “The review of the European Union
(EU) budget and the Common Agricultural Policy reform
are tightly connected issues influencing each other. We
assume that the outcomes will be influenced by their
impact on the net balances of Member States (MSs), and
use isobudget and isobalance functions to analyse
different hypotheses about the EU budget expenditure.
These functions are key in understanding substitutability
or complementarity between agricultural and other
expenditures and shed some light on the positions of the
MSs in favour or against possible reform proposals”.
DEVILLÉ Hubert. « Le financement du régime de pensions
des fonctionnaires des Communautés européennes ».
Revue française de finances publiques, avril 2010, n. 110,
p. 189-208.
INTERNAL POLICIES OF THE UNION. « Direct Payments in
the CAP post 2013 ». Brussels : European Parliament,
2011. 33 p. Summary: “The Communication identifies
crucial challenges, above all the need for EU agriculture
to provide public goods. However, only limited changes
to the CAP are proposed. Rather than making a
determined move towards targeted measures, direct
payments are supposed to continue forming the
backbone of the support regime. The “greening
component” cannot really improve the targeting of
payments. Redistribution of payments across Member
States may or may not enhance equity and will not
improve the provision of public goods.”
download.do?language=fr&file=34680
INTERNAL POLICIES OF THE UNION. «Factual study on the
follow-up of pilot projects and preparatory actions :
2009-2013 ». Brussels : European Parliament, 2014. 66 p.
Summary: “This study examines budgetary resources for
Pilot Projects (PPs) and Preparatory Actions (PAs) in
2009-2014 and the outcome of PPs and PAs that have
come to an end in this period. Taking account of both
new and on-going projects, funding for 136 Pilot Projects
and 95 Preparatory Actions have been included in the
budget since 2009. Since 2009, of the total budgetary
resources available, on average PPs have used 88% and
PAs 54%. In terms of outcomes up until 2013, 63% of PPs
and 86% of PAs are either still on-going or have had
legislative consequences”
http://bookshop.europa.eu/en/factual-study-on-the-follow-upof-pilot-projects-and-preparatory-actionspbQA0214115/?CatalogCategoryID=f.cKABstF7wAAAEjwYYY4e5
K
INTERNAL POLICIES OF THE UNION. « Parliamentary
control of budget implementation ». Brussels : European
Parliament, 2012. 57 p. Summary: “This study aims to
describe control of the EU budget exercised by the
European Parliament, in particular ex-post control of the
budget after it has been implemented, and to compare it
to ex-post control of national budgets carried out by the
parliaments of the EU Member States. The subject is
introduced by a brief overview of budgetary control in
the different phases of the EU budgetary cycle. The study
then focuses on the discharge procedure itself. After
considering what this control function consists of, the
study presents how parliaments carry it out and provides
an overview of the examination of the EU budget by
Member States. Subsequently, it identifies prerogatives
and roles of other actors involved in the discharge
procedure, notably the Supreme Audit Institutions and
the Executive. The study closes with a brief presentation
of the consequences resulting from exercising budgetary
control.”
http:// dx.publications.europa.eu/10.2861/22839
GAILLARD Yann, SUTOUR Simon, FRANCE. SÉNAT.
COMMISSION DES AFFAIRES EUROPÉENNES. « Rapport
fait au nom de la Commission des Affaires européennes
sur l'avenir de la politique de cohésion après 2013 ».
Varying Title : « De nouvelles ambitions pour la politique
européenne de cohésion après 2013 ». Paris : Sénat,
2011. 58 p. (Rapports d'information / Sénat, Commission
des affaires européennes, ISSN:1249-4356 ; 2010-2011.
266).
http://www.senat.fr/rap/r10-266/r10-2661.pdf
10
GUILLOU Marion, SAWICKI Marek, BOULANGER Pierre H.
« L'avenir de la PAC ». Politique étrangère, 2011, n. 2, p.
321-358. Contents : Pour une Politique agricole
commune ambitieuse, mais renouvelée − La Politique
agricole commune comme facteur d'intégration : un
point de vue polonais − Quelle réforme pour la Politique
agricole commune et le budget européen?.
