Europe from Exclusive Borders to Inclusive Frontiers

Transcription

Journal of the Institute for
“Jean Monnet” European
Euregional Studies
Centre of Excellence
University of Oradea
University of Debrecen
Volume 4
Autumn 2007
Oradea-Debrecen
1
Journal of the Institute for Euregional Studies
“Jean Monnet” European Centre of Excellence
University of Oradea
Volume 4
Europe from Exclusive Borders to
Inclusive Frontiers
edited by
Gerard DELANTY, Dana PANTEA & Karoly TEPERICS
References by
Robert BIDELEUX & Thomas LUNDEN
2007
Oradea-Debrecen
2
Eurolimes
Journal of the Institute for Euroregional Studies
“Jean Monnet” European Centre of Excellence
Autumn 2007
Volume 4
Europe from exclusives Borders to inclusives Frontiers
edited by Gerard DELANTY, Dana PANTEA & Karoly TEPERICS
Honorary Members
Paul Allies (Montpellier), Peter Antes, Cristiane Lemke (Hanover), Enrique Banus (Pamplona), Michel Carmona
(Paris), Jean Pierre Colin (Reims), George Contogeorgis (Athene), Gerard Delanty (Liverpool), Gyorgy Enyedi
(Budapest), Richard Griffiths, Chris G. Quispel (Leiden), Horvath Gyula (Pecs), Andreas Herdina, Livio Missir di
Lusignan (Brussels), Jaroslaw Kundera (Wroclaw), Ariane Landuyt (Siena), Gheorghe Mahara (Oradea), Adrian
Miroiu, Şerban Papacostea (Bucuresti), Jean Nouzille (Strasbourg), Nicole Pietri (Strasbourg), Vladimir Pessenko
(Rostow –on- Don), Frank Pfetsch (Heidelberg), Vasile Puşcaş, Vasile Vesa (Cluj-Napoca), Mercedes Samaniego
Boneau (Salamanca), Rudolf Rezsohazy (Leuven), Maria Manuela Tavares Ribeiro (Coimbra), Dusan Sidjanski
(Geneve), Goran Therborn (Uppsalla), Maurice Vaïsse (Paris)
Advisory Committee
Bela Baranyi, Czimre Klara, Kormos Janos, Kozma Gabor, Szabo Bela, Szabo Gyula, Teperics Karoly, Varnay Erno
(Debrecen), Iordan Barbulescu, Gabriela Dragan, Miahai Razvan Ungureanu (Bucuresti), Stephan Bielanski
(Krakaw), Rozalia Biro, Anca Dodescu, Alexandru Ilies, Lia Pop, Rodica Petrea, Sorin Sipos, Barbu Stefanescu, Ion
Zainea (Oradea), Maria Craciun, Ovidiu Ghitta, Adrian Ivan, Nicoale Paun, Ioan-Aurel Pop, (Cluj-Napoca), Gunilla
Edelstam (Stockholm), Didier Francfort (Nancy),Tamara Gella (Orel), Ioan Gumenai, Alla Rosca (Chisinau), Catalina
Iliescu (Alicante), Ines Kanthenusen (Hanover), Anatoly Kruglashov (Chernivtsi), Renaud de La Brosse, Gilles Rouet
(Reims), Giuliana Laschi (Bologna), Illkka Likanen (Joensuu), Stephan Malovic (Zagreb), Maria Marczewska-Rytko
(Lublin), Fabienne Maron (Brussels), Silvia Mihalikova (Bratislava), Misklevetz Ferenc (Szombathely), Ivan Nacev,
Margareta Shivergueva (Sofia), Zaneta Ozolina (Riga), Carlos Eduardo Pacheco do Amaral (Asores), Procopis
Papastratis (Athens), Alexandru-Florin Platon (Iasi), Mykola Palinchak (Uzhgorod), Daniele Pasquinucci (Siena),
Stanislaw Sagan (Rzeszow), Angelo Santaugustino (Brescia), Grigore Silasi (Timisoara), Lavinia Stan (Halifax),
Peter Terem (Banska Bystrica), Esther Gimeno Ugalde (Wien), Jan Wendt (Gdansk),
Editorial Committee
Ioana Albu, Ambrus Attila, Mircea Brie, Mariana Buda, Carmen Buran, Vasile Ciocan, Sorin Cuc, Cristina Dogot,
Antonio Faur (Oradea), Peter Balogh (Uppsala), Andreas Blomquist (Stockholm), Vasile Croitoru, Adriana Dilan
(Chisinau), Csakbereny-Nagy Gergely, Molnar Ernı, Penzes Janos, Radics Zsolt, Tımıri Mihály (Debrecen),
Bohdana Dimitrovova (Belfast), Justina Kutrzeba (Krakaw), Peter Kopekzy (Bratislava), Florin Lupescu, Simona
Miculescu, Adrian Niculescu (Bucuresti), Myroslava Lendel (Uzhgorod), Anca Oltean, Dana Pantea, Mihaela Patraus,
Adrian Popovici, Delia Radu, Alina Stoica, LuminiŃa Şoproni, Mirel Stasac, Constantin Toca (Oradea), Oleksandr
Svyetlov (Kharkiv), Toma Tanase (Paris), Şerban Turcuş (Roma), Natasha Trajkova (Prilep)
The full responsibility regarding the content of the papers belongs exclusively to the authors.
Address: University of Oradea
1, Universitatii st.
410087-Oradea/Romania
Tel/fax: +40.259.467.642
e-mail: [email protected]
www.iser.rdsor.ro
Stamp: Georgius Houfnaglius, Varadinum (Oradea), 1598, National Archives – Bihor County Directorate, Stamp and Manuscript Collection
Eurolimes is a half-yearly journal. Articles and book reviews may be sent to the above mentioned
address. The journal may be acquired by contacting the editors
Journal of the Institute for Euroregional Studies is issued by
Ioan HORGA (Oradea) and Istvan SULI-ZAKAR (Debrecen)
with the support of the Action Jean Monnet of the European Commission,
Oradea University Press
ISSN: 1841-9259
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Cuprins ◊ Contents ◊ Sommaire ◊ Inhalt ◊ Tartalom
Cuprins ◊ Contents ◊ Sommaire ◊ Inhalt ◊ Tartalom ................................................................... 3
Ioan HORGA, Dana PANTEA (Oradea) ◄► Europe from Exclusive Borders to
Inclusive Frontiers. Introduction ............................................................................................ 5
I. Europe - a Euromyth with or without Borders ................................................................... 11
Frank R PFETSCH (Heidelberg) ◄► Borders: Cause of Conflict or Catalyst for
Peace? .................................................................................................................................. 12
CSAPO Tamás (Szombathely) ◄► Workforce-market cooperation along the
Hungarian-Austrian border .................................................................................................. 19
PÉNZES János, MOLNÁR Ernı (Debrecen) ◄► Analysis of the economical
potential in Bihor and Hajdú-Bihar counties ....................................................................... 25
TEPERICS Károly (Debrecen) ◄► Educational co-operations along the HungarianRomanian-Ukrainian border ................................................................................................ 37
Gunilla EDELSTAM (Stockholm) ◄► Concerning the competence of the European
Union in over border security issues .................................................................................... 49
II. Europe, an Inclusive Frontier ............................................................................................. 57
Gerard DELANTY (Liverpool) ◄► Peripheries and Borders in a Post-Western Europe...... 58
Jaroslav KUNDERA (Wroclaw) ◄► L’Europe elargie sans frontiere monetaire .................. 69
CZIMRE Klara (Debrecen) ◄► Cross-border co-operation in Europe: scientific
research ................................................................................................................................ 78
Mihaela GAVRILĂ (Cluj-Napoca) ◄► Trafficking in Human Beings in South Eastern
Europe .................................................................................................................................. 90
Chris QUISPEL (Leiden) ◄► The opening of the Dutch borders. Legal and illegal
migration to the Netherlands 1945-2005............................................................................ 102
III. Image and Identity of the Frontiers of the New Europe ............................................... 111
Fabienne MARON (Bruxelles) ◄► Les nouvelles frontières de l’Europe: repenser les
concepts ............................................................................................................................. 112
Esther GIMENO UGALDE (Wien) ◄► Multilingualism as a new EU-strategy and the
impact of European political border shifts on languages ................................................... 124
Enrique BANUS (Pamplona) ◄► Images of openness - Images of closeness ..................... 134
Dana PANTEA (Oradea) ◄► Cross – Border Politics and Its Image in the European
Union ................................................................................................................................. 142
Margarita CHABANNA (Kiev) ◄► Psychological preconditions of totalitarianism and
their effect on democratic transformations in European states .......................................... 148
IV. Focus .................................................................................................................................. 163
Rudolf REZSOHAZY (Leuven) ◄► The Cultural Frontiers of Europe : Our Common
Values ................................................................................................................................ 164
Reviews and References.......................................................................................................... 171
About the Authors ................................................................................................................... 189
Introduction
Ioan HORGA, Dana PANTEA
In 2005, when the European Centre of Excellence “Jean Monnet”-Institute of
Euroregional Studies Oradea-Debrecen Project was prepared and the publication of Eurolimes
journal was planned, there wasn’t any idea of a publication having the name of a paradigm.
Kalipso Nicolaides considers that Eurolimes is "un paradigme qui lie l'integration a l'interieur et
a l'exterieur, les liens intercultureles, interethatiques et interclasses tisses au sein de l'Union
d'aujourd'hui et les liens inter-Etats tisses avec ses nouveaux membres potentiels" (Nicolaides,
2007: 287). The meaning of the Eurolimes paradigm as mentioned above by Nicolaides
(Nicolaides, 2003) was defined in the very first issue, in the article Why Eurolimes (Horga,
2006). The same meaning is to be found with Etienne Balibar who speaks about Europe as of a
borderland (Balibar, 2004); with Jacques Rupnik who speaks not only about Europe’s frontiers,
but also about the new frontiers “inside Europe” (Rupnik, 2003; Rupnik, 2007); with Thomas
Christiansen who writes about fluid frontiers (Christiansen and all, 2000) or with Olli Rehn for
whom the notion next frontier is more suitable than border for testing ground for the EU soft
power (Rehn, 2006). Our journal aims at presenting the way in which the changing in the
meaning of internal frontiers takes place as seen evolving from the national perspective towards
the community one; and the way in which the meaning of EU’s external frontier changes from
an exclusive community perspective to a flexible inclusive one. The balance between open
frontiers and closed frontiers (Delanty, 2006), confirming the borders – transcending the
borders (Dimitrovova, 2007), intercultural dialogue and the impact of media (La Brosse, 2007;
Malovic, 2007), the role of media in changing the meaning of borders (Horga: 2003; 2007),
interethnic relations (Soproni, 2006; Follrichova & Rouet, 2007), interreligiuos relations
(Marczewska – Rytko,2006; Bazin, 2007), across border social relations are terms used in the
first three issues of our journal (Eurolimes, 2006/1-2; 2007/3) and will be used in the following
ones.
In order to prepare the current issue of the journal we organized the seminar From
Kaliningrad to the Black Sea. A New Interpretation of European Union’s East Frontiers in
Oradea, on the 4th – 7th of June 2007. We had in mind to gather as many different points of view
concerning the East frontier of the new Europe as possible, after the most extensive acceding
process has been completed. During the seminar there were presented three different categories
of papers which didn’t have as main subject Europe as an open frontier. That’s why we
considered to change the title of our publication in order to gather the papers presented at the
seminar under the title: Europe from Exclusive Borders to Inclusive Frontiers. This decision
is based on the similitudes between our subject and the one of the supporters who are in favour
of the paradigm of Europe as an inclusive frontier (Eurolimes) (Nicolaidis, 2007; Zielonka,
2002, 2006; Geremek & Picht, 2007).
We followed these steps under the circumstances in which the greatest part of the
papers deal with the changing in the meaning of frontiers between the new EU member states.
This change proves us that the research workers , especially those from the newly integrated
countries, but not only them, are more interested in a pragmatic perspective than in a
cosmopolitan one. The papers dealing with this subject have been gathered in a chapter under
the title: Europe - a Euromyth, with or without Borders.
The first paper in this chapter is that of Frank Pfetch. The author's main question in his
contribution is whether that the borders are an obstacle or a facilitator for peace. Since it is quite
obvious that borders can be both object of quarrel and defenders of peace, the question has to be
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reformulated: what are the conditions for borders to become an object of war or a facilitator for
peace. The answers present some conditions as to obstacles to peace, such as on the one hand
countries with open frontiers without natural delimitating lines, disputed lines of demarcation,
and arbitrarily dictated borders by outside dominating powers without consultation of the
population. On the other hand borders can offer an opportunity for cooperation if they coincide
with the principle of self-determination, if state borders reinforce identity of a population, or if
political borders correspond with ethnical, religious or cultural groups. The overarching
international framework for boundary-as-barrier is that of national power politics, that of
boundary-as-inducer-to-peace is that of regional integration led by negotiated arrangements.
A pragmatic perspective upon the role of the internal frontiers of Europe is offered by
Csapo Tamas in his study about the history of the labour market relationships on the
borderland of Austria and Hungary during the last 20 years. In the beginning, Hungarian
employees got a job on the conventional way, based on the strict permission policy of the
Austrian government, and those who worked a longer period, got a green card. Borderland
labour has been regulated by treaties between the two states since 1998. One of them is the
Borderland Commuting Agreement. Due to it, 2200 people got employed. The other one is the
Probationary Agreement. As a consequence of it, 600 people engaged themselves to work in
Burgenland from West-Transdanubia. Since Hungary has joined the EU, those Hungarian
employees who belong to either the group of traditional employees or those who belong to the
authority of the Commuting Agreement, after 12 months work abroad may get the permission
discharge certification. All these restrictions may remain until 2011, and then Austria must open
its labour market for the newly joined EU member states.
A similar situation is analyzed by Janos Penzes and Molnar Erno , but this time, the
countries are Romania and Hungary and the cities are Oradea and Debrecen, two cities which
lie very close to the border between the two countries. The cities are centres of economic space
of their counties and the value of the inner potential depends on the distance from the countyseat. Considering the present road network, the settlements near the border crossing stations
(Biharkeresztes and Valea lui Mihai) might profit from the unifying economic space of the two
counties. The moderate opportunities of the mutual agglomeration of Debrecen and Oradea are
shown by the minor potential difference of the settlements locating between the two great
towns.
An interesting subject is that of Karoly Teperics' essay which has as object the
educational cooperation along the Hungarian-Romanian-Ukrainian border . The essay is a
research of the presence of Hungarian students who are a minority in Romania and Ukraine in
the educational system in Hungary . The author considers that the introduction of the Schengen
Agreement may create an interesting situation in this field. The mobility will be unchecked in
the directions of Slovakia and Austria but it becomes more complicated in the case of Romania
which is to enter later and Ukraine which is to remain outside it permanently. As far as the latter
is concerned, the compulsory visa obligation may seriously hinder the movements. The research
shows that in spite of the dynamic progress taking place in Europe, this progress doesn't cover
all the fields of activity (Suli-Zakar, 2005) and Europe still remains a myth with frontiers.
From Gunilla Edelstram's point of view
the border issue that was once national
has, due to the Schengen, become EU issues where member states must follow EC regulation
and directives on visas and immigration. The security issues that goes with it are issues where
the member states must co-operate. Most of this is done through intergovernmental decisions
where EU does not have much power. Through EU the intergovernmental activities are coordinated. But it is rather obvious that even though the EU does not have much competence the
intergovernmental co-operation within the second and third pillars is very important for the
member state in these security issues that we cannot handle alone. We are also - especially in a
country like Sweden with utter borders only at airports and harbours - very dependent on how
the EC secondary legal sources (regulations and directives) on visas and immigration as well as
the co-operation according to the third pillar is carried through in countries like for example
Romania with borders to non-EU member states.
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The chapter Europe – an Inclusive Frontier brings about five answers to the
following question: Should Europe stop before or beyond its margins which “are traditionally
oriented more towards the exterior than towards the interior and are inhabited by peoples who
have a incomplete feeling of belonging to the empire”? (Nicolaides, 2007: 287). The European
frontiers are not mere geographical space and peoples living on both sides of the borders but
they refer to a much larger context including migrants, refugees, transnational communities
(Ibidem).
The concept of borderlands with respect to current developments in European
societies, especially in the context of the recent enlargement of the EU is presented by Gerard
Delanty. It examines the changing nature of borders with a view towards offering an assessment
of the notion of a post-western Europe. The thesis advanced in the paper is that Europe is taking
not just a post-national form, but is also taking a post-western shape and this latter dimension
may be more significant. An important aspect of this is changing relations of peripheries to the
core. The aim of the paper is to offer a new assessment of the periphery which can be seen as a
zone of re-bordering. In the periphery the relation between the inside and the outside is complex
and ambivalent; while often taking exclusionary forms, this is a relation that can also be viewed
as the site of cosmopolitan forms of negotiation
The article of Jaroslaw Kundera deals with another kind of inclusive frontier: . the
processes of adhesion the East- Central European countries to the Euro zone. The statistical
analysis indicate that only few countries have fulfilled the convergence criteria distinguished
under the Maastricht Treaty which doubted about usefulness of application these criteria to the
countries in the processes of transformation. In the view of the author the benefits for the Peco
countries from the participation in the Euro zone will be greater then economic costs. The
question is only to choose the optimal date of adhesion because few Peco countries need some
freedom in elasticity of the economic policy to finish their transformation processes.
Klara Czimre offers possible approaches which may transform the attitude towards
transboundary rivers and international river basins pointing out that the scientific and
institutional approaches are intertwined and rely on each other. Consequently, both the
European Union needs the outcomes of the scientific researches and the scientific researches
need supports from the European Union. The cross-border aspect is the most important to be
followed in the river basin principle since “rivers do not consider administrative borders”.
The trafficking in human beings in South Eastern Europe is Mihaela Gavrila's subject.
The author considers that physical and psychological harm, including diseases and stunted
growth often has permanent effects, ostracizing trafficking victims from their families and
communities. Trafficking victims often miss critical opportunities for social, moral and spiritual
development. In many cases, the exploitation of the victims is progressive, a child trafficked
into one form of labour may be further abused in another. For instance, in many countries, girls
recruited to work have been forced later into the sex industry. The countries are requested to
strengthen their border control in order to prevent and detect trafficking in persons. Establishing
and maintaining direct channels of communication should strengthen cooperation among border
control agencies. It also means close cooperation between different national actors, including
the police, prosecutors, NGOs and others, with border control authorities.
By means of a case study, Chris Quispel analyzes another kind of inclusive frontier:
the rise of migration in Holand. It is argued that, unlike during the pre war years, it has become
increasingly difficult for the Dutch government to close its borders for a growing number of
migrants. Initially the main causes of migration to the Netherlands were the dismantling of the
former Dutch colonial migration and labour market problems in the sixties. At first this was
legal migration, but in the seventies and eighties, the line between legal and illegal migration,
became more and more blurred. Migration causes migration and it has become difficult for the
Dutch government to stop the growing flow of migrants. Things became even more difficult in
the nineties when large numbers of asylum seekers and economic refugees, tried, often
successfully, to enter the Netherlands. The result was a growing anxiety among politicians and
among the Dutch public, resulting in several attempts to change the law in such a way that
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illegal migration would become impossible, or at least much less attractive. Though partially
successful, the Dutch government was never able to really stop the flow of migrants. Nowadays
the problem of illegal migration has become intertwined with fears of radical Islam and
terrorism. It also has become an important element of EU policy. It has led to a steep rise in the
expenses paid to protect the EU borders. It has made illegal migration more difficult and
dangerous, but, as is the case at the American-Mexican border, human trafficking and
smuggling has not stopped
The Image and Identity of the Frontiers of the New Europe is the chapter in which
one can notice the contradictory images of perceiving frontiers: from the process of relativized
frontiers towards the idea of bringing frontiers under discussion in the context of globalization;
from the opening of the East and Central Europe to the depreciation of the concept of frontiers
and sovereignty up to the west countries' temptations to close borders both against the
immigrants and the countries that would like to accede to the EU (Rupnik , 2007: 304). The
changing in perceiving frontiers in the transformational context during the last decade in Europe
(Tavares-Ribeiro, 2003) and accepting these changes have become important ideas in the
enlarged Europe, ideas which are dealt with by the authors gathered in this chapter.
Fabienne Maron considers that the effects of 2004 and 2007 enlargement combined
with the raising mobility, the old and new migrations, the important exchanges with the rest of
the world through commerce, education, traveling, globalization have increased the interaction
between cultures, religions and the languages inside and outside Europe.
In this multicultural European society and in its enlarged space permanently changing,
the role of media and intercultural dialog is of great importance both for keeping the Union's
cultural diversity and for enforcing its cohesion by promoting the respect for the common
values. Media and dialog also give Europe the possibility to make conections with
neighbourhood countries.In this situation, the frontier becomes borderline, in a positve sense,
because it gives the possibility to share values, ideas, projects.
The intercultural dialog has its roots in recognizing the differences and multiplicity of
the world we are living in. These differnces in opinions, points of view, in values can be found
inside the culture itself, and between different cultures. The intercultural dialog considers these
differences by trying to understand the other and it opens an interaction aiming at sharing ideas
and values. It also encourages us to define our own cultural frontiers and suggests to
communicate over these frontiers or put them under question.
The paper of Esther Gimeno Ugalde analyses the relation between languages and
borders. Borders can be political, economic, cultural, etc. but they can also be linguistic. As all
kinds of borders, language borders are dynamic and they highly depend on political border
shifts. The article offers an overview of the historic development of languages and borders
during the 19th and 20th centuries and its impact on language typology. It also offers a
classification of cross-border languages and reviews language diversity in Europe while
analyzing European multilingualism as a new strategy of the EU.
In his paper "Images of openness - Images of closeness", Enrique Banus considers that
the borders as political reality can become a cultural reality, can distinguish, can be significant
as defining the element of "otherness": the other is who lives on the other side of the border not to speak about the problem when the "other" is living within the own community, the
problem of the minorities, peoples belonging to the same political community, but unified by a
different cultural code. Physical borders are mentally assumed as cultural borders. These mental
borders by then to divide the world in closed cultures. The mental borders try to separate
absolutely the own culture from the culture of the "other" (Banus, 2006: 202).
In her paper, Dana Pantea considers that the most important problem of cultural
mondialization is how people should live together at a global level with all the cultural
differences which keep changing all the time. Other influential things are: the importance of
mass media for the cultural activities, the problems of national identity which are strongly
related to culture and its symbols, the impact of the fall of the Berlin Wall upon the
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globalization of media, the empire of the internet, the commercial media that bring profits of
millions of dollars.
The purpose of the article written by Margarita Chabanna is to demonstrate that
Europe's evolution towards a space determined by inclusive frontiers depends very much on the
psychological aspects of the of the memory of totalitarianism, especially in the East and Central
Europe where this regime has recently been abolished. Accordingly the author shows that
successful democratization of post-totalitarian state requires transformation of totalitarian
consciousness.
This issue focuses upon Rudolf Rezsöhazy's points of view about the cultural frontiers
of Europe. The author distinguishes nine cultural frontiers which are the equivalent of the
following nine European common values : 1. Greece and Rome : the scientific thinking ; the
Promethean spirit ; the Roman legal constructs. 2. Christianity : the dignity of the person ; love ;
justice ; fraternity. 3. The Middle Ages : reason ;citizenship ; learning ; time as value ; work as
virtue. 4. Renaissance and Reformation : autonomy of the individual ; relativism ; tolerance ;
spirit of enterprise. 5. Enlightenment : modern science ; critical spirit ; idea of progress. 6.
Industrial and Political revolutions : technology ; freedom ; human rights ; democracy ;
separation of Church and State. 7. Capitalism and Socialism : private property ; free market ;
competition ; consumerism ; social reforms ; solidarity ; equality. 8. The last developments :
self-determination of peoples ; peace ; Welfare State ; women’s emancipation. 9. The family.
The points of view expressed by the authors in the articles published in the current
issue of Eurolimes prove that the perspectives upon the future of Europe cannot be foreseen
without taking into account the identity and frontier dimension because Europe is a mainly open
society. The present day European crisis
has raised the problem of the frontiers
(Geremek,2007:21). The successive accessions have overrun the internal separations (TavaresRibeiro, 2004) and have broken the mental blocking in perceiving the geographical horizon of
European integration . During this process, the European frontiers are defined in terms of
Geography, axiology and political will. For example the accession conditions from Copenhagen
establish the European frontiers by referring to the fundamental values accepted by the
countries that decided to be part of the EU. It is important to mention that these values do not
push Europe to closure after each wave of accession, because contemporary processes and
phenomena -modialization and interdependent markets- stop this danger (Bauman, 2004) .
The contents of the current issue make clear the idea that Europe doesn't want to
become a state defined by certain frontiers . The existing image of a crisis as well as certain
doubts are a part of the European construction process. The solutions to these problems are to
be found both in the process of deepening the internal reform of EU, of defining the European
citizenship through an inclusive process, by reconciling the historical memory, by harmonizing
the developing pattern based on competition with the social pattern, by accepting the role of
immigration in the European society. On the other hand the solutions must be found out in
building a common memory and in accepting diversity as dimension of a dynamic deontologic
code in which the notion of frontier has the meaning of dialog rather than of dispute.
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d'empire", in Anne -Marie le Gloanec et Alecksander Smolar (eds), Entre Kant et Kosovo,
etudes offertes a Pierre Hassner, Paris, Presses de Sciences -Po, pp. 339-360,
21. Rupnik, Jacques (2007, "La nouvelle frontiere" de l'Europe: quels confins pour une Europe
elargie?", in Bronislaw Geremek & Robert Picht (ed), Visions d'Europe, Paris, Odile Jacob,
pp. 299-316,
22. Soproni, Luminita (2006), “Cross-Border Identity in Building a Regional Brand: Northen
Transylvania Region”, in Eurolimes, vol. 2, Oradea University Press, p. 54-64
23. Suli-Zakar, Istvan (2005) (eds)
24. Tavares-Ribeiro, Maria Manuela (2004) (eds), Ideasde Europa: Que Fronterias?, Coimbra,
Quarteto
25.Tavares-Ribeiro, Maria Manuela (2003) (eds), Europa em Mutação. Cidadania. Identidades.
Diversidade Cultural, Coimbra, Quarteto
26. Wihtol de Wenden, Catherine (2005) "The frontier of mobility" in Antoine Pecoud and Paul
de Guchteneire (eds), Migration without Borders, Oxford, New York, Berghan books
27. Zielonka, Jan (2006), Europe as Empire, Oxford University Press;
28. Zielonka, Jan (2002), Europe Unbund: Enlarging and Reshaping the Boundaries of the
European Union, Londres, Routledge
I. Europe - a Euromyth with or without Borders
1. Frank R PFETSCH, (Heidelberg) ◙ Borders: Cause of Conflict or Catalyst
for Peace?
2. CSAPO Tamás (Szombathely) ◙ Workforce-Market cooperation along the
Hungarian-Austrian Border
3. PÉNZES János, MOLNÁR Ernı (Debrecen) ◙ Analysis of the Economical
Potential in Bihor and Hajdú-Bihar Counties
4. TEPERICS Károly (Debrecen) ◙ Educational Co-operations along the
Hungarian-Romanian-Ukrainian Border
5. Gunilla EDELSTAM (Stockholm) ◙ Concerning the Competence of the
European Union in Over Border Security Issues
12
Borders: Cause of Conflict or Catalyst for Peace?
Frank R. PFETSCH
Abstract The main issue I am asking in this contribution is that of borders as an
obstacle to or facilitator for peace. Since it is quite obvious that borders can be both, object of
quarrel and defenders of peace, the question has to be reformulated: what are the conditions
for borders to become an object of war or a facilitator for peace. The answers present some
conditions as to obstacles to peace, such as on the one hand countries with open frontiers
without natural delimitating lines, disputed lines of demarcation, and arbitrarily dictated
borders by outside dominating powers without consultation of the population. On the other
hand borders can offer an opportunity for cooperation if they coincide with the principle of selfdetermination, if state borders reinforce identity of a population, or if political borders
correspond with ethnical, religious or cultural groups. The overarching international
framework for boundary-as-barrier is that of national power politics, that of boundary-asinducer-to-peace is that of regional integration led by negotiated arrangements.
Keywords: borders, conflicts, peace, war
Introduction
Territories and their boundaries belong to the primary goods which are the foundations
of possession, greed and claims to power among tribes and states. Territory is according to
Jean-Jacques Rousseau the foundation of the civil society: “Le premier qui ayant enclos un
terrain s’avisa de dire, Ceci est à moi, et trouva des gens assez simples pour le croire, fut le vrai
fondateur de la société civile » (Rousseau 1962 : 169). Such an archaic delimitation of
territories seems to be an anthropological and socio-psychological constant that requires a line
between the self and the other, between the own group identity and the other group, between the
“friend and the enemy” (C. Schmitt). Conflicts about territories are among the classical
conflicts between pre-states and governmental entities.
Territories and their delimitations have different meanings depending on a topographic or
geographic, geo-political, political, societal, economic point of view.
Topography and geography have to do with the location of the territory: on a continent
or on the sea shore, in the mountains or in the flat land; borders may be open or marked by
rivers, mountains, lakes or other natural borders. Clear natural boundaries can be more secure
than open territorial locations; islands such as Great Britain or Japan are more secure than the
continental states in Europe or Asia.
Politically two aspects are of utmost importance: power and security. The possession
of land or the control over territories may imply an increase in political power or national pride.
Since the Hobbesan days the security aspect of the national territory has been the topic of
political theory: security within the nation state and the defence against the outside world
belong to the classical political issues all through times.
Economically territory became important through its natural resources and
transportation facilities; fertile land and land rich with resources have always attracted the
interest of colonial and imperial powers and led to occupation and/or possession. The more
economic transportation by sea led to habitations near the shore rather than in land such as in
the Mediterranean, in Asia or Africa; recently the pipelines for oil and gas have become a
political issue: transportation of Russian oil led to a conflict with Poland because the pipeline
does not go through Polish territory and thus keeps Poland from access to oil and duties; both,
the oil-pipeline Baku-Tiflis-Ceyhan and the gas-pipeline Nabucco which leads from the
13
Caspian Sea through Turkey, Bulgaria, Romania and Hungary to Austria; have become an issue
of high political security significance.
Socially the aspect of identity within and beyond the borders of the nation state has
become an important element of quarrel and, in rare cases, of cooperation. The so-called
identity conflicts arise from discrepancies between the borders of the nation state and the
borders of ethnic, religious or cultural groups. In cases where borders cross national boundaries
and split ethnic, cultural or religious groups the identity question arises as an important issue of
conflict. In the European Union as a transnational entity the various identities have to be
accommodated within a single political entity.
Historically all theses aspects have to be seen in the context of two time periods: on the
one hand in the framework of the so-called Westphalia state system since the 15th century until
mid 20th century and on the other within the post Westphalia context since the second half of
the 20th century. It is my main argument that with the end of WW II the different aspects of
territories and borders changed their significance fundamentally.
I will, therefore, discuss border problems within these two different historical periods,
the period which was dominated by the Westphalia state system and the period after mid 20th
century in which the secular change from national power politics to cooperative regional
integration politics occurred in various parts of the globe with significant consequences about
the meaning and functions of state borders. In some parts of the world the policy turn can be
labelled as a change from zero-sum politics, where one country tried to gain at the expense of
the other, to positive-sum politics, where a negotiated arrangement brought gains for both.
I. Borders in the Westphalia state system
Much of the meaning of territory and its borders has been formed during the process of
state formation since about the 15th century.
I.a. Territory and borders in political history
With the formation of the territorial state, territory from absolutistic times on became
the base of dynastic domination and later on of ethnic or cultural identity. This territorially
defined rule is protected by the principle of state sovereignty and non-interference; international
law has codified this principle in almost all statutes of International Organisations, especially in
the UN-Charter. Territory was considered as a resource on which the power of the state was
based. The desire to posses a certain territory is determined by national prestige as well as by
factors like fertility of the land, climate, natural resources and geo-strategic position; for other
states the importance is determined by the economic and military relevance that makes a
territory attractive to others. Natural resources in particular as well as general economic goods
were important reasons for territorial conquests. The history of states is at the same time a
history of their economic and geo-strategic importance that can be based on other factors like
the degree of industrialisation or qualified workers in addition to natural resources. Nationalism
and imperialism were focused on territories for reasons of national prestige or competitive
power positions and/or access to natural resources. The conquest of territories was driven by the
desire to increase power and wealth of the state. Not necessarily does foreign territory need to
become integrated into or joined to the territory of the aggressor. Controlling territory
politically fulfils the same purpose. Whereas the war between Iran and Iraq in the eighties as
well as the war between Iraq and Kuwait in 1991 were mainly based on territorial claims, the
recent war between the US and Iraq was about political and economic control. Carl Schmitt
states in “Nomos der Erde”: “The territorial status of the state in question is not altered to the
effect that its territory will be incorporated into the intervening state. However, the state
territory will be integrated into the spatial sphere of the controlling state and its special interest
that is integrated into its spatial sovereignty… Political control or leadership is based on
interventions whereas the territorial status quo is guaranteed.” State borders need not be altered
with reference to claims of political domination. The Soviet Union never changed the physical
14
borders of its satellite states, and the US carried out their influence without territorial alteration.
In contrast however, the victorious states in the First and Second World War changed arbitrarily
the occupied territories, a fact that explains a great deal of warlike conflicts in the second half of
the twentieth century.
I.b. Boundary classifications
The geographic location of rivers also may have an impact on the conflict behaviour of
riparian states. According to Whittemore Boggs, boundaries can be assessed firstly according to
whether they are geometric or morphologic, and, secondly according to their genetic nature
(Boggs 1940: 22-28). One would expect geometric boundaries to have a high conflict potential,
because they may be artificially drawn by political considerations in some instances by foreign
powers. Religious, ethnic, and/or economic groups are likely to be separated by such lines.
Morphological boundaries are related to the nature of earth’s surface. Lord Curzon (1907)
emphasized the superiority of “natural” boundaries being dependent on physical geographic
features, over “artificial” boundaries of latitude and longitude (Prescott 1965:13). One would,
therefore, expect a boundary following the crest of a rugged mountain range to have a lower
conflict potential than one following a line of hills, and lower yet than one drawn across a lowlying plain. Furthermore one would expect river boundaries to possess a lower conflict potential
because rivers are more likely to follow natural morphological situations and they unite rather
than separate. But as the river Rhine shows it united riparian states like Germany and
Switzerland but separated Germany and France.
A more meaningful approach to boundary classification is the generic one, that is, the relation
of the boundary to the cultural pattern existing at the time the boundary was delimited. Here,
three types of boundaries can be distinguished in order of increasing conflict potential:
antecedent, subsequent, and superimposed. The first predates settlement, so that the evolution of
cultural patterns, if any, is related to the established boundary. The second is preceded by
settlement, and tends to take that settlement into account. The third is independent of existing
cultural pattern, and in fact may be forced upon them, as in the case of truce and armistice lines,
or superimposed boundaries in the event of political division of a territory between two
independent states.
I.c. The role of the state
A state is defined by three characteristics: territory, rule, and population. The various
functions of a state are amongst others: internal and external security and peace, national frame
for integration and identification, sense of belonging together, borderline between the self and
the other, securing territorial integrity, resources for economic development, wealth and social
welfare, historically grown self identification, securing the ‘individuality’ of peoples, providing
the legitimacy of the rulers. The world as a state world is based on the assumption that modern
nation states possess these functions internally as well as externally and are able to implement
their laws authoritatively and effectively. In these capacities the state has become indispensable
and on the whole was not substituted by another agent. In cases where a state could not fulfil
these functions disastrous warlike conflicts erupted and led to the dissolution of the state
altogether. A Hobbesan state of war is the result.
II. Borders in the period of post-Westphalia state system
After the end of World War II the territorial based state system eroded especially in the
West. The classical meaning of territory and border lost its original significance.
II. a. Changes in the territorially based state monopoly
The end of nationalistic power politics brought about (a) a differentiation between the
OECD world of industrialized countries and the world outside to which two thirds of the states
15
belong and (b) a change within the OECD world that was geared by the processes of
globalization and regionalization.
Whereas in the OECD world the state remained more or less the agent of rule, security
and welfare, in the periphery and outside the OECD world a multitude of states lost their
function of controlling the nationally defined territory and protecting borders. In the so called
failing or weak states in various parts of the third world the central government lost control over
the nationally defined territory. In these cases two developments could occur: either the national
territory fell apart as in the former Soviet Union or Yugoslavia and led to new independent
states, or the territory based state was divided and separated into new states as in Pakistan or
Czechoslovakia; in the weak states with restricted state rule civil wars broke out and led to a
multitude of separate territorial rules by the so called warlords as in Somalia, Afghanistan or
Palestine.
Also in the OECD world changes happened as regards the territory based state: Parallel
to the process of national territorial delimitations an overarching non-governmental
transnational process of market opening has taken place (“globalization”). The state is
territorially bound, capital is fluid and has crossed borders and made national boundaries
permeable. The control of such sub-governmental fluxes has become a new preoccupation of
state rule. Due to global challenges like terror, humanitarian catastrophes, drug smuggling,
environmental disasters etc. states are no more able to cope with these challenges alone.
International cooperation between states, international, non-governmental and regional
Organizations have to deal with such global problems.
Apart from globalization a second new development occurred after World War II when
in Western Europe regional integration became the new political framework of originally six,
later on 27 countries. This system of supranationality is based on the assumption that the
territory based state gives up national competences and transfers some of its sovereign rights to
a communitarian agent. By doing this some of the state functions have become a common
enterprise to all the member states. Especially in the economic field through the liberalization
policies the Economic and Currency Union have made frontiers practically non existent.
II. b. Conflicts about borders
Since World War II conflicts have escalated more frequently about territories and
boundaries; in fact, they have been the most controversial issues in the post-war period. Border
conflicts are about physical boundaries on land or on the sea. Especially in international
disputes conflicts about territory and borders are by far the most frequent. It goes without
saying that internal conflicts are dominated not by territorial claims but by conflicts over power
positions. The same holds with violent conflicts, whereas non-violent conflicts are mostly over
territorial issues (Pfetsch/Rohloff 2000: 130-131). Compared to conflicts about ethnic, religious
or regional autonomy and about ideology, national and international power or resources,
territory and its border has been the most contended issue on nearly all continents. Out of the
661 conflicts that were observed between 1945 and 1995, conflicts about borders were involved
in 223. However, as mentioned, these border conflicts possess a considerably less violent
potential than, for instance, ideological conflicts.
The hypothesis stating that the higher the number of neighbouring countries, i.e. the number of
boundaries, the higher the probability of conflicts, was empirically tested. It seems plausible to
assume that the more borders a state has, the more conflicts emerge. However, there was only a
weak statistical relationship (see graph 1). Borders are therefore not automatically causing
conflicts and especially not violent ones. Germany as a central continental power with her high
number of borders is a good example for the change of significance of boundaries: The
unification of the “Reich” under Bismarck was achieved by fighting three wars, and World War
I and II led to wars both with Eastern and Western countries. For the first time in German
history the Federal Republic of Germany exists within safe borders, which are accepted by her
and its neighbours.
16
Graph 1: Non-violent conflicts and the number of state borders
10
Non-violent conflicts
8
6
4
2
R Sq Linear = 0,034
0
0
2
4
6
8
10
12
14
Borders
Regression Statistics
Multiple Correlation Coefficient 0,1830735
Observation93
From this follows that physical borders remain important for the preservation and the
security of national societies. Border protection must be considered an important mission of
governments. If central governments cannot secure their borders, the state collapses and the socalled “war lords” control parts of the territory as in Somalia, Peru, in former Afghanistan, or in
numerous states on the African continent. In such cases protecting state borders and preserving
their integrity is peace preserving or peace making. However, this is not true in all cases. If the
will to separate through self-determination is high, giving up borders and therefore the
separation can be a remedy for securing peace. The division of Pakistan, of Czechoslovakia, of
Ethiopia, and even of Yugoslavia can be judged as peacemaking.
Also the geography of states can determine external threats: Central locations are
threatened more than peripheral regions, states with many neighbouring states show a higher
conflict potential than states without any borderlines, islands are safer than central continental
locations, but geography also determines the degree of controllability.
II. c. Borders in the ‘mental maps’: a constructivist approach
Space becomes a conflict factor also outside the national territory: in foreign policy
doctrines of leading states air, sea and land are declared national zones of interest that have to
be respected by other states. They are no neutral geographical dimensions. So-called “mental
maps” divide territory according to spheres of interest. Since the time of President Monroe, who
declared the “American continent” as US American spheres of influence, to most of the
Presidents after World War II regions or states (China, Santo Domingo, Greece and Turkey, the
Middle East region, the gulf region, the Dominican Republic, etc.) have been claimed to belong
to American’s “spheres of interest” or “spheres of influence”. At times of the superpower
17
rivalry the Soviet Union under Stalin and his followers claimed their spheres of influence
(“Two Worlds”, “Two Camps”) in Eastern Europe and tried to get a foot down in South East
Asia, Africa or even in Central America (see Pfetsch 1995: 60-76). Territory is also evaluated
according to the range of military capabilities. During the Cold War the super powers tacitly
acknowledged the respective influence sphere of one another. Neither the US nor the “West”
intervened in East Germany in 1953, in Hungary and Poland in 1956 or in Prague in 1968, nor
did the Soviet Union interfere in the Central American backyard with the exception of Cuba.
Where it was attempted (US intelligence in Eastern Europe, positioning of Soviet missiles in
Cuba), it was forced back by political threat or violence.
After the conquest and settlement of territories outside of Europe (colonialism,
imperialism), the sea has become more important recently due to the mineral resources as well
as the waterways and the fishing zones. The 1994 UN-Maritime Convention divides the sea into
different zones: The territorial water base of 12 sea miles falls under the sovereignty of the
coastal state, an area of 200 sea miles is reserved for exploitation by the coastal state. Only then
begins the “liberty” of the high sea, the “common heritage of humanity” and the area which is
regulated by the International Sea Bed Agency as to the exploitation of resources. This
convention, however, has resulted in numerous conflicts between neighbouring states on all
continents due to overlapping sea territories. Between 1945 and 1995 we counted 15 of these
sea conflicts in Europe, particularly in the North and Baltic Sea as well as in the Aegean Sea.
Where sea borders of neighbouring countries overlap, conflicts emerge about fishing or drilling
rights as well as about other resources on the sea bed.
After all land has been distributed among states, only sea and space still offer room for
manoeuvring. Further processes of nation state-building result in a distribution instead of a gain
problem. Interstate relations become more frequent and closer due to their density and can lead
to conflicts or to regional integration. Especially in Western states, borders have become more
transparent, modern communication technology transcends space and time, relates peoples
closer to another and makes events in different parts of the world synchronic experiences. In the
age of CNN there does not exist stable and isolated space and a diachronic sequence concerning
the perception of events. What counts is the way in which political events are set in scene and
which kind of information is transported.
II.d. Conditions for peace promoting borders
There are two main strategies to promote peace within and among states: through
strengthening governance of individual states and through political integration. Whereas the
former secures identity and promotes security by effective state control (national state function
to be observed), the latter solves the so called security dilemma – which consists of the fear to
become attacked by another state – by bringing states closer to each other through regional
arrangements forming an integrated political system such as today’s European Union. In both
cases by giving up national power politics states can gain more than they would gain if they
played a zero-sum game.
Along with the changes of state functions in Western societies, state borders have attained a
new quality. The European integration model reduced the fear of war and made borders
permeable. The same holds for territory based ethnic groups that according to the four freedoms
can move freely between states. The will to unify Europe resulted in the ratification of
numerous border treaties i. e. between Germany and the Netherlands (concerning Elten,
Tuddern and Dinxperlo), between Germany and France (concerning the “Saarland”), between
Poland and Germany (“Oder/Neiße”), between Belgium and the Netherlands (concerning
Baerle-Duc) which either implied the acceptance of respective territories or a territorial
compensation. The voluntary integration of states into a regional alliance made such agreements
about borders possible. Furthermore, the East-West-conflict has neutralized the arbitrary
borders created by former power politics. German unification, the peaceful separation of
Czechoslovakia, the formation of independent nation states after the fall of the Soviet Union
and Yugoslavia would not have been possible without such changes after 1989.
18
Conclusions
In conclusion, borders can be both, a cause of conflict and a catalyst for peace. The
role of the geographic attributes of a boundary or territory can be both, an opportunity for
cooperation or a cause of conflict. Both positions are possible: boundary-as-barrier and
boundary-as-inducer-to-peace. Conflicts over borders arise when national sovereignty rights of
riparian states are questioned, where borders are arbitrarily dictated from outside or where
borders are not defined unambiguously. Peace is promoted by borders if they function as a
demarcation between the inside and the outside, between us and the others and therefore
reinforcing identity and peace. With strong governance capacities the state can fulfil the
functions of securing peace inside and outside its territory. The Western states cum grano salis
possess these capacities more or less, whereas in the world of weak or failed states this peace
promoting function is not fulfilled.
In some cases the reduction of tensions within states can be achieved by building new
entities through separation or division. Such processes, if they occur peacefully, are based on
the principle of self-determination. The peaceful division between Slovakia and the Czech
Republic is a good example for such a new demarcation. Other cases of state division have been
violent though, like the division between East and West Pakistan or between Eritrea and
Ethiopia. The separation of territories by building a wall is not a solution (at least not in the
long run) to a peace process. Such ‘demarcations’ miss the main essential part of a peace treaty,
namely the agreed consensus by the parties involved. The Berlin wall was only a temporary
‘solution’ to the imposed separation of a nation and the walls that separate parts of Israel and
Palestine nowadays will not be a ‘solution’ to the conflict between the two nations.
The other strategy consists of integrating states into a regional or organisational
arrangement. Such arrangements can reduce conflicts or even solve them as the examples of the
European integration shows. Border conflicts have been solved and minority conflicts reduced.
The enlargement of the European Union towards Eastern Europe can help overcoming the
numerous minority conflicts in that area. Borders promote peace if they become integrated into
an agreed and mutually accepted agreement. In contrast, imposing borders by external force
potentially results in warlike conflicts as the European history of the 20th century teaches.
References
Pfetsch, F.R. and Christoph Rohloff (2000): National and International Conflicts. New Theoretical
and Empirical Approaches. London et al.: Routledge
Pfetsch Frank R. (1995): Dimensionen des Politischen: Handlung und Reflexion. Theoretische
Dimensionen des Politischen. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft
Prescott, J. (1965): The Geography of Frontiers and Boundaries. Chicago: Aldine
Schmitt, Carl (1950): Nomos der Erde im Völkerrecht des Jus Publicum Euopaeum. Berlin
Rousseau, Jean-Jacques: The Political Writings of Jean Jacques Rousseau (1962). Introduction
by C.E. Vaughan. Oxford : Basil Blackwell
Whittemore Boggs ((1949): International boundaries: A Study of Boundary Frontiers and
Problems. N.Y.: Columbia UP
Workforce-market cooperation along the Hungarian-Austrian border
CSAPÓ Tamás
Abstract:The history of the labour market relationships on the borderland of Austria
and Hungary is looking back for 20 years so far. In the beginning, Hungarian employees got a
job in the conventional way, based on the strict permission policy of the Austrian government,
and those who worked a longer period, got a green card. Borderland labour has been regulated
by treaties between the two states since 1998. One of them is the Borderland Commuting
Agreement. Due to it, 2200 people got employed. The other one is the Probationary Agreement.
As a consequence of it, 600 people engaged themselves to work in Burgenland from WestTransdanubia. Since Hungary has joined the EU, those Hungarian employees who belong to
either the group of traditional employees or those who belong to the authority of the
Commuting Agreement, after 12 months work abroad may get the permission discharge
certification. All these restrictions may remain until 2011, and then Austria must open its
labour market for the newly joined EU member states.
Keywords: employee, labormarket, green card, Interreg Phare CBC, permission
exemption
The beginning
Our cooperation and professional connection with Austrian associations already started
in the 1990s in the West-Transdanubian counties. The relationship between the ÖAR Regional
Bureau and Vas county filled a pioneer role, which during the years has expanded gradually and
prepared the ground towards deeper and institutionalized cooperations. It should be also noted
that Vas county has always filled a leading role in the borderland relations, and nowadays also
this county coordinates the borderland cooperations on the field of the labour market.
In the first period, the main forms of the cooperation with the Austrian labour market
organizations – most of all with the Styrian and Burgenlander Labour Market Office – were the
bilateral experience exchanging visits and consultations. On these meetings both sides informed
each other about the function of the employment organizations, external relations, the judicial
frame of dealing the unemployment, as well as about passive and active employment policy
instruments.
In the first half of the 90s the following trainings took place: intensive training of high
school students (Kapfenberg, 1992), instruction of career orientation trainers (Graz, 1994),
further education of teachers (Neutral 1994) by the support of the Austrian Eastern Relief Fund.
Besides this, there were opportunities for more Austrian study-tours as well, which helped for
Hungarian experts to be able to examine public employment and training programmes (in
Burgenland, Styria and Upper Austria), and took a view of industrial parks and innovative
centres (Wiener Neustadt, Gmünd and Leoben) as well as educational centres (in Neutal,
Obervart and Fohnsdorf). Hereby planning of mutual conferences, discussions, meetings and
informatory meetings were started on both sides, which has produced a high interest even in the
beginning.
The formation of the Borderland Regional Council and the launch of the INTERREG
II - PHARE CBC cooperation -which primarily aimed regional development- gave a significant
boost for the institutionalization of the borderland cooperations. The Borderland Regional
Council’s Employment committee first of all performed the set up of briefs, found the possible
areas of cooperation and organized experience exchange meetings and successful employment
conferences. The Austrian Burgenland province and the three counties of West-Transdanubia
(Gyır-Moson-Sopron, Vas and Zala) have partaken in the INTERREG II – PHARE CBC
20
cooperation. Since 1995 the three Hungarian counties gave in altogether five
successful competitions by the help of Labor Market Service of Burgenland. During the
accomplishment of the competited programs a tight cooperation was formed among Hungarian
and Austrian experts, organizations and institutions. (CSAPÓ, T. 1999).
In the first programme the professional strategy of cooperation has been worked out in
the borderland region by experts, which determined and still determines the main
directions of the cooperation.
The training programme of project managers has ensured the instruction of 14 WestTransdanubian project managers, who were the leader of employment organizations.
The third programme was the mutual training of 14 West-Transdanubian and 14
Burgenlander career-orienting managers in two mixed nationality groups in Oberwart
and Szombathely.
The program for deepening the cooperation between employment organizations in the
border region has started in the summer of 1999. In the framework of this program,
Hungarian experts were able to examine the work of Austrian branches on the spot.
Two Employment Information Centres has been called into being in 2001 on Austrian
sample and by professional help in Szombathely and Zalaegerszeg, then a year after in
Gyır as well.
Finally the project of the borderland employment informational system has been handed
in, which was realized in 2002 by the help of the PHARE CBC.
Interstate agreements
A new period has been started in the cooperation of the Hungarian-Austrian labour market since
1998, when two interstate agreements was signed; herewith the spontaneous connection was
institutionalized.
1). The Borderland Commuting Agreement
The Agreement was signed in Szombathely on 26 March, 1997, the exchange notes of
coming into force was placed on 28 January, 1998, then it was published in the Magyar
Közlöny in the 14/1998 edition, and it was proclaimed the 38/1998 (III.1) Government
Regulation.
The main goal of the Agreement was to strengthen the cooperation in the border
region, firstly by the easing of borderland commuters’ employment. It has determined the
borderland territories and the conditions for commuting and working. According to the
Agreement the borderland in the Republic of Austria: Bruck an der Leitha, Neusiedl am See,
Eisenstadt, Mattersburg, Guessing, Oberpullendorf and Oberwart districts, while in the
Republic of Hungary: Gyır-Moson-Sopron, Vas and Zala counties. The effect of the Agreement
was expanded for the Jennersdorf district in 2003. The conditions for undertaking a job can be
found in the Agreement Order of the Agreement. The most important among these are the
followings:
the employees are the citizens any of the two contracting states
they are permanent residents of any borderland areas which has been concluded in the
Agreement
the other contracting state’s borderland an employee has got an employment offer
they must have a police record of their unpunished past
21
The competent authority of the implementation of the Agreement from the Hungarian
side is the Ministry of Labour, and form the Austrian side is the Federal Ministry of Labour,
Health and Social affairs.
An Austrian-Hungarian mixed commission has been called into being with five-five
persons from each side for the discussion of questions concerning the implementation of the
Agreement. The concrete implementation of the Agreement is the duty of the Labour Market
Service of Burgenland (on the Austrian side), and the Labour Centre of Vas County (on the
Hungarian side). In Hungary, since 1 January 2007 regional labour organisations have been
formed, therefore the executive branch on the Hungarian side is the West Transdanubian
Regional Labour Centre, although within this The Labour Centre of Vas County continue to
manage all the affairs of the employees.
The Agreement fixed the length of the work abroad in maximum 6 months, however it
is prolong able and the mutual contingents (the number of potential employees) have also been
fixed.
The implementation of the Austrian-Hungarian Borderland Commuting Agreement
started on 4 May 1998, and as it was expected mostly Hungarian employees were applied for
Austrian jobs. In the first year, 1365 competitions were sent in, out of this 427 were not
adequate formally or did not contain job offer from Austrian employer. The presented
applications were aimed 557 agricultural, 262 tourism industry and 546 other areas. In the year
of 1998 there were 602 successful applications, and the most of them from Gyır-Moson-Soron
county (453) and 138 from Vas county and the least from Zala county, 11. Above these, 203
work permits were prolonged in this year.
The first results of the Hungarian-Austrian Borderland Commuting Agreement after
two and a half years were good according to the evaluation of the Labour Centre of Vas county
(Szatmári, J. 1999). Fruitful and good work relations have been formed between the Hungarian
and Austrian sides. Both the 550 person contingent of 1998 and the 650 person contingent of
1999 were filled fast and the utilization of the contingents are almost always 100% (Chart 1.).
The vacant places were filled with Austrians within a few days. The applications of 1999 are
already contained job offers in the ratio of 95%, and there were hardly any unsatisfactory
applications. The most applicants came form Gyır-Moson-Sopron county and most of the
successful applications were there, on the other hand the number of applicants form Zala county
were insignificant due to the unsuccessful applications, the lack of suitable relationships and
acquaintances, the lack of German skills and also the greater distance.
Chart 1. Summarized statistics of the Borderland Commuting Agreement
Title
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Contingent
550
650
900
1200 1400 1700 1900
Application
1365 673
1126 1163 825
933
852
First permit
585
300
404
409
272
414
360
Prolongation
197
884
1349 1954 2329 2877 1057
Permit-free
1401
certificate
Source: Labour Centre of Vas county
2005
2050
431
160
68
1687
2006
2200
427
150
123
1842
According to the comparison of the results of the last two years, the number of the
prolongation of the issued permits to the number of the applications it has been shown that the
demands of the Hungarian employees and of the employees from Burgenland are significantly
different. More powerful enlargement of the contingent and the integration of Jennersdorf
district and maybe some borderland (but not the whole Burgenland territory) settlements such
as Kirschlag, Wiener Neustadt and Fürstenfeld to the Agreement were suggested.
Finally, the territorial power of the Agreement could have been expanded from 2003
when it was extended to Jennersdorf district, too. However, the size of the contingent has
expanded since the turn of the millenium. It doubled in two years and by 2003 the given number
22
of the people reached 1700. In the meantime, the number of the applications has decreased to a
certain extent, however, more and more people asked for and got prolongation.
With Hungary’s accession to the European Union a completely new situation has come
into being since 2004. Thus in accordance with the acceding agreement, employees who have
been working on the borderland in Austria get permit-free certificate from the employment
organizations according to the one-year –old rule. The employees themselves have to ask for
the exemption at the competent Austrian labour department before the 12-month-deadline is up.
The employees must take the employer certificate, which verifies that the employer gives work
to them.
Since 2004, in accordance with the Agreement, the contingent is extended by 150
people, which already means 2350 people in 2007. The number of the applications and the
approved permits are as well as the number of the prolongations have decreased since the
acceding agreement with the EU. However, the number of the permit-free certificates is
constantly increasing (see: Chart 1). The explanation to this is that the number of permits that
can be issued has been deceasing since the last two years. As a result of this there is less chance
for getting a commuting agreement so people are not so interested or are interested in other
kinds of permits. In 2006, the contingent consisted of 2200 people the number of applications
was 427 from which 250 were granted. At the same time 1842 employee had permit-free
certificates in 2006.
According to a report from 2006, from the contingent consisting of 2200 people 1950
people is due to Burgenland and 205 people is due to Bruck an der Leitha district. According to
the three categories defined by the Austrian partner, the given number of people in Burgenland
is distributed as follows: catering 34,1%, agriculture 19,5%, other sectors 56,4%. From the
people who ask for commuting permit 28% are female, 72% are male, half of the applicants are
under 30, the third of them are between 31 and 40, so mainly young people are interested
(SZATMÁRI, J. 2006). The rates are similar to the rate in the last years. If qualifications are
taken into consideration, the rate of the secondary professional qualifications is significant.
(vocational school 69%, secondary technical school 16%), and at the same time the rate of low
qualification (minimum 8 years at primary school) or academic qualification is insignificant.
This shows that the applicants are aware of that on the on the other side of the border the
industry and the service industry require qualified workers, furthermore, commuting permits are
granted in these fields of work. The same rate can be seen in case of the approved permits
(GALLUP INTÉZET 2001).
The territorial distribution of the commuting permits has been the same for years. To
the largest extent (68%) people from Gyır - Moson – Sopron county go abroad to work, from
Vas county 29% and from Zala county only 3%. Most of the workers find work on the northern
part of Burgenland or in the Bruck district.
The cooperation between the Hungarian and Austrian partners are really good in terms
of The Borderland Commuting Agreement. Statistics concerning commuting has been made
since 2001 and the Iternet database and the everyday connection between the partners have
worked excellently since 2004. The centres of the executive offices are Eisenstadt in
Burgenland, Szombathely in West-Transdanubia, but there are offices in Gyır and Zalaegerszeg
as well. The cooperation and the issuing of employer permit became much quicker and simpler
as the Austrian colleagues can see all the applications and the demands of the employers and it
indicates at once and gives out the permits.
2) Hungarian-Austrian Trainee Agreement
This Agreement was signed together with the Commuting Agreement (26 March 1997) and
came into force from 1 March 1998. The aim of this Agreement is to improve young workers’
(trainees) professional knowledge and language skills. Those employees are considered as
trainees who:
- are citizens of the two contracting countries and have a permanent residence
23
- have qualifications or professional practice
- at the starting of the employment they are not younger than18 and older than 35
The Agreement is in force on the territories of both countries. It was the two governments
that signed the Agreement but the Hungarian government charged the Employment Office
(Foglalkoztatási Hivatal) with the execution, which has authority in the whole country. Similar
to the other agreement the partners have established an Austrian-Hungarian committee, which
consists of 5-5 people from both countries. The members of the committee are the government
offices and the representatives from the prevailing representation of interests. The committee
holds sessions at least once a year and takes turns in the two countries.
The permitted number (300 people) of the trainees in the first year was put down in the
Agreement. This has gradually been increased an annual agreements, in 2006 the given number
of people was 1800. It has to be mentioned that the given number of people was filled until
Hungary’s accession to the EU (2004) but since then only 60% of it filled. In 2006,
approximately 950 Hungarian people work as trainees in Austria, from this 590 in Burgenland.
