procurement, purchasing and supply chain management

Transcription

PROCUREMENT, PURCHASING AND
SUPPLY CHAIN MANAGEMENT
RIRL 2010 - Bordeaux September 30th & October 1st, 2010
RIRL 2010 The 8th International Conference on Logistics and SCM Research BEM Bordeaux Management School September 29, 30 and October 1st 2010 Une étude exploratoire de la relation client-fournisseur
en contexte d'achats contraints
Valérie Barbat
BEM Bordeaux Management School, France
[email protected]
Résumé
Bien que négligées par la littérature, les relations où le client est fortement dépendant de ses
fournisseurs existent et peuvent être prédominantes pour certaines entreprises. C'est
notamment le cas des grandes entreprises des secteurs de la défense et de l'aérospatial qui,
au-delà des contraintes de rareté des ressources, de coût de requalification technique, etc., se
trouvent aussi confrontées à la contrainte de retour géographique. Leur environnement,
extrêmement contraint, restreint alors leurs sources d'achat potentielles quand il ne leur
impose pas un fournisseur unique. Dans cette situation, comment le client peut-il assurer la
continuité de ses achats stratégiques, le respect des engagements de ses fournisseurs et
minimiser leurs comportements opportunistes ? Afin de répondre à cette question, notre
recherche repose sur l'étude de cas approfondie d'une filiale d'EADS, Astrium Space
Transportation. Son analyse débouche sur une catégorisation des relations fournisseurs
déterminée selon le degré de contrainte des achats et une description des dispositifs de
pilotage de la relation auxquels recourt l'entreprise cliente.
Mots clefs : relation client-fournisseur, achats contraints, dépendance, pilotage interorganisationnel, Supplier Relationship Management.
1 RIRL 2010 - Bordeaux September 30th & October 1st, 2010
Les entreprises industrielles recourent de plus en plus à l'externalisation afin de réduire leurs
coûts, d'améliorer leur flexibilité, de se recentrer sur leurs principales compétences et, en
définitive, de construire un avantage concurrentiel (Narasimhan et Das, 1999). Avec cette
dynamique industrielle, les achats sont devenus, au cours de cette dernière décennie, une
fonction stratégique (Reid et Plank, 2000 ; Carter et Narasimhan, 1996 ; Nishiguchi, 1994).
Aujourd'hui, praticiens et chercheurs s'accordent sur l'importance des décisions relatives aussi
bien à la sélection des fournisseurs qu'à la gestion de la relation client-fournisseur (RCF) : les
rappels de véhicules automobiles dans le monde entier (Toyota, Honda puis Nissan en 2010)
ou les retards de livraison dans l'aéronautique (les livraisons de l'avion militaire A400M,
n'interviendront pas avant 2011 au lieu de 2009) largement médiatisés, soulignant le rôle
crucial joué par les fournisseurs dans la commercialisation d'un produit et, par extension,
l'enjeu stratégique de la gestion de la relation client-fournisseur (RCF) pour le client. Depuis
les années 80, la compréhension du fonctionnement des échanges entre client et fournisseur
est devenue une préoccupation centrale des chercheurs (Homburg et Kuester, 2001) qui a
fortement évolué pour passer d'une perspective transactionnelle à une approche relationnelle
et d'une analyse dyadique à une analyse plus large des liens inter-organisationnels à travers la
notion de réseau. De nombreuses configurations de la relation client-fournisseur (RCF) ont
ainsi émergé et servi de socle à l'étude de la coordination entre l'entreprise cliente et
fournisseur.
Parmi l'éventail des RCF existantes, nous nous proposons d'étudier une RCF négligée dans la
littérature : la RCF en contexte d'achats contraints. Une RCF est ainsi qualifiée – par nos soins
– lorsque l'entreprise cliente voit son panel de fournisseurs sensiblement réduit, voire imposé,
par son environnement. Dominante dans l'industrie de la défense et de l'aérospatial, cette RCF
peut se rencontrer également, mais de manière plus marginale, dans d'autres secteurs. En
outre, de part sa nature, cette relation concerne des achats stratégiques. Pour toutes ces
raisons, la présente recherche se propose d'explorer cette RCF en privilégiant le point de vue
de l'entreprise cliente. Pour cela, il convient de mener au préalable une réflexion sur les
différentes configurations de RCF et dispositifs de leur pilotage étudiées dans la littérature.
La littérature offre plusieurs référents théoriques en fonction des caractéristiques des
transactions, du rapport pouvoir-dépendance entre les parties, des risques perçus par le
client… Elle est présentée dans un premier paragraphe. En raison de la vocation
compréhensive du projet de recherche, l'étude empirique réalisée est de nature exploratoire et
la méthode d'investigation retenue qualitative. Elle repose sur l'étude de la RCF qu'entretient
Astrium Space Transportation (AST), filiale d'EADS, avec ses fournisseurs et est exposée
dans un deuxième temps. Enfin, les principaux résultats de notre étude de cas sont présentés
et discutés dans un troisième paragraphe.
1. LA REVUE DE LA LITTERATURE
L'objectif de cette revue est d'exposer le cadre théorique dans lequel s'inscrit l'étude. Plus
spécifiquement, il conviendra d'examiner comment les RCF sont appréhendées dans la
littérature afin de caractériser la RCF en contexte d'achats contraints par rapport aux autres
RCF et de fournir un cadre d'analyse adapté à cette relation.
La majorité des typologies des RCF proposées par la littérature sont établies à partir de deux
critères, soit l'intensité relationnelle1, soit la dépendance des acteurs.
Les typologies basées sur l'intensité relationnelle s'inscrivent dans la théorie de l'échange
relationnel qui s'est développée au début des années 80 avec l'ouvrage de Macneil (1980).
Cette approche, privilégiant la dimension évolutive des échanges inter-organisationnels,
s'oppose à la logique transactionnelle de l'échange. Pour les tenants de cette approche, les
relations inter-organisationnelles n'existent pas de facto. Elles se construisent à partir des
attentes mutuelles et du degré d'implication de chacune des parties suivant un processus au
cours duquel des normes relationnelles se développent. Dyer, Schurr et Oh (1987) font ainsi le
parallèle entre le développement et les caractéristiques des RCF et l'institution du mariage en
intégrant les notions de confiance, de solidarité, de congruence des buts, de satisfaction
mutuelle… A partir de cette métaphore, ils décomposent le processus de développement de la
relation en cinq phases depuis la prise de conscience jusqu'à la dissolution en passant par
l'exploration, l'expansion et l'engagement.
Dans son ouvrage, Macneil (1980) s'attache à distinguer l'échange discret et l'échange
relationnel. Il suggère de classer les RCF sur un continuum allant des transactions discrètes (à
très faible intensité relationnelle) aux échanges relationnels (à intensité relationnelle forte). La
distinction entre ces deux extrémités repose sur la durée de la relation mais aussi sur la
présence de normes relationnelles plus ou moins élevées. Ces normes relationnelles sont des
codes de conduite, telles que la réputation, l'implication, la solidarité…, qui se construisent au
1
L'intensité relationnelle est déterminée par les comportements des acteurs de l'échange (Lefaix-Durand et al.,
2006) tels que l'engagement (évalué par le degré d'acceptation de la relation et la propension des acteurs à mettre
un terme à cette relation, la coopération (évaluée par l'action conjointe et la résolution des conflits), la
communication (évaluée par le partage d'informations pertinentes) et la confiance.
cours de la relation et qui agissent comme des mécanismes de gouvernance. Ainsi la
transaction discrète est unique et exclut tout élément relationnel tandis que l'échange
relationnel s'inscrit sur le long terme et se caractérise par des normes relationnelles élevées
concourant à la régulation des échanges relationnels et à la réduction des comportements
opportunistes (Wang et Wei, 2007 ; Heide John, 1992). Dans la même veine, des chercheurs
opposent deux types antinomiques de RCF (Helper et Sako, 1995) : les relations "distantes"
(arm's length relationships) ou "antagonistes" (antagonistic transactions) à faible intensité
relationnelle et au sein desquelles chaque acteur considère l'autre comme un rival (Watts, Kim
et Hahne, 1992) et les relations coopératives et étroites (close-cooperative or
collaborative/voice relationships) caractérisées par un échange d'informations et un
engagement des partenaires élevés. Entre ces deux relations extrêmes, d'autres chercheurs
définissent une palette plus ou moins large de RCF intermédiaires (Laing et Lian, 2005 ;
Donaldson et O'Toole, 2000; Dyer, Cho et Chu, 1998 ; Mudambi et Helper, 1998 ; Webster,
1992).
Les travaux appréhendant les RCF comme des relations de pouvoir et de dépendance à l'égard
des ressources s'inscrivent dans la théorie de la dépendance des ressources. Cette théorie se
focalise sur l'importance des variables environnementales dans la compréhension du
processus de décision des organisations et postule que les entreprises, n'étant pas en situation
d'autosuffisance pour répondre à leurs besoins, doivent acquérir des ressources auprès
d'organisations extérieures. Il en résulte une dépendance, plus ou moins déséquilibrée, envers
les organisations qui détiennent ces ressources et une incertitude dans la prise de décision de
l'entreprise. Pfeffer et Salancik (1978) déterminent trois facteurs d'évaluation de la
dépendance d'une organisation : l'importance de la ressource pour l'organisation dépendante,
le caractère exclusif ou non de l'organisation pouvant fournir la ressource et l'étendue du
pouvoir de cette dernière sur la ressource qu'elle possède. La dépendance est, en outre,
inversement corrélée au pouvoir. Or le pouvoir d'une organisation sur une autre n'est jamais
total. Chaque acteur de la relation en détient une parcelle (la détention d'informations non
partagées, la possibilité d'agir de manière plus ou moins zélée…). Il existe également une
"asymétrie du pouvoir" (Pfeffer et Salancik, 1978) dans la mesure où l'échange ne revêt
généralement pas la même importance pour les entreprises impliquées dans un échange.
Variable explicative des relations inter-organisationnelles, la dépendance et, dans une
moindre mesure son corollaire le pouvoir, est utilisée par les chercheurs comme facteur
d'identification des types de RCF (Donada et Nogatchewsky, 2008 ; Tangpong et al, 2008 ;
Cox, 2001 ; Bensaou, 1999 ; Heide, 1994). Il convient de signaler que la première typologie
des RCF basée sur la dépendance des acteurs de l'échange est proposée dès 1987 par Dwyer,
Schurr et Oh et s'inscrit dans la théorie des échanges relationnels. Dwyer, Schurr et Oh
distinguent quatre types de RCF2 : les échanges discrets qui traduisent l'indépendance des
deux parties, les relations caractérisées par la dépendance du fournisseur, les relations
caractérisées par la dépendance de l'entreprise cliente et les relations bilatérales définies par
l'interdépendance (c'est-à-dire la mutualité de dépendance entre les acteurs). La dépendance
est ici déterminée par la spécificité des actifs engagés dans cette relation et par certains
facteurs liés à l'environnement de l'échange (tels que la rareté des ressources). Elle se crée
naturellement à l'occasion d'épisodes d'interaction répétés entre les acteurs et s'amplifie tout
au long du processus de développement de la relation. Contrairement à ce que suggèrent les
travaux de la théorie de l'échange relationnel, la théorie de la dépendance des ressources
maintient que la rareté des ressources nuit à la coopération des organisations, ces dernières
ayant intérêt à développer des stratégies d'évitement de l'influence des organisations
détentrices des ressources à acquérir (Nogatchewsky, 2004).
Malgré leur finalité descriptive, les typologies ébauchent des prescriptions quant aux
stratégies relationnelles à poursuivre et aux dispositifs de gouvernance à mettre en œuvre.
Principalement trois théories se consacrent, dans la littérature, à l'étude respective des
mécanismes de gouvernance de la RCF (tableau 1) : la théorie de l'agence, la théorie de
l'échange relationnel et la théorie de la dépendance des ressources. Récemment, des travaux
consacrés au contrôle inter-organisationnel retiennent une approche intégrative de ces
mécanismes (Donada et Nogatchewsky, 2008 ; Fernandes, 2007 ; Nogatchewsky, 2006).
Des divergences apparaissent concernant la question de la complémentarité ou de la
substituabilité des mécanismes formels par la confiance ou, plus largement, par les
mécanismes informels de la gouvernance des RCF (Beaujolin-Bellet et Nogatchewsky 2005 ;
Nogatchewsky, 2004) : pour les uns, le contrôle formel détruit la confiance, pour les autres,
mécanismes formels et informels sont complémentaires pour créer un climat de confiance.
2
La typologie qu'ils proposent étant basée sur la dépendance des parties et non sur l'intensité relationnelle, nous
choisissons, par commodité et souci de clarté, de présenter leur typologie dans ce paragraphe.
Tableau 1 – Théories et mécanismes de gouvernance de la RCF
Théorie
•
•
•
de l'agence
de l'échange
relationnel
de la
dépendance
des
ressources
Idée force
Mécanisme de gouvernance
En situation de divergence
d'intérêts et de partage des risques
entre l'entreprise cliente et le
fournisseur, d'une part, et
d'asymétrie informationnelle,
d'autre part, le contrat est en
mesure de créer les conditions
nécessaires et suffisantes à
l'émergence et à la stabilité de
leur coopération.
Le contrat
- Les normes relationnelles
telles que la solidarité, le
partage de l'information, la
volonté des deux parties de faire
des ajustements lorsque des
changements apparaissent,
l'harmonisation des conflits…
(Macneil, 1980 ; Heide et John,
1992 ; Brown et al. 2000 ;
Cannon et al. 2000).
- La confiance (Donada et
Nogatchewski, 2007)
Tout au long du processus
relationnel, des mécanismes de
régulation sociaux et implicites se
développent et permettent la
coordination des échanges.
A partir de l'identification des
différentes démonstrations du
pouvoir dans la RCF six stratégies
d'influence d'un acteur sur l'autre
sont identifiées.
- La menace
- L'argument juridique
- La promesse
- La requête
- La recommandation
- L'échange d'information
Nature du
mécanisme de
coordination
Formelle
Informelle
Informelle
Coercitive ?
oui
oui
débat
non
non
non
Pour d'autres, "le débat est désormais pratiquement clos" (Lefaix-Durand et al, 2006) : les
mécanismes de gouvernance informels et formels se complètent ou se substituent les uns aux
autres selon le stade de développement du processus relationnel et l'évolution des conditions
d'échange. En outre, les liens entre stratégies d'influence et dépendance étudiés dans la
littérature, et recensés par Nogatchewsky (2004) dans la figure 1, montrent que plus
l'amplitude de l'interdépendance entre les acteurs de l'échange relationnel est forte, plus
l'équilibre entre mécanismes formels et mécanismes informels pencherait en faveur des
derniers et moins les parties adopteraient une stratégie d'influence coercitive.
Figure 1. Les effets de la dépendance sur les stratégies d'influence
Situations d'asymétrie de dépendance
1.
La dépendance unilatérale
Acteur
dominant
Acteur
dépendant
Stratégie
d'influence
coercitive
Stratégie de
résistance à
l'influence
Conséquences
Une relation fragilisée dans la
durée
Peu de confiance
Accroissement du conflit
relationnel
Réduction de la satisfaction des
parties
2. La dépendance bilatérale
modérée
Si besoin de
coordination
faible
Si besoin de
coordination
plus élevé
Stratégie
d'influence
coercitive de la
part de l'acteur
dominant
Stratégie
d'influence
moins coercitive
de la part de
l'acteur dominant
Conséquences
Stratégie
autodestructrice à terme
Plus grande
implication des
acteurs
Renforcement de
la dépendance
des acteurs
3. L'interdépendance
Plus l'amplitude de
l'interdépendance est forte,
moins les parties adoptent
des stratégies d'influence
coercitive
Conséquences
Développement des
normes relationnelles et de
la confiance
Amélioration de la
performance des parties
Les travaux dédiés plus spécifiquement au SRM (Supplier Relationship Management)
montrent, quant à eux, que les stratégies de gouvernance varient selon le cycle de vie du
management de la relation par l'entreprise cliente (Moeller et al, 2006). Pour finir, il convient
d'aborder la notion de risque. Ainsi, Salle et Sylvestre (1992) soulignent le rôle moteur du
risque perçu sur le comportement du client au sein de la RCF. Trois types de risques sont
identifiés : les risques liés aux caractéristiques des transactions (qui sont fonction de l'enjeu de
l'achat pour le client, de la disponibilité des produits…), les risques liés à la nature de la RCF
(risques de dépendance et risques relatifs à l'engagement du fournisseur dans la relation) et les
risques liés à la position du client face au marché des inputs (qui sont en fonction des enjeux
de sécurisation et d'amélioration de la performance du client sur le marché de l'offre).
Finalement la littérature offre une palette étendue de RCF au sein de laquelle il conviendra de
positionner la RCF en contexte d'achats contraints, son décryptage étant permis grâce aux
concepts et aux théories mobilisées dans notre revue de la littérature.