HEINEMANN Friedrich. « EU-Kohäsionspolitik : Finanzielle
Fehlanreize und die Suche nach dem europäischen
Mehrwert ». Zeitschrift für Wirtschaftspolitik, 2013, v. 62,
n. 1, p. 58-69.
HEINEMANN Friedrich et al. « Die Zukunft der EUStrukturpolitik ». Baden-Baden : Nomos, 2010. 264 p. 264
p. (ZEW Wirtschaftsanalysen ; Bd. 94). Contents note:
1. Einleitung − 2. Wirtschaftstheoretische Konzepte zur
Erläuterung und Bewertung der EU-Strukturpolitik und
ihrer
Entwicklung
−
3.
Merkmale
und
Entstehungsgeschichte des Status quo − 4. Wirkungen
der regionalpolitischen Instrumente − 5. Einzelprobleme,
Status-quo-Fortschreibung und Stellschraubenanalyse −
6. Reformoptionen − 7. Schlussbemerkungen − 8.
Anhang.
KARAKATSANIS, George. « Performance management
and performance auditing of the EU budget : The case of
Common Agricultural Policy and the implementation of
the Posei and smaller Aegean Islands policies ».
Thesis−Glasgow Caledonian University, 2010. 318 p. 1.
Introduction − 2. Critical literature review and
hypotheses − 3. The EU budget: policy implementation
and performance management − 4. Methodology − 5.
The Posei-Aegean Islands policy − 6. The Commission − 7.
France: the implementation system for the Poseidom
programme − 8. Greece: the implementation system for
the smaller Aegean Islands policy − 9. The Spanish
administrative scheme for Poseican and the Portuguese
system for Poseima − 10. Cross case analysis − 11.
Conclusions: Implications of the research results.
LAFFINEUR Marc, ASSEMBLÉE NATIONALE (FRANCE).
« Rapport d'information sur le projet de budget général
de l’Union européenne pour l’exercice 2012 (E 6343, E
6344 et E 6408) ». Paris : Assemblée nationale, 2011. 49
p. (Les Documents d'information. Délégation pour
l'Union européenne. 3637).
http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/13/pdf/europe/rapinfo/i3637.pdf
MIRWALDT Katja, MCMASTER Irene, BACHTLER John.
« Reconsidering cohesion policy : the contested debate
on territorial cohesion ». 2010. 52 p. (European Policy
Research
Paper ; 66).
_66_Reconsidering_Cohesion_Policy.pdf
NATIONAL AUDIT OFFICE (NAO) (United Kingdom).
« Managing the impact of changes in the value of the
euro on EU funds : Report by the Comptroller and
Auditor general ». London : The Stationary Office, 2011.
40 p. (HC 759 Session 2010-2011 : 18 February 2011).
http://www.nao.org.uk/publications/1011/eu_funds.aspx
NÚÑEZ FERRER Jorge, FIGUEIRA Filipa. « Achieving
Europe's R&D objectives : delivery tools and role for the
EU budget ». Stockholm : Swedish Institute for European
Policy Studies (SIEPS), 2011. 53 p. (Reports / Swedish
Institute for European Policy Studies (SIEPS) ; 2011:6).
http://www.sieps.se/en/publikationer/achieving-europes-rdobjectives-delivery-tools-and-role-for-the-eu-budget-20116
NÚÑEZ FERRER Jorge. « Internal and external EU climate
objectives and the future of the EU budget ». Stockholm :
Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies (SIEPS),
2010. 8 p. (European Policy Analysis / Swedish Institute
for European Policy Studies (SIEPS) ; 2010:1).
http://www.sieps.se/en/publications/european-policyanalysis/-internal-and-external-eu-climate-objectives-and-thefuture-of-the-eu-budget-20101epa.html
NÚÑEZ FERRER Jorge. « Investing where it matters: a
sustainable 'green growth' agenda for the EU budget ».
Intereconomics/Review of European Economic Policy,
2012, 47, n. 3, 155-159.
PARLIAMENT. HOUSE OF LORDS. « The Common
Agricultural Policy after 2013 ». London : HMSO, 2011.
2010/2011. Report 5).