Two third of the trainees are from Western-Transdanubia, one third is from other parts of the
country.
According to the Trainee Agreement the employment permit was valid for maximum 12
months which could be prolonged once for another 6 months, thus the trainee could stay in
Austria for not more than 18 months. After Hungary’s accession to the EU, the permits are
given out for five calendar weeks and these cannot be prolonged. The Austrian partner takes
care of that the trainees’ employment would not reach the 12-month-period because the
exemption after one-year-work could be applied for them such as for the borderland commuters.
The Hungarian partner protested against it several times but with no result.
Traditional employment forms
Austria elaborated the strict system of foreigners’ employment at the end of the 1980s
and at the beginning of the 1990s (FRECHET, T 1999). Until then Austria employed relatively
lot foreign workers, for example, 1n 1990 the number of them was 267,000 but only 2,000 was
the number of the Hungarians. Despite the aggravation, the Austrian government concluded an
agreement with Hungary in 1990. According to this, a slight number of Hungarian employees
(9,500 people) can work in Austria. This quota was valid until the signing of the two
agreements between the two countries. Since then the given number of people system ceased to
exist as the interest for this kind of employment decreased. Nowadays these is a kind of decree
which says that the rate of the foreign workers cannot be more than maximum 8% of the
Austrian workers.
According to the Austrian laws, the Austrian employer asks the foreign (Hungarian)
employee’s employment from the local labour office with the reason that he did not find a
native workman. The employer arranges the permit that not the employee but he receives.
Nowadays the most important employee permits are the following:
-
permit for one year where the 8% limit should be taken into consideration. The
employer has the right to give notice to the employee at any time during the 12-monthperiod, not like in the agreement between the two countries.
- season permit (usually in winter is summer period)
- gathering permit (maximum 6 weeks)
According to the principle of communal preference the EU state members (since 2004 also
Hungary) get positive discrimination as opposed to non-EU state members in connection with
the traditional kind of employment. In so far as the employee works in Austria for more than 12
months, the exemption has been valid for him/her since 2004. Previously, before 2004,
foreigners including Hungarians who had worked in Austria for years could get a so-called
green card which meant unlimited employment. Since Hungary’s EU membership the green
card has been changed to a permit-free certificate.
24
In the EU in accordance with the acceding agreement the free flow of manpower can be
restricted for maximum 7 years (until 2007). At present 9 countries gave exemption from the
employment permit, in other words they opened their labour markets for Hungary and other
newly acceded countries. These are Cyprus, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Malta, GreatBritain, Portugal, Spain and Sweden. Iceland which is not an EU member belongs here, too.
Employment permit is not but only registration and liability to notification is needed in case of
the countries which acceded to the EU at the same time as Hungary. In five countries such as
Belgium, Denmark, France, Luxembourg and the non-EU member Norway and Switzerland,
the Hungarian employee has to ask for a permit but it is not needed to make a labour market
study. Finally, for the employment in Austria, Holland and Germany, employees have to ask for
a permit.
To sum it up, 15,000 foreign people work on the Burgenland territory and approximately
55% of them (8,000 people) are Hungarian. Its distribution is:
- people who have been working there for years
4,400
- daily commuters
2,200
- people who have traditional permit
1,200
- trainees
600
Finally, it is interesting to study how the theoretically mutual employment appears in the
employment of Austrian workers in Hungary. This opportunity did not prove to be appealing to
the Austrians although Burgenland is the least developed territory in Austria. Burgenland
people were not interested in jobs in Hungary. The main reason for this is that there are
differences in wages in the two countries, and that there are more favourable opportunities than
the employment, for example, company or enterprise establishment in Hungary. Furthermore,
many people from Austria (partly the owners, partly the leading managers) go to work for
companies which are under Austrian ownership since permit is not needed.
According to official statistics, 4875 foreign applications arrived at the WestTransdanubian Regional Labour Centre (Nyugat-Dunántúli Regionális Munkaügyi Központ) in
2006 and 439 were granted. Most of the permissions were given to citizens of non-EU member
countries such as Romanian (become EU member meanwhile), Serbian, Ukrainian, Moldavian
and Croatian. The citizens of the EU countries got only 80 permits, 42 of them were given to
Austrian citizens, and half of them lived in Burgenland. In 2006, only two Austrian employees
asked for and got permit-free certificate, 77 Austrian people worked permit-freely in
Transdanubia and from this 42 people were from Burgenland. As the Labour Cenrte of Vas
County (Vas Megyei Munkaügyi Központ) estimated, if the managers and owners of Austrian
companies are added to this number, 250 people worked in Transdanubia in 2006 and more than
a half were from Burgenland.
References
CSAPÓ, T. (1999): Határ menti együttmőködések a munkaerıpiac területén, különös tekintettel
Vas és Zala megyére. - In.: Rechnitzer J. (szerk.): Elválaszt és összeköt - a határ. MTA
RKK, Pécs-Gyır, pp. 269-297.
FRECHET, T. (1999): A külföldi munkavállalók jogi helyzete Ausztriában az EU csatlakozás
utáni idıszakban. In: A munkaerı migrációja és az EU. Európai Tükör Mőhelytanulmányok
61. Miniszterelnöki Hivatal Budapest pp. 21-33.
GALLUP INTÉZET (2001): Külföldi munkavállalási hajlandóság a Nyugat-Dunántúlon.
Kutatási zárójelentés Magyar Gallup Intézet. Budapest, 114 p.
KISS, P. (2007): Külföldiek Magyarországon történı foglalkoztatásának rövid elemzése.
Nyugat-Dunántúli Munkaügyi Központ, Szombathely 9 p.
SZATMÁRI, J. (2006): Tájékoztató a magyar-osztrák határ menti ingázói egyezmény
végrehajtásáról. Vas megyei Munkaügyi Központ, Szombathely, 12 p.
Analysis of the economical potential in Bihor and Hajdú-Bihar counties
PÉNZES János, MOLNÁR Ernı*
Abstract: Debrecen and Oradea are centres of economic space of their counties and
the value of the inner potential depends on the distance from the county-seat. Considering the
present road network, the settlements near the border crossing stations (Biharkeresztes and
Valea lui Mihai) might profit from the unifying economic space of the two counties. The
moderate opportunities of the mutual agglomeration of Debrecen and Oradea are shown by the
minor potential difference of the settlements locating between the two great towns.
Keywords: borders, employment, potential model, regional inequalities, road accession
Introduction
This analysis focuses on the effect of the formation of a unified economic space and
the disappearance of the state borders. The enlargement of the European Union, the accession of
Romania to the community was the first step to make the state border history in economical
terms. The role of the cross-border activities – especially the economic connections and cooperations – is going to be more important in the areas along the Hungarian-Romanian border
as a result of this process. It can be a tool to close up the settlements being in a peripheral and
backward situation. Finally, the possibility of the mutual agglomeration of Oradea and
Debrecen might have an effect on the economic growth.
In the light of these facts, the potential effects of the subsequent changes are relevant
from a spatial perspective. How can those settlements be chosen that profit from the
disappearance of the state borders? To answer this question it is quite important to demonstrate
the actual situation of the spatial pattern of the counties – namely Bihor, Romania and HajdúBihar, Hungary county.
The spatial pattern and regional inequalities in Bihor and Hajdú-Bihar county
Two indicators – the number of employees and the income of enterprises – were
chosen that demonstrate the economic conditions directly. During the selection we needed to
pay attention to the diverse statistical methods of the authorities and the different date of
sampling or calculating. In case of the number of employees it was a problem to decide whether
the Romanian territorial statistics mean the number of population working in the locality of
residence or the number of persons in employment by localities (one variable, two different
interpretation). In spite of this problem the indicator was appropriate to become the first base of
the study, though the Hungarian data were measured during the census in 2001 and the
Romanian data were derived from 2004.
The number of employees is appropriate to illustrate the size of the local economies
and it provides opportunity to compare the studied counties. Both counties are characterized by
the significant concentration of the economy in the light of the regional inequality indicators,
and the figures (fig.1-2) also confirm this phenomenon. Two regional inequality indicators were
used during the study – the concentration (or Hirschman-Herfindahl) index and the Hoover
index1.
*
Detailed information about the indicators can be found in the following references: K. Major, J. Nemes
Nagy, Területi jövedelem-egyenlıtlenségek a kilencvenes években. Statisztikai Szemle 6., 1999, p. 397421; J. Nemes Nagy, Területi egyenlıtlenségi mutatók. Matematikai és statisztikai módszerek alkalmazási
1
26
Figure 1 The number of employees (person) in Bihor county (2004)
Source: edited by the authors by the database of the Romanian National Institute of Statistics
Figure 2 The number of employees (person) in Hajdú-Bihar county (2001)
Source: edited by the authors by the database of the Census, Hungarian Central Statistical
Office
The concentration was calculated by the formula:
lehetıségei a területi kutatásokban. (T. Sikos T., ed.) Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, 1984, p. 65-79; J.
Nemes Nagy (ed.), Területi egyenlıtlenségek. Regionális elemzési módszerek. Regionális Tudományi
tanulmányok 11. ELTE Regionális Földrajzi Tanszék – MTA-ELTE Regionális Tudományi
Kutatócsoport, Budapest, 2005, p. 105-136
27


n
x
C = ∑ n i

i =1
 ∑ xi
 i =1






2
The concentration index compares a given distribution to the completely homogeneous
distribution. It shows strong concentration above 0.6. The index (C) ranges from 1/n to one,
where n is the number of settlements in the given area. Due to this feature the index is not
acceptable to compare the counties, but it can demonstrate the degree of the concentration
concerning the indicators
The concentration index was 0.33 in Bihor and 0.28 in Hajdú-Bihor county by the
number of employees in the settlements. Since the number of settlements is not equal in the two
counties the results are not comparable. Owing to the similar contribution of the county seats, in
case of the number of employees the concentration did not represent significant difference.
n
H=
∑x
i =1
i
− fi
2
The Hoover index (H) is based on the Lorenz-curve, comparing the distribution of two
variables (usually the population number is one of the variables involved in the calculation).
The Hoover index is typically used in applications related to socio-economic investigation. The
index ranges from 0 to 100, and it is reduced into percent. The sum of both distributions is 100
percent.
∑ x = 100 and ∑ f
i
i
= 100
The Hoover index was 33.4% in Bihor and 16.9% in Hajdú-Bihar county. In spite of
the concentration index, the Hoover-index is appropriate to compare the disparities of HajdúBihar and Bihor counties based on the number of employees. The regional inequalities are
much higher in the Romanian county because of the significant role of Oradea. The spatial
pattern of Hajdú-Bihar is more even, than the spatial pattern of Bihor.
Another indicator was chosen in order to represent the productivity of the local
economies. The Hungarian and the Romanian indicator were not measured by the same way,
but the conditions were acceptable to use them in the current study. The income of the local
enterprises in euro shows more significant regional disparities than the number of employees. It
is important to emphasize that the size of productivity of Debrecen is twice as much than
Oradea’s value. (Figure 3 and 4)
28
Figure 3 The income of enterprises (thousand euro) in Bihor county (2004)
Source: edited by the authors by the database of the Romanian National Institute of Statistics
Figure 4 The income of the enterprises (thousand euro) in Hajdú-Bihar county (2004)
Source: edited by the authors by the database of TEIR
The concentration index showed higher inequalities in the counties calculated by the
income of enterprises, than in the first case which was based on the number of employees. The
Hirschman-Herfindahl index was 0.42 in Bihor and 0.39 in Hajdú-Bihar county. The spatial
29
pattern was dominated strongly by the county-seats and the contribution of Oradea was
significantly higher than the participation of Debrecen in the given county.
The Hoover index was 43.4% in Bihor and 39.3% in Hajdú-Bihar county. In the light
of the results, large difference between the Hoover index based on the number of employees
and the income of enterprises in Hajdú-Bihar is clearly visible. The results based on the income
of enterprises represents significantly higher regional disparities than the one based on the
number of employees in Hajdú-Bihar county, although both these values did not reach the
values of inequality indicators of Bihor county.
The economy of Bihor county fundamentally represents a larger concentration in the
light of the examined indicators, however in case of the income of enterprises the concentration
is similar in both counties and the regional inequalities are in a higher level. Both counties are
characterised by the significant role of the county-seats. There is a relatively underdeveloped
zone of settlements along the Hungarian side of the state border.
The potential-model and the conditions of the research
The potential model is one of the methods which are adopted from physics.2 The
model is appropriate to illustrate the spatial pattern of an area. It can show the flows of
population or economic factors. Due to the distance component, the potential effect of the
development of the road network can be predicted with the help of the model.3
The formula of the potential model can be seen:
n
Mj
j =1
d ijk
P( Ai ) = ∑
P(Ai) – the potential in Ai point
Mj – the weight of the points (income, number
of employees)
dij – the distance between Ai and Aj points
n – number of points
The selected settlements of the counties (Figure 5) were the points (Ai) in the formula
above. The following sections include the principle of settlement-selection. The weight (Mj)
means some social-economical indicator, which might be the population number, personal
income etc. The number of employees and the income of enterprises were used as weights to
illustrate the economical potential. In this case, the distance was based on the road accession
and measured in minutes with the help of a route planner softver.
2
J. Nemes Nagy, Gravitációs- és potenciálmodellek. Matematikai és statisztikai módszerek alkalmazási
lehetıségei a területi kutatásokban. (T. Sikos T., ed.) Akadémiai Kiadó, Budapest, 1984, p. 181-185; J.
Nemes Nagy, A tér a társadalomtudományban. „Ember-Település-Régió” series, Hilscher Rezsı
Szociálpolitikai Egyesület, Budapest, 1998, p. 151-155; G. Tagai, Kelet-Közép-Európa népesség- és
potenciáltere. MTA KTI Mőhelytanulmányok 26., Budapest, 2004 p. 1-19
3
G. Tóth, Az autópályák szerepe a regionális folyamatokban. Hungarian Central Statistical Office,
Budapest, 2005, p. 81-91;
30
Figure 5 The settlements taken into the calculation
Source: edited by the authors
The total potential of a given area
consists of three components. The first one is the self-potential, which is the potential of the
settlements on their own that are represented by the points in the calculation. The value of the
“self potential” depends on the level of development and the administrative area of the given
settlement. The “inner potential” contains the total influence of other settlements or regions
which are considered within the borders of the studied territory. The inner potential is
significantly high on those settlements that are close to the large centres. Finally, the “outer
potential” includes the external effects of the most important economic centres in the
surroundings of the studied area. Since in this study the local conditions were emphasized, the
“outer potential” was left out.
Not all the settlements were considered during the study, only the most important
settlements were selected by their economic role. The administrative rank of the settlements
was not regarded in this case, only their economic contribution was taken into consideration,
however the larger towns and the county-seats were included in the calculation. Those
31
settlements were included that had higher number of employees than the average of the given
county
This calculation did not contain the values of Debrecen and Oradea because of their
extremely high role. According to the average of the county 22 Hungarian and 19 Romanian
settlements were selected. (Figure 5)
1. Results of the study
The values of the inner potential of the economical indicators were calculated by the
demonstrated method. The results were illustrated on isoline maps created by interpolation
technique with the help of the softver used.4 There might be distortions occurred as the result of
the interpolation.
First of all, the spatial patterns of the counties were modelled by calculating the
potential based on the settlements considered as the main economic actors.
On the other hand, in order to illustrate the effect of the disappearance of the borders
the inner potential was calculated in two ways. Firstly, the counties were modelled isolated; in
this case only the settlements located in the same county were considered in the calculation.
Secondly, completely integrated economies were assumed; in this case, all the settlements of
both counties were considered.
Figure 6 Inner potential by the number of employees
4
Interpolation was applied in this study similarly to the article of L. Bene, K. Tekse, Vizsgálatok a
népesség területi eloszlásának alakulásáról Magyarországon 1900-1960. KSH Népességtudományi
Kutató Csoport Közleményei 9., Budapest, 1966, p. 65; or T. Czyz, Die Neue territoriale Struktur der
Verwaltung und die regionale soziökomische Struktur in Polen. Europa Regional, 7/1., 1999, p. 33-44
32
Figure 7 Inner potential by the income of enterprises
Figure 6 illustrates the values of the inner potential of the settlements concerning the
number of employees calculated by the isolated method. High potential is depends on the
closeness to the largest centres. So the magnitude of the inner potential mainly depends on the
distance measured from Debrecen and Oradea. Though the numbers of employees were similar
in the cases of these towns, but the maximum value of the inner potential appeared in the
surroundings of Oradea. The phenomenon can be explained by the analysed settlements –
especially Sinmartin and Nojorid. The distance between these settlements and Oradea is
smaller, than the distance between Debrecen and the surrounding settlements. It might be the
result of the difference in the characteristics of the settlement pattern.
The values of the inner potential of the isolated model calculated by the income of
enterprises are determined by the distance from Debrecen and Oradea. (Figure 7) However, in
this case, the twofold magnitude of Debrecen could counterweight the influence of the larger
distances of the settlements in Hajdú-Bihar county. Hajdúszoboszló (in the Hungarian side of
the border) is the third settlement from this respect after the two county-seats, this is the reason
why the relatively small Ebes – between Debrecen and Hajdúszoboszló – has the maximum
inner potential from the studied settlements.
Figure 8 and 9 show the ratio of the two calculations (the isolated and the integrated
model) giving percentage values. All the settlements had higher values when both counties were
considered. As a result of this, at least one hundred percent were indicated everywhere. The
largest difference between the values of potential appeared along the state border, in the
surroundings of the border crossing stations. These settlements – mainly Biharkeresztes and
Valea lui Mihai – might profit mostly from the disappearance of the state borders, considering
the same road network.
The most significant differences arise from the influence of the county-seats on the
other side of the state border. Of course, the effects do not show the same extent in the case of
Valea lui Mihai and Biharkeresztes. Due to its closeness, the effect of Oradea is much stronger
than the effect of Debrecen regarding the number of employees, but in the case of the income of
enterprises the role of Debrecen is larger as a result of its extent.
33
Figure 8 The ratio of the inner potential by the number of employees in percentage
Figure 9 The ratio of the inner potential by the income of enterprises in percentage
34
The spatial distribution of the potential values was modified in the light of the sum of
the self and the inner potential (virtually the “regional potential”) considering the number of
employees and the income of the enterprises supposing a hypothetic economical unity of the
counties (Figure 10 and 11). The value of the potential depends on the weight, the extent of the
area and the closeness of the large centres. Debrecen and mainly Oradea are in a better position
due to their self-potential compared to the previous maps.
Figure 10 The ratio of the self and inner potential by the number of employees in percentage
35
Figure 11 The ratio of the self and inner potential by the income of enterprises in percentage
Three major cores were formed by the results – around Stei, Oradea and Debrecen. Stei
has significant values regarding both indicators, while Oradea and its surrounding area have an
important role in the case of employment and a moderate role considering the income of
enterprises. This phenomena occurred as a result of the closeness of relatively large local
economies, while Debrecen and its environment is characterised by average value regarding
both indicators. The values of Stei and Oradea are the result of the self potential, Sinmartin,
Nojorid, Bors, Sintandrei near Oradea and Ebes next to Debrecen has large values thanks to the
inner potential.
The settlements between Oradea and Debrecen have minor potential surplus, than most
of the examined settlements. This fact shows the moderate opportunities of the mutual
agglomeration of Debrecen and Oradea.
Finally, the ratio of the isolated and the unified economies of the two counties were
also calculated using the sum of the self and inner potentials. Regarding these results, the
difference of the potentials of the settlements depends on two factors; firstly, the magnitudes of
the difference in the inner potential, secondly the ratio of inner potential in comparison with the
self potential. (Figure 10 and 11)
It can be stated in the light of these maps illustrating the employment and the income
of enterprises that again the benefits appear in the settlement along the state border. However,
only the areas around Biharkeresztes – which is located close to Oradea – can emerge from their
environment. The settlements of the northern core show less significant changes in case of the
total potential because of the smaller weight of the inner potential.
36
Conclusions
As a conclusion, it can be stated, that Debrecen and Oradea are the absolute dominant
in the economic space of the two counties. As a result of this, the inner potential of the
settlements mainly depends on distance from the county-seats. The economic benefits of the
disappearing borders can be seen along the state border, mainly in case of the border crossing
stations and the surrounding settlements. The areas benefiting from the unifying economic
space could be extended by the development of the road accession and the opening of a new
border crossing station between the two presently existing border crossing points. As a result of
this new investment the two sides of the state border could be closer to each other.
References
L. Bene, K. Tekse, Vizsgálatok a népesség területi eloszlásának alakulásáról Magyarországon
1900-1960. KSH Népességtudományi Kutató Csoport Közleményei 9., Budapest, 1966, p.
65
T. Czyz, Die Neue territoriale Struktur der Verwaltung und die regionale soziökomische
Struktur in Polen. Europa Regional, 7/1., 1999, p. 33-44
K. Major, J. Nemes Nagy, Területi jövedelem-egyenlıtlenségek a kilencvenes években.
Statisztikai Szemle 6., 1999, p. 397-421
J. Nemes Nagy, Gravitációs- és potenciálmodellek. Matematikai és statisztikai módszerek
alkalmazási lehetıségei a területi kutatásokban. (T. Sikos T., ed.) Akadémiai Kiadó,
Budapest, 1984, p. 181-185
J. Nemes Nagy, Területi egyenlıtlenségi mutatók. Matematikai és statisztikai módszerek
alkalmazási lehetıségei a területi kutatásokban. (T. Sikos T., ed.) Akadémiai Kiadó,
Budapest, 1984, p. 65-79
J. Nemes Nagy, A tér a társadalomtudományban. „Ember-Település-Régió” series, Hilscher
Rezsı Szociálpolitikai Egyesület, Budapest, 1998, p. 151-155
J. Nemes Nagy (ed.), Területi egyenlıtlenségek. Regionális elemzési módszerek. Regionális
Tudományi tanulmányok 11. ELTE Regionális Földrajzi Tanszék – MTA-ELTE Regionális
Tudományi Kutatócsoport, Budapest, 2005, p. 105-136
G. Tagai, Kelet-Közép-Európa népesség- és potenciáltere. MTA KTI Mőhelytanulmányok 26.,
Budapest, 2004 p. 1-19
G. Tóth, Az autópályák szerepe a regionális folyamatokban. Hungarian Central Statistical
Office, Budapest, 2005, p. 81-91
Educational co-operations along the Hungarian-Romanian-Ukrainian border
TEPERICS Károly
Abstract
The number of students from foreign countries in the Hungarian educational
institutions is significant. The lowest number is detected in the primary schools where their
presence is rather to be treated as the evidence of migration instead of part of the educational
market. It is maximum in the close proximity of the border where the traces of the market
position may be detected.. It may be observed that from the nineties onwards a new dimension
of the co-operation appeared and the number of participants in the Hungarian education
increased and this level has some unique characteristics with respect to the causes as well. The
market forms of the human capital development can be recognised. The foreigners appearing
on this level prepare themselves for the Hungarian labour market even at severe sacrifices.
Both the predominance of the vocational trainings and the share of the various professions
support the above.
The most characteristic feature of the higher level is the lack of mobility. On the whole,
there are much less students than expected on the basis of the number of students in the
secondary schools and thus the reality did not testify the proposed hypothesis. Only the number
of students from Slovakia grew in comparison with the lower educational levels. It is surprising
that there are more students from Europe in the precious and relatively cheap medical training
than Hungarians from the neighbouring countries in the Hungarian training.
The number of pupils and students in the Hungarian education may be set in parallel
with the number of the Hungarian minority and the socio-economic situation of the
neighbouring countries. Most students come from Romania but proportionally they are overrepresented in the case of the Transcarpathian region.
The introduction of the Schengen Agreement may create an interesting situation in this
field. The mobility will be unchecked in the directions of Slovakia and Austria but it becomes
more complicated in the case of Romania which is to enter later and Ukraine which is to
remain outside it permanently. As far as the latter is concerned, the compulsory visa obligation
may seriously hinder the movements.
Keywords: cross-border co-operation, public education, higher education, education
market, labour market
I. Introduction
The nature and political interpretation of the borders changed fundamentally in East
Central Europe as a consequence of its transformation starting in the nineties. The radical
change in the approach altered the opportunities offered by cross-border co-operations.
Education traditionally belongs to the main fields of co-operation. Although, it is not the most
important in this co-operation system since the traditional daily activities (such as trade and
economic relations) affect much wider communities and have a more powerful impact but their
range reflects the profoundness of the co-operations.
In the past years, the author attempted to survey the international relations of the
Hungarian educational system as part of a series of research after the millennium. The survey
focused on the presence of foreign citizens in the Hungarian educational institutions
(TEPERICS, K. 2000, 2003). The present paper (as a kind of summary) concentrates on the
38
outcomes of these co-operations along the north-eastern border of Hungary with respect to
public education (primary school and secondary school) and higher education.1
The facilities of data collection set a limit in the range of tasks to be undertaken and
have an impact on their processing, as well. The available data could be only collected from the
Hungarian educational institutions because in Hungary the compulsory institutional supply of
data includes the citizenship of the students only from 1998. However, it did not allow of the
study of time series data since statistics attested by the Ministry of Education were available
only for 2001 and 2002. The source of the data concerning public education was the KIR
(Public Educational Information System) where the integrated form of the annual data supply of
the institutions could be bought. The data related to higher education – by institutions – were
collected from the annual reports published by the Ministry of Education.
The registry fundamentally focused on the presence of the Hungarian speaking
minorities in the Hungarian institutions and date back to the period before the Hungarian
(Slovakian, Slovenian, Romanian) accession. Accordingly, the data from 2002 were processed.
Their actualisation (regarding the latest enlargement process of the European Union) has
become timely where the available data of 2008 – from the academic year 2007/2008 – would
be applicable.
The structure of data collection defines the applied categories and it can be easily
recognised that the Hungarian Ministry of Education attempted to compile a statistics for the
Hungarian students from abroad. The Hungarians from the neighbouring countries appear on
the list separately (Table I) except for the data of Austria which is listed in the category entitled
“Hungarian (speaking) citizen of an EU member state”. The category named “Hungarian from
elsewhere” covers those who are neither from the listed neighbouring countries nor from the
European Union and they are not itemised furthermore. Non-Hungarian speaking citizens are
only listed in the category entitled “non-Hungarian citizens from an EU member state”. There
are no accessible data on the non-Hungarian speaking citizens outside the European Union.
Consequently, the available data provides an opportunity for an intensive study of the
cross-border co-operation which does not cover all sides. Thus, due to the deficiency of sources,
the paper:
- Undertakes the analysis of only the Hungarian-Hungarian relations and the students with other
mother tongue appear in the sample only incidentally.
- It follows up the mobility of the Hungarian-speaking students coming from the neighbouring
countries to Hungarian educational institution but does no include information on the reverse
movement due to the deficiency of data supply.
On the basis of the gravitation zones related to the different levels of education
(KOZMA, T. 2000; SÜLI-ZAKAR, I. 1994), the proposed scope of study from the
kindergartens and primary schools is the settlement level, while the study of the secondary
schools is more sensible on the regional, county and microregional levels and higher education
on the regional (even so, in the currently not regional entities such as Eastern Hungary and
Northeastern Hungary) and national levels. According to the preconception of the author, the
higher educational level represents more and more extended spatial (even international)
relations. Therefore, the secondary and higher degrees represent the substantive frames in the
study of territorial relations and the survey of international relations become relevant in these
cases.
1
It is practical to have a look at the structure of the Hungarian educational system. The traditional 8+4
system is characteristic of the public education. Traditionally there are 8 years spent in the primary school
followed by 4 years in the secondary degree. The latter is more varied since there are types providing
professional and general training (secondary grammar school, technical school). The higher education is
built on these offering either 4 years of college or 5 years of university (as of the times before the Bologna
Process).
39
II. Public education
Foreign citizens may legally study in the Hungarian public educational institutions and
the schools are entitled to the same support (quota) as in the case of the Hungarian citizens.
Possessing a permit of residence, as a result of intergovernmental agreements, it means the
emergence of the principle of reciprocity.
As my preconception suggests the settlements provide the optimal frames for study in
the case of the primary education. The significance of the bigger units and international cooperations is negligible. Compared to this, foreigners also appear in higher numbers on this
educational level than expected.
Their number is lower than in the case of the secondary and higher degrees and the reasons for
their presence are also distinctive. The foreign citizens constitute 0.7% (6245 students) of the
approximately 920 000 students in the Hungarian primary schools. Most of them are from
Romania (2864 students), Ukraine (816 students) and Serbia (510 students).
Table I. Data of students participating in the Hungarian public education2
(Source: KIR, 2002)
Primary school
Secondary school
Total
Number/Ratio of foreigners
6 245
(0.68%)
15 558
(2.8%)
21 803
Number/Ratio of Hungarians
from across the border
5 281
(0.57%)
14 963
(2.74%)
20 244
Number of programmes
Non-Hungarian citizen from EU
member state
Ukraine
1 072
782
-
964
595
1 559
816
3 972
4 788
2 864
5 979
8 843
Serbia-Montenegro
510
2 324
2 834
Slovakia
88
2171
2259
Slovenia
9
35
44
Croatia
43
104
147
Hungarian citizen from an EU
member state
Hungarian from other countries
482
64
546
469
314
783
Romania
It may be observed that most of them come from those countries where the level of the
economic situation and/or the education is lower than in Hungary. The ratio of students from
2
The problem of the data supply can be seen in the Table: the data concerning the member states of the
EU are listed with a distinction between Hungarian and non-Hungarian (and the neighbours by countries)
but those who are not EU members or not European are listed in the same group with the Americans.
40
Ukraine exceeds the number of the Hungarian minority3 whereas the ratios of students from
Croatia, Slovenia and Western Europe are below their absolute share. This movement may
result in the dramatic diminution of the Hungarians living in the Transcarpathian region.
Almost half of the foreign students in the Hungarian primary schools arrive from Romania. It
may be established on the basis of the data on the secondary school students that most of them
also come from Romania. Their weight, however, is more significant in the case of the primary
schools. They are followed by the students from Ukraine and Serbia.
The low number and low ratio – as opposed to the secondary schools – of the
Hungarians from Slovakia is an interesting element. It is difficult to find explanation for this. It
can be either due to a properly functioning primary school system or they might not be as much
attracted by the Hungarian conditions. The latter may provide an explanation. It is probable that
it is a phenomenon related to the lower age of the primary school students; therefore, the
appearance of the students in the Hungarian education system is more likely to be related to the
number of the “guest labourers”. Thus, it may be in connection with the less intensive working
pattern of the Slovakian Hungarians in their homelands.
One can find almost exclusively Romanian and Ukrainian foreign citizens in the primary
schools in North-east Hungary.
The primary school education of the foreign students cannot be regarded as part of the
evolving educational market. It is not motivated by the free cross-border school selection but it
is a kind of tracing of the migration patterns. Resulting from their ages, the students are in the
bonds of the family and mostly get to the Hungarian primary schools as the children of the
workers with foreign citizenship. The young employees who are the most active elements of the
(initially) temporary migration take their families with themselves and they are enrolled in the
Hungarian educational systems.
They are mainly Hungarian speaking students but many of them (much more than the
ones in the grammar school system) are not regarded as Hungarian speaking in the Hungarian
public education system. In these cases, the family ties mean the children of diplomats and
managers of multinational companies4 but there are presumably (e.g. Asian) employees with
lower positions as well. The highest numbers of Hungarians from the neighbouring countries
come from those places where the socio-economic situation (and not especially the level of the
educational system) of the present Hungary is regarded attractive. Most of them are Romanian,
Ukrainian and Serbian citizens; the ratio of Slovenians, Croatians, Austrians and Slovakians is
much lower in comparison with their absolute number.
Budapest and its agglomeration have a decisive role in their preference of settlements
(mostly due to their labour market positions) in addition to the settlements along the state
borders.
The schools endangered due to demographic reasons on many small settlements may owe their
survival to the quotas received after the students. The institutional side of the issue is definitely
remarkable including the motives of the receiving institutes. Almost 20-25% of the students in
the schools with low number of students on the small settlements are represented by legal
students supported by the national quota system. In the case of many small settlements along
the state border, the demographic downturn and the struggle for students resulted in the
3
It must be considered here that the data of the latest Census for the Hungarians in these countries say:
Romania – 1 434 000, Ukraine – 152 250, Slovakia – 520 000, Serbia – 293 299.
4
The dual language schools in Hungary have an important role in their training. At present, 66 primary
schools and 96 secondary schools provide teaching in a foreign language (or in a foreign language as well
as in Hungarian) in Hungary. The education of the children of the management layer appears among the
“soft” factors of the capital site selection. Characteristically, the foreign (second) language is the mother
tongue for the minorities in the schools along the state borders (or in Baranya for the Svabs) and the world
languages in the bigger towns. The ranking by frequency is German-English-Other. Education in
Romanian is mostly found in Békés county.
41
diminution of their number. For them, the education of the Hungarians from across the borders
means an opportunity for escaping from the impossibility of economic performance. The ratio
of foreign students is above 5% on 20 settlements represented mostly by schools with some 25200 students where the foreign students mean survival owing to the quota.
There are 421 000 students in the secondary schools of Hungary. Approximately
2.8% of them are foreign citizens (15 558 students), of which only 595 are non Hungarian
native speakers and come mainly from EU member states – most probably children of
diplomats or managers of international companies. Looking at the choice of students by school
programmes (not by institutes because there can be different curricula in each school), it is
remarkable that out of the total 2242 programmes there are foreigners only in 782.Thus, there
are students from abroad in every third programme who – if owning a permit of residence –
legally participate in the Hungarian public education.
Most of them come from Romania and Ukraine while the next category is represented
by Yugoslavia and Slovakia. The high number of the students coming from the Transcarpathian
region is – again – remarkable in comparison with the ratio of the Hungarian minorities by
countries. If one takes into consideration the other extreme (the infinitesimally low
representation of the Slovenian, Croatian and Austrian minority) then it suggests that the
students mostly come from those countries from which the Hungarian economic situation seems
to be good and their goal is to get in to the Hungarian labour market.
The traditional elements can be recognised in the background of the relations since
one can observe the resurgence of the formerly existing social-economic-cultural unity
disrupted by the Treaty of Trianon. The situation is facilitated by the fact that there are
Hungarians on both sides of the border and thus there are no language problems. The attraction
zones of the secondary schools (the extensive schooling area of the Reformed Colleges of
Sárospatak and Debrecen) developed in the times of the Monarchy (or in some cases earlier)
disintegrated after the war and the “etherealising” borders brought about their re-construction
and the appearance of new secondary schools.
It can be regarded as a modern motive that education as a cross-border service also
appeared as a factor in the background. The parents of the students sent to Hungarian secondary
schools make financial sacrifices on the basis of rigorous economic rationality expecting better
labour market position and – later – higher wages. In principle, it is in accordance with the
human capital theory of economics (HARBISON, F. - MYERS, C. H. 1964, BECKER, G.1964)
which says that the parents of the students invest in education in the hope of the future yields.
The governmental intentions are missing here and only the students and their families
stand in the background of studying abroad. This is the classic “bottom-up” way when the
governmental will only follows the events and only legalises exiting relations.
The above is supported by the choice of school type within the secondary education
(Figure 1). Two-thirds of the students choose secondary vocational schools, almost one-quarter
decide to attend grammar schools and the rest goes to vocational schools. This choice – with the
preponderance of vocational secondary schools offering more practical knowledge – suggests a
modern approach and rational preparation for the labour market. This substantially differs from
the “conservative” professions provided by the higher education (TEPERICS, K, 2000).
Characteristically more Hungarian students from abroad enrol for institutes offering
professional training (vocational secondary school and vocational school) than the Hungarian
average. Approximately 40-45% of the age-group in Hungary attends grammar schools offering
general educational and not vocational training, while only around 15% of the students from
Ukraine and Romania choose this school type. It may be explained by the fact that the
vocational secondary training in Hungarian is scanty in Ukraine and does not meet the needs in
Romania either. In Romania 75% of the secondary education in Hungarian belongs to the
“lyceum” category and the vocational training (in Hungarian) is effaced. One-third of the young
people studying professions in Hungarian (approximately 5000 students) acquire qualification
in Hungary.
42
secondary school
vocational secondary school
100%
90%
80%
70%
292296
1514
79
60%
3378
5096
594
883
Ukraine
Romania
50%
40%
30%
20%
238913
810
25
10%
0%
Hungary
SerbiaMontenegro
Croatia
Figure 1. Programme choices of the secondary school students from across the national border
by countries (Source: KIR, 2002)
This suggests to me that the students choosing secondary schools in Hungary do not
necessarily intend to attend higher education institutions. The vocational secondary schools
prepare their students for the labour market. Those who gain secondary qualification in
Hungary neither prepare for the higher education training in their homelands nor for the labour
market of their homelands but for the ones in Hungary because they expect advantages or at
least corresponding chances in comparison with those of the Hungarian students. It suggests a
much a more down-to-earth and categorical will to settle down in Hungary than the tendencies
observed in the higher education. One can be the witness of the most vivid form of cross-border
co-operations since the “homo oeconomicus” parents and students make financial sacrifices for
the sake of increasing their own intellectual capital without any state support.
The share of the groups of professions in the vocational secondary schools offers an
interesting field to study for their predominance (Figure 2). Comparing the preferences of the
foreign pupils with the Hungarian average, it becomes conspicuous that the professions related
to agriculture-food industry, trading, humanities and arts are more popular. Their presence in
the art schools is especially salient. They are lagging behind their own ratios in the secondary
schools related to technical and fiscal sciences – though, at present, they belong to the “trendy”
professions in Hungary. It is even more difficult to get enrolled in these schools from abroad
due to the market trends and booming.
One can find more pupils from abroad in those vocational secondary schools which do
not belong to the booming sector. This obviously also affects their access to the labour market.
43
50
ratio of Hungarians from abroad
ratio of Hungarians from Hungary
%
44.6
45
40
35
30
28
25
20.8
20
17
17
14.2
15
14
12
10
12
8.1
7.7
5
1.7
0
agriculture,
food
industry
technical
trade,
catering
fiscal
hum anities
arts
Figure 2. Ratio of foreign students in the secondary vocational schools of Northeast Hungary
(2002)
(Source: KIR))
The picture is more characteristic with respect to the spatial relations than in the case
of the primary schools. Budapest and the settlements along the state border reflect the gravity
zones perfectly.
The study of the national data suggests three steady spatial concentrations as far as the
settlement choice of the students is concerned. The In addition to the Budapest-Northern
Transdanubia and the Southern Great Plain concentrations, the number of foreign students in
the secondary schools of North-east Hungary is also high. Approximately 27.9% of the foreign
students attend Hungarian secondary schools.
Within this region, the zone between Fehérgyarmat and Tiszaújváros on the area of
Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg county is the most spectacular in this respect. This zone is completed
by Sárospatak-Sátoraljaújhely in the north and Debrecen in the south. It is interesting to see that
Hajdú-Bihar county and Borsod-Abaúj-Zemplén county in general and Jász-Nagykun-Szolnok
county – being far from the state border – have much fewer students from abroad. Presumably,
the much more intensive grammar school network and the less intensive vocational secondary
school network in Hajdú-Bihar county cause the much lower number of foreign students than in
the neighbouring Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg county. The other factor could be that the students
from the Transcarpathian region – constituting the majority of the total number of students –
almost exclusively attend schools in the border county.
As far as the division by citizenship is concerned, the proximity of borders is the
decisive factor. Most of the pupils in North-east Hungary come from Ukraine (62%) and
Romania (20%) (TEPERICS, K. 2003). It is worth to mention in connection with the latter that
44
they are the least bound by the geographical proximity and there are high numbers of them not
only in the Southern Great Plain region but in Budapest and even in the Transdanubaian area.
The students from Slovakia, on the contrary, appear only in the secondary schools of the border
settlements (in Zemplén in Northeast Hungary). Most students in the latter region come from
Ukraine (2711 students). Approximately two-thirds of the total number of foreign citizens
(4352 students) belong to them. The non-Hungarian speaking from the area of the European
Union (122 pupils) are concentrated in the bigger cities and attend dual language grammar
schools.
III. Higher education
The higher education co-operations may be regarded as some kind of indicators. They
are regarded as basic condition of modernisation and their indexes reflect the development level
of societies and communities in the regions (LADÁNYI, A. 1996). Typically, the government
will – in addition to the individual interests – have a significant role in the progress of the cooperation. As a result of this, institutionalised forms and higher education associations are
formed (e.g. ACRU, Association of Carpathian Region Universities) and exchange programmes
develop. One of the best examples of the inter-institutional co-operations is the IERS (Institute
for Euroregional Studies) run by the University of Debrecen and the State University of Oradea
which enables joint research projects and student exchanges.
This cross-border co-operation seems to be natural in the higher education. On this
level, the national or regional schooling may involve attraction of the other side of the border,
too. The Hungarians appearing among the citizens of the neighbouring countries generate the
resurgence of the traditional relations. Similarly to the secondary schools, the personal
initiations appeared in the case of the higher education, too. As a consequence of a classically
bottom-up process, the Hungarian students from abroad chose Hungarian higher education
institutions for their further studies. The resuscitation of the historical gravitation zones may be
observed in many cases.
Debrecen with its extensive secondary school network and renowned university is the
traditional educational centre of the region. The education gravitation zone of the city almost
covers the historical relationship system of the Reformed College of Debrecen which is
regarded the predecessor of the university. The areas intensively related to the city include
Szabolcs-Szatmár-Bereg, Hajdú-Bihar counties (Hungary), Bihor, Satu Mare, Mara Mures, Silaj
counties (Romania) and the Transcarpathian region (Ukraine). The “particula-system” of the
College5 affected the same area where the current relations exist. The difference may be
measured on two areas. As time passed by, the Hungarian gravitation zone became narrower in
the west. The appearance and strengthening of new institutes overwhelmed the effect of
Debrecen. The system of relation in the east also changed. Those areas which used to have their
own college/lyceum/academy in the Middle Ages (as quasi self-sufficient areas the effects of
Debrecen were weaker, e.g. Székelyföld) were represented in the higher education institutions
of Debrecen.
On the whole, the number of foreign students in Hungary6 is much below the expected
in the preconception (Table II). This approximately meant 3% (13601 students) in 2005 out of
5
The particula-system may be interpreted as a complex relationship system between a mother-school and
part-school. The College, on the one hand, had educational relations with the particulas: the teachers got to
the village schools from the College, the curricula were prepared in the College, and the most talented
pupils from the small schools continued their higher studies there. On the other hand, there were financial
relations as well since these settlements contributed to the operation of the College through the
supplication, legation and endowment.
6
Similarly to the rest of the paper, only the state-acknowledged/subsidised higher education institutions
are studied here. The various forms of post-secondary training are omitted – although, these institutions
offer the majority of the trainings demanded on the labour market. Estimations support the acceptability of
narrowing suggesting that the ratio of foreign citizens is low in these pay-training.
45
the total 421 520 students7 in the Hungarian higher education – which is similar to the
secondary schools in its proportions. Substantial difference may be detected in the especially
low ratio of the Hungarian students from the neighbouring countries. They constitute only about
8000 students out of the total 13 000 and the rest are non-Hungarian natives. Their number,
thus, is far below the ones in the secondary schools and their total number is somewhat more
than half of the secondary school students. Besides the Hungarian students from the
neighbouring countries, the number of Germans (1151 students) and other European citizens
(e.g. Norwegians) are also relatively high.
Table II. Foreign students in the higher education institutions of Hungary (2005)
Geographic unit
Africa
America
Serbia-Montenegro
Germany
Ukraine
Other European
Asia
Slovakia
Romania
Total
Number of students
275
336
1132
1151
1294
1938
1956
2341
3171
13594
The changes in the number of Hungarian students from abroad are also peculiar
(Figure 3). The ratios of the students from Romania by school types are in accordance with the
average of the Hungarian students from abroad. Roughly half of the secondary school students
are enrolled to some kind of higher education institutions. This is much the lowest in the case of
the Hungarians from the Transcarpathian region (less than one-third). Interestingly, the number
of higher education students from Slovakia is high. In every other case – but in Slovakia – the
number of students in the higher education institutions is less than the secondary school
students.
7
The number of students in the higher education institutions on all courses (full-time, night,
correspondence and distant) and training levels (tertiary vocational training, college and university basic
and complementary training, continuing professional education, doctoral training). Statisztikai Tájékoztató
– Felsıoktatás, 2004/2005
46
14000Primary school
student
Secondary school student
High school student
12000
10000
3172
8000
6000
5979
2341
1294
4000
2259
3972
2000
2864
2172
816
0
Romania
Slovakia
Ukraine
Figure 3. Educational co-operation on the various levels
According to the available data, the average ratio of the foreign students in the
institutions of Eastern Hungary is around 3-4%. Somewhat more than one-third of them come
from neighbouring Carpathian Euroregion member countries (Slovakia, Romania, Ukraine) and
most probably they are Hungarian speakers. The example of the University of Debrecen allows
us to picture the current level and intensity of co-operation. On the basis of the data from 2005,
it is remarkable that the number of Hungarians from abroad is low among the enrolled students.
Most of them arrived from Norway (174 students), and there are 172 students from Romania,
162 students from Israel and 110 students from Ukraine. Slovakia is fifth on the list (28
students) and Iceland is the sixth (20 students) with quite similar numbers. The reason can be
relatively easily found: the medical training in Debrecen attracts a lot of people from all over
Europe. In the case of the DEOEC (University of Debrecen Medical and Health Science
Centre), the ratio of the Hungarians with foreign citizenship is less than 10% and there are
many students from the “West” and from other continents attending the English training.
The other extreme is embodied by the religious education with low numbers but high ratios
where the foreign citizens are almost exclusively represented by Hungarians from abroad.
For the present, the cheapness of the paying medical training induces a stronger mobility than
the common language or the geographical proximity. The enhancement of the aptitude for
mobility aimed by the Bologna process is a serious task and it may be seen that more students
come from further than Hungarians from the neighbouring countries.
Extending the study to the higher education institutions of Northeastern Hungary, some
tendencies may be observed (Table III).
Looking at the data of the institutions in the region which are responsible for the training of
pedagogues and teachers, it may be established that no foreigners apply for enrolment to these
Hungarian institutes. The first Hungarian higher education institutions in the neighbouring
countries more or less covered this field in the Transcarpathian region, in Romania and in
Slovakia as well.
47
It is striking that there are only a few students in the higher education institutions from the
neighbouring countries specialising in agricultural, technological and economic studies. This
may be the result of the national differences between these (agrarian, technological, economic)
sectors but the immaturity of the Hungarian institutional network may also play a role in it. As
far as the technological higher education of the region is concerned, the University of Miskolc
has a decisive role but the students from the neighbouring countries may go as far as Budapest
to study subjects not included in its offer. The motives may include the lack of the labour
market demand and in the later phase of the economic transformation these subject fields are
expected to be demanded in the neighbouring countries too and this may lead to an increase in
the number of students.
The students coming from the other side of the borders mostly choose the humanities
and pedagogue courses on the university level (University of Miskolc, University of Debrecen
Centre of Arts, Humanities and Sciences). This is – interestingly – in harmony with the
endeavours to establish institutions for the Hungarian minorities in the neighbouring countries.
Table III. Characteristics of the choice of professions of the students from across the border in
the Hungarian higher education (2005)
(Source: OM)
Pedagogue
Agriculture
Economics
Health sciences
Arts
Religion
Technical
Sciences
Romania
6
12
17
22
38
42
43
122
Slovakia
30
25
11
23
6
71
33
144
Ukraine
8
33
9
18
5
36
19
82
As far as the choice of cities is concerned, Budapest and the geographical proximity have
primary roles. As a consequence of the spatial structure of the Hungarian higher education
(Budapest centred), and due to the wide scale of the courses offered, almost half of the
Hungarian students from the neighbouring countries choose the capital. For those who prefer
the proximity of the border, Debrecen is the most popular (and also resulting from the number
of the institutions). The gravitation zone of the higher education institutions of the settlement
covers not only North-east Hungary but the border regions of the neighbouring countries, too.
The traditions, the economic situation and the language made Debrecen the scientific centre of
the area and made the Hungarian higher education institutions attractive. The institutions of the
city most intensively attract an area shaping a rectangular zone with a north-north-east–southsouth-east axis whose borders are constituted by the Hungarian Bihar in the south and the
Transcarpathian Munkacevo, Beregovo and Vynohradiv districts in the north. It is bordered by
Borsod (and the River Tisza) in the west and the Romanian Satu Mare and Bihor counties in the
east. The settlements with mostly Hungarian population in Slovakia and Székely land (in
Eastern Transylvania) also appear in “patches” in addition to the contiguous zone. The other
higher education institutions of the region in Miskolc, Eger and Nyíregyháza have a less
intensive attraction across the borders (due to number limits, specialisation, etc.).
IV. Summary
The number of students from foreign countries in the Hungarian educational
institutions is significant. As it was suggested by the preconception, the lowest number is
48
detected in the primary schools where their presence is rather to be treated as the traces of
migration instead of part of the educational market. It is maximum in the close proximity of the
border where the traces of the market position may be detected.
Almost half of the foreigners in Hungary attend secondary schools. It may be observed
that from the nineties onwards a new dimension of the co-operation appeared and the number of
participants in the Hungarian education increased. This level has some unique characteristics
with respect to the causes as well. The market forms of the human capital development can be
recognised. The foreigners appearing on this level prepare themselves for the Hungarian labour
market even at severe sacrifices. Both the predominance of the vocational trainings and the
share of the various professions support the above.
The most characteristic feature of the higher level is the lack of mobility. On the
whole, there are much fewer students than expected on the basis of the number of students in
the secondary schools and thus the reality did not testify the proposed hypothesis. Only the
number of students from Slovakia grew in comparison with the lower educational levels. It is
surprising that there are more students from Europe in the precious and relatively cheap medical
training than Hungarians from the neighbouring countries in the Hungarian training.
The number of students in the Hungarian education may be set in parallel with the
number of the Hungarian minority and the socio-economic situation of the neighbouring
countries. On the basis of their number, most students come from Romania but proportionally
they are over-represented in the case of the Transcarpathian region.
The introduction of the Schengen Agreement may create an interesting situation in this
field. The mobility will be unchecked in the directions of Slovakia and Austria but it becomes
more complicated in the case of Romania which is to enter later and Ukraine which is to remain
outside it permanently. As far as the latter is concerned, the compulsory visa obligation may
seriously hinder the movements.
References
Becker, G. (1964): Human capital. - Columbia University Press, New York. XVI,187p.
Harbison, F. – Myers, C.A. (1965): Manpower and Education. - Country studies in Economic
Development, - McGrawe Hill Book, New York - Toronto – London. 343p.
Kozma, T.(2000): Regionális együttmőködések a harmadfokú képzésben. - Educatio Füzetek,
OKI, Budapest. 57 p.
Ladányi, A. (1996): A felsıoktatás nemzetközi statisztikai összehasonlítása. Oktatáskutató
Intézet, Budapest
Süli-Zakar, I. (1994): Debrecen és Kelet-Magyarország (Egy regionális központ és a
regionalizmus országunk keleti felén).- In.: Tanulmányok Debrecen városföldrajzából
(Szerk. :Süli-Zakar I.) Debrecen. pp. 7-73.
Teperics, K. (2002): Factors Behind the Increase in the Number of the Students at the
University of Debrecen). – In: Borders and Cross-Border Co-opertions in the Central
European Transformations Countries (ed.: K. Czimre) – Kossuth Egyetemi Kiadó,
Debrecen. Pp. 184-195.
Teperics, K. (2003): Határmenti együttmőködések Északkelet-Magyarország középfokú
oktatásában. – In.: Határok és határmentiség az átalakuló Közép-Európában (Szerk.: SüliZakar I.), Debrecen. pp. 112-121.
Teperics, K.(2006): Schengen Challenging the Educational System for the Hungarian Living
Abroad.- In.: Challenges and Perspectives int he Regional and Euroregional Issues int he
New Europe Eds.:
I., Horga – I., Süli-Zakar.) Institute for Euroregional Studies, Oradea – Debrecen, 45-51 pp.
Concerning the competence of the European Union
in over border security issues
Gunilla EDELSTAM
Abstract
The author is interesred in the security of her country, Sweden, a country surrounded
by EU member states. She deals with the problem of over border criminality which has greatly
increased sfter the EU enlargement. She analyzes the cooperation between EU and her
country, regarding the fight against terrorism, the treaties, agreements, methods used and the
legal system. The problem of maintaining Sweden's sovereignty in accepting EU legislation is
also an isuue of this article.
Key words: security, border, crime terrorism, cooperatin
Over border security issues
Sweden is a small country surrounded by EU member states (Denmark, Finland,
Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Germany), the EES member state Norway and Russia
through Kaliningrad. Sweden joined the EU in 1995 and the free movement of people within
the EU is thus something that we adapt to. The field in focus of this report is the dangers of over
boarder criminality, i.e. the mentioned freedom in relation to security. New competencies are
allocated to the EU concerning security. Security used to be a national issue but the over
boarder criminality makes a certain co-operation necessary. The level of the threats against
Sweden is assessed to be low but assessed to be somewhat higher against American, British and
Israeli interests in Sweden. The Swedish Security Service (Säkerhetspolisen, SÄPO) warns that
there is a risk that Sweden can become a base for recruitment of terrorists and for the planning
of attempted outrages in other countries. More than twenty persons with Swedish citizenship or
with Swedish residence permit have – after 9/11 2001 - been captured due to suspicions of
terrorism. About half of them have been caught abroad (in Morocco, Ethiopia, Pakistan, Bosnia
and the Czech Republic). In almost all of these cases there are connections to extreme Islamists.
Only two persons have been convicted in Sweden according to the law on terrorism1. Some
have been convicted abroad. A Bosnian penal court sentenced a twenty-year-old Swede2 with a
Bosnian name to eight years of prison. In some of the cases there has been no conviction due to
lack of evidences. The most noted concerned a man that was in prison on the Guantanamo
military base.
Issues like this where immigrants might be a source of threat to security as well transnational crimes such as human trafficking and drug traffic are security issues where cooperation is needed. The EU co-operation implies preventing and fighting against terrorism,
human trafficking, drug traffic and traffic with weapons. These crimes are to an important
extent crimes where the criminals act or co-operate over borders. A European Union goal is to
strengthen co-operation between police, customs and other relevant authorities in the member
states as well as the co-operation between the legal authorities in order to prevent and fight
against terrorism and other (mainly over border) crimes.
1
2
The two men were convicted for having supported the Kurdish terror organisation Ansar al-Islam in Irak.
It takes five years to become a Swedish citizen. Medborgarskapslagen 11 §.
50
The three pillars
There are three different parts of EU co-operation that are intertwined when it concerns
such issues.
- The first pillar with the regulation on visas, asylum and immigration according to
which there shall be no control of persons when they pass the inner borders
irrespective of whether they are citizens of the EU or of a third country. There shall
though be controls at the utter borders and similar regulations for visas, asylum and
parts of the immigration policy.
- There is also the second pillar according to which the EU shall establish and carry
through a common foreign and security policy in order to strengthen the security of the
EU. Of special importance is the so-called European neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and
the so-called European Neighbourhood Policy Instruments (ENPI). The second pillar
ENP mainly focus on a soft security policy with agreements with neighbouring
countries on better institutions and rule of law.
- There is the third pillar on co-operation concerning justice and home affairs according
to which the EU shall shape the co-operation between the authorities involved in
preventing and fighting against criminality.
The European Community (EC) that is the first pillar, is regulated in the EC-treaty
while the second and the third pillars are regulated in the EU-treaty. The first pillar thus contain
the possibilities to move and to stay in EU member states, the second pillar forms the policy in
relation to third countries and the third pillar forms the co-operation between the authorities of
the different EU member states. These issues are intertwined when it concerns security. The
free movement that is an important basis of the EC and that includes visa and immigration
issues makes it important to augment the co-operation between the legal authorities in the
countries and it also makes it important to form some kind of policy on how to act in relation to
third countries, especially these that are neighbours of the EU and where the standard of living
is low.
Different methods are used for the creation of common policies within these areas.
With the competence in the first pillar the EC establishes the regulation and directives. With the
competence in the second pillar EU shapes agreement with neighbouring countries, the ENP.
With the competence in the third pillar the EU shapes the co-operation between the legal
authorities. Within the first pillar the EC has the authority to give regulation that is binding for
the state and to give directive that are binding to its results and goals. Within the second and
third pillar there is instead intergovernmental agreements on what to do. An intergovernmental
agreement implies that all member states must agree. The intergovernmental decision making
on these agreements are combined with certain voting rules that to a certain extent creates
possibilities to agree with qualified majority.
For a small country like Sweden and probably for any other member state that has
accepted the free movement and certain possibilities to immigrate from third countries it is
impossible to handle the security issues without co-operation between the member states. The
cross border nature of these security issues makes co-operation important. The inner market and
its freedom of movement for individuals reduces the possibilities to control at inner borders and
the possibilities to control at utter borders must therefore be strengthened. (Norway takes part in
Schengen) but when flight and boats come from other EU countries we cannot control them. It
is supposed to have been done in other countries when it concerns citizens from third countries.
The harmonisation of the control at borders is dependant not only on having the same regulation
but also on the interpretation and the procedure. For example a word such as ”refugee” might be
interpreted in different ways in different countries. When it concerns the procedure issues such
as for example who has the burden of proof and what is good evidence might have different
solutions in different countries. We are thus dependent on how other countries apply the
regulations concerning immigrations and visas - for example how they evaluate evidences and
how they apply the burden of proof - but we are also responsible, on national level, for how we
51
give visas and residence permits. Some issues concerning the procedure and evidences are part
of the EC, such as the Eurodac (EC/2725/2000) system for identification of asylum seekers
through fingerprints in order to restrain the asylum seeker from ”asylum shopping”, i.e. to
continue to another EU member state and have a new procedure and a new decision there, when
the first visited member state has denied asylum. Similar issues will also be part of the cooperation through the Prüm treaty that is being incorporated as a part of the EU legislation. This
co-operation gives the police of the different member states access to the criminal registers as
well as databases with information on DNA, fingerprints and car numbers. We might see more
of these kinds of procedural regulations in the future, where information and evidences can be
found easier and it might be part of the third pillar.
The third pillar
The third pillar of the EU treaty with co-operation and minima regulation on Justice
and home affairs (JHA) is closely connected to the EC-treaty IV that concerns regulations on
visas and immigration. The free movement is a contributory cause to the need for co-operation
on security in the third pillar. The way the immigration is handled affects terrorism and cross
border criminality. Fight against terrorism when it concerns terrorism is part of the third EU
pillar but within this field the national legislation on penal law is also important.
The third pillar EU co-operation through decisions and framework decisions does to
some extent concern definition of crime and penalty for such crimes - for example the EU
framework decision (2002/475/RIF) on fight against terrorism - but it is to some extent cooperation in order to prevent terrorism and to investigate crimes and accomplish national
sentences, that is part of this pillar. An example of such co-operation is the framework decision
(2002/584/RIF) on European arrest warrant. The framework decisions shall be unanimous and
the other decision shall be taken with a qualified majority. They are binding for the member
states. There are thus certain possibilities to decide on regulation within the third pillar
The co-operation within the third pillar imply to important extent assistance when it
concerns the investigations and co-operation in order to prevent crimes. I find it quite natural
that prevention and investigation of crimes and similar issues must be handled through cooperation when it concern over border crimes. Not only due to the fact that Justice and home
affairs are not EC-issues but also due to the fact that co-operation is easy to say but hard to do.