2. LA METHODOLOGIE DE L'ETUDE
Après avoir exposé les modalités de notre étude empirique, le contexte du cas étudié est
décrit.
2.1.
Une étude de cas de nature exploratoire
En raison de la vocation compréhensive du projet de recherche, l'étude empirique réalisée est
de nature exploratoire et la méthode d'investigation retenue qualitative. Elle a duré seize mois
au cours desquels nous avons interrogé à plusieurs reprises deux interlocuteurs privilégiés de
la direction « Programme Sourcing » d'EADS Astrium Space Transportation (AST) : le "Head
of Mechanical Equipment and Infrastructures Sourcing" et un "Supplier Relationship
Manager". Chaque entretien a fait l'objet d'un enregistrement. Le planning des entretiens ainsi
que les thématiques abordées sont décrits dans le tableau 2.
Tableau 2 - Présentation signalétique des entretiens
Date
11 octobre
2007
Durée
1h
16 novembre
2007
1h
16 novembre
2007
1h
24 avril 2008
1h45
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
4 juin 2008
2h15
•
•
•
3 juillet 2008
1h45
•
9 février 2009
3h
•
•
Thématiques
Définition de la problématique et description du contexte
Mise en place de la procédure de recueil d'informations
Signature de l'engagement personnel de confidentialité
Présentation de l'activité transport spatial civil
Présentation des acteurs concernés
Identification des contraintes de cette activité
Présentation de l'activité transport spatial et militaire
Présentation des acteurs concernés
Identification des contraintes de cette activité
Vérification de la bonne compréhension de l'activité transport spatial
militaire
Vérification de la liste des parties prenantes identifiées lors du précédent
entretien
Approfondissement du rôle de maître d'œuvre d'AST
Approfondissement des relations d'AST avec les parties prenantes de
l'activité transport spatial et militaire
Identification d'une typologie des relations contraintes AST-fournisseurs
pour l'activité transport spatial et militaire
Identification des différents leviers d'action en possession d'AST pour gérer
les relations avec ses fournisseurs et éviter des comportements
"opportunistes"
Présentation de la solution organisationnelle reposant en partie sur des SRM
Soumission d'une synthèse des entretiens réalisés et sa validation auprès des
interlocuteurs
Compte tenu du chiffre d'affaires réalisé par deux des quatre business divisions3 d'AST
(environ 75 %) – "Lanceur" et "Défense" – nous avons décidé, avec nos interlocuteurs
d'EADS AST, de concentrer notre étude sur les activités qu'elles recouvrent et, plus
particulièrement, les programmes Ariane 5 et M51. Nos entretiens semi-directifs ont été
complétés par des documents internes tels que des plaquettes de présentations, des documents
de travail, des présentations power point … L'analyse des données retenue découle de la
codification des entretiens semi-directifs. Le choix des unités d'analyse a été réalisé en
fonction des objectifs de la recherche. Elles sont au nombre de quatre : le rôle d'AST dans la
supply chain, les contraintes de la supply chain, la nature des RCF et les dispositifs de
pilotage de ses RCF.
2.2.
Le contexte du cas
Il convient, ici, de se focaliser sur la filiale AST4 d'EADS Astrium et, plus particulièrement,
sur les enjeux liés à son rôle de maître d'œuvre dans la supply chain aussi bien au sein du
programme civil Ariane 5 que du programme militaire M51.
AST est maître d'œuvre unique ("prime contractor") du transport spatial civil et militaire ce
qui lui confère un rôle particulièrement stratégique dans la chaîne de fournisseurs en raison :
-
d'une part de la nature des programmes qui s'inscrivent dans des cycles long de
développement industriel et sont particulièrement coûteux : quelques milliards d'euros
pour Ariane 5 et le M51
-
d'autre part, la nature des lanceurs. Ces derniers sont produits en petite série et ne sont pas
réutilisables. Cela implique qu'ils ne peuvent pas faire l'objet d'essais en vol et, par
conséquent, qu'ils doivent être parfaitement opérationnels pour leur unique utilisation.
Ainsi pour Ariane 5 (encadré 1), AST se voit confier la responsabilité de la coordination des
contrats associés et la livraison en temps et en heure d'un lanceur complet et testé à ses
commanditaires Arianespace et l'ESA (European Space Agency) 5, en plus de la fabrication de
3
Les activités d'AST sont regroupées en quatre business divisions (BD) : la BD Lanceurs (lanceurs civils), la BD
Défense (lanceurs militaires), la BD Systèmes Orbitaux et la BD Propulsion et Equipements.
4
Spécialisée dans les lanceurs et les infrastructures orbitales, AST conçoit, développe et produit les lanceurs de
la famille Ariane, le laboratoire Columbus et le cargo spatial ATV pour la Station Spatiale Internationale, des
véhicules de rentrée atmosphérique, les missiles de la Force de dissuasion française, des systèmes propulsifs et
des équipements spatiaux.
5
Pour l'activité lanceur, AST a pour unique client Arianespace dont il détient environ 30% du capital.
Arianespace, première société mondiale de service et solutions de lancement, est en charge de la
commercialisation d'Ariane 5 et des lanceurs Soyuz et Vega ainsi que de la conduite des opérations de lancement
depuis la Centre Spatial Guyanais (CSG). A ces côtés, l'ESA, fondée le 31 mai 1975, a pour mission de
trois sous-ensembles principaux d'Ariane 5 – que sont le premier étage cryogénique, l'étage
supérieur et la case à équipements – et de l'adaptateur de charge utile. Or, la production
d'Ariane 5 fait intervenir plus de 1000 fournisseurs. Pour les principaux tronçons du lanceur,
l'annexe 1 indique les fournisseurs concernés. Néanmoins, parmi ces fournisseurs seulement
quatre réalisent une majeure partie du montant des contrats de fourniture d'Ariane 5. En tant
que maitre d'œuvre, AST s'engage auprès de son client à respecter ses exigences en matière de
qualité, de coûts et de délais : "Nous livrons ce que nous promettons". Cet engagement,
omniprésent dans les plaquettes de présentation d'Astrium, est au cœur des valeurs de
l'entreprise. En effet, en tant que "prime contractor", AST doit supporter les pénalités de
retard dues à un défaut de qualité et reportant un lancement d'Ariane 5. Celles-ci s'élèvent très
vite à plusieurs millions d'euros même si la pièce défectueuse ne coûte que quelques milliers
d'euros. La maîtrise d'œuvre recouvre également le développement du projet. Pour des projets
à cycle long6, il s'avère important pour AST de se voir confier par l'ESA la phase de
développement du futur lanceur. Cela pérennise son rôle de maître d'œuvre et lui assure à long
terme une partie de la production en série7 du nouveau lanceur, à l'instar des autres
fournisseurs associés aux futurs développements d'Ariane.
Dans le domaine de la défense (encadré 1), la maîtrise d'œuvre recouvre la responsabilité du
pilotage et de la gestion de l'ensemble du processus industriel pour le compte de la DGA8 –
le client –, l'utilisateur étant la FOST9. Elle comporte principalement trois phases :
-
Le développement du missile : cette phase prend fin avec la qualification du missile.
-
La production : cette phase englobe la fabrication et la livraison des sous-ensembles sur la
base opérationnelle de l'île Longue (Presqu'île de Crozon), site où le missile est assemblé
et embarqué sur les SNLE (sous-marins nucléaires lanceurs d'engins).
-
Le maintien en condition opérationnelle du missile sur le site de l'île Longue.
"développer à des fins exclusivement pacifiques la coopération entre Etats européens dans les domaines de la
recherche et la technologie spatiales et leurs applications spatiales, en vue de leur utilisation à des fins
scientifiques" (Convention portant sur la création d'une Agence spatiale européenne, Article II, Missions). Elle
coordonne ainsi les projets spatiaux de 18 pays européens qui ne sont pas tous nécessairement membres de
l'Union européenne. L'ESA est également copropriétaire du CSG de Kourou, qu'elle finance au deux tiers.
6
C'est le cas pour le futur lanceur Ariane 5ME (Midlife Evolution) pour lequel AST s'est vu confier la première
phase de développement à la fin de l'année 2009. La mise en service de ce lanceur est prévue vers 2017.
7
La production en série correspond dans ce cas a environ 5 à 7 lanceurs par an.
8
La DGA, Délégation Générale pour l'Armement, en tant que maître d'ouvrage des programmes d'armement, est
responsable de la conception, de l'acquisition et de l'évaluation des systèmes qui équipent les forces armées
françaises. Elle est le premier investisseur de l'Etat et les contrats passés par la DGA représentent plus de 60% de
l'activité de l'industrie française de l'armement. 9
La FOST, Force Océanique Stratégique, est, quant à elle, la composante principale de la force nucléaire
stratégique en France et se voit ainsi confier la majeure partie des armes stratégiques françaises. Elle est en
charge de la base opérationnelle de l'île Longue.
Encadré 1. Les acteurs des filières industrielles du programme Ariane 5 et du programme
M51
Programme Ariane 5
Programme M51
Les fournisseurs
Les fournisseurs
Les équipementiers
Rangs 1 et 2
Les équipementiers
Rangs 1 et 2
AST Prime contractor
Actionnaires
d'Arianespace
AST Prime contractor
Client : la DGA
Ministère de la Défense
Client ARIANESPACE
ou
ESA
Utilisateur : la FOST
Marine Nationale
Client final : opérateurs
de satellites privés et
gouvernementaux
G2P10, DCNS11 et Thales sont parmi les trois principaux fournisseurs de ce programme. On
trouve également une petite dizaine de fournisseurs de Moyens Mécaniques ou Infrastructures
Sol (Bâtiments spéciaux, Moyens de manutention et d'assemblage, Ponts roulants sécurisés,
Moyens de transport…), dont un petit nombre qui concentre une majeure partie du chiffre
d'affaires sous-traité pour cette famille d'achats. Ils interviennent majoritairement sur la base
opérationnelle de l'île Longue.
3. PRESENTATION ET DISCUSSION DES RESULTATS
Conformément aux objectifs fixés, les résultats de notre étude offrent une description :
10
G2P est un GIE composé de SNECMA Propulsion Solide et de SME (SNPE Matériaux Energétiques).
Héritière de la DCN, Directions des Constructions Navales, la DCNS est l'expert européen des systèmes
navals militaires (bâtiment de surface, sous-marins conventionnels et nucléaires, système de combats…) tant
pour l'entretien (maintien en condition opérationnelle) que pour les constructions neuves. Incorporée lors de sa
création dans la DGA, elle fût une administration publique avant de devenir une entreprise de droit privé en juin
2003. L'Etat français en est encore actionnaire à 75 %. En 2007, elle a racheté la branche "Systèmes naval" du
Groupe Thales.
11
-
des configurations relationnelles d'AST basées sur l'intensité des contraintes d'achat que
l'entreprise rencontre ;
-
et des dispositifs de pilotage de ces relations qu'elle utilise afin d'amener les fournisseurs à
agir dans le sens de ses attentes.
3.1. Configurations des RCF selon l'intensité des contraintes d'achat
Afin de comprendre les contraintes d'achat rencontrées par AST, il convient de rappeler les
trois caractéristiques fondamentales du secteur de l'espace12 :
- sa dimension technologique ;
- son marché final étatique et commercial : si le marché final des lanceurs militaires est
exclusivement étatique et, par conséquent, emprunt d'une certaine stabilité, celui des lanceurs
spatiaux est par essence plus cyclique car fortement lié au secteur des télécommunications.
- sa dimension stratégique et militaire : source récurrente d'activités et d'innovation, la défense
a permis le développement des technologies qui ont débouché sur des applications civiles, en
particulier le lanceur Ariane. Or l'ensemble des applications de l'industrie de l'espace, aussi
bien dans le domaine militaire que dans le domaine civil, sont essentielles dans l'affirmation
d'une réelle souveraineté politique nationale (pour le domaine des lanceurs militaires) ou
européenne (pour le domaine des lanceurs civils). Il en résulte que les deux principaux
donneurs d'ordres de cette industrie sont, en Europe, des émanations d'un ou plusieurs Etats :
la DGA et Arianespace via l'ESA.
En raison de ces caractéristiques apparaissent trois contraintes typiques – en plus des
contraintes plus classiques liées aux performances techniques et de qualité exigées – qui
déterminent fortement les politiques d'achat des acteurs de l'industrie spatiale.
Contrainte 1 : le retour géographique
Pour le programme Ariane 5, AST n'est pas totalement libre du choix des fournisseurs. Il doit
respecter des conditions de "retour géographique" qui font du lanceur Ariane 5 un meccano à
l'échelle européenne. Le financement du programme Ariane 5 est assuré par 12 pays
européens, sous la coordination de l'ESA, bailleur de fonds. L'ESA fonctionne sur la base de
la règle du retour géographique (ou "juste retour") en reversant environ 95 % (les 5% restant
12
Cf. Allocution de M. Maquet, Vice President Institutional Relations EADS Space, intitulée "L'espace au cœur
de la politique de sécurité et de défense de l'Europe" et prononcée le 27 mars 2006 lors de la Commission
Défense.
étant liés aux frais généraux de l'agence) de son budget sous forme de contrats avec des
entreprises nationales, en fonction du financement apporté par le pays dans le projet. Les pays
financent le programme en fonction de leurs intérêts et de leur entreprise. Cette contrainte
n'existe pas dans le domaine de la Défense.
Contrainte 2 : la nature du lien entre certains fournisseurs et le client de la filière
Arianespace est détenue par une vingtaine d'actionnaires de nationalités européennes
différentes. Les principaux actionnaires sont le CNES (Centre National d'Etudes Spatiales)13
et l'ensemble des sociétés industrielles européennes participant au programme Ariane parmi
lesquelles se trouvent le groupe EADS, le groupe Safran14, MT Aerospace (Allemand) et
Avio (Italie) ainsi que des entreprises suisses, danoises, suédoises… Par conséquent, ces
entreprises sont à la fois actionnaires et fournisseurs d'Arianespace (Cf. encadré 1). Cette
situation renforce considérablement l'interdépendance des gros fournisseurs d'Ariane 5 et
impacte le pouvoir de négociation d'AST, maître d'œuvre : ses principaux fournisseurs étant
également, pour partie, ses clients, la négociation commerciale sur les prix devient plus
difficile. Dans le domaine de la défense, ce lien d'actionnariat n'existe pas en tant que tel.
Néanmoins, il existe deux fournisseurs historiques de la DGA (lien historique) qui, par le
passé, était ses interlocuteurs directs dans les projets défense : DCNS et G2P. A ce titre, ils
sont des fournisseurs incontournables du programme M51 et, de fait, les principaux
partenaires de la BD Défense d'AST puisqu'ils réalisent une partie importante des contrats de
fourniture du M51.
Contrainte 3 : la protection du secret
En raison de la nature hautement stratégique des programmes défense, les fournisseurs sont
soumis à deux dispositions légales émanant du gouvernement français :
-
l'habilitation "Confidentiel Défense" : pour intervenir sans accompagnement sur la BO de
l'île Longue, tout fournisseur doit être qualifié "confidentiel défense". Or les exigences de
cette habilitation sont, par nature, difficiles à obtenir. Cette habilitation est aussi requise
pour manipuler des données classifiées ;
13
Le CNES est à l'origine de nombreux projets spatiaux (lanceurs et satellites). Il agit aujourd'hui comme
autorité de conception et de qualification pour le compte de l'Etat français et joue aussi le rôle d'assistant au
maître d'ouvrage, l'ESA, pour les nouveaux développements.
14
Safran est un groupe international, spécialisé dans les hautes technologies. Ses activités sont réparties en
quatre branches : propulsion aéronautique et spatiale, Equipements aéronautiques, Défense Sécurité et
Communciations. Parmi ses sociétés filiales, on trouve Snecma Services, Snecma Propulsions solide,
Turbomeca, Europropulsion (50%), Messier-Bugatti, Sagem avionique, Sagem Optronique et Défense ou encore
Sagem Télécommunications.
-
la disposition "Spéciale France" ("For French eyes only") spécifie, quant à elle, que les
activités de sous-traitance ne peuvent être confiées à des entreprises étrangères.
Plus largement, le recours aux fournisseurs, y compris de rang inférieur, nécessite
l'autorisation technique du client DGA. Il en est de même pour le programme Ariane 5 où
l'autorisation technique d'Arianespace et de l'ESA est nécessaire. En revanche, à très bas
niveau de la pyramide, la BD Lanceur peut librement sélectionner ses fournisseurs.
Néanmoins, les coûts de requalification, de justification, de démonstration des pièces et des
sous-ensembles sont tellement lourds, qu'un changement de fournisseur devient malaisé.
L'existence de ces dispositions et autorisations limitent ainsi considérablement l'éventail de
fournisseurs que peuvent solliciter les deux BD d'AST.