1:http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmsel
ect/cmenvfru/671/671i.pdf
2:http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201011/cmsel
ect/cmenvfru/671/671ii.pdf
PELLEGRINI Guido, TERRIBILE Flavia, TAROLA Ornella,
MUCCIGROSSO Teo, BUSILLO Federica. « Measuring the
effects of European regional policy on economic growth:
a regression discontinuity approach ». Papers in Regional
Science, 2013, v. 92, n. 1, p. 217-233.
PORRAS GÓMEZ Antonio-Martín. « La gobernanza
multinivel del gasto público europeo ». Directores de la
Tesis: Manuel Medina Guerrero. Sevilla: Universidad de
Sevilla,
2013,
p.
556.
http://fondosdigitales.us.es/tesis/tesis/2016/la-gobernanzamultinivel-del-gasto-publico-europeo/
RUBIO Eulalia. « Budget de la zone euro : trois fonctions,
trois instruments ». Revue de l'Union européenne, 2013,
n. 567, p. 214-217.
ROUSSEL Carine. « Le coût caché de la PAC : les
corrections financières infligées aux États membres en
cas de mauvais contrôles des dépenses agricoles ». Revue
du Marché commun et de l’Union européenne 2011, n.
544, janvier, p. 36-45. Abstract : "La question de la
responsabilité financière des dépenses agricoles
irrégulièrement employées, est un sujet sensible entre
les États membres et la Commission. Cette répartition
11
entre ce qui doit être imputé au budget communautaire
et aux budgets nationaux est opérée par un mécanisme
ingénieux: la procédure d’apurement. Cette procédure
quantifie chaque année en fin d’exercice, mais aussi
rétroactivement, les dépenses qui ne peuvent être
financées par le budget communautaire et qui doivent
rester à la charge des États membres. Les rejets de
dépenses opérés par la Commission par le biais de
l’épurement obligent les États membres à se tourner vers
leur propre budget pour les financer. Les moyens dévolus
à la phase d’apurement sont insuffisants et contraignent
la Commission à opérer des rejets forfaitaires, qui
augmentent le poids des sanctions. Les sommes
prélevées par la Commission sur les dépenses dues aux
États membres constituent à la fois une sanction
financière pour les États membres et un gain financier
pour la Commission."
SAURER Johannes. « The accountability of supranational
administration : the case of European Union agencies ».
American University International Law Review, 2009, vol.
24, n. 3, p. 429-488.
http://www.auilr.org/pdf/24/24-3-2.pdf
SINABELL Franz, PITLIK Hans. « Der Agrarhaushalt der EU
und ausgewählte Folgen einer Kürzung ». Wien :
Österreichisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung
(WIFO), 2011. 17 p.
http://franz.sinabell.wifo.ac.at/lehre/2011/agrarhaushalt_sinab
ell_pitlik.pdf
SONNLEITNER Gerd. « Die gemeinsame Agrarpolitik
(GAP) nach 2013 ». Politische Studien 2011, v. 62, Heft
437,
p.
58-68.
http://www.hss.de/uploads/tx_ddceventsbrowser/PS_437_03.
pdf
SZEMLÉR Tamás. « The new EU budget and the new
Member States ». Budapest : Hungarian Economic
Association (MKT), 2010. 53 p. Contents note: The EU
budget – Before a new chapter of an evergreen story −
The EU budget after the global financial crisis − EU
budget review: the position of Poland’s Government and
of Polish experts − The EU budget reform – Upcoming
debate from the Czech perspective − Hungary and the
new EU budget − From damage limitation to red lines:
Slovak position to the reform of the EU budget.
http://www.mkt.hu/docs/2010-05-04-22-09-09CENS_MKT_EUBudget_March2010.pdf
TARSCHYS Daniel (ed.). « The EU budget : what should go
in? What should go out? ». Stockholm : Swedish Institute
for European Policy Studies (SIEPS), 2011. 129 p. (Reports
/ Swedish Institute for European Policy Studies (SIEPS) ;
2011:3).
http://www.sieps.se/en/publikationer/the-eu-budget%E2%80%93-what-should-go-in-what-should-go-out-20113
ZAHRNT Valentin. « A guide to CAP reform politics :
issues, positions and dynamics ». Aussenwirtschaft, 2011,
v. 66, n. 1, März, p. [89]-130. Abstract: "CAP reform is the
major bone of contention in the negotiations of the next
long-term EU budget beyond 2013. This paper reviews
the political landscape so as to make it more legible to
the public. First, it summarizes the arguments concerning
key reform issues. What should be the size of the CAP
budget and who should finance agricultural policies?