The mere nature of co-operation on investigation involves other methods and it depends on the
structure of the legal system and the institutions that might – due to history and tradition – be
different. Besides, how do you transfer such issues without transferring all or large parts of
penal law?
However there are two different decisions that can be made according to the third
pillar. The competence of the EU within the third pillar concerns not only co-operation (art. 2932) but also minima regulations on prerequisites for crimes and sanctions concerning organised
crimes, terrorism and drug traffic (art. 31.1.e). These insertions can be done through decisions
on framework concerning approximation of regulations and through decision concerning other
purposes according to the third pillar.
Sovereignty of member states
Does the possibility to decide on approximation of regulation in member states mean that the
EU interferes with the penal sovereignty of the member states? What is the nature of the union
competence under the third pillar? One can make a separation between the mentioned minima
regulations and the co-operation. The minima regulations could be interference in the
sovereignty of the nation states while the co-operation is less likely to involve interference. On
the other hand the minima regulations must be taken unanimously. The minima decision on
approximation of laws must be taken through a framework decision (31.1.e and 32.2.b EU
treaty) and is like an international treaty. Its nature is international treaty. According to art 34.2.,
52
the mentioned decisions are binding. If the procedure with the preparations in the member state
has followed the national way for preparation of regulation and if the person representing the
member state has the competence to enter into an agreement it should be no interference in
penal sovereignty.
In a country like Sweden that uses the dualistic method for implementation of
international treaties, the Swedish courts can only apply the EU third pillar decision if it has
been implemented through Swedish legislation. This can be compared with the EC-directives
that have to be applied by the Swedish courts if it has not been transformed into Swedish
regulation within a certain time. If the EC-court notifies the national court in advance or on the
validity or the interpretation of the mentioned third pillar framework decision, the Swedish
court is obliged to follow the Swedish regulation and if it would be in contradiction to the way
the EC-court makes its interpretation the Swedish court would have to follow the national
legislation. This is a consequence of the dualistic method that we use for implementation of
international treaties. But the national law would probably need to be changed by the legislator
if it can be interpreted in a way that is wrong according to the decision or framework decision.
Anyhow the fact, that the courts can not apply a treaty unless it has been incorporated in the
national legal system, makes it unlikely that the EU decision could pre-empt the competence of
the state.
The disobedience of the directive according to the EC treaty should have different
consequences than the disobedience of a decision or framework according to the art 34.2. in the
third pillar part of the EU treaty. If the council according to art. 42 decides to move certain
measures within the third pillar to the first pillar, the situation would change. The art. 42 would
hardly have any meaning if the decisions according to art. 32.2. EU treaty would be just as
binding as the directives according to art. 249 EC treaty. It must also be noted that the
possibility to transfer parts of the co-operation in the third pillar, according to art. 42, has as
prerequisite, that the member states takes the decision (to follow such a recommendation from
the council) in accordance with their constitutions.
Member states cannot be taken to the EC-court if they do not follow the decision or
framework decision according to art 32.2. According to the regulation in the third pillar, a court
in a member state may ask the EC court for a notification in advance (art 35.). The EC court
may also decide a dispute between the member states on how the decision or framework
decision according to art. 32.2. in the EU treaty, should be interpreted. But there is no right for
the court to sanction disobedience. The possibilities to impose sanctions exist in the EC treaty
art. 228 when it concerns disobedience against the EC regulations.
For reasons mentioned, I do not find that there is interference with national penal
sovereignty when it concerns the framework decisions according to the third pillar and I do find
that the third pillar framework decisions are different than to the first pillar directives. The
decisions for other purposes than approximation of member states legislation might though
imply a certain interference in the national sovereignty as it can be taken by a majority of the
member states and be binding also for the others.
However when it concerns the possibility for the EC to give directives on penal law
issues I would say that the EC does not have the right to give directives on sanctions within the
first pillar. The reason for this is that a directive is binding only as regards the result that shall
be achieved (EC treaty art 249). The result is not aimed at a punishment but at the
accomplishments of the four freedoms. It is the member state that has the sovereignty to decide
whether penalty, administrative sanctions or maybe damages would be the better sanction. If the
member state finds that the aim of the EC directive would be easier or better achieved with
private law regulation and damages, than with a penal law penalty, the state may chose the
private law regulation. If the state finds that the aim could be achieved through an
administrative law regulation that establishes an administrative sanction, the state may chose
the administrative law regulation. Directives on penalties can therefore be considered as
interference in member states sovereignty. With a framework decision on penalties in the
53
member states it is different. The third pillar decisions are a kind of international treaties in
between the member states.
Democratic deficit
Is there a democratic deficit in the third pillar co-operation? As the co-operation is
intergovernmental and based on treaty like decisions this is a kind of international public law.
This co-operation does not have a democratic deficit if the regulation for how to enter
into international agreements according to the constitution of the member state is being
followed and if the decision is unanimous. However Sweden has made a change in its
constitution that affects this third pillar co-operation. The main rule according to the Swedish
constitution (RF 10:2) is that the government may not sign a treaty unless the parliament had
decided to accept it. This acceptance is needed in cases where the treaty affects the legislation.
According to the change in the Swedish constitution, that was done in 2002 (RF 10:2), the
parliament may accept an EU agreement also if the agreement does not exist in its final version.
Thus for changes that are made after this acceptance, there is a democratic deficit in Sweden
due to the Swedish legislation.
International treaties with third countries
Another issue concerning the shaping of security is the external treaty making of the EU. This
mainly takes place within the first (EC) and the second (CFSP) pillar. EC can make
international agreements according to art. 300 EC treaty. The council decides to start
negotiation with third country and the commission has the responsibility for the negotiations. A
decision to accept a proposal for agreement with a third country can be taken by the council
with qualified majority. The competence to enter into agreements with third countries that are
not member states is based on the EC-treaty. This competence is exclusive and the member
states have lost their competence within the EC. Fields like trade, fishing, agriculture and
research are issues where the EC has exclusive competence. This competence has been
established partly through case law according to which the court has found that it is of
importance whether the EC has used its competence before (for example through a regulation
(AETR 22/70 Commission against the Court 1971 ECR 263) and that the mere existence of
international EC competence implies extern competence (3,4,6/Kramer 1976 ECR 1279). This
can be seen as a part of the implied power of the EC. If a treaty gives an institution (for ex. the
commission) a task to fulfil, the necessary authority to do it, is implied. The external
competence is thus based on the first pillar competence and the case law.
Some international agreements are second pillar CSFP issues only. The member states
must take part in the agreement. Such agreements with third counties can also be mixed
agreements where the EC and the member states take part. The work within CFSP - the second
pillar - is intergovernmental. Unanimous decisions are the main rule but there is also a certain
possibility to have qualified majority decisions. The European neighbourhood policy concerns
the relations with neighbouring countries. The European council has established strategies (EUtreaty 13.2.) The aim is to create security with peace and stability. It is done through action
plans. These are agreements with neighbouring countries where an important part is to improve
institutions and strengthen rule of law as well as giving the possibilities to take part in the
common market and helping them to improve the economies.
Does the competence to make external agreements pre-empt this competence of the
member states? The EC treaty must be considered to pre-empt the competence of the member
states to act on their own, but as it has to do with the free movement issue, it would be not
possible to join the EU as a member state if this pre-emption was not accepted by the member
state. For CSFP issues the competence is not pre-emptied but there is a certain obligation to act
together to find common solutions.
54
Legal personality
Does it matter whether the EC/EU has legal personality when an external treaty is
concluded with third country? Only those that have legal personality according to national legal
system can make legally binding agreements. States have legal personalities but EC as well as
EU is not a state. The EC has legal personality according to the EC treaty art. 281 and 282. EC
can be the owner of property and enter into agreements concerning properties in each member
state and it can plead its cause in the courts of the member states. EU does not yet have legal
personality3.
Is the mere fact that the EU does not have a legal personality according to the EU
treaty in itself something that makes it impossible for the EU to enter into external agreements
with third countries? No obviously not. EU can according to the second pillar make agreements
with third countries that are not EU member states. The possibility exists because the member
states have given the right to the council to take second pillar decisions unanimously and in
some cases with qualified majority. Could the treaty making possibility be seen as a part of the
legal personality or maybe as a part of the authority of the EU? As the EU does not have legal
personality the possibility to enter into international agreements with third countries should not
be a part of that. Could it instead be a part of the authority that has been given to the council
according to the second pillar? No, hardly because the EU does not have any authority over
third countries. Hence the agreement that is made with third countries might be some kind of
legal personality after all, where the EU is responsible with its assets for eventual claims due to
an international treaty that it has entered. But the EU does not have any assets. It cannot have
assets as it is not a juridical person.
Some international agreements are political and in such cases it does not matter
whether EU has legal personality or not. A political obligation that does not involve any
economic interest is political for the member states together and must be solved together. If
economic issues are involved and EU takes decisions, such as for example the ENPI (European
Neighbourhood Policy Instrument), where there are economic responsibilities to fulfil, this
should also be seen as an obligation for each member state. As long as the EU manages to solve
issues together in unanimous decisions there will probably be no problem concerning the
fulfilment of agreements but if this would not be the case, the third country would only have the
possibility to turn to each country for the fulfilment.
The question was whether it matters whether the EC/EU has legal personality when an
external treaty is concluded with third country. EC has legal personality and if an agreement is
not fulfilled the EC is responsible with its assets. The third country can turn to court and ask for
compensation. The right court would then probably be a court in Brussels. It would not be the
EC-court unless this has been agreed between the contracting parties, i.e. EC and the third
country. EU does not have legal personality. A third country that asks for compensation would
have to do this in each member state.
Human Rights
Some of the security in the first and the third pillar involve issues of human rights. The
human rights issues that above all come in focus are the unification of families and the integrity
of individuals in relation to the state, i.e. the respective member state. While the immigration
regulation do support family reunion to a certain extent the third pillar co-operation has led to
some regulations that might involve a break of human rights concerning integrity. It is the
European court on Human rights (and the national courts) that take decisions in cases where the
human rights have been violated and it is thus not an issue for the EC court. The European court
might thus in a case come to the conclusion that a national court has violated the human rights
when they applied a law that was established by the national parliament due to a decision or
3
The new constitution that is proposed, gives legal personality to EU.
55
framework decision within the third pillar. The decisions in the third pillar might thus be
criticised by the European court. Would it be a good a good idea to have a European agency for
Fundamental Rights? It would not be a good idea if this agency could come to other results than
the court and if the individual could complain to both instances at the same time.
Concluding Remarks
The border issues that were national have, due to the Schengen, become EU issues
where member states must follow EC regulation and directives on visas and immigration. The
security issues that goes with this are issues where the member states must co-operate. Most of
this is done through intergovernmental decisions where EU does not have much power.
Through EU the intergovernmental activities are co-ordinated. But it is rather obvious that even
though the EU does not have much competence the intergovernmental co-operation within the
second and third pillars is very important for the member state in these security issues that we
cannot handle alone. We are also - especially in a country like Sweden with utter borders only
at airports and harbours - very dependent on how the EC secondary legal sources (regulations
and directives) on visas and immigration as well as the co-operation according to the third pillar
is carried through in countries like for example Romania with borders to non-EU member
states.
References
Allgårdh/Norberg, EU och EG-rätten. Norstedts Juridik AB.
Danelius, Mänskliga rättigheter i Europeisk praxis.Norstedts Juridik.
Craig/De Búrca, The Evolution of EU law. Oxford University press.
Melin/Schäder, EU:s konstitution. Norstedt Juridik.
Tallberg, EU:s politiska system. Studentlitteratur.
II. Europe, an Inclusive Frontier
1. Gerard DELANTY (Liverpool) ◙ Peripheries and Borders in a PostWestern Europe
2. Jaroslav KUNDERA (Wroclaw) ◙ L’Europe elargiee sans frontiere
monetaire
3. Klara CZIMRE (Debrecen) ◙ Cross-Border Co-operation in Europe:
Scientific Research
4. Mihaela GAVRILA (Cluj-Napoca) ◙ Trafficking in Human Beings in
South Eastern Europe
5. Chris QUISPEL (Leiden) ◙ The Opening of the Dutch Borders. Legal and
Illegal Migration to the Netherlands 1945-2005
Peripheries and Borders in a Post-Western Europe
Gerard DELANTY
Abstract: The paper explores the concept of borderlands with respect to conceptions of
Europe and current developments in European societies, especially in the context of the recent
enlargement of the EU. It examines the changing nature of borders with a view towards
offering an assessment of the notion of a post-western Europe. The thesis advanced in the paper
is that Europe is taking not just a post-national form, but is also taking a post-western shape
and this latter dimension may be more significant. An important aspect of this is changing
relations of peripheries to the core. The aim of the paper is to offer a new assessment of the
periphery which can be seen as a zone of re-bordering. In the periphery the relation between
the inside and the outside is complex and ambivalent; while often taking exclusionary forms,
this is a relation that can also be viewed as the site of cosmopolitan forms of negotiation.
Keywords: EU enlargement, borderlands, cosmopolitanism, postcommunism, diversity
Introduction
The enlargement of the European Union has brought about a significant change in the
shape of Europe as a geopolitical entity. The significance of the eastern enlargement process
goes beyond the institutional question of the membership and constitution of the EU and
suggests a major reorientation in the identity of Europe. Unlike earlier enlargements of the EU,
the recent enlargement processes have wider cultural implications. The earlier expansion of the
EU in the pre-Cold War period differed in that it was premised on the certainty offered by the
Iron Curtain and while the Treaty of Rome declared any European country could join, it was
evident that there were political limits to expansion. It was primarily a western European interstate system. Moreover it was an enlargement that was based on what was believed to be a
common European political heritage. It is certainly the case that this heritage was often a
divisive one and in the case of the southern European countries – Greece, Portugal and Spain –
they joined the EU in the early 1980s only after a prolonged period of military rule. Yet, despite
these caveats, prior to the current enlargement the EU was a fairly cohesive entity and was able
to undergo relative deepening in socio-economic integration as well as in political integration.
The implications of a considerably enlarged EU have been much discussed as far as integration
is concerned, but what has been given less attention is the implications for the cultural and
political identity of Europe.
One the one side, the EU does not have a political or cultural identity in any
meaningful sense of the term, while on the other side, the identity of nation-states has been
undermined in part as a result both of Europeanization and wider processes of globalization. In
this contest, it is undoubtedly the case that it has been nation-states who have been the winners,
in that with few, if any, exceptions most member states have benefited from EU membership
and, as far as identity is concerned, national identity is far from being in demise. But it would
be too simple to conclude that in the EU of 27 members – and undoubtedly with more to come
– that there has been a turn to the national interest and an increase in national identities. The
argument advanced in this paper is that the current situation is more complicated and that a
more accurate account is one that recognizes the modification of nation-states by
Europeanization. Rather than look for a European level of identity over and beyond national
identities or see the latter as resisting a top-down supranational European identity, attention
should be focussed on the mixed or hybrid nature of national identities, which have been
transformed in numerous ways by Europeanization. For this reason the logic of Europeanization
has tended towards the Europeanization of national identities rather than the demise of national
identity. This is evident in many spheres, in communication, in life styles, and in the many areas
59
in which the EU has gained legal competences, as in, for instance, education and citizenship
(Delanty, 2007).
This paper is concerned with one aspect of the Europeanization of the nation-state,
namely the changing relation of centres and peripheries. This will be explored largely around
the question of the kinds of borders that are being created in the periphery as a result of
Europeanization. My thesis is that there is now a changed relation of the periphery to the core
with the periphery emerging from marginalization to becoming a site of cosmopolitan rebordering. However the true significance of the relation of core to the periphery is rather an
inter-civilizational one than one that can be seen in terms of inter-state relations and defined in
terms of state-EU dynamics.
A Post-Western Europe?
My first thesis is that Europe is taking increasingly a post-western shape. Until now
one of the striking features of the European project was the steady development of a postnational polity whereby the sovereign national state had to share its sovereignty with other
levels of governance, which included regions and the EU itself. While this remains a feature of
contemporary Europe, there is a more far-reaching development apparent that goes beyond
issues of governance. The reshaping of Europe since the end of communism and the
enlargement of the EU, the prospect of the inclusion of much of the former Yougoslavia and
possibly Turkey’s eventual membership, suggests a change in the identity of Europe in the
direction of a multiple constellation of regions. This more than a geopolitical shift, but is also a
shift in cultural self-understanding. Europe today is no longer a western enclave centred around
the core founding states. The earlier EU was largely determined by the circumstances of its
birth in the reconciliation of France and Germany. It was a Europe centred on the Rhine and the
historical territory of the Carolingian Empire with the Elbe and Danube marking its outer
eastern limits. As I remarked above, the addition of other countries to this did not change the
basic shape of this civilizational current; it was a Europe based on the western heritage of Latin
Christendom1, the Enlightenment, democracy and the free market economy. The western nature
of post-war Europe was consolidated in the twentieth century with the rise of the United States.
What we are witnessing today is the emergence of different civilizational heritages.
These do not so much make redundant or challenge the western heritage but add to it. The
richness of Europe is the richness of its civilizational heritages. Until now the dominant
approach has been to emphasise the diversity of Europe in terms of its nations. Indeed, this is
the main meaning of the term ‘unity in diversity,’ which has come to be the principal statement
of its cultural and political identity. This is a unity defined in terms of the diversity of national
cultural and political traditions. A broader view of the transformation of Europe suggests, I
argue, an inter-civilizational perspective since the shape Europe is now assuming is one that is
determined by both its civilizational context and, related to this, different routes to modernity.
An inter-civilizational perspective, as opposed to a state-centric approach, is suggested by the
enlargement of the EU into areas of the continent that have had different experiences with
modernity.2 The case of Central Europe is one such example of an inter-civilizational heritage,
which while being part of the western European heritage has also been shaped by its proximity
to eastern and western Europe. In the case of East Central Europe - where the emphasis shifts to
the eastern orientation - this inter-civilizational dimension is much more significant, for the
region has been considerably influenced by Russia and by the wider Euro-Asian borderland (see
Arnason, 2005). The notion of borderlands, which will be discussed below, is relevant here in
the context of inter-civilizational zones of overlapping identities, heritages, and experiences of
modernity. Of relevance, too, is the emerging identity of what is increasingly being termed the
1
With the exception of Greece (whose claim to the European heritage was not based on Christianity but
classical antiquity).
2
For a fuller account of a civilizational approach, see Arnason (2003) and with an application to Europe
see Delanty (2003) and Delanty and Rumford (2005). See also chapter one in Byrnes and Katzenstein
(2006).
60
‘Euro-Balkan’ region. While the recent enlargement of the EU has tended to emphasise central
and eastern Europe, the south-east region is another part of the European civilizational
constellation. Much of this regions has been influenced by the Ottoman tradition and thus
suggests the relevance of the inter-civilizational dimension, which in this case is less ‘eastern’
than ‘southern.’ At the present only Slovenia is a member of the EU, but this is a complicated
case since arguably Slovenia belongs more to Mitteleuropa than to the Euro-Balkan region (see
Vidar and Delanty, 2008).
While Slovenia might be considered to be somewhere ‘in-between’ Mitteleuropa and
the Balkans, the case of Romania and Bulgaria are particularly interesting examples of the intercivilizational nature of Europe. Unlike the countries that make up central Europe, in the stricter
sense of the term, Romania and Bulgaria were products of the Eastern Roman Empire and,
especially Romania, the culture of the Byzantine Empire made its impact as did the Ottoman
tradition and, of course, later these countries fell within the orbit of Russia. The cultural
specificity of these countries is not one that can be accounted exclusively in terms of national
trajectories. The civilizational shaping of the modern nation-state is much in evidence in terms
of the model of modernity adopted and in societal structures and identities (Arnason, 2003).
From a historical sociological perspective, the emerging shape of Europe is perhaps
understood as deriving from three basic configurations, which constitute ‘three Europe’: a
western Europe, a central-eastern Europe, and a south-eastern Europe. Of these the latter is the
most problematic. In a classic essay, Scüzs (1988) argued Europe consists of three geopolitical
units, which were formed out of the East-West divide: a western ‘Carolingian’ Europe, Central
Eastern Europe, and an Eastern Europe, which has been closely linked with Russia and has no
clear-cut eastern frontier. The fate of Europe was determined by these three historical regions.
There can be little doubt that it was the first one that was decisive in shaping the European
legacy, which Szüzs claimed was characterized by a synthesis of diverse elements that were
assembled out of the prior disintegration of the older imperial structures. With the partial
incorporation of some of the eastern region into what might now be called east central Europe,
the notion of an eastern Europe might be redefined to include the southern sphere of Europe. In
any case it seems incontrovertible that the old East versus West division of European history
must now be modified in various of one that is more sensitive to the diversity of the central and
eastern regions (see also Halecki, 1962; Delanty, 1995). The notion of ‘three historical’ Europes
needs to redefined to take into account the fact that all three varients all included relations a
wider civilizational area: the western Europe includes within the wider colonial context; central
eastern Europe includes the engagement with Russia and the wider Slavic dimension; and south
eastern Europe includes within it the Ottoman heritage as well as the Byzantine and Slavic
heritages. All three of were shaped by many common strands – the Roman Empire, JudeaChristianity in both its Latin and Greek forms - suggesting a hyphenated notion of civilization
as a plural phenomemon.
In emphasizing the civilizational sources of contemporary Europe my aim is neither to
exaggerate these differences nor to suggest that what we have is some kind of a clash of
civilizations. In this respect I refute the Huntington thesis that the eastern borders of Europe are
zones of civilizational clashes. The seductiveness of the thesis is in part due to a core of truth in
the argument: the post-1989 world is not exclusively determined by the older political
ideologies and civilizational factors are playing themselves out in different ways. The error of
the argument is to see civilizational differences only in terms of conflicts. My argument rather
is to see the civilizational background to contemporary Europe as a source of its diversity and
rather than clashes we can see signs of mutual cooperation. Moreover, Hungtington’s thesis is
empirically false in that there is no evidence of civilizational clashes or conflicts of a cultural
nature as far as the enlargement of the EU is concerned. With the single exception of the
Balkans, the integration of post-1989 Europe – from German unification to post-communist
transition – to the enlargement of the EU – has been remarkably peaceful. The case of ethnic
cleansing in the Balkans can be seen as a product of the collapse of the state rather than
resulting from a primordial cultural conflict.
61
Looking at Europe as a whole an unavoidable conclusion is that the Danube is
replacing the Rhine as the symbolical line that marks the centre of Europe. In addition to this it
may also be suggested that the gravity is shifting from the Atlantic to the Mediterranean Sea in
a Europe that is steadily moving eastwards towards the Black Sea. The new axis is less that of
the Baltic and Adriatic than the Baltic and the Black Sea. The notion of a post-Western Europe
is intended to capture the spirit of this movement. Indicated by the term is a multiple kind of
Europe, consisting of many heritages and experiences with modernity. Some of these are older
than the western tradition and are coming to play a role in the making of Europe today in ways
that cannot be reduced to a simple notion of a clash of cultures. The notion of a post-western
Europe, too, is intended to indicate a reflexive relation in the identity of Europe as no longer
exclusively determined by the relation with the United States. This does not mean antiAmericanism, for on the contrary many central and Eastern European – notably Poland the
Czech Republic - countries are strongly pro-US; rather it points to a more self-problematized
identity and one that does not have the same kind of self-assurance that it had until about ten
years or so ago.
The Periphery Considered
On the basis of the fore-going argument concerning the emergence of a post-western
Europe in which the inter-civilizational dynamic is an important but neglected dimension, I
would like to clarify the question of the periphery and its relation to the core. Obviously a
periphery can be understood only in relation to a core. In the case of the European core and
peripheries, I am arguing that the relation of the core to the periphery is multi-dimensional,
evolving and cannot therefore be easily reduced to an one dimensional notion of the
domination of the periphery by the core. My second thesis is that there is a general shift to the
periphery largely as a result of Europeanization, but partly as a consequence of globalization.
Clearly the core still dominates if not the periphery, at least the EU as a whole. The core
western countries – Germany, France, UK – are the largest and most powerful economies in
Europe and among the most powerful in the world and the terms of EU membership were not
open to much negotiation. Notwithstanding these obvious objections, the point I am making is
not that the periphery is not disadvantaged and now stands in a relation of equality, but that a
more complex relationship has emerged as far as power and marginality is concerned.
A feature of the eastern enlargement of the EU is the incorporation of countries that
were once on the margins of Europe and many of which had been in a subordinate status with
respect to the major European powers. It is also noteworthy that many of these are small
countries - the Baltic states, Slovenia, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Hungary, Cyprus, Malta - and
those that are territorially relatively large such as Bulgaria are demographic terms small and
traditionally peripheral. Poland, with a population of c 30m is an exception, as possibly is
Romania with a not insignificant population of 22 m, but too have been traditionally peripheral.
Aside from the question of Turkey, the next wave of accession countries will be those in the
Balkans: Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia Herzegovina. Constituting what German historians once called
an ‘in-between Europe’ (Zwischeneuropa), these countries experienced marginalization for
much of the modern history of Europe and in many cases where subjugated by the totalitarian
states east and west. Emerging out of this background, participation in the EU offers many
advantages. A longer view of history will place the current transformation of central and eastern
Europe in the context of the re-invention of political modernity.
It is arguably the case that the smaller European countries have benefited from EU
membership. That is certainly the case as far Ireland is concerned. Since joining in 1973 it has
been a major beneficiary. While the rapid economic growth that Ireland has experienced since
the early 1990s has been due to many factors, EU membership has played a major role in
economic recovery. Greece and Portugal, although not experiencing the same economic takeoff, have benefited too. It is far too soon to assess the implications for the recently joined
countries, but there is enough evidence to suggest that the triple transition to democracy, market
62
societies and national autonomy has been relatively successful.3 In the case of German Polish
relations, while some of the old asymmetries have reappeared, Spohn (2003: 137) has
commented that these have crystallized in new forms: the Europeanization of the German
economy and Polish economic growth have weakened the older core-periphery dynamic and the
older nationalistic forces have lost their power. Furthermore, the EU itself has been an
important lever of democratization in applicant countries, as is evidenced by the example of the
rapid democratization of Turkey and in recent years Bulgaria and Romania.
In political terms the EU is now significantly different in that the large number of
small countries have changed the balance of power. This inevitably leads to a different kind of a
relation between the core and periphery. The pre-1989 EU did not experience any challenges
from the small countries of the periphery, represented by Ireland, Greece and Portugal. The
smaller founding countries - Belgium, Luxemburg and the Netherlands - were relatively
prosperous and part of the core. This was also true of Denmark and later the Nordic countries.
Until the 1990s the EU was largely shaped by the dynamic of the core countries while today an
entirely different dynamic is emerging. The crisis of the constitutional treaty in 2005 and the
current hiatus is an indication of a growing uncertainty in the political identity of an union of 27
members and with the prospect of more to come. The project of deepening European integration
socio-economically and politically was premised on a smaller group of countries with similar
levels of socio-economic development. The societies of central and eastern Europe have put the
brakes on deepening, but have not arrested the further development of Europeanization, which
is currently re-adjusting to what can be viewed as the encounter with different models of
modernity, some of which, as argued in foregoing, are related to civilizational contexts.
For the first time the core countries have found themselves challenged by the
encroachment of the periphery. Fears of increased immigration from central and eastern Europe
have been at the forefront of most countries politics and in several cases have led to a
reorientation in political support for the mainstream parties of which the beneficiaries have
often been the extreme right. But in many cases large scale migration, where it has occurred,
has not resulted in significant challenges. In Ireland, for instance, the 2006 census reports that
there are over 400,000 non-nationals resident in the country, making migrants about 10 per cent
of the population. Polish immigration is a major part of this. It has been estimated that up to
300,000 Poles have migrated to the UK since 2003. It does appear to be the case that migration
into western European countries is relatively stable and fears of a massive influx of migrants are
largely unwarranted. Recent research suggests that the relatively large-scale Polish migration
will not be repeated when restrictions are lifted against Bulgarian and Rumanian migration in
the first phase after accession. The case of Polish immigration is also a pertinent example of the
reconfiguration of the core and the periphery around multiple forms of migration. European
migration is multi-directional with migrants moving from East to West on a non-permanent
basis. Such episodic patterns of migration have already made a huge impact on the host
societies as well as on the home countries and constitutes a significant dimension of
Europeanization. Europe is moving to a situation in which the periphery is already located
within the core and where there is no hard fast distinction between core and periphery.
With the gradual incorporation of the periphery into the core the periphery does not
disappear. Rather new peripheries emerge. This is already the case with regard to the division
that is now becoming evident between the countries that have joined the EU and those that
remain outside. Although the older term ‘Eastern Europe’ is now losing its meaning in that it
does not refer to a specific regional entity, the functional equivalent is taking shape with
countries further to east – such as Moldovia, Belarus and the Ukraine – and to the south east,
such as the Balkan countries.4 Relations between cores and peripheries are also being redefined
around new kinds of power relations around energy supplies, as the example of gas pipelines
illustrates. Another example is the recent case of the alignment of Poland and the Czech
3
4
See Arnason (2005).
On the idea of eastern Europe, see Wolff (1994 ).
63
Republic with the US in allowing the construction of missile defence installations directed at
Russia.
What this suggests is that the core-periphery distinction is no longer the only model
available for understanding marginality and patterns of growth and change in Europe today.
Europeanization and gloablization have to an extent eroded the core-periphery distinction in so
far as this was a simple polarity. Rumford has argued that globalization reshapes the hierarchal
framework within which the core-periphery relation has been constituted (Rumford, 2002:
chapter 7). What has emerged instead is a more complicated spatial structure and which could
be understood in terms of the notion of a network; a structure that is more polycentric and
which entails a basic pluralization of the core-periphery relation. In this sense, then, the older
core-periphery relation is one that was more a feature of the pre-1989 model of Western
Europe, while the advent of a post-western Europe signals a different spatial dynamic.5
In sum, while it cannot be said that the periphery is now on an equal footing with the
core, the relation has changed to the advantage of the periphery. In this respect one can be
reminded of James Joyce’s intention to ‘Europeanise Hibernia and Hibernicise Europe.6 Taking
Ireland as a metaphor for the periphery, the task has a contemporary relevance in drawing
attention to the need for Europe to find a mutually positive relationship between the core and
the periphery.
Different Kinds of Diversities
A consideration of the nature of European diversity that takes into account the
perspective of the periphery will have to address the reality of different kinds of diversities. In
this respect the European debate is very different from the North American and Australian
debate, which has been influenced by the language of race and the existence of pre-settler
groups (Kymlicka and Norman, 2000). The European context is different in that the debate
about diversity is not addressed to the problem of indigeneous pre-settler groups, but groups
formed out of migration or groups created as a result of nation-state formation. Perhaps for this
reason the emphasis in Europe has been on diversity and ethnicity rather than race.
The dominant understanding of diversity that has emerged with European integration
has been the notion of a ‘unity in diversity.’ This has generally been understood to be a
response to the multi-national nature of Europe and the fact that Europeanization is not leading
to the emergence of an over-arching identity that would be a focus for unity. The trend has been
towards the recognition of the diversity of Europe. While from the perspective of the EU this
diversity is in the first instance national, a fuller analysis reveals a more complex picture.
The previous discussion has emphasized the inter-civilizational diversity of Europe in
terms of a constellation of at least three different regional variants, the western, the central and
eastern/southern. This perspective can be furthermore related to the debate on multiple
modernities in relation to Europe (Blokker, 2005; Delanty, 2003a). In this regard the emphasis
shifts to varieties of modernity rather than, for instance, a simplistic notion of a single, western
version of modernity replacing a notion of tradition or the claim that postcommunist countries
are simply catching up on the west (Habermas, 1990).7 As Roudometof (1999) has argued in the
case of south-eastern Europe, what is often regarded as a recalcitrant tradition was in fact an
experiment with modernity that went wrong. His argument is that the actual or potential
conflicts in the Balkan region were the result of rivalries created by the regions re-organization
according to western models of modernity and not due to a primordial clash of civilization. In a
similar way, Blokker (2002) has argued that rather than understand accession and convergence
as the logical outcome of the transition to post-communism where the accession countries shed
their ‘non-Europeaness’ and become normal, the widening of the EU should be seen as
5
I am grateful to Chris Rumford for clarifying this point.
Hiberia was the Latin name for Ireland. On Ireland and Europe, see McCall and Wilson (2008
forthcoming).
7
See Outwaite and Ray (2006, in particular chapter 5) for a discussion on social theory and modernity
with respect to postcommunism.
6
64
increasing the diversity of Europe. Moreover, as argued above, the inclusion of central and
eastern European countries in the EU allows those countries to articulate different interests and
perspectives. This is not only a matter of different models of modernity, but also different
combinations of premodernity with modernity. Outhwaite and Ray (2006: 114-5) argue in this
vein that the outcome of the implosion of communism was combinations of local traditions and
practices with new developments rather than a simple adoption of westernization. In this sense,
then, the enlargement of the EU increases diversity rather than diminishing it.
A broader view of European diversity, I have argued, must go beyond a focus on
nations in relation to the EU. The civilizational approach I have sketched suggests a broader
conception of European diversity than one reducible to nations. This suggests a view of
modernity itself as multiple and the source of the diversity of Europe. If this is correct, then, we
can expect increased political diversity. But what of cultural diversity beyond and below the
level of nations? Here we move closer to the sphere of multiculturalism. Any account of
European diversity will have to address the problem of different understandings of cultural
diversity in the various parts of Europe. This is unavoidably linked to different experiences with
minorities and with migration.
In Europe migrants comprise 4.5 per cent of the total population and in many countries
they are the main factor in population increase. There about 24.6 million recorded foreign
nationals in European countries.8 About 83 million people in Europe who were born in
countries other than the ones in which they reside. There are about 10 million foreign workers
currently registered in those European states. This figure obviously does not include a large
number of illegal migrants. However, estimates differ. One view is in that the wider European
Economic Area hosts some 56.1 million migrants, circa 3 migrants to 1000 inhabitants.9 This of
course includes only migrants, persons born outside the country in which they are resident. It
does not include ethnic communities with large numbers of permanent residents including those
who have acquired the nationality of the country of their birth.
A new understanding of diversity is emerging in which the concern with diversity is
excluding recognition of minorities. Kevin Robbins (2006) has argued that there has been a
discursive shift in Europe generally whereby the language of ‘minorities’ has been replaced by
a new emphasis on diversity (see also Bennett, 2001; Ellmeier and Rasky, 2006). To an extent,
as he notes, this is positive in that the equation of ‘otherness’ with minorities is reduced and a
more generalizable notion of diversity relevant to the vast range of social and cultural
differences can be more readily applied. As Robins points out, the notion of diversity
normalizes difference and facilitates a broadening of the horizons beyond ethnic categorization,
working towards the ‘de-ethnization of difference’ and invoking a more positive understanding
of difference. However, the centrality of ‘diversity’ today is not unproblematic since it is being
predominantly being interpreted in much of central and eastern Europe as a way to relate to
national autochthonous minorities. What had begun as an attempt to replace the language of
minority/majority culture to take account of a wider range of diversities, is in danger of being
reduced to ethnic categories. In the discursive shift what is lost is recognition of forms of
diversity that are not related to national minorities.
The main difference is that western experiences are based on postcolonial immigration
while in central and eastern European the main interest is in autochthonous minorities. As
Robbins (2006) and Ellmeier and Rasky (2006) argue, in central and eastern Europe the
language of diversity is borrowed from the western European experience, which has been
heavily influenced by diasporic migration from former colonies, and is being applied to national
minorities – so called autochthonous groups. In the former case, diversity is predominantly
postcolonial and diasporic and has been the basis of much of multiculturalism in Britain,
Belgium, Netherlands and France. A second wave of migration in western Europe can also be
8
This figures and other cited here are derived from Salt (2005).
http://www.coe.int/t/e/social_cohesion/population/EPC(2005)K3.0%20Salt%20keynote.doc
9
Boswell (2005) Migration http://www.gcim.org/attachements/RS4.pdf
65
identified and which has had wider sphere of relevance. This can be related to an intraEuropean migration from the south to the north in the 1970s and which most western/northern
European countries experienced and which has been decisive in shaping the transition to
multiculturalism in those countries. To this can be added the current wave of migration from
East to West that had followed in the aftermath of the enlargement of the EU, a wave of
migration that coincided with an increase in asylum seekers and refugees.
While western Europe has had a relatively long experience with cultural diversity, the
situation in central and eastern Europe is less straightforward. On the one side, it can be argued
that the legacy of history has been one of greater cultural and political diversity and that this has
never been successfully accommodated within the structures of the nation-state. This is an
diversity that is primarily based on autochthonous minorities that have been in different ways
associated with the former multi-ethnic empires (Habsburg, Ottoman, Russian) out of which the
modern nation-states were created. The cultural heterogeneity of the old empires is to be found
at the level of cross-national cultures and other kinds of over-lapping affiliations. Although too
a feature of western Europe, it is a more pronounced feature of the cultural landscape of central
and eastern Europe.
On the other side, in central and eastern Europe the experience with diasporic
minorities formed as a result of migration from outside Europe is limited and consequently
cultural diversity policies are generally aimed at autochthonous minorities to the relative neglect
of other kinds of minorities. This is to the disadvantage of non-ethnic minorities such as
refugees and asylum seekers. In addition, in the former communist countries there is the
emergence on ‘new minorities’, i.e. as former majorities, or relatively large ethnic groups,
becoming minorities (e.g. Russians in Latvia or Serbs in Croatia). As Ellmeier and Rasky
(2006: 29-33) point out, cultural policy in many cases is connected with nation-building
exercises and there is a general interest in maintaining the old minorities as the crucial points of
diversity and identity politics.
What we have here are two different conceptions of diversity, one that is primarily
based on multiculturalism and the rights of citizenship and one that is more ethnopluralist and is
generally directly concerned with regional and ethnic autonomy. It is not clear how the current
notion of diversity constrained as it is by national borders is able to suggest a way forward. So
my third thesis is that central and eastern Europe has a long way to go in linking citizenship
with diversity, while on the other side Europe as a whole will need to move beyond the
currently bifurcated conception of diversity.
The problem of ethnopluralism has a direct bearing on the question of borders since
much of the problem is due to fact that many national minorities are linked to a majority
population group in a neighbouring countries. A pertinent example of this is Romania, where
the Hungarian minority, which represents 6.6% of the population, is concentrated into locations
on the Hungarian border and in parts of Transylvania (where it is as much as 30 per cent of the
population). Aside from very small minorities related to neighbouring countries, the other
minority, the Roma, who constitutes 2.2%, did not have any minority status until 1990
(Ellmeier and Rasky, 2006: 61) and as a transnational or transcultural group it does not fall into
the category of autochthonous minorities and as a result it is disadvantaged.
Re-interpreting the Border: Cosmopolitan Orientations
The border has for long marked the rise of modernity and the geopolitical system of
nation-states that is brought into existence. Although these units are still with us they have been
considerably diminished, at least within Europe, in so far as they are defined with respect to
their borders. Borders are no longer dividing lines akin to the traditional notion of a frontier in
the sense of a line demarcating one state from another; they have become considerably
weakened and are more diffuse, often sites of overlapping communities and regions. This is also
the case with respect to the external relation of Europe to the wider world. The border is a
networked and fluid process rather than a fixed line and is constituted in new and changing
relations between cores and peripheries. Europeanization has neither eliminated borders nor
66
created a new external frontier. New kinds of borders are taking shape in European space.10 The
present contours of the EU do not amount to a final frontier. The European external border is
not a clear-cut line of demarcation that is capable of dividing an inside from an outside. There is
no point at which an Iron Curtain is reached. The EU’s system of governance now extends
beyond EU space to the wider south and entails relations that cannot be understood in the
traditional terms of a closed frontier. Europe’s borders, both internal and external, are shaped
not just by the logic of Europeanization, but by the interaction with the global context. The
global, the national and the European dimensions interact to produce a complex field of borders
and rebordering out of which emerges a post-western constellation.
It may be contended that the southern frontier is coming into existence and replacing
the East-West divide. This North South border, with its focus on the Euro-Mediterranean area –
has certainly become more salient (Suarez-Navaz, 2004), but it is not a straightforward
replacement of the older East-West border. Although the EU is not likely to expand across the
Mediterranean Sea in the way it has into eastern Europe, the Euro-Mediterranean region has
become an unavoidable part of the wider European area. It is principally represented with the
present configuration by Malta. However, despite the various partnerships arrangements, the
present structures of the EU do not adequately accommodate this region, which has also been
somewhat marginalized as a result of the eastern enlargement and has too become a focus of
new security concerns.
Notwithstanding these qualifications around the ambivalence of internal and external
borders, I would like to conclude with the final thesis that there are grounds for optimism in that
there are some interesting examples of the border becoming a site of cosmopolitan
reorientations in previously divided identities. It is in this respect that Europe as a whole can
learn from the experience of the periphery in coming to terms with conflict and with difference.
The relevant examples that can be cited are changing cross-border relations in South Tyrol,
Cyprus, Northern Ireland, Hungarian-Romania border area, Polish-Lithuanian cross-border cooperation to mention just a few examples. In such cases where there are contested borders,
different and conflicting collective memories, minority rights relating to religion and language,
political representation, considerable progress has been made in moving towards reconciliation
and the negotiation of conflict.11 Other and different examples can also be found, such as crosscountry anti-human trafficking measures. An overall view is difficult but it might be suggested
that the cultural logic of Europeanization has brought a decrease in border conflicts and a
general move in the direction of more cosmopolitan orientations (see Delanty and Rumford,
2005). A cosmopolitan interpretation of such developments suggests the relevance of a
consideration of Europe in terms of a borderland (see Balibar, 2004: 219). The significance of
the notion of the borderland is that it captures much of the reality of European borders, where
inside and outside are not easily separated and where the border is being reconstituted in
numerous ways.12 Moreover, the notion of the borderland invokes the move towards a network
conception of space, which I have argued is relevant to the current dynamic of Europeanization
and its interface with globalization.
In sum, the border is not just a conflict zone where a primordial clash of civilizations is
played out. The border takes many different forms and includes sites of negotiation, which are
illustrated by some of the examples referred to above. In such cases the periphery has moved
beyond the limits of border thinking and where the simple polarities of self versus other are
losing their force.
Conclusion
Fifty years ago with the Treaty of Rome in 1957 the European project commenced as a
project to integrate the two major core states of the European continent, France and Germany.
10
See Delanty (2006) for an extended discussion of this point.
See Anderson et al (2003), Meinhof (2002).
12
For a further account of borders and borderlands, see Rumford (2006).
11
67
This venture has been successful and in more recent times, since the end of communism, a new
era has begun in which the focus has shifted to the periphery and to its relation with the core.
The new challenges are those of a much more complicated world of diversities and the
negotiation of borders and, especially in the case of central and eastern Europe, of conflict
resolution between communities divided as a result of the legacy of nation-state building. The
simple appeal to Europe’s diversity will not be enough since many of the problems to which
diversity is intended to be a solution are produced by the very national models that are regarded
as the carriers of diversity. A step in the right direction would be an inter-cultural dialogue of
the different European understandings of diversity and to explore ways of reconciling the
divergent western and central and eastern approaches to cultural diversity.
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L’Europe elargie sans frontiere monetaire
Jaroslaw KUNDERA
Abstract: The article deals with the processes of accession of the East- Central
European countries to the Euro zone. The statistical analysis indicates that only few countries
have fulfilled the convergence criteria distinguished under the Maastricht Treaty which casts
doubt on the usefulness of applying these criteria to the countries in the processes of
transformation. In the view of the author the benefits for the East Central European countries
from the participation in the Euro zone will be greater then economic costs. The question is
only to choose the optimal date of adhesion because few of these countries need some freedom
of manoeuvre in economic policy to finish their transformation processes.
Key words: euro, economic policy, frontier, accession
« L’Europe se fera par la monnaie ou ne se fera pas » écrivait en1949 Jacques Rueff,
grand économiste français. En 2001 les 11 pays de l’UE avaient déjà mis en pratique l’idée
d’intégration monétaire que l’euro avait impliqué après le long et dur processus d’adaptation.
Maintenant, les douze nouveaux Etats membres de l’Europe Centrale et Orientale (PECO) se
trouvent obliger d’adopter la devise européenne : l’euro. Selon l’acte relatif aux conditions
d’adhésion à l’Union Européenne, chacun des nouveaux Etats membres doit participer à l’union
économique et monétaire et ils sont obligés d’adopter l’euro à compter de la date d’adhésion :
alors, le 1er mai 2004 les dix nouveaux Etats membres et 1er janvier 2007 aussi la Romaine et
la Bulgarie. La date définitive de l’introduction de l’euro n’est pas fixée pour aucun pays, mais
avant l’adoption de la monnaie unique, ils doivent participer au mécanisme de change
européenne 2 (MCE 2) pendant une période minimale de deux ans et respecter les critères de
Maastricht.
Pour participer à L’Union Monétaire, les Pays de l’Europe Centrale (l.’U.E.M) doivent
accomplir leurs obligations d’adhésion. La Commission et la BCE feront un rapport au Conseil
sur les progrès faits par les Etats membres qui vérifiera si les législations nationales sont
compatibles avec l’obligation d’indépendance des banques centrales et si les conditions de
convergences sont remplies. La Commission s’est engagé à faire régulièrement un rapport sur
l’état d’avancement de ces préparatifs. En effet, l’entrée dans la zone euro des nouveaux états
membres de l’UE est conditionnée par le respect des critères de convergence qui sont les
suivants :
Inflation –le taux d’inflation de PECO ne doit pas dépasser 1,5% du taux d’inflation
moyen des trois Etats membres de l’Union Economique et Monétaire présentant le meilleur
taux.
Déficit public – le déficit annuel d’un Etat ne doit pas dépasser un 3% de son PIB, le
déficit public incluant, selon les normes européennes, le budget de l’Etat, mais aussi les
résultats de la Sécurité sociale, de l’assurance-chômage et des collectivités locales.
Dette publique – les pays PECO aspirant à l’adhésion doivent ajuster leur endettement
à un taux inférieur à 60% de leur PIB. Cependant, on peut faire une exception si l’endettement
public « diminue suffisamment et s’approche de la valeur de référence à un rythme
satisfaisant ».
Taux d’intérêt – les taux d’intérêt nominaux à long terme ne doivent pas dépasser avec
plus de 2% la moyenne des taux d’intérêt à long terme des trois pays présentant les taux
d’inflation les plus bas.
Taux de change – la monnaie du pays PECO candidat à l’Union Monétaire doit avoir
respecter depuis au moins deux ans les marges de fluctuations du SME.
70
On doit ajuter que tous les pays de PECO doivent introduire l’indépendance complète
de leur banque Centrale. C’est-à-dire qu’avant d’entrer dans l’UEM leur banque centrale doit
opérer de façon indépendante et décider indépendamment de l’émission de leur monnaie. Après
l’adhésion à la zone Euro, les Banques Centrales de PECO devront accepter le transfert de
compétence exigé par le passage à la monnaie unique, alors ils perdront l’initiative de la
politique monétaire et le droit d’émission de la monnaie nationale.
Quoique l’entrée dans la zone euro de PECO suppose de remplir les critères de
convergence, ils ne sont pas de la même nature et donc, ne peuvent pas être, à mon avis, aux
mêmes niveaux. La convergence des taux d’inflation apparaît comme la condition essentielle de
la stabilité, donc les taux de change et les taux d’intérêt sont plutôt d’éléments de vérification
de cette stabilité que des vrais critères de convergence. Les critères budgétaires sont aussi très
importants parce qu’il faudra éviter des financements inflationnistes des déficits publics et les
effets négatives des déficits excessifs de certains pays PECO sur le fonctionnement du marché
financier européen et sur les financements des autres membres de l’UE.
Tab. No 1 Croissance et taux de chômage dans les pays PECO
Croissance du PIB
Surplus de croissance
Moyenne annuelle, en %
requis (1)
1996-2000 2001-2005 2006-2007
EU-12
2,7
1,4
Peco-8
4,2
3,8
2,4
Pologne
5,4
3,0
5,8
6,1
2,9
Hongrie
4,0
4,0
3,9
2,2
Rép.Tchèque 1,5
3,6
6,1
1,4
Slovaquie
3,7
4,9
8,3
2,6
Slovénie
4,4
3,4
5,2
1,2
Estonie
5,6
7,6
6,2
11,9
2,6
Lettonie
5,4
8,1
8,5
11,4
3,0
Lituanie
4,2
7,6
6,7
7,5
2,9
Bulgarie
Roumanie
6,0
5,5
7,7
6,1
PIB relatif Part de
par tête l’emploi
100
52,9
46,7
58,3
69,1
51,1
76,3
52,4
44,1
48,1
Taux de
chômage
Agricole en %
4,5
8,4
12,0
12,0
14,7
16,2
5,1
7,7
4,2
7,7
13,9
15,5
10,5
6,3
5,7
7,0
12,7
8,4
15,8
7,1
8,0
6,0
Note : Eurostat. 1-pour rattraper le PIB par tête d’habitant de l’actuelle zone euro en 25 ans
Dans le tableau 1 nous voyons que les pays PECO ont une croissance vigoureuse
depuis la moitié des années 1990 : 4,2% par an de 1996 à 2000 ; 3,8% de 2001 à 2005, soit
2,4% points de plus que la zone euro. En 2005 le produit intérieur brut (PIB) en PPA attendait
le niveau de 52,9% face au niveau de la zone euro (voire 41,1% en 1995), 44,1 pour la Lettonie,
Pologne-46,7, Lituanie- 48,1, Slovaquie-51,1, Estonie – 52,4 Hongrie -58,3, jusque 69,1 pour la
République Tchèque, et Slovenie-76,3. On a calculé qu’à ce rythme de croissance économique
dans les pays PECO, un rattrapage du PIB par tête de la zone euro est envisageable en vingtcinq ans, sauf peut-être pour la Pologne, la Romaine et la Bulgarie (1). Mais la Pologne, la
Lettonie, la Lituanie, la Bulgarie et la Romaine avaient le taux de croissance le plus élevé en
2006. La croissance en Pologne arrivait à un niveau annuel de 5,8% de plus en 2006 par rapport
aux prévisions des analystes, en Romaine 5,5%, en Bulgarie 6%. De plus, la croissance en 2007
pourrait être encore plus rapide : d’après la nouvelle prévision de la Banque Mondiale elle
devrait atteindre 11,9% en Lettonie, 11,4% en Estonie, 8,3% en Slovaquie, 7,7% en Romaine,
7,5% en Lituanie, 6,1% en Pologne, Bulgarie et Rép. Tchèque, 3,9% en Hongrie. Au premier
trimestre la production industrielle en Pologne a augmenté plus que 7%. D’après l’évaluation du
ministre des Finances de Pologne, le PIB devrait augmenter en 2008 plus de 5%. Il faut
toutefois noter une forte reprise de l’investissement en Pologne, qui a augmenté de 16,7% en
71
2006 en avoisinant 20% du PIB seulement fin 2006. Cette augmentation d’investissement peut
également pérenniser la croissance. Deux pays : Pologne et Slovaquie connaissent des taux de
chômage élevés par rapport aux autres pays PECO et aussi les 15 pays membres de l’UE. Mais
le taux de chômage en Pologne diminue constamment : au début de notre adhésion à l’UE il
atteignait presque 20% mais en 2007 il a baissé à 14,7% et d’après la prédiction de la Banque
Nationale Polonaise, dans ce rythme de croissance économique, notre taux de chômage pourrait
être inférieur à 10% pendant trois ans. La Pologne, la Lituanie, la Lettonie, la Romaine et la
Bulgarie ont encore un nombre important d’agriculteurs : trois ou quatre de plus que le nombre
moyen pour toute l’UE (4,5%).
Tableau 2. Inflation et taux d’intérêt
En juillet 2006
Inflation
Taux court
Taux long
UE-12
2,4
3,1
4,1
Pologne
1,4
4,2
5,6
Hongrie
3,2
6,9
7,6
Rép. Tchèque
2,4
2,3
4,0
Slovaquie
5,0
4,9
5,4
Slovénie
1,9
3,3
3,9
Estonie
4,5
3,2
4,2
Lettonie
6,9
4,4
4,3
Lituanie
4,4
3,1
4,3
Bulgarie
3,7
Roumanie
7,0
Critère d’entrée
3,05
6,55
Source : ICEP Européen Centre, IMF, EIU
Nous voyons dans le tableau 2 qu’en juillet 2006 seulement trois pays de PECO
avaient un taux d’inflation au-dessous du critère d’entrée, 3,05 % (La Pologne, la Slovénie et la
République Tchèque ) mais 7 pays avaient un taux d’inflation supérieur au critère d’entrée
(Slovaquie, Estonie, Lettonie, Lituanie, Hongrie, Romane, Bulgarie). Le niveau des prix en
Pologne est actuellement de 53% Nous voyons dans le tableau 2 qu’en juillet 2006 seulement
trois pays de PECO avaient un taux d’inflation au-dessous du critère d’entrée, 3,05 % (La
Pologne, la Slovénie et la République Tchèque ) mais 7 pays avaient un taux d’inflation
supérieur au critère d’entrée (Slovaquie, Estonie, Lettonie, Lituanie, Hongrie, Romane,
Bulgarie). Le niveau des prix en Pologne est actuellement supérieur avec 53% vis-à-vis de celui
de la zone euro. Selon l’effet Balassa - Samuelson, l’entrée dans l’UE d’un pays avec un niveau
des prix d’autant plus baissé que le pays est moins développé va égaliser les prix des produits
échangeables et va induire les prix pour les biens non échangeables, par exemple les salaires.
En effet, les prix augmentent plus rapidement dans les pays qui ont adhéré à la zone Euro et qui
gardent le taux de change flexible parce que cette hausse peut être absorbée par l’appréciation
de la valeur de la monnaie nationale. On a estimé que l’entrée des pays PECO dans la zone
Euro en 2006 induira une hausse de 0,2% de l’inflation de la zone (2). On a estimé que l’entrée
des pays PECO dans la zone Euro en 2006 induira une hausse de 0,2% de l’inflation de la zone
(2).
En juillet 2006 tous les pays, sauf la Hongrie, qualifiée au critère de taux d’intérêt à
long terme de 6,55% des pays de la zone euro, après l’entrée dans la zone euro auront les
mêmes taux nominaux que les membres actuels. Alors, on peut reproduire l’exemple espagnol
où le taux d’intérêt a diminué à une moitié après l’adhésion à la zone Euro, influençant un boum
du crédit, en particulier pour l’immobilier.
72
Tableau 3. Dettes et soldes publics
En% du PIB
Solde public Dette publique Solde structurel FBCF publique Transferts nets
L’UE (1)
UE-12
2,4
70,5
1,0
2,5
Pologne
-3,7
45,5
-0,8
4,0
0,5-0,8
Hongrie
-6,7
59,9
-2,9
2,7
0,1-1,6
Rép.Tchèque
-3,2
31,5
-2,2
6,5
0,1-2,6
Slovaquie
-2,7
34,3
-0,7
1,9
0,3-2,0
Slovénie
-1,9
47,6
-0,3
3,4
0,0 -1,3
Estonie
1,4
3,6
1,3
4,0
1,0 -0,7
Lettonie
-1,0
11,3
-0,6
2,7
1,8-0,3
Lituanie
-0,6
18,9
-0,3
3,5
1,6-0,4
Bulgarie
0,5
Romania
- 1,0
Critère
D’entrée
-, 3,0
60
----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------1. impact budgétaire de l’accession. Sources : Commission européenne, Euroframe-en
2006
En 2004 dix Etats membres de l’UE enregistraient des déficits de plus de 3% du PIB.
Dans le cadre du progrès économique des pays de l’UE en 2006 – la croissance du PIB a atteint
3%, contre 1,7% en 2005, les efforts d’assainissement budgétaire accomplis et le déficit public
de tous les pays de l’UE est retombé de 2,4% du PIB en 2006 à 1,7% en 2006. Mais cette
réduction s’est passée dans les 15 pays UE, les pays de Baltes et Bulgarie, Roumanie et
Slovénie. Nous voyons dans le tableau 3 que la plupart de pays PECO ont une dette publique et
un déficit public relativement limités. La Hongrie dépasse sérieusement le limite de 3,0 et le
déficit budgétaire arrive a 6,7% par rapport au PIB. Dans le cas tchèque, le déficit budgétaire
atteint une limite de 3,2% ; ceci se justifie par un effort important d’investissements publics. On
évalue qu’en 2006 le déficit public de la Pologne était 3,7% (l’exécutif européen estimait pour
la Pologne un déficit de 4%), et on prévoit que cette année il aura 3,4% du PIB, étant donné les
bonnes performances de l’économie polonaise, pour descendre à 3,1% en 2008 et à 2,9% en
2009. Le 28 Novembre 2007 les ministères européens des Finances réunis à Bruxelles ont
estimé que la Pologne n’a pas pris les mesures suffisantes pour réduire son déficit public sous
3% du PIB, afin de se conformer au Pacte de stabilité et de croissance. La reforme du Pacte a
introduit des dispositions en établissant que les Etats membres devraient opérer un ajustement
structurel annuel de 0,5% du PIB au minimum. La Pologne est sous le coup d’une procédure de
déficit excessif depuis 2004. Elle s’était engagée à réduire son déficit public mais d’ici fin 2007
le déficit sera plus que le plafond de 3% du PIB. La participation de l’Etat dans l’économie
polonaise est évaluée à 25% du PIB, trois fois plus que la moyenne dans les pays de l’ancienne
UE des 15. En effet, la Commission formule une recommandation modifiée, fixant pour
Pologne une nouvelle date pour respecter le pacte. N’étant pas membre de la zone euro, la
Pologne ne risque toutefois pas de sanctions financières pour non-respect du pacte, sauf
quelques éventuelles menaces sur l’attribution d’une partie de fonds de cohésion. Certains pays
de PECO : Pologne, Hongrie, Slovaquie, Slovénie ont entrepris des reformes de leur systèmes
de retraite remplaçant en partie de systèmes de pension par répartition. Il en résulte une hausse
du déficit budgétaire parce que à partir de 2007 Eurostat n’accepte plus que les fonds de
pension restent dans le secteur public et leur excèdent venait en déduction du déficit public.
Cette reforme va augmenter de 1 à 2 points de PIB le déficit public des pays PECO ce que sera
particulièrement difficile pour la Hongrie, la Pologne et la Slovaquie.
L’organisation de l’Euro 2012 en football sera confiée au tandem Pologne- Ukraine.
Pour organiser cet événement sportif, la Pologne sera obligé de réaliser non seulement la
construction de l’infrastructure sportive, notamment de nouveaux stades ultramodernes, mais
73
aussi la mise aux niveaux des infrastructures routières, aéroport, chemin de fer, etc. que le
économistes évaluent à 50 milliards d’euros pour la Pologne ( 3 ). Ces nouvelles dépenses
budgétaires pourront ralentir le rythme des réductions des déficits publics en Pologne afin de
satisfaire les critères de Maastricht.