En définitive, la majorité des achats d'AST se singularise par un marché des inputs
particulièrement contraint. Trois configurations de relations entre AST et ses fournisseurs
émergent alors de nos entretiens et se distinguent selon l'intensité de contrainte vécue par les
acheteurs : les relations ultra-contraintes, les relations moyennement contraintes et les
relations faiblement contraintes.
Ces RCF sont décrites dans le tableau 3 au regard des critères suivants : les caractéristiques
des fournisseurs concernés, l'enjeu de la situation d'achat, la nature de la dépendance entre les
acteurs, la nature de la relation, la nature des risques pour AST et les enjeux de la
coordination pour AST.
3.2. Les dispositifs de pilotage relationnel
En raison d'un contexte d'achats fortement contraints, la dépendance d'AST vis-à-vis de ses
fournisseurs est élevée. Afin de piloter les relations avec ses fournisseurs, elle recourt à divers
dispositifs de gouvernance qui varient selon le cycle de vie du management de la relation et
de la configuration de la RCF.
Tableau 3. Configurations des relations entre AST et ses fournisseurs
Relations ultra-contraintes (RUC)
Caractéristiques des
fournisseurs
concernés
Enjeu de la situation
d'achat
Nature de la
dépendance
Nature la relation
Nature des risques
pour AST
Enjeux de la
coordination pour
AST
Il s'agit de quelques fournisseurs, de grande taille, qui
réalisent une majeure partie des fournitures d'Ariane 5 et
du M51, souvent incontournables, parfois pour des raisons
historiques. La relation contractuelle est sur le modèle de
la sous-traitance. Mais, dans les faits, ces fournisseurs sont
davantage des partenaires.
Achats hautement stratégiques pour AST car
principalement relatifs à la propulsion des missiles et
lanceurs, ainsi qu'aux opérations sur le site de la Base
Opérationnelle de l'île Longue.
Interdépendance très élevée
car
- Fournisseurs incontournables pour AST
- Fournisseurs liés au client (actionnaires d'Arianespace ou
relations historiques avec la DGA) et donc très impliqués
dans les programmes
Pérenne, étroite, orientée client, partage des risques
1/ Risques liés aux transactions :
- Risque financier élevé
- Risque lié à la disponibilité des produits élevé
- Risque technique élevé
2/ Risque lié à la relation avec le fournisseur élevé car
existence d'un ticket de sortie de la relation très fort pour
AST en raison de la règle du retour géographique
Le respect des engagements de qualité, de délais et de
coûts
La capacité pour AST d'assumer son rôle de "prime
contractor" vis-à-vis de fournisseurs puissants et
historiques aussi bien d'Arianespace que de la DGA.
Relations moyennement contraintes
(RMC)
Il s'agit des autres fournisseurs d'Ariane
5
Achats importants mais moins
stratégiques car ne représentant que 30%
du programme Ariane 5
Il s'agit principalement des fournisseurs de Moyens
Mécaniques ou de Moyens Infrastructure Sol du
M51. On y trouve aussi les fournisseurs de "petits
équipements ou sous-équipements" ainsi que les
sous-traitants de fabrication ("Built-to-Print" par
opposition à "Built-to-Specification")
Achats importants mais non stratégiques
Dépendance bilatérale en raison de la
contrainte de retour géographique et de
l'implication forte des fournisseurs dans
le programme qu'elle sous-tend mais plus
modérée
Dépendance élevée d'AST car panel de fournisseurs
restreint
Pérenne, orientée client
Les risques liés aux transactions sont
moins élevés que dans le cas des RUC
Le risque lié à la relation est élevé en
raison de la contrainte de retour
géographique
Plus instable / parfois très ponctuelle
Risque technique faible mais contrainte de sûreté
élevée pour les fournisseurs qui interviennent sur la
BO de l'île Longue. Néanmoins, des compétences
spécifiques peuvent être attendues en raison de la
manipulation d'objets pyro-nucléaires par certains
de ces fournisseurs.
Le risque lié à la relation existe, même s'il est
moins fort que dans le cas des RUC et RM, car
panel de fournisseurs restreints en raison de la
contrainte d'habilitation "Condidentiel Défense".
Le respect des engagements de qualité, de délais et
de coûts
Le respect des engagements de qualité,
de délais et de coûts
15 Relations faiblement contraintes (RFC)
En phase amont, chaque fournisseur doit se soumettre à des spécifications et procédures
propres à chaque programme, définies par le client et particulièrement contraignantes. Pour le
programme Ariane 5, les spécifications de management portent sur : l'organisation industrielle
(indiquant le cadre dans lequel le fournisseur intervient), l'organigramme technique (les
modalités selon lesquelles le fournisseur doit définir et structurer les composantes de son
produits), la conduite des travaux, la gestion de la configuration (la transmission des
informations nécessaires à la connaissance de l'état de définition du lanceur) et l'assurance
qualité et sûreté de fonctionnement adaptée des standards d'assurance qualité en vigueur dans
le domaine spatial. Nos entretiens ont également révélé le recours aux perspectives exposées
au fournisseur de pouvoir participer à d'autres programmes d'AST, voire d'Astrium ou
d'EADS si ce dernier donne pleinement satisfaction dans le programme pour lequel il est
sélectionné. Afin de contrer de manière plus radicale les contraintes imposées par son
environnement, AST dispose d'un troisième outil lié à son statut de maître d'œuvre : la
possibilité sur un nouveau programme d'internaliser tout ou une partie d'une activité
jusqu'alors externalisée dans les programmes précédents, à condition de disposer des
ressources et des compétences pour le faire.
En phase de gestion de la relation fournisseur, la palette des mécanismes de pilotage s'étoffe.
Parmi ceux-là, le contrat joue un rôle crucial pour AST. En effet, le pouvoir d'AST réside
dans son expertise, à savoir sa capacité à maîtriser le process industriel inhérent à son statut de
maître d'œuvre. Ainsi, l'élaboration du contrat entérine AST dans son rôle de maître d'œuvre,
c'est-à-dire d'interlocuteur direct de l'ensemble des fournisseurs pour la totalité du processus
industriel. Outre le fait de spécifier le périmètre d'intervention de chacun des acteurs de la
supply chain, le contrat sert aussi à anticiper les sources de conflits liés aux retards, aux
défauts de qualité ou aux surcoûts grâce à la mise en place d'un système détaillé de pénalités.
Dans les autres cas, un dispositif que nous qualifions de "menace" nous a été décrit.
Lorsqu'AST travaille sur des programmes de développement avec l'ASE, il est moins
contraint de recourir aux fournisseurs du programme Ariane 5. Par ce biais, il s'informe des
prix pratiqués par les fournisseurs "out". S'ils sont inférieurs à ceux pratiqués par les
fournisseurs "in", cette information devient un levier de pression sur ces derniers. Des efforts
leur sont alors demandés s'ils veulent être retenus ou renforcer leur activité dans le
programme futur. Enfin, il est apparu à plusieurs reprises au cours des entretiens que les
acteurs de la supply chain, en particulier ceux des rangs 1 et 2, étaient pleinement conscients
d'appartenir à des réseaux économiques œuvrant pour un intérêt commun supérieur : l'intérêt
national et l'enjeu de la dissuasion (pour le programme M51) et l'enjeu de la conquête spatiale
européenne (pour le programme Ariane 5).
Plus largement, le management des fournisseurs s'inscrit dans un processus organisationnel de
management des sous-contrats visant à optimiser l'interface entre le fournisseur et des
personnes dédiées au sein d'AST, à renforcer la coordination des messages vers les
fournisseurs, de poursuivre l'amélioration continue de la chaîne d'approvisionnement et le
partage des "Best practices" internes et externes. La coordination des interfaces avec le
fournisseur est permise grâce au Supplier Relationship Manager (SRM) qui est responsable de
la performance et des plans d'amélioration du ou des fournisseurs qu'il gère. C'est lui qui
surveille l'ensemble des risques relatifs à ses fournisseurs. Il anime une équipe constituée de
trois fonctions : Technical Product Manager (expert technique du contrat), Procurement
Manager (garant du contrat) et Quality Engineer (garant de la qualité produit). Enfin, il a une
vue transversale de l'interface avec le fournisseur (négociations, évaluation globale de la
performance, plan d'action) pour l'ensemble des programmes et des phases d'intervention
(développement / production) concernés. Cette organisation permet de mieux piloter la RCF
en limitant les comportements opportunistes.
Selon le degré de contrainte de la RCF, les dispositifs de pilotage privilégiés varient. Dans le
cas des relations ultra-contraintes, AST recourt surtout aux mécanismes formels que sont le
contrat, les pénalités attenantes et les spécifications de management. Cette observation est à
rapprocher de la description du partenariat (configuration de contrôle basée sur
l'interdépendance) proposée par Donada et Nogatchewsky (2008) et est régi, selon ces
auteures, par un contrôle bureaucratique structuré. Pour les relations moyennement
contraintes, l'influence d'AST s'accroît ainsi que le recours à des mécanismes plus coercitifs
tels que la menace ou la promesse (de perspectives exposées au fournisseur par exemple).
Pour les fournisseurs majeurs de l'industrie, et généralement ultra-contraints, comme pour
AST, il existe une culture commune de l'intérêt national et européen qui semble agir comme
une norme relationnelle facilitatrice de la gestion des conflits. Notons toutefois, qu'aucune
autre norme relationnelle n'a été appréhendée lors des entretiens et que cette norme semble
plus liée aux spécificités de l'industrie étudiée qu'à une règle de conduite co-construite par les
acteurs. Quoiqu'il en soit, en situation d'interdépendance forte, les mécanismes formels
dominent largement sur les mécanismes informels ce qui est contraire à la thèse classiquement
défendue dans la littérature (Lusch et Brown, 1996). Si, conformément à la littérature, les
mécanismes de coercition sont absents des relations ultra-contraintes, nous remarquons que le
recours à l'internalisation (bien que marginal), y est possible, au même titre que pour les deux
autres configurations relationnelles.
CONCLUSION
Cette étude avait pour objet d'étudier une forme de RCF négligée dans la littérature, la RCF
en contexte d'achats contraints. L'étude exploratoire du cas AST, à travers les relations que
cette entreprise cliente entretient avec ses fournisseurs sur les programmes Ariane 5 et M51,
permet d'appréhender les enjeux de sa fonction achat ainsi que la nature du pilotage de la RCF
dans un tel contexte.
Aux trois contraintes spécifiques de son environnement – retour géographique, lien
actionnarial des acteurs de la filière et protection du secret –, auxquelles AST doit faire face,
s'ajoutent des contraintes observées, plus fréquemment, dans d'autres industries : spécificité
des actifs et coûts élevés de transfert vers un autre fournisseur. Au regard de l'intensité de
l'ensemble de ces contraintes et de leur combinaison possible, il nous a été possible
d'identifier trois configurations de RFC :
•
Les RCF ultra-contraintes qui portent sur de gros contrats et concernent quelques
fournisseurs de grande taille, pour lesquels soit le retour géographique et le lien
actionnarial avec le client final (dans le cas du programme Ariane 5), soit la protection du
secret et la nature historique de la relation entretenue avec le client final (dans le cas du
programme M51) créé une relation d'interdépendance très forte.
•
les RCF moyennement contraintes qui portent sur de plus petits contrats et concernent des
fournisseurs plus caractérisés par la spécificité de leurs actifs que par le lien actionnarial
ou historique qu'ils entretiennent avec le client final, moins soumis à la contrainte de
retour géographique et avec lesquels AST entretient une relation de dépendance bilatérale
modérée.
•
Les RCF faiblement contraintes – dominantes dans le programme M51 – qui en raison de
l'importance de la contrainte de protection du secret se traduisent par une dépendance
plutôt élevée vis-à-vis d'un panel restreint de fournisseurs.
Ces situations d'interdépendance et de dépendance observées sont imposées par les
caractéristiques de l'industrie étudiée. En conséquence, elles ne sont pas créées ni amplifiées
naturellement à l'occasion d'épisodes d'interaction répétés. Dans ces conditions, notre étude
montre que les dispositifs formels de gouvernance sont privilégiés. En outre, cette abondance
de contraintes implique pour AST de gérer une forte diversité de RCF auxquelles elle ne peut
répondre par un système de gouvernance relationnelle unifiée. La continuité de la relation
ainsi que la minimisation des comportements opportunistes du fournisseur requiert alors un
pilotage unique et global (pour l'ensemble des programmes concernés d'AST) de chaque
fournisseur. C'est le rôle du SRM et de son équipe.
Au final, la focalisation de notre étude sur un contexte spécifique contribue à enrichir la
connaissance des RCF et, plus particulièrement, des RCF interdépendantes. A l'avenir, des
entretiens menés auprès de SRM, chargés de l'interface avec des fournisseurs appartenant aux
deux premières configurations de RCF identifiées grâce à notre étude, devrait permettre
d'approfondir notre connaissance des enjeux liés à ces contraintes ainsi que des stratégies de
gouvernance et de leur mise en œuvre opérationnelle. Ensuite, la collecte de témoignages de
fournisseurs d'AST permettraient d'apprécier la dépendance des fournisseurs de leur point de
vue et fourniraient des informations quant aux stratégies d'influence mises en œuvre par ces
derniers.
BIBLIOGRAPHIE
Beaujolin-Bellet R. et Nogatchewsky G. (2005), La rupture du contrôle par la confiance dans
les relations client-fournisseur, Comptabilité – Contrôle – Audit, Tome 11, N°2, pp. 39-60.
Bensaou M. (1999), Portfolios of Buyer-Supplier Relationships, Sloan Management Review,
Vol. 40, N°4, pp. 35-45.
Brown J.R., Dev C.S. et Lee D-J. (2000), Managing Marketing Channel Opportunism: The
Efficacy of Alternative Governance Mechanisms, Journal of Marketing, Vol. 64, pp. 51-65.
Cannon J.P., Achrol R.S. et Grundlach G.T. (2000), Contracts, Norms, and Plural Form
Governance, Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, Vol. 28, N°2, pp. 180-194.
Carter J.R. et Narasimhan R. (1996), Is Purchasing Really Strategic?, International Journal of
Purchasing and Materials Management, Vol. 32, N°1, pp. 20-28.
Cox A. (2001), Understanding Buyer and Supplier Power: A Framework for Procurement and
Supply Competence, The Journal of Supply Chain Management, Vol. 37, N°2, pp. 8-15.
Donada C. et Nogatchewsky G. (2007), La confiance dans les relations interentreprises – Une
revue des recherches quantitatives, Revue Française de Gestion, n° 175, pp. 111-124.
Donada C. et Nogatchewsky G. (2008), Partenariat, vassalité, marché et seigneurie : 4
configurations de contrôle client-fournisseur, Comptabilité – Contrôle – Audit, Tome 14, n°1,
pp. 145-168.
Donaldson B. et O'Toole T. (2000), Classifying Relationship Structures: Relationship Strengh
in Industrial Markets, Journal of Business and Industrial Marketing, Vol. 15, N°7, pp. 491506.
Dwyer F., Schurr P. et Oh S. (1987), Developing Buyer-Seller Relationships, Journal of
Marketing, Vol. 51, N°2, pp. 11-27.
Dyer J.H., Cho D.S. et Chu W. (1998), Strategic Suplier Segmentation: The Next "Best
Practice" in Supply Chain Management, California Management Review, Vol. 40, N°2, pp.
57-77.
Fernandes V. (2007), Gestion de la relation fournisseurs : étude des relations entre les modes
de contrôle et les dimensions des transactions, Comptabilité – Contrôle – Audit, Tome 13,
N°2, pp. 53-74.
Heide J.B. (1994), Interorganizational Governance in Marketing Channels, Journal of
Heide J.B. et John, G. (1992), Do Norms Matter in Marketing Relationship?, Journal of
Helper S.R. et Sako M. (1995), Supplier Relations in Japan end the United States: Are they
Converging?, Sloan Management Review, Vol. 36, N°3, pp. 77-84.
Homburg C. et Kuester S. (2001), Towards and Improved Understanding of Industrial Buying
Behavior: Determinants of the Number of Suppliers, Journal of Business-to-Business
Laing A.W. et Lian P.C.S. (2005), Inter-organisational Relationships in Professional Services:
Towards a Typology of Service Relationships, Journal of Services Marketing, Vol. 19, N°2,
pp. 114-127.
Lefaix-Durand
A.,
Poulin
D.,
Beauregard
R.
et
Kozak
R.
(2006),
Relations
interorganisationnelles et création de valeur – synthèse et perspectives, Revue Française de
Gestion, N°164, pp. 205-227.
Lusch R.F et Brown J.R. (1996), Interdependency, Contracting and Relational Behavior in
Marketing Channels, Journal of Marketing, Vol. 60, pp. 19-38.