What should happen with direct income support and
how to deal with price fluctuations and food security?
Which public goods should the CAP pursue and how to
promote environmental public goods, in particular?
Second, it examines the formal positions as well as the
less visible interests and internal conflicts of the main
policy actors: DG Agri, the Commission College, the
European Parliament, the Member States, farmers and
landowners, other civil society stakeholders, and
academics. Finally, the paper discusses the prospects for
the reform process, such as a change in the CAP narrative
towards competitiveness and innovation or the
increasing influence of financial considerations and
broader EU affair on CAP reform."
http://www.reformthecap.eu/sites/default/files/A%20guide%2
0to%20CAP%20politics.pdf
INTERNAL AND EXTERNAL AUDIT
BALDASSARINI Antonella, BATTELLINI Federica, DI VEROLI
Nadia. « Towards a system of supervisory and control for
national accounts ». 2010.
http://homes.stat.unipd.it/mgri/SIS2010/Program/contributed
paper/797-1487-1-DR.pdf
BARZELAY Michael, LEVY Roger, PORRAS GOMEZ Antonio
Martin. « Analyzing public management policy cycles in
the European Commission : Oversight of budget control
and the integrated internal control framework ». London
: London School of Economics and Political Science, 2010.
29 p. (LSE / Discussion Paper ; 65).
http://www.lse.ac.uk/collections/CARR/pdf/DPs/Disspaper65.p
df
BERNICOT Jean-François. « Quels contrôles pour les
nouveaux instruments financiers? ». Revue française de
finances publiques, 2014, n. 125, p. 23-34. Abstract :
“Pour faire face à la crise bancaire, transformée en crise
de la dette souveraine, les États membres ont mis en
place de nouveaux instruments financiers et dispositifs, à
caractère
à
la
fois
intergouvememental
et
communautaire, pour l'ensemble des pays de l'Union ou
pour seulement une partie d'entre eux, sans que les
dispositifs de contrôle financier ou démocratique aient
été réellement prévus”.
BLASIAK-NOWAK
Beata,
RAJCZEWSKA
Marzena.
« Kontrola zewnętrzna wykonania budżetu Unii
Europejskiej i państwa członkowskiego ». Kontrola
Państwowa, 2010, n. 3 (332), p. 3-28. Initially published
in European Court of Auditors Journal, December 2009, p.
12
19-34.
BUSUIOC Madalina. « External audit : The European
Court of Auditors and the Joint Audit Committee ». In:
The accountability of European agencies : legal provisions
and ongoing practices, Delft : Eburon, 2010, p. 140-151.
MENDEZ Carlos, BACHTLER John. « Administrative reform
and unintended consequences: an assessment of the EU
Cohesion policy ‘audit explosion’ ». Journal of European
Public Policy, 2011, vol. 18, Issue 5, p. 746-765.
« Financial management in the European Union : Report
by the Comptroller and Auditor general ». London : The
Stationary Office, 2010. 37 p. (HC 34 Session 2010-2011 :
11
June
2010).
http://www.nao.org.uk/publications/1011/financial_managem
ent_in_the_eu.aspx
« Financial management in the European Union : Report
by the Comptroller and Auditor general ». London : The
Stationary Office, 2009. 45 p. (HC 349 Session 2008-2009
:
27
March
2009).
http://www.nao.org.uk/publications/0809/financial_managem
ent_in_the_eu.aspx
STERN Elliot. « Evaluation policy in the European Union
and its institutions ». New directions for evaluation, 2009,
n.
123,
p. 67-85.
SUPREME AUDIT OFFICE OF THE CZECH REPUBLIC
(Prague). « EU Report 2010 : Report on the EU Financial
Management in the CR ». Prague: Supreme Audit Office
of the Czech Republic, 2010. 68 p.
http://www.nku.cz/downloads/eu-report/EU-report-2010EN.pdf
FIGHT AGAINST FRAUD
BUEB Jean-Pierre. « Des entreprises éthiques pour lutter
contre la fraude aux intérêts financiers de l'Union ».