Tableau 4
Régime de change, soldes extérieurs et taux d’épargne
Régime de change évolution de change (1) Solde extérieur (2) taux d’épargne
Pologne
Flottant
3,0/ 3,3
-1,5 (21,)
17,5
Hongrie Flottant avec bande -6,9/ 14,0
-7,3 (4,8)
15,2
Rép.Tchèque Flottant gère
26,2/30,2
-2,0 (8,3)
24,1
Slovaquie MCE2-nov.2005
13,2/27,0
-8,6 (4,1)
23,3
Slovénie MCE –juin2004
-13,8’1,1
-1,1(0,2)
25,1
Estonie
MCE –juin 2004
0,0/13,7
-11,0 (18,2)
25,2
Lettonie MCE-juin 2005
-19,6/-2,7
-12,4 (3,2)
21,2
Lituanie MCE-juin 2004
7,0/7,0
-6,9(2, &)
18,8
1. par rapport a l’euro : nominal/réel (base sur les prix du PIB)
2. en % du PIB, (IDE – investissement direct étranger)
Source : Commission européenne, FMI
Avant d’entrer dans la zone euro, les pays PECO doivent adhérer au
mécanisme de change européen 2 (MCE2) et doivent rester proche d’une valeur pivot pendant
au moins deux années sans dévaluer et sans tension. Durant ces deux années les pays doivent
pratiquer une politique budgétaire restrictive. Trois pays : Slovénie, Estonie, Lituanie qui ont
adhéré en juin 2004 ont maintenu un change fixe. La Lettonie a dévalué de 7% sa monnaie
avant d’entrer, puis est restée en change fixe et la monnaie slovaque reste fluctuante. La
Pologne, la Lituanie et la Lettonie ont plutôt maintenu un taux de change stable. Le taux de
change stable leur assure des gains de compétitivité sur le marché international. Au contraire, la
Hongrie, la République Tchèque et la Slovaquie ont laissé leur taux de change réel s’apprécier
pour réduire leur taux d’inflation. Entrer au mécanisme de change européen 2 après une
appréciation du taux de change de monnaie, les pays PECO courent le risque de compétitivité
dégradée. D’autre côté, dévaluer la monnaie avant d’entrer dans le système fait donc courir le
risque de manquer l’objectif d’inflation.
Pendent la période de transition de l’introduction des billets et des pièces en euro les
prix de nombreux produits ou services devront être libellés à la fois en euros et en monnaie
nationale. Les opérateurs qui affichent ce label s’engagent à utiliser le taux officiel de
conversion et à respecter les règles légales d’arrondi. Les taux de conversation d’une monnaie
nationale en euros sont exprimés en six chiffres significatifs.
Lorsque un ou plusieurs Etats deviennent membres de l’Union européenne et que leurs
banques centrales nationales entrent dans le SEBC, le capital souscrit de la BCE ainsi que le
plafond des avoirs de réserves de change pouvant être transférés à la BCE sont
automatiquement augmentés. Le montant de l’augmentation est obtenu par la multiplication des
montants respectifs alors en vigueur par le ratio, dans le cadre de la clé de répartition des
souscriptions au capital élargi, toute la pondération des banques centrales nationales entrantes
concernées et la pondération des banques centrales nationales qui sont déjà membres du SEBC
(article 17 de l’Acte relative aux conditions d’adhésion à l’Union européenne de la République
Tchèque, de la République d’Estonie, de la République de Chypre, de la République de
Lettonie, de la République de Lituanie, de la République de Hongrie, de la République de
Malte, de la République de Pologne, de la République de Slovénie et de la République Slovaque
et aux adaptations des traités sur lesquels est fondée l’Union Européenne). Selon la théorie de la
zone monétaire optimale élaborée par Robert Mundel, une Union monétaire n’était pas
concevable qu’entre des pays économiquement proches. Union monétaire et économique
74
suppose que les pays membres aient à peu près le même cycle économique et les mêmes
besoins en termes de taux de change et de taux d’intérêt. Dans une zone monétaire optimale ce
sont les mouvements de prix et de salaires ou encore ceux de la main-d’œuvre ou de capitaux
qui permettent d’ajuster les différentiels de compétitivité ou de productivité. Tout choc
asymétrique des pays membres de l’Union peut être donc absorbé sans recourir à des
modifications de taux de change. On peut posé la question si les pays de PECO ont les mêmes
structures économiques et le même cycle conjoncturel que les pays qui étaient entrés avant dans
Union monétaire. On a dit que pour le moment les pays PECO ont structurellement besoin d’un
taux d’intérêt plus élevé pour freiner la surchauffe et leur taux de change variable pour contrôler
l’inflation et garder leur compétitivité.
La Slovénie, comme premier pays PECO passé à l’euro le 1er janvier 2007, la Banque
Nationale de Slovénie a arrangée un scénario de « big-bang » dans lequel la période de double
circulation de monnaie nationale et euro était portée à 14 jours. Chypre et Malte espèrent passer
à l’euro le 1er janvier 2008. La Lituanie prévoyait d’adopter l’euro le 1er janvier 2007, mais le
rapport de convergence établi par la Commission conclut cependant que le pays ne remplissait
pas à cette heure les conditions nécessaires au passage à l’euro à cause de la haute inflation.
Selon le plan initiale de l’Estonie, le 1er janvier 2007 était également la date visée pour le
passage à l’euro, mais l’Estonie ne s’était pas conformer à temps aux critères de convergence et
son gouvernement a donc décidé de repousser sa date cible au 1er janvier 2008. La Slovaquie
vise un passage à l’euro au 1er janvier 2009, la République Tchèque et la Hongrie au 1er janvier
2010. Les préparatifs en République Tchèque et Hongrie sont encore dans un stade
préliminaire. La Lettonie partageait à l’origine la date cible, 2008, mais les autorités lettons ont
récemment annoncé de repousser cette date. La Pologne n’a pas encore annoncé de date- cible
(tableau No 5).
Tableau 5 La date d’adoption de l’euro par le pays PECO
Date cible
1er janvier 2007
1er janvier 2008
1er janvier 2009
1er janvier 2010
A redéfinir
Etats membres
Slovénie
Malta, Chypre, Estonie
Slovaquie
République Tchèque, Hongrie
Lettonie, Lituanie, Pologne
La Slovénie a introduit l’euro sans aucun problème. L’acceptation de l’euro comme la
monnaie nationale a donné une novelle impulsion pour le développement économique : en 2007
la croissance du PIN va être de 7% et on prévoie que dans sept années, dans ce rythme de
croissance, la Slovénie atteindra le niveau moyen de développement de l’UE 27. Selon
l’enquête « Eurobaromètre », en 2006, la population slovène était parmi les plus enthousiastes
vis- à- vis du passage a l’euro des pays PECO : 64% ont été personnellement heureux que
l’euro remplace leur monnaie nationale contre 48% dans les nouveaux Etats membres (4). Le
schéma directeur de la Slovénie pour le passage à l’euro a été approuvé par la Banque Centrale
deux ans avant, en janvier 2005. Une fois le taux de conversation fixé, le double affichage des
prix devrait commencer afin que les consommateurs se familiarisent avec la nouvelle monnaie.
Il conviendrait également de maintenir le double affichage pendant une période de six à douze
mois après la date du passage à l’euro. Depuis le 1er mars 2006 il est obligatoire le double
affichage du prix des marchandises et des services en euros et monnaie local, les tolars. La
régulation slovène prévoit un grand nombre de dérogations à l’obligation du double affichage,
par exemple pour les stations d’essence, les petites entreprises, les exploitants agricoles. Parce
que la Slovénie ne possède pas de monnaie, les pièces étant fabriquées à l’étranger, la monnaie
de Finlande a été choisie pour fournir les euros. Cela afin d’éviter un afflux de numéraire
75
national juste avant le jour du passage à l’euro, la date de paiements des pensions étant avancée
du 29 décembre au 22 décembre 2006.
La crainte d’augmentation des prix ou d’abus constitue une des raisons principales du
manque d’enthousiasme envers le passage à l’euro dans pays PECO. Même si les données
statistiques indiquent clairement que l’impact sur les prix a été marginal dans les pays de 12
(l’impact total estimé selon Eurostat dans une gamme de 0,09 a 0,28 (5)), on observe une fosse
entre la perception de la société des pays PECO et la réalité. L’expérience des pays du premier
vague indique que la conclusion d’accords formels entre les détaillants et les consommateurs
sur le respect de la stabilité des prix au cours du passage à l’euro (sous forme de codes de
conduite) est le plus effective à cet égard. Afin d’éviter d’utiliser le passage à l’euro comme un
prétexte à des hausses des prix excessives, l’Association des consommateurs de Slovénie
surveille l’évolution des prix dans le commerce en détail et elle publie dans les médias les noms
des détaillants qui ont augmenté les prix de manière excessive au cours de la période de
transition. De plus, la Lettonie planifie actuellement une campagne en faveur des pratiques
commerciales loyales, les entreprises lituaniennes seront encouragées à adopter le code de
bonne pratique commerciale, un code éthique volontaire, code qui est aussi en préparation en
Slovaquie.
Pologne, jusqu’ à présent, s’est abstenu de fixer une date pour le passage à l’euro. Si
on prend en considération l’excessif déficit budgétaire, Pologne a encore besoin de plusieurs
années pour être en mesure de respecter le critère de convergence : 3% par rapport au PIB. Mais
ce manque de date cible implique des incertitudes. La fixation d’une date cible crédible en
Pologne peut être un instrument très important pour promouvoir le processus de convergence,
développer un nouveau système financier ou comptable, préparer progressivement opérateurs
publics et privés pour le nouveau système monétaire.
Pour le passage à l’euro, il est nécessaire d’élaborer un système propre d’information.
La Commission soutient diverses activités développées dans ces métiers par les autorités
nationales (conférences, Expositions, programmes de jumelage). L’Estonie, la Lituanie et la
Slovénie ont adopté leurs stratégies de communication sur l’euro en 2005. Ils ont signé des
accords de partenariats avec la Commission le 8 novembre 2005. Leurs compagnes de
communications ont démarré des activités comme : sites internent consacrés à l’euro, des
publications, des messages visuels, etc. Chypre et Malte ont conclu un partenariat avec la
Commission le 5 mai 2006. La Lettonie et la Slovaquie ont élaborés un premier projet de
stratégie de communication mais la Pologne, la République Tchèque et la Hongrie n’ont encore
planifié aucune activité ni d’information ni communication. (6).
Les effets bénéfiques à attendre de la mise en place de l’Euro dans les pays PECO sont
à peu près unanimement reconnus par les spécialistes. De manière générale, nous pourrions
affirmer que l’élimination des frontières monétaires en Europe apportera plus d’avantages que
d’inconvénients pour l’ensemble des pays de PECO qui ont décidé de participer à la zone Euro.
La répartition de ces bénéfices dépend de la manière dont on différentie les pays et dont leurs
agents économiques s’adapteront à la nouvelle situation. Mais les politiques de désinflation et
d’assainissement des finances publiques peuvent provoquer pendant quelques années une faible
croissance. On espère cependant que, par la suite, les effets bénéfiques d’une monnaie uniques
permettront un relancement durable de l’économie. Il s’agit donc d’accepter moins de
croissance et d’emploi aujourd’hui pour en avoir davantage demain. Si on prend en
considération les expériences des 12 pays membres de la zone Euro, nous pouvons établir les
avantages suivants pour les pays PECO pour avoir participer à l’UEM :
Diminutions des coûts de transaction entre les 13 pays de la zone Euro et les nouveaux états
membres. La suppression des taux de change a deux effets : d’une part, éliminer les vrais
coûts des transaction – entre 0,3% et 0,4% du PIB dépensé en commissions par les
entreprises et les particuliers de l’UE des 12 et d’autre part la disparition de la rente des
banques.
Réductions du degré d’incertitude lié au taux de change des monnaies de chacun des pays
PECO. Cela devrait améliorer la qualité de l’information donnée aux consommateurs
76
comme aux entreprises. Euro garantira une plus grande sécurité du commerce et des
circulations de capitaux entre les nouveaux pays membres et les 15 membres de l’UE sur le
Marché Unique. Les effets de la monnaie unique se remarqueront plus chez les entreprises
des pays PECO développant une activité à l’international, en particulier les corporations
multinationales. Le passage à l’euro apportera à ces entreprises non seulement une réduction
des coûts de transaction dans les options commerciales et financières mais aussi une
diminution de l’incertitude dans la planification stratégique. La réduction du risque du taux
de change sera hautement bénéfique aussi aux Petites et Moyennes Entreprises de PECO qui
pourront multiplieur les ventes de produits et de services aux clients de l’étranger.
Meilleure transparence des prix entre les 13 états membres de la zone Euro et les nouveaux
états membres. Fixation des prix par le business en fonction du niveau de prix aux pays
partenaires. Avec la disparition des fluctuations des devises de prix en pays PECO mèneront
à leur convergence à la zone Euro. Lorsque tous les prix des biens des pays PECO seront
marqués en Euros, cela entraînera une augmentation de la concurrence sur le marché unique.
Les filiales des multinationales fonctionnant à l’intérieur du PECO devront faire face au
nivellement international avec l’Euro et l’augmentation de la concurrence. Le comparaison
des prix des produits et services entre 13 états membres de la zone Euro et les PECO
provoquera une augmentation de la concurrence et à long terme la pression des
consommateurs pour des prix toujours plus bas.
Introduction de l’Euro par les pays PECO équilibrera mieux leurs finances publiques. Les
pays PECO gagneront grâce à l’Euro une plus grande stabilité macro-économique par
l’harmonisation de la politique monétaire et des taux d’intérêt. La réduction des déficits
budgétaires se traduira par une moindre demande de financement sur le marché financier
européen et donc à la baisse des taux d’intérêt. La baisse des taux d’intérêt exercerait
plusieurs effets favorables dans les économies des pays PECO : une relance de la
consommation via les effets de richesse et surtout de l’investissement.
Stabilité des prix des pays PECO. Les contrats conclus dans un environnement de stabilité
des prix et sans risque de change de cours de la monnaie nationale seront moins coûteux
pour les business des pays PECO grâce à une plus grande stabilité due à la monnaie unique.
Si la BCE contrôle l’inflation, l’UEM améliorera l’efficacité économique du marché des
pays PECO qui participeront dans la zone Euro.
La monnaie des pays PECO sera une monnaie internationale de réserve. Euro représentait
19,7% des réserves officielles des banques centrales en 2003, contre 63,8% pour le dollar,
c’est-à-dire une part légèrement supérieure à celle occupée par les monnaies nationales.
D’ailleurs, 24,8% des exportations mondiales sont facturées en euro, contre 52% en dollar,
car la devise américaine demeure la monnaie de facturation du pétrole et de la plupart de
matières premières ainsi que des industries aéronautique, électronique et informatique ( 7 ).
Alors, on peut attendre la disparition des pressions spéculatives face aux autres monnaies
dues à l’importance de l’Euro qui va se substituer à plusieurs monnaies des pays PECO.
Grâce à l’Euro, la création d’un marché financier élargi permet aux entreprises d’accéder à
des capitaux plus abandons dans les pays de 15 et à la baisse des taux d’intérêt moins
coûteux.
En somme, l’analyse standard tend à montrer que l’adoption de l’euro permettrait à la
Pologne de gagner un point de pourcentage de croissance par un an sur 20 ans et 2 points pour
les autres pays plus petits du PECO (8). Ce supplément de croissance résulterait
principalement : d’une intensification des échanges commerciaux avec l’UE-15 et d’une plus
forte concurrence ; la suppression du risque de change et la réduction des coûts de transaction ;
une nouvelle impulsion à l’entrée d’investissements directs étrangers ; se financer plus
facilement sans des agents économiques, autant publics que privés et à un moindre coût sur les
marchés européennes.
D’autre côté, on dit que les critères de convergence nominale sont inappropriés à des
pays en transition. Compte tenu des déséquilibres spécifiques que pressentaient les économies
des nouveaux états membres de l’UE, les critères de convergence envisagés pour les membres
77
de l’UE – 15 ne semblent pas, de toute façon, les plus adaptés pour pays de PECO. Alors, les
économistes posent une question : faut-il imposer aux entrants des PECO les règles que les
membres actuels de l’Union Economique et Monétaire ne vérifient pas toujours ? (9). La
tentation est forte pour les pays de l’Europe centrale et orientale de hâter le processus afin de
profiter des effets bénéfiques promis par la théorie économique de la zone monétaire optimale.
Néanmoins, l’entrée à Union Monétaire a été refusée en 2006 dans le cas de la Lituanie, qui
dépassait un peu la limite d’inflation, le mois de l’examen. La Commission Européenne se
méfiait des risques d’instabilité économique et financière de Lituanie qui avait de forts déficits
extérieurs et une forte croissance du crédit
On peut attendre les inconvénients suivants pour les pays de PECO, liés à l’adhésion à
l’UEM et à la liquidation de frontière monétaire :
- Impossibilité de réaliser les politiques monétaires aux niveaux nationaux. Aucun état de
PECO, après son adhésion à la zone Euro ne pourra pas changer de manière individuelle les
taux de change pour répondre aux crises économiques temporaires ni modifier de manière
unilatérale des taux d’intérêt nationaux.
- obligation de limiter de manière substantielle au niveau national de PECO l’utilisation des
politiques fiscales expansives.
- probabilité d’existence de problèmes de chômage dans certaines régions de PECO qui seront
difficiles à combattre étant donnée la perte de souveraineté en matière de politique
monétaire. Il sera donc nécessaire d’opérer un transfert de richesses des 15 états membres
les plus riches de l’UE vers les zones les moins favorisées de nouveaux états membres afin
d’atteindre l’objectif de convergence sur l’entier Grand Marché Intérieur.
4. Dans les pays PECO les mécanicismes de marché sont jeunes et ils fonctionnent
correctement pas plus que 10- 15 années. D’ailleurs, l’institutionnalisme montre que les
institutions jouent un rôle fondamental dans le bon fonctionnement de chaque économie pour la
réglementation des marchés, de stabilisation et légitimation des marchés etc. Les risques de
déstabilisation des marchés sont également plus importants pour les pays PECO en transition
que pour les pays développés de l’UE 15. La nécessité de garder une marge des manœuvres est
particulièrement cruciale en matière d’inflation et politique de restructuration économique. Il
semble aussi nécessaire que chaque pays PECO puisse continuer à disposer d’instruments de
réglage qui lui permettent de réduire la durée des phases descendantes des cycles. Une fois
l’euro adopté les pays se priveront d’un levier de politique économique bien plus nécessaire
pour les pays en transition que pour des pays de la zone Euro où les institutions sont plus
matures.
Bibliographie
1. C. Mathieu et Henri Sterdyniak, Les PECO sont-ils les bienvenus dans la zone euro ?
Problèmes économiques, mercredi 20 décembre 2006, bimensuel n 2913), p. 30-31.
2. Ibidem, p.31.
3. Les Echos Pologne no 73 mai 2007, s 12.
4. Communication de la Commission au Conseil, au Parlement Européen, au Comité
Economique et social Européen au Comite des Régions et la Banque Centrale Européenne.
Troisième rapport sur la préparation pratique en vue du futur élargissement de la zone euro,
SEC (2006) 785, Bruxelles, le 22.06.2006
5. Eurostat juin 2003, http://epp.eurostat.cec.eu.int/cache/ITY_Public/2-18062003-AP/EN/2)
6. Communication de la Commission au Conseil, au Parlement Européen, au Comite
Economique et Social Européen et au Comite des Régions et a la Banque Centrale
Européenne. (Op. cit ), page 11, 12.
7. André Gauthier, La construction européenne, Poitiers 2005, p.229
8. Schadler S et al., 2005, Adopting the Euro in Central Europe, IMF Occasional Paper, no 234
9. Les PECO sont-ils les bienvenus dans la zone euro ? Problèmes économiques, mercredi 20
décembre 2006, no 2913, p.30.
Cross-border co-operation in Europe: scientific research
„…most environmental problems have a cross-border impact…”
CZIMRE Klára
"The author of this paper is a grantee of the Bolyai János Scholarship."
Abstract: The paper highlights possible approaches which may transform the attitude
towards transboundary rivers and international river basins, pointing out that the scientific and
institutional approaches are intertwined and rely on each other. Consequently, both the
followed in the river basin principle since “rivers do not consider administrative borders”.
Keywords: cross-border co-operation, international river basin, transboundary rivers,
EU actions, transboundary environmental regimes
„A louse and a flea were brewing in an eggshell. The louse fell in and burnt herself. This made
the flea weep, which made the door creak, which made the broom sweep, which the cart run,
which made the ash-heap burn, which made the tree shake itself, which made the girl break her
water-pitcher which made the spring begin to flow. And in the spring’s water everything was
drowned.”
Introduction
State borders have a specific role in the management of the European Union.
Researchers, environmentalists, economists and politicians all attribute high importance to
them. Consequently all areas of life are affected. The paper focuses on four key points related to
cross-border flood management:
2. Evolution of scientific researches related to cross-border co-operations
3. EU actions for supporting and facilitating cross-border co-operations
4. Routine border problems related to environmental issues
5. Effectiveness of cross-border co-operations
Evolution of scientific researches related to cross-border co-operations
Role of borders and cross-border co-operations
The development of the interpretation of borders can be traced on many levels. The
two basic interpretations are offered by the studies related to the evolution of EU policy and the
widening of the scope of scientific researches. Nevertheless, the two are closely intertwined.
As far as the EU policy is concerned, the rise of euroregional co-operations started as a
consequence of the creation of the proper legal background and the realisation of the need of
financial supports for cross-border co-operations. These two moments contributed to the growth
of the tendency to establish more and more cross-border co-operation. The fifth enlargement of
the European Union also resulted in the increase of the number of euroregions since both the
number and length of the state borders within the EU grew.
The scientific researches opened up new issues to be addressed by the cross-border
policy of the European Union. However, the increasing number of legal and financial
instruments called for analysis on the scientific level. Therefore, the focus of cross-border
researches shifted from the ethnic issues and conflicts to the question of neighbourhood,
economic integration and today more and more researches concentrate on the regional
79
development and environmental issues faced by the numerous cross-border co-operations all
over Europe.
The author focuses on the geographic aspects of the above researches and therefore it
may be established that political geography, economic geography, cultural geography and
regional geography all have their own special focuses. Nevertheless, as far as the major issues
addressed by geographers focusing on cross-border co-operations are concerned, the keywords
always include efficiency, instruments, interconnection, openness, similarities and differences,
synergy, networks, co-operations, alliances and thus the protagonist of the cross-border issues is
represented by the Homo cont(r)actis.
EU
enlargement
legal background
financial support
first euroregions
EEC
WW2
1953
1960s
1980
1986
1990
2004
regional development
ethnic issues
environmental
neighbourhood
conflicts
issues
economic integration
closer co-operation
researchers
Figure 1. Development of cross-border approaches on the level of EU politics and scientific
researches
Milestones in the Hungarian cross-border researches
If one looks at the involvement of the Hungarian literature devoted to border and crossborder issues then two chief movements can be traced. The basic change of the scope of studies
is defined by the political and economic transformation taking place in the late eighties and
early nineties. Prior to that „borders have been handled as fetishes and as such have become
difficult to be crossed” and no scientific analysis was welcomed by the political sphere.
Afterwards there was a growing attention towards the opening of borders. What were the chief
signs of the latter? A growing attention and intensified research activities can be detected on all
levels in Hungary – including the various political and administration levels. The Regional
Research Institutes of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences (especially the ones in Pécs and
Debrecen) started to focus on cross-border issues. The universities and other research bodies
also addressed issues which were formerly not allowed and spread information related to border
regions. Numerous conferences, seminars and workshops were fully devoted to researches
dealing with the positive and negative impacts of borders and the overall effect of state borders.
The focus of border effect also shifted a great scale: while first it emphasised the backwardness
80
and peripheral nature related to borders, it soon started to look at the borders as peculiar
features creating peculiar situation and providing opportunity for relations.
Definitions of cross-border co-operations and euroregions
It is hard to grasp the meaning and mission of cross-border co-operations by only one
sentence. As these co-operations are very complex and flexible, therefore, it is more efficient to
look at some aspects that may lead us to a better understanding. The most obvious of these is
the analysis of the connecting and dividing factors contributing to the nature of the borders.
(Table 1) As suggested by many researchers, state borders have a dual character. On the one
hand they divide and on the other hand they connect. The balance of the two defines the nature
of the border and the intensity of cross-border co-operations.
Table 1. Borders: connecting and dividing factors
-
Connecting factors
geographical situation
climatic conditions
common history
common cultural roots
economic development
economic structure
trade relations
language competence
common goals and strategies
Dividing factors
differences in administrative systems and
tasks
different taxation systems
different legal methods
insufficient cross-border markets and supply
varying spatial planning and regional
development methods
non-harmonised environmental and waste
management regulations
different currencies
language problems
Source: Czimre, 2006
It is also important to look at the impacts of borders and cross-border co-operations on
the various levels (Table 2) which actually explains the significance of the involvement of all
levels.
Table 2. Impact of borders on the different levels of life
Level
Impact
civil
border regions get to know each other → better understanding
institutional
local governments and powers learn about each others’ practices → co-operate
economic
co-operations between SMEs → job creation
social-cultural provides opportunity for know-how and information exchange between regions
services
development of tourism (through the joint marketing activities and projects)
Source: Czimre, 2006
81
Taking the above into consideration, it suggests that there are four preconditions for
the success of cross-border co-operations: (1) the interests of the inhabitants must be fully
considered; (2) the representatives of the political life must be fully involved from all levels
(local, regional, national, EU); (3) institutions and organisations must participate from both
sides of the border in the joint work; (4) more and more cross-border organisations must be
created – self-supported – for the fulfilment of the growing number of tasks.
Taking into consideration the area of the European Union before the enlargement in
2004, one may establish that Germany has the highest number of neighbours (6), while Greece
has no common continental borders with any of the EU member states. Denmark, Finland,
Ireland, Great Britain, Portugal and Sweden only border one EU members. Nevertheless, if we
take the entire area of Europe – instead of the EU perspective – then the situation is completely
different. In this case the number of the EU members having common borders within the entire
Europe increases to eight and Greece has three neighbours on the continent. The first approach
is applied in cases when the European Union is referred to as a separate entity. This approach
allows us to say, for instance, that the European Union borders Switzerland or Russia.
Scrutinising the map of Europe, it may be also found that in some of the member states
of the EU15 the ratio of border regions exceeded 50% of the total area of the country
(Luxembourg, Austria, Belgium, Finland, Sweden, Portugal) and this ratio is above 15% except
for two countries (Denmark, Great Britain) which have short continental borders due to their
maritime geographic position. (Figure 2)
Source: Second Report on Economic and Social Cohesion, 2001
Figure 2. Border regions in Europe
Rivers versus borders
82
International river basins of Europe
The total number of international river basins on the area of the European Union is 39.
14 of these cross the external borders of the European Union, that is, 36% of them call for
special attention due to their border position and may get into the focus of cross-border cooperations across external EU borders. The Carpathian Basin is affected by the water issues
mostly by the largest international river basin in the European Union, that is, by the Danube
International River Basin. (Figure 3) As the river basins in most cases do not follow the state
borders defined by the individual countries and governments, therefore, they require joint action
initiated by cross-border co-operations. The management of the rivers and estuaries call for cooperation on various fields including navigation as well as flood protection and prevention.
Water authorities, self-governments and the various cross-border institutions situated on the
area of certain river basins need to have common goals and intention to facilitate and improve
the equipments and raise consciousness on the area of the international river basins
Source: Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database, 2000
Figure 3. International river basins of Europe
Transboundary rivers
There are 150 major transboundary rivers in Europe that either constitute or cross
borders between two or more countries, some 25 major transboundary lakes, and some 100
transboundary aquifers. Out of the 108 euroregions in Europe, rivers constitute state borders in
21 cases (almost one-fifth of all euroregions).
A further interesting fact concerning the above data is that one-third of these
euroregions are located in Central Europe. It is worth to take into account that the pattern of
state borders is rather varied all over Europe. In fact, as far as the area of the European Union is
concerned, there are 55 state borders representing a length of 23389 kilometres. Basically, we
can distinguish between EU internal borders and EU external borders. At present, both the
number and length of the internal borders are higher than those of the external borders. The
83
altogether 30 internal borders run along 12565 km constituting 54.5% and 53.7% respectively.
However, it was not always this way but has changed as the European Union reached its present
state with the current number of member states. In addition to the two basic European types of
borders there are other further specifications which highlight different types. (Figure 4) The
light grey bulbs represent the cross-border regions related to the new member states following
the fifth enlargement.
between
more
developed
regions:
between
less
developed
regions:
with non EU
member
Western
European
regions:
13
EU borders
Number:
55 – 100%
Length:
23389 km
between old
member
states and
new member
states:
22
other
10
between
regions of
new member
states:
along new
member
states:
13
Figure 4. Types of euroregions by borders
The major challenge for the flood management is that the integrated management of
transboundary river basins requires the integration of different administrative, legal, cultural,
institutional and economic traditions.
Attitudes and the evolution of the cross-border aspects in flood management
The interpretation of flood management in the transboundary areas developed throughout the
history of mankind. In the early stage, floods were interpreted as an Act of God characterised by
an attitude where the vagaries of nature were accepted and taken as natural phenomena.
Nevertheless, as the relationship between the people and nature changed and men
started to exploit nature, it also meant that men started to turn against nature. Consequently,
there were several attempts made to fight against the harmful effects of floods and various ways
were sought to defend the lands and prevent floods. This, of course, also meant that the
economic purposes got into foreground and floods became active elements in the economic life
replacing their former passive role.
84
The third stage is represented by the breakthrough of social interests where the
population is understood as an important factor and being responsible for the emergence and
management of floods. However, this stage is the result of the growing importance of economy
and the increasing demand for resources – including the water related energy, too. Therefore,
the already existing flood management became complemented by the so called flood risk
management and the communities and societies living in the river basins – and being the
intensively affected by the effects of floods – have become more and more involved and the so
called flood awareness substituted the initial ‘negligence’.
The above described three stages are the outcomes of changes related to the
development of education, economy, social security and the increasing number of international
co-operations.
As far as the current role of the cross-border aspects is concerned, a quick survey was
carried out about the presence of the issues related to cross-border flood management on the
internet. A statistics was made on some related keywords with the help of three search engines.
The three basic terms addressed were calamity management, flood prevention and flood
management as the three basic ways of measuring the presence of social responsibility in flood
issues. It showed that the cross-border aspect is not as widely applied yet as it could be expected
taking into consideration the area of international river basins and the number of transboundary
rivers. (Table 3)
Table 3. The occurrence of search items related to cross-border flood management on the
Internet (as of October 2005)
cross-border
transboundary
cross-border calamity
management
cross-border
flood prevention
cross-border
flood management
transboundary calamity
management
transboundary
flood prevention
transboundary
flood management
www.google.com
10 900 000
1 590 000
www.yahoo.com
26 800 000
1 260 000
search.msn.com
1 787 771
179 621
15 100
102 000
3 702
92 600
290 000
19 205
218 000
788 000
39 453
473
255
690
68 300
39 300
15 768
131 000
77 000
29 531
EU actions for supporting and facilitating cross-border co-operations
The European Union has been focusing on the cross-border effect from the early years
of its establishment. Nevertheless, the most spectacular development in this respect was seen in
the late eighties and early nineties when it strengthened its positions both in legal and financial
terms. Consequently, the Community actions were rendered an ever increasing role and today
they compose of a three-stage system including (1) funding (research, policy, agriculture), (2)
communications, directives and conclusions, and (3) research, education and exchange of
knowledge.
Funding
The system of funding related to cross-border co-operation and flood management is
centred around the Structural Funds with completions by various specific funds and policies.
85
(Figure 5) The programmes initiated by the cross-border institutions and water management
authorities may be implemented with the help of a wide-scale of resources. This is, of course,
due to the evolvement of flood consciousness. The various policy fields may be all affected
both by the positive and negative impacts of floods. Therefore, it is not surprising at all that
projects related to flood management may appear in topics ranging from agriculture,
reforestation, construction works, study trail management or even education. As the crossborder aspect follows the river basin principle, thus they may all appear in cross-border
programmes and projects, too.
The Interreg Programme enabled the emergence of such innovative projects as the
IRMA programme (Interreg IIC) or the FLAPP network (Interreg IIIA). The Living Tisza
Project initiated by the Carpathian Euroregion has also become a prospective Interreg
programme since the fifth enlargement enabled the affected regions to be eligible for funding.
EUSF
LIFE
2. water
management
+
innovative
measures
for flood
prevention
STRUCTURAL
FUNDS
for
emergency
operations
ERDF
Rural Development
Regulation
National rural development
*
programmes
Interreg IIC
IRMA programme
Programme for
combating floods in
France
↓
Interreg IIIA
New Cohesion Policy
2007-2013
“Environment and risk”
- New cross-border
funding
EU Neighbourhood Policy
* flood prevention and protection measures to be included in national rural development
programmes
Figure 5. Community actions – funding (research, policy, agriculture)
Communications, directives, conclusions
In 2000 the Water Framework Directive (WFD) was issued which contained several
elements with relevance to transboundary water courses. The fundamental message in this
respect is the river basin principle which says that “water management should be carried out on
a river basin scale” and “rivers and lakes will need to be managed by river basin boundaries, not
administrative borders”. These two segments clearly reflects and supports the acceptance of the
fact that rivers do not consider the administrative borders and leave their impacts without
respecting in which country they run. The cross-border aspect appears on three levels of cooperation, namely on the (1) river basin level, (2) coordination between sub-catchment areas,
and (3) coordination within a sub-catchment area.
Summing up the essence of the WFD, flooding mostly affects entire river basins and a
large number of river basins are international and thus Member States are practically forced to
86
cooperate and to use the opportunities offered by the WFD. Difficulties in this respect appear
due to differences in political, social and institutional structures (strong need for clarifying and
setting up rules for cooperation especially though not exclusively with respect to flooding),
different objectives and the lack of international relations, regulations and arising conflicts.
In 2003, a Best Practice Document on flood prevention, protection and mitigation
was published which provided information and assistance for raising flood awareness all over
Europe.
The Communication on flood risk management in 2004 included a proposal for a
concerted EU action programme (EU Commission – COM(2004)472 – Flood risk management;
Flood prevention, protection and mitigation). It calls for international co-operation in
transboundary rivers and sets guidelines for the development and implementation of flood risk
management plans and flood risk maps.
The AEBR Statement and Suggestions on the 6th EU Environment Action
Programme is an argument for the importance of special assistance for border and cross-border
regions and clarifies that border and cross-border regions are themselves natural partners of the
EU in environmental issues.
In addition to the above it is also important to mention that there are numerous
Environmental Council conclusions on floods and the Johannesburg Summit in 2002
emphasised the relevance of transboundary considerations in water management.
Research, education and exchange of knowledge
Looking at the period between 1986 and 2003, there were many issues of relevance to
flood management in the scientific researches. It may be observed that the number and scope
of the projects has increased in the past decade and characteristically research set mostly within
the context of a broader programme of science on understanding natural hazards and hydro
geological risks.
Another development in this respect is that the implementation of research project
knowledge into practice gained ground and the scientific researches and projects have become
more integrated and intertwined. The co-operation between the scientific and social levels is
also supported by the fact that involvement of university research teams within the national and
EC funded research programmes. The intensifying presence of the involvement of the European
Union in the scientific field can be also seen as the EC promotes Advanced Study Courses
(ASC) on a variety of topics with issues of flood management.
Knowledge and experience can be accessed through various organisations and
institutions within the European Union which either fully or partly focus on issues related to
cross-border water management, these include the International Association of Hydrological
Sciences (IAHS), the European Geophysical Society (EGS), the River Basin Modelling
(RIBAMOD), the Risk of Inundation Planning And Response Interactive User System
(RIPARIUS), the Mitigation of Climate Induced Hazards (MITCH), Achieving Technology
Innovation in Flood Forecasting (ACTIF).
The most comprehensive approach in this respect was outlined by the Budapest
Initiative on Strengthening international co-operation on sustainable flood management
(30November – 1 December 2002).
Routine border problems related to environmental issues
The assistance in the event of accidents and disasters face several deficiencies and
problems which may be either general or specific. The routine border problems in this respect
include the lack of formal regulations and the absence/lack of clarity about the coverage of
people and goods by insurance companies. The latter implies that cross-border assistance is not
secure in financial terms. The further barriers to assistance include such problems as the use of
technical communications equipment (radio) on neighbouring country’s communications
87
network is either not possible or not allowed and in many cases there are old-fashioned and
mainly manually operated hydrological and meteorological networks. These lead to interrupted
communication lines during flood situations. It may also happen that there is no existing
communication network between the flood alarm centres and the effectiveness of the existing
regional forecast systems is low.
The major obstacles to cross-border water management in the Tisza River Basin are
the following:
- no inter-ministerial (sector) co-ordination
- lack of information exchange
- lack of sufficient funds
- no clear boundaries between national and regional responsibilities
- lack of work plans with monitoring mechanism for implementing bi- and multilateral
agreements
- multitude of agreements, projects and actions require more coordination
- no harmony in bilateral agreements
- the role of the ICPDR is not recognised equally important in riparian countries
The above listed problems might vary not only by river basins but also by countries.
The key issues of the Tisza River Basin highlight common and specific problems which could
be overcome by international co-operation and an even more effective cross-border water
management. (Figure 6) This requires co-operation between the water authorities concerned as
well as coordination by cross-border institutions (e.g. Carpathian Euroregion, Danube-KrisMures-Tisza Euroregion).
flood management,
water supply,
ecology (biodiversity),
agricultural potential
flood management,
re-forestation in the
Carpathians,
reduction of
contamination,
job diversification
international
co-operation,
flood
management,
WFD,
good
agricultural
practice
RBM with ICPDR,
water supply,
water quality
improvement,
ecological
reconstruction
water supply,
water quality,
flood
management,
biodiversity,
Figure 6. Key issues per countries – case study: Tisza River Basin
88
Effectiveness for the evaluation of the performance of transboundary environmental
regimes
Cross-border co-operation regimes on the EU external border have a function of
ensuring security of the EU and of its member or accession states located on this border through
resolutions and the prevention of potential conflicts between bordering counties. As far as flood
management is concerned, this could be observed on two levels. In some cases, the institutional
efficiency may be stronger while in other cases the environmental effectiveness may be more
intensively felt. (Table 4)
Table 4. Institutional and environmental effectiveness of cross-border co-operations
Institutional
Environmental
- can be indicated, for example, in a - level of improvement in the quality of the natural
capacity of actors involved to ensure
environment through the actions of the regime
compliance in the water basin with the - for example, in terms of attaining a goal of
requirements of the EU WFD and to
ensuring good flood management or water
be able to resolve and prevent
quality
conflicts
- limited application along the external borders →
- can assist policy makers in developing
as the EU and the non-EU countries have very
robust and flexible institutional
different environmental quality standards and
arrangements
approaches to measuring and analysing
Generally speaking, it may be observed that in Europe – and thus in the European
transboundary river basins – the environmental effectiveness is more present within the
European Union and along the internal borders, while the institutional level is more
strengthened along the external borders of the European Union. (Figure 6)
ENVIRONMEN
TAL
INSTITUTION
AL
Figure 7. Effectiveness of transboundary environmental regimes
89
Conclusions
The paper highlighted the possible approaches which may transform the attitude
towards transboundary rivers and international river basins. These pointed out that the scientific
and institutional approaches are intertwined and rely on each other, therefore, both the
followed in the river basin principle since as it has been stated by many “rivers do not consider
administrative borders”.
References
CZIMRE, K. (2006) Cross-border Co-operation: Theory and Practice. Debreceni Egyetem
Kossuth Egyetemi Kiadó, Debrecen. 146p.
AEBR Statement and Suggestions on the 6th EU Environment Action Programme,
Best Practice Document on flood prevention, protection and mitigation, 2003
EU Commission – COM(2004)472 – Flood risk management; Flood prevention, protection and
mitigation, 2004
Second Report on Economic and Social Cohesion, 2001
Transboundary Freshwater Dispute Database, 2000
Water Framework Directive, 2000
Trafficking in Human Beings in South Eastern Europe
Mihaela GAVRILĂ
Abstract: The article is dealing with the spread of phenomenon of trafficking in human
beings in the South Eastern Europe. This modern form of slavery is a human rights issue as it
entails the violation of women’s dignity and integrity, their freedom of movement and, in some
cases, their right to life. As far as the individual is concerned, it affects the very foundations of
human rights: the equal dignity of all human beings. Although many countries are in the
process of reviewing their legislation in order to include trafficking in human beings in their
Criminal Codes, trafficking continues to be viewed in a different manner from the criminal
point of view, this having a negative effect on combating this phenomenon. In this respect,
further Cooperation between authorities in different countries is needed in investigation and
prosecution, in prevention as well as in victim/witness protection.
In its four sections, the
present article defines the issue of trafficking in human beings, presenting its forms, as well as
the international co-operation in this field.
Keywords: trafficking, globalization, phenomenon, transnational, co-operation
1. Trafficking in Human Beings - preliminary view
Generally speaking, the phenomenon of globalization1 has modified our lives. The
speed of communication between persons and the ease of movement across physical space of
people, goods, money and information have changed us forever. The ever widening world,
unconfined by national borders, has also facilitated criminal action: the dark side of
globalization is transnational organized crime2, which threatens to damage our societies.
As the criminal organization becomes more powerful, this radically alters, having a
divided structure. Nowadays, we are the witnesses of the proliferation of transnational criminal
organizations, capable of adapting not only to local changes and conditions in which they
operate, but also to global changes.
The fall of totalitarian systems in all the countries belonging to the former communist
bloc, the collapse of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia had an unquestionable impact on
dynamism and structure of the criminality. The negative outcome of the opening the borders
since 1989 has been profound crisis of poverty and disintegration of political and social
structures – in other words a hotbed for organized crime in all its sinister forms. Delinquents
1
Globalization” has been defined as “an evident loss of borders respect of everyday operations in different
dimensions of the economy, of information, ecology, technology, transcultural conflicts and civil
society… Money, technologies, goods, information, pollution go beyond borders, as though didn’t exist.
Even things, persons and ideas which Governments would like to keep out of their countries (drugs, illegal
immigrants, critics of the violation of human rights) find their way in…so globalization translates into a
killing of distance (cf. U. Beck, Che cos’e la globalizzazione. Rischi e prospettive della societa,
planetaria., Carocci, Roma, 1999, pag. 39)
2
An offence is transnational in nature, according to the definition of article 3, paragraph 2 of the UN
Convention Against Transnational Organized Crime, adopted in Palermo in 2000, if:
a. It is committed in more than one State;
b.It is committed in one State but a substantial part of its preparation, planning, direction and control
takes place in amother State;
c.It is committed in one state but involves an organized criminal group that engages in criminal activities
in more than one State; or
d. It is committed in one State but has substantial effects in another State.
91
use more and more often the political and economical changes from this region. The legislative
lacks and social instability had a great contribution to the increase of the criminal phenomenon.
Groups formerly active in specific routes or regions have expanded the geographical
scope of their activities to explore new markets. Some have merged or formed cooperative
relationships, expanding their geographical reach and range of criminal activities. Illegal
migrants and trafficking victims have become another commodity in a larger realm of criminal
commerce involving other commodities, such as narcotic drugs and firearms or weapons and
money laundering, in some cases even terrorism that generate illicit revenues or seek to reduce
risks for traffickers, sustaining corruption. According to the UN, trafficking in persons is the
third largest enterprises worldwide, after drug trafficking and trafficking in fire arms, generating
an estimated 95 billion USD in annual revenue3.
Over the past decade, trafficking in human beings has reached epidemic proportions.
No country is immune. Economic disparity, high unemployment and the disruption of
traditional livelihoods abroad have fueled the search for work. Traffickers face few risks and
can earn huge profits by taking advantage of large numbers of potential immigrants4 Every
year, millions of women, children, and men are trafficked world wide. Access to reliable data
on the number of trafficked person is not possible. All general assessments are hard to verify
and vary according to the context and source of information. Governments, international
agencies and NGOs provide different kind of data, which is often not comparable5
In particular there is little reliable information regarding trafficked children. Girls
under 18 working in the sex industry often pass as adults, especially when they do not have
documents or use false papers. Information about child trafficking for organs is even more
difficult to obtain – there is no evidence, no witnesses and no data that could positively confirm
its existence. Data on trafficking of children for begging and labour are sparse and information
on internal trafficking is almost completely absent.
There is almost no information about the traffickers themselves. The lack of legislation
in many countries, which would allow the perpetrators to be prosecuted directly for the crime of
trafficking, has led to a situation whereby even the most obvious cases of trafficking are not
prosecuted as such (Conso G, 2000:168)
Risks are further reduced by the extent to which victims are intimidated by traffickers,
both in destination countries, where they fear deportation or prosecution for offences such as
prostitution or illegal immigration, and in their countries of origin, where they are often
vulnerable to retaliation or re-victimization if they cooperate with criminal justice authorities.
The support and protection of victims is a critical element in the fight against trafficking to
increase their willingness to cooperate with authorities and as a necessary means of
rehabilitation.
2. Defining the Problem
There is little agreement in the international community as to how “trafficking” should
be defined. Historically, trafficking has been defined in terms of the trade in women and
children for prostitution or other “immoral purposes”.
While trafficking indisputably has a disproportionate impact on women and girls and
frequently entails trafficking for commercial sex purposes , trafficking is a much wider
phenomenon. Trade in people may include, for example, trafficking in migrants for sweatshop,
domestic, or agricultural labour (it may occur also at a national level), brokering forced or
fictitious marriages, etc. Men work illegally in the "three D-jobs" – dirty, difficult and
dangerous.
3
www.unhchr.ch/women/trafficking, last visited on 24 May 2004
www.aic.org.gov.an, last visited on 2 December 2004
5
Europol estimates that the industry is now worth several billion dollars a year
4
92
With the adoption of the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in
Persons, Especially Women and Children6, supplementing the UN Convention against
Transnational Organized Crime in November 2000 trafficking in persons7 was defined as the
recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat or
use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of
power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to
achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of
exploitation. Exploitation shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of
others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or services,
slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs (Rossi E. 2001:46)
The problems and political division surrounding the term ”trafficking” are not fully
resolved by this definition since it fails to define many of its constituent elements. For example,
the terms ”sexual exploitation” and “exploitation of the prostitution of others” are not defined.
This makes it virtually impossible to specify who has or has no been “trafficked” into the
commercial sex trade without becoming embroiled in the more general debate about the rights
and wrong of prostitution.
3. Forms of trafficking
3.1. Trafficking in Women and Girls for the Sex Industry
Trafficking in human beings is a crime in which victims are moved by the traffickers
from poor environments to more affluent ones, with the profits flowing in the opposite
direction, a pattern often repeated at the domestic, regional and global levels.
Generally, the countries from where the victims of this offence come have experienced
severe and social decline. Unemployment, inflation, income differentials and poverty have
increased. As a result of economic change, living conditions and access to services have all
deteriorated.
I
n many cases, trafficking patterns are also related to conflict situations as combatants
(or even peacekeepers) create a market for the services of victims and the effects of conflict
erode the capacity of law enforcement and other authorities to combat the problem. This was
the case of the countries of the former Yugoslavia.
The new situation has also a special impact on women. The reality of the post conflict
situation and economic transition have weakened the position of women in the labour market,
causing more women to be unemployed and the feminisation of poverty, which in turn has
resulted in increased migration, especially among younger women.
Another important factor which contributed to the growing number of young women
willing to take their chances for a better life in the West is the discrimination which also led to
lower wages because of the lack of skills and training. Their lack of influence in public/political
life and their exclusion from decision making processes are increasing trends.
6
T he Protocol was adopted by resolution A/RES/55/25 of 15 November 2000 at the fifty-fifth session of
the General Assembly of the United Nations. In accordance with its article 16, the Protocol will be open
for signature by all States and by regional economic integration organizations, provided that at least one
Member State of such organization has signed the Protocol, from 12 to 15 December 2000 at thePalazzi di
Giustizia in Palermo, Italy, and thereafter at United Nations Headquarters in New York until 12 December
2002.
7
The Convention was adopted by resolution A/RES/%%/”% of 15 November 2000 at the fifty-fifth
session of the general Assembly of the United Nations. In accordance with its 36, the Convention will be
open for signature by all states and by regional economic integration organizations, provided that at least
one Member state of such organization has signed the Convention, from 12 to 15 december 2000 at the
Palazzi di Giustizia in Palermo, Italy, and thereafter at the United Natinos headquartersin New York until
12 December 2002.
93
Another cause is represented by the changing of family life with more single mothers
taking responsibility for their children. More women are becoming the only breadwinner in
families where the men have become unemployed and are not able to find a job as a result of
the process of transition.
Trafficking of women and girls for the sex industry is a significant part of trafficking
in human beings. In the Balkans, due to the difficult economic situation and lack of
employment, the sex industry is the only known area of work for women and adolescent girls
trafficked from other countries.
Women who work in the sex industry in their home country are much more vulnerable
to being trafficked. Some of the women working as prostitutes decide voluntarily to migrate and
work abroad but the majority are trafficked. At the internal level, prostitution is located in big
cities, in coastal resorts during the summer and in border areas. Women working in the sex
industry in these areas come the poorest parts of their countries, thus providing a constant
supply of cheap labour. They are controlled by an organized system, which move them from
place to place, sell, and kidnap them. In the process, some are trafficked abroad.
Poorly functioning legal and law enforcement systems in the majority of the
destination countries makes trafficking less risky for the perpetrators. This low risk and high
profit are combined with a large demand for sexual services in the destination countries (OIM,
2001)
Many young women recruited from regions were socio-economic conditions are
difficult know they will be working in this industry, but they are deceived about the conditions
of their work. Some agree to work in “milder” forms of sex work, such as “peep shows” or
club, but later are forced into prostitution. Others agree to work abroad as prostitutes or escorts,
expecting to earn money quickly and then return home after a short period of time. Instead, they
are sold on the marketplace to brothels and then trapped in abusive situations.
Some of the victims are innocent, due to their lack and education. In a typical situation,
the young woman responds to an advertisement or is recruited informally by an agent (often an
acquaintance or even a relative, institutions such as orphanages) offering a good job in another
country or region. Typically, the jobs offered are for nurses, hair stylists, au pairs, domestic
workers, waitresses, models or dancers. In some countries, women and girls have been abducted
across borders by “friends” for nightlife or tourist excursions. Some women travel overseas for
arranged marriages, only to be forced into prostitution by their “husbands” when they arrive8.
The development of the new means of information, mass media, also had an
unquestionable impact upon this category of vulnerable women. They present a new image of
the women that involves in many cases losing self-esteem, where sexual activities become a
normal issue.9
In the case of international trafficking, traffickers use various mechanisms to transport
women and girls across borders, sometimes with the co-operation of immigration authorities.
Sometimes, the means are legal. For instance, many women (particularly from Central and
Eastern Europe) are able to enter destination countries legally on student, tourist or temporary
work visas and then overstay their visas10. Once in the control of traffickers, the trafficked
women and girls are either forced into prostitution or trapped in exploitative conditions through
dept bondage. In many cases, the young women are beaten, raped, threatened, and deprived of
food until they agree to the trafficker’s demands. In almost all cases, the traffickers take the
woman’s travel documents, control her movement, and uses debt bondage to coerce and control
8
“Vulnerability to Trafficking in Human Beings of Young Female population in Romania” – main
Findings of the Sociological Research, IOM Office in Romania, July 2001, pag.5-6
http://www.un.ro/iom.html
9
Council of Europe Recommendation No. R(2000) 11, Appendix – Paragraph 8
10
International Organization for Migration “Trafficking and Prostitution: The Growing Exploitation of
Migrant Women for Central and Eastern Europe, May 1995 http:// www.iom.org
94
her. If she escapes, she faces retribution against herself or her family for defaulting on her
debt.11
Since prostitution is illegal in many countries and, of course in Southern Eastern
Europe, except in Bulgaria and FYR Macedonia, the threat of being involved in an illegal
activity as a prostitute and also in being illegally in a country is the most effective mean of
control used by the authorities. Corruption of the local police and other authorities and their
links with the traffickers is another reason. As an example, there is information about Bulgarian
border police who first took money from women to take them safely back to Bulgaria only to
deliver them back to the traffickers for additional money.
3.2. Other forms of trafficking
The commercial sex industry is one of the principal, but by no means only, sectors into
which human beings are trafficked within the region. Prosecutors report incidences of workers
being trafficked by sophisticated criminal networks, stripped of their documents and forced to
work without pay in restaurants and other business through debt bondage and other form of
coercion. Romanian and Albanian children are brought across the border by traffickers to beg or
steal in Germany, Italy, and France.
NGOs in the Russian federation report that large numbers of men are being trafficked
into slave labour overseas by employment companies offering them decent jobs.
For instance, according to the 2004 statistics of International Organization for
Migration, Bucharest office, three Romanian males (two minors and a 44 years old adult) have
been repatriated.12
Other forms of “slavery-like practices” not traditionally encompassed under “forced
labour” may also exist. These include trafficking for domestic servitude and various noncommercial forms of sexual slavery, such as false marriage, forced pregnancy and sham
adoptions.
NGOs and institutions working to combat trafficking increasingly emphasize the
commonalities between persons trafficked for the sex trade and those trafficked for other
purposes. Like victims of sex trafficking, people trafficked into sweatshops and other forms of
forced labour or servitude suffer severe human rights and labour abuses, including deprivation
of liberty, appropriation of income, illegal working conditions and various forms of
psychological, physical and sexual abuse. They are trafficked using similar methods and
channels, sometimes by the same criminal networks engaged in forced prostitution. Like
victims of sex trafficking, few victims can escape their traffickers or negotiate the conditions of
their “employment” or “marriage”. If discovered by authorities, they face arrest and immediate
deportation. Few receive any assistance or restitution, or have any legal recourse against their
traffickers. As in sexual trafficking, it appears that the majority of victims are female.
3.3. Trafficking of children
In general, trafficking of children under 12 (girls and boys) for begging and 2)
trafficking of teenage girls for sexual exploitation.
A distinction needs to be made between the trafficking of young children (under
twelve) for begging, organs, adoption, prostitution, pornography and the trafficking of
adolescent girls for prostitution. In Southern European Europe there is no evidence for the
existence of a special market for the sexual services of children, as in the case in other parts of
the world in connection with the fear of HIV/AIDS. There is evidence that young children, both
11
12
http:// www.osce.org, last visited on 2 May 2004
IOM report, 2004
95
girls and boys, are trafficked for forced labour particularly from Albania into Greece and Italy.
It is estimated that over 2,000 Albanian children have been trafficked to Greece.
It is also estimated, by NGOs working with trafficked persons estimate that underage
prostitutes comprise approximately 10-30 percent of all sex workers. About 10-15 percent of
the trafficked persons, whom IOM has assisted to return home from the Balkan countries, are
girls under the age of 18. Save the Children estimates that up to 80 percent of all trafficked
persons from Albania are teenage girls under 18.13
The underlying socio-economic causes of migration and factors that increase
vulnerability to trafficking are the same for teenage girls as for older young women. These
include poverty, gender-based discrimination and violence, lack of jobs and restrictive
migration regimes. Underage girls, especially from dysfunctional families and from institutions,
are therefore also becoming victims of trafficking (Ichim C, 2003:14)The distinction that can be
made between this group and young children trafficked for begging is that teenage girls are
being trafficked not because they are children, but because they are female. Often they pass for
adults and have false documents.
The most dangerous aspect is that in many cases the recruiters are relatives or
acquaintances. Some of the trafficked girls become traffickers, going back to their homes
recruiting member of their families. This is understood as a mean of protection, survival of
these families (Onu E, Petrescu, V 2005:77)
There is, however, no concrete evidence or data regarding boys being trafficked for
prostitution, although there are reports and newspaper articles of trafficking in boys for the
Western European male prostitution and pornography market, and of children for organ
transplants. However, the experience of UNICEF in other parts of the world demonstrates the
vulnerability of both boys and girls to trafficking for the purposes of sexual exploitation and
child pornography.
There is some information from Moldova that trafficking of children for illegal
adoption is reportedly widespread and children coming from big families from the countryside
are offered for adoption. It was not confirmed the information that these children were used for
trafficking of organs.
Despite the signature and ratification of the UN Convention on the Rights of the
Child14 by all countries in Southern Eastern Europe, there are no special legal regimes, special
protection or special treatment for trafficked children. Children under 12 in some countries of
destination, including FYR Macedonia, Greece and Italy, are placed in orphanages while they
await organized return. Older children are treated as illegal migrants and criminals and face
prosecution, imprisonment and deportation from the countries in which they were arrested.15
4. Transnational co-operation in fighting trafficking in human beings
Organized crime and trafficking is a complicated and multifaceted problem that
requires a co-ordinated, interdisciplinary and international response. As it had already been
presented, it has roots in socio-economic and gender inequalities; it involves migration and law
enforcement problems, it is increasingly perpetuated by organized criminal groups; it raises
numerous human rights and gender issues and has broad implications for the stability,
democratization and rule of law (Baldwin C R, 1997:56)
Despite recent positive efforts and developments at national, regional and international
levels, little has changed for those concerned. The attempts to come to grips with the problem of
human trafficking have so far been without much success. Despite increased attention at the
political level, few States have taken adequate measures to protect individuals from trafficking
13
D. Renton, Child Trafficking in Albania, Save the Children, Tirana 2001, www.savethechildren.org, last
visited on 23 September 2005.
14
Article 355 stipulates that the child must be protected against trafficking
15
http:// www.iom.org, last visited on 26 August 2006.
96
and its related human rights abuses, and to provide effective assistance and remedies for
trafficked persons, or to prosecute those engaged in trafficking. Far too often, still, the
defenceless victims of cynical traffickers are regarded as the perpetrators, and are criminalized
and deported before the true circumstances are investigated — with no care or support and with
no regard for the severe traumas these people frequently suffer (Spiezia F, Frezza, F, 2002:182190)
When a crime is unconfined by domestic borders, all the problems of ascertaining and
prosecuting have to be solved by national jurisdiction, trough judicial and law enforcement
cooperation, intended in the traditional sense. This shows all its limitations, especially in
relation to the complexity of the structure of a transnational crime.
Often there is a problem of overlapping of jurisdiction: this happens because of the
complexity of crimes, which cover a larger territory, or it is committed, for example, by an
organized group of people from different countries.
We can also have problems determining the place where the crime was perpetrated
(locus commissi delicti) especially in relation to criminal associations.
Perhaps the most significant limitation in current law and policy is the failure of national
governments to treat trafficking – in practice as a serious human rights issue. In the vast
majority of the destination countries, trafficking is approached primarly as an ilegal migration
or prostitution problem. Consequently, most law enforcement strategies target the people who
are trafficked, not the criminal networks that traffic them, while the traffickers continue to
operate without impunity.
4.1. What solution can be found?
International community have been working on instruments for fighting crime at a
horizontal level. As we will see during this research paper, we have a lot of international
treaties, bilateral or multilateral, in relation to mutual legal assistance, but we have to look for a
new direction, forward towards a future vertical level, imagining a transnational structure,
similar to the international criminal court, for establishing a jurisdiction to protect the most
important interests of humanity.
We can give universal values to a transnational jurisdiction, only if we overcome our
diffidence towards a transnational system and we are ready to recognize different level of
jurisdiction, which can be used in all cases.