Macneil I. R. (1980), The New Social Contract, An Inquiry into Modern Contractual
Relations, New Haven, Yale University Press.
Moeller S., Fassnacht M. et Klose S. (2006), E Framework for Supplier Relationship
Management (SRM), Journal of Business-to-Business Marketing, Vol. 13, N°4, pp. 69-94.
Mudambi R. et Helper S. (1998), The "Close but Adversial" Model of Supplier Relations in
the U.S. Auto Industry, Strategic Management Journal, Vol. 19, N°8, pp. 775-792.
Narasimhan R. et Das A. (1999), An Empirical Investigation of the Contribution of Strategic
Sourcing to Manufacturing Flexibilities and Performance, Decision Sciences, Vol. 30, N°3,
pp. 683-718.
Nogatchewsky G. (2004), Les configurations de contrôle dans les relations client-fournisseur,
Thèse de Doctorat es Sciences de Gestion (Université Paris Dauphine).
Nogatchewsky G. (2006), L'impact de la dépendance sur les stratégies de contrôle d'un
équipementier automobile vis-à-vis de ses fournisseurs : une lecture militaire, Finance
Contrôle Stratégie, Vol. 9, N°2, pp. 89-119.
Ouchi W.G. (1980), Markets, Bureaucraties and Clans, Administrative Science Quarterly,
Vol. 25, N°1, pp. 129-141.
Pfeffer J. et Salancik G. (1978), The External Control of Organizations, New York, Harper &
Row Publishers.
Reid D.A. et Plank E.P. (2000), Business Marketing Comes of Age: A Comprehensive
Review of Literature, Journal of Business-to-Business Marketing, Vol. 7, N°2/3, pp. 9-185.
Salle R. et Sylvestre H. (1992), Vendre à l'industrie – Approche stratégique de la relation
Business to Business, Editions Liaisons.
Tangpong C., Michalisin M.D. et Melcher A.J. (2008), Toward a Typology of Buyer-Supplier
Relationships: A Study of the Computer Industry, Decision Sciences, Vol. 39, N°3, pp. 571591.
Wang E.T. et Wei H. (2007), Interorganizational Governance Value Creation: Coordinating
for Information Visibility and Flexibility in Supply Chains, Decision Sciences, Vol. 38, N°4,
pp. 647-674.
Watts C.A, Kim K.Y. et Hahn C.K. (1992), Linking Purchasing to Corporate Competitive
Strategy, International Journal of Purchasing and Materials Management, Vol. 28, N°4, pp.
2-8.
Webster F.E. (1992), The Changing Role of Marketing in the Corporation, Journal of
Annexe 1. Les tronçons d'Ariane 5 (Source : Site internet ESA)
RIRL 2010 The 8th International Conference on Logistics and SCM Research BEM Bordeaux Management School September 29, 30 and October 1st 2010 Collaboration as an Anti-Crisis Solution:
The Role of the Procurement Function
Oihab ALLAL-CHERIF a, Salvator MAIRA b,
a
BEM Management School Bordeaux France
b
Grenoble Management School France
Abstract
The length and sheer scale of the current economic crisis has surprised managers, who were completely unprepared to deal
with such an unanticipated situation. Standing at the heart of their businesses and providing a link between executives and
employees, these managers need to limit the impact of the crisis in an environment in which various constraints, unexpected
events and social tensions are on the increase. Their skills, responsiveness and perseverance are called upon in order to keep
the business going, reassure their employees and maintain development and creativity. Restructuring and cost-killing are the
first port of call, which makes buyers very busy people. However, some buyers are pioneering a new kind of collaborative
management which, instead of increasing the pressure on suppliers and reducing risk-taking to a minimum, advocates taking
new initiatives that are not aimed solely at maximising profits in the short-term. This article offers an overview of this new,
foresight-based Procurement practice. After highlighting recent Procurement function developments, which were largely
responsible for the consequences of the crisis, our constructivist methodology proposes to interview 12 buying experts in
order to develop scenarios and identify the features of the Collaborative Procurement. The final section then presents: (1)
new forms of internal and external collaboration; (2) the roles and specific skills of this type of the "buyer of the future"; and
(3) how the globalised economy is becoming an increasingly community-based, collaborative virtual environment.
Keywords: Procurement, Economic Crisis, Collaboration, Collaborative Buyer, Foresight.
Corresponding author: Oihab Allal-Cherif - Tel. 0(033)682410611 - Fax 0(033)556845500
Email address: [email protected]
1
Introduction
As firms have refocused on their core business there has been a rapid, significant increase in
the importance of managing the Procurement function. This increase in purchasing volumes
automatically puts greater pressure on the control of costs, quality and lead-times (Ballaz,
1983; 2002). It is accompanied by a new development in the Procurement function whereby
buyers, in addition to managing supplies, listen to the market in order to detect new trends
and technical progress resulting from technological innovation (Perrot, 2007; Allal-Chérif,
2007). The Procurement value chain gradually becomes less operational and more strategic.
The 2009 economic crisis has put businesses, and especially Procurement departments, in a
particularly difficult situation. Faced with dwindling order books and significant financial
losses, the initial reaction is to embark on a drastic policy of cost-killing and procedural
restructuring. Objectives are all scaled down, investment projects and recruitment are frozen
and output is slowed or even stopped in some cases. The Procurement function is thus in the
vanguard when it comes to finding ways of maintaining corporate financial health.
Buyers are the first levers in cost reduction, particularly in industrial companies such as
Caterpillar, Schneider Electric, Nestlé, Thales or PSA, where they manage over 65% of
turnover. However, the Procurement function is faced with a dilemma: it needs to reduce
spending significantly without increasing the pressure on suppliers that are already on the
verge of bankruptcy, with potentially disastrous consequences for their own companies.
Buyers therefore need to manage risk and prepare for the end of the crisis by implementing
root and branch changes to business practices and consolidating the competitive advantages
deriving from better management of supplier relations. The major multinationals have thus
realised that the reason some of their suppliers have completely disappeared is not for the
want of customers, but rather a lack of cash-flow; these suppliers are often paid 60, 90 and
even 120 days after the billing month (Benassy-Quéré et al, 2009). Despite their order books
being full, many of them had accepted trading conditions that were too dangerous for their
financial stability, which the crisis ended up undermining.
This paper presents a new, “collaborative buyer” approach to the management of the
Procurement function, as applied by 12 Procurement Directors or Managers in their
companies. During the course of our interviews a new approach to managing the Procurement
function emerged, with different objectives and new methods. In the first part, traditional
Procurement practices will be analysed in light of the current crisis in order to underline their
limitations and the need for innovative approaches to internal and customer-supplier relations.
The second part will present the two-pronged research methodology: occupational foresight
and the scenario approach. The profile of the “Procurement experts” interviewed and the
interview guide will be described. The third part will present several hypothetical scenarios
that have been co-constructed, along with recommendations for best Procurement practice.
1. Procurement and the economic crisis
The behaviour of buyers during the 1990s ended up putting extreme pressure on suppliers in
the 2000s. In order to keep some contracts and face up to increasing competition, they
accepted terms that were sustainable during a period of growth, but which became impossible
to comply with during a time of economic crisis, leaving them facing bankruptcy. As the
global economy collapsed in 2009, the most vulnerable companies were the first to disappear.
In order to protect themselves, buyers tended to attempt to reduce costs and risks to a
minimum and to cut back on any initiatives that were too expensive. However, in large
2
multinational companies with sophisticated Procurement departments, buyers have been
pioneering a cooperative management style which marks a radical departure from traditional
methods and a new dawn of the collaborative economy.
1.1. Polymorphic management of the Procurement function: a collection of
occupations and a wide range of practices
Over the past 15 years, the Procurement function has evolved significantly: it has played an
increasingly important role in the life of firms and has become highly strategic (Perrotin,
2002; Perrotin and Loubère, 2005). This traditionally low-profile function involving between
2% and 5% of employees in multinational firms has emerged as a key profit centre that is
managed meticulously and whose performance indicators are closely monitored by head
office (Lurin and Beloeuvre, 2005). In addition to their normal tasks, i.e. to maximise quality
while minimising costs and optimising lead-times, buyers create value by identifying their
suppliers’ new techniques, developments or inventions (Vlcek, 2002). They are at the heart of
the innovation process because they are best placed to know the suppliers that they might
bring into a potential partnership to work together on a new product or new technology
(Teece et al. 1997; Boujut and Jeantet, 2001). Buyers now work proactively: they find
solutions through strategic alliances involving several links of the same industrial value chain,
enabling them to access resources, technologies and levers which the firm would not be able
to access alone (Pensel, 2004). They can see how the talents of several companies may be
combined to produce key competitive advantages (Rechenmann, 2002; Hervier, 2003).
After a long period lasting until the late 1990s in which buyers tended to be recruited for their
expertise in reducing costs and streamlining the supply chain, they are now much more likely
to be selected for their ability to anticipate market changes and to propose new development
projects rather than in response to any accounting concerns (Dominguez, 2005). Cost and
lead-time optimisation quickly reaches a ceiling which technological progress can ignore and
it is in this race for innovation than most companies are now seeking a technological
advantage (Calvi and Barreyre, 1997; Roy and Bigras, 2000; Fernandes, 2005). Groupings –
whether between competitors or between customers and suppliers – are on the increase, in
order to secure financial, material and human resources and greater expertise. The teams
subsequently set up systematically involve buyers who use information and communications
technology to improve business intelligence, information-sharing, collaboration, knowledge
capitalisation and project management (Bressler and Grantham, 2000; Schubert and Ginsburg,
2000; Brousseau, 2001; Curchod, 2006).
The sales department of Arcelor describes the changes in the buyer’s role as follows: “their
skills have evolved significantly in recent years. Nowadays, most of them have a universitylevel background in management or science. Moreover, this has prompted us to gradually
renew our sales teams” (Le Roux, 2004). Buyers are increasingly involved in the design stage
of the products they buy; this calls for a degree of technical know-how and a mastery of
purchasing criteria that go way beyond those involved in managing volumes and prices. As
the role of Procurement has changed in industrial companies it has become a meticulously
managed profit centre because it handles the lion’s share of the production cost. Its initially
very administrative role has gradually become more tactical and strategic, involving a great
deal of business intelligence and negotiation. The Procurement function impacts directly on
corporate competitiveness and the company’s ability to innovate and develop competitive
advantages.
3
1.2. A strategic function that needs to develop significantly before it can be
considered mature
Procurement does not have the same importance in every company, as this will depend on its
size, age, sector or strategy. There are four stages of maturity of the Procurement function.
“The first phase corresponds to emerging companies or those with a low level of sectoral
organisation. The prime concern here is management of transactions. Sales departments are
decentralised with little communication going on between them and they operate like
uncoordinated snipers. Quality, time or storage problems are ignored.” (Gumb et al, 2005). In
the second phase “some recurring transactions start to be automated; ‘framework contracts’
are negotiated; piecemeal buying becomes the exception; cooperation with supplier accounts
departments is stepped up.” Procurement remains a fairly operational task for the company,
whose aim is not to create value but merely to satisfy internal needs in the best possible
conditions and without expending too many resources. The third phase involves extending
buyers’ range of analysis. They no longer think solely in terms of technical specifications and
price, but also in terms of quality, timescales, technological performance, risks and
assurances. In the fourth phase, the Procurement function is aligned with the organisation’s
overall strategy. In each segment, suppliers are ranked, and the market share of each is
correlated with the rank obtained (Gumb et al., 2005). At this almost utopian level of maturity
– which very few companies achieve – Procurement becomes proactive. In addition to being
strategically aligned, it becomes part and parcel of the strategy, providing a key competitive
advantage and actively helping to create value.
In the 1990s, buyers were treated as “cost-killers”, their main role being to minimise supply
costs. Fierce pressure was exerted on prices and suppliers, which gave rise to unfair trading
conditions (Perrotin, 2007) accompanied by destabilising manoeuvres and bargaining tactics.
Those practices where due to the immaturity of the purchasing function in most firms during
this period of time. In addition, management was very fragmented around independent profit
centres with short-term profitability objectives owing to a lack of transparency. These harmful
approaches were often approved by management, with its inadequate knowledge of the
business of Procurement and managing customer/supplier relations. Outsourcing an activity
was considered like outsourcing the problems related with this activity and companies didn't
want to know about it. There suppliers just had to deal with it the way they wanted to. The
emergence of sustainable development in companies with a focus on ethical, fair and
environmentally-friendly trading has changed the rules of the game and radically altered
buyers’ behaviour. Gradually, the large vertical and extremely hierarchical companies have
given way to horizontal organisations which have concentrated themselves on the heart of the
profession and have enjoyed an increasingly greater market appeal. Three main theories
explain this refocusing on the heart of the profession: The Transaction Costs Theory
(Williamson, 1979), which testifies to the underlying reduction of transaction costs and to the
reduced interest in internalising1; the resources approach which encourages companies to
refocus on the activities for which they have key resources (Hamel and Prahalad, 1991); and,
of course, the financial theory according to which it is the shareholder’s responsibility, and
not that of the company, to diversify its portfolio. The Purchasing function has therefore
developed naturally, with each outsourced activity giving birth to one or several new
purchasing portfolios. The resorting to the use of contractors to carry out an increasing
number of strategic tasks has led to a need for highly qualified and specialised purchasers.
1
A few months ago, the recognition of the pertinence of the TCT theory won Williamson the 2009 Nobel Prize
for Economy.
4
The increase in the purchasing share in companies’ turnover figures has contributed to the
development of the Purchasing function and has given this latter a considerable power, as
each of its decisions can have significant financial consequences.
Buyers are regularly involved in a company’s sustainable development policy, where one
exists. They are no longer content to assess suppliers on price or even quality and lead-times,
but also on criteria such as social performance (child labour, wages, working conditions, etc.)
and environmental issues (C02 emissions, impact on nature, recycling, etc.). Products and
services that are certified and guaranteed by charters can increase costs by up to 10%: buyers
are willing to accept this in order to enhance the image of their company, notwithstanding that
they are sometimes less expensive than their “regular” competitors. Green products are more
difficult to access, but the chains are becoming easier to identify according to the sector
concerned (Ruth, 2003). Apart from reducing costs and consequently the purchase price of
supplies, buyers appreciate suppliers with whom they can establish long-term partnerships,
who are committed to complying with production standards, take a professional approach to
transaction monitoring and litigation management and also show a certain degree of loyalty.
The values associated with sustainable Procurement must first be shared by the buyers, who
then seek out partners that endorse the same ideas. According to the French association
Altereco, fair trade must comply with five criteria: it must show solidarity and justice and be
direct, transparent and dignified.
1.3. The future of Procurement: the cooperative management approach
There are several factors behind the current radical rethink of traditional management
methods. An accelerating economy leads to a frantic race to innovate in a bid to be the “first
mover” to exploit a killer technology. Globalisation requires a much more highly-developed,
sophisticated competitive intelligence, capable of detecting faint signs of opportunities or
threats at a very early stage. The rise of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT)
has helped to strengthen horizontal communication and opportunities for coordination
between players within and outside the company. The new Generation Y now accounts for
20% of the workforce, but should rise to 40% within 5 years (INSEE). The economic crisis
has shown the limitations of the traditional models of managing the Procurement function by
revealing the interdependence of companies operating in the same market and the risks
ensuing from stiff competition between competitors or when the customer/supplier power
relationship is heavily skewed. The rise of the cooperative management approach to the
Procurement function (Figure 1) is a solution that very few companies had envisaged before
the crisis, and which suddenly became much more popular afterwards.
5
Figure 1 – Procurement efficiency trend (Perrotin and Soulet de Brugière, 2007)
Thus, the cooperative management approach to the Procurement function is only present in a
few pioneering companies with a high level of maturity such as Schneider Electric, IBM and
Nestlé. This method has gained many followers since the beginning of the economic crisis,
both in terms of internal and external collaboration. Internally, it can be achieved through: (1)
synergies between Procurement and other functions such as Research and Development or
Marketing; (2) co-decisions between hierarchical levels; (3) buyer-led cross-project
management. Externally, the main forms of cooperative management of the Procurement
function involve: (1) technological co-development and product co-design with suppliers; (2)
sponsorship of innovation; (3) assisted production planning; (4) integration of information
systems; (5) automation or outsourcing part of the Procurement function; and (6)
collaborative strategic management (Perrotin, Soulet de Brugière, 2007; Allal-Cherif et al.,
2010).
The Procurement function has thus undergone several successive transformations over the last
two decades, but there is scope for it to mature still further. The economic crisis has
encouraged new initiatives by revealing certain weaknesses in the old ways of doing things
and by creating an opportunity for radical managerial innovation. A foresight approach to the
Procurement function would thus seem appropriate; accordingly, we will trace a development
scenario using the interviews we conducted with 12 Procurement experts.