Revue du Marché commun, 2010, n. 538, p. 323-330.
Summary: "La fraude aux fonds européens est une
industrie d’avenir. C’est toujours une entreprise qui,
contrainte ou instigatrice, met en place le procédé
frauduleux. Malgré tous les efforts de l’OLAF et des
organismes nationaux d’investigation, la recherche de
preuves reste difficile. Les risques sont-ils limités lorsque
les entreprises adoptent un comportement éthique?
Depuis une dizaine d’années, les entreprises ont adopté
des "codes of ethics". Mais, en français, une mise au
point lexicographique s’avère indispensable car ce mot
anglo-saxon recouvre des notions très différentes. Les
codes qui existent sont censés mobiliser les employés et
les ouvriers sur la qualité des produits et les cadres sur
les valeurs de l’entreprise. Ils doivent également rassurer
les clients et les actionnaires. Ces codes sont donc des
outils au service des entreprises. Mais ils permettent
également un transfert des responsabilités en cas de
fraude ou de corruption. Ils sont souvent associés à un
dispositif d’alerte : le whistleblowing. Mais ce dispositif
est assez mal accepté car synonyme de délation et il
comporte des risques, aussi bien pour celui qui dénonce
que pour celui qui peut être victime de dénonciation. Le
comportement "éthique" des entreprises est une
nécessité mais il ne supprime pas le risque de fraude : il
rend seulement un peu plus difficile la découverte du vrai
coupable."
CRAIG David, ELLIOTT Matthew. « The great European
rip-off : how the corrupt, wasteful EU is taking control of
our lives ». London : Random House, 2009. 329 p.
DOIG, Alan. « Asking the right questions? : Addressing
corruption and EU accession : the case study of Turkey ».
Journal of Financial Crime, 2010, v. 17, n. 1, p. 9-21.
Summary: “Turkey is currently a candidate for accession
to the European Union (EU), and one of the preconditions is to address corruption. Turkey is also a
member of the Council of Europe and subject to the
GRECO peer-review process on corruption. Various
quantitative and quantitative surveys rank Turkey as
having a continuing corruption problem, while the 2006
GRECO report warned of a lack of progress and proposed
major institutional and other reforms. Turkey’s political
and administrative development, however, may require
the EU to understand that addressing corruption in such
a context may require different answers from those
normally elicited to the usual questions about what is to
be done.”
ENGELBREKT Kjell. « EU enlargement and the
emboldening of institutional integrity in Central and
Eastern Europe : the "tough test" of public
procurement ». European Law Journal, 2011, v. 17, n. 2,
March, p. [230]-251. Abstract : "EU enlargement and the
incorporation of the acquis communautaire are widely
seen as successful and emboldening the integrity of
political, administrative and legal institutions in Central
and Eastern Europe (CEE). The analysis reported here
describes the specific problems associated with affirming
institutional integrity in the field of public procurement,
which constitutes a "tough test". Public procurement is
namely an area where the acquis swiftly gained preeminence in accession states, but whose complex
regulations depend on a well-functioning judiciary,
effective administrative supervision and limited
corruption. The experience in Poland and Bulgaria,
countries that represent different stages of institution
building in this area, is compared. The results suggest
that an EU-compatible public procurement regime is
being consolidated throughout the CEE region. At the
same time, that regime may only work well when
boundaries between institutional subjects, as well as
13
between the spheres of law, politics and economics, are
upheld in post-communist countries."
HOWSE Tricia. « Concluding reflections : towards a new
strategy for anti-fraud cooperation ». Journal of Financial
Crime, 2010, v. 17, n. 1, p. 163-167. General note: Notes
on the EU panel of the British Society of Criminology
Conference, 2009. Summary: “This paper seeks to
examine the prevalence of fraud in the EU, the
weaknesses of the current system in combating it, and to
suggest recommendations for a more effective effort in
this respect.”