It is known that we have obtained a first important stage, namely the International
Criminal Court, but unfortunately, this tribunal has not been defined as a part of a transnational
form of jurisdiction, yet. In addition to the limited numbers of crimes (genocide, crimes against
humanity, war crimes and aggression) the jurisdiction is considered complementary to the
domestic jurisdictions (Michellini G. 2001:36)
In order to react against this new and insidious form of criminality, effectively without
frontiers, we have to remember that a single State is not able to give an efficacious answer to
the globalization of the criminal market. Therefore, a method to contrast effective criminality
needs to be developed in transnational cooperation. There is a need to strengthen the criminal
justice response to organized crime through legislative reform, awareness-raising and training,
as well as through national and international cooperation. The support and protection of victims
who give evidence is the key to prosecuting the ringleaders behind the phenomenon.16
The most important thing is to obtain an effective punishment, in respect of the
fundamental principles of the defence, rather than to claim to the principle of the sovereignty of
jurisdiction. In order to obtain an effective punishment, having evidence is indispensable. When
a crime involves a transnational phenomenon it is easier to have evidence as a result of a
common effort between all states interested in the crime.
16
www.unov.org, last visited on 5 June 2004
97
On the legislative level, governments must ensure that national and local laws are
adequate to prevent trafficking, prosecute traffickers and protect trafficking victims. Moreover,
police, prosecutors, judges and other officials may need training to recognize and more fully
understand this complex phenomenon.
As an illustration of what written above, since September 2000, there has been a major
change in attitude and in the level of the government involvement in counter-trafficking
activities in South-eastern Europe. From having denied the existence of trafficking,
governments are now giving priority to anti-trafficking initiatives and assigning responsibilities
at ministerial level. The establishment of the Trafficking Task Force under the Stability Pact
has served to provide the much needed overall co-ordination and guidance for anti-trafficking
activities in South-eastern Europe. Within this framework, the governments have developed
National Plans of Action, which allow a structured, comprehensive approach to the problem,
and the involvement of international agencies and NGOs, as well as a willingness to co-operate
and exchange information at regional level.
4.2. Governmental/Intergovernmental solutions
As regarding the countries from Southern Eastern Europe, the development of
comprehensive policies, regional initiatives and responses have been relatively recent. Before
the year 2000, some NGOs and international organizations were responding to the situation on
the ground, but there was no institutional or co-ordinate approach to the problem. Since the
adoption of the UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime and its protocols, and
the establishment of the Stability Pact Trafficking Task Force in Human Beings (SPTTF) in
September 2000, an institutional framework for anti-trafficking action has been created, and in
2001 a significant number of regional initiatives were undertaken which influenced policy
development and activities in the countries of Southern Eastern Europe.
All the Countries of SEE – Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, the
federal Republic of Yugoslavia, the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Greece,
Hungary, the republic of Moldova, Romania and Slovenia, Turkey and Ukraine signed the UN
Convention against Transnational Organised Crime and its two additional Protocols on 13
December 2000 in Palermo, at a very early stage, aspect that shows their commitmment to
erradicate this phenomenon.
The effectiveness of most of these initiatives cannot be yet fully evaluated, since most
of them are recent or not yet fully developed, and many have yet to be translated into concrete
actions. All the countries in the region agree on the importance of an integrated approach to
trafficking and are working on developing operational structures which can effectively combat
trafficking, but they are also struggling with a lack of financial resources to make the structures
work.17
Within the framework of the Stability Pact Working Table III initiatives, the
governments of the SEE countries have signed a number of co-operation agreements. In
December 2000, al SEE countries signed the Palermo Trafficking Declaration of South Eastern
Europe. 18By signing the Anti-trafficking declaration ministers committed their countries to
implement effective programmes for prevention, victim assistance and protection, law
enforcement, legislative reform and prosecution of traffickers. They also acknowledged the
need for programmes to raise awareness, for training and for co-operation and co-ordination
among border officials, police judges, prosecutors and consular personnel. They agreed to meet
once a year to exchange information on trafficking in human beings and the progress made in
combating it.
17
http://www.osce.org/odihr/documents/trafficking/at_dec6_minc.pdf, last visted on 1 June 2005
Address by Mary Robinson, United Nations High Commissioner fro Human rights, consultation on
Trafficking and the Sex Industry (June 1999), http://www.unhchr.org, last visited on 14 November 2005.
18
98
In order to enhance the cooperation between States in the region, Southern Eastern
Countries Initiative (SECI) was founded upon the Multilateral Agreement for Cooperation to
prevent and combat trans-border crime signed in 1999 by 11 governments.19 The purpose of the
Centre is to improve regional law enforcement cooperation, through the joint activity of police
and customs administrations of the different countries, by facilitating investigations, sharing
experiences, establishing common operations, and continually evaluating and analyzing the
crime situation in the region. In October 2000, Romania and SECI signed the Headquarters
Agreement, which entered into force in April 2001. The SECI Centre became operational in
November 2000.
In May 2000 the Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI) Regional Centre
adopted as a priority to form a task force, with the mission designed to disrupt and combat THB
and IM. In accordance with this effort, Romania was designated as the lead Coordinator to
command and control its activities.
Operation Mirage was the SECI Centre’s first attempt to conduct an aggressive and
active regional operation for countering THB and IM. Participating countries20 in this initiative
identified and agreed on the principles of this regional initiative prior to the initiation of the
operation.
Last but not least, US State Department support should be mentioned, to include the
FBI and INS active participation, especially during the preparatory phase of the operation.
Subsequently, during the agreed period of the operation, all the participants operated
according to their national plans and to the adopted methodology. Police, border police, other
appropriate law enforcement agencies and institutions such as ministries of finance, education
and health were involved at the national level in the operation. At the same time IOM and
NGO’s participated in the operation, as partners responsible for victim assistance, increasing the
cooperation established21. Preventive measures and activities were undertaken during the
operation to focus on recruitment and transportation of potential victims22.
19
The Agreement was signed in May 1999 by Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Greece,
Hungary, FYR of Macedonia, Moldova, Romania, Serbia and Montenegro and Turkey . Croatia signed the
document on 13 November 1999 and Slovenia on 29 August 2000. The SECI Agreement entered into
force in February 2000.
20
Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Former Yugoslavian Republic of Macedonia
(FYROM), Greece, Hungary, Moldova, Romania, and Turkey.The SECI Center members agreed to invite
Ukraine, FR of Yugoslavia and the UN Mission in Kosovo.
21
Concerning Human beings trafficking:
Controlled places – 20,558; Night clubs, discothèques, restaurants,border crossing points and other places
were checked all over the region
Identified women – 1,738; these persons were found in places such as the above mentioned, and were
checked regarding their identity, the legal stay in the respective country as well as their presence at the
controlled places and others.
Identified victims of trafficking - 237; from the total number of identified women 237 proved to be
trafficked persons or potential victims of trafficking. 23 of them were assisted by IOM and NGOs, while
the rest of them were subjected to preventive measures such as interdiction of exiting or entering a certain
country.
Identified traffickers - 293; this figure represents the number of persons identified as being involved in
trafficking of human beings as recruiters, transporters, hosts and pimps.
Cases for which criminal procedure has been undertaken - 293; investigations are continuing in many
of these cases even after the operation ended, with the purpose to identify all the accomplices and
members of networks.
Cases for which administrative measures have been undertaken - 2933 (fees, interdictionstemporary
imprisonment, expelling);
22
For example, artistic management companies, transportation, employment agencies and others were
targeted; strict controls being made regarding their activities and also at the border. As a result it was
possible to stop many persons, women and illegal migrants, in their travels to Western countries. Also,
many of the above mentioned companies were subjected to administrative measures taken against them
such as fees, restriction of the operations, interdictions.
99
The results were appreciated as positive and encouraging, and demonstrate that this
kind of operation should be organized and conducted more often in the future, as it is one of the
most active and aggressive methods of combating THB and IM23.
Another important step in fighting trafficking in human beings is represented by the
Stability Pact for Southern Eastern Europe’s “Task Force on Trafficking in Human Beings”
(SPPTF). It was launched in September 2000. The governments of the SEE countries, donors,
international agencies (including OSCE, the Council of Europe, IOM, UN High Commission
for
Human Rights (UNHCHR) and UN Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF) and
international and national NGOs are all active members of the Task Force provides a regional
forum for co-ordination and has developed a comprehensive regional strategic framework for
anti-trafficking efforts in the region. Priority areas identified for action are prevention, raising
awareness, victim protection, return and reintegration, legislative reform and law enforcement
co-operation, training and exchange of information. International organisations form an expert
“Task Force Co-ordination Group” addressing the priority areas of concern as listed below.
These organizations serve as an advisory board to the SPPTF Chair and hence meet regularly24.
Conclusion
This modern form of slavery is a human rights issue as it entails the violation of
women’s dignity and integrity, their freedom of movement and, in some cases, their right to
life. As far as the individual is concerned, it affects the very foundations of human rights: the
equal dignity of all human beings. Trafficking should be considered a crime against humanity.
Victims of human trafficking pay a horrible price. Physical and psychological harm,
including diseases and stunted growth often has permanent effects, ostracizing trafficking
victims from their families and communities. Trafficking victims often miss critical
opportunities for social, moral and spiritual development. In many cases, the exploitation of the
victims is progressive, a child trafficked into one form of labour may be further abused in
another. For instance, in many countries, girls recruited to work have been forced later into the
sex industry.
Ironically, the human capacity to endure unspeakable hardship and deprivation leads
many victims to continue to work, hoping for eventual freedom.
Although many countries are in the process of reviewing their legislation in order to
include trafficking in human beings in their Criminal Codes, trafficking continues to be viewed
by the police and judiciary as illegal migration for purposes of prostitution (Haibronner C.
1997:2; Delicato V. 2000:137) rather than a flagrant violation of human rights, still, there are,
however, no clear human rights standard for the treatment of trafficked women and children, no
referral mechanisms in place to ensure that all trafficked persons are identified and assisted.
There are no standard protocols for the behaviour of the law enforcement agencies, international
organizations and NGOs providing identification, referral and assistance. Lack of special
procedures and special protection for children has resulted in the authorities and assisting
23
Regional Center for Combating Transborder Crime, Seci Center, Bucharest, SECI information materials
Annual Report 2002, p.11-14
24
These agencies bring their expertise to bear on all the areas of concern and co-operate in a cross-sector
matter.
The SPTTF acts as a clearing house, fostering co-operation between the relevant actors,
providing information and supporting regional co-operation between governments, international agencies
and NGOs. SPPTF has also developed a model National Plan of Action as a framework for a
comprehensive anti-trafficking approach.
The SPTTF Secretariat organises periodical Task Force Meetings and has convened two
Ministerial Meetings in Palermo and Zagreb where the governments of SEE committed themselves to
concrete anti-trafficking activities
100
organizations treating girls under 18 as adults. Many trafficked women and children are falling
back into the trafficking cycle due to gaps in service and support provision both in the
destination country and the country of origin.
In this respect, further Cooperation between authorities in different countries is needed
in investigation and prosecution, in prevention as well as in victim/witness protection. An
important element is also the cooperation between criminal justice practitioners in different
countries which will result in information exchange and joint action in combating trafficking.
Countries are also requested to strengthen their border control in order to prevent and
detect trafficking in persons. Establishing and maintaining direct channels of communication
should strengthen cooperation among border control agencies. It also means close cooperation
between different national actors, including the police, prosecutors, NGOs and others, with
border control authorities.25
States shall establish comprehensive policies, programmes and other measures to
prevent and combat trafficking in persons and to protect victims of trafficking from
revictimization. Information campaigns should be promoted as measures to prevent persons
from becoming victims of trafficking as well as to discourage the demand that fosters all forms
of exploitation leading to trafficking.
Awareness-raising is also needed to draw the attention of policymakers, criminal
justice practitioners and other authorities to trafficking as a serious crime. Activities in this area
are carried out in partnership and collaboration with other organizations with required expertise.
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Law to Readmit their Own and Foreign Nationals, Zeitchift fur Ausländisches Öffentliches
Recht und Völkerecht, 1997;
Ichim I.C. Minorul – in reglementarile europene, Ed. Timpul, Iasi, 2003, p.14;
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italiana e prospettive” in Questione Giustizia 2001
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Infractor.Victima. Infractiune., Asociatia Magistratilor Iasi, Asociatia Alternative Sociale
Iasi, 2005, p. 77;
Rossi E., La trata di esseri umani e il traffico di migranti, “Cassazione penale”, 2001;
Spiezia F., Frezza F, Pace N. M., Il traffico e il sfruttamento di esseri umani, Giuffre Editore,
Milano, 2002;
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The opening of the Dutch borders. Legal and illegal migration to the Netherlands
1945-2005
Chris QUISPEL
Abstract: This article analyses the rise of migration to the Netherlands after the
Second World War. It is argued that, unlike during the pre war years, it became increasingly
difficult for the Dutch government to close its borders to a growing number of migrants.
Initially the mean causes of migration to the Netherlands were the dismantling of the former
Dutch colonial migration and labour market problems in the sixties. At first this was legal
migration, but in the seventies and eighties, the line between legal and illegal migration,
became more and more blurred. Migration causes migration and it became difficult for the
Dutch government to stop the growing flow of migrants. Things became even more difficult in
the nineties when large numbers of asylum seekers and economic refugees, tried, often
successfully, to enter the Netherlands. The result was a growing anxiety among politicians and
among the Dutch public, resulting in several attempts to change the law in such a way that
illegal migration would become impossible, or at least much less attractive. Though partially
successful, the Dutch government was never able to really stop the flow of migrants. Nowadays
the problem of illegal migration has become intertwined with fears of radical Islam and
terrorism. It also has become an important element of EU policy. It has led to a steep rise in the
expenses paid to protect the EU borders. It has made illegal migration more difficult and
dangerous, but, as is the case at the American-Mexican border, human trafficking and
smuggling has not stopped.
Keywords: Migration, Borders, Netherlands, Labour market, Illegality
Illegal Migration is a recent phenomenon in Dutch society. In the thirties concerns
about the growing number of, mainly Jewish, refugees from Germany, led to the closing of the
Dutch-German borders. Those that still managed to enter were considered to be illegal
migrants, at that time a new category. Before that time border crossings were not considered to
be illegal. This did not mean of course that everybody was welcome. Each year thousands of
people were expelled from the Netherlands, because of a lack in means of subsistence, in the
case of men or immoral behaviour in the case of women. But they were not seen as illegal but
as unwanted. Not the fact that they had not been allowed to cross the border, but the fact that
they had behaved improperly was the reason of their expulsion. (v.Eyl 2005) After the Second
World War, the subject of illegal migration disappeared from the minds of the Dutch again. For
a while more people left the Netherlands than entered it. It is only in the nineties that illegal
migration again became a concern for Dutch policy makers and for the Dutch public in general.
These fears were closely related to uncertainties about the rising number of legal migrants. As a
matter of fact, illegal migration is closely related to legal migration, as well in its causes as in
the anxieties it brings about.
Legal migration to the Netherlands became more prominent after the Second World
War. There are two main reasons, the consequences of decolonisation and labour shortages in
the sixties. After the Second World War the Dutch never regained control over their Asian
colonies again. The inevitable independence of Indonesia created a large scale migration to the
Netherlands. The migrants were not Indonesians, unlike in the case of the demise of the British
empire, few Asians migrated to the Netherlands. The majority of the migrants consisted of so
called Indo’s, people of mixed Dutch, Indonesian descent. Indo’s had been an intermediary
group in colonial society. Most of them felt closer to Dutch then to Indonesian culture. In the
labour market they held functions considered too low for the real Dutch but too high for
Indonesians. After independence they were mistrusted by the new government, though many
still hoped to stay. Between 1945 and 1949 more then 100.000 people came to the Netherlands,
103
many of them still thinking they would return after the war, but this turned out to be an illusion.
(Bossenbroek 2002: 176) In 1950 and 1951 another 67.000 left for the Netherlands. Continuing
harassment by the Indonesian government forced another 70.000 to migrate between 1952 and
1957. The same number felt forced to leave because of the tensions between the Dutch and
Indonesian governments over New Guinea. (Willems and Lucassen 1994: 8)
Anxiety over the economic future was the main reason for the large scale migration
from Surinam that started in the middle seventies after independence. Nowadays around
300.000 people of Surinam descent are living in the Netherlands. Though the Dutch
government was not overanxious to receive such a large group of migrants, there was not much
they could do because all Surinamese at the time had Dutch passports. For the same reason
migration from the Dutch Antilles is still continuing
In the sixties the Netherlands enjoyed a period of rapid economic growth, rising wages
and shortages on the labour market. The only solution at the time seemed to be importation of
foreign workers. At first labourers came mainly from Yugoslavia and Italy Later Turkey and
Morocco became the main providers of cheap labour. These ‘guest labourers’ came on short
term contracts and they were supposed to return to their homeland after the expiration of their
contracts. Most European labourers returned, but the majority of the Moroccan and Turkish
workers stayed. This became a problem when the economic situation worsened and many of
them lost their jobs. Though the labour market situation worsened, migration did not stop, on
the contrary. At present the number of Turks in the Netherlands is estimated at about 300.000
and the number of Moroccans at 200.000. (Penninx and Vermeulen 1995)
As said before, legal and illegal migration are often closely related. Phenomena like
family reunion and chain migration are well described in literature and can easily lead to illegal
migration. Migrants often have a preference for a marriage partner from the country of origin,
either through personal choice or forced by family interests. Though in the past it was very easy
to bring in a partner legally nowadays new laws have made this a much more difficult
proposition and marriages have become an important source of illegal migration. Chain
migration has the same effect. Migration causes migration, enthusiastic letters home, the
prospect of easy jobs, employer’s preference for labourers from the home country, neighbours,
nephews and nieces expecting to be taken care of, are just some of the causes. Not so much with
the Indo’s, who came to Holland more or less as a group, but certainly with the Surinamese,
Antilleans, Turks and Moroccans. When one considers that almost a third of the Surinamese
people nowadays live in the Netherlands, it is easy to understand that there is a continuous
traffic of people from Suriname to the Netherlands and the other way around. Though visa are
required for Surinamese, this continuous stream of persons travelling to and fro, is very hard to
control. The situation of the Surinamese is even more complicated when one realises that the
elder Surinamese once where in possession of a Dutch passport and that through their networks
in Dutch society and excellent knowledge of Dutch language and culture, they easily adapt to
living in the Netherlands. (Ferrier 1985)The situation of the Turks and Moroccans is different,
but chain migration is just as important. Though the total percentage of Turks living in the
Netherlands is of course negligible, at the local level things can be markedly different. A 1993
study after the regional origin of Turks in the Netherlands showed that almost half of the Turks
living in Haarlem and almost all the Turks in neighbouring Ijmuiden, came from the small
Turkish town Emirdagh and some surrounding villages. (Exter 1993 27) The large majority of
the Moroccans in the Netherlands originates in the Riff mountains and its easy to trace their
departure to the Netherlands, at least in part, to chain migration. (Buijs and Nelissen 1995, 189)
Since the nineties asylum seekers and economic refugees have become another source
of (il)legal migration, rapidly taking over the afore mentioned ‘traditional’ migrant groups.
Whereas the ‘other’ category numbered 64.000, this number had risen to 435.000 by 1997. The
reasons for this astonishing rise are manifold. Political tensions in different parts of the world,
but especially the Middle East, notably Iraq, Europe, the disintegration of the Russian empire
and Yugoslavia, Africa, troubles in Ethiopia, Somalia and an unfortunate many other countries,
led to an enormous rise in the numbers of refugees. Political refugees of course were nothing
104
new to Europe but in the fifties and sixties most of them had fled communist countries and they
received a warm welcome. Larger numbers and the fact that many were culturally and
religiously different from Europeans, were reasons for a much less enthusiastic reception in the
nineties. Changes in communication and transportation are another reason for the enormous rise
in the number of people willing to get access to the Netherlands. Not only has the world
population in general risen dramatically in the past decades, the number of people that has at
least some, often unrealistically idealised, knowledge of the living conditions in the West, has
grown accordingly. Add to that the fact that for the first time in history, it is actually possibly
for large numbers of them to actually go to the west, either legally, with tourist visa, or illegally,
by overstaying their visa or by human trafficking, and you have the recipe for mass migration.
According to the official government statistics, the number of persons from third world and
East European countries, living in the Netherlands, has risen from 64.000 in 1990 to 435.000 in
1997. (v.d Leun 2003, 12)
1. Integration and the labour market
Whereas the assimilation of the Indo’s is generally considered to have been successful,
the same can not be said of the Caribbean, Turkish and Moroccan migrants. What made the
indo’s successful ? First, they knew there was no way back. Though most of them had never
been to the Netherlands before, they realised their future lay in their new home country. Second,
the labour market situation in the fifties and sixties was extremely favourable. These were the
years of ‘wederopbouw’ (rebuilding). Jobs were plentiful. Given their background, the new
migrants met the qualifications demanded by the Dutch labour market. They spoke the language
and they could easily enter the kind of service sector jobs they had fulfilled in Dutch East India.
Third, government policy was focussed on quick integration. Indo’s were not allowed to live
where they wanted, but were distributed evenly across the country. There were language
courses, cooking lessons for the women and cultural programs to make them acquainted with
Dutch customs and to force them to forget their own. A fourth factor often mentioned is the
pluriformity of the Dutch Indonesian migrants. These were people from different layers of
colonial society, some almost European, others almost Indonesian. Once in the Netherlands,
their social differences did not disappear overnight. It made the formation of interest groups,
political parties and the growth of a group identity opposite Dutch society, difficult. The most
important expressions of a Dutch Indian identity in Dutch society were on a cultural level and
had a high degree of nostalgia. Nowadays most people of Dutch Indian descent are still aware
of their origins, but they feel first and foremost Dutch. Some hard feelings still exist about the
forceful way in which they were forced to abandon their cultural identity and the lack of interest
in their background, but this has not been a hindrance to their integration. (Willems 2001)
Other migrants so far have taken a different route. They came to the Netherlands in
times of economic difficulties. Mass migration of people from Surinam and the process of
family reunion among Mediterranean migrants started in the seventies. In the middle of what
economic historians have called the first oil crisis. Though for reasons that are outside the scope
of this paper the Dutch economy did not do too badly during the first oil crisis, the effects of the
second oil crisis were much more troublesome. Like most Western economies, the Dutch
economy had to cope with the rise of low wage economies. This resulted in the almost total
disappearance of the once flourishing textile industry and shipbuilding, sectors with a large
number of unskilled labourers. Labour saving production methods reduced the market for
unskilled labour even further. New migrants had a hard time finding a job. Especially since the
Dutch labour market at that time was still strongly protected. Many companies, like the PTT the
Dutch post and telephone company, still preferred to hire new personal through informal
channels. Jobs that in many countries serve as entrance opportunities for migrants, like driving a
taxi, were closed to outsiders. No wonder unemployment figures among migrants were
shockingly high.
105
In 1987, according to a report by the Scientific Council of Government Policy, 13 per
cent of the autochthonous Dutch working population was out of a job. Among the Surinamese
working population the figure was 27 per cent, while among Turks and Moroccans it was above
40 per cent. (Wetenschappelijke Raad voor Regeringsbeleid 1989: 106) At that time the labour
market was expanding again and joblessness among autochthonous Dutch was already going
down, but among job seekers of non Dutch origin it was still rising. Partly this was the result of
continuing migration, partly it had to do with a preference among Dutch employers for Dutch
labour. Only in the nineties did demand for migrant labour start to grow again, mainly because
the reservoir of Dutch labour was drying up, but joblessness among them remained significantly
higher then among the Dutch. (Dagevos 2001: 15) In 1998 joblessness among the Dutch was
4%, among the Surinamese 13%, among the Antillians also 13%, among the Turks 18% and
among the Moroccans 20%. (Veenman 1999: 92) The fact however that especially Turkish and
Moroccan labourers often get low qualified and lower paid jobs within their own ethnic
segment does not bode well for the future. (Dagevos e.a. 2003: 418)
Evidently access of migrants to the Dutch labour market has not been easy, but what
are the reasons? Broadly speaking there are three explanations. The first one concentrates on
human capital or the lack of it. The groups we are discussing, the Surinamese and the first
generations of Antillians excepted, generally do not have the education you need to be a
successful participant on the labour market, they have language problems and have a hard time
adapting to Dutch society. Turkish and Moroccan migrants in particular are often recent arrivals
from the most backward regions of their home countries and they have trouble coping with the
cultural discrepancies between their old and new surroundings. Their traditional Islamic
background is another factor hindering integration in Dutch society. There is an even more
important aspect of human capital. Getting a job is only partly dependent on objective market
factors like education wage and experience. Not all jobs are filled after a careful procedure in
which each candidate is judged according to strict objective measures. Other things can be
much more important, being a member of the right clubs, coming from the right neighbourhood,
knowing the right people, being from the right family. In short being part of the right networks
can make the difference between getting a job and getting a refusal note. Migrants of course
lacked meaningful networks.
The second approach focuses on macro-economic developments. This line of
reasoning has been made popular in the United States by people like Kasarda and Wilson.
(Wilson 1996; Kasarda 1990: 26-47) The idea is that starting in the sixties a ‘mismatch’
developed between the skills of a large segment of African-Americans, in the American case or
migrant workers in the Dutch case, and the demands in the labour market. Migrants suffered
from changes in the labour market, mentioned before, which led to a strong reduction of blue
collar work and a new emphasis in white collar work. Migrants simply lacked the qualifications
to be a successful competitor in the new labour market.
And of course there is discrimination. While few will disagree about the importance of
the first two factors, discrimination is more hotly debated. There is little overt discrimination in
the Netherlands. Dismissing applicants because of race or ethnicity is punishable by law and it
rarely happens. Of course this does not mean discrimination is nonexistent in the Dutch labour
market and there is plenty of circumstantial evidence of discriminatory practices. In 1977
Bovenkerk and Breuning-van Leeuwen conducted a research on the role of discrimination on
the Dutch labour market. Persons of different ethnic origin, but comparable in all other aspects
were asked to apply for the same job. Their conclusion, in 20% of the cases there was a strong
suspicion of discrimination. They also concluded that discrimination is less important when
there is a shortage on the labour market and more obvious when there is a large supply of
applicants. Employers mentioned fear for negative responses from clients, lack of knowledge of
the Dutch language and culture and possible hostile reactions among Dutch employees as
reasons for not hiring foreigners.(Bovenkerk and Breuning van Leeuwen 1978: 31-57)
Bovenkerk en Breuning van Leeuwen’s conclusions seem to be supported by the fact that better
106
economic conditions in the eighties at first only helped to better the labour market position of
the Dutch and that only in the nineties migrants started to catch up, albeit still slowly.
In 1984 employers and labour agencies mentioned discrimination, but not their own, as
one of the main reasons for the problems migrants experienced on the labour market.(Veenman
1985) In 1992 van Beek and van Praag noticed little change. Eighty percent of the employers
they interviewed preferred Dutch applicants over migrants. Especially in small firms and
commercial functions chances for non Dutch were small.(van Beek and van Praag 1992: 58)
Other authors have stressed the importance statistical discrimination. Employers often prefer a
Dutch candidate because there is less risk involved and because statistically there is a higher
chance of foreigners taking sick leave. Then there is indirect discrimination, not acknowledging
diploma’s from foreign countries, not taking into account previous job experience in other
countries etc. (O.A.V. Report 1990: 68) A 2003 report showed that in a situation in which
candidates are comparable in every respect the Dutch applicant gets the job. A fact that won’t
surprise anybody, certainly not those acquainted with the American job market.
The recent group of refugees (asylum seekers) and migrants looking for economic
opportunities has not had an easy time on the Dutch labour market. Access to the regular labour
market is difficult because without a social-fiscal number, which, being illegal, they do not
have, it is almost impossible to get a normal job. For the same reason starting one’s own
business is hardly possible, except on an irregular base within their own communities. It means
the great majority is confined to illegal work. For many Dutch employers this was not such a
bad solution. Illegal labour is cheap and employers don’t have to bother about laws and
regulations. Though illegal work can at least keep illegal migrants from starving, in the longer
run it is no solution. It means illegal migrants remain confined to the lower segments of the
labour market. Their jobs are permanently insecure, often confined to certain times of the year.
They have to move around a lot in order to remain employed, but even then they are
unemployed during long periods. Often, especially when working for relatives or compatriots,
they do not really earn money but must contend themselves with food and lodging. Upward
mobility is a far away dream.( v.d. Leun 2003; v.d. Leun and Kloosterman 2006)
2. Migration and Government Policy.
In the fifties the Dutch government played an active role in the in the integration of Dutch
Indian migrants. In the sixties there was government support for the recruiting of
Mediterranean guest workers. However there was no government policy to help their
integration in Dutch society, as they were supposed to leave at the end of their contract. In the
eighties and early nineties when it was clear that the majority of the migrants were here to stay,
discussions were centred on the possibilities of integration without losing your own identity.
This can be called the Dutch variety of multiculturalism. Policy makers were convinced
differences in language, religion and culture in general were no hindrance to integration. There
even were experiments with schools teaching in Turkish or Moroccan. (Entzinger 1990;
Lucassen and Kobben 1992)
That policy has come under heavy attack. A heterogeneous group of politicians,
journalists and social scientists, sometimes called ‘de nieuwe realisten’ (new realists), issued
stern warnings. (Prins 2002 and 2004) In 1991 in an article in the progressive Dutch newspaper
the ‘Volkskrant’, liberal leader Frits Bolkestein declared that in his opinion European culture
was superior to all other cultures. Freedom of speech, separation of church and state and the
principle of non-discrimination originated in Europe and had become an integral part of
European culture. This, according to Bolkestein, is in stark contrast with the Islamic world in
which these values still have little meaning.(Volkskrant 15/9/1991) More then any other writer
or politician Pim Fortuyn has made this line of reasoning popular among the Dutch population.
To Fortuyn the multicultural society has become a drama. Relativism of our own culture to him
is one of the main threats to western society. Like Bolkestein he stressed the importance of the
separation between church and state and western culture is superior in the way relations
107
between men and women and between adults and children have developed. If the West
compromises on these points, according to Fortuyn, the integrity of our society is in danger.
Though fundamentalist Islam is the greatest danger, there are also differences with liberal Islam
that are unbridgeable.(Fortuyn 2001) Of course 9/11 has done much to make Fortuyn’s fear of
Islam more popular. But fear of Islam is not the only reason public opinion in the Netherlands is
changing. In 2000 Dutch publicist Paul Scheffer wrote an article in the Nieuwe Rotterdamse
Courant under the title ‘Het multiculturele drama’. Ethnic communities, he writes, are
threatened by all kinds of problems. Joblessness, crime and lack of education are much higher
than among the original Dutch population. Worse there are no signs of betterment. Young males
of ethnic minorities turn away from Dutch society and Western culture. They are resentful,
frustrated and have no knowledge of the values that are important to the society they live in.
Not only their present day situation is bleak, there is also little hope for their future.(NRCHandelsblad 29/9/2000)
There has been a lot of criticism of Bolkestein, Scheffer and Fortuyn. But after 9/11,
the murder of Fortuyn and the huge electoral success of his poliical party, the LPF, a lot has
changed. One can almost speak of a reversal of political correctness. If political correct means
saying what the majority wants to hear, speaking on behalf of ethnic minorities and the
blessings of multiculturalism, now definitely is very incorrect. The new Dutch political
correctness has a lot in common with Dinesh D’Souza’s straightforward approach to the
solution of the American ‘underclass’ problem. If blacks and especially young black males start
behaving in a responsible manner and ‘act white’, they will find out that access to civilised
American society is quite easy. It is a matter of getting an education, hard work and the living
up to the right values. (D’Souza 1995) Attacks on migrant behaviour, nowadays are often
combined with attacks on the welfare state. The Netherlands used to have an extensive welfare
system. This is not the place to discuss the pro’s and con’s of the welfare state and the extent of
government responsibilities. But there is an element in the present discussions that is highly
relevant to this subject. More and more, sometimes in an open sometimes in a more veiled way,
attacks on the welfare state are combined with migrant policy.
‘Post War migration is unique because it is the first example of mass migration in the
era of the welfare state’, Paul Scheffer wrote in a recent newspaper article. (NRC-Handelsblad
10/1/04) His thesis is clear, poor migrants are attracted to the Netherlands because they know
they will be protected by the welfare state and this enables them to hold on to their original
culture. Active participation in the labour market on the other hand forces people to adapt in
important ways to the culture of their new homeland. This is the main difference between
migration to the Netherlands and migration to the United States. In the United States migrants
have to work hard to earn a living and there is no polarisation between productive indigenous
labourers and unproductive migrant minorities. Scheffer is not a Dutch right wing Republican
who blames all society’s evil on government and there is still a general consensus in the
Netherlands about the importance of keeping at least some elements of the welfare state intact,
but he touches upon sentiments that are becoming more and more popular among Dutch
politicians and among the Dutch public.1 There is a growing feeling the welfare state is getting
too expensive, this coincides with the feeling that life is made too easy for migrants. Attacks on
the welfare state try to kill three birds with one stone, government expenditures will go down,
integration of migrants will be helped and the Netherlands will become a much less attractive
place for future migration. Like in the United States, the more expenses on social policy are
seen as benefiting migrants and/or outsiders, the more it comes under attack. Not long ago the
Dutch liberal party has published a plan to diminish migration. One of its proposals is to wait
ten tears before migrants are entitled to the benefits of the Dutch welfare state. The first
reactions of Christian Democrats and Socialists were positive. Only the greens are violently
against.
1
Not only in the Netherlands in the Economist 1/3/2004 mention is made of the dilemma many
progressive British feel about the perceived choice between mass migration and the welfare state.
108
So far the rising number of migrants has not really changed Dutch policy regarding the
welfare state and despite growing fears among the Dutch population about the rise of
fundamentalist Islam, anti Islamic measures have not been taken. Only in the field of illegal
migration Dutch government policy has really changed. Measures have been taken to guard the
Dutch and especially the European border, it has become increasingly difficult for migrants to
get a staying permit, at EU level new laws have been introduced to strike down on illegal
migrants and in the Netherlands several so called Linking Acts have been introduced to make
life more difficult for those who do not have the right papers. Measures have been introduced to
stop family reunion, it has been become much more difficult to marry a partner from a non EU
country. Persons who are involved in the smuggling of illegal migrants or who are caught
employing them can get very heavy fines. The number of countries, whose inhabitants need
visa, has grown immensely, while the number of countries considered so dangerous that
refugees should be admitted has shortened substantially. There is a growing and more and more
efficient system of information among EU countries.
These measures have been fairly successful. The number of persons seeking asylum in
the Netherlands has dwindled. Despite this fact concerns among the Dutch population and
among Dutch politicians seem to have grown bigger. The surprising Success of Geert Wilders,
anti foreign, PVV, at the parliamentary elections of November 2006, is a clear sign. Even the
Dutch liberal party has made expulsion of illegal migrants and asylum seekers a main point of
their electoral program. So far expulsion has been less successful than border control. Arresting
and deporting of illegal migrants is not the biggest priority of the Dutch police and manpower is
limited.. Normally illegal migrants are only arrested in relationship with criminal activities.
Even then it is not always easy to expel them. Expulsion can only take place to the country of
origin and it is very difficult to find out what that country is if a person has no papers. Often
illegal migrants are kicked out on the streets again. Part of the Dutch population is also
supportive of illegal migrants, especially when children are involved. This is reflected in the
Dutch Parliament where there are as many members in favour of a general pardon for illegal
migrants, as there are members who are vehemently opposed.
.In 1998 the Dutch parliament passed the Linking Law. The name refers to the fact that
all kinds of benefits and services from then on would be linked to a person’s residence status.
Health care, education, housing and social benefits would only be available to those who could
prove to be entitled to them. This is of course a far reaching law, which, if executed correctly,
would really make life difficult for illegal migrants. However, so far only in the field of
housing, the Linking Law has really functioned well. Nowadays it is almost impossible for
illegal migrants to rent a house. Instead they move in with relatives and friends or sub rent a
house. Thus overcrowding in already poor neighbourhoods has been one of the unwanted
results of the 1998 law. In other fields civil servants, health care workers and civilians have not
always acted according to the law. The reasons are manifold, doctors and nurses confronted
with a sick or wounded persons are not concerned about their legal status. Others feel a kind of
solidarity with people in trouble or simply do not have the time to act according to the official
regulations. In some sectors, education for instance, there is a strong tradition of independence
and little patience with bureaucracy.
3. Conclusion
Except for a short period in the thirties when Jewish refugees where treated as illegal migrants,
the Dutch have never bothered about illegal border crossings until the late twentieth century.
Political instability in Eastern Europe, Africa and the Middle East, growing numbers of
economic refugees and fears about the illegal consequences of older forms of legal migration,
made politicians, government and the Dutch public in general suddenly aware of the existence
of illegal migration and its potential costs to Dutch society. The murder of Theo van Gogh and
of course 9/11 did much to enhance these fears. This is not just a Dutch phenomenon, all over
Europe fear of foreigners is growing. The result has been a considerable rise in the expenses
109
necessary to protect the EU borders. This has been only partially successful. Illegal border
crossing has become more difficult and more dangerous. But as is the case on the American
Mexican border, it is very hard to stop human smuggling and trafficking. And there is the added
problem that a large number of illegal migrants simply enters a country as a legal migrant, only
to become illegal when visa or residence permits have expired.
Since the Schengen treaty (1992), the Dutch borders are more or less open and once
you are inside the EU it is not difficult to enter the Netherlands. Therefore Dutch policy has
been to tighten control at Schiphol, the national airport and, more important, to make life more
difficult for the illegal migrants who have entered the country. As we have seen these measures
have also been only partially successful. Illegal migrants still manage to find opportunities to
live and work in the Netherlands. They are helped by the fact that not all Dutchmen feel at ease
with the new tough anti immigrant laws. Refusal to implement the laws, be it for principal or
more practical reasons, is one of the reasons illegal migrants find ways to circumvent the laws.
On the other hand the new laws and measures are sufficiently successful to stop any possibility
of social progress, at least for the great majority of the illegal migrants.
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111
III. Image and Identity of the Frontiers of the New Europe
1. Fabienne MARON (Bruxelles) ◙ Les nouvelles frontières de l’Europe:
repenser les concepts
2. Esther GIMENO UGALDE (Wien) ◙ Multilingualism as a New EUStrategy and the Impact of European Political Border Shifts on Languages
3. Enrique BANUS (Pamplona) ◙ Images of Openness - Images of Closeness
4. Dana PANTEA (Oradea) ◙ Cross – Border Politics and Its Image in the
European Union
5. Margarita CHABANNA (Kiev) ◙ Psychological Preconditions of
Totalitarianism and Their Effect on Democratic Transformations in
European States
Les nouvelles frontières de l’Europe: repenser les concepts
Fabienne MARON
Abstract :Etant donnés les récents élargissements de l’Union européenne de 2004 et
2007, la question des frontières de la nouvelle Union pose le problème du sens et de l’essence
du projet européen, parce que, en ce moment, il faut repenser le concept de frontière
européenne, en prenant en compte les nouvelles raisons dues à la pertinence des frontières de
l’Europe/de l’Union. Le concept de frontière est devenu dynamique et innovateur, étant un
instigateur de coopération entre les états. Aujourd’hui, il a totalement perdu sa signification
initiale, exclusivement militaire : « faire front » à l’ennemi. A présent, il est crucial pour la
viabilité politique, économique et sociale de l’Union de tracer en Europe les frontières de
l’Europe. Pourtant, l’enjeux majeur auquel on est soumis est de se décider si les frontières de
l’Europe coïncideront avec celles de l’Union Européenne. Pour y arriver, plusieurs défis,
comme l’identité européenne, la diversité en Europe, l’évaluation et la mise en œuvre de la
politique européenne de voisinage, le lancement d’un vrai dialogue interculturel, attendent
encore une réponse concrète.
Mots clés : frontières, Union Européenne, Europe.
I. Introduction : pourquoi re-penser les frontières de l’Europe ?
L’élargissement de l’Union européenne aux pays de l’Europe centrale et orientale a
déplacé les frontières et les limites géographiques, culturelles et intellectuelles de la sphère
européenne. L’espace européen, la portée et la direction de la construction européenne ont été
transformés par l’arrivée de nouveaux membres dans le giron communautaire. Il ne fait aucun
doute que ce qui est en jeu n’est rien d’autre que la re-définition même du projet européen, de
son espace et de ses frontières.
La question des frontières de l’Union européenne demeure l’un des aspects les plus
controversés de la construction européenne et l’un de ceux qui soulève des difficultés majeures
et essentielles. Elle pose, en effet, le problème du sens et de l’essence du projet européen. Elle
questionne sur les limites de l’Union européenne, ses valeurs et sa finalité. Il est évident que
nous devons nous interroger sur les raisons de la difficulté de l’Europe à parler de ses frontières,
identifier les critères selon lesquels elle définit ses frontières. Ce questionnement nous amènera
à parler de ses relations avec les pays voisins de l’Union européenne et du cadre de celles-ci : la
politique européenne de voisinage (PEV) (L. Beurdeley, R. de la Brosse, F. Maron 2007).
Cette question doit être traitée de manière interdisciplinaire par des
experts/académiques qui souligneront la question complexe des concepts : borders, boundaries,
frontiers, limits…et par des praticiens qui seront amenés à traiter les problèmes pratiques qui en
découlent. Définir, contrôler et administrer l'espace européen « délimité » par de nouvelles
frontières géopolitique, économique, monétaire, culturelle, et administrative tel est l’enjeu
fondamental. La discussion doit porter sur les différents aspects de l'interprétation des frontières
: ouvertes/fermées, territoriales/fonctionnelles, statiques/dynamiques. Nous devons aussi mettre
en évidence la relation entre les frontières en Europe et les frontières de l'Europe.
Nous souhaitons souligner le fait que la définition de la frontière européenne influence
la discussion politique sur la sécurité, le développement économique, la liberté et la justice dans
l’espace européen. C'est également un débat In/Out.
Plusieurs raisons, particulièrement fortes, nous invitent donc à nous questionner sur la
notion et la pertinence des frontières de l’Europe/de l’Union et ce, de façon théorique et de
manière concrète voire pragmatique.
La première raison est liée à l’accélération du processus d’élargissement et aux
inquiétudes qu’il suscite. Il est clair que l’arrivée en 2004 et en 2007 de douze pays de l’Europe
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centrale et orientale et bientôt de la Croatie constitue un événement important et une étape
majeure dans le processus européen : la délocalisation industrielle s’en trouve accélérée, ensuite
les institutions européennes ne fonctionnent pas de façon assez efficiente pour mener une
Europe à 27 voire à 28 ; enfin l’Union européenne recouvre maintenant la quasi-totalité du
continent posant avec acuité la question des frontières de l’Europe. De plus, en termes de
gestion administrative, elle recouvre une grande diversité difficile à harmoniser et à faire
fonctionner efficacement. Cette difficulté se décline tant sur le plan de l’administration
supranationale : l’Union européenne que sur le plan national : les systèmes de gouvernance des
Etats membres. D’où la question qui émerge : la nouvelle frontière de l’Union pose-t-elle les
limites de son efficacité managériale ?
La seconde raison consiste en la mise en exergue de la question turque (Entretiens avec
Jacques Lévy, 2007, p. 8-9) qui pose également le problème des frontières géopolitiques et
culturelles de l’Europe.
Enfin, l’accélération du processus d’élargissement appelle d’autres pays à se porter
candidat accentuant la pression sur l’Union européenne.
Il est donc désormais nécessaire que l’Union définisse ses frontières en raison de la
limite de ses capacités administratives à intégrer de nouveaux membres.
Nos propos seront pertinents si nous nous posons les questions majeures relatives à la
gouvernance européenne telles que : comment gérer les diversités en Europe ? Le dialogue
interculturel est un aspect clé du débat et une manière d’aborder le problème. La politique
européenne de voisinage est un élément de solution mais les décideurs européens sont face à un
point nodal de l’évolution européenne : élargir ou approfondir l’UE ?
La question des frontières est sans doute l’une des plus importantes de notre époque.
Les débats menés à Oradea en juin 2007 s’inscrivent dans une histoire qui éclaire peu ou prou
nos pas.
Le projet et les frontières de l’Union sont intiment liés comme l’étaient les limites des
Empires et les projets des hommes qui ont les ont construits (Ph. Paraire, 1996).
L’Histoire fournit de timides lumières sur le tracé des frontières. Cependant ce dernier
ne reste–t-il pas liée à la volonté des hommes et à leur imaginaire comme le montre l’épopée
romanesque de Gilles Lapouge intitulée « La mission des frontières » que j’ai lu en traversant
bien des frontières : « Il y a quelques années, les Brésiliens ont découvert, au fond de la forêt
amazonienne, une stèle formant frontière entre le Royaume du Portugal et les possessions
espagnoles. Nul ne sait qui a charrié cette pierre gigantesque, il y des siècles, depuis les
montagnes portugaises jusqu’au confins des choses » (Gilles Lapouge, 2007). Cette anecdote
montre que l’on peut faire de toute chose une « frontière », elle peut se transformer en un
obstacle ou être franchie au nom de la coopération trans-frontalière. Ces déclinaisons qui font
notre histoire sont autant d’éléments de notre analyse.
En Europe, la frontière est un terme utilisé pour décrire une région par delà les limites
mouvantes de l’UE. Cette dernière a désigné, dans la PEV, les pays de sa proximité qui font
partie du « voisinage » et sont, dans ce cadre, ses partenaires. Les candidats actuels sont la
Croatie et la Turquie (O. Rehn, 2007). L’Ukraine s’est également positionnée parmi les
premiers pays souhaitant rejoindre l’Union comme l’ont fait les pays des Balkans et du Sud
Caucase. Où s’arrêteront alors les frontières de l’Union ?
Lors de nos débats sur les nouvelles frontières européennes, nous avons tenté de
circonscrire les aspects géographiques (J. Lévy, 1997) mais nous avons également mis en
lumière ce qui définit les « Européens » aujourd’hui et ce que sont leurs valeurs communes (R.
Rezsohazy, 2007). Cependant, les systèmes politiques, administratifs et leurs frontières ne
coïncident pas toujours avec celles des systèmes culturels, sociaux et économiques (P. Artus, A.
Cartapania, L. Fontagné, 2006). L’Europe se réfère à plusieurs géométries. Elle contient de
nombreuses cultures différentes et cette grande diversité fait sa richesse et sa beauté. Apprendre
et se renseigner sur les autres cultures fait partie du voyage (G. P. Chomette).
Le concept de frontière devient dynamique et innovateur. La frontière existe dès lors pour être
franchie, elle n’est plus un obstacle mais un instigateur de coopération.
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Afin de mettre en exergue un des enjeux majeurs de la question des frontières
européennes, je voudrais citer Olli Rehn (O. Rehn, 2006-2007), Commissaire européen à
l’Elargissement : “The future challenge of EU is to meet new frontiers, not to retreat behind
borders”.
La définition des frontières de l’Europe s’est toujours posée avec acuité et est plus que jamais
au cœur de l’actualité. Les enjeux que les frontières adressent aux politiques portent sur
différentes dimensions du projet de l’Union et influencent le dessein et le destin européens.
« L’Europe n’en finit pas de déployer l’espace de son devenir » ( J.Lévy, 1997).
L’Europe n’a cependant que peu parlé de ses frontières (T. Ferenczi, 2007). Les textes
qui président à sa construction ne les mentionnent point. L’article 49 du Traité sur l’Union
européenne dispose que « tout Etat européen qui respecte les principes énoncés à l’article 6,
paragraphe 1er peut devenir membre de l’Union. L’article I-1 du projet de Traité constitutionnel
offre une formulation comparable : « L’Union est ouverte à tous les Etats européens qui
respectent ses valeurs et qui s’engagent à les promouvoir en commun ». Si les valeurs en
partage sont clairement énumérées dans le texte, la notion géopolitique d’Etat européen reste
indéfinie.
Ce constat montre toutes les difficultés et les défis que portent en elles les frontières de
l’Europe, présentes et à venir.
Tout dans le monde aujourd’hui nous pousse à abaisser les frontières : ainsi les
échanges commerciaux et économiques, grâce au libre échange, ainsi les médias et les
nouvelles technologies d’information et de communication, grâce à Internet, et les voyages,
grâce aux moyens de transport modernes et l’abolition progressive des visas et des contrôles
aux frontières.
Dévaluer le rôle des frontières voir les abolir à l’intérieur d’un espace européen unifié
constituait déjà une idée majeure du projet des pères fondateurs. Réunir et Réconcilier. Plus
largement, l’Europe a été construite sur l’idée de faire disparaître les frontières.
Tandis que dans l'Europe postcommuniste, une dé-légitimation et une redéfinition des
frontières se couplaient à une dissolution des fédérations multinationales, l'UE poursuivait plus
avant le processus de la dévaluation des frontières des Etats membres. Comme Robert Schuman
(1963) l'a mis en évidence : « les frontières sont nées d’une évolution historique et ethnique
respectable, d’un long effort d’unification nationale; on ne saurait songer à les effacer. A
d’autres époques, on les déplaçait par des conquêtes violentes ou par des mariages fructueux.
Aujourd’hui, il suffira de les dévaluer»
Le paradoxe de l’Europe unie est qu’elle ne peut renoncer à s’assigner des limites
territoriales mais qu’elle ne peut pas non plus les définir clairement par avance : « Il semble
bien que l’Europe de la construction européenne soit condamnée à rester ambiguë par rapport
à la géographie, qu’elle ne puisse se penser sans frontières mais que ces frontières soient
condamnées à rester mouvantes et contradictoires » (P. Hassner, 2003).
La géographie de l’Europe n’est pas seulement l’affaire des géographes, elle est, aussi
et surtout, celle des politiques (Jacques Lévy, 1997).
Comme le dit Jacques Lévy, c’est au moment où les frontières sont stabilisées qu’on
commence à vouloir les abolir. « C’est l’histoire un peu triste de cette utopie, qui, quand elle a
eu les moyens d’être réalisée, est déjà obsolète » (Jacques Lévy, 1997).
II. Concepts de base
Pour mieux comprendre l’évolution de la notion de frontière dans le cadre de la
dynamique européenne, il nous faut d’abord examiner sa genèse, définir le concept et en
circonscrire les acceptions. Notre approche doit prendre en compte la diversité que recouvre la
notion même de frontière.
Jusqu’au 18ème siècle, le mot “frontière” a eu une signification exclusivement
militaire « Faire front » signifiait alors faire front à l’ennemi. Elle désignait donc une limite
territoriale. Cette ligne était susceptible de bouger en fonction de l’évolution de la situation.
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Cette connotation de mouvement s’est maintenue dans le mot anglais « Frontier » qui par
opposition à « boundary » désigne une zone en mouvement. Aux Etats-Unis ou au Canada, elle
désignait une ligne vers l’Ouest perçue comme la limite de l’avancée coloniale.
Avec l’émergence de pouvoirs concentrés et le désir de mainmise du Prince sur son
territoire, la frontière devient le moyen de désigner la limite séparant deux Etats. L’essor, à la
Renaissance, de la cartographie renforce ce souhait de tracer des limites. On peut également
distinguer :
La frontière glacis : matérialisée par des obstacles naturels (chaîne montagneuse,
massifs forestiers) et donc faiblement peuplée, elle est davantage perçue comme un lieu de
protection (barrière) que comme un lieu de flux et d'échanges. Dans la perspective d’une
construction étatique, le Prince a tenté d’affirmer l’existence de frontières naturelles à son
territoire. Deux théories ont été formulées : l’une reconnaissait l’existence d’accidents
géographiques qui permettaient de marquer la séparation « naturelle » entre les Etats ; l’autre
qui montrait que les frontières naturelles ne reposent pas sur une justification topographique
mais sur une césure ethnoculturelle (critères ethniques, linguistiques, culturels) ou frontière
culturelle.
Ensuite vient la frontière creuset : caractérisée par une absence d'obstacle naturel, elle
doit son tracé à l'histoire davantage qu'à la géographie. Elle connaît souvent une urbanisation
importante des deux côtés de la frontière. Lieu de passage et d'échanges humains et
économiques, elle a favorisé le brassage et facilité l'émergence de références culturelles
communes.
D’autres géographes encore ont développé la thèse que les frontières sont le fait de
constructions humaines. Pour eux la frontière est le fruit de rapports de force et de négociations
entre décideurs politiques.
On peut affirmer que la référence militaire au front s’est évaporée, avec le temps, pour
laisser place à la notion positive de zone en mouvement.
Les frontières peuvent également être qualifiées de frontières fermées qui empêchent
pratiquement tout flux ; de frontières barrières dont le franchissement est soumis à certaines
restrictions tels que la détention d’un visa. Ces dernières décennies, la tendance est à
l’affaiblissement du rôle de barrière pour la frontière. Enfin, elles peuvent revêtir la qualité de
frontières ouvertes dont le franchissement est autorisé sans restriction. Dans ce sens, les
frontières entre les pays de l’espace Schengen sont un exemple de frontières ouvertes.
L’histoire européenne veut, qu’au-delà de la frontière, se trouve aujourd’hui, non plus
l’ennemi, mais le voisin, le partenaire, l’ami que l’on veut connaître dans une dynamique de
dialogue interculturel.
Les frontières de l'Europe, en 50 ans de construction européenne, ont non seulement
résulté de choix stratégiques mais d'un mélange d'événements et de décisions politiques
réfléchies. Arnold Toynbee a distingué les concepts suivants : « limes », les frontières d'un
Empire en déclin, « limen », les frontières d'un empire en extension.
L'Europe est aujourd'hui au carrefour entre la désintégration de l'empire
soviétique/russe et la construction d’un « empire de remplacement »1 ou plutôt « un espace
commun » pour le XXI ème siècle : l'Union européenne. Cette dernière grandit moins par
dessein que par l'attraction formidable qu’elle exerce sur les territoires de sa périphérie orientale
et méridionale. Les pays qui depuis un demi siècle étaient la périphérie de l'Est deviennent la
périphérie de l'Ouest. En faisant face à ses défis, l’Union européenne se déplace
incrémentalement plutôt que par conception (Kalypso Nicolaidis, 2005).
Une nouvelle carte politique est en construction et, pour la première fois, elle n'est pas
le fruit des conceptions et des rivalités de grandes puissances, mais principalement celui d’un
processus de changement démocratique et d’intégration européenne.
1
Selon Jacques Lévy, il n’y a pas de légitimité parmi les Européens pour faire de l’Europe un nouvel
Empire, personne ne veut ça, ça ne pourrait pas marcher. C’est une dimension (« impériale ») qui est
encore très présente à travers certaines choses comme le racisme. Ce sont plutôt les traces des anciens
empires.
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L’élargissement aux 12 nouveaux pays européens d’Europe centrale et orientale a
profondément affecté le rapport de l'Union européenne avec la Russie et sa périphérie
immédiate d'une part, et avec les Balkans et la Turquie d’autre part.
III. Nouvelles Frontières : « tracer » l'Europe : Les frontières en Europe et les frontières
de l'Europe
Frontières internes et externes : immigration, intégration, développement
« Tracer les frontières » est crucial pour la viabilité politique, économique et sociale de l’Union
européenne élargie (Jacques Rupnik, 2007) (et donc l'acceptation d'autres élargissements).
L'UE a été pendant environ vingt années la zone principale d'immigration au niveau
mondial (près de 40 millions d'immigrés, légaux et illégaux, résidant dans l'UE). Chaque année
environ 1.4 millions d'immigrés entrent dans l’UE (S. Lamalle, 2007), ce qui est plus que les
USA, le Canada et l'Australie réunis. En dépit des différentes rhétoriques, une légalisation
massive des immigrés illégaux a eu lieu en France et plus récemment en Italie (Berlusconi,
2004) et en Espagne (le gouvernement de Zapatero a légalisé un million d’immigrés en 2005).
En mars 2007, Wolfgang Schaübe, rappelait à propos des phénomènes migratoires lors
de la présidence allemande de l’Union : « Les défis qui sont au devant de nous continuent d’être
très importants, nous devons rester très vigilants et surveiller toute évolution dans les
phénomènes migratoires ».
En Belgique, la problématique de l’immigration est depuis juin 2007 à l’agenda des
négociateurs dans le cadre de la formation du gouvernement (une des pierres d’achoppement
des négociations).
L'impact de l'élargissement de l’UE a été minimal en termes de migration intra
européenne mais a peu ou prou renforcé la coopération des Etats membres, notamment par le
développement de l’idée d’une police des frontières mais les politiques d’immigration
demeurent du ressort des Etats (B. Khader, M. Martiniello, A. Rea, C. Timmerman, 2006 ; Ph.
De Bruycker p 239-254).
Tout comme les pays de l'Europe méridionale, les nouveaux membres d’Europe
centrale et orientale sont, pour des raisons de stagnation démographique, devenus terres de
passage et d’immigration de l'Est et du Sud. Ceci soulève de nombreuses questions au sujet des
droits des migrants (droits civiques) et de l'accès à l’Etat providence. Les frontières sont
contrôlées au niveau européen mais les politiques d'intégration restent nationales.
L’élargissement de l’Union européenne pose donc la question de la nature de ses
frontières (dures ou souples). Le dilemme peut être formulé comme suit : pour « vendre »
l’élargissement aux opinions publiques d’Europe l'Ouest, vous tendez à réclamer l'ordre dur des
frontières. Pour « vendre »l’élargissement en Europe centrale et orientale, vous devez plaider
pour des frontières plus souples.
La question de la nature des frontières en Europe est ainsi liée à la question des
frontières de l'Europe. Et la réponse à cette question dépendra du genre d’Union en
construction. Chaque communauté politique - et l'Union européenne en est une - doit avoir des
frontières. Chaque inclusion est par définition exclusion. Si vous avez intégré de nouveaux
Etats membres (in), cela signifie que vous en avez omis d'autres (out).
En 1957, Jean Monnet a observé que les frontières de la Communauté étaient moins le
résultat de la volonté des six membres fondateurs que de ceux qui voulaient ou ne pouvaient
rejoindre l’Union. Un demi siècle plus tard, soulever la question signifie s’interroger sur les
avantages de l’élargissement ou sur la capacité d’absorption de l'UE. En dehors de l'Union, la
recherche pour une identité européenne est devenue synonyme de l’ambition de rejoindre l’UE.
Cette confusion entre les frontières de l'Europe et de l'UE est, naturellement, un hommage
rendu à l’Union mais, certains experts s’interrogent sur le fait d’éviter la désintégration de
l’Union en raison de sa taille et sa capacité de gouvernance. Nous reviendrons plus loin sur les
problèmes liés à l’administration de l’Union élargie.
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Pour l'UE, la difficulté est d’autant plus grande qu’elle doit entièrement redéfinir sa
raison d’être, son identité et son projet politique. Des craintes existent tant pour les anciens
Etats membres que pour les nouveaux venus. Le problème pour les membres fondateurs de l'UE
est que la perspective "d'une union toujours plus étroite/profonde" a été remplacée par celle
"d'une union toujours plus grande". La crainte symétrique des nouveaux membres est que le
fantôme d'un tel "noyau" viderait l'élargissement durement gagné (et sa suite) de sa substance.
C'est alors une Europe Réseau qui apparaît comme projet géopolitique plutôt qu'un
régime et un acteur politiques.
À quelle vitesse l’UE devrait-elle s’agrandir ? Personne ne peut le dire et il serait
probablement impossible de trouver un consensus interne sur ses frontières futures. Les
frontières des Etats européens sont "historiquement inscrites dans l'espace"; elles sont le produit
de l'histoire. Les frontières de l’Europe ont été construites « contre l'histoire » en raison d’une
volonté politique. Les frontières de l'UE seront formées par le croisement entre un projet
démocratique et un projet géopolitique.