2. A constructivist methodology: foresight and the scenario method
The future is an embodiment of a collective desire, of a common will (Thamain, 2009; Boyer
and Scouarnec, 2009). In order to map the future of the Procurement function, it would thus
6
seem appropriate to look at the expectations and forecasts of the players involved in this
function, whether professionals or academics. The aim is a “comprehensive, long, rational,
ownership approach” that is action-oriented (Hatem and Préel, 1995; Boyer and Scouarnec,
2009). We thus take a wholesale look at the management of the Procurement function up to
2020, based on the precise, subtle perception of faint signs of coming change by people who
are immersed in the Procurement sector and wish to influence and exercise control over their
profession. The aim is to identify future departures and discontinuities by extrapolating from
the past in order to prepare and enact the measures needed to deal with these changes serenely
(Jouvenel, 1999).
2.1. Procurement foresight: Towards structural, functional anticipation
This paper aims to carefully co-construct a common picture of the future of the Procurement
function, based on interviews with twenty experts (Thamain, 2009). This “anticipation,
however imperfect, of changes, discontinuities, contingencies” of the Procurement function is
not covered by managerial foresight (Boyer and Scouarnec, 2002). Given the increasingly
sustained, violent turbulence affecting the business world, foresight has become essential for
companies to prepare to challenge their competitors, who are also trying to look ahead and
find their place in the world of the future. Environmental changes can, in fact, be anticipated
and controlled to some extent. Preparing to adapt will always be much more effective than
reacting to the unexpected and it is through the use of foresight to identify potential problems
that solutions are most likely to be found and implemented in time (Julien et al., 1975). The
scenario method is a good way to “stimulate the imagination and thoughts” of the selected
experts in order to consider how the Procurement function, which is seen as a complex group
of professions, relationships and tools, might evolve in the future.
“Occupational forecasting is an approach that involves anticipating possible futures in terms
of the skills, activities and responsibilities of an occupation. It enables us to envision the
knowledge and qualifications, expertise or professional know-how and the attitudes and social
skills that might, in future, best serve the individual and the organisation. To achieve this, the
experts in the occupation/s under analysis need to co-construct a picture of the potential future
of that occupation or those occupations. It therefore involves reflecting on the individual
occupation and the way work is organised.” (Boyer and Scouarnec, 2005). This article
therefore proposes to consider all the features that might be involved in the Procurement
function in the years ahead. The Procurement professionals we interviewed agreed to coconstruct this new buyer profile resulting from the changes to the old buyer profile and the
convergence of other occupations, with new skills and expertise and significantly different
attitudes both in terms of organisation and the environment.
2.2. Selecting the Procurement experts and the interview protocol used
In order to carry out this foresight study, we chose 12 experts in the field, working in various
sectors such as Textile, IT or energy and from heterogeneous size. This diversity allows for a
sufficient variety of viewpoints to cover most of the buyer’s skills, activities and
responsibilities being studied. In order to minimise the effects of any subjectivity and
interpretation, only half of these experts were previously known to the interviewers.
However, even those experts who were unknown to the interviewers before the survey were
approached by the researchers, following a recommendation, in order to promote the climate
of trust and confidence required by the nature of the research. Table 1 summarises some of
7
the characteristics of the Procurement experts and assigns them a code which will be referred
to when quoting verbatim.
Buyer
code
A1
A2
A3
A4
A5
A6
A7
A8
A9
A10
A11
A12
2.3.
Position
Size of firm
Turnover
Sector
(employees)
Procurement Manager
400 000
€104 billion IT
Procurement Manager
270 000
€75 billion Foodstuffs
IT Procurement
200 000
€19 billion Electricity
Procurement Director
120 000
€180 billion Energy
Procurement Manager
100 000
€40 billion Machinery
Buyer
70 000
€20 billion Cosmetics
Procurement Manager
55 000
€10 billion Distribution
9 000
€5.1 billion Telecoms
8 000
€2.5 billion Textiles
1 400
NA
Public Health
CEO
47
€200 million Equipment
CEO
20
€50 million IT consulting
Table 1 – Panel of Procurement Managers/Directors interviewed
The interview guide and method
The interview guide was based on a review of the literature by the authors, all Procurement
function professionals for between 10 and 30 years, and ten contact interviews used to present
the project to the experts. Noting the individual interests and specialisations of each expert,
we tailored the interview guide to reflect their experience and style. Indeed, some were
particularly sensitive to sustainable development and information system issues, and some
were more concerned about relations with suppliers and how to bring them on board; others
were worried about their livelihood within the company and felt that their jobs were
threatened by a hostile future. In order to prepare for the interviews, the researchers made
sure they well acquainted with the skills and roles of the people interviewed and the
characteristics of their companies.
8
Figure 2: Thematic interview guide
A first round of informal exploratory talks was conducted with the 12 Procurement experts in
order to identify development pathways for the Procurement function. The range of
respondents was sufficient to cover all the themes present in the guide. During these initial
interviews, no reference was made to the responses given by other interviewees. A second
round of semi-structured interviews was then held to confirm and expand on the previous
interviews. These were conducted in reverse order so as to revisit all the pathways identified
and to get a more accurate picture of the views of the experts. This second round also enabled
us to address some sometimes diverging views and make choices in order to produce a
coherent development scenario for the Procurement function in the years ahead.
The purpose of these interviews was to get respondents to express their views and their vision
of the future straightforwardly and with a certain amount of risk on their part. The first nonstructured part of the information gathering exercise thus consisted of conversations in which
the interviewers did not attempt to guide the interviewees but did prompt them to give further
information (Thiétart et al, 2007). A semi-structured interview guide specifically tailored to
each expert was then designed in order to obtain additional information and examples. This
second interview not only allowed each interviewee to clarify his point of view but also to
comment on the views expressed by others. This approach helps to builds an informed picture
of Procurement foresight and progress is made through the “creative” loosely-structured
interviews that guide the research and the more precise, rational approach of the “active”
interviews involving a greater degree of structure and organisation (Thiétart et al, 2007).
9
The interviews enable us to trace the profile of the Collaborative Buyer and to anticipate a
new way of managing the Procurement function. This innovative management mode will be
illustrated through a presentation of the different types of internal and external collaboration,
a description of the specific skills of the buyers of tomorrow and a new vision of a
collaborative, community-based virtual economy.
3. A more collaborative buyer, both internally and externally
At a time when the virtues of collaboration are being praised from all sides, the buyer has
become the epitome of this virtue. He sees people’s expectations of him changing
significantly. These changes come from within the organisation, reflecting the expectations of
internal customers and strategic management; and from outside, reflecting buyers’
commitment to developing new forms of relationships with their partners.
3.1. More internal and external collaboration: the art of creating a competitive
advantage together
A1 says that the role of the project buyer, the cross-buyer and the purchasing coordinator
will grow considerably at the expense of product buyers or national buyers. Buyers will assist
project leaders and in some cases even replace them, from one project to the next. “The same
person will source all the components for the project and then move on to the next one.” This
method differs significantly from that most commonly used, in which one person sources a
class of products or services for a large number of different projects. Furthermore, the project
buyer organises all the Procurement activity for his projects, whereas the product buyer is
part of a very rigid hierarchy, having to report to several higher levels and being responsible
for the tasks delegated to the lower levels. The buyer of the future will therefore need to have
a much broader vision of the company. This is borne out by current trends in the internal
interfaces with which he has to operate. Rather than imposing new constraints, these actually
constitute new prerogatives for buyers. A8 is concerned, however, about the need to manage
them with the utmost care, given that there is considerable potential for drift.
Sustainable, responsible and ethical Procurement will also become a standard feature of all
supply operations rather than merely a side-line of this function. New forms of collaboration
between customers and suppliers are emerging, such as in the automotive, electronics or food
processing industries, where supplier integration is increasingly a key factor in strategic
success. When it achieves a high level of maturity, the Procurement function – which is very
close to senior management – has a major influence on the adoption of sustainable practices.
Stable partnerships and the need to promote innovation and develop new projects are
prioritised over economic calculations. Unilateral decisions in the interests of a single link in
the supply chain are no longer made; instead, collective decisions are taken in a bid to
consolidate the whole venture. Total Cost of Ownership (TCO), which encourages buyers to
adopt cost out (cost reduction) policies is replaced by Total Value of Ownership (total value
added) which encourages “value in” (creation of joint value) practices. The “win-win”
scenario, which was essentially a marketing approach that never really took off in the area of
Procurement, is becoming both a buzzword and a reality, because it is considered to be more
effective than the “winner-loser” scenario. A11 says “there is no generosity here: it is merely
self-interest.”
In 2007 Perrotin was already advocating cutting back on out-dated, counterproductive cost
killing methods and considering collaboration as a major strategic factor. Buyers were
10
encouraged to build on their knowledge, to develop joint projects and to worry about the
financial viability of their business partners. All the experts we interviewed are aware of this
latter need, which was greatly neglected until the financial crisis kicked in. A drive to
establish a coherent culture for client and supplier firms is underway, strategic goals are set
jointly and shared values are promoted to other market players. The new virtual platforms for
e-commerce and SRM (Supplier Relationship Management) provide collaborative tools,
support for jointly promoting associated companies, opportunities to capitalise on shared
knowledge, project management, co-design and co-development software and certification
and validation procedures, as well as approaches to sustainable development. Each step of the
Procurement value chain can be managed, automated and benefit from expert advice. The
experts’ recommendations will be used to optimise each link in the chain, rather than just the
negotiating stage. When the whole process is taken into account, sustainable value is created
– and not just an ad hoc basis. It can therefore be argued that the members of the logistics
chain gradually establish partnerships by pooling their resources, risks and profit. The
relationships thus established are extremely complex. Information, goods and capital flows
need to be managed scrupulously. Logistical integration depends above all on improving the
way the firms exchange information. Reliable, regular exchanges facilitate forecasting and
planning, which makes for agile flow management. Collaboration and anticipation yield
considerable reductions in transportation costs as the logistical synergies emerge. A2 says that
in his firm, the “road map is modelled on the road map used by our suppliers. We adapt to
their pace and organise ourselves around their projects and the innovations they can bring to
us. If we have no overview of their business, then we have no overview of our own.”
At the moment when the virtues of collaboration are praised everywhere, the purchaser, the
extreme collaborator, sees the expectations with regards to him developing in an appreciable
way. These changes come from both internal and external sources. They are driven by the
expectations of internal customers and strategic management, and externally, by the
purchasers’ desire to develop new forms of relationships with their partners. C1 explains that
the functions of the ‘project purchaser’, the ‘transversal purchaser’, and the ‘coordinator
purchaser’ are going to grow considerably to the detriment of the ‘product purchaser’ and the
‘country purchaser’. Purchasers will accompany project leaders, and even in certain cases
replace these, from one project to another. "The same person will be responsible for sourcing
all the components in a project and then will move onto the next project". This method is
significantly different from the one that is most frequently used, where one person is
responsible for the sourcing of a category of products or services for a very large number of
different projects. All the more so in the case of the ‘project purchaser’, who leads on the
totality of purchasing activity around his projects, whilst the ‘product purchaser’ is part of an
unwieldy hierarchy, accountable to several levels above him and with responsibility for tasks
delegated to those at the levels beneath him. Tomorrow’s purchaser will need to develop a
much wider view of the company. The current development of internal interfaces with which
he is obliged to function attests to this. More than new constraints, this is in fact a question of
new prerogatives for purchasers. However, these prerogatives need to be managed. A7 uses
inter-supplier coaching. He selects suppliers with high growth potential from emerging
countries and asks his western suppliers to help them grow by sharing their know-how with
them. These buyer initiatives which bring competitors together in partnerships create a threeway relationship in which everyone stands to benefit: the customer, who gets a new, more
efficient local supplier; the supplier who is coached matures much more quickly; and the
supplier providing the coaching secures new business opportunities and the opportunity to
develop a lasting partnership.
11
One can therefore consider that the logistics chain members establish partners with a pooling
of resources, risks and profits. Relationships built in this way are highly complex (Harland,
1996; Lamming, 2002), and market places would be able to play an essential role in
formalising and optimising these. The influxes of information, of merchandise, and of
resources need to be managed with a great deal of rigour. The logistical integration between
companies, above all else, has to happen via improvements in the processes of information
exchange. The reliability and regularity of these exchanges will favour forecasting and
planning and therefore a more agile management of these influxes. Collaboration and preemption generate a considerable reduction in transportation costs, with the emergence of
logistical synergies. Collaboration is not, however, a risk-free enterprise (either for the
supplier or his customer). It is not always a magic bullet and sometimes it does not achieve
the desired effect. It may even constitute a real trap for suppliers. It is also worth pointing out
that different relationships often need to be developed with the suppliers, depending on their
role (Bensaou, 1999). Indeed, it is difficult to be everyone’s partner. But the potential benefits
of collaboration that make for genuine “cooperative advantages” (Kanter, 1994) are still
manifold (improved product quality, shorter lead-times, enhanced image, etc.). Several
authors writing some ten years ago seem to have been visionaries in this field. They
demonstrate the importance of being able to build new relationships, but also the ability to
coordinate partner input (Lipparini and Fratocchi, 1999), which Simonin (1997) refers to as
“cooperation expertise”. Successful collaboration requires a certain amount of effort and
considerable perseverance. Tsang (1999) said that firms need to work together properly in
order to continue to attract the best partners. Similarly, ten years ago Lorenzoni and Lipparini
(1999) were already stressing the importance of these two abilities, which they grouped
together under the concept of “relational capability”. It has taken an economic crisis to
demonstrate the practical relevance of the theory.
3.2. Managing Procurement expertise: lead project buyer and talent manager
The buyer recruitment procedure is highly elitist. Employers are looking for specialists with 5
years of post-high school education in either engineering or business. Experience is less
important than the initial training, which must be solid and enable young graduates to avoid
the traps laid in heated negotiations. Proficiency in information and communication
technology is essential to manage multicultural teams from a distance and to interact in virtual
environments. Buyers also need to be persuasive when it comes to promoting a sense of
ownership, both internally and externally. Buyers are becoming a pro-active force: by
forming strategic alliances between different links in the same value chain, they can access
resources, technologies and levers which the firm would not be able to access alone. They can
see how the talents of several companies might be combined to secure key competitive
advantages. C4 highlights the creative side of the buyer: “The character of the buyer is
increasingly important: the best buyers are the most forceful and resourceful. They have to
think outside the box and come up with original solutions. They need to shape, from the
countless items at their disposal, the most appropriate response to the needs of their firms.
They have an element of intuition that a computer cannot replicate.”
The foresight skills of the buyers of the future, identified together with the Procurement
experts we interviewed, are as follows:
- The ability to operate in virtual environments and to detect faint signs of opportunities or
potential threats;
- The use and optimisation of information and communication technology, especially
collaborative platforms, social networks and the virtual communities of practice that
12
constitute strategic intelligence tools, as well as benchmarking, management of expertise,
collaboration and facilitation of professional networks;
- Being a global responsibility activist by combining sustainable development, fair trade and
ethical work;
- The ability to bring suppliers on board and secure exclusive innovations;
- Flexibility and multi-tasking, naturally dipping in and out of several projects or cultures;
highly mobile, etc.;
- Highly creative and spontaneous: questioning existing solutions and with a strong ability to
innovate;
- Strong leadership with senior management potential.
For A2, “the buyer is particularly mobile and might not have an office”. After a period in
which management tried to impose new information systems on buyers, making them deskbound and automating their work, a new phase is dawning in which the buyer is taking the
power to make decisions back from his office equipment. Indeed, given the wide range of
performance criteria that must be taken into account when assessing a supplier and the
decisions that have to be made, only the buyer, with his proven expertise, is able to “weigh up
the pros and cons”. It is this diversity of criteria which makes traditional tools less relevant or
obsolete, for it is difficult to fit all the currently accepted performance criteria into synthetic
indicators. Even with TCO and TVO, which include many parameters, it is difficult to take
account of social and environmental criteria, and especially the collaborative capital of
suppliers which is currently so highly valued.
For A6, “the new people think that our firms are still living in the Stone Age.” This view is
shared by most of the experts we interviewed. In their opinion, firms are lagging behind
society. In some cases, it is no longer the private sector that innovates for the public sector,
but the public sector that innovates for the private sector. Firms take some time before
adopting the new practices: “they are increasingly lagging behind”. A gap is also gradually
emerging, but more quickly between traditional buyers and those of the Internet generation:
they don’t use the same methods, tools, or even the same language. Given that one side is
under the impression that the other side is trying to push them out of the door, we can imagine
the tensions and problems involved in managing such a wide variety of profiles.
The academics amongst the Procurement experts all envisage a much more digital and
collaborative future. Nevertheless, most professional buyers do not yet understand the
potential of the new information systems – genuine examples of artificial intelligence which
major industrial concerns are trialling to manage much of their buyer activity. A4 feels that
“IT tools still have some way to go before they can replace a buyer’s instinct”, which is
capable of picking up on very faint but decisive signs during the supplier selection process.