INGHELRAM, Jan Frans Hendrik. « Legal and institutional
aspects of the European Anti-Fraud Office (OLAF) : an
analysis with a look forward to a European Public
Prosecutors's Office ». Groningen : Europa Law Publ.,
2011. Contents note: I. The protection of the EU's
financial interests − II. The creation of OLAF − III. OLAF
legal instruments − IV. OLAF's competences − V. Rights of
the defence of persons under investigation by OLAF − VI.
Organisation and institutional position of OLAF − VII.
Supervision of OLAF − VIII. Judicial review of OLAF
investigative acts − IX. A look forward to a European
Public Prosecutor's Office − Conclusion.
LAZZARO, Tullio. « Frodi comunitarie e Corte dei conti ».
2009. 9 p. Intervento tenuto al Convegno "Finanziamenti
comunitari e contrasto alle frodi" Milano, 6 maggio 2009.
http://www.astrid-online.it/Bilancio-d/Studi-ric/LAZZARO_Frodi-comunitarie-e-Corte-conti_06_05_09.pdf
NEAGU, Norel. « Accession blues : modest successes and
major difficulties in Romania ». Journal of Financial
Crime, 2010, v. 17, n. 1, p. 47-60. Summary: “The purpose
of this paper is to analyse the legislation and case law
relevant to preventing and combating fraud affecting the
European Union (EU)’s financial interests in Romania.”
OFFICE EUROPÉEN DE LUTTE ANTI-FRAUDE (OLAF).
« Prévenir la fraude en informant le public : table ronde
sur la communication anti-fraude ». 4. éd. Luxembourg :
OPOCE, 2010. 471 p. Round table on anti-fraud
communication: "Deterring fraud by informing the
public".
http://ec.europa.eu/anti_fraud/olaf-oafcn/rt/c/i_fr.html
QUIRKE Brendan. « Economic crime
competence in the EU », 2009. 20 p.
and
legal
the national levels to fight fraud against the European
budget. It also seeks to consider the experiences of two
new Member States, Romania and the Czech Republic, in
seeking to build effective anti-fraud structures and to cooperate effectively with Brussels.”
TUPMAN William. « Keeping under the radar : watch out
for “Smurfs” ». Journal of Financial Crime, 2010, v. 17, n.
1, p. 151-162. Summary: “The purpose of this paper is to
argue that small-scale, low-value but high-volume fraud
should be pursued as seriously as high-value, organised
crime-related fraud.”
XANTHAKI, Helen. « What is EU fraud? : And can OLAF
really combat it? ». Journal of Financial Crime, 2010, v.
17, n. 1, p. 133-151. Summary: “The purpose of this
paper is to assess the real reasons behind the widely
accepted view that the European Anti-Fraud Office
(OLAF) is not performing to its full potential.”
WHITE, Simone. « EU anti-fraud enforcement :
overcoming obstacles ». Journal of Financial Crime, 2010,
v. 17, n. 1, p. 81-99. Summary: “The purpose of this
paper is to analyse the extent to which the (changing)
European Union (EU) constitutional context impacts on
the investigation of fraud affecting the EU budget, with a
focus on fraud affecting expenditure.”
***
*
The literature cited is available to users at the Court Library.
European Court of Auditors
Library, Documentation and Archive Service
12, rue Alcide De Gasperi
L - 1615 Luxembourg
Tel: + 352 4398 45178
Fax: + 352 4398 46183
[email protected]
http://eca.europa.eu/alipac
The Service is open Monday – Friday: 9.00-13.00 and 14.0017.00. Visitors, especially those from outside the European
institutions, are strongly advised to contact the service in
advance of any visit to
the library and the archives.
http://www.ljmu.ac.uk/AFE/AFE_docs/cibef0109b.pdf
QUIRKE Brendan. « EU Fraud : institutional and legal
competence ». Crime, law and social change, 2009, v. 51,
n. 5, p. 531-547.
QUIRKE, Brendan. « Fighting EU fraud : Why do we make
life difficult for ourselves? ». Journal of financial crime,
2010, v. 17, n. 1, p. 61-80. Summary: “The purpose of this
paper is to examine the arrangements and institutions
that have been put in place at both the transnational and
14

Bibliography on the EU budget (Update 2009

Transcription

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