PROGRAMME PRÉLIMINAIRE

Transcription

PROGRAMME PRÉLIMINAIRE
Colloque CIREQ Montréal de théorie microéconomique
19 et 20 novembre 2016
Montréal, Québec
PROGRAMME PRÉLIMINAIRE
SAMEDI, 19 novembre 2016
* Chaque présentation a une durée de 30 minutes; Sean Horan est le président de toutes les sessions.
13:00 - 13:10
Inscription
13:10 — 14:40 Szilvia PAPAI (Concordia University, CIREQ)
Circulation under Responsive Preferences (avec Peter Biro et Flip Klijn)
Bettina KLAUS (University of Lausanne)
Object Allocation via Immediate-Acceptance : Characterizations and an Affirmative
Action Application (with Battal Dogan)
Utku ÜNVER (Boston College)
Incentive-Compatible Liver Exchange
14:40 - 15:00
Pause
15:00 - 16:30
Tommy ANDERSSON (Lund University)
Assigning Refugees to Landlords in Sweden : Stable Maximum Matchings
(with Lars Ehlers)
Onur KESTEN (Carnegie Mellon University)
A Study of the Turkish High School Admissions
Marek PYCIA (University of California at Los Angeles)
Matching Market Outcomes
16:30 - 16:50
Pause
16:50 - 18:20
Thayer MORRILL (North Carolina State University)
Which School Assignments Are Legal?
Fuhito KOJIMA (Stanford University)
Stable Matching in Large Economies (with Yeon-Koo Che and Jinwoo Kim)
Scott D. KOMINERS (Harvard University)
Hidden Substitutes (with John W. Hatfield)
18:50
Restaurant Laloux (18:50-19:30 Cocktail; Souper à 19:30) – Sur invitation seulement
DIMANCHE, 20 novembre 2016
8:30 – 9:00
Petit déjeuner continental
9:00 - 11:00
Itai ASHLAGI (Stanford University)
Communication Requirements and Informative Signaling in Matching Markets
(avec Mark Braverman, Yash Kanoria et Peng Shi)
Bumin YENMEZ (Boston College)
Matching with Externalities (with Marek Pycia)
Vikram MANJUNATH (Texas A&M University)
Mechanism Design with Privately Known Outside Options (avec Samson Alva)
Jacob LESHNO (Columbia Business School)
A Simple Model for the Top Trading Cycles School Choice Mechanism Using Fluid
Approximation
11:00 - 11:30
Pause
11:30 - 13:00
Federico ECHENIQUE (California Institute of Technology)
A Characterization of Combinatorial Demand (avec Chris Chambers)
Umut DUR (North Carolina State University)
School Choice with Partial Fairness (avec Arda Gitmez et Ozgur Yilmaz)
Shengwu LI (Harvard University)
Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms
13:00 - 14:30
Dîner