A5 tells of all the disastrous consequences of “excessive reliance on certain sourcing
platforms” in his firm. When asked about this negative reaction to the virtualisation of part of
their work, the experts stress that buyers are trying to resist inevitable change and that if they
refuse to submit, they are in danger of being excluded from the Procurement departments of
multinationals in the future.
3.3. Towards a virtual, community-based collaborative economy
A5 says that “the crisis made us realise that we needed to treat our suppliers better. We
decided to be just as concerned about them as we are about ourselves because we are
interdependent. We changed our payment policy and we now settle our invoices in 8 days
13
instead of 3 months.” Companies thus prefer their money to be with their suppliers so that it
can be used to innovate and keep them going rather than being parked in the bank to earn
interest. Consequently, investment and long-term gains are prioritised over structured finance.
Some companies even go as far as paying their suppliers’ suppliers, so that their business will
not be put at risk by financial difficulties. The spate of bankruptcies which the financial crisis
has produced in a huge domino effect has induced buyers to pay more attention to their
strategic partners. However, this type of chaperone policy may be seen as interfering and as a
perverse way of extending control, with over-intrusive concern for the way a sovereign
company manages its finances.
A3 stresses the importance of modern means of communication, which also play a key role in
the new relationships between firms. Companies are gradually organising themselves as
professional virtual communities that share the same values and cooperative closely on a wide
range of activities. This type of “meta-company” requires a “meta-network”, an intelligent
network enabled by the new information and communication technologies. It allows member
companies to pool their intelligence, their technical expertise and some of their business
costs. It also gives them three precious gifts: ubiquity, omnipresence and omniscience. The
more responsive, more flexible joint ventures will have a considerable advantage over
individual companies as they are able to share costs and expertise simultaneously. “In a
virtual universe of exchange networks, we now need to optimise value added chains between
partners” and “roll out new forms of cooperative business.” The fact that these potential
suppliers are grouped together in the same community, making it possible to submit problems
and directly compare the solutions proposed by each of them, provides incalculable gains in
terms of time, money and quality. It is also essential to “find new customers outside the
comfort zone without having to pay exorbitant canvassing costs” (Yolin, 2005).
The “e-business crossroads” phenomenon thus seems to be a natural consequence of the
economic climate and a response to the way it has developed. Furthermore, it is often “people
from the same line of work” grouped together in corporations, unions, trade shows or on trade
magazines - in other words, real communities of individuals who would meet and trade goods
or information - that are behind these “marketplaces”. These players have taken advantage of
technological progress and the fact that companies have refocused on their core business to
extend an already existing network, but using few resources and limited in space and time.
These marketplaces, which address a very real need, have nevertheless emerged with such
speed that their operations have tended to be improvised, i.e. worked out in response to an
emergency or to address problems instead of by anticipating them and operating in an
economically logical way. Nevertheless, while these virtual communities have a place in the
changing global economy, they have so far tended to focus on the economic transaction side
of things rather than on their potential as an information-sharing base. Several contradictions
have emerged in this twofold objective which involves bringing the players in a given market
together so that they can meet up more easily and freely exchange information in order to
build a common knowledge base, while – at the same time – encouraging them to do business
with each other, thus exacerbating the sense of fierce competition.
Conclusion
Traditional Procurement practices were an aggravating factor in the consequences of the
financial crisis of 2009. They caused value chains to be weakened and called supplier
relationship management practices into question. Some firms ended up weakening themselves
by overshadowing and oppressing respected players in their own market and which they
14
helped to eliminate. Cooperative management, which is still at the experimental stage, has
become a much more credible alternative to the drastic policies of cost-cutting and fierce
competition achieved through radical, automated sourcing methods. The Procurement
function thus acts as a pioneer in developing new forms of internal and external
collaborations and adopting a partnership approach with all key suppliers in order to address
the economic crisis and prepare to emerge from it. There is still some scepticism surrounding
these new methods, which the drastic situation has helped to highlight and make more
popular. However, in large multinational companies, the profile of buyers has changed
dramatically. Their role is no longer confined to satisfying internal needs and automatically
reducing costs: it now involves maximising the sustainable value created jointly with their
partners. From initially managing transactions and then information, they have now moved on
to relationship management, which calls for very specific skills. They have replaced a
confrontational, systematically comparative approach with a process of association and
coordination. Buyers are no longer content to meet current needs; they now try to anticipate
future ones. They run projects in which they need to combine complementary talents in order
to co-build a key competitive advantage. The buyer’s buying role is increasingly less
important: they are becoming mediators who ensure a healthy market; watchmen who
anticipate dangers and look out for opportunities; and project managers who prepare for the
future of the company and ensure its long-term survival.
References
Allal-Chérif O. (2007) – Un modèle économique pour les places de marché électroniques,
Thèse pour l’obtention du titre de Docteur en Sciences de Gestion, dirigée par Marc Favier,
présentée et soutenue le 15 mai 2007.
Allal-Chérif O., Favier M. (2008) – "Le modèle économique des places de marché
électroniques : du transactionnel au collaboratif", Revue Française de Gestion, N°2, Vol. 181,
p. 161-173, janvier 2008.
Allal-Chérif O. Poissonnier H., Maira S. (2010) – "Prospective du management de la fonction
Achats : vers l'Acheteur Collaboratif", 10ème colloque prospective des métiers : le
Management de Demain, 16 mars 2010, ESSEC, Paris.
Ballaz B. (1983) – "Le système d’information pour l’achat", Revue Française de Gestion,
Novembre-Décembre, p. 48-56.
Ballaz B. (2002) – "Le management des achats et de la chaîne intégrée clients-fournisseurs :
le rôle clé du système d’information", In : Castagnos J.-C., Retour D. (2002) – Le
management des achats, Presses Universitaires de Grenoble, chap. 1, pp. 87-109.
Barreyre P.-Y. (1997) – "Achat Industriel", dans Joffre P. et Simon Y. (1997), Encyclopédie
de Gestion, Economica, 3 volumes, 1-15.
Bénassy-Quéré A., Decreux Y., Fontagné L., Khoudour-Casteras D. (2009) – Economic
Crisis and Global Supply Chains, Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations
Internationales, N°2009, 15 july.
Bensaou B. M. (1999) – "Portfolios of buyer-supplier relationships", Sloan Management
Review, vol. 40, n° 4, Summer, p. 35-44.
Boujut J. F. et Jeantet A. (2001) – "Développement de processus coopératifs en conception de
produits et évolutions des outils de l’ingénieur", In H. Dumez (coord.), Management de
l’innovation, management de la connaissance, L’Harmattan, FROG, pp. 139-177, 2001.
Boyer L., Scouarnec A. (2002) – "La prospective métier : Définition, intérêts et proposition
méthodologique", Cahier de Recherche Dauphine Marketing Stratégie Prospective, N°308.
Boyer L., Scouarnec A. (2005) – L'observatoire des métiers : concepts et pratiques, EMS
Editions.
15
Boyer L., Scouarnec A. (2009) – La Prospective des métiers, EMS Editions.
Bressler S.E. et Grantham C.E. (2000) – Communities of Commerce, McGraw Hill, New
York.
Brousseau E. (2001) – "Commerce électronique : ce que disent les chiffres et ce qu’il faut
savoir" ; Économie et Statistique, n° 339-340, 2000 - 9/10, pp. 147-170.
Calvi R. et Barreyre P.Y. (1997) – "La participation des Services achats au développement
des produits nouveaux : une approche organisationnelle", Colloque International de Génie
Industriel, Albi, 3, 4 et 5 septembre 1997.
Camison Z. C. et Lapiedra A. R. (1999) – "The Enabling Role of Information Technologies
on the Emergence of New Organizational Forms", M@n@gement, vol. 2., n°3, pp. 251-261.
Carter P.L., Carter J.R., Monczka R.M., Blascovich J.D., Slaight T.H., Markham W.J. (2007),
Succeeding in a Dynamic World: Supply Management in the Decade Ahead, CAPS Research,
138 p.
Comité 21 (2005) – Achats et développement durable : enjeux, méthodologie et initiatives,
AFNOR.
Curchod C. (2006) – "Stratégies d'intermédiation et dynamiques des marchés : une relecture
du phénomène Internet", Actes de la XVème Conférence de l’AIMS, Annecy, 14 au 16 juin
2006.
Dominguez C. (2005) – Modèles d’affaires et valeur des places de marché électroniques :
taxonomie d’un phénomène émergent, Thèse pour l’obtention du titre de Docteur en Sciences
de Gestion présentée et soutenue publiquement le 24 novembre 2005.
Donada C. (1997) – "Fournisseurs : pour déjouer les pièges du partenariat", Revue Française
de Gestion, Juin-Juillet-Août 1997, p. 94-105.
Ettighoffer H. D., Van Beneden P. (2000) – Méta-organisations, Editions Village Mondial,
Paris 2000.
Fernandes V. (2005) – "Identification des modes de contrôle des fournisseurs dans le cadre du
management de la supply chain", Actes de la XIVème conférence de l’AIMS, Angers.
Gumb B., Allal-Chérif O. et Maira S. (2005) – "La logistique/achats en tant que fonction
stratégique : le rôle des systèmes d’information et de la mesure des performances", dans
Gumb B. (dir.), Des idées pour décider : pilotage et systèmes d’information, Village Mondial,
Pearson Éducation France, Paris.
Hamel G., Prahalad C. K. (1991) – "The core competences of the corporation", in Cynthia A.
Montgomery & Michael E. Porter (eds) Strategy: seeking and securing a competitive
advantage, Boston, Harvard Business School Press, p. 277-299.
Harland, C.M. (1996) – "Supply Chain Management, Purchasing and Supply Management,
Logistics, Vertical Integration, Materials Management and Supply Chain Dynamics", In:
Slack, N (ed.) Blackwell Encyclopedic Dictionary of Operations Management, UK:
Blackwell.
Hatem F., Préel B. (1995) – Pour une prospective participative, Ronéo, BIPE-Conseil.
Jouvenel H. de (1999) – "La démarche prospective : un bref guide méthodologique",
Futuribles, N°247, novembre 1999.
Hervier G. (2003) – Optimiser vos achats, Éditions d’Organisation.
Julien P.-A., Lamonde P., Latouche D. (1975) – "La méthode des scénarios, une réflexion sur
la démarche et la théorie de la prospective", in Travaux et Recherche de Prospective, coll.
Schéma général d’aménagement de la France, N°59, La documentation française, Paris.
Kanter R. (1994) – "Collaborative advantage", Harvard Business Review, july-august, p. 96108.
Lamming, R.C. (2002) – "Purchasing and organizational design", In: Day, M. ed. Handbook
of Purchasing Management, 3rd Edition Ch. 1, pp. 9-22, UK: Gower.
16
Le Roux V. (2004) – "Des acheteurs plus incisifs", La lettre des achats, N°122, novembre
2004.
Lipparini A., Fratocchi L. (1999) – "The capabilities of the transnational firm: accessing
knowledge and leveraging inter-firm relationships, European Management Journal", vol. 17,
n° 6, p. 655-667.
Lorenzoni G., Lipparini A. (1999) – "The leveraging of interfirm relationships as a distinctive
organizational capability: a longitudinal study", Strategic Management Journal, n° 20, p. 317338.
Lurin F et Beloeuvre F. (2005) – Valeur de Croissance ou Le directeur des Achats, Lettre
Stratégie n°22, Bearing Point.
Pensel J.-L. (2004) – "L’achat électronique sur les places de marché : vers une coopération
contingente", Actes du 9ème colloque de l’AIM, 26 au 28 mai, INT Evry.
Perrotin R. (2002) – e-achat, stratégies d'achat et e-commerce, Éditions d'Organisation.
Perrotin R. (2003) – "Achats et développement durable", conférence annuelle du Master
Achat, Grenoble Ecole de Management, Cegos, mars 2003.
Perrotin R., Soulet de Brugière F. (2007) – Le Manuel des Achats : Processus, Management,
Audit, Eyrolles, Editions d'Organisation.
Rechenmann J.-J. (2002) – Places de marché mode d’emploi, Éditions d’Organisation.
Rodriguez Ruiz J. A. (2005) – "European study about e-purshasing", Mastère Spécialisé
Stratégie et Ingénierie des Affaires Internationales, ESSEC Business School.
Roy J. et Bigras Y. (2000) – "Le partenariat : un élément clé de la chaîne logistique", Les
Troisièmes Rencontres Internationales de la Recherche en Logistique Trois-Rivières, 9, 10 et
11 mai 2000.
Ruth E. (2003) – "Développement durable et achats", conférence annuelle du Master Achats,
Grenoble Ecole de Management, www.comite21.org.
Schubert P. et Ginsburg M. (2000) – "Virtual communities of transaction: the role of
personalization in electronic commerce", Electronic Markets, vol. 10, pp. 45-55.
Simonin B. (1997) – "The importance of collaborative know-how: an empirical test of the
learning organization", Academy of Management Journal, vol. 40, n° 5, p. 1150-1174.
Teece D. J., Pisano G. et Shuen A. (1997) – "Dynamic Capabilities and Strategic
Management", Strategic Management Journal, vol. 18, n°7, August 1997, pp. 509-533.
Thamain J.-L. (2009) – "Anticiper en GRH, prévision et prospective, un diagnostic des
pratiques et des représentations", Management et Avenir, N°25, juin 2009.
Thiétart R.-A. et coll. (2007) – Méthodes de recherche en management, Paris, Dunod.
Tsang E. (1999) – "A preliminary typology of learning in international strategic alliances",
Journal of World Business, vol. 34, n° 3, p. 211-229.
Vlcek J. (2002) – Le profil de la fonction d’acheteur et les défis du futur, European Center for
Research in Purchasing and Supply, Vienne, novembre 2002.
Webster F. E. (1965) – "Modeling the industrial buying process", Journal of Marketing
Research,Vol. 2, p. 370-376.
Williamson O. E. (1979) – "Transaction-cost economics: the governance of contractual
relations", Journal of Law and Economics, vol. 22, October 1979, p. 233-262.
Yolin J.-M. (2005) – Internet et entreprise : mirages et opportunités ? Pour un plan d’action.
Contribution à l’analyse de l’économie de l’Internet, Rapport de la mission conduite par
Jean-Michel Yolin, Ministère de l’économie, des finances et de l’industrie.
17
RIRL 2010 The 8th International Conference on Logistics and SCM Research BEM Bordeaux Management School September 29, 30 and October 1st 2010 From Round Table to Arm’s Length and Back?
- purchasing strategies in the automotive industry
Ove Brandes
Linköping Institute of Technology, Sweden
[email protected]
Staffan Brege
Linköping Institute of Technology Sweden
[email protected]
Per-Olof Brehmer
Linköping Institute of Technology, Sweden
[email protected]
Abstract
Our aim is to study strategies of purchasing in the automotive industry:
- Can a technology leader get access to scale economies in product development via a
supplier without giving up the leadership and competitive advantage?
- Can a core competence be outsourced and still be controlled by the OEM?
- The importance of intellectual property?
Our empirical data is from a longitudinal (1990-2007) case study of Volvo and Autoliv car
safety systems. Chambre séparée is our conceptual model for the management of knowledge
and product development between one lead firm, a prime supplier and their competing
customers.
Key words: purchasing, product development, management of knowledge.
1
Theoretical Background
Helper et al (2000) have pointed out one major theoretical problem in their analysis of the
American automotive industry vs. the Japanese one. They argue that the American strategy is
a market organization (Williamson, 1975; 1985) while the Japanese strategy is a hybrid
organization with collaborative (voice) relationships with major suppliers. They are trying to
explain why the more competitive American strategy has been outcompeted by the
collaborative Japanese strategy. Even Japanese transplants in e.g. GB and the US have better
key figures than the domestically owned factories, the Detroit Three/D3 (Chrysler, GM and
Ford Motor Co). One part of the explanation is that the Japanese culture is more collaborative
but theoretically there are still many questions unanswered.
Whitford et al (2007) are taking up the discussion on collaboration starting from
Granovetter’s (1985) paper on the social embedding of economic actions. They “are looking
at boundaries between organizations by analysing the content and structure of ties between
large manufacturers and their suppliers”. In their conclusions they are taking steps towards “a
behavioral theory of the networked firm”.
In these two articles, some major theoretical problems related to the automotive industry have
been pointed out. However, both were based on empirical data from the period before the
financial crisis’ start in Q3/2008. The problems have changed and become even more
dramatic during the crisis and the theoretical analysis is now more complicated:
1
The debate on global warming is putting new pressure on the industry from both
society and consumers.
2.
The second revolution of the auto industry will be when the fully electrical
vehicle is a realistic alternative to the petrol car (Freyssenet, 2010).
3.
Public interests and political interventions have increased during the crisis
starting in 2009 and will play a more important role for the future of the automotive industry.