C’est dans ce sens que la question de l'élargissement de l’Union à l’Est est devenue
une "nouvelle frontière" dans le vrai sens du terme : « un moment pour la définir ».
IV. Frontières de l'Europe et futures frontières de l’Union européenne ? Les enjeux
majeurs.
Comme JF Kennedy l’a indiqué en 1960 pendant sa campagne présidentielle: “We
stand today on the edge of a new frontier,… a frontier of unknown opportunities and paths, a
frontier of unfulfilled hopes and threats,… The new Frontier …is not a set of promises; it is a
set of challenges…”
L'Europe fait face à cette situation.
Laissez-moi épingler quelques uns des défis auxquels elle doit répondre
1. Identité : Qui sommes-nous ?
La première question concerne évidemment la prétendue identité européenne : qui
sommes-nous et qui sont-ils ? Eriger des frontières signifie en effet créer des « Étrangers » en
sélectionnant nos « autres ». Mais dans le cas présent, la construction « contre » d’autres ne
reviendrait-elle ici à nier l'essence même de la création de l'Union européenne ?
La deuxième question qui émerge en discutant de l’identité européenne et de la nature
des frontières de l’UE touche à l’homogénéité et l'hétérogénéité. Dans cette perspective,
l'hétérogénéité de l’Europe peut être politiquement négociée mais ne peut être éliminée (R.
Leveau, 2005). Une vision vraiment "fédérale" de l'Europe, préservant les différences et les
solidarités culturelles, doit être modélisée. La question de qui peut rejoindre l’Union
européenne porte plus sur le partage d’une communauté de projet que sur le fait d’appartenir à
une communauté d’identité.
Il en va de même pour identifier qui est notre « voisin » et donc notre « partenaire »
(M. Hasting, 2007). Cette définition de l’autre constitue une troisième question tout aussi
fondamentale que les deux premières.
2. Gérer la diversité en Europe
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a) Diversité culturelle : Il n’est de richesses que d’hommes
Les derniers élargissements ont fait passer la population européenne (P. Verluise,
1/12/2004) de 379 millions à 492,3 millions d’individus. Cette augmentation des populations
produit un renforcement de la diversité des cultures qui devront cohabiter. Cette coexistence ne
pourra se faire que sur base d’un dialogue et d’un respect mutuel. Il ne s’agit pas ici de gommer
les différences de cultures et de valeurs, il s’agit de les partager. Car ce qui fait la richesse de
l’Europe réside dans sa diversité culturelle. Converger l’un vers l’autre ; porter le regard sur
l’autre ; partager le patrimoine culturel européen riche des apports multiples tels sont les
objectifs. Nul besoin d’uniformité, juste l’envie de découvrir l’autre dans son altérité.
b) Diversité administrative : Vers un espace administratif européen ?
Dans l’Union européenne, différents systèmes administratifs cohabitent depuis des
dizaines d’années.
Les systèmes de gestion administrative des Etats membres sont organisés sur des bases
culturelles, des modèles et des principes administratifs différents. Les expériences nationales
montrent cette grande variété des cultures administratives.
Cependant, à force d’être confrontés à des défis similaires, les administrations des
Etats membres de l’Union européenne ont tendance à converger vers des modèles de gestion
partagés. Cette convergence est renforcée par le développement de standards communs. Il faut
toutefois nuancer notre propos par la robustesse et la résistance institutionnelles.
La tendance à une certaine convergence se dessine aussi au niveau global (C. Pollitt,
2002, p. 471-492) avec le développement et le passage du « gouvernement » à la
« gouvernance ». Au niveau mondial et au niveau européen, cette propension est encore accrue
par le développement des « bonnes pratiques ».
Ces convergences sont-elles toutefois suffisantes pour laisser espérer la création d’un
espace administratif européen ? Les avis des experts divergent sur ce point. Ils observent une
convergence due non pas à « un acquis communautaire formel » mais à « un acquis non
formalisé » né de la confrontation des Etats aux enjeux majeurs de la gouvernance.
Jacques Ziller (J. Ziller, (98) 39) démontre que les Etats membres recherchent
l’inspiration dans l’expérience les uns des autres.
Ce chemin vers le « benchmarking » et vers le « bench learning » est encore favorisé
par le fait que depuis 1997 l’Union européenne a placé les questions administratives en tête de
son agenda. La question de la bonne gouvernance est devenue une des conditions de l’accession
(F. Maron, 2005, p. 44-57) … L’Union a coordonné la politique de reforme administrative et la
politique d’adhésion en portant une attention particulière au renforcement des capacités
administratives des pays candidats.
Il n’existe ni voie unique ni solution simple. Il s’agit d’améliorer les capacités de
gouvernance en favorisant la comparaison des expériences et en en épinglant les meilleures.
Comparer et partager les bonnes pratiques revient à mettre en œuvre un dialogue entre
les théoriciens et praticiens2. L’importance d’une « Plateforme européenne » est une évidence.
Ici, comparaison est raison.
3. Évaluer et mettre en oeuvre la politique européenne de voisinage
Avec son élargissement historique en mai 2004, l’Union européenne a accompli un
grand bond en avant pour promouvoir la sécurité et la prospérité sur le continent européen. Cet
élargissement signifie également que les frontières extérieures de l’Union ont été redessinées.
Nous avons aujourd’hui de nouveaux voisins et nous nous sommes rapprochés des anciens. Il
en résulte à la fois de nouvelles opportunités et de nouveaux défis. La politique européenne de
2
Le Groupe Européen d’Administration publique a lancé un Groupe « Bonnes pratiques en Administration
publique (Permanent Practitioners Group) et est partenaires du « European Public Sector Award »
(http://www.eps-award.eu). Ces deux initiatives visent à la création d’une « Plateforme européenne » :
http://www.iiasiisa.be/egpa/agacc.htm
119
voisinage (PEV) (F. Maron et R. de la Brosse, 2005) entend répondre (L. Beurdeley, 2005, p.
567-582 ; M. F. Labouz, C. Philip, P. Soldatos, 2006) à cette nouvelle donne mais aussi appuyer
les efforts en termes de stratégie européenne de sécurité.
L’objectif de la PEV est de faire partager aux pays voisins les bénéfices de
l’élargissement de l’UE en 2004 et 2007 pour renforcer la stabilité, la sécurité et le bien-être de
l’ensemble des populations concernées.
La PEV doit éviter la création de nouveaux clivages entre l’UE élargie et ses voisins et
leur offrir la possibilité de participer à diverses activités de l’UE dans le cadre d’une
coopération politique, sécuritaire, économique et culturelle renforcée.
La méthode proposée consiste à définir, avec les pays partenaires, un ensemble de
priorités dont la réalisation les rapprochera de l’Union européenne. Ces priorités sont ensuite
intégrées dans des plans d’action3 adoptés conjointement, couvrant un certain nombre de
domaines-clés qui requièrent une action spécifique : dialogue politique et réforme, commerce et
mesures préparant les partenaires à une participation progressive au marché intérieur, justice et
affaires intérieures, énergie, transports, société de l’information, environnement, recherche et
innovation, politique sociale et contacts entre communautés.
La relation privilégiée avec les voisins s’appuie sur un engagement réciproque en
faveur de valeurs communes se situant principalement dans les domaines de l’État de droit, de
la bonne gouvernance, du respect des droits de l’homme, notamment des droits des minorités,
de la promotion des relations de bon voisinage et des principes de l’économie de marché et du
développement durable. Des engagements de la part des pays partenaires sont également
demandés en ce qui concerne certains aspects essentiels de l’action extérieure de l’UE, en
particulier la lutte contre le terrorisme et la prolifération des armes et de destruction massive,
ainsi que le respect du droit international et des efforts dans le domaine de la résolution des
conflits.
Les plans d’action s’appuient sur un ensemble commun de principes mais sont
différenciés, reflétant en cela l’état des relations avec chaque pays, ses besoins et ses capacités
ainsi que les intérêts communs. Le niveau d’ambition des relations de l’UE avec ses voisins
tient compte de la mesure dans laquelle ces valeurs sont effectivement partagées (F. Maron, R.
de La Brosse, I. Horga, 2005).
Instrument central de la PEV, les Plans d'Action constituent un référentiel pour la
programmation de l'assistance en faveur des pays concernés. Cette assistance est complétée par
un appui au titre de l'instrument européen de voisinage, prévu pour la période 2007-13. Les
montants et la périodicité de cette assistance seront définis en fonction des engagements de
chacun des pays et des progrès dans la mise en oeuvre des Plans d'Action.
Le champ d'application des Plans d'Action couvre notamment les domaines suivants : Dialogue politique ; les Politiques de développement économique et social ; le ; la Justice et les
affaires intérieures ; la Coopération sociale et culturelle.
Les organes mis en place par les accords de partenariat et de coopération ou les
accords d’association suivent les progrès accomplis pour atteindre les priorités fixées
conjointement. La Commission rend compte périodiquement de ces progrès. Sur la base de cette
évaluation, l’UE, avec les pays partenaires, réexamine le contenu des plans d’action et décide le
cas échéant de les adapter et de les renouveler.
La politique européenne de voisinage renforce les formes existantes de coopération
régionale et sous-régionale et met en place un cadre pour leur développement ultérieur. La PEV
renforce la stabilité et la sécurité et contribue aux efforts entrepris pour résoudre les conflits. En
continuant à développer diverses formes de coopération transfrontalière, associant les autorités
locales et régionales (H. Comte, N. Levrat, 2006), ainsi que des acteurs non gouvernementaux
3
Les nouveaux voisins de l’Union Européenne, EurActiv, www.euractiv.com/fr/elargissement/nouveauxvoisins-ue/article-130588?_print, Publié le 7 octobre 2004 & mis à jour le 18 avril 2007 ; consulté le 4 mai
2007- Ce dossier propose un bilan des relations contractuelles, des plans d’action et un état des lieux grâce
aux rapports pays/PEV.
120
(K Czimre, 2006), l’UE et ses partenaires peuvent oeuvrer de concert pour faire en sorte que les
régions frontalières bénéficient de l’élargissement de l’UE de 2004 et de 2007.
Dans les régions méridionales, la PEV encourage également les participants à cueillir
pleinement les fruits du partenariat euro-méditerranéen (processus de Barcelone qui vient de
fêter ses 10 ans)), à promouvoir les interconnexions et les réseaux d’infrastructures, d’énergie
notamment, et à mettre en place de nouvelles formes de coopération avec leurs voisins. La PEV
contribue au développement du processus d’intégration régionale, en s’appuyant sur les
résultats atteints dans le cadre du partenariat euro-méditerranéen, entre autres dans le domaine
du commerce. Elle renforce les efforts consentis pour atteindre les objectifs de la stratégie
européenne de sécurité dans la région méditerranéenne (L. Beurdeley, 2007) et le MoyenOrient.
Le concept qui se trouve ancré dans la politique européenne de voisinage est celui d’un cercle
de pays, partageant les valeurs et objectifs fondamentaux de l’UE et s’engageant dans une
relation de plus en plus étroite allant au-delà de la coopération, c’est-à-dire impliquant un
niveau d’intégration économique et politique important. Cette démarche sécrète des gains
énormes pour les pays concernés en termes de stabilité, de sécurité et de prospérité renforcées.
La possibilité d’élargissement fait l’objet d’une grande incertitude au sujet des frontières. Après
l’arrivée de 15 Etats et demi en 2004 et 2007, d'autres Etats attendent toujours l'adhésion.
S'ajoutant à la géométrie variable de l'adhésion à l’UE, les politiques de l’Union ont proposé
d'offrir à Israël et à l'Ukraine une sorte d’"adhésion virtuelle" dans le cadre de la politique
européenne de voisinage (PEV).
Le dilemme pour l'UE est que, d’une part, l’élargissement et l’intégration plus
profonde pourrait garantir la fidélité des gouvernements et la stabilité à ses frontières, mais que
d’autre part, cela mettrait en péril son administration/sa gestion et surévaluerait les fidélités des
citoyens envers l'intégration européenne. La première manière de résoudre ce dilemme a été de
contrôler les frontières externes et d'influencer les pays voisins sans leur offrir d’adhésion mais
en leur offrant de nouvelles perspectives grâce aux plans inscrits dans la politique européenne
de voisinage (PEV). Les Etats périphériques craignent que des frontières de l’Union exclusives
ne créent des tensions économiques et politiques. La coopération a été lancée entre les Etats
membres et les voisins du bassin méditerranéen et ceux de l'Europe du nord concernant la
sécurité environnementale ou sociale. Intégrant ces deux initiatives, la PEV offre un cadre pour
éviter l'exclusion à une plus grande échelle.
En décembre 2006, la Commission réévaluait la PEV et tirait les leçons de ses actions.
Au vu des analyses, elle souhaitait renforcer la politique européenne de voisinage.
Un rapport de progrès a été examiné en juin 2007 et les conclusions ont été entérinées
par la présidence allemande de l’UE avant d’être présentées au Conseil européen.
Le 3 septembre 2007, lors de la Conférence sur la PEV, Benita Ferrero-Waldner,
Commissaire européen pour les Relations extérieures et la politique européenne de voisinage, a
rappelé les enjeux du renforcement de la PEV. Elle a épinglé les domaines principaux dans
lesquels elle estime que les partenaires tireront des bénéfices en renforçant cette politique :
l’intégration économique, la mobilité, l’énergie et l’assistance financière et technique (B.
Ferrero-Waldner, 2007).
Des initiatives ont été proposées telles que le développement des contacts entre les
peuples, l’intégration de dimensions thématiques (énergie, environnement, transport, santé)
dans la PEV. La mise en œuvre de ces programmes est en cours et des indicateurs de progrès
instaurés
Dans la rhétorique de la politique de voisinage, la Commission européenne définit les
frontières non plus en tant que lignes de division mais comme « pont » vers l’extérieur, vers le
voisin, le partenaire.
4. Lancement d'un vrai dialogue interculturel
121
Les effets des élargissements 2004 et 2007 combinés à ceux de la mobilité accrue, des
flux migratoires anciens (IIAS-IISA, 2007) et récents4, des échanges importants avec le reste du
monde à travers le commerce, l’éducation, les loisirs et la globalisation en général accroissent
les interactions entre les cultures, les religions et les langues en Europe et ailleurs.
Face à cette réalité de plus en plus multiculturelle des sociétés européennes et de son
espace d’intégration toujours en devenir, le rôle des médias et la place du dialogue interculturel
sont d’une grande importance afin de maintenir la diversité culturelle de l’Union tout en
renforçant sa cohésion et en promouvant le respect de valeurs communes. Ils permettent
également à l’Europe de nouer des partenariats avec les pays proches.
Ici, la frontière devient « ligne de partage » (J. Lévy, 1997) dans le sens positif du
terme, c’est-à-dire de mise en commun. Partage des valeurs, des idées, des projets…
L’idée de dialogue interculturel5 puise donc ses racines dans la reconnaissance de la
différence et de la multiplicité du monde dans lequel nous vivons. Ces différences d’opinion, de
points de vue et de valeurs existent au sein même des cultures mais surtout entre celles-ci. Le
dialogue interculturel vise à considérer ces différences avec le souhait profond de comprendre
l’autre. Il ouvre une interaction enrichissante menant au partage respectueux d’idées et de
valeurs. Il nous encourage à identifier les frontières culturelles qui nous définissent et nous
propose de communiquer à travers elles ou à les remettre en question.
En lançant en 2008 l’année du dialogue interculturel, l’Union européenne continue sur
sa lancée…En gardant « ouvertes » ses frontières …
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Multilingualism as a new EU-strategy and the impact of European political
border shifts on languages
Esther GIMENO UGALDE
Abstract: This paper analyses the relation between languages and borders. Borders
can be political, economic, cultural, etc. but they can also be linguistic. Like all kinds of
borders, language borders are dynamic and they highly depend on political border shifts. The
article offers an overview of the historic development of languages and borders during the 19th
and 20th centuries and its impact on language typology. It also offers a classification of crossborder languages and reviews language diversity in Europe while analyzing European
multilingualism as a new strategy of the EU.
Keywords: multilingualism, language diversity, cross-border languages, EU-language
typology, border shifts
-
About the concept of borders and its relevance
Borders in Europe have a long history. Especially in the twentieth century the
successive break-up of some multinational empires (Ottoman, Russian, Austro-Hungrian,
German, French and British) and most recently the break-up of the Soviet empire have
demonstrated the volatility of borders (O’Dowd: 1999,15). This is particularly true if we take
into account that in 1989 only ten European states had the same boundaries as one hundred
years ago (ibid 15-16).
Look at European history over the last hundred years, one could easily conclude that
contemporary borders have suffered important mutations. Thus borders (presumed to be
permanent1) should be defined as dynamic realities, which are in a permanent changing process.
Borders are not only dynamic, but also have different nature: They can be political, economic,
cultural, religious and also linguistic. Moreover, borders can be seen from different dimensions,
e.g. regional, national and transnational, and not to forget, they can also have a mental
dimension.
The European integration process leads us to rethink the concept of border and to
analyze its nature. Some idealist politicians and scholars think about the end of borders (mostly
related with the end of the nation-state) and dream of a “Europe without frontiers” or a
“borderless world” but, in my opinion, it is more than probable that borders will still exist in the
future. It is true that Europe has been in permanent renegotiation and redefinition of its
geographical and political territory and that the idea of a united Europe has developed a new
way of “thinking” and even “feeling” boundaries, maybe in a more flexible way, but Europe
and the European Union are still based on the concept of borders. In fact, borders are an
essential feature of human beings and “integral to the human behavior” (O’Dowd: 2002,14)2.
Therefore, nowadays the discussion about borders under different perspectives and the revision
of this concept seems to me more than necessary.
This paper deals with the concept of border in relation to languages. For this purpose, I
will first summarise the historic development regarding borders and languages. After offering a
classification of cross-border languages in the Europe, I will try to analyse multilingualism as a
new way of understanding the relation between borders and languages.
1
In fact, as Bornträger points out, borders are not permanent and rather limited. For instance, in Europe in
the year 1989 “only 45% of the length of inter state border lines had existed for 80 years or more, and this
after an unusually long period of territorial stability” (1999:3). Cf. also O’Dowd: 1999,15.
2
Similarly, Gerard Delanty sees borders as “products of human agency” (Delanty: 2006,48).
125
-
The historic development of borders and languages
During the 19th century, Europe was in part a transnational entity built up of different
multinational empires (e.g. Habsburg, Hohenzollern, Ottoman). Considering this, we could say,
on the one side, that boundaries have been flexible through the history and, on the other side,
that the contact among languages, multilingualism and language diversity are not a new
phenomenon in Europe.
Since the late 18th century, however, the nation-state with a unique national language
became (with some exceptions) the main pattern in the Western European landscape. France or
Spain, just to give two examples, have been officially monolingual nations since the 18th
century3. For instance, French was the official language for French people and Spanish for the
Spaniards. Even for those who spoke another language as mother tongue, the so-called
regional/minority languages4, accepted the role of the national language as the official language
(in contrast to regional languages which were banished from all public domains). Despite of this
situation, all European countries were still multilingual.
In this mainly monolingual official context, French was the lingua franca for
diplomacy and international relations since the 17th century. After the World War I this position
was replaced by English, which still is the most used communication language of international
relations, business and science.
In the 19th and 20th century, most European countries have remained officially
monolingual, even in most of the cases some languages coexisted in different degrees5. Contact
with other languages happened, however, in some concrete cases in areas with language borders
within the same country: for instance, this was the case of French-German, Italian-German and
Romansh-German in Switzerland. There was also contact in border regions of countries with
different languages (e.g. in border regions of Spain and Portugal). Another case of contact
occurred between official and regional/minority languages in which -needless to say- the
official languages enjoyed a major prestige especially in formal contexts (e.g. Spanish and
Catalan during the 18th and the main part of the 19th century). And of course, contact with other
languages happened when people traveled with different purposes to other countries. In this last
case, people normally used a lingua franca, mainly an international language, or they spoke the
language of the country. These cases are still common nowadays; nevertheless, as it should be
highlighted in the next paragraph, the existence of the European Union has vastly changed the
way of understanding language contact6.
-
The impact of European political border shifts on languages: the relation between
borders and languages in the 20th and 21th centuries
The European Union has been a starting point for a new way of understanding borders,
also concerning languages. During the first part of the 20th century the states of Europe (with a
few exceptions7) have seen the border of the own country as a linguistic border as well. The
establishment of the EU, however, has set up a new framework, in which contact among
3
Indeed, only since the late twentieth century (after Franco’s death) the so-called regional or minorities
languages enjoy legal status in Spain, whereas France remains a special case since it does not offer any
legal status to its minority languages.
4
As Máiréad Nic Craith points out, the origin of most regional and minority languages as minority
languages have their roots in the nineteenth century, when they were excluded from official status during
the state-building process. See: http://www.pfd2004.org/show.php?page_id=48
5
Probably the most well known and paradigmatic exception is Switzerland, a quadringual nation in which
all four languages, French, German, Italian and Romansh enjoy legal equal status. French, German and
Italian are national languages since 1848, whereas Romansh is national since 1938 (cf. Rash: 2002,113).
6
The term “language contact” is here differently used as the traditional sense known from the
Sociolinguistics.
7
Some exceptions are, for instance, countries with the same official language such as France and Belgium.
126
languages is continuously increasing and in which the official status of languages goes further
than the own state.
Thus the European Economic Community (EEC), created by the Treaty of Rome in
1957, established four official languages: Italian, French, German and Dutch (see Table 1). The
EU enlargements have extended the number of official languages progressively to 23. By the
first enlargement in 1973, Danish and English have obtained the official status in the EU. With
the accession of Greece (1981), Greek became the 7th official language and five years later in
1986 Spain and Portugal also joined the EU being Spanish and Portuguese official too. The
1995 enlargement introduced Finnish and Swedish to the EU. More recently, the 2004
enlargement conferred the official status to nine more languages, namely Czech, Estonian,
Hungarian, Latvian, Lithuanian, Maltese, Polish, Slovak and Slovene. With the latest
enlargement this year (2007), Bulgarian and Romanian became EU official languages and also
Irish obtained the official status with derogation8 (see Table 2). It should be emphasised here
that the question of multilingualism in the EU has been tackled (either implicitly or explicitly)
since the creation of the EEC. On the other hand, the fact that the number of official languages
in the EU amounts to 23 should not lead us to believe that all of them are used in all
communication contexts. For pragmatic reasons, each EU-institution has established its own
language regime, reducing not de iure but de facto the official status of certain number of
languages9.
TABLE 1
Year Foundational Member States
Total of Official Languages
Total
Member
of Official
States
Languages
1957 France, Germany, Italy, Belgium,
6
Italian, French, German, Dutch
4
Netherlands, Luxembourg
(except Luxembourgish10)
TABLE 2
Year Accession of new Member
States
1973 Denmark, Ireland, United
Kingdom
1981 Greece
1986 Spain and Portugal
1995 Austria, Finland and Sweden
2004 Cyprus, Czech Republic,
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia,
Lithuania, Malta, Poland,
Slovakia, Slovenia
2007 Bulgaria and Romania
8
Total of Official Languages
Member
States
9
Danish and English (Irish
obtained a particular status)
10
Greek
12
Spanish and Portuguese
15
Finnish and Swedish
25
Czech, Estonian, Hungarian,
Latvian, Lithuanian, Maltese,
Polish, Slovak, Slovene
27
Bulgarian and Romanian
+ Irish became official with
derogation11
Total
of Official
Languages
6
7
9
11
20
23
Not all documents have to be translated into Irish as is the case of the other EU official languages
(Climent/Gimeno: 2006,141).
9
For example, the languages used by the Commission are English, French and German: meetings are
conducted in these three languages. More detailed information on this topic can be founded in
Climent/Gimeno (see references), concretely in pages 139-140.
10
Luxembourgish became official in Luxemburg in the year 1984.
11
Council Regulation (EC) 920/2005 of June 13 2005. Irish was already Treaty Language since 1973.
127
The tables presented above should provide a better overview of the EU official
languages which are currently 23 (see Annex12). For the member states the official status of a
language is not exclusively reduced any more to the national level, but it is also extended to the
EU-level. Consequently, as has been mentioned before, the EU leads us to rethink borders not
only in political, economic and cultural terms, but also in terms of languages.
European multilingualism is reflected, only in part, in the previous tables which have
presented the official languages of the current EU. However, the European language mosaic is
more complex and richer. In Europe there are more than 70 languages13, with obviously
different number of speakers and with a different level of recognition and legal status14. All EU
member states are multilingual and consequently the number of the EU official languages does
not reflect the language richness neither of the Union nor of its member states.
Europe has, on the one hand, a large number of the so-called “regional/minorities
languages” and, on the other, many languages which belong to the category “immigrant
languages”. As Extra and Gorter have noticed, the origin of most of European regional/minority
languages as minority languages “lies in the 19th century, when, during the processes of stateformation in Europe, they found themselves excluded from the state level, in particular from
general education” (Extra/Gorter: 2001,2. Cf. also footnote 4). Thus, they did not become
official languages of the nation-states, which were established. Since that moment, their
existence has been continually threatened and only during the last few decades some of them
have obtained more protection in legal terms, both at national and at European level, being part
of political action of the EU.
Over the centuries, there have always been speakers of immigrant languages in Europe.
But it has been especially in the last years when these language communities have emerged due
to an intensification of immigration processes in some member states (Extra/Gorter: 2001,2-3).
These languages, such as Turkish and Arabic, are spoken by millions of inhabitants in the EUmember states (especially in Western Europe), but they are much less protected than the
regional/minority languages and are excluded from EU-action plans. Actually, as it has been
claimed by Extra and Gorter, learning and in less extend teaching these languages is often seen
as an obstacle to integration.
Before dealing with the question of how does the EU promotes multilingualism, it
seems relevant to me to analyse language diversity within the EU, paying special attention to
the concept of border, in order to establish a language classification.
Some of the EU official languages enjoy official status in different countries15: this is
the case of English, French, German, Greek and Swedish, which are official at national level in
different member states (see Table 3).
12
The table presented in the Annex offers an overview of the EU official languages and the countries in
which are officially spoken (national level).
13
A
detailed
list
of
languages
spoken
in
Europe
can
be
founded
in:
http://www10.gencat.net/casa_llengues/AppJava/en/diversitat/diversitat/llengues_europa.jsp
14
Even though the EU has substantially changed the way of understanding border and languages, it should
be here emphasised that the level of recognition and legal status of languages still is a national issue. In
other words, the member states still decide the legal status of languages spoken in their territory.
15
The term of “official” is polysemic and it used at different levels: supranational (here EU-level),
national and regional level. I will distinguish therefore three types of official languages: first of all, EU
official languages (currently 23. See Table 1), secondly, official languages at national level. In other
words, languages which are officially recognised in the whole national territory (e.g. German in Austria
and Germany and Romanian in Romania) and, finally, official languages at regional level, i.e. languages
which enjoy official status in one or more regions within a country, but not in a whole national territory
(Catalan in Catalonia, Balearic Islands and Valencia). As it has been pointed out in footnote 14, although
the EU has replaced the nation-state in terms of sovereignty in many aspects, the decision of the legal
recognition of a language is still taken by the nation-states.
128
TABLE 3
Official language
English
French
German
Greek
Swedish
Member State
U.K.
Ireland (co-official, together with Irish)
Malta (co-official, together with Maltese)
France
Belgium
Luxembourg
Germany
Austria
Luxembourg
Greece
Cyprus
Sweden
Finland (co-official, together with Finnish)
The rest of the 23 EU official languages are only official in one member state such as
Romanian, Bulgarian, Spanish, Greek, just to mention a few of them. However, many of the EU
official languages are spoken in several countries, even though they do not enjoy official status
at national level in other countries: these are the so-called minority or regional languages16.
Hungarian, for instance, is official in Hungary and therefore EU official language (that means at
supranational level). It is also a minority language in Romania, Southern Slovakia and Eastern
Austria, where it is recognised as an ethnic minority. In North-eastern Slovenia it even enjoys
co-official status17.
The described case is very common in Europe. As a result of political changes, in
many cases state borders have divided language communities, building what have been called
“cross-border languages”18. As it has been highlighted by Máiréad Nic Craith, “languages that
are spoken in more than one state which are not necessarily adjacent” - i.e. non neighboring
countries, are included into this category19. Within the European context, cross-border
languages can be divided into two groups: the first group is built by languages with an official
status in the European Union, but which are considered minority/regional languages in other EU
member state (such as the Danish speaking community in Germany or the German speaking
community in Denmark or also the Hungarian speaking community mentioned above. See more
examples in Table 4). The second category is reserved to languages with official status in a
country (at national level), which is not a member state of the Union, but which are considered
regional/minority languages in a EU-member state: this is the case of Croat speakers in Italy,
Austria, Hungary, Romania and Bulgaria or Turkish speakers in Bulgaria and Greece, just to
mention two examples (see other examples in Table 5).
16
The Euromosaic III study (2004), performed by a team of experts and scientists thanks to a EUComission’s initiative, listed aprox. 90 minority groups in the EU25 member states.
Compare:
http://ec.europa.eu/education/policies/lang/languages/langmin/euromosaic/synthesis_en.pdf
17
Hungarian is also recognised as an ethnic minority in other European countries which do not form part
of the EU: Eastern Croatia, Northern Serbia and Montenegro and Western Ukraine.
18
Here it may be interesting to introduce the concept of “kin state” language. This term is referred to “a
country where the regional or minority language is a state official language, and therefore potentially able
to serve as support in various forms” (from Euromosaic III study. See footnote 16). This notion has been
particularly relevant since the 2004 enlargement, because most of the new regional and minority languages
in the new 10 member states have “kin states”.
19
See: http://www.pfd2004.org/show.php?page_id=48
129
TABLE 4
(Official in EU member state/s and minority/regional language in other EU member
state/s20)
Official Language
Regional/Minority Language
Bulgarian
Czech Republic
Greek
Hungary
Danish
Germany
Finnish
Sweden
French
Italy
German
Denmark
Hungary
Czech Republic
Estonia
Italy
Latvian
Lithuania
Poland
Slovakia
Slovenia
Romania
Hungarian
Romania
Slovakia
Austria
Slovenia
TABLE 5
(Official in a non-member state but regional/minority language in EU member state/s21)
Official Language
Albanian
Italy
Greece
Catalan22
Spain
France
Italy
Croatian
Italy
Austria
Hungary
Romania
Bulgaria
Turkish
Bulgaria
Greece
Macedonian
Bulgaria
Greece
The next case refers to languages, spoken in more than one member state of the EU,
which have official status neither at national nor at Union’s level such as Basque, Occitan or
Sami (See Table 6). In my point of view, these languages can be seriously endangered, since
20
This table is not completed: it just provide some examples of this category.
(Cf. footnote 20).
22
It has official status in Andorra.
21
130
they are not official in any state (and if so, only at regional level), even though, as
minority/regional languages, the EU has taken some actions to promote and safeguard them.
TABLE 6
(Non-official status neither at national nor at EU-level23)
Official Language
Basque
Spain
France
Occitan
Spain
France
Italy
Sami
Sweden
Finnland
The last type of cross-border language is rather a unique case within the EU. I have
reserved this category for Romanian, which is an official language of an EU-member state
(Romania) and therefore since this year official at EU-level but also official at national level in
a European non-member state (Moldavia) (Table 7).
TABLE 7
(Official in EU member state and official in a non-member state24)
Official Language
Country
Romanian
Romania
Moldavia
The tables above (3-7) illustrate different typologies of cross-border languages in
Europe. It should be pointed out that it is of course not a final classification but a first attempt to
classify cross-border languages within the European landscape. Language classification can be
established from different perspectives. I have proposed a possible classification taking the
concept of cross-border as reference, but there are many other language typologies we can deal
with. A very common classification of European languages (different from the official EU
languages) are the so-called regional/minorities languages and immigrant minority languages. I
would also add another type (not only present in Europe but almost around the world) which is
reserved to stateless languages such as Yiddish and Romany. In my opinion, all these
classifications have something in common: they are all very close to the concept of border.
Therefore, if we think about enlargement in terms of next frontiers (following Olli Rehn’s
proposal25), we can only conclude that these types are subjected to changes.
23
The level of recognition and legal status of these category’s languages vary considerably from language
to language since it still is a national issue (see footnote 15). For instance, Basque is co-official in the
Basque Country (Spain); it is co-official or has certain recognition in Navarra (Spain), depending on the
region and it has no recognition in France. Occitan, spoken only in North-Western Catalonia, is official in
Catalonia (Spain) since 2006 (Catalan Statute of Autonomy); it is not recognised in France and it has some
kind of legal recognition in some regions of Italy. Finally, Sami is official in Northern and Central Norway
and Northern Finland and recognised as an ethnic minority in some regions of Sweden and Russia.
24
Italian could be also included within this category since it is official in a EU member state (Italy) and
also in a non-European member state (Switzerland). Nevertheless, I consider the case of Italian a different
one, because it shares the official status in Switzerland with French, German and Romansch, being thus a
quadringual nation (Cf. footnote 5).
25
The idea of “next frontiers” is taken from Olli Rehn, the European Commissioner for Enlargement, who
used the rhetorical question: “instead of limits and borders ... couldn’t we Europeans think in terms of next
frontiers”, quoted by Ioan Horga (2007,28).
131
4. Multilingualism: A new EU-strategy and way of understanding the relation
between borders and languages
Language is an integral part of our identity26 and “the most direct expression of
culture” . People socialise through language, which helps to organise our thoughts and transmit
our cultural heritage. The EU has been always sensitive to the crucial role of languages and has
always attached importance to multilingualism in order to respect European language diversity.
Europe has been and will always be multilingual. Therefore, in an increasing
interconnected Europe, learning new languages can open new doors not only in the labour and
academic environment (for instance making people more mobile) but also in personal contexts.
The EU has also seen language learning as a form of understanding other people and their way
of thinking, which can avoid racism, xenophobia and intolerance. As the EU itself declares:
“Languages build bridges to other people and cultures”. If it is so (as I also strongly believe),
languages open the door to new cultures and enhance an intercultural dialogue. For all these
reasons, the EU considers language learning a major component of education and training
programs. Being aware of its importance, the EU has launched an action plan for language
learning and linguistic diversity in 2003. The main goal of this action is that Europeans should
be able to communicate in at least two languages in addition to their mother tongue - i.e. the socalled “mother tongue plus two other languages principle”. This principle is based on the idea
that the use of a lingua franca has limitations28.
Even though multilingualism and language diversity have been always crucial within
the EU (e.g. Socrates and Leonardo da Vinci programs), it has been over last years, especially
since the European Year of Languages in 2001, when some relevant promoting actions have
been lunched. One of the most important steps was to include by decision of President Mariano
Barroso in 2004 Multilingualism for the first time as part of a portfolio of the Commission.
Consequently, Jan Figel29 became in November 2004 Member of the European Commission
responsible for Education, Training, Culture and Multilingualism. This new EU-policy aims at
three main goals: first, to encourage language learning and promoting linguistic diversity in
society; second, to promote a healthy and multilingual economy and third, to give citizenships
access to European Union legislation in their own languages30. This decision clearly
demonstrates that multilingualism is a core value in the EU and a new future strategy. Since
January 1 2007, with the accession of Bulgaria and Romania to the Union, Multilingualism has
been transferred to Commissioner Leonard Orban being the first Commissioner for
Multilingualism in the History of the EU31.
27
5. Concluding remarks
Borders whatever their nature, can be considered dynamic. In terms of languages,
borders are flexible and on permanent change. The impact of European political border shifts
has consequences in language classification. Therefore, we can conclude that the proposed
classification would change, if political borders would be moved (e.g. by a new EU
enlargement). In other words, this classification highly depends on political borders.
26
Ioan Horga speaks about four different types of identities: regional, religious, racial and linguistic.
(Horga: 2007,35).
27
In: http://ec.europa.eu/education/policies/lang/doc/com596_en.pdf
28
The International Seminar titled “From Kaliningrad to the Black Sea: Intercultural Dialogue and the
New Interpretation of the Frontier” organised by the IERS in Oradea from 5-9 June 2007 is a good
example for this. Whereas English and in less extend French have been mostly used as lingua franca
during the presentations, many participants communicated in many other different languages (e.g.
German, Hungarian, Romanian or even Spanish), establishing thus bridges to other people and cultures
and promoting interculturalism.
29
See: http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/figel/index_en.htm
30
http://ec.europa.eu/education/policies/lang/doc/com596_en.pdf
31
http://ec.europa.eu/commission_barroso/orban/index_en.htm
132
As it has been seen, the establishment of the EU and its rich European linguistic
mosaic lead us to review, on the one side, language diversity in Europe and, on the other, the
concept of “borders” in linguistic terms.
Languages can be both a frontier and a bridge to other people and cultures. The EU
strongly believes in the importance of learning languages as a way of establishing bridges to
other people and cultures and has developed multilingualism as a new strategy for Europe.
Thus, we can conclude that the multilingualism-strategy is based on a new interpretation of the
EU-frontier.
ANNEX
EU OFFICIAL LANGUAGE
Bulgarian
Danish
Estonian
French
Finnish
German
Greek
Hungarian
Irish
Italian
Latvian
Lithuanian
Maltese
Dutch
Romanian
Polish
Slovak
Spanish
Swedish
English
EU-MEMBER STATE
Bulgaria
Denmark
Estonia
Belgium (French is official together with Flemish)
France
Luxembourg
Finland
Austria
Germany
Luxembourg
Cyprus
Greece
Hungary
Ireland (Irish is official together with English)
Italy
Latvia
Lithuania
Malta (Maltese is official together with English)
Netherlands
Romania
Poland
Slovakia
Spain
Sweden
Finland (as well as Finnish)
United Kingdom
Ireland (as well as Irish)
Malta (as well as Maltese)
References:
ANDERSON, JAMES / O’DOWD, LIAM / WILSON, THOMAS. M. “Why Study Borders
Now?” In: Regional and Federal studies. Special Issue on New Borders for a Changing
Europe. Cross-border Cooperation and Governance (ed. Anderson, James / O’Dowd, Liam /
Wilson, Thomas M.). Vol. 12, No. 4, Winter 2002, pp. 1-12.
BORNTRÄGER, EKKERHARD W. Borders, Ethnicity and National Self-determination.
Braumüller: Vienna, 1999.
CLIMENT, VICENT / GIMENO, ESTHER. “EU Enlargements and its Linguistic Borders: A
Historical Review”. In: Eurolimes. Vol. 1. Oradea, 2006, pp. 136-143.
DELANTY, GERARD. “Borders in a Changing Europe: Dynamics of Openness and Closure”.
In: Eurolimes. Vol. 1., Oradea, 2006, pp. 46-58.
133
EXTRA, GUUS / GORTER, DURK. “Comparative perspectives on regional and immigrant
minority languages in multicultural Europe”. In: The other languages of Europe (ed. Extra,
Guus / Gorter, Durk). Multilingual Matters LTD, 2001. pp. 1-41.
HORGA, IOAN. “The role of the Media in changing the meaning of borders”. In: Eurolimes.
Vol. 2. Oradea, 2007, pp. 28-46.
O’DOWD, LIAM. “The Changing Significance of European Borders”. In: Regional and
Federal studies. Special Issue on New Borders for a Changing Europe. Cross-border
Cooperation and Governance (ed. Anderson, James / O’Dowd, Liam / Wilson, Thomas M.).
Vol. 12, No. 4, Winter 2002, pp. 13-36.
RASH, FELICITY. “The German-Romance Language Borders in Switzerland”. In: Journal of
Multilingual and Multicultural Development. Vol. 23, No. 1 and 2, 2002, pp. 112-136. In:
www.multilingual-matters.net/jmmd/023/0112/jmmd0230112.pdf
Images of openness - Images of closeness
Enrique BANUS
Abstract:This essay presents the history of Europe from the cultural point of view, the
influence different European cultures and literatures had upon the evolution and relations
among peoples, the necessity of the linkage of each culture to its roots. It also makes a survey
upon the world wide perspective language and culture give to the human beings. The author
raises the problem of identity seen through the linkage with the historical mentality and the
frontiers.
Key words: frontier, literature, openness, closeness, culture, tradition, identity
1. Ways for Defining National Identity
In the 12th century Geoffrey of Monmouth wrote his famous Historia regum Britanniae
(The History of the Kings of Britain)1. It begins with the story of the mythical origins of the
Britons, linked with Britus or Brutus, a descendent of Anaeis, the Trojan hero, the point of
reference during the Middle Ages. In fact, Geoffrey of Monmouth tells the following story:
After the Trojan war, Aeneas, flying with Ascanius from the destruction of their city,
sailed to Italy. There he was honourably received by king Latinus, which raised against him the
envy of Turnus, king of the Rutuli, who thereupon made war against him. Upon their engaging
in battle, Aeneas got the victory, and having killed Turnus, obtained the kingdom of Italy, and
with it Lavinia the daughter of Latinus. After his death, Ascanius, succeeding in the kingdom,
built Alba upon the Tiber, and begat a son named Sylvius, who, in pursuit of a private amour,
took to wife a niece of Lavinia. The damsel soon after conceived, and the father Ascanius,
coming to the knowledge of it, commanded his magicians to consult of what sex the child should
be. When they satisfied themselves in the matter, they told him she would give birth to a boy,
who would kill his father and mother, and after travelling over many countries in banishment,
would at last arrive at the highest pitch of glory. Nor where they mistaken in their prediction;
for at the proper time the woman brought forth a son, and died of his birth; but the child was
delivered to a nurse and called Brutus.
The travel to the island which will become the Britons’ fatherland is the consequence
of a superior will, in that case, of Diana’s commandment:
Brutus! there lies beyond the Gallic bounds
An island which the western sea surrounds,
By giants once possessed, now few remain
To bar thy entrance, or obstruct thy reign.
To reach that happy shore thy sails employ
There fate decrees to raise a second Troy
And found an empire in thy royal line,
Which time shall ne'er destroy, nor bounds confine.
1
More details to Geoffrey, for example, in John Jay Parry and Robert Caldwell. "Geoffrey of Monmouth"
in ''Arthurian Literature in the Middle Ages'', Roger S. Loomis (ed.). Clarendon Press: Oxford University.
1959.
135
Awakened by the vision, he was for some time in doubt with himself, whether what he
had seen was a dream or a real appearance of the goddess herself, foretelling to what land he
should go2.
A foundation story is told here, a story that, of course, has to be linked with the heroic
times of the Trojan War.
When four centuries later, in the XVIth century (concrete in 1572), Luis de Camoes
was writing the national epos of the Portuguese (The Lusiads), he stated Lisbon was founded by
Ulysses
And thou, famed Lisbon, whose embattled wall
Rose by the hand that wrought proud Ilion’s fall;
Thou queen of cities, whom the seas obey,
Thy dreaded ramparts own’d the hero’s sway3.
Again a foundation story: a city looks for a heroic ancestor. When comparing this text
with Geoffrey’s one there is, of course, a relevant change: now the point of reference is Ulysses,
now more Aeneas. This change is very eloquent for a transition: the transition from Middle
Ages to Renaissance.
Ulysses is now the point of reference, no more Aeneas, who was the hero during the
Middle Ages4: he will –only one example for his popularity– accompany Dante in the Divina
Commedia5, whereas Ulysses is burning in the Hell, because, after arriving in Ithaca, he has
abandoned Penelope, for seeking for new adventures on sea6. Odysseus, known only through –
2
Quoted after http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/History_of_the_Kings_of_Britain/Book_1#_ref-3, that
reproduces the translation based on Aaron Thompson (1718), revised and corrected by J. A. Giles (1842).
3
Os Lusiadas III.57-58, See also III.74; IV.84, and VIII.5. Quoted after http://www.sacredtexts.com/neu/lus/index.htm: The Lusiad, by Luis de Camõens, trans. by William Julius Mickle [1776,
edition of 1877].
4
His prestige is so high that in Dante’s Divina Commedia one of the characters exclaims: "Per te poeta fui,
per te cristiano". It was Statius, a Roman poet of the Silver Age of Latin literature, in the 1st century. The
quote in the Purgatory, Chant XX, verse 73. St. Augustine’s admiration for Vergil is probably one of the
causes for this high prestige: “San Agustín conoce y cita todas las obras de Virgilio” (José Oroz: San
Agustín. Cultura clásica y cristianismo, Salamanca, 1988, 35).
5
Dante greets him with the following words, plenty of admiration: "Now, art thou that Virgilius and that
fountain / Which spreads abroad so wide a river of speech? […] O, of the other poets honour and light, /
Avail me the long study and great love/That have impelled me to explore thy volume! / Thou art my
master, and my author thou,/Thou art alone the one from whom I took / The beautiful style that has done
honour to me.” (The Divine Comedy, translated by Henry Wadsworth Longfellow; see
http://www.everypoet.com/Archive/poetry/dante/dante_i_01.htm).
6
At the end of Canto XXVI in the Inferno, Ulysses tells the story: Nor fondness for my son, nor reverence
/ For my old father, nor the due affection / Which joyous should have made Penelope, / Could overcome
within me the desire / I had to be experienced of the world, / And of the vice and virtue of mankind; / But I
put forth on the high open sea / With one sole ship, and that small company /By which I never had
deserted been. / Both of the shores I saw as far as Spain, / Far as Morocco, and the isle of Sardes, / And the
others which that sea bathes round about. /I and my company were old and slow / When at that narrow
passage we arrived / Where Hercules his landmarks set as signals, / That man no farther onward should
adventure. […] / 'O brothers, who amid a hundred thousand / Perils,' I said, 'have come unto the West, / To
this so inconsiderable vigil / Which is remaining of your senses still / Be ye unwilling to deny the
knowledge, / Following the sun, of the unpeopled world. / Consider ye the seed from which ye sprang; /
Ye were not made to live like unto brutes, / But for pursuit of virtue and of knowledge.' / […] Five times
rekindled and as many quenched / Had been the splendour underneath the moon, / Since we had entered
into the deep pass, / When there appeared to us a mountain, dim / From distance, and it seemed to me so
high / As I had never any one beheld. / Joyful were we, and soon it turned to weeping; / For out of the new
land a whirlwind rose, / And smote upon the fore part of the ship. / Three times it made her whirl with all
the waters, / At the fourth time it made the stern uplift, / And the prow downward go, as pleased Another, /
Until the sea above us closed again" (The Divine Comedy, op. cit.; see
http://www.everypoet.com/Archive/poetry/dante/dante_i_26.htm).
136
strongly transforming– translations, was not so popular: he was seen as an astute but not always
honest negotiator, who, for example, caused Troy’s fall using a stratagem.
The protagonist has changed but the nucleus is the same: when establishing the
collective identity, when looking for the roots, for the foundation myth, the identity is
established in positive connection to the others – to specific others, of course. The origins have
come from abroad, from a glorious past, from the heroes of the Antiquity. To underline this link
is a matter of pride, not of humiliation.
As a joke, but with a serious fundament, Hans–Robert Jauss has once written: “Dans la
tradition européenne, les préhistoires reçoivent habituellement leurs lettres de noblesse quand
elles sont à même de prouver qu'elles descendent soit d'Homère, soit de la Bible (Jauss, 1989:
59-76, p60). In fact, the historical reference has dignified a city, a country, a society, in the
collective memory. What is relevant in our context is that during centuries this reference was
made looking over the borders, finding the dignity precisely in being linked with great heroes
“from abroad”.
Also the European Union tries to establish some links with worthy ancestors: the
Preamble of the failed “European Constitution” mentions “the cultural, religious and humanist
inheritance of Europe”7 as point of reference. But the European integration is born in a time in
which the references to the “heroes from abroad” are no more so simple, in which frontiers have
played an essential role, in which the world has become more complex.
Many examples can be found for this evolution in cultural history in Europe. In 1687,
the German philosopher Christian Thomasius wrote a book8 with the eloquent title Von
nachnahmung der Franzosen (“On the imitation of the Frenchmen”). He doesn’t advocate
enthusiastically the imitation of the French culture, but he neither rejects it as a matter of
principle. His position tries to be balanced, recognising that the French behaviour is more
refined than the German in many fields – and he identifies sometimes „French“ with
„European“. And this is relevant in our context. Already in European Modernity the look over
the borders can be considered enriching – although it shall not be forgotten that the positive
reception has to do with the political events 1689–1721; after that, in Germany a vogue of
Europeanism has arisen and it was acceptable to admire French intellectuals. In any case,
Finsen’s dictum is true: „Es regt sich bei Thomasius kein beleidigter Nationalstolz, denn es geht
Zivilisation vor Nation, und jene ist zur Zeit französisch vertreten“9: civilisation is considered
more relevant that „the nation“; if civilisation is found outside the own borders, it can be
„imported“. The other is considered as complementary to the own culture, as a mirror looking
to which the own debility can be overcome.
Again some time later, around two centuries, we find another German text with a very
similar title: „Nachahmung der Franzosen“. In that case it is a poem by Heinrich Seidel, a short
poem published 189310: “Nachahmung der Franzosen“:
Haben wir den Feind aufs Haupt geschlagen,
Um seine abgelegten Hosen aufzutragen?
Why this friendly engineer and humorous writer is writing such a spiteful poem, in
which every contact with the people living on the other side of the border is rejected? The
“pantaloons” the Frenchmen have disrobed should now not been used by the Germans. The
historical situation, obviously, has changed. The social atmosphere after the French–Prussian
7
Quoted after http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/12004V/htm/C2004310EN.01000301.htm.
Stricte sensu it is not a book, bot only a “Vorlesungsankündigung”, that is, the announcement of the
lectures Thomasius intended to give at the University. Nevertheless, the “small” announcement
comprehends around 70 pages.
9
Hans Carl Finsen: Die rhetorische Nation, in: Augias, nr. 53 (1998), p. 3–41, quoted from:
http://www.hum.au.dk/germansk/augias/katalog/53/home.htm, consulted June 2007.
10
Quoted after: Heinrich Seidel: Gesammelten Schriften, vol. XI; Stuttgart: J.G. Cotta'sche Buchhandlung
Nachfolger, 1900; originally in: Neues Glockenspiel; Gesammelte Gedichte von Heinrich Seidel, II.
Sammlung, 1893.
8
137
War supports the radical fracture: to learn from the “Erzfeind” (“Archenemy”) is now
considered as something absurd. Some historical events have propitiated the change of mental
paradigm. But the reversal is caused not only by the immediate circumstances, but is rooted in
long–lasting intellectual developments we can again exemplify with a well–known text. I
n 1773, Johann Gottfried Herder wrote an article with the title “Shakespeare”11. It is a
programmatic speech against the Enlighten postulate to imitate the French theatre, a postulate
defended by French theorists12, because (supposedly) the French theatre has rediscovered the
Greek tragedy, in which the human nature is expressed13. Also one century after Boileau, when
Herder wrote his article, this postulate was very popular, not only in France, but in was
widespread all over Europe, represented in Germany mainly by Johann Christoph Gottsched
and his Critische Dichtkunst14.
Against this theory, Herder wrote: “The drama was born in Greece as is couldn’t be
born in the Northern space”15. In this view, the Greek tragedy is no more the model for every
time. Herder’s writings contain in nuce not only the cultural relativism but also arguments
which can lead to mental borders, to encapsulation16. In fact, Herder also wrote: “Shakespeare
represents touches and teaches Northern people”17. So, he establishes cultural spaces with their
own rules. It seems that civilization is no more the priority: the tension between openness and
concern for the own roots will no more abandon Europe’s intellectual history. Of
course,
Herder is not isolated. Similar attitudes –often linked with the debate on Shakespeare– can be
found in some writings by contemporary authors like Johann Wolfgang von Goethe –for
example the “Rede zum Schäkespears Tag” from 1771- or even an Enlighten spirit like
Gotthold Ephraim Lessing: in his famous 17th Letter on Literature, he not only criticises
Gottsched’s efforts to introduce a French–like theatre in Germany18, but he also presents the
argument, Shakespeare is a better paradigm for the German literature due to the cultural
nearness or, more exactly, the belonging to the same cultural space, because “wir mehr in den
Geschmack der Engländer als der Franzosen einschlagen” (Lessing, 53).
11
Originally published in the journal Von Deutscher Art und Kunst. Quoted after Herder, Johann
Gottfried: Sämtliche Werke, ed. Bernhard Suphan, 33 vol., Hildesheim 1967 (Nachdruck der Ausgabe
1877-1913), vol. V, p. 159–257
12
The main example for this attitude is Nicolas Boileaus’s “L’art poétique” from 1674, but it is only one
example of a common mentality at that time (see the texts collected in the anthology: Kibedi-Varga, Aron,
Les Poétiques du classicisme, Paris 1990).
13
In Boileau’s view there is an identification between “nature“, “raison“ and poetic precepts, which are
supposed to be the main characteristic of the French literature of his time: see the sentences from the Art
poétique: “que la nature donc soit votre étude unique”; “que la raison à ses règles engage”.
14
Johann Christoph Gottsched: Versuch einer critischen Dichtkunst vor die Deutschen, Leipzig 1730.
15
“In Griechenland entstand das Drama, wie es in Norden nicht entstehen konnte”. Own translation.
16
But Herder also wrote: “Wie nun der Wanderer kein süßeres Vergnügen hat, als wenn er allenthalben,
auch wo ers nicht vermuthete, Spuren eines ihm ähnlich, denkenden, empfindenden Genius gewahr wird:
so entzückend ist uns (...) die Echo aller Zeiten und Völker“ (Johann Gottfried Herder: Ideen zur
Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit, in: Sämtliche Werke, ed. by Bernhard Suphan, Hildesheim
1967, vol. II, p. 359). This has to be underlined to avoid the impression of a nationalistic attitude – as we
will explain more in detail.
17
“Und wenn jener [Sophokles] Griechen vorstelle und lehre und rühre und bildet, so lehre, rührt und
bildet Shakespeare nordische Menschen!” Own translation.
18
„Niemand, sagen die Verfasser der Bibliothek, wird leugnen, daß die deutsche Schaubühne einen
großen Teil ihrer ersten Verbesserung dem Herrn Professor Gottsched zu danken habe“. Ich bin dieser
Niemand; ich leugne es gerade zu. Es wäre zu wünschen, daß sich Herr Gottsched niemals mit dem
Theater vermengt hätte. (...) Er wollte nicht sowohl unser altes Theater verbessern, als der Schöpfer eines
ganz neuen sein. Und was für eines neuen? Eines Französierenden; ohne zu untersuchen, ob dieses
französierende Theater der deutschen Denkungsart angemessen sei, oder nicht“ (Gotthold Ephraim
Lessing: „Briefe, die neueste Literatur betreffend“, 17. Brief, „Den 16. Februar 1759“, orig. Berlin and
Stettin, 1759-1765, quoted after: Gesammelte Werke, vol. 2, München: Carl Hansen 1959, p. 53).
138
The question is not to opt exclusively for openness or closeness, because at that time
both attitudes are coexisting. In the case of Herder, for example, he writes regarding his own
country that the main default is an exaggerate appreciation for the foreign culture, so that the
own culture is unknown and not valued19. But he also recommends abandoning the closed
mental worlds, which emerge from only a specific geographical space20. Not only this: he
recognises that the human being remains the same although the expressions of the different
thoughts and feelings are marked by the historical circumstances21.
The key for the change of paradigm which has been introduced by Herder (or, at least,
in Herder’s time)22 is the genetic way for explaining the cultural phenomena. According to him,
they can be understood only when looking to the roots, to the origins23. And this creates indeed
the practice to look not over the borders trying to understand a culture, and mainly the own
culture. The glance is turn backwards: Aeneis or Ulysses are no more sought; the explanation
can no more come over the sea, from a spatial remote culture, but only from a temporal
distance.
This idea will evolved to the widespread conviction of the linkage between the vitality
of a culture and the connection to the own roots. These ideas have dominated a good part of the
recent intellectual history in Europe. But in this vision, culture can be seen not only as the factor
which guarantees fortitude, but also as a strong determination which, at the end, annuls
freedom. In fact, if these ideas were true, human being would be unable to liberate him or
herself from the bonds of the own origins, and all his or her world vision would be determined
by this bonds, in a sort of cultural determinism (which is on the ground of the so widespread
cultural relativism24).
2. L’Enfant sauvage
In 1797, a boy was found in the woods near Saint Sernin sur Rance (France)25.
Apparently, he had lived his entire childhood alone, and probably in the wild: His lack of
speech, as well as his food preferences and the numerous scars on his body were signs of this.
19
For him, the “Hauptfehler unsrer Nation” consists in the fact “dass sie aus zu grosser Gefälligkeit gegen
Fremde sich selbst nicht kennet und achtet” (Johann Gottfried Herder: Briefe zur Beförderung der
Humanität (1793-1797), in op. cit., vol. XVIII, p. 111).
20
“Lasset uns also (...) so viel möglich alle engen Gedankenformen, die aus der Bildung eines Erdstrichs
(...) genommen sind, verläugnen” (Johann Gottfried Herder: Abhandlung über den Ursprung der Sprache,
in op. cit., vol. V, p. 89).
21
“zu allen Zeiten war der Mensch derselbe; nur er äusserte sich jedesmal nach der Verfassung, in der er
lebte” Johann Gottfried Herder: Briefe zur Beförderung der Humanität (1793-1797), in op. cit., vol. XVIII,
p. 139).
22
Herder often has been seen as “innovator through the ages” or as “Wegbereiter” (respectively Koepke,
Wulf-Knoll, Samson B. (eds.): Johann Gottfried Herder, Innovator through the Ages, Bonn 1982, and
Wiese, Benno von: Herder. Grundzüge seines Weltbildes, Leipzig 1938, p. 143)
23
He often explains literary expressions looking to the circumstances of its origins: the
“Morgenländischen Gedichte”, for example, can be explained “aus dem Lande, der Geschichte, den
Meinungen, der Religion, dem Zustande, den Sitten und der Sprache ihrer Nation” (Johann Gottfried
Herder: Ueber die neuere Deutsche Litteratur. Eine Beilage zu den Briefen, die neueste Litteratur
betreffend (1766-1767), in op. cit., vol. I., p. 273f.). And he claims not to forget these origins when an
artistic manifestation should be explained: “Wer kann nun ohne Rücksicht auf Zeit, Land, und Sprache
Sannazar und Vida, Dante und Petrarca, Ariosto und Tasso, und wen weiß ich mehr? tadeln, ohne sie zu
erklären, ohne uns auf ihre Jahrhunderte aufmerksam zu machen” (Johann Gottfried Herder: Kritische
Wälder. Oder Betrachtungen, die Wissenschaft und Kunst des Schönen betreffend, nach Maasgabe
neuerer Schriften (1769), in op. cit., vol. III, p. 232).
24
Hegel Gombrich
25
He was captured, but soon escaped. He was then captured again and kept in the care of a local woman
for about a week before he escaped once more. However, on January 8, 1800, he emerged from the forests
on his own.
139
He was unable to recognize his image in the mirror, couldn’t imitate anything26, and was not
sensitive for heat and coldness. His age was unknown but citizens of the village estimated that
he was about twelve years old. He received the name Victor of Aveyron27. His remarkable
situation has caused numerous debates in the Enlightenment circles, and 1970 his story has
inspired François Truffaut to make a movie with the title L’Enfant sauvage.