In our study we have focused on the carmakers’ relationships with their major suppliers that,
especially after the financial crisis, are more powerful than the customers/carmakers. These
relationships are important for the understanding and development of the strategies in the
automotive industry (Gnyawali and Madhavan, 2001; Quinn, 2000).
The Automotive Industry: A textbook interpretation of carmakers’ strategies
The background of our case study is that the automotive industry is in a crisis since 2009. In
terms of employment and technology, it is one of the most important industries, it is global
and in a period of dramatic change (Boyer and Freyssenet, 2002). Let us start with some
winning and losing (market share and financial performance) strategies in 2000-2010:
2
Winning and losing strategies in 2000 – 2008: Examples
Winning strategies volume segment:
Toyota and Volkswagen Group
Losing strategies volume segment:
Chrysler, GM and Ford
Winning strategies premium segment:
Audi, BMW and Lexus
Losing strategies premium segment:
Saab Automobile/GM and Volvo/Ford
Both Toyota and the three American/Detroit carmakers are mass producers. But the Japanese
strategies are different from the American ones (Dyer & Nobeoka, 2002). Toyota has the
lowest degree of global sourcing and the highest degree of in-house component deliveries
(Mueller, 2010). With external major suppliers Toyota has a collaborative (voice) strategy.
Toyota is a global carmaker, with direct investments in the US and 13 manufacturing
locations in 2010. The strategies of GM, Ford, and Chrysler are typical for global Mass
Production with arm’s length (exit) relationships with suppliers.
The Volkswagen Group (Audi, VW, Skoda, and Seat) has a high degree of global sourcing.
But lately they also have organized an internal component division. The product strategy is to
build many models per platform in order to take advantage of both economies of scale and
scope. There is a risk for internal cannibalism between e.g. VW Passat and Skoda Superb but
during the period we have studied both the market share and the financial performance have
been among the best in class. However, an unfriendly takeover in 2008 and 2009 by VW of
Porsche and v.v. has been devastating for the financial stability of both.
Premium brands have a significantly higher price per kilo than the mass-produced ones in the
same bracket (sedan, SUV etc.). BMW’s strategy is differentiation by technical leadership,
advanced design and high performance. Saab and Volvo have been involved in the strategies
of their American owners and lost their brand image. After 20 and 15 years respectively Saab
Automobile is sold by GM to Spyker Cars, NL and Volvo is sold by Ford Motor Co. to
Chinese Geely. The future is problematic for both Swedish carmakers.
Which formal strategies from the most cited scholars (that also should be well-known among
top executives in the automotive industry) in Strategic Management have been applied in the
examples above? How can the formal strategic concepts and models help us understand what
has happened? Can formal strategic management theory facilitate for planning and
management of the suppliers and the carmakers in the crisis of 2009-2010?
The Toyota model is well-known for lean production, with high quality and a complete line of
brands and models. This model is very complex and deeply integrated in the Japanese culture
and therefore hard to imitate by carmakers in other cultures. There is no clear interpretation of
these strategies in the mainstream literature on Strategic Management. Expansion of both
markets and products (Ansoff, 1965), both cost efficiency and differentiation (Porter, 1980)
and Core Competence (Prahalad & Hamel, 1990) are some of the references that could apply.
The long-term perspective of Toyota can be caught in the BCG grid (1968) where Cash Cows
are delivering resources to Question Marks and Stars in order to find new Cash Cows. Toyota
and Lexus are leading in hybrid and battery technology which is one example of long-term
strategy producing Question Marks and later new Cash Cows (Prius and Lexus). But have the
Toyota management and owners used these models for development of their winning
strategies?
3
The VW Group has applied a mix of strategies. Their strategy is both cost efficient and
differentiated, which is not recommended by Porter (1980). Seat is a mass production brand
and Audi is a premium car at the top of the product line. Audi has successfully competed with
Mercedes. The Daimler acquisition of Chrysler was a failure and later Fiat took control of
Chrysler. Daimler/Mercedes lost focus and Audi took market shares in the US, the most
important market for both German premium brands.
The American Mass Production model is easier to catch in the Porter (1980) model as a Cost
Efficient strategy. Helper et al (2000) have explained why it was not competitive. Global
Sourcing as a part of the Mass Production strategy is not leaving enough resources for R&D
and new products. In total, this Purchasing Strategy has failed.
Also the BMW strategy is easy to catch in the Porter (1980) model as a Differentiation
strategy. But it is much more complex as a part of a German high technology culture with a
long history. There are problems also for BMW. After having developed a profile with
powerful engines BMW now has started to deliver engines with sufficient power and fuel
efficiency and low emissions.
Saab Automobile and Volvo have been ‘stuck in the middle’. Even if Volvo’s volumes have
been 2-3 times higher than Saab’s, both have been too small to get access to scale economies
as stand alone firms. But Volvo has been profitable almost all the time from the start in 1926
until 2009. The safety image of Volvo is a result of a long-term successful Differentiation
strategy. Most competitors have the same ranking in NCAP safety tests but Volvo has a
leading position and image as a very safe car. Also in this case Volvo’s safety technology
development can been seen as a product of a historical Swedish safety culture. Saab has
jumped between different images and lost market shares. Saab has been profitable only during
a short period since the start in 1946 as a consequence of a diversification strategy within the
Swedish defence/airspace industry.
The winners have demonstrated ‘dynamic capabilities’ (Teece et al, 1997) by their ability to
develop new products and systems over and over again. This is an ‘ex post fact’ and inspiring
challenge for the creation of winning strategies. But it is not easy to use as a generative
concept for the losers.
The major challenge for the next decade is the power train and the fuel efficiency for
reduction of emissions. The carmakers have weak financial status after the crisis starting in
Q3/2008. Therefore, national governments and political institutions like the EU can be
expected to support the green technology development. This process has already started both
in the US, Japan, and the EU with plug-in electrical cars, hybrid engines, and new battery
technologies (Freyssenet, 2010).
From 2010 we can expect that the development of green technologies in the car industry will
require new competence and heavy investments. At the same time the biggest carmakers will
reduce their capacity in the US and the EU by 20-25 percent and expand in growing markets
(e.g. China and India).
The core competence for the development of green technology is now in the power
companies, the electronic and computer industries (e.g. battery technology). Will they come
in as new partners in the product development in the automotive industry? Will the carmakers
accept to become dependent on outside suppliers for one of the core technologies? How can
carmakers develop and protect unique competence in a collaborative strategy?
A part of the answer can be found in the development of leading safety systems in close
relationship between the Volvo and Autoliv safe belts and airbags. Also the steelmaker SSAB
has contributed with new materials and designs for the protection of passengers. Safety is the
4
most important core competence of Volvo but it is shared with the suppliers Autoliv and
SSAB. These suppliers also have Volvo’s competitors as clients. This example could be a role
model for more collaborative product development and purchasing strategies in the
automotive industry. The example was only valid as a success during the product
development period and as long as Volvo could manage as a stand alone company. During the
Ford ownership Volvo could not differentiate the cars within the Ford Global Purchasing
strategy.
Since the IMVP report “The Machine that Changed the World” (Womack et al, 1990) was
published, it has been clear that the Japanese benchmarking figures have been better than the
American ones. Many improvement programs were initiated by Chrysler, GM, and Ford
Motor Co. Both production and quality have developed in the US factories. But the problems
were so serious that it turned out to be too little and too late. In 2009, GM went bankrupt. The
American government took control and saved GM financially. Fiat took control over
Chrysler. Ford Motor Co. is doing best of the Detroit Three financially but is still weak.
Downsizing in the US and Western Europe and expansion in Asia have accelerated after the
financial crisis that started in Q3/2008.
One of the most discussed differences between the American and the Japanese strategies is
how purchasing and product development is organized. Helper et al (2000) and Sako (2003)
have found more collaborative (voice) relationships between Japanese carmakers and their
major direct suppliers. The American strategy is typically arm’s length or exit.
A note on the research method
In case-based research, the choice of empirical cases is crucial. Several longitudinal case
studies are by definition more adequate for the understanding of strategies and long-term
relationships between OEMs in the automotive industry and its first tier suppliers. The
problem is that interviews are time-consuming and expensive. Therefore, we have
concentrated on interviews about every second year with a few firms over more than a
decade.
The first contacts with Volvo and Autoliv created a joint interest between the companies and
us as researchers in the topic and it was decided to extend the research period beyond the first
project. This ongoing research period is now into its sixteenth year, which provides us with a
longitudinal knowledge of the development of the Volvo - Autoliv relationship. Autoliv is
also an important supplier to the other main competitors among the European OEMs – Saab,
Audi, Mercedes, and BMW, i.e. all brands competing worldwide with Volvo. Based on the
case presentation, we can draw conclusions about the function of “Chambre séparée” in
product development from the perspective of the European premium car segment.
The empirical evidence for this article has been collected through a sequence of interviews
covering more than 25 individuals, equally divided between Volvo and Autoliv, interviewed
at several occasions during the 1994-2007 period, and secondary data, such as reports,
internal documents, and official material. The interviews cover individuals involved in a
variety of areas such as product development, purchasing, general management, marketing
management, and dealer management. Interviewees have always been introduced by people
already interviewed and the interviews have been semi-structured. The interviews were taped
or documented by two of us in order to facilitate interpretation and to promote the
trustworthiness of the results.
5
Case study
Volvo (Volvo Pv before 1999=Volvo Cars after 1999 in the Ford family)
Volvo, one of the two Swedish personal car manufacturers, produces and markets personal
cars for the premium segment, and its main competitors are OEMs such as Audi, BMW, and
Mercedes. Volvo performed very well during the beginning of the new century, in terms of
both growth and profitability and was the best in class in the Ford Group. However, the
situation in the early 1990s was different and considered very problematic. Could such a small
player in the personal car industry (and also in the premium car segment) survive in the long
run?
The new role Volvo took on required developing the total car concept and to co-ordinate
the supply chain. In the Volvo strategy, it was recognized that the only way to be first to
market in product development was to cooperate with large, resourceful suppliers. The
procurement and development departments developed a new field of competence dealing with
supplier partnerships. When describing the core competence of Volvo managers and
purchasers we were continuously coming back to three core values: safety, environment, and
quality.
"Today we have a narrow and deep competence to construct and produce a few
car models. In the future we will need a broad and superficial competence to
deal with more car models and place demands on our suppliers instead of
doing things ourselves." (Purchaser, Volvo, 1994)
To take advantage of the suppliers’ competence and capacity, Volvo started to develop
partner relationships with the major direct suppliers (about 20). Single sourcing was
considered the most realistic strategic choice, considering that Volvo was a small OEM in
terms of volume. Even though Volvo was considered a comparatively “fair” customer, this
new initiative created considerable confusion among the suppliers. What was included in the
concept of partnership and was Volvo willing to go all the way towards single sourcing?
Volvo began by using their established and mostly European supply base, but over time more
and more relationships have developed with all the global mega-suppliers, including the
American and the Japanese.
When a large system was to be bought from one single first-tier supplier in a partnership,
Volvo required that it should have the following characteristics:
1.
Strategic importance, giving Volvo a unique profile and having an important effect
on Volvo business.
2.
Part of the module strategy and the platform strategy. The module should be useable
in several cars and the supplier should be able to produce the modules at different
locations.
3.
Invest heavily in logistics and development. The supplier should establish part of
their operations in the Volvo supplier villages created close to their three manufacturing
plants to ensure sequencing and flexibility.
4.
Fast adaptation of new technology and fast Time To Market (TTM). The suppliers
should work with other OEMs and be committed to use the knowledge gained in the
relationships with Volvo. Through this way of working Volvos intention was to halve the
time between the launchings of new car generations.
6
Autoliv was one of the suppliers that were highly rated as a stable partner, even before the
partnership program was launched. However, there were more steps to be taken and today
Autoliv is one of Volvo’s closest suppliers in terms of mutual trust and cooperation.
The development of Volvo owned by Ford in 1999-2008
Until 1999 when it was acquired by Ford Volvo was an independent OEM. Now, Volvo is
part of the Ford Premier Automotive Group. With almost ten years perspective on Ford’s
acquisition of Volvo in 1999, top managers at Volvo argue that this is probably the best M&A
in the automotive industry.
Maybe Volvo was saved by being a business area within one of the ‘Big Six’ in this
industry. At the same time there is a consensus among senior Volvo managers that there are
problems and cultural clashes which are not yet overcome after almost ten years. One major
point is that American as well as German and Japanese managers are demonstrating “I am the
boss” more than Swedish managers normally do.
Before 1999 Volvo had both good (Mitsubishi) and bad (Renault) experiences of close
horizontal partnerships. In both cases there was a close cooperation with first tier suppliers in
order to get economies of scale. All this time Volvo could develop its position as the leading
firm in car safety systems. Both Mitsubishi and Renault learned a lot from Volvo. Volvo
learned mostly from Mitsubishi, especially how to assemble different models on the same
final assembly line.
From 1995 until 1999 Volvo had integrated Product Development and Purchasing which
was successful initially. When Ford became the new owner, Global Sourcing was introduced
also at Volvo. Global Sourcing with arms-length supplier relationships and cost focus was an
adequate strategy for a commodity car producer but not for Volvo with a premium car
strategy. Cost cutting became more important than technology development. “This was a
major disturbance in the relationship with Autoliv”, said two senior Volvo managers and one
from Autoliv. Ford nominated Volvo as a Center of Excellence in car safety. But the content
of this position was later reduced to ‘lead’. Volvo had an important role in the development of
car safety in the Ford organization until 2010 when Volvo was sold by Ford to the Chinese
carmaker Geely.
Volvo’s competitors Audi, BMW, and Mercedes are the leading brands in the premium
segment. The German brands are giving priority to technology leadership. Their financial
performance has also been much better than “The American Big Three” (now, in 2010, called
Detroit Three/D3) during several decades. Volvo makes premium cars with another profile
than the German ones. Safety is Volvo core value No. 1. The main competitors have almost
the same safety technology, but Volvo has been the leading firm since the 1960s. Safety
reputation and image are of great value for Volvo.
“The difference is that USA believes in size, Europe believes in technology. Japan is
copying at lower costs. Korea and China are following Japan. Toyota is developing inhouse.” (Volvo manager)
Volvo’s cooperation with Autoliv before 1999 was based on closeness (both
geographically and personally) and cost sharing for the development of new safety systems.
7
Autoliv
The Swedish supplier Autoliv was founded in 1953 and was a very early player in the
development of seat belts. In 1956, the first seat belts were delivered to Volvo. Today,
Autoliv Sweden is part of a worldwide enterprise which develops, manufactures and markets
car safety products. The merger between Autoliv and the American company Merton Auto
Safety Products was considered a very good match. They complemented each other - Autoliv
was strong in seat belts and in the European market and Merton was strong in airbags and in
the American market.
“The acquisition of Merton (in 1997) meant that we added new competencies
to existing ones, strengthened our position towards the OEMs and we
expanded our customer base since the end of the 80s. All European OEMs
were now our customers and the innovation rate was high.” (Business Director,
Autoliv, 2005)
Their business mission is to develop and sell systems related to the safety of the car.
Autoliv is one of the world’s leading airbag producers and has most of the world’s car
manufacturers as their customers. They estimate that Autoliv has a global market share of 30
per cent in the market for “car occupant restraint products” and the market share in Europe is
50 per cent.
It has been an explicit strategy to be located close to the customers and they have 80
factories in 30 countries. Autoliv has experienced great advantages from being early on the
market with new technology. The strategy is clearly to be a technological leader and Autoliv
was first on the market with e.g. the SIPS (Side Impact Protection System). To deliver car
safety systems the supplier has to be a technological leader and have close cooperation with
the OEMs. Autoliv has launched the Thorax Bag (1994), AntiWhiplash Seat (1998) and
Automatic Mayday System (2000) together with Volvo, but has also cooperated and launched
other products together with other customers for example the Inflatable Tubular Structure
together with BMW and the Head Thorax Bag together with Ford and Renault.
Volvo is not Autoliv’s biggest customer, but is the most important one in terms of product
development. Both Volvo and Autoliv have high ambitions to be leading in car safety, which
makes it necessary for them to work in close cooperation. When listening to the managers
interviewed, for them car safety can be interpreted as a common religion.
"Our ambition with a partnership with Volvo is to get a partner with which we
can try new products. When you are in the safety systems business you cannot
develop new products on your own, you need a car manufacturer to work with.
Together we can create new products. That is a common interest for us and
Volvo and their customers and that is what makes this successful. Both of us
feel that we can take advantage of a co-operation and we develop new products
for our future survival. Our company is growing and Volvo helps us to bring
new products to the market. Safety is one of their most important areas."
(Business Director, Autoliv, 1999)
Autoliv updated case until fall 2007
The Volvo Cars-Autoliv relationship is a long story from seatbelts in the late 50s to world
leadership in safety systems. Historically, Volvo had to cooperate closely with suppliers
already from the start-up in 1926:
“Chambre séparée is a good metaphor for Autoliv’s relationship with
many premium brands. Patents and licences are formalities. (Autoliv manager).”
8
“Volvo and Autoliv have been a transparent relationship with technology
development vs. ‘arm’s length’ without any R&D. There was a disturbance when Ford came
in as a new owner in 1999/2000 leading to a slowdown in the technology development.
(Volvo manager, 2007).
Autoliv became a global firm before Ford acquired Volvo in 1999. After the merger with
Merton in 1997, Autoliv had to find a new strategy. Earlier the foreign subsidiaries were
strong and very cost efficient. But with more and more global customers/OEMs the new
Autoliv CEO launched a global strategy with a more centralized R&D. The production is
stepwise being moved from high cost to low cost countries. Autoliv became more competitive
in its relationship to customers with Global Sourcing strategies, e.g. Ford, GM, and
Volkswagen.
For Volvo the global strategies have led to more cost focus and less resources for
technology development. But still, the Volvo cars are ranked as the safest cars even if the
differences between the premium cars are small or have disappeared even. There are some
examples of projects for renewal of the tight Volvo - Autoliv relationship. In the development
of active safety the new Volvo S80 has some features like Adaptive Speed Control (ACC) and
alerting brakes before a collision.
The Volvo – Autoliv relationship
The definition of the safety system and the interfaces between the airbag system and its
environment (safety belt, dashboard, and other physical systems in the car and the occupants
of the car) is the starting point for the system competence. The Volvo and Autoliv engineers
and managers involved are well aware of their respective competence profiles. One way of
preserving and protecting competence is the use of patents. Patents are often written in
common in contracts between Volvo and Autoliv and they rarely have problems in finding a
solution to the patent sharing. Ethics is an important element in the preservation of knowledge
in the companies. One aspect of ethics is not to steal employees who are very competent from
other companies.
“Our relationship expanded as the market demands for safety equipment took
off in the 1970s. Volvo decided to make safety one of their top priorities in
development as well as marketing with the 240-series and at that time a
number of individuals in Autoliv’s development group came from Volvo. By
this (joint development groups) we created a relationship that was beneficial
for Autoliv as well as Volvo.” (Business Director, Autoliv, 1999)
To utilise the knowledge created in projects with several customers but still develop
unique products is an organizational problem that Autoliv seems to have solved in a
satisfactory way. As already mentioned, Autoliv is running development projects together
with partners besides Volvo. A clear boundary was established between the people working
with Volvo and the people working with for instance Saab Automobile, BMW, or Audi
except for executives not taking part in the daily operations.
“With so few suppliers in the world, we know which other OEMs Autoliv is
working with. As long as we don’t lose access to innovations that are funded
by us, or that actions taken by the supplier do not harm our market position as
leader within the safety area, we think this kind of coopetition is better than the
alternatives.” (Product Development Director, Volvo, 2005)
9
Upcoming problems can lead to an improvement of the R&D competence of the Volvo
project team when more and more responsibility is given to the supplier. The use of suppliers
that are partners is increasing the Volvo system competence. The reason is that a supplier like
Autoliv has customers on a worldwide basis and develops 3-5 projects at the same time. This
pace is much higher than anything that Volvo could achieve. Furthermore, the different
demands from car manufacturers put additional requirements on the supplier in terms of
innovation, quality, and performance. The people in the Volvo projects can take advantage of
the general experience gained from other customers’ projects with Autoliv.
“A key factor for Volvo is to ensure that Autoliv can attract development
assignments from several OEMs. If not, their new product development
portfolio would contain fewer projects which over the time will make it more
difficult for Volvo to rely on Autoliv for our future profile as a safety-focused
brand.” (Product Development Manager, Volvo, 2005)
This is what we call chambre séparées (Figure 1) with overhearing for new product
development (Brandes et al. 2008). It can be considered a development of the Round
Table strategy at Volvo in the 1990s. None of these supplier relations strategies are
without conflicts. But in the end all parties are reasonably satisfied.
1. Regional
Partnership
Proprietary
Patents etc
Volvo Pv/Swedish
until about 1990
Autoliv/Swedish
2. Chambre
séparée
Audi
BMW
Daimler Bentz
Autoliv/global business
3. Learning by
overhearing
Volvo Cars/Ford
Figure 1
Parallel chambres séparées with overhearing for new product development
Managerial conclusions
The American car industry went into a deep crisis in the beginning of 2009. GM went
bankrupt and the US Government took control as a majority owner. Chrysler is
managed by Fiat, subsidized by the US taxpayers (Helper, 2010). Ford Motor Co. has
10
the best key figures among the Three Detroit (D3) automakers but the financial
situation is weak. The problems with the D3 falling US market shares started in the
1980s (sales from 77 per cent 1980 to 45 per cent 2009, production from 97 to 45 per
cent). Transplants (New Domestics) have taken increasing shares of N.A./US markets
(Helper 2010).
The D3 has since many years complained about the legal costs (pensions etc.). But the
basic problem, after restructuring of the debts in 2009-10, is no longer high costs. The
problem is the margin that is significantly lower than for comparable Japanese models.
One of the main reasons for the problems of D3 passenger cars is the strategic focus
on mass production and cost cutting. The relationships with the suppliers are among
the worst in the world (Mueller, 2010) and there are no resources for R&D. Together
with the mass production strategy this is devastating for the quality and the image.
Even if there are some D3 models among the best in the JD Power’s ranking the
question is about the future for the US passenger industry’s production in the USA.
Ford Global Purchasing strategy has been cost efficient for Volvo, but Volvo has lost
in technical development and image partly as a consequence of the Ford ownership
era, partly because passive safety systems are becoming generic. The next big leap,
active safety systems, requires high investments in infrastructures e.g. highways.
Investments in new, green powertrains have a higher priority than safety systems.
Volvo had a good financial performance from the beginning of the 1990s and also
during the first 5-6 years in the Ford family from 1999. Therefore, Volvo could build a
strong position also as a part of Ford Motor Co. Volvo was nominated a Center of
Excellence within Ford Motor Co. e.g. in safety technology and several other R&D
fields. The Volvo technology, e.g. safety system, was applied to Ford models and Ford
Europe has built Mondeo models on the Volvo S80 platform.
Volvo had a very strong safety image since the 1960s. Volvo, with its close
relationship to Autoliv, has been leading the car safety technology since the late
1950s. But Volvo’ competitors in the premium segment have almost the same safety
systems delivered by Autoliv. Still, Volvo has the reputation of having the safest cars.
What can we learn about knowledge management from this case study? How does our
findings relate to earlier studies?
From our Volvo-Autoliv case we have earlier developed the concept of Chambre
Séparée as a metaphor for the successful management of knowledge between one lead
firm, a prime supplier and several competing buyers (Brandes et al 2008).
We can draw some conclusions about the dynamics of relational capability. For Volvo
and Autoliv there was a long period in the 1980s and 1990s with adequate resources
for development of safety systems. Later, when the technology became generic and
mature, volume and cost efficiency matter and so does ownership. When Ford Motor
Co. acquired Volvo the cost cutting strategy dominated over product development.
But, at the same time the safety systems became generic. The Ford Global Sourcing
with focus on cost reduction and economies of scale more than on R&D happened to
be just in time.
Will only the biggest car producers survive? Yes, according to the American
commodity car producers before 2009. Now, with all three Detroit carmakers in a deep
crisis it is an open question. GM has the US Government as the majority owner, and
Chrysler is managed by Fiat subsidized with US taxpayers.
11
The German premium OEMs, Audi/VW, BMW, and Mercedes are big enough to
survive if they can adapt to the green powertrain. Volvo has been sold by the
commodity car producer Ford Motor Co to Chinese Geely. Again, ownership matters
for Volvo/Geely as a premium car and a lead firm in car safety. The purchasing
strategy is more critical than ever. If “strategy is a pattern in a stream of actions”
(Mintzberg, 1987), both the R&D and the purchasing strategy are open questions for
Volvo.
Discussion and conclusions
Many scholars of Strategic Management have studied the automotive industry. One obvious
reason is that it is one of the most important industries in the world in terms of employment
and technology. It was globalized in the 1990s in the first wave of outsourcing and many
M&As. This became a politically hot issue when the US and Western Europe lost jobs to
Mexico, South America, Eastern Europe, and Asia. In 2010 the overcapacity in the US and
Western Europe is estimated to be about 25 per cent (ACEA, 2010).
Our case study of Volvo and Autoliv during the period of developing the world’s leading
safety systems is, based on waves of in-depth interviews, covering more than 15 years. This is
a success story and a possible role model for collaborative carmaker-supplier strategies for
long-term development projects. Volvo outsourced R&D in core competence of safety
systems to Autoliv in order to get access to economies of scale. Autoliv had several of
Volvo’s competitors as costumers and sold new safety systems with some time lag from
Volvo’s presentations of new models and systems. Patents and Intellectual Property Rights
have been handled in consensus between Volvo and Autoliv.
Looking ahead, green technology leading to lower emissions will be necessary components in
the strategy and investment plans for winners in the future car market. The “Second
Revolution in the Auto Industry” is the fully electrical car (Freyssenet, 2010). With
financially weakened carmakers we can expect more political interventions in the automotive
industry to prevent social unrest and facilitate the development of more fuel efficient engines.
There will be some actors taking the lead and others will be followers. ‘Overhearing’ between
suppliers and their competing customers/carmakers in the process of new technology and
product development has been observed in several studies (Doz, 1996; Doz and Hunter, 2004;
Parry and Roehrich 2009).
We conclude that the winners in the automobile industry from 2010 on will be those who can
organize long-term collaboration partnerships between the carmakers, their suppliers and the
political stakeholders. The carmakers must accept that their external suppliers have
competing carmakers as their customers. This is the only way to get short Time To Market
and economies of scale in R&D, product development, and production. Ownership and
market organization matter, but in combination with collaboration there are hybrid
organizations for more efficient product development than the pure market. In total, we
conclude that all empirical evidence is showing the importance of collaborative relationships
and cooptition, sometimes in Chambre separées with overhearing, between carmakers and
their first tier suppliers. This is one of the most important differences between success and
failure in 2000-2010.
The limitation of our study is of course that it is based on one longitudinal case. However, we
have many references from other scholars that we have considered. The major limitation is
which conclusions we can learn from in future developments.
Future research ideas are concluded from our theoretical background and empirical
conclusions. The theory of competition and cooperation can be developed to catch the
12
complex development of industries like the automotive. The concepts should be even more
generative for new empirical studies after the 2008-10 crises. The managerial models from
Ansoff (1965) to Teece (1997) should be reviewed in the light of the current development.
Obviously many top managers are applying these models but what have they learnt? Also, the
role of governments and institutions like EU should be studied further in developments of the
new vehicles for better environment protection.
References
ACEA, The European Automobile Industry Association, Industry Report 2009. Brussels.
Ansoff, I. 1965. Corporate Strategy, McGraw Hill, New York.
Bagshaw,M. Bagshaw, C. 2001. Co-opetition applied to training - a case study. Industrial and
Commercial Training, 33 (5), 175-177.
Bengtsson, M. Kock, S. 2000. “Co-opetition” in business networks - to cooperate and
compete simultaneously. Marketing Management, 29, 411-426.
Bengtsson, M. Kock, S. 2003. Tension in co-opetition. Developments in Marketing Science,
26, 38-42.
Boyer, R. Freyssenet, M., 2002. The Productive Model, Palgrave MacMillan, New York.
Brandenburger, AM. Nalebuff, B.J. 1996. Co-opetition. Doubleday, New York.
Brandes, O. Brege, S. Brehmer PO., 2008, Chambre Séparée in Product Development. Paper
at the SMS Annual International Conference in Köln, Oct 13-15.
Brandes, O. Brege, S. Lilliecreutz, J. 1999. Chambre Séparée in Prime-Supplier Relations Building Sustainable Competitive Advantage. IMP competitive paper, Industrial
Marketing and Purchasing Conference, August, Dublin/Belfast
Contractor, FJ. Lorange, P. 1988. Cooperative strategies in international business. Lexington
Books, Boston.
Dowling, J. Roering, WD. Carlin, BA. Wisnieski, J. 1996. Multifaced relationships under
coopetition - description and theory. K, 5 (2), 155-167.
Doz, YL. 1996. The evolution of cooperation in strategic alliances: Initial conditions or
learning processes? K, 17, 55-83.
Doz, YL. Hunter, M. 2004. Coopetition for Leading Networked Industries, Coopetition
Strategy: Towards a New Kid of Interfirm Dynamics? European Institute of Advanced
Studies in Management (EIASM) Conference Catania, Italy, September 16-17 2004.
Dyer, Jeffrey H. Kentaro Nobeoka. 2000. “Creating and Managing a High-Performance
Knowledge-Sharing Network: The Toyota Case.” Strategic Management Journal 21: 345367.
Fine, CH. 1998. Clockspeed: Winning Industry Control in the Age of Temporary Advantage,
Perseus Books Publishing, Boston.
Freyssenet, M. 2010. The beginnings of a Second Automobile Revolution. Firms strategies
and public policies, Convegno, Milano. Digital publication, freyssenet.com, 2010, 1Mo,
ISSN 7116-0941.
Gnyawali, DR. Madhavan, R.2001. Cooperative networks and competitive dynamics: A
structural embeddedness perspective. Academy of Management Review, 28 (3), 431-445.
Hamel, G. Doz, YL. Prahalad, C.K. 1989. Collaborate with your competitors and win.
Harvard Business Review, 67 (1), 133-139.
Helper, S. 2010. Challenge and Opportunity in the US Auto Industry: The Key Role of
Suppliers. MIP Convegno, May 17, 2010. Milano.
13
Lilliecreutz, J. 1998. Orchestrating Resource Base, Role, and Position – A Supplier's In
Buyer-Dominated Relationships. European Journal of Purchasing and Supply
Management 4, 73-85.
Lorenzoni, G. Lipparini, A. (1999), ‘The Leveraging of Interfirm Relationships as a
Distinctive Organizational Capability: A Longitudinal Study’, Strategic Management
Journal, 20, 317-338.
Mueller, HE., 2010. Hybrid Supplier Strategies – A Way out of Crisis at Toyota and General
Motors? Convegno di Economia e Politica Industriale. MIP Politecnico di Milano, 2010.
Mintzberg, H. Waters, J.A. (1985). "Of Strategies, Deliberate and Emergent." Strategic
Management Journal, 6, 257-272.
Mintzberg, H., (1987) Five Ps for Strategy. In The Strategy Process, California Management
Review, 30, 11-24.
Nalebuff, BJ. Brandenburger, AM 1997. Co-opetition: Competitive and Cooperative business
strategies for the digital economy. Strategy & Leadership, 25 (6), 28-33.
Nichiguchi, T. 1994, Strategic Industrial Sourcing: The Japanese Advantage. Oxford
University Press. New York. 1994.
Porter, ME. 1980. Competitive Strategy. Techniques for analysing industries and competitors.
Free Press. New York.
Porter, .E. 1985. Competitive Advantage. Free Press, New York.
Sako, M. 2003. Supplier Development at Honda, Nissan, and Toyota. Comparative Studies of
Organizational Capability Enhancement. Industrial and Corporate Change.
Sutherland, D. 2005. OEM-supplier relations in the global auto and components industry: is
there a business revolution? International Journal of Automotive Technology and
Management, 5 (2), 234-251.
Teece, DJ, Pisano, G. Shuen, A. 1997. Dynamic capabilities and strategic management.
Strategic Management Journal, 18 (7), 509-533.
Wernerfelt, B. 1984. A resource-based view of the firm. Strategic Management Journal, 5,
171-180.
Whitford, J. Simmons, S. Helper, S. 2007. Contested Collaboration: Toward a behavioural
theory of the networked firm. NY: Columbia University. Unpublished MS.
Wilkinson, I. Young, L. 2002. On cooperating firms, relations and networks. Journal of
Business Research, 55 (2), 123-132.
Womack, D. Jones, D. Roos, D. 1990. The machine that changed the world,
Rawson/MacMillan, New York.
Zajac, EJ. Olsen, CP. 1993. From transaction cost to transactional value analysis: Implications
for the study of interorganizational strategies. Journal of Management Studies, 30, 131145
14

procurement, purchasing and supply chain management

Transcription

Documents pareils

Camion benne entrepreneur 21 M3 FMX 8x4, 440 CV

Maintenance / STOCKAGE DE PIÈCE S DÉTACHÉES

L`avenir industriel de Renault Trucks Bourg en Bresse et les

Questionnaire automobiles

oceanis 411 - Riviera Plaisance

Mini pelle VOLVO E25

Distribution automobile : Les rachats et

Volvo et ArvinMeritor signent une alliance stratégique dans le

www.naturalselling.biz