This story remind us that, in fact, culture means linkage to a tradition and, therefore,
also to a determined world view, which we often applied unconsciously. We are born within a
society. And this society is transmitting us a culture – in the broad sense, for example, as
expressed in the classical definition by Edward B. Tylor, according to him culture is "that
complex whole which includes knowledge, belief, art, morals, law, custom, and any other
capabilities and habits acquired by man as a member of society” (Tylor, E.B. 1871:1).
This society is transmitting also a language. And at the latest since Humboldt –because
the theory has many honourable precursors28– we know that a language is not only a collection
of denominations, but includes a world view. In Humboldt’s word:
“Durch die gegenseitige Abhängigkeit des Gedankens, und des Wortes von einander
leuchtet es klar ein, dass die Sprachen nicht eigentlich Mittel sind, die schon erkannte Wahrheit
darzustellen, sondern weit mehr, die vorher unerkannte zu entdecken. Ihre Verschiedenheit ist
nicht eine von Schällen und Zeichen, sondern eine Verschiedenheit der Weltansichten selbst.
Hierin ist der Grund, und der letzte Zweck aller Sprachuntersuchung enthalten“ (Humboldt,
1903-36, 27).
This has different consequences. One of them is that full translation is always
impossible29. In that sense, language is connecting people, but also separating them. This is the
human constituency. Most of the human realities are ambiguous or even complex. “To be born”
in a society, to receive inevitably some values and attitudes seems to be (and it is) a limitation
of the freedom. But it is needed in order to avoid a vacuum, the vacuum of a world without
points of reference – and we know how deep the horror vacui is installed in human being.
3. To whom do I belong?
An essential part of culture is the answer to the question “who we are?”, the question,
therefore, of collective identity: “To whom do I belong?”
This question can be answered, as we have seen with the examples at the beginnings,
on different ways, with an essential difference: accepting the other as a part of ourselves or
looking for only own elements, for the own roots. We have to accept that the historical
mentality is profoundly linked to the European mind (and maybe not only with it) and that the
comprehension of origins and evolution tranquilize giving the impression do cause
comprehension. But in this justification of the identity via the past the quoted alternative is
given: the other can be considered as a part of the past or not; and –if given and accepted– it can
be considered as a pride or as a humiliation.
26
This fact supposes an interesting footnote to Aristotle’s mimesis–theory.
To his story, see Lane, H.: The wild boy of Aveyron. Harvard University Press. Cambridge, Mass., 1976.
28
“Der Grundgedanke des sprachlichen Weltbildes bzw. der sprachlichen Weltansicht ist schon alt, wenn
auch noch nicht mit dem modernen Begriff gefasst. Im Ansatz findet er sich schon bei Nikolaus von Kues,
Francis Bacon, John Locke, Giambattista Vico, Johann Georg Hamann und Johann Gottfried Herder.
Seine klassische Formulierung und Einführung in die Sprachwissenschaft hat er aber erst durch den
preussischen Staatsmann und Sprachforscher Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767-1835) gefunden.” (Helmut
Gipper: „Die Sprache als Instrument der Weltsicht. Zur Geschichte einer umstrittenen Idee“, in Neue
Zürcher
Zeitung,
10.07.1999,
p.
79,
quoted
after:
http://www.kzu.ch/fach/as/material/Texte_philo/Sprache/sp_01.htm, consulted June 2007).
29
See the beautiful examples –for instance about the German “Wald” and the Spanish “bosque” in José
Ortega y Gasset: “Misery and Splendor of Translation”, a lecture given in the 30ies at a German
University (Miseria y esplendor de la traducción, Miseria y esplendor de la traducción, in Obras
completas, vol. V. Madrid: Ed. Revista de Occidente 1970).
27
140
The second possibility has considerable consequences: one of them is that frontiers
become symbols of the singularity, of the independence, of the willingness not to be
contaminated (and frontiers have been for a long time symbols, self-representations of the State,
of the nation).
We have to recognize that the second way has predominated in Europe. And this has
configured the mental space of generations of Europeans with categories that emerged also in
situations normally we would not recognized as expression of this hidden nationalism. Also
here, an example (a text) shall illustrate this thesis: Max Frisch is a Swiss author who is
“obsessed” (if we can apply this expression) to deconstruct national myths: his Wilhelm Tell für
die Schule is an eloquent example of it30 – here, Frisch present an alternative story of the Swiss
hero, in which he is presented not as an hero; and the footnotes (in a stylistic uncommon
combination with a novel!) are foreseen for improving his view. Nevertheless, in one of his
Diaries he recognizes that he himself has experienced the temptation of nationalistic reactions,
in a very subtle way:
He tries to eliminate every reaction of pride when reading that a Swiss has received the
Nobel prize or another honour, but now, writing in Milan, he has to recognise that he is irritated
when he sees his compatriots buying in the Italian shops. The small story begins with the
words: “Man ist immer noch ein Nationalist!”31.
This insight shows how profoundly certain mental categories are rooted and the fact
that they sometimes escape to our control could cause the impression that the cultural
determinism is right: we would be slaves of our culture. But the experience shows that are able
to overcome (partially, it is true) our cultural paradigm, and so, to cross borders: St. Thomas
Aquinas writes that human being is capax universi32, capable of understanding the whole of
reality. This can be understood in different ways, I will understand it as “able to open for other
worlds”.
In that sense, European integration, with the relativization of frontiers, is a project with
very relevant cultural effects. Although one on the main experts in Culture within the European
Parliament could say some time ago: “Certainly that is often quoted in the Culture
Committee”33, referring to Jean Monnet’s dictum: “If I were to begin again, I would begin with
culture” – although this conviction, the quote is not true34. But it doesn’t matter, because in fact
Jean Monnet and the other “founding fathers” have begun with culture.
References:
Banús, Enrique: 'Some Simple Thesis for a Complex Subject: "European Culture"', in:
Culturelink 27 (1999), pp. 127-138.
Frisch, Max: Wilhelm Tell für die Schule. Mit alten Illustrationen, Frankfurt am Main:
Suhrkamp 1971.
30
Max Frisch: Wilhelm Tell für die Schule. Mit alten Illustrationen, Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp 1971.
“Wenn ich von einem Landsmann lese, dass er den Nobelpreis bekommen oder dass ihn der Kaiser von
China empfangen habe, verbiete ich mir jeden Stolz, weil wir zur Genüge erfahren haben, wohin diese Art
von Herdenstolz [...] in der Geschichte der Völker führen muss. [...] Aber das Gegenteil [-...] wirft meine
weltbürgerliche Pose jedesmal über den Haufen; wenn ich hier meine Landsleute sehe, wie sie mit ihrer
Währung die italienischen Läden plündern, ärgere ich micht bleich – Warum eigentlich? Die offenbare
Enttäuschung verrät unsere heimliche Annahme, dass das eigene Volk, nur weil wir ihm selber gerade
angehören, schliesslich doch ein Mustervolk sei“ (Max Frisch: „Mailand, Oktober 1946“, in Tagebuch
1946–1949, quoted according to Gesammelte Werke in zeitlicher Folge, Bd. 2, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp 1976,
p. 452f.).
32
See Josef Pieper, Living the Truth, San Francisco, CA: Ignatius, 1989, p. 43.
33
Roy Perry -Budget Rapporteur for the Culture Committee of the European Parliament- at a public
meeting "The Artists and EU" in Copenhagen 26. May 2004, quoted after:
http://www.eca.dk/debate/perry.htm; consulted June 2007.
34
See details in Enrique Banús: 'Some Simple Thesis for a Complex Subject: "European Culture"', in:
Culturelink 27 (1999), pp. 127-138.
31
141
Gesammelte Werke in zeitlicher Folge, Bd. 2, Frankfurt: Suhrkamp 1976, p. 452f.
Gottsched, Johann Christoph: Versuch einer critischen Dichtkunst vor die Deutschen, Leipzig
1730.
Lane, H.: The wild boy of Aveyron. Harvard University Press. Cambridge, Mass., 1976.
Herder, Johann Gottfried: Abhandlung über den Ursprung der Sprache, in op. cit., vol. V, p.
89).
Herder, Johann Gottfried: Briefe zur Beförderung der Humanität (1793-1797), in op. cit., vol.
XVIII, p. 111
Edward B. Tylor, Primitive Culture, London 1871:1.
Jauss, Hans Robert: « La théorie de la réception: Coup d'oeil sur ses antécédents méconnus ».
In: Actas del II Congreso Mundial Vasco. Madrid. 1989. 59-76, p. 60.
Humboldt, Wilhelm von: Über das vergleichende Sprachstudium. In: Gesammelte Schriften, 17
vol. (ed. Albert Leitzmann et al.), Berlin: Behr 1903-36, vol. IV, p. 1-34. The quote on p.
27.
Parry, John Jay and Caldwell Robert. "Geoffrey of Monmouth" in ''Arthurian Literature in the
Middle Ages'', Roger S. Loomis (ed.). Clarendon Press: Oxford University. 1959.
Perry, Roy-Budget Rapporteur for the Culture Committee of the European Parliament- at a
public meeting "The Artists and EU" in Copenhagen 26. May 2004, quoted after:
http://www.eca.dk/debate/perry.htm; consulted June 2007.
Pieper, Josef: Living the Truth, San Francisco, CA: Ignatius, 1989, p. 43.
Robert, Hand: : « La théorie de la réception: Coup d'oeil sur ses antécédents méconnus ». In:
Actas del II Congreso Mundial Vasco. Madrid. 1989. 59-76, p. 60.
Seidel, Siedel: Gesammelten Schriften, vol. XI; Stuttgart: J.G. Cotta'sche Buchhandlung
Nachfolger, 1900; originally in: Neues Glockenspiel; Gesammelte Gedichte von Heinrich
Seidel, II. Sammlung, 1893.
http://en.wikisource.org/wiki/History_of_the_Kings_of_Britain/Book_1#_ref-3, that reproduces
the translation based on Aaron Thompson (1718), revised and corrected by J. A. Giles
(1842).
Tylor, Edward B, Primitive Culture, London 1871:1.
http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/12004V/htm/C2004310EN.01000301.htm.
Cross – Border Politics and Its Image in the European Union
Dana PANTEA
Abstract: The article presents the relationship between politics and frontiers. It
explains how politics was born, its relation with the evolution of humanity and its history, the
importance of identity in the relations inside a group, a nation and between them. The history of
borders and frontiers is presented, the changing of their meaning along centuries and how they
influence politics and international relations. The image of the Other and its origins are
presented and its role in the political imagery. The author considers that the most important
problem of cultural mondialization is how people should live together at a global level with all
the cultural differences which keep changing all the time. Other influential things are: the
importance of mass media for the cultural activities, the problems of national identity which are
strongly related to culture and its symbols, the impact of the fall of the Berlin Wall upon the
globalization of media, the empire of the internet, the commercial media that bring profits of
millions of dollars.
Key words:politics, frontiers, borders, image, cultural policy
1.Birth of Politics
Tailored from a mixed texture, made of images and concepts, passion and reason, the
politics remains a human construction built from light and shadow, good and evil, rational and
non rational” (Wunenburger, J 2005: 27) This is the way Jean-Jacques Wunenburger sees
politics in his book “Politics Imaginaries” (Wunenburger, J 2005: 27)
The meaning of politics comes from the necessity of human societies to organize their
life according to specific rules and give authority to some of their members in order to ensure
the fulfillment of their will. According to J.J. Wunenburger, political rapports are established in
a public entity (state or nation) that has a certain name, recognize themselves as members of an
ensemble, no matter the differences between them, and relate to the same central power which
is empowered to ensure the observance of the same laws and impose the same decisions for the
benefit of the group regarding its security, liberty, prosperity ((Wunenburger, J 2005: 27).
This general conception springs out from ancient history as politics was born in
Ancient Greece, where it was in strong connection with democracy. Institutions were created to
solve the conflicts of every day life and the need to find the best possible forms of organizing
societies brings together politics and rationality. Rationality is the field of philosophers, so not
seldom do we find together politicians and philosophers in an attempt to work in order to
enhance the power of rationality in the field of politics. The question Wunenburger arises here
is whether elements of non-rationality enter the sphere of politics, and the answer is an
affirmative one.
In order to better understand and analyze politics, one has to take into consideration the
non-rational part of it which springs from the human emotional and imaginary elements. The
non-rational factor exists in any human being, in any society and includes emotions, passions,
imagination, elements which cannot be excluded from the political life because there is a strong
need for passion on the battlefield, respect for democratic institutions, loyalty to ancestors, to
the nation or a certain group. So we draw the conclusion that we cannot connect the birth of
politics only to the strict rational part of it. The linguistic term itself is derived from the Greek
“polis” meaning city, fortress, a formation that was not spontaneous and was based not only on
institutions, but also on social representations, histories, beliefs and the imaginary – symbols,
archetypes, myths.
143
It is these symbols, archetypes and myths that help invent a superpower which invests
the individual – ruler, king, emperor – with the attributes of power. Thus beginning with the
ancient times, political power doesn’t belong to a human being but to a god. This is a paradox
of ancient and medieval politics according to which a ruler, a king must be invested with
authority by a god so that he might be an absolute ruler and induce both fear and admiration to
his subjects. Hence the symbolic charge of ceremonies, the throne, the scepter, the effigy.
2.The Connection between Politics and Border
There are political myths which explain the origin of institutions, of laws, the nature of
power. They can easily be used for political purposes offering the rulers a means of imposing
their own authority. Used in this way the political myth can determine the cohesion against the
Other who represents the danger, becoming an instrument of manipulation (Nicoara, S. Nicoara,
T. 1996:62).
A group of people organizing under the same power and ruler needs a certain territory.
A political power needs a geographical space where it exercises its authority. Thus at the
beginning frontiers define the limits of the authority and juridical laws of a certain state that
represents its people by means of its institutions and establishes contacts and relations –
alliances, neutrality, conflict – with other people.
Any territory becoming a legal space for a certain political authority marks its limits
with certain symbols – for example, the flag – and is associated with old stories that give it
identity.
Inhabiting a territory is often based on the genealogy of a family, a group, a tribe or is
justified through a myth or through the right of the first occupant underlying the strong relations
with the ancestors buried in that land. The memories and the image of the homeland lie at the
basis of the identity of a nation. The political territory has its roots in the genealogical memory
and this is the reason why any power makes the defense of the national territory an important
factor of its politics.
Myths have dominated history and political thinking along the evolution of mankind.
Analyzing the myths that dominated the political imaginary of the 19th and 20th century Giradet
observes the important moments which brought about important changes and crisis such as
revolutions. Important myth of the modern time which affected the limits of territories are the
Revolution, the Scientific and Technological Progress, the Nation – State.
3.Politics and Political Imaginary
Space and Time are the main coordinates of human existence, they represent both the
natural and social universe where the contact with the Other takes place. The image of the Other
is very important to be studied because it brings about the mechanism of social behaviour
explaining the roots of human relations (Simona Nicoara, 2000: 158). The contact with the
Other is the source of compromises and tensions, both inside a social or ethnic group and
between them. When these groups are situated near the border between two countries this image
is defining for the neighbourhood relations. The farther the Other is, the better his image and
vice versa.
It is well known along history, that from the very beginning the stranger has always
been regarded as a potential danger: he brought about death by war, plague, disease and
misfortunes. This image lies at the basis of nationalism, but also has a determining role in
judging the Other, leading to feelings of rejection, mania, phobia.
The image of the Other evolves during centuries; historical changes, industrial
revolutions make communications faster and easier, thus the historians can study the image of a
country or a people as seen by a foreign country to understand the political relations between
the two respective countries, or important political events. International relations are
determined by this image, the leaders, the diplomats who are in charge with taking decisions are
144
influenced by the image they have about a nation, and not by the reality itself and how that
nation really is (S. Mitu, 2006: 69).
The social imaginary is a proof that along history different societies make up their own
global representations which lie at the basis of their own identity, of their models for the
members of the society, of the designation of their enemies.
The political imaginary has its great role in revealing the deepest crisis of a certain
society in understanding the rich field of representations and mentalities. It can help understand
and explain the collective mentality with its emotions, hopes, fears, memories. As Bastide says
the political imaginary develops in a situation of social emptiness and is a means of regaining
identity.
Myths, which are more powerful than reality itself, as A. Malraux observes, gain a
political dimension when they explain the nature of the power, of the political institutions, how
these came into being as a result of the work of their founders. Political myths can easily be
used or manipulated by the rulers in order to induce collective actions, one of them being the
collective cohesion against the danger brought by the Other: the barbarian, the stranger, the
neighbour. Identity cannot exist without Alterity, each human being relates himself to the Other
in the process of defining the difference. Being different is the nature of the Other, the
difference serves as the point of reference to identify the Other as the Other, especially in the
field of politics. The difference between the Self or us and the Other as a distinction between I
and enemy draws a line of suppression and domination, thus establishing a black and white
relationship.
The image of the Other has an important role during the history of mankind as it
determines the relations between the members of the same group or different groups, societies,
nations. The members of a group plan the future, remember the past with its great personalities,
their words,, their deeds. This is the historical awareness that lies at the basis of a group
identity. There are many criteria used to identify the Other, the most important being the
religious, the political, the ideological, the economic and the cultural ones. Seeing the Other
through these criteria has as consequence the transformation of one image – the Other – into
another – the Enemy which was often used by the rulers to start wars. The defense of the
national territory is a strong argument of politics and defensive wars leave their impact upon the
collective imaginary, while offensive and imperial wars find motivation in regaining a lost
ancient territory or in unifying peoples that have become estranged because of different
historical events.
4.Limes, Borders, Frontiers
Territory is not only an institution whose frontiers are established by international
treaties but also a symbol for the members of the same political group. The religious criterion is
important here because a certain territory or space can be claimed in the name of the ancient
religion and ancient memories as there is no cognition without recognition. Foundational
episodes and crisis in the past take on mythical meaning, the permanence of their remembrance
establishes continuity between the past and present, identity against alterity.
The frontiers which separate and mark the limits of states are also a place of contact,
change and conflict. Both during the past and the present the frontiers are closely connected
with history and politics because they depend upon the relations between the neighbouring
states. That’s why they can never be considered as established forever in spite of the signed
treaties .During centuries frontiers were subject to conflicts especially where there were ethnic
groups.
The frontier as a concept appeared during the Roman Empire when the Romans
established the frontiers of their cities. They also introduced the term “limes”, which at the very
beginning meant a small road separating two lands. Later it acquired a new meaning: the
installations the Roman soldiers had at the border to defend the empire from the Other, the
barbarians in this case. Along history the borders didn't stop individuals and societies to
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communicate, communication didn't stop at the border, it was more a threshold where
communication took place at a lower level. Inside and outside the borders there were different
group identities which changed in size over time, changed their mentalities, their image about
one another, while communicating .Studying the image about the Other, the stranger, the
enemy; the historian can better understand the rapports between two cultures, their
relationships, the crises that block their relations (Nicoara, S, Nicoara, T, 1996:57)
Another concept derived from the idea of frontier, coming from the Latin “margo”,
became marche in French, mark in German and indicated a strip of territory separating from a
neighbouring country and having the role of military protection from proximity. During the
Middle Ages the frontier was a place of conflict where armed people fought to expand or to
defend their territories, thus the frontiers moved according to the understanding between
families, groups, battles and wars, or were mere and simple inexistent.
The year 1575 marks an important landmark: the publication of the first atlas by
Abraham Ortels, a fact which helped draw the frontiers.
As Lucian Boia says, “natural frontiers exist only if we want them to exist” (Boia, L,
2006). He goes on explaining: the Roman Empire had natural frontiers: the Rhine, the Alps, the
Danube, present-day Scotland with its mountains and moorlands and forests and Africa with the
Atlas Mountains. It was a natural limes, separating the Empire from the barbarians, but this
frontier existed only in the political imaginary of the Romans, because the barbarians crossed
the rivers and the mountains quite easily when they wanted to attack the Empire.
Another natural frontier, this time between France and Germany is the river Rhine. The
same function had the Pyrenees Mountains between Spain and France where th Catalan State
was born.
Romania has three rivers as natural frontiers, while Europe lies between ocean and
mountains.
If we go back to history we can observe that the first European frontier was determined
by the Latin Catholicism. By the end of the Middle Ages, the frontiers are still of religious
nature. Beginning with the 11th century, the limited territory becomes the place of many
changes: the invention of better tools, the building of ships, the development of metal work, of
education in Latin, a network of universities appeared (Oxford, Paris, Cologne). The Gothic art
is also an expression of the European unity, the Gothic churches forming a line the separated
Europe from Finland, the Baltic countries, Poland, Hungary,Croatia, Slovenia.
During the 14th century the Turks were a constant menace for Europe, in 1526 hey
conquered Hungary, and in 1529 they almost succeeded in doing the same thing with Austria,
but they were never considered Europeans.
In the 17th century, the Russian Empire was as big as today but not very powerful and
rather barbarian. But with emperors like Peter the Great or empress as Catherine, the Russians
started to civilize, to create a real aristocracy after the French model, While the Ottoman
Empire was slowly withdrawing from Europe, the Russians expanded conquering Finland,
Ukraine and the Baltic countries When in the 20th century the Russian Empire was destroyed,
the European frontier moved east.
Nowadays the political changes that occurred on the European arena caused the
reassessment of the concepts of identity and frontier. The frontier shapes the mental, affective
and volitional processes and its meaning is to gather together strategies, symbolical systems,
theories, so that we might speak about the economy and sociology of the frontier, the
philosophy and a moral of the frontier and very important the policy of the frontier.
5.Politics and Culture
In modern Europe the difference between Us and the Other, identity and alterity, is
translated into cultural and national differences, the cultural differences defining the basis of
political conflicts. Defining the Other on the basis of cultural principles means referring to him
or her by mens of international community values. Culture helps to know the Other better,
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especially his main characteristics. Cultural differences do not always imply incompatibilities in
communication, differences can be transformed into conflicts by specific ideological, political
or religious orientations which dominate each historical epoch (Chiciudean, I. Halic, Al. 2003:
97)
The problem of Alterity is important when studying public opinion, the image of a
country or a people in the public opinion of a foreign country at a certain moment. “The
contacts between cultures are established through filter made up from the image of the Other”
(Dutu, Al. 1985:18). The contacts between cultures are established through a filter made up
from the image of the Other. It chooses those aspects of the stranger's personality which allow
the observer to define his self (Mitu, S. 2006:68)
In order to fulfill the European construction, especially where there are opposed
national myths, and symbols, there is a strong need for a common accepted history. Very
important here, is the difference between identity and alterity expressed in cultural and national
differences. The enlarged Europe has a very difficult task: to redefine its political identity,
because for some countries having a European identity has become equal to integration into the
European Union.
6.Conclusions
The interest for cultural problems appears only when different cultures bring about the
subject of political demands. The evolution of economy and politics which went global gave
birth to a new cultural system, a global one too, which includes all the cultures in the world, one
by one.
“Les enjeux de la mondialisation culturelle” is a very interesting study of the present
day world with problems raised by the continuous changes in the economic, political and
cultural life of humanity.
Jean Tardif, one of the authors, taught anthropology at Kinshasa, Lumbashi and
Montreal, worked in the Foreign Office in Quebec and founded PlanetAgora International
Association. The other one, Joelle Farchy, is an economist and teacher of Information and
Communication Science at the University of Paris 1.
According to the two authors the problems of cultural identity become stronger every
year and in connection with these they put the question of how people can live together having
so many different cultures. They make a survey of the last years’ crises and point out the rising
in the outskirts of Paris, the problems caused by the caricatures of Mohamed, the refusal of the
European Union constitution by the French and Dutch. Pierre Manent is quoted with his
suggestion to deal with these problems using the means of modern and classic political science
beginning with the notion of culture defined by Montesquieu.
The most important problem of cultural mondialization is how people should live
together at a global level with all the cultural differences which keep changing all the time.
Other influential things are: the importance of mass media for the cultural activities, the
problems of national identity which are strongly related to culture and its symbols, the impact of
the fall of the Berlin Wall upon the globalization of media, the empire of the internet, the
commercial media that bring profits of millions of dollars.
The dramatic events of September 11 and the Tzunami of December 26, 2004
exemplify the existence of a global public opinion that manifested itself on these occasions.
Thus the authors conclude that media has the most important role in the cultural mondialization.
After asserting and proving the existence of the process of mondialization, Tardif and
Farchy raise the question of mastering this process. They underline the difficulty of such a thing
when taking into account the interests of mankind which are not at all the same as those of the
national state. As a solution they suggest global governance that has as main objective to settle
the means by which it can manage the interdependences between societies and between
humanity and biosphere.
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In this governance culture has a political dimension, there are certain cultural factors
which determine the structure and interaction between societies, they deal with the problems of
cultural politics at national and international level, and also they recognize the importance of
culture in the strategies of present-day political powers and suggest a solution: global cultural
pluralism.
The geographical space is a place for knowledge and reflection, the space doesn't exist
in itself, it exists only in its rapport with the human groups who have collective attitudes, a
common imagery determining the existence of the space itself with its perpetual moving
frontiers.
Regarding Europe's enlargement, each new country that has acceded can be seen as an
inclusion, each country that has been left out is an exclusion, “The border of European states are
“time written in space”; they are the product of history. The frontiers of the European Union
have been built against history (and against the geopolitics of European states) as a result of
political will. The borders of the EU will be shaped as a cross between a democratic and a
geopolitical project rather than the other way around: a project shaped by pre-determined
historical or cultural borders. It is in this sense that the issue of EU enlargement to the East has
become its defining moment, “a new frontier” in the true meaning of the word”.(J. Rupnik)
References
Besancon, Alain, Eseuri despre lumea de azi, Bucuresti, Editura Humanitas, 2007
Boia, Lucian, Pentru o istorie a imaginarului, Bucuresti, Editura Humanitas, 2006
Chiciudean, Ioan, Halic, Bogda-Alexandru, Imagologie. Imagologie istorica, Bucuresti, Editura
comunicare.ro cursuri universitare, 2003
Mazilu, Dan Horia, NOI despre CEILALTI. Fals tratat de imagologie, Iasi, Polirom, 1999
Mitu, Sorin, Transilvania mea. Istorii, mentalitati, identitati, Iasi, Polirom, 2006
Nicoara, Simona, Nicoara, Toader, Mentalitati colective si imaginar social, Istoria si noile
paradigme ale conoasterii, Cluj-Napoca, Presa Universitara Clujeana/Mesagerul,1996
Rifkin, Jeremy, Visul european. Despre cum, pe tacute, Europa va pune in umbra “visul
american”, Iasi, Polirom, 2006
Rupnik, Jacques, Europe's New Frontier: What Borders for an Enlarged EU?;
www.chair.coleurop.pl/VoE/issues/issuesq/html
Tardif, Jean, Farchy, Joelle, (2006), Les enjeux de la mondialisation culturelle, Hors
Commerce, Paris
Thiesse, Anne-Marie, Crearea identitatilor nationale in Europa. Secolele XVIII-XX, Iasi,
Polirom, 2000
Wunenburger, Jean-Jacques, (2005) Imaginariile polticului, Paideia, Bucuresti
Psychological preconditions of totalitarianism and their effect on democratic
transformations in European states
Margarita CHABANNA
Abstract: The purpose of the article is to argue that the establishment of totalitarian
regimes depend on psychological features of citizens who have aspirations for being objects of
total control performed by a state. Therefore, it allows totalitarian parties to use efficient
methods of manipulation. Accordingly author shows that successful democratization of posttotalitarian state requires transformation of totalitarian consciousness.
Keywords: totalitarianism, democratization, mass society, totalitarian ideology,
propaganda
The issue of international cooperation has always been very important for European
states. And now a special attention is paid to development of the process of Eurointegration and
contribution of European Union with neighboring states. For successful politics in this sphere it
is necessary to take into consideration the consequences of totalitarianism existence in 20th
century. Particularly intense influence of totalitarian authority was made in the states of Central
and Eastern Europe. And now successful activity of these states in political and economic
borders of Europe necessitates the implication of democratic standards and values. This
implication is guarantee of effective existent cooperation, and is important precondition for the
participation of Eastern European states in the process of integration.
Accordingly, the process of democratic transformations in post-totalitarian states is
very important for the development of many European countries. But simultaneously this
transition is rather difficult because of steady negative consequences of the period of totalitarian
governing. Prospective democratic transformations necessitate a long period of time and radical
changes of all subsystems of society (including political, economic, and social ones). Relevant
institutional adaptation is a quite clear process. But every totalitarian authority creates a special
reality, and tries to form a special type of personality. And in the context of democratic
transition’s study, totalitarian social consciousness can be regarded as one of its strongest
obstacle. Therefore successful implication of democratic principles requires the changes of
citizens’ values, aspirations, dispositions.
Generally, in order to investigate a political phenomenon (and especially to consider
the opportunities of its transformation), it is necessary to research the process of its origination
and its preconditions. That is why the research of social and political situation in pre-totalitarian
and totalitarian states, including the features of psychology of people; the investigation of its
origin and development, allows to understand the best ways of appropriate transformation,
necessary for successful functioning of the democracy in post-totalitarian states.
Generally, political systems of Central and Eastern European states have significant
differences. But in the context of this research the historical preconditions of their formation
have similar aspects. Consequences of communist regimes are essential and they determine
particular approach to the realization of reforms. Comparable historical experience of postcommunist states allows using similar indicators for consideration relevant democratic
transformations.
Post-communist development of the states of mentioned region depends on their ability
to overcome the consequences of totalitarian influence; and ability to create conditions for
successful functioning of democracy. Generally, it is connected with the following changes:
1. adopting democratic Constitutions;
2. protection of human rights and freedoms;
3. presence of political pluralism, development of multiparty systems;
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4. extension of opposition activity;
5. realization of the principle of separation of power;
6. development of market economy;
7. development of civil society.
All states of the region have met the necessity to realize appropriate transformations.
And they have achieved different results depending on ability to reform existing political and
economic systems.
As a result, some systems are successfully transformed. In other words, many states
overcame the consequences of totalitarian influence quite easy. But there are lots of difficulties
connected with corresponding transition in some other countries. This process is particularly
complicated in the majority of post-Soviet states. Such situation is preconditioned by the
peculiarities of historical development in pre-totalitarian period, and it is caused by strong
influence of established totalitarian regime. Especially it results from different mentality of
citizens in considered countries. And relevant peculiarities depend on different influence made
by totalitarianism. Indisputably, several social groups and individuals were subjected to the
influence of totalitarian manipulation in many European states. But their number and political
activity were different. At this point it is worth considering the existence of authoritarian
political regimes (with the features of totalitarianism which changed mentality) in the states of
Central and Eastern Europe, and the establishment of totalitarian regime in Soviet Union.
Every totalitarian political regime seeks to establish total control over society, and to
make use of specific methods in the government of a state subject to its support by population.
In general, it may be stated that the establishment of totalitarian regime takes place as the result
of:
- availability of political forces being able to carry out relevant transformations (directed at
the establishment of total control) in political, economic, social, cultural, military spheres,
- availability of population whose wishes could be satisfied by a totalitarian party.
Thus, it may be stated that the establishment of totalitarian political regime depends on
the ability of totalitarian leaders to convince people of the necessity of proposed
transformations. It may be caused by the availability of certain psychological features of
citizens (different from those ones of the members of societies with democratic, liberal
traditions). Those psychological peculiarities (which characterises social consciousness) were
used by totalitarian parties in Italy, Germany, and Russia in the 20th century. And after the
establishment of totalitarian regimes in these states, the same features were developed by
communist regimes in Central and Eastern European states.
The aim of this research is to prove the decisive role of the psychological peculiarities
of the members of mass society in establishment of totalitarianism. Therefore, it is necessary to
consider the concept of mass society, its main aspects; consequences of its appearance; specific
psychological features of people (which allowed acceptance of totalitarianism); and the actions
of totalitarian power (directed at exploitation of these features for the establishment of certain
dictatorships).
In general, this research is based on works of such theorist of totalitarianism, as H.
Arendt, K. Friedrich, Z. Brzezinsky, E. Fromm, L. Shapiro, J. Ortega y Gasset, H. Marcuse, F.
L. Neumann etc.; and such theorists of mass society as W. Kornhauser, K. Mannheim, M.
Lipset, E. Lederer, H. Lasswell, J. Bensman, B. Rosenberg, H. Elsner, and W. Whyte as well as
J. Ortega y Gasset, H. Arendt and so on.
In this article totalitarian regime is considered according to the definition proposed by
C. J. Friedrich (Friedrich, C.J. 1969:123-64) and developed by Z. K. Brzezinsky (Friedrich,
C.J., Brzezinsky, Z.K. 1962:8,9)
So, the main aspects of totalitarianism are:
- totalitarian ideology (obligatory for everyone),
- single party led by one dictator (who formulates the aims of social development),
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- developed secret policy,
- terror (which is used in order to make control over society),
- monopolistic state control of mass communication, weapons, all organizations, including
economic ones (Friedrich, C.J., 1069:123-164)
The origin of totalitarian regimes in the 20th century shows that it became possible in
this period only. But preconditions for this process had arisen earlier. And it is important to
notice that they had been shaping for a long period of time.
Mainly, the most important preconditions include the peculiarities of political
development, technical changes, social and economic transformations, and corresponding
changes in social consciousness in some European states. Only combination of the
aforementioned may lead to the establishment of totalitarian government. As history of many
European states shows, separate transformations (associated with the development of the states
in the 19th and 20th centuries) may cause appearance of totalitarian movements only (not
establishment of relevant regimes); or establishment of authoritarian dictatorships; or economic
difficulties, social tension, etc. Dependence of totalitarianism on the changes of people’s
psychology should be studied in this context.
As it has been mentioned, changes in social consciousness at the beginning of the 20th
century were predefined by political, social and economic changes which had taken place in
different European countries in the 18th and 19th centuries.
Dynamic industrial development, implementation of relevant economic
transformations associated with capitalism and market relations are the most significant
economic innovations in this context. For example, E. Fromm stated that “the market as the
prime regulator is freed from all traditional restrictive elements and comes into its own in the
nineteenth century” (Fromm, E. 1991:84). But he emphasized not only the role of law of the
market, but also the development of science and technique. Technical changes in the 19th and
20th centuries were connected with the use of the steam engine, combustion motor, electricity,
and atomic energy. This development was characterized by the increasing replacement of
manual work by machine work (Fromm, E. 1991:101). These events had decisive social and
economic effect; they changed working conditions; and made a significant influence on social
and personal relations.
Generally, according to A. Toffler, the principles of industrialism are: standardization,
specialization, synchronization, concentration, maximization, centralization (Toffler, A. 1990:
46-60).
The implementation of these principles had an important influence on mass
consciousness. Firstly, as it has shown, mass production required standardization of demand;
market relations required standardization of monetary system and prices. The specialization was
connected with the development of production and the division of labour. As J. Ortega y Gasset
has written, specialization created “an extraordinarily strange type of man” (Ortega y Gasset, J.
1951: 81). And A. Toffler proved that “...The spread of industrialism was dependent upon the
synchronization of human behaviour with the rhythms of the machine” (Toffler, A. 1990:
103).A. Toffler wrote about the synchronization in space and time (Toffler, A. 1990: 107). The
following aspects should be taking into consideration in this context: concentration of
population, human resources, energy resources; and centralization of labour, political power,
economic power.
Therefore, it is worth defining the following changes occurred as a result of industrial
revolution: increase in labour productivity led to the increase in mass production, mass
consumption, and the standardization of demand.
Division into production and consumption (unlike agrarian societies where producers
usually are consumers) and developing division of labour resulted in increased personal
interdependence. However, personal dependence in social relationships (peculiar to agrarian
society) was reduced due to the high level of social mobility. It leads to depersonalization of
social ties and their formalization by public, legal, moral, and linguistic norms.
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Formalization of communication through: depersonalization of social ties, perceiving
people to be functions depending on their social roles, necessitates standardization (e. g., of
languages). It requires implementation of mass education, on the basis of which people acquire
skills in formalized communication and competence required in industrially developed state.
On the whole, the role of mass communication development is rather important. It is
one of the decisive factors of the establishment of totalitarianism, because corresponding
influence is one of the most important factors in understanding totalitarian society where
socially atomized people are connected by means of mass communication. So, communicative
connection changed the physical connection (necessary for communication in traditional
society). And mass communication became one of the most effective methods of social control
over mass activities.
Mainly, origin and development of mass communication is historically preconditioned
by the following factors:
- mass production (which resulted in the need of forming standardized demand of mass
consumers);
- development of the market of labour force (which resulted in the growth of social
mobility and in the extension of the range of population’s information needs);
- mass education;
- participation of wide sections of population in politics.
A. Toffler has written that developed mass media offered the standardized reports. It
led to the elimination of the diversity in language, leisure, life-style, work. And generally, it is
worth saying about “common mentality” Toffler, A. 1990: 51).
Mass communication (combined with the standardization of social ties) had the
following impacts: people intensified striving for being like others; enforcement of
conformism; weakened criticism.
Consequently, on the basis of the study of the results of modernization, it is necessary
to underline that the establishment of totalitarianism in the 20th century was preconditioned by
the origin of mass society. Mass society is a society of the increasing disintegration of socially
atomized, alienated people. Social and psychological relationships among alienated
personalities without a direct contact between them (because under the conditions of developed
means of mass communication, community may exist without a direct interaction) are meant
here.
On the whole mass society was created due to the following factors: existence of mass
production and mass consumption; creation of mass communication system and mass education
system; processes of urbanization and increased migration.
Moreover, marginalization of population (as the result of industrial revolution,
urbanization, war, and post-war social and economic crisis), was a major factor of further
massovization of society.
Taking into consideration the circumstances of military actions and the necessity of
mass mobilization of population (as well as resources) for military service; representatives of
various social classes began to deal with the army. Such situation caused elimination of
professional and social individual differences. The situation was alike out of the limits of
military sphere. Therefore, conditions of World War I and its effects may be considered to be
very important preconditions of massovization. World War I had also an impact on generation
of mass consciousness through the processes of equalization, division, marginalization, and as a
result of state regulation of economy and social sphere.
State regulation of economy conditioned by the military needs had an impact on the
future events. Specifically, emerging role of the state followed by the establishment of
totalitarian regimes is associated with the need for solving the question of social tension, caused
by: economic difficulties; payment of reparations; striving for enforcement of political and
economic power.
It is generally possible to state that development of organizational structures at the
national level took place as the result of population growth and complication of social ties.
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Economic growth and economic stabilization (due to state regulation of economy) resulted in
the improved standards of living (and consequently growth of population). At the same time
there also took place the concentration of economic power in hands of monopolistic
corporations. In this context it is worth saying about monopoly of major corporations in the
market of goods, monopoly of trade unions in the market of labour force, monopoly of major
banks in the capital market.
Economic monopoly specifically (and its inflexibility in adaptation to the changeable
requirements of the market) caused increased marginalization during the economic (and
consequently social and political) crisis of 1929-1930s of the 20th century. It was a crisis of
overproduction when marginalization of population became the major factor in the
establishment of dictatorships.
Thus, marginalization caused or increased: disorientation of population, an attempt to
avoid responsibility, waiver of choice, which is due to conformism, necessity for external
control (and corresponding striving to find a leader), tendency to direct interference in politics.
Changes in political sphere associated with further establishment of totalitarianism
relate to democratic transformations in European states. Such aspects as politization of
population, politization of trade unions, common activity of trade unions and parties, are
associated with the expansion of democratic rights and freedoms (which provides such
opportunity) and the interest of population in politics. These aspects need detailed study.
Usually, politization of citizens occurs under the following conditions:
- marginalization of population (when people do not belong to certain groups and
organizations which give them an opportunity to pursue their interests). As H. Arendt has
written “people who either because of sheer numbers, or indifference, or a combination of both,
cannot be integrated into any organization ..., into political parties or municipal governments or
professional organizations or trade unions” (Arendt, H 1959: 311)
- complicated economic situation (causing dissatisfaction of people). Instead, depolitization
and demassovization of population occur during the period of prosperity, development of
middle class, generation of various social groups and communities, and development of party
system. Political activity of population can be limited by involving into the groups, where
people pursue their own various interests. As J. Ortega y Gasset has written, “mass-man”
dominates public life, political and non-political (Ortega y Gasset, J. 1951: 38) the mass-man
“regards himself as perfect” (and in general try “intervene in everything” (Ortega y Gasset, J.
1951: 49).
Considering social atomization to be the main aspect of mass society, many
researchers (such as H. Arendt, E. Lederer, H. Marcuse, H. Elsner etc.), investigated masses as
the result of becoming society déclassé. In this context, it is worth giving definition of a class
proposed by G. D. Lasswell. According to this definition, class is a large social group whose
members perform similar functions, have similar status and similar ideology (Lasswell, H.D.
1950:9)He has also written that a class represents a group of people who have identical attitude
to the creation and distribution of one or more certain values (Lasswell, H.D. 1963:62).
Therefore, on the basis of the study of mass society as an outcome of déclassé, masses are
contrasted with both separate individual and class (or social group). Thus, researchers study
mass society as a spontaneous formation. H. Arendt and E. Lederer associated origin of masses
with the abolition of class system. They underlined the absence of social groups created on the
basis of common interests. H. Elsner accentuated the necessity of definition of the fact: which
groups and under which conditions become masses as a result of déclassé (Elsner, H. 1967:
204). It is necessary emphasizing that déclassé society means in this context means a society
with eliminated traditional class structures. The process of elimination arouses out of industrial
revolution, social, political, economic crises at the beginning of the 20th century.
In this context W. Kornhauser named three levels of social ties: interpersonal or
primary, intermediate (which serve as a connective between individuals; individuals and a state;
etc), and state or national. However, centralization of state influence takes place in mass
society. It causes: 1) the weakness of intermediate social ties, and 2) the isolation of primary
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relations. According to W. Kornhauser’s definition, individuals in mass society are
interconnected by the attitude of each of them towards the authority, and state specifically
(Kronhauser, W. 1960:74-75). So, they are not directly correlated with each other inside
different independent groups. According to scientist’s conception, mass society is defined as
atomized society.
Social atomization of individuals as a phenomenon of mass society should be
considered in the context of the study of the social structure of society. Different theorists of
mass society (regardless of the differences of their researches), acknowledged that elite and
masses are the necessary elements of the social structure of the society.
J. Ortega y Gasset in “The revolt of the masses” had emphasized that society is a unity
that consists of minorities and masses. The minorities are individuals who are specially
qualified; and “the mass is the average man”(Ortega y Gasset, J. 1951: 9). So, each member of
minority (or elite) separates herself or himself for special, personal reason; but the members of
masses try to be like everybody.
Taking into account that the social structure of society is determined by relations
between social groups (usually divided into small, medium or large depending upon their size
and the goal of formation), elite (in mass society) may relate to high consolidated middle group
formed non-spontaneously, because other middle groups are spontaneous. However, inclusion
into some large groups is spontaneous too.
Under such conditions, there is a direct interdependence of elites and non-elites
(masses) which causes the origin of mass activity. Appropriate disposition to the mass activity
can be explained by availability of interpersonal relations, and lack of wide social relations in
mass society. Instead, the intermediate or middle groups play the leading part in interaction of
elites and non-elites in pluralistic society. Such groups have relatively equal influence on
society, and it allows them to compete for a leadership position. As it has been earlier said, wide
sections of population have an access to elite in democratic society, but their political activity is
limited by the intermediate groups. These groups perform intermediary functions at the time
when people exercise their rights to influence political decision making.
One of the main ideas of Kornhauser’s considerations of mass society is the idea of the
importance of available (for making influence) elites and available (for mobilization) masses
(Kronhauser, W. 1960:39)In other words, mass society in W. Korhauser’s conception is the
society of accessible or open elite and accessible for mobilization masses. The scientist wrote
that the activation of masses takes place when elites and non-elites are not isolated (Kronhauser,
W. 1960:42).
A high level of social mobility both vertical and horizontal is an important feature of
mass society (as well as of totalitarian society). Social mobility means the ability of individuals
to switch from one social group to another. S. М. Lipset defined the social mobility as a process
of individuals’ transition from one social position to another (when these positions add specific
hierarchical values) (Lipset, S.M. & Bendix, 1964: 1-2) Mannheim also paid attention to the
role of social mobility (Mannheim, K. 1936:3-7).
Therefore, the structure of mass society is characterized by the process of social
atomization associated with the centralization of power, the convergence of society and state.
And exactly special psychological features of atomized people combined with economic
difficulties and political development have a significant value for totalitarianism.
As E. Fromm has written, considered situation caused the existence of such
characterological changes as: quantification, abstractification, alienation, anonymous authority,
conformity and other aspects (Fromm, E. 1991:107-185) Thus, it is important to say about the
conception of social character. The concept of social character was referred to by E. Fromm as
the “nucleus of the character structure which is shared by most members of the same culture” in
contradiction to “the individual character in which people belonging to the same culture differ
from each other” (Fromm, E 1991:76).
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For the purpose of distinguishing particular features of authoritarian personality, E.
Fromm chose the concept of alienation according to which he analyzed the social character in
the 20th century
The reasons of such consideration were:
1. this concept seemed “to touch upon the deepest level of the modern personality”
(Fromm, E 1991:107).
2. it is “the most appropriate if one is concerned with the interaction between the
contemporary socio-economic structure and the character structure of the average individual”
(Fromm, E 1991:107).
The alienation, according to E. Fromm, is conditioned by such economic features of
capitalism, as: quantification and abstratification (because without their realization mass
production would be unthinkable); and means that a person “does not experience himself as the
active bearer of his own powers” (Fromm, E 1978:133). In a society “in which economic
activities have become the main preoccupation of man, this process of quantification and
abstratification has transcended the realm of economic production, and spread to the attitude of
man to things, to people, and to himself” (Fromm, E 1991:121).In other words, in industrial
society alienation becomes apparent in people’s attitude to their work, to the consumption, to
others and to themselves.
In this context totalitarianism, as it was mentioned, can be determined by the features
of an industrial society. “Modern industrialism is politically ambivalent because it contains and
intensifies two diametrically opposed trends in modern society: the trend toward freedom and
the trend toward repression” (Fromm, E 1991:108). Large-scale technology on the one hand
may imply the total dependence of industrial population upon a complex, integrated
mechanism, which exists in a highly organized system. “This system must instill the virtues of
discipline, obedience and subordination – no matter who owns the means of production. Thus,
modern industrialism preaches the very virtues which every authoritarian political systems
seeks to cultivate. These virtues are repressive because they are opposed to man’s selfdetermination” (Fromm, E 1991:121).
W. Whyte distinguished such features of society as domination of organizations,
appearance of new bureaucratic or organizational ethics and corresponding values; he paid
attention to the appearance of certain type of personality (so-called “organizational man”, who
is a conformist and an inert person). H. Marcuse wrote about “one-dimensional man” whose
appearance was the result of economic development when “The Welfare state is a state of
unfreedom because its total administration is systematic restriction ...” (Marcuse, H. 1964:49).
Generally, bureaucratization means that human relations become mediated relations in
which public, private or state functionaries authoritatively prescribe the behavior of people. The
growth of bureaucracy preconditioned by the growth of population brings some kind of order
into society and can rationalize social ties that would otherwise be irrational. But some negative
consequences have to be considered too.
For instance, bureaucratization tendencies in Russia and in the West-European
countries caused the depersonalization of social ties, and J. Ortega y Gasset stated that “XIXthCentury civilization has automatically produced the mass-man”, (Ortega y Gasset, J. 1951: 9)
because this civilization has such dimensions as: “liberal democracy and technicism” H.
Marcuse said that “The prevailing forms of social control are technological in a new sense ...
the technical structure and efficacy of the ... apparatus has been a major instrumentality for
subjecting the population to the established social division of labor throughout the modern
period” (Marcuse, H. 1964:9)It leads to the tendency to automation and promotes the creation
of politically manipulated industrial society (Marcuse, H. 1964:435 where economic-technical
coordination is related to the manipulation (Marcuse, H. 1964:49) Besides, it should be said that
every bureaucratic organization needs conformists (Whyate, W. 1956: 120) and this need is
conditioned by the importance of mechanical efficiency at making tasks for bureaucracy
(Bensman, J. & Rosemberg, B. 1963:508) So, the bureaucratization of governing, - as well as
applying punitive sanctions, which are caused by deviant behaviour, - develops conformism of
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members of mass society. At this time, H. Arendt mentioned that “The peculiar selflessness of
the mass man appeared here as yearning for anonymity, for being just a number and functioning
only as a cog, for every transformation ... which would wipe out the spurious identifications
with specific types or predetermined functions within society” (Ardent, H. 329)
Therefore, considering mass society (which is the basis for totalitarian movements and
regimes), the consequences of its forming, relevant social and political tendencies, it is
necessary to define the key concept of mass society as the society of atomized individuals. This
society arises as a result of deformation of traditional social ties. In this case it is necessary to
take into account that masses can exist only as the result of atomization of social ties. And the
preconditions of establishment of totalitarianism (predefined by the availability of mass society)
are connected exactly with the process of social atomization.
Under these conditions there are many opportunities for totalitarian parties to get
people to social political movements and to establish relevant regimes. Above all, the
establishment of totalitarian regime requires the mobilization of population. Such purpose may
be achieved by totalitarian movements which are social political movements and which use
both people’s psychology and their dissatisfaction with social and economic situation.
Consequently, the success of movements depends on their ability to satisfy people’s aspirations
which differ from aspirations of people in democratic states.
Members of societies (where described changes took place) became the objects of
totalitarian parties’ influence. It is necessary to pay attention to these methods of influence
because of their great importance for totalitarian government. Thus, totalitarian ideology,
totalitarian propaganda, peculiarities of organizational structure of a party and a society are the
main methods of influence selected according to psychological peculiarities of citizens.
Success of totalitarian movements was caused by particular social conditions, because
it depended on specific conditions of atomized masses. So, totalitarian movements may be
considered as “mass organizations of atomized, isolated individuals”. It may be explained by
their demand for total loyalty of the member. Such total loyalty is the psychological condition
for total control. And this loyalty can be expected only from the totally (socially and
psychologically) isolated people who are not able to pursue own interests and intentions within
small social groups. J. Ortega y Gasset, for example, said that fascism was a manifestation of
new mentality of masses (Ortega y Gasset, J. 1951: 52). The totalitarian movements “aim and
succeeded in organizing masses”, but not classes, “not citizens with opinions about, interests in,
the handling of public affairs, like the parties of Anglo-Saxon countries” (Ardent, H. 308).
Totalitarian movements are possible wherever masses strive for political organization
for any reason. These people are not closely connected by a common interest, they do not have
“specific class articulateness which is expressed in determined, limited, and obtainable goal”
(Ardent, H. 311). Totalitarian movements recruit their members from these masses. G. Germani
has made an accent in “Fascism and Social Class” on the following elements significant for
totalitarianism: available masses, available elites and available ideologies (Felice, R. 1997:9596).
K. Mannheim, who wrote about fascism, said that “it is the irruption on the political
scene of those irrational masses who have been least integrated into the existing social order
and who are guided by intellectuals who have not been socially integrated”, so the fascism was
“activistic and irrational” Felice, R. 1997:88).
Consequently, increased activity of mass men and the extension of forms of their
political participation possible due to available freedoms, rights and democratic institutions are
the major preconditions of totalitarianism. It is important that the establishment of single-party
regimes replaces democracy in Italy and Germany and authoritarianism in Russia. But in all
countries mentioned, creation of conditions for a political fight contributes to the victory of
radical parties. Extended suffrage facilitated both the opportunity to influence the state power
and increased degree of its accessibility. Psychological resistance of population to introduced
changes resulted in active interference of citizens in politics. It contributed to popularity of
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totalitarian movements, to their active support by citizens (who were not involved in alternative
groups where it would be possible for them to pursue their interests).
Concurrently, the wide interest of population in politics, extension of people’s political
participation, were associated with the integrating processes and the increase in social
informing. The origin of totalitarian tendencies was caused by the creation of so-called
legitimate political space for prospective political discussions and by participation of radical
parties in the political processes.
The issue of psychological manipulation is a key issue in consideration of parties’
activity. It means influencing people and it provides for shaping of people’s activity, intentions,
and desires of an individual (or social group) which contradict people’s own desires, but which
can be pursued as the result of adoption of indirectly dictated purpose. Moreover, it is worth
emphasizing that new technical opportunities for manipulation and control over the
consciousness of society have appeared. In particular, it is necessary to mention the fact of
creation of the system of mass communication which can shape social consciousness in
accordance with the idea of radical society reorganization.
Additionally, it is important to give some definitions to explain the capability of
totalitarianism to exert influence on people’s consciousness and unconsciousness. More than
that, success of relevant movement depends on success of such influence. For the purpose of
influencing social consciousness, the political leader may use certain arguments. Yet their use
cannot cause establishment of total control, because people retain critical thinking in such
situation. That is why the totalitarian leader’s ability to change the unconsciousness has a
decisive role for party’s activity. And it is possible to make mental functioning – the collective
functioning. Just as individual is not only individual but also social being, so that human mind
is also a collective phenomenon. And just as certain social functions or instincts are opposed to
the egocentric interests of the individual, so certain functions or tendencies of the human mind
are opposed, by their collective nature, to the personal mental functions (Jung, C. 1972: 275).
That is why a totalitarian leader tries to exert suggestive influence, and he is interested in some
repression. As C. G. Jung has written, commonly, repression is the process that begins in early
childhood under the moral influence of the environment and continues throughout life, the
repressions are removed and the repressed wishes are made conscious again. But unconscious
includes not only repressed contents, but also all psychic material that lies below the threshold
of consciousness. Up to the theory, analyzed by C. G. Jung, unconscious contains those
elements of personality which have been suppressed through the process of education (Jung, C.
1972: 270) As it is known, totalitarian organizations tried to educate (or re-educate) people in
order to create the new society. And that is why the process of repression had a very significant
meaning in totalitarian state. “Repression of the collective psyche was ... necessary for the
development of the personality, since collective psychology and personal psychology exclude
one another ...” (Jung, C. 1972: 277)
Now it is worth considering different methods used by totalitarian authority for
creating corresponding type of personality who can be an object of total control. It is essential
to mention that these methods are methods of both direct influence (for changing
consciousness) and indirect influence (for changing unconsciousness).
For the purpose of influencing this way, the following discoveries and inventions were
used:
- greatly improved technique of suggestion,
- fully developed science of human differences, enabling government managers to assign
any given individual to his or her proper place in the social and economic hierarchy,
- system of eugenics, designed to standardize the human product and so to facilitate the
task of the managers (Formm,, 219-220)
Conformism as one of the features of mass people’s consciousness plays a major role.
As a rule, it is connected with the aspiration of mass man to avoid responsibility. And the fact
that the state appropriates the right to determine the goals of society’s development has a double
effect. On the one hand, it allows totalitarian subjects to feel certain relief, as their personal
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responsibility for the decisions made is missing. On the other hand, totalitarian authority binds
them with obligations to be limited by the sole idea and type of behaviour which can be used as
a weapon.
Extraordinarily important role for totalitarianism is played by ideology. Researchers
claim that availability of ideology is necessary for understanding the world.As it has been said
before, for the purpose of getting mass support, a relevant political party has to offer ideas
which can be interesting for most people whose psychological features were originated under
the considered circumstances of historical development. It is worth defining in such context
what aspirations are satisfied by totalitarian ideology, and what projects of public organization
it offers.
Through the processes of marginalization, the growth of political activity of
population, the development of technical opportunities for influencing society, social and
economic difficulties caused by the results of rapid modernization process, World War I, postwar crises, politicized population of the states supported radical left and radical right ideologies.
These ideologies contained criticism of democracy, capitalism, and liberalism; and expressly
pointed to the forces which could implement such principles. Conformity of radicalism with the
aspiration of population became the reason for generation of totalitarian ideologies created to
get mass support of totalitarian parties.
Totalitarian ideologies have indisputably different contents, but they are similar by
offered methods of achieving certain goals. Notably, the common aspects of totalitarian
ideologies are the purpose of their creation and the form of their presentation. Therefore, any
utopian project is in the centre of every totalitarian ideology, and all ideas offered refer to
implementation of this project.
It is necessary to remember that consolidation is an extremely important factor for
totalitarian activity and ideology. In this context, the idea of enemy used by totalitarianism
allows uniting population and clarifying the effects of possible mistakes of power, if any, at the
same time. It is well known that it is much easier to unite a certain community on the basis of
the idea of opposition than on the basis of calls to achieve a certain goal. Besides, taking into
consideration that totalitarian ideology is introduced in mass society, it is necessary to take into
account such results of the development of states as standardization and unification. These
processes cause the striving of individuals for being like other members of society. And
consequently, it caused xenophobia. In this case it is important mentioning that using the ideas
acceptance of which depends on xenophobia every totalitarian movement directs the activity of
individuals to the certain way required by this movement.
An idea of belonging to great community became one of the most significant ideas and
a basic consolidating factor due to isolation, insecurity and inability of “potentially Fascistic”
(de Felice, 86) individuals and groups. Due to F. Neumann’s consideration, Italian and German
fascism had the possibility which was “the attempt of what one might call doomed classes to
change radically the socio-economic situation, to reverse it, and to install a political system that
would restore them to their old pre-eminence” (Neuman, 251)
Community gives people a sense of belonging and requires strong ties of loyalty
between its members and theirs organization (Toffler, 367-368). There was an idea of belonging
to certain class in communist ideology, an idea of belonging to certain nation in fascism, an idea
of belonging to certain race in national-socialism. Thus, totalitarian party satisfied the aspiration
of the members of mass society for association and unification, and supported their xenophobia
at the same time. So, availability of totalitarian movement satisfied the aspiration for
organization, submission and being under control. These aspirations usually relate to noncriticism, avoidance of responsibility, and incapability of independent decision making.
An idea of grandeur of some community (exploited by totalitarian ideology in its
different versions) is also important for succeeding in attracting interest of marginalized
population. Individuals like the idea of grandeur of a nation, class or race; it gives them a
feeling of belonging to grandeur nation, class or race. Such situation may be explained by
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peculiar features of mass perception connected with the disposition of atomized individuals to
self-identification with a leader or a large community.
The next idea (which significantly influences implementation of the whole system of
ideas) is an idea of charismatic leader. Generally, an idea of existing national leader can help to
organize a diversified society. Glorifying a leader means by the members of mass society means
glorifying themselves (as a result of self-identification with a leader).
An idea of necessity for elite conforms to mass striving for submission, being under
control and being organized. For the same reason, interference of the state in various public
spheres (including private one) is supported by people.
An idea of nationalism associated with imperialistic aspirations has also become a
consolidating factor as a result of military defeat and post-war division of territories.
Accordingly, it can be explained by dissatisfaction of population.
Striving for social justice is always peculiar for the population of the states with the
difficult economic, social and political situation.
Consequently, every totalitarian ideology is directed at the perception of people who
have such psychological peculiarities, as: paternalism; conformism; xenophobia; striving for
searching leader; striving for social justice; striving for belonging to large community; striving
for being controlled.
However, the discrepancy of ideological programs is a necessary instrument for
involving population in totalitarian movement and providing support for the regime. “The
totalitarian movements, each in its own way, have done their utmost to get rid of the party
programs which specified concrete content and which they inherited from earlier,
nontotalitarian stages of development. No matter how radically they might have been phrased,
every definite political goal which does not simply assert or circumscribe the claim to world
rule, every political program which deals with issues more specific than “ideological questions
of importance for centuries” is an obstruction of totalitarianism” (Ardent, 324). Considered
discrepancy of ideological programs is necessary because ideology should contain ideas of
different political thoughts; social, economic and political promises directed at satisfaction of
maximum number of citizens.
For the purpose of introducing ideology, totalitarianism (both for establishment and for
functioning of the regime) uses one of the main means of persuasion – propaganda. For its
successful implication totalitarian propagandists uses: the idea of enemy, anti capitalist
orientation, declarative promises of social justice, equality, welfare, the idea of creation of new
society and new state.
Thus, it is important to pay attention to the methods of totalitarian propaganda which
was mass propaganda (widely used earlier by non-totalitarian power).
So, there can be distinguished the following methods of totalitarian mass propaganda:
reiteration; defining enemy of class, nation or race (effective as a result of xenophobia);
addressing to the authority (popular due to the aspiration for searching leader); ssertion (which
was related to the principle of reiteration); expression of majority’s opinion (which was related
to aspiration for being like others); addressing to the emotions (effective for the members of the
mass society) (Lasswell, 47) suggestive influence made by the leader.
Therefore, the methods of totalitarian propaganda are aimed at making the ability of
critical thinking impossible.
And, accordingly, numerous mass meetings, manifestations and parades which require
active participation of citizens play the great role. Every person in totalitarian state must be
politically, socially active. “The insistence upon activism in place of thinking means that men
shall never have the freedom and time to think for themselves. Action without thought is
possible only if it is directed and controlled action, except in short period of mass spontaneity.
Thus controlled it is pseudo-action, for it is not man who acts but a bureaucratic machine”
(Neuman, F.L. 1966:439). This technique aims at making the action of an authoritarian
apparatus appear as the spontaneous activity of the members of mass society. And such
situation makes an important influence on the efficiency of totalitarian propaganda.
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H. Arendt has written that totalitarian propaganda “raised ideological scientificality
and its technique of making statements in the form of predictions to a height of efficiency of
method and absurdity of content because, demagogically speaking, there is hardly a better way
to avoid discussion than by releasing an argument from the control of the present and by saying
that only the future can reveal its merits”. And H. D. Lasswell has mentioned the connection
between fluctuating levels of insecurity and the effectiveness of propaganda. Generally,
agitation and propaganda may rally fanatic support, and appeals to self-interest may enlist the
energies of the ambitious and bind their fortunes to the regime.
On the whole, such psychological features of people as aspiration for being like others,
conformism and xenophobia facilitated use of totalitarian propaganda directed at mass
perception.
This type of perception (as well as inspirations and dispositions which are peculiar to
members of mass society) is necessary for totalitarian authority. And that is why the
conservation of relevant psychological features is one of the most important tasks of totalitarian
regime.
Thus, social policy of all totalitarian states is directed to the acceptance and
strengthening of the prevailing class character, to the atomization of wide sections of population
through the destruction of every autonomous group mediating between citizens and the state, to
the creation of a system of autocratic bureaucracies interfering in all social relationships.
Corresponding transformations necessitates a special organizational structure of
society. And simultaneously, they depend on the organization of totalitarian party.
Forms of totalitarian organization were new in comparison with the contents of
propaganda. Provided that it is a totalitarian organization of society, effective use of
mechanisms of influence on population is possible subject to availability of a leader, elite (or
party elite), activists of movement (or activists of a party) and the followers.
The aim of totalitarian organization was “to translate the propaganda lies of the
movement” (Ardent, 364). “New organizational device of the movements in their prepower
stage is the creation of front organizations” (Ardent, 364) and it showed the distinction between
party members and sympathizers. At the same time, “as party members are related to and
separated from the fellow-travellers, so are the elite formations of the movement related to and
separated from the ordinary members” (Ardent, 347).
The role of monopolistic party in totalitarian state is great. F. Neumann has separated
this aspect and written that such party “is required because the traditional instrument of
coercion do not suffice to control an industrial society, and all the less to since bureaucracies
and armies may not always be reliable” (Neuman, 244). The monopolistic party is a flexible
instrument which provides the force to control the state machine and society and keeps together
the authoritarian elements within society.
Generally, the monopolistic party involves a socio-psychological aspect pertaining to
mass society. As for the party’s reputation, since totalitarian dictatorships arise, “within and
against democracies” the totalitarian “clique has to assume the shape of a democratic movement
and to retain this façade even after it has come to power” (Neuman, 244).
An important for totalitarianism “leadership principle” has been borrowed from
authoritarianism and military dictatorships. H. Arendt has written that “totalitarian leader is
nothing more nor less than the functionary of the masses he leads” (Ardent, 325) “The Leader
who bestrides the peak of totalitarian edifice is the victim of his own limitations. He cannot
decide everything, and even when he exercises his power to decide, he must depend on
bureaucratic instruments to project” his decisions. “Authority becomes institutionalized, and its
fragments are distributed among the manifold sub-bureaucracies which collectively contribute
to the illusion of totalitarian omniscience” (Fainsod, 386)
Generally, the leader’s presence is necessary for masses, because the individual is
made to feel powerless and insignificant, but taught to project all his human powers into the
figure of his leader” (de Felice, 85) Yet, for example, Gurvitch wrote that so called charismatic
leader was the secondary element (de Felice, 91)
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Organizational division of the movement into elite formations, membership, and
sympathizers allows working the leader’s lie (Ardent, 383). The point is that the sympathizers
in front organizations despite their fellow-citizens’ complete uninitiation, the party members
despite the fellow-travellers’ gullibility and lacks of radicalism, the elite formations despite for
similar reasons the party membership. While membership doesn’t believe statements (made for
public consumption), they believe all clichés of ideological explanation (Ardent, 384). At the
same time “... elite formations are distinguished from the ordinary party membership in that
they ... are not even supported to believe in the literal truth of ideological clichés” (Ardent,
384). The topmost layer in the organization of totalitarian movements is the circle around the
leader, to them ideological clichés are mere devise to organization the masses (Ardent, 385).
“The only group supported to believe loyalty and textually to the Leader’s words are the
sympathizers whose confidence surrounds the movement with an atmosphere of honesty and
simple-mindedness, and helps the Leader to fulfil half his task, that is, to inspire confidence in
the movement. The party members never believe public statements and are not supposed to, but
are complimented by totalitarian propaganda on that superior intelligence which supposedly
distinguishes them from the nontotalitarian outside world” (Ardent, 383).
F. Neumann and M. Fainsod had emphasized the importance of leadership principle as
the mechanism of control over totalitarian society. The skillful totalitarian dictator weaves a
complex web of controls in which social pressures and incentives have their appointed places
and indoctrination plays a key role (Fainsod, 421).
F. Neumann has written that control can be achieved by the following techniques:
- the leadership principle – to enforce guidance from the top and responsibility to the top;
- the “synchronization” of all social organizations (in order to control them and to make
them serviceable to the state);
- the creation of graded elites in order to enable the rulers to control the masses;
- the atomization and isolation of the individuals for manipulation;
- the transformation of culture into propaganda (Neuman, 245)
In general, the principles of totalitarian organization (as well as basic ideological
postulates and principles of propaganda) were formed according to the necessity for
mobilization and attraction of maximum amount of people to the movement. This aim could be
reached due to the creation of totalitarian organization which offered a new social structure of
society to the individuals who were representatives of marginalized population. The
peculiarities of this structure meet their aspirations, because the new social structure
1) allows: participating in political processes, avoiding responsibility, finding not only a
leader but also supervisory force,
2) does not contradict their aspiration for: conformism, non-criticism, unification,
xenophobia.
The corresponding features of social consciousness have been shaped for the long
period of time. At the beginning, these features were used by totalitarian parties for the purpose
of attracting people to totalitarian movement and for the purpose of getting support of
population. Later on, these features were developed by the methods of totalitarian government
because the authority was dependent on their existence.
These peculiar psychological features facilitate the totalitarian methods of governing a
society and are unusual for democracy. It is necessary to emphasize dependence of any political
regime on the formed social consciousness (and on people’s perception of the governmental
methods and the changes introduced).
Conservation of considered features at the present time causes a success of radical
ideologies in European states. It complicates both internal and foreign relations. For instance,
some parties of post-communist states hinder international cooperation, oppose the process of
states’ integration into EU, and try to influence public opinion in order to get support. People,
whose mentality is characterized by mentioned peculiarities, oppose political, economic and
social reforms. Moreover, conservation of investigated features of social consciousness causes
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non-democratic political phenomena and processes (e. g., non-transparent elections and activity
of mass media, corruption, violation of law, etc.).
And now the following features have the most significant meaning for politics in some
post-Soviet states:
1. paternalism complicates regular change of elites and reduces an influence of opposition;
2. striving for being controlled causes the voting only for leaders (when voters take into
consideration only personal characteristics of leaders), but not for their political programs (or
party programs);
3. xenophobia complicates a process of reforming;
4. passiveness results in low rates of citizens’ participation in politics;
5. conformism forms non-critical attitude to government; complicates the opportunity to
involve people in different democratic movements and organizations which can be considered
as institutions of civil society;
6. avoiding responsibility and appropriate avoiding political participation result in
establishment of authoritarian regimes.
Thus, in the context of democratization of a post-totalitarian state, it is worth paying
attention to the possibility of democratization of the society. Consequently, success of
democratization relies on the transformation of people’s consciousness.
Therefore, the importance of psychological aspect for the establishment and
functioning of totalitarianism is undisputable. Accordingly, its meaning is significant for
prospective transformation of the regime. In the context of cooperation of European states it is
impossible to neglect circumstances which determine peculiarities of transformations in postcommunist states. And the most important peculiarity (which determines the reform policy) is
connected with the development of democratic political culture and the forming of new social
consciousness.
More than that, European community is interested in the creation of safety space and
intends to the cooperation with democratic partners and neighbors. So, successful
democratization of post-totalitarian states has advantages not only for these states, but also for
the states of European Union. As it was said, development of civil society allows making
effective institutional changes possible. And in the context of integration process,
harmonization of standards, values, intentions, outlooks, can support the development of
bilateral relations and negotiations in all spheres.
However, the transformation of social consciousness (as well as transformation of
individual one) is a continuing process, which depends on both factors of political environment
and existing psychological features of individuals. That is why democratization of posttotalitarian society takes place gradually and requires considerable efforts of:
1) state institutions;
2) non-government organizations;
3) educational institutions;
4) citizens who are able to influence social processes in the state.
Achievement of this purpose requires not only people’s awareness of the principles of
democracy, availability of legislative basis, institutional changes in the state. Striving of citizens
for taking part in political, social and economic processes according to the rules and principles
of democracy, acceptance of democratic values are rather important steps when switching to
democracy.
Therefore, at this point it is important to mention that establishment of democracy
requires citizens who can initiate or support the democratic transformations. However, the
research of features of the members of mass society proves that psychological features peculiar
to this society (and as a result, peculiar to post-totalitarian society) makes positive influence
only on establishment of authoritarianism or totalitarianism.
That is why introducing of democratic values is a difficult process (which faces
resistance of citizens) for many post-totalitarian societies. As it has been mentioned,
consciousness of population (which has been formed for the long period of time) changes
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slowly, especially under new conditions which require fast political, economic, and social
transformations. Consequently, the establishment of democratic regime in a post-totalitarian
state is a difficult process which must be followed by the changes of social consciousness. And
the great efforts of different subjects of politics are to be specifically aimed at transformation of
social consciousness and at the establishment of civic society respectively.
References
Arendt, H. (1959). The Origins of Totalitarianism. New York: Meridian books, Inc.
Bensman, J., & Rosenberg, B. (1963). Mass, Class and Bureaucracy: the Evolution of
Contemporary Society. New York: Englewood Cliffs, Prentice-Hall.
Blau, P. M. (1971). Bureaucracy in Modern Society. New York: Random House.
Elsner, H. (1967). The Technocrates, Prophets of Automation. Syracuse: Syracuse University
Press.
Fainsod, M. (1963). How Russia is ruled. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
de Felice, R. (1997). Interpretations of Fascism. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Friedrich, C. J. (1969). The Evolving Theory and Practice of Totalitarian Regimes. In C. J.
Friedrich (Ed.), Totalitarianism in Perspective: Three Views. (pp. 123-164). New York:
Praeger.
Friedrich, C. J., & Brzezinsky, Z. K. (1962). Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy. New
York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., Publisher.
Fromm, E. (1991). The Sane Society. London and New York: Routledge Classics.
Fromm, E. (1978). To have or to be? London: Jonathan Cape Thirty Bedford Square London.
Jung, C. G. (1972). Two Essays on Analytical Psychology. First Princeton: Bollingen Paperback
Printing.
Kornhauser, W. (1960). The Politics of Mass Society. London: London Routledge and Kegan
Paul.
Lasswell, H. D. (1950). Politics: Who Gets What, When, How. New York: Peter Smith.
Lasswell, H. D. (1963). Power and Society: A Framework for Political Inquiry. New Haven:
Yale University Press.
Lipset, S. M., & Bendix, R. (1964). Social Mobility in Industrial Society. Berkeley: University
of California Press.
Mannheim, K. (1936). Ideology and Utopia: An Introduction to the Sociology of Knowledge.
San Diego: Harcourt Brace Javanovich.
Marcuse, H. (1964). One-dimensional Man. Studies in the Ideology of Advanced Industrial
Society. Boston: Beacon Press.
Neumann, F. L. (1966). Behemoth. New York: Harper & Row.
Neumann, F. L. (1957). The Democratic and the Authoritarian State: Essays in Political and
Legal Theory. New York: The Free Press.
Ortega y Gasset, J. (1951). The Revolt of the Masses. New York: Mentor book.
Pipes, R. (1974). Russia Under the Old Regime. New York: Scribner.
Smith, T. (1987). Thinking Like a Communist: State and Legitimacy in a Soviet Union, China,
and Cuba. New York: Norton.
Toffler, A. (1990). The Third Wave. New York: A Bantam Book.
Whyte, W. (1956). The Organization Man. New York: Simon & Schuster.
IV. Focus
Rudolf REZSOHAZY (Leuven) ◙ The Cultural Frontiers of Europe: Our
Common Values
Note of the editors:
The ideas expressed by the author represent the point of view of a personality with a broad
expertise from the scientific and didactic point of view. He belongs to the cultural environment
of Eastern Europe through his origin and to the Western dimension through his career.
The Cultural Frontiers of Europe : Our Common Values
Rudolf REZSÖHAZY
Abstract : In this article the following European common values are shortly analysed :
1. Greece and Rome : the scientific thinking ; the Promethean spirit ; the Roman legal
constructs. 2. Christianity : the dignity of the person ; love ; justice ; fraternity. 3. The Middle
Ages : reason ;citizenship ; learning ; time as value ; work as virtue. 4. Renaissance and
Reformation : autonomy of the individual ; relativism ; tolerance ; spirit of enterprise. 5.
Enlightenment : modern science ; critical spirit ; idea of progress. 6. Industrial and Political
revolutions : technology ; freedom ; human rights ; democracy ; separation of Church and State.
7. Capitalism and Socialism : private property ; free market ; competition ; consumerism ; social
reforms ; solidarity ; equality. 8. The last developments : self-determination of peoples ; peace ;
Welfare State ; women’s emancipation. 9. The family.
Keywords : Cultural Frontiers, Europe, Common Values, the family
When we study the concept of frontier, it seems to me useful to distinguish between political
and cultural frontiers. The political ones deliniate clearly the limits of a State, a province, a
town, the area of competence of a public power.
Cultural frontiers are approximate, blurred, moving. They cover an area where people speak the
same language, adopted the same life style, behave similarly, and so on. Several criteria can
serve to define a cultural living unit. I choose the shared values by a given population.
My thesis consists to affirm that Europe makes a cultural reality thanks to the values Europeans
have in common. In this sense, we can assert that Europe means the peoples and the territories
where they live, who adopted throughout the history the same values. I shall locate at various
points in the past the emergence of the values which form the foundations of European identity.
Which are these values ?
1. Greeks and Romans
To the Greeks we owe our attitude towards the world. They were the first to view it in
a spirit of enquiry, to ask the major questions of philosophy and to initiate scientific thinking.
Thanks to the Greeks, our civilisation bears the everlasting seal of the Promethian spirit : the
universe is a place to be discovered, to be subjected to human mastery and dominion (and not
an unkown and indecipherable force to which mankind remains in thrall or which has to be
appeased by entreaties to the gods).
We also owe to the ancient world, and above all to the Romans, the example of their
political and legal constructs. I lay particular stress on the idea of the law instilled into us by the
Romans, which has influenced us down to the present day.
2. Christianity
Our civilisation is, undeniably, Judaeo-Christian. It owes to the Jewish tradition, and
even more to the teachings of Jesus, notions as basic as a unique and personal God, as well as
the concepts of salvation, the person (possessed of dignity, irreplaceable, saved), love, justice,
fraternity (all men are the children of one Father), etc. Europe is clearly no longer Christian in
institutional terms ; its population belongs to several different philosophical and religious
traditions. But the key values of Christianity have been incorporated into the European heritage
and are shared, over and above the divisions. As such I believe that their inclusion in all school
curricula is highly to be recommended. In the absence of an acquaintance with the culture of
Christianity, you cannot even be an intelligent tourist. If you visit a Baroque church, to the
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strains, if possible, of Baroque music, you will not understand a thing unless you know
something about the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation, about the Holy Trinity and the
Catholic doctrine of the Eucharist.
Basically, we can find three types of values in the Holy Scripture. Some are universal.
For example compassion and mercy are present in Islam as well as in Buddhism. Others are
especially christians such as the most virtues recommended by the Sermon on the Mount. And
thirdly, we have the values which spread beyond the believers and became the patrimony of all
Europeans, such as fraterrnity, solidarity, dignity of man.
3. The Middle Ages
It is during the Middle Ages that the legacy of Christianity acquired the form in which
it has been handed down to us. I have frequently asked what would have happened if the
apostles had moved eastwards, rather than travelling to Athens and Rome. Doubtless the vital
and original components of Christ’s message would have been transmitted. But it is highly
probable that Christianity, in contact with India or China, would have donned a specific cultural
garb. Encountering Greece, it was impregnated by the Hellenic mentality and the demand that
everything be subjected to rigorous examination in the light of pertinent questions.
From this demand stemmed the need to reconcile faith and reason, to make Christian
belief reasonable. The thinkers of the Middle Ages took up the colossal task of expressing faith
in rigorous language, borrowing from Plato or Aristotle the notions and tools for their thinking.
These endeavours have given us another shared heritage : we consider that every
thought, every intention, every initiative should be subject to the control of reason. Reason is
highly prized. It is something we trust.
The year 1054 is the official date of the religious schism between Rome and
Byzantium. It was an inauspicious moment, for, from that point on, the destinies of the West
and East were to diverge.
Nevertheless, our frontiers with the East remain porous. In the 19th century, the
Russians contribute to the scientific progress. Their music and literature enrich our common
treasury. Their social revolutionaries are inspired by the West. But, meanwhile marxism gives
birth to social democracy in our countries, it produces Lenin and Stalin in Russia.
The path followed by the West was to be marked by the birth of cities and the middle
classes. From this point on our civilisation was to be an urban civilisation. The French word
« bourgeois » (originally inhabitant of a « bourg ») does not describe the figure of the times as
accurately as the German « Bürger » or the Spanish « ciudadano ». This figure was not just an
artisan or merchant who sought to make an independent living but also a citizen who valued his
sense of personal autonomy.
It is thus not surprising that in the towns we encounter the early signs of democracy. It
was not yet a question of positive freedoms (such as freedom of speech or of religion) but of
franchises (removal of previously suffered constraints) ; not of constitutions but of charters
enshrining a number of circumscribed gains (not to be liable to arbitrary arrest, or to pay tax
without having voted it, etc.).
This period also saw the founding of the first universities. These were institutions
devoted to the exercise of reason. They fostered new values : the force of intelligence, the
prestige of learning, the importance of knowledge.
At the same time, the Middle Ages witnessed a remarkable technological evolution
(the Promethian spirit at work !) : one need think only of the range of optical instruments, the
invention of clockwork, and soon printing. Behind the scenes of such progress stood the figure
of the craftsman, with his ideal of the carefully fashioned artefact, his concern for ponctuality.
Two major values were, very gradually, to take root : control over time and a belief in work as a
sacred virtue.
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4. Renaissance and Reformation
During the 15th and 16th centuries our « stock » of values continued to expand. The
voyages of discovery radically changed the dimensions of our world. We came into contact
with other cultures, with human beings who were unlike ourselves, and we observed with
surprise that, even deprived of Christian enlightenment, these « Others » could sometimes
display virtuous feelings (e.g. the « noble savage » and the belief in the natural goodness of
man). From now on it would be more difficult to judge everything by the standards of one’s
own parish. A new way of seeing began to gain ground : that all that is earthly is relative.
Relativism was thus incorporated into the cultural impedimenta of Europe.
From the standpoint of the « production of values », the most striking feature of the
Renaissance period is the emergence, and indeed in some cases the glorification, of the
individual. During the Middle Ages, as in most civilisations, the individual derived his
justification, his status, his identity from the community (the family, the lineage, the village, the
ethnic group) in whose midst he lived. Now he became gradually emancipated and began to
define himself in accordance with the fact of his separate existence, his own peculiar features,
his acts and his achievements.
Speaking of the Reformation, I shall not focus upon the new split in Christianity and
the bloody conflicts which followed in its wake. The role played by Luther was important, as
was that of Calvin, but it is Erasmus, the herald of tolerance, who is of most relevance to my
concern. The world in which a single religion reigned supreme was coming to an end ; the dawn
of plurlism was on the horizon. A society in which different, indeed opposite, beliefs and
opinions are simultaneously present cannot remain for long in existence without a modicum of
tolerance. At the beginning the coexistence of opposites was ordered according to a somewhat
crooked arrangement : « cuius regio, eius religio ». But as attitudes evolved, pluralism was no
longer just passively accepted but came to be regarded as an opportunity for mutual enrichment.
In this way tolerance came to be preached as a virtue.
In this period the prevailing economic system was undergoing a transformation.
Merchant capitalism came to dominate financial transactions and the movement of goods.
Figures like Jacques Cœur, or the Fugger family gained wealth and renown. The spirit of
enterprise was deployed. It became a source of wealth, power and prestige, instilling into our
civilisation its dynamism, providing the impetus for expansion and the achievement of material
superiority, culminating in the conquests of colonialism.
5. Enlightenment
It may be said that in the 17th century the victory of science took its definitive hold. We
have seen its rapid dawning in Greece, and we have seen the conquests of reason in the Middle
Ages. Now a genuine revolution took place, thanks to the accumulation of observations, the
testing on innovatory hypotheses, the formulation of laws and their demonstration, the progress
of mathematics, the devising of new methodological approaches. Science became emancipated
from philosophy and from the doctrines handed down from the Ancient World.
This evolution produced two consequences of relevance for my arguments. The first of
these was the separation of faith and science. After painful struggles, it became increasingly
accepted, in Christian circles too, that faith and science were different areas of concern, that
they represented two separate approaches, the one irreducible to the other. This is yet another
feature of our civilisation which we do not encounter elsewhere. The other development was the
generalisation of the critical spirit engendered by science. The change in our mentality made us
unwilling to take what we see or are told, on trust ; we like to have positive evidence of the
truth.
The major strides in scientific understanding gave birth also to the idea of progress.
Earlier, only two visions of history had been formulated by humanity : one was cyclical (the
passage of time is subject to periods of rise, apogee and decline ; it is an eternal return) ; the
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other was nostalgic (at the beginning was paradise, golden age ; at the end is a vale of tears).
With the accumulation of scientific and geographical discoveries, the broadening of intellectual
horizons and the expanding economy, thinkers began to believe that history was perhaps
moving in a definite direction, the direction of progress ; in other words they nurtured the hope
that humanity was embarked on a linear and unending forward march. By the end of the 18th
century, this hope had become a widely held doctrine and in the 19th century it turned into one
of the myths of our civilisation. This belief in the inevitability of progress has been precipitated
into periodic crisis, particularly after the First and Second World Wars, and yet it continues to
prevail. That progress should be halted is an intolerable prospect : our national product must
continue to grow, unemployment must be brought down, a cure must be found for cancer and
aids, the different sources of energy must be harnessed (the Promethian dream is not over !).
6. Industrial and Political Revolutions
The onset of the machine age ushered in the first industrial revolution (with others
following down to the present day). From this point on the inventor came to be revered as the
new hero. In the wake of the material transformations which were henceforward to form the
backcloth to our lives, new values were being affirmed and gaining currency : an admiration for
technology, an aspiration to well-being, the attraction of consumerism. It was to be more than a
century before we entered the « consumer society », but the values which prompted markets to
develop in this direction had been in existence for a very long time.
We have to go back once more into the 18th century to pinpoint other values which
were subsequently adopted. I refer here to values that were transmitted principally by the
ideology of the Enlightenment : first of all liberty, which now meant not just franchises but
positive options, systematically spelt out, allowing choice to be exercised in all areas of life. I
am thinking also of the freedom of enquiry, and of the right to happiness and personal
fulfilment which was to become such a popular demand in the 1960s.
The political upheavals which brought this process of intellectual fermentation to its
height (such as the American and French revolutions), also set the seal on the preparatory
endeavors. The rights of man were solemnly declared : it was recognised that human beings
have, by virtue of their human nature (natural law), inalienable and inviolable rights, the
validity of which overrides all considerations deriving from the political or social order.
The foundations of modern democracy had been laid : all power must derive from the
sovereignty of the people ; equality before the law must be the rule, etc. These principles could
not all be effectively realised from one day to the next, and the struggle for universal suffrage or
for votes for women continued through the 19th and a good part of the 20th century.
I would like to stress here another initiative which gave rise to protracted struggles,
namely the separation of Church and State. The operation finally turned out to be of benefit to
both sides and its outcome became part of the common heritage of Europeans, including
Christians.
7. Capitalism and Socialism
The 19th century was also the era of capitalism triumphant. Here too , I shall focus not
on its weaknesses or failures, but on its contribution to the making of our culture. I lay the
emphasis on three characteristics which put down deep roots and to which the great majority of
Europeans are deeply committed : the concept of private property (« my » house, « my » car,
« my » belongings), the market as the locus of the regulation of supply and demand, and
competition (albeit subject to a certain amount of restraint designed to redress its excesses) as
the means of ensuring that the most able can come to the fore.
Not only have the protests voiced against the abuses of capitalism led to social reform ;
the labour movements and socialism, in general, have also enriched our system of values by the
fostering of solidarity and equality, principles regarded as indispensable for ensuring that every
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citizen enjoys broadly similar conditions for starting out in life and in the face of the major
choices encountered on its path.
8. The last developments
The national states are predominantly the creation of the 19th century and their birth
pangs left behind a memory of conflicts and wars. But the positive element on to which
posterity has held tight is the « right of self-determination of peoples ». Both the vast movement
of decolonisation and the return to sovereign existence of certain European countries were
achieved under the auspices of this principle.
The excesses of nationalism also entailed a happy consequence, namely, the
increasingly firm adherence to the value of peace. For a thousand years it was considered
normal that a dispute between two European peoples, for example the French and the Germans,
should be settled by war. Today such an outcome is unimaginable.
After the Second World War, our economic and social institutions continued to
change. The principal new arrival on the scene was the Welfare State. This institution has been
criticised by the exponents of neo-liberalism, and yet it is an idea that has become rooted deep
in the public awareness. It consists in the argument that the members of a society cannot be left
to suffer the reverses of fate (unemployment, sickness, accidents, etc.) but that the community
owes them particular protection and has a duty to repair the harm suffered. And so the Welfare
State is the modern incarnation of values such as the dignity of the person, equity, and
solidarity.
It is the last fifty years which have seen the redress of the inequalities between women
and men. Women’s emancipation is nearing its goal and each of us will have witnessed the
changes that have taken place not only in legislations but in mentalities.
9. The family
If I have so far omitted to mention one of the central values of our society, namely the
family, this is because it is not possible to locate its birth at a precise date. The institution of the
family has traversed the whole of our history. It has altered, changed shape, but has never
ceased being regarded as one of the foundations of the community. This is the case, even at
times of crisis, like the present. Though marriage partnerships have become more fragile, all the
surveys concur in saying that the success of the couple and the arrival of children, number
among the very deepest of our contemporaries’ aspirations.
*
*
*
To ensure that what I have said is correctly interpreted, I should like to make a few
additional remarks.
The different values have been enumerated in isolation, in chronological order, without
taking account of their importance in relation to one another. Yet it is important to stress that
the values adhered to by an individual or society are always organised in a system, within which
each value confers its significance upon others , and that this system is organised hierarchically
so that some values are more important than others.Though it may seem reasonably to claim
that the different values enumerated would be endorsed by most Europeans, it is also true to say
that individuals too differ from another in the manner in which they organise their value system.
It goes without saying that Catholics set greater store by certain values than do non-believers
and the same will be true of employers and workers, socialists and liberals, or citizens of
different countries.
This presentation of values in their chronological order of appearance gives the
impression that the course of history was ordained as a necessary evolution. This impression is
produced by the retrospective reading of facts. In reality, when we consider them in parallel
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with the events as they actually took place, we perceive the complexity of situations, the ebb
and flow and rise and fall of destinies. Viewed in this way, history no longer appears as fate or
destiny written in advance but as the sum of the decisions taken by human beings as they
interact in a sometimes warlike sometimes peaceable manner.
Another misapprehension could creep into the reader’s mind because the emergence of
a value is located at a precise date. It is true that I have placed each value at a specific linear
point in time. But in each case this was a beginning, frequently followed by a period of struggle
and a slow process during which the value in question spread, before the point was reached
where its generalised presence could be diagnosed.
I should like to ask one final question : is it possible to consider that the values adopted
by Europeans constitute a definitive acquisition? To this question I propose a twofold answer.
First of all, it must not be forgotten that a value is also an ideal which may be belied by
behaviour. Thus, for example, we may regard the critical spirit as an important value and yet it
may happen, in a given circumstance, that we are credulous and fall pray to the seductive
message of a political speech or an advertisement. Or again, we may revere the concept of the
family at the same time as our society exhibits a rising divorce rate.
Secondly, it would be extremely rash to claim that a value is immune to crisis, or even
desertion. It is for this reason that the values which we cherish must be nurtured and transmitted
by upbringing and education to ensure their firm presence in our awareness. There can be no
other guarantee against their decline.
References
Given the general character of this essay we recommend to consult the volumes of the
main collections of history :
Evolution de l’humanité, Paris, Albin Michel
Histoire générale des civilisations, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France
Histoire générale de l’Eglise, sous la dir. de Fliche et Martin, Paris, Bloud et Gay
The New Cambridge Modern History, Cambridge (G.B.) University Press
History of Mankind, London, George Allan & Unwin
Nouvelle Clio, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France
Peuples et Civilisations, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France.
Reviews and References
172
Michel FOUCHER, L’obsession des frontières, Paris, Editions Perrin, 2007, 249 p,
ISBN 978-2-262-02667-7
« L’obsession des frontières » est un livre très intéressant qui traite d’un sujet actuel :
la production continue de frontières politiques. Michel Foucher montre ici combien les
frontières sont révélatrices à la fois des logiques contemporaines des Etats-nations et des
dynamiques à l'échelle mondiale. Même si la mondialisation économique est souvent perçue
comme une dynamique portant l'effacement des frontières étatiques, Michel Foucher démontre
que les phases de mondialisation économique s'accompagnent toujours d'un mouvement de
consolidation territoriale.
L’ouvrage aborde ce que Michel Foucher appelle « dyade », c’est-à-dire les frontières
interétatiques qui définissent les périmètres de souveraineté des Etats-nations. Ces limites sont
plus nombreuses que jamais, vu que l’Europe compte 26.651 kilomètres de frontières de plus
qu’avant 1990. La fin des grands empires depuis le XXe siècle (austro-hongrois, russe puis
soviétique, chinois) s’est accompagnée d’un redécoupage du monde. En parallèle à cette
multiplication des frontières s’est développée une accélération majeure des mobilités et des
flux. Quelle place ont donc les frontières dans un monde fluide ?
Le livre est structuré en six parties : tout d’abord on trouve l’Introduction qui pose la
problématique directement et dès le début : est-ce que la mondialisation et la production des
frontières n’est-ce pas un paradoxe dans le monde actuel ? Pour y répondre, l’auteur montre que
les phénomènes de mondialisation ont toujours apporté la création de nouvelles bornes. Le
mouvement appelle l’ancrage ; les réseaux sont composés de flux organisés entre des nœuds.
Egalement, la mondialisation est une mise en circulation du monde à partir des territoires.
Donc, paradoxalement, la mondialisation est créatrice des frontières. Il est important d’ajouter
que ces frontières ne sont pas vues comme des barrières, mais bien comme des limites
territoriales.
Le premier chapitre, Régler les frontières, montre que, en fait, les frontières sont des
discontinuités qui répondent au désir croissant de sécurité que chaque Etat veut sentir. De cette
manière, les frontières peuvent se transformer en barrières et cristalliser la peur de l’Autre, peur
qu’on trouve sans doute en chaque pays.
Le deuxième chapitre, Clôturer les limites, explique par des exemples concrets
l’émergence des clôtures et murs, comme réponse à la multiplication des frontières, évoquée au
premier chapitre. L’exemple du mur électrique partiellement érigé entre les Etats-Unis et le
Mexique trouve un écho dans de nombreux autres lieux, notamment dans le cas de la frontière
entre l’Inde et le Pakistan, avec l’installation d’une clôture métallique, d’éclairages nocturnes et
l’ouverture de routes de patrouille. Cela démontre que les frontières sont plus ou moins
surveillées, en fonction des relations qui existent entre les Etats. Egalement, les frontières
peuvent être le lieu où naissent les conflits réels ou potentiels mais en même temps elles
peuvent refléter l’idée de l’exclusion.
Dans le troisième chapitre, La production continue des frontières politiques, on aborde
l’exemple européen de création continue de frontières en Europe et également l’impossibilité de
trouver des limites pour l’Union Européenne. L’Europe possède 28% des dyades mondiales
pour 3,3% de la superficie des terres émergées. Ces découpages successifs posent alors le
problème si réellement existe une identité européenne et comment pourrait-on la borner. La
réponse qu’on trouve c’est que l’identité se superpose à des enjeux économiques et
géopolitiques pour pouvoir penser les futurs élargissements de l’Union Européenne.
Dans le quatrième chapitre, Reculer la frontière pour regler les confins, on trouve
présentés cinq scénarios cartographiés. Allant du scénario américain (tout le continent, Turquie
et Caucase compris sauf la Russie), en passant par le scénario confédéral (les limites de Union
européenne seraient celles du Conseil de l’Europe, Turquie, Caucase et Russie inclus), le
scénario géoculturel (sans la Turquie, le Caucase, la Russie), le scénario géoéconomique (avec
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une Union à 28 et des partenariats économiques, avec la Turquie, la Russie et un élargissement
possible aux Etats des Balkans, du Caucase et de l’ex-bloc communiste) et finalement le
scénario géopolitique avec une limitation de l’Europe à 28 Etats, l’auteur détaille les intérêts qui
pourrait exister pour chaque option. A travers cet exemple, on peut étudié très bien l’ambiguïté
des frontières : ligne ou espace, barrière fermée ou discontinuité vouée à être ouverte, voire
dépassée, limite identitaire ou ressource économique. Les frontières sont des objets complexes
qui cristallisent les enjeux actuels des Etats et de leurs sociétés.
La cinquième partie de l’ouvrage présente la Conclusion du livre, intitulée L’angoisse
française des frontières. On observe ici très bien la double appartenance professionnelle de
l’auteur : géographe et diplomate. Ainsi il présente à la fois des analyses sur les frontières,
pensées en termes spatiaux, et des réflexions géopolitiques voire institutionnelles. En fait, il
essaie d’expliquer en quoi la coopération transfrontalière devrait être une priorité politique plus
affirmée en France.
La dernière partie du livre est constituée par une dizaine des cartes très explicites qui
essaient de faciliter la compréhension des exemples proposés par l’auteur au cours de l’ouvrage.
Michel Foucher montre à travers de multiples exemples que les enjeux politiques au cœur de la
création ou de la disparition des frontières ont aussi des conséquences spatiales et, par
conséquent, géographiques majeures.
Mariana Buda, [email protected]
Peter Catterall, David Kaplan, Elfiè Rembold, Christopher Vernon (editors),
National Identities, volume 9, 2007, ©Taylor & Francis, ISSN 1460-8944
‘The National Identities’ magazine appears quarterly in Great Britain and it is made up
in a forum for all the young scholars or more experimented ones which are dealing with the
national identity issue. The editorial board is composed by scholars from Germany, France,
Great Britain, Australia and Japan.
The articles published in this review explore the building and the utterance of the
national identity, from the ancient times until now. There are also examined the role of the
culture (language, architecture, music, religion, media, sport) in the formation and evolution of
the national identity and the politic factors (states foundation, wars, frontiers).
To these coordinates also belongs the article named Fluvial Landscapes and the
Formation of the National Identity, the author being Tricia Cusak and published in the 9th
volume, number 2 from June 2007 of the review. For this article the author had as source of
inspiration the poster of The Annual Meeting of the American Historians Association which
had place in Philadelphia, the meeting being at its 120th edition and having as theme Nations,
Nationalism and National Histories.
Starting from this poster, the author passes from the geographical fluvial landscape to
the image of the stream as axes of formation of the nations studying some streams from the
Globe with nations that had been formed around them. Many cities which were built on the
shore of some important streams became state capitals, and those streams are included in the
national conscience as national symbols (it is the case of Thamis for Great Britain, the Sene for
France, the Bagmati stream for India, etc).
Threw the time, the streams became legends, being met in the myths about the origins
and building of a nation. Therefore, they were included in the national memory as an example
of continuity , their constat and undefeated flow being associated with the national unity , as
Tricia Cusak states.
Another aspect shown by the author is that of their role as boundary between two
religions and even cultures which some Global streams have. It is the case of the Jordan stream
which functions as border not only for the Palestinian people but also for the Israelian ones,
174
having the role of geographic and politic limit for these two national identities. The stream is a
symbol for both nations, generating permanent conflicts.
Further, the author analyses the Bagmati stream from India which is in a severe stage
of degradation and pollution. Just like the stream, the society on its shores is having many
degradation issues which will finally lead to its decline. For both the situations is guilty a
regime that doesn’t count on its national inheritance.
This is not the case of the Swan stream from Western Australia. The streams’
contiguous territory was colonized, in the indigens’ favour. Today, an environmental policy of
the stream exists, there is also a policy of uniting the indigen traditions with the occupying past,
values that contributed to the formation of the Australian nation.
In the end of the article, the author reveals connections between the image of a pure
and clean stream and the health and vitality of a community, but also the fragility of the riveran
systems which is in contradiction with the continuity of the stream.
In the magazine are also published book reviews having as subject the national
identity. An example is the review made by Anne J. Karhen from the Center of Studies of
Migration from the Queen Mary University in London , Great Britain , in number 1 from March
2007 of the review, to Robin Cohen’s book entitled The Migration and its enemies : the global
capital , the migrating labour and the national states, appeared in 2006.
The reviews’ author makes a critic analyse of the books’ theme, the interaction between
the immigrants, capital and state , and also at the answers given by the books’ author to the
following questions :
Can the borders be supervised efficiently?
How can the immigrants, without politic power, have the privileged citizen
statute, in comparison with the native population?
It is possible that the capitals’ migration determine the labour and not the other
way?
In the first part of the book, Robin Cohen makes a radiography of the theories and
the academic speeches on the labour migration theme focusing on the Great Britains’ case.
Threw the legislation adopted in this country, the exclusion of the Eastern immigrants was
succeeded, especially those from the Eastern Europe, from the local labour territory. It is a
phenomenon that appeared in the XXth century and continues today despite the changes in the
Eastern Europe.
The author sees the borders as ‘theoretical elements of social exclusion and doesn’t
agree with the Britanics’ attitude, especially because in the Eastern Europe appeared new
nations and new identities. The capitals’ move influences the labours’ migration, but also the
apparition of transnational companies, and the international division concept of labour wasn’t
fully accepted.
The reviews’ author doesn’t agree with all these ideas considering them too
idealistic. Therefore she gives as arguments the events from July 2005 or the hijacking of some
international planes in the summer of 2006, the vents from the 9th of November in Madrid,
followed by a change of thinking of those who intercede the free diffusion of labour and
capitals along the borders.
At the beginning of the XXI st century, the situation is more comples as Robin
Cohen described in its book because there appear migration aspects, nationalism and the role of
the national state in defeating the national values. The author of the review asks herself if the
taken measures are legal and if those in charge can be verified.
A clear example, in this context, are the recent events in Italy whose consequences are
not finished yet. A normative act adapted in rush permitted to those called to use it, to decide
ones fate, without giving the self defence right as for every European citizen.
As a conclusion, this magazine debates contemporary issues, themes which can be
seen in everyday life of the European Union citizens of the beginning of the XXIst century.
Florentina Chirodea, [email protected]
175
Bat Ye’Or, Eurabia. Come l’Europa è diventata anticristiana, antioccidental,
antiamericana, antisemita, Torino, Ed. Lindau, 2007, 413p.
Il est évident même à partir du titre que le livre de Bat Ye’Or est une provocation jetée
aux dirigeants européens et également aux citoyens qui se considèrent européens. C’est pour
cela qu’au début de notre démarche il est nécessaire de clarifier le concept d’Eurabia : c’est ce
que les européens nomment la civilisation méditerranéenne, terre de l’interculturalisme où la
culture arabe a eu autrefois un rôle important1. L’auteur annonce même dans la préface du livre
que le sujet qu’il attaque le constitue l’antisémitisme européen à son niveau général et le plus
haut, non d’un niveau individuel, personnel, minimal. Et pour nous introduire dans les aspects
actuels de ce problème Bat Ye’Or nous donne des exemples des officiels européens qui, après
les attaques terroristes dans certains pays européens, ont eu un attitude hostile envers les juifs
uniquement pour attirer de leur part la population islamique (attitude qui ne doit pas toutefois
être confondu avec la politique de l’État). Après une courte présentation de l’évolution de la
tension actuelle d’entre certains pays européens et le monde arabe, l’auteur nous fait une courte
histoire et une présentation conceptuelle synthétique du jihād et passe à une présentation assez
étendue des relations d’entre le monde européenne et celle islamique d’après la deuxième
guerre mondiale jusqu'à présent.
Par la suite l’auteur nous parle de la genèse de ce qu’il appelle eurabia, genèse qu’il la
situe dans les années soixante-dix, quand les pays membres de la Communauté européenne ont
signé un pacte avec les pays arabes contre l’Israël, un pacte considéré comme d’essence
politique mais ayant des raisons fondamentalement économiques. Développées dans un cadre
institutionnalisé (le Dialogue Arabo-Européen), visant plusieurs domaines (politique,
économique et technologique, culturel, éducatif), les relations d’entre le monde arabe et
l’Europe ont été ainsi, dans l’opinion de Bat Ye’Or, un bon instrument de pression pour les pays
arabes dans leurs relations avec les États-Unis. L’argument de l’auteur est convaincant : à 26
septembre 1977 le Ministre des Affaires Extérieures Henri Simonet, à l’occasion de l’assemblée
générale ONU, soutenait la nécessité d’un pays pour le peuple palestinien et excluait la
possibilité d’une paix séparée entre Israël et les pays arabes. Et le fait que le traité de paix
séparée d’entre l’Egypte et l’Israël a paralysé le Dialogue Arabo-Européen pour deux ans est un
argument assez pertinent.
Pour suivre ses politiques pro-arabes l’Europe a sacrifiés, dans l’opinion de Bat Ye’Or,
ses relations avec les États-Unis ou avec l’Israël, et a fait des concessions en ce qui concerne la
préemption du christianisme ou des autres valeurs occidentales. Le Dialogue Arabo-Européen
est continué par les pays européens à travers les années, même après une autre crise, celle de la
période 2000-2003, qui a eu comme principale cause la « politique du chaos » promue par le
lieder palestinien Yasser Arafat, et aussi l’attentat terroriste de 11 septembre 2001. Bat Ye’Or
met en évidence les difficultés européennes, arabes et internationales qui ont troublé souvent le
cadre de débat qui est le Dialogue, mais finalement il considère que le résultat est prépondérant
positif : en dépit des événements d’Espagne et de Grande Bretagne, en dépit des nombreux
crises d’otages, l’Europe est resté un espace du multiculturalisme où les citoyens arabes peuvent
trouver leur place. Et c’est possible que Bat Ye’Or, un égyptien de nationalité britannique, a ses
raisons d’affirmer cette chose…
Cristina Dogot, [email protected]
1
Eurabia a été aussi le nom d’un journal apparu a Paris en 1975, journal qui représente une de bases
d’étude réalisé par Bat Ye’Or.
176
TZIFAKIS, Nikolaos, “EU’s region-building and boundary-drawing policies: the
European approach to the Southern Mediterranean and the Western Balkans”,
in: Journal of Southern Europe and the Balkans, Volume 9, Number 1, April 2007,
p. 47-64.
L’article de M. Tzifakis pose la question de régions périphériques, tel comme ceux
méditerranéenne et balkanique, régions dont la situation économique et politique soulèvent
plusieurs problèmes, mais qui sont part de l’identité européenne. L’auteur se propose de
démontrer que l’Union européenne constitue, par ses institutions et ses politiques spécifiques,
un élément stabilisateur et une source de sécurité. Plus précis, pour les deux régions
mentionnées l’Union européenne a initié deux projets de coopération (et implicitement
« d’européisation »). Sont visées ainsi les quatre sub-régions majeures (Maghreb, Mashreq, les
Balkans, l’Europe de Sud) et aussi les régions d’au-delà de ces sub-régions. Par conséquence,
en 1995 ont été élaboré le Partenariat Euro-Méditerranéen, affété aux relations avec les pays
sud-méditerranéens, et l’année suivant le Processus de Stabilisation et d’Association (ce dernier
destiné à la région balkanique).
Le premier projet, celui concernant la zone méditerranéenne, s’inspire bien de
l’Organisation pour Sécurité et Coopération en Europe, en s’appuyant également sur des
problèmes militaires que sur des questions sociales ou économiques (la pauvreté, la migration et
le développement). Toutefois, le principal objectif du projet consiste dans le plan de création de
l’Espace Euro-Méditerranéen du Commerce Libre jusqu’en 2010, nécessaire pour créer le
développement économique de la région et également une méthode d’élimination des conflits.
Même si les théoriciens réalistes des relations internationales ont soutenu que l’Union
européenne a procédé à une hégémonie ou à un nouveau colonialisme dans la région ; même si
les pays arabes ont accusé l’Europe d’ignorer leurs problèmes avec l’Israël ou avec les ÉtatsUnis, M. Tzifakis considère fausse cette vision, l’Europe ne se proposant pas ces objectives
dans le projet mentionné. Une autre accuse concerne le domaine économique : la création de
l’Espace Euro-Méditerranéen du Commerce Libre diminue les revenues obtenues par taxes ou
impôts, provoque l’abaissement des industries et l’accroissement du chômage. Cette critique est
partagée partiellement par M. Tzifakis, qui souligne le fait que l’Union n’a jamais imposée des
dates limites et a accordé des importantes allocations financières pour la région.
La première étape du projet européen visant les Balkans (appelé l’Approche
Régionale), a été élaboré dans le contexte du début du processus de paix de BosnieHerzégovine et Croatie, avec l’objectif clairement établie d’offrir un cadre de collaboration
bilatérale pour les anciens États combattants (Albanie, Bosnie-Herzégovine, Croatie,
Macédoine et Yougoslavie), et entre ceux-ci et l’Union européenne. Néanmoins ce projet ne
peut pas être considéré un succès : seulement Albanie et Macédoine ont accepté de conclure des
accords économiques avec l’Union européenne et en 1999 le conflit de Kosovo s’est escaladé
de nouveau. Par la suite la responsabilité de la gestion de la paix este revenu à l’OSCE, l’Union
européenne lançant un nouveau plan : le Processus de Stabilisation et d’Association, en offrant
aux pays mentionnés la possibilité de l’intégration dans les structures européennes si elle
parvenaient à accomplir certaines conditions. La nouvelle cible de l’Union est évidente :
l’intégration d’un espace qui traditionnellement est considéré est se considère lui-même comme
distinctif (ou même marginal) par rapport aux autres espaces européens ; un espace qui est
considère est se considéré lui-même comme un espace du conflit. Dans l’opinion de l’Union
cette intégration aura comme résultat une amélioration de l’image de soi pour la région
balkanique, l’élargissement de l’Union étant la méthode par laquelle la paix pourrait (enfin !)
être instauré dans les Balkans. En dépit de tous les progrès, cet objectif reste encore à être
réalisé…
Cristina Dogot, [email protected]
177
Monika Eigmüller, Georg Vobruba (editors), Grenzsoziologie. Die politische
Strukturierung des Raumes, VS Verlag für Sozialwissenschaften, Wiesbaden
2006, 308 p, ISBN-10: 3-531-14606-8, ISBN-13: 978-3-531-14606-5
The term Grenze, derived from slavic roots, such as Polish granica, into the German
language in the 13th century cannot be translated in one definite way as it contains a variety of
similar meanings which are clearly distinct in English and other languages. The meanings
include terms such as border, limit, frontier, boundary,… With this three-parted book the
editors wish to prepare the basis for a new field of sociological theory and research:
Grenzsoziologie, a composite that also contains all the different aspects mentioned above.
Grenzsoziologie in Eigmüller’s and Vobruba’s definition deals with social sciences’ perspective
on territorial and political borders, which is stressed by the subtitle chosen for this publication:
“The political structuring of space” [M.H.] The actual contributions, though, show that their
perspective is not limited to this specific area.
In the first part they present typical examples of three theoretical concepts that deal
with questions of space and borders that have, as the editors put it, not been regarded carefully
enough in the research on borders. By rereading them, in this book they are used as a basis for
further development of a specific sociological theory of borders as well as a background for
current sociological research in this area.
These theoretical texts first are Der Raum und die räumliche Ordnung der Gesellschaft
[Space and the spatial order of society, M.H] a chapter of Georg Simmel’s classical foundation
of sociology2 in which he demonstrates that borders are mainly the result of social action
appearing in space and do not exist on their own as a part of the natural environment. Secondly,
the editors republish Stein Rokkan’s Differenzierung und Grenzbildung3 that deals with the
historical conditions of the raising of borders in the modern sense. Rokkan shows how the
establishing of a territorial border leads to a strengthening of political power of a state and also
establishes a social space within it. Other aspects of this text are the crossing of borders
(territorial and social) and processes of peripherization of certain territories.
The third text in this part is Hans Medick’s Grenzziehungen und die Herstellung des
politisch-sozialen Raums4 [The drawing of borders and the establishing of the political-social
space, M.H.]. He takes an even more detailed look on the historic conditions and development
of borders. He stresses the fact that borders must not only be interpreted from the centres of
political power; the territories surrounding the borders, the so called peripheries and peoples’
actions in these areas are for him at least of the same importance if one wants to get a real
insight into the borders’ functions.
In the second part on the theory and empire of the sociology of borders, different
strings of theory are discussed, deepened and further thought into in the particular light of
contemporary empiric researches. The focus in this part lies on the establishment, function und
transformation of states’ borders. An important topic is the development of border zones, border
lines and punctual borders. Factors for the transformation and the meaning and function of the
borders of states are searched for. The stress lies on the U.S.-Mexican border and mainly on the
new and old borders of the European Union. It is explicitly said that in the case of the last
mentioned the border is not necessarily a border in the old common opinion but can also be
invisible and appear much harder to pass than the classic ones. The contributions to this chapter
are, in part, the following:
In Der duale Charakter der Grenze, Bedingungen einer aktuellen Grenztheorie [The
dual character of the border, conditions of a contemporary theory of borders, M.H.], Monika
2
Taken from: Georg Simmel (1908) Soziologie. Untersuchungen über die Formen der Vergesellschaftung.
Kapitel IX
3
Stein Rokkan (2000) Staat, Nation und Demokratie in Europa. Die Theorie Stein Rokkans aus seinen
geammelten Werken rekonstruiert und eingeleitet von Peter Flora.
4
First in: Bernd Weisbrod (ed.) (1993) Grenzland, Beiträge zur Geschichte der deutsch-deutschen Grenze
178
Eigmüller suggests combining three older theoretical ways of thinking about borders. Starting
with a historic overview of the development of the term Grenze, she combines the concept
according to Febvre with the rising of national states and continues by searching for a theory of
borders for in a post-nationalist time. Therefore she rereads and combines three main traditions
of theoretically dealing with borders in the German scientific community: Friedrich Ratzel’s
concept of natural given borders existing without human action to which she refers as
essentialistic. Questions regarding the function of borders are not asked in this model, so that
the sociological impact is rather small. All the same, Eigmüller stresses the aspect that this
concept plays a major part in the public opinion and by this influences people in their social
actions concerning borders.
In the second theory she discusses, deconstructs, based on Luhmann, the idea of a
territorial border and regards them only as a manifestation of the differences and the possiblity
of contact between systems and environments. This perspective from above, though, makes it
impossible to ask, how borders, and political systems in general, work.
The last perspective is Simmel’s analyzation of borders as a result of social interaction that on
the other hand through manifestation in space influences peoples’ daily actions.
Eigmüller claims that all three perspectives should be considered for a new theory of borders in
order to be able to deal with the complexity of this topic.
An interesting new perspective on borders can be found with Mathias Bös and Kerstin
Zimmer in Wenn Grenzen wandern, Zur Dynamik von Grenzverschiebungen im Osten Europas
[When borders move, On the dynamic of moving borders in the East of Europe, M.H.]. They do
not focus on individuals passing borders but on borders passing individuals. From the various
possibilities of dividing Europe (the Roman limes, the catholic and the orthodox world, by
means of early industrialization, …) they choose the state borders and consider their
development in Middle and Eastern Europe in the 20th century as an attempt of continuous
homogenization and creating of new minorities while borders move over them. As a result
people themselves start to migrate, either voluntarily or under pressure of the authorities.
Georg Vobruba, starting from a reflection on dramatic results of several attempts of
crossing a closed border, demands that a sociology of borders should focus on institutions as
well as on strategies of acting in regard of borders, as the development of the institution
“border” takes place in interaction. He considers Grenzsoziologie als Beobachtung zweiter
Ordnung. [Sociology of Borders as a seconder-order Observation, M.H.]
In Udo Thiedecke’s Grenzen des Grenzenlosen [Borders of the borderless, M.H.] the
perspective is even widened to the limitations and boundaries passed by modern communication
technology.
The third chapter takes a look on border attacks not in the military way but through
unspectacular everyday life social acts like migration, smuggling, guarding borders and passing
them for various reasons. Hereby it is shown how the theoretical instrument offered before can
help to get a deeper sociological understanding of – sometimes even paradox – phenomena in
connection with borders.
A wide range of border observations by various other persons is presented, from the
memoirs of an U.S. immigration officer at the Mexican border in the first half of the 20th
century for a research on prostitution at the German-Polish and German-Czech borders. Two of
those shall be presented here
Eva Horn analyzes three groups of individuals and their connections to borders and
border-crossing as a part of their affiliation to one of the social groups Partisan, Siedler,
Asylant - partisan, settler, asylum seeker.
The drastic results of the European border policies concerning the Mediterranean Sea
on human lives are presented by Paolo Cuttitta in Das Mittelmmer als Wohlstandsgrenze [The
Mediterranean Sea as border of prosperity, M.H.]. This report concentrates on the development
of European attempts to gain influence in Northern Africa in order to hinder migrants from
crossing over to Europe. Also the often inhuman treatment of refugees by different states –
including Italy – are discussed.
179
The book convinces through its well thought structure as each of the three parts
corresponds with the others. This makes the connections between the theoretical questions and
the empiric aspects obvious, as well as the benefits which a sociology of borders based on a
combined paradigm can bring for the understanding of phenomena occurring in these days in
connection with migration in and into the European Union. It could also help to find a
sociological view on the European integration. But the selected texts can also be perceived on
their own.
Grenzsoziologie, the sociology of borders is a new field within the German scientific
community. The editors are aware of this fact and luckily avoid presenting a closed and narrow
system but instead by their publication invite the reader to join the process of establishing this
new area in social sciences by his or her own work on theories and empiric research.
Martin Hofmann, [email protected]
Jacques Rupnik (dir.), Les Banlieues de l’Europe. Les politiques de voisinage de
l’Union européenne, Paris, Presses de Sciences Po, 2007
L’Union européenne fait face à la double contrainte de stabiliser ses périphéries et
d’éviter l’inclusion comme seule finalité de ses relations avec ses nouveaux voisins. Quelles
sont en effet les limites géographiques, institutionnelles et politiques du processus
d’élargissement ? L’Union peut-elle poursuivre l’« européanisation » de sa périphérie sans
offrir de perspective d’intégration ? Quel type d’influence l’Union peut-elle exercer sur son
voisinage proche qui ne passe pas par l’élargissement ?
Le présent ouvrage tente de répondre à ces questions en offrant au lecteur une analyse
des politiques de voisinage, de leur réception par les pays concernés (Ukraine, Géorgie,
Moldavie, Balkans, pays de la Méditerranée, Turquie).
Les auteurs fournissent un éclairage particulier sur des enjeux auxquels l’Europe doit
répondre : des frontières russes au partenariat euro-méditerranéen.
Dans son introduction, Jacques Rupnik nous invite à appréhender, peu ou prou, les multiples
dimensions de la politique européenne de voisinage. Il fait état des relations de l’Union
européenne (UE) avec ses voisins, nouveaux et plus anciens. Il met en exergue les trois
dimensions des rapports de l’UE avec ses périphéries : l’Union y apparaît successivement
comme pourvoyeur de sécurité et de stabilité, ensuite comme puissance normative favorisant les
réformes des pays voisins et enfin, comme vecteur des valeurs européennes, du respect des
droits de l’homme et de la gouvernance démocratique. Il y dépeint l’Union comme puissance
structurelle c’est-à-dire ayant la capacité d’imposer sa logique à son environnement. Il épingle
aussi un autre objectif de la PEV : celui de sécurité. L’UE vise à étendre son modèle de sécurité
vers ses voisins. La capacité de l’UE à recourir à la force, hard power, pour maintenir ou même
imposer la paix reste limitée mais la possibilité de promouvoir son propre modèle de
« puissance civile » dépend en partie de son soft power, c’est-à-dire de l’attrait que l’UE exerce
sur sa périphérie.
Jacques Rupnik esquisse les scénarios pour une géopolitique européenne. Cet exercice
pose avec acuité certains enjeux et souligne les différentes positions des membres de l’UE
nouveaux et plus anciens quant aux propositions de partenariat qu’offre l’UE. La PEV affiche
en effet plusieurs objectifs : réunir sous un concept commun la relation de l’UE avec ses
périphéries tant à l’Est qu’au Sud ; elle aide à dépasser la question de l’adhésion, elle implique
la redéfinition de la relation avec la Russie, elle met en question la nature de la relation de l’UE
avec la Turquie.
Dans les chapitres suivants, Anne de Tinguy analyse le rapport de l’Ukraine à
l’Europe ; Silvia Serrano montre la longue quête d’européanité de la Géorgie ; Florent
Parmentier nous introduit aux paradoxes moldaves. Jacques Rupnik revient sur la question des
Balkans et la quête d’une « communauté de sécurité ». Esther Barbé centre sa contribution sur
180
le voisinage méditerranéen et la nécessité de redéfinir le partenariat euro-méditerranéen. Enfin,
Mario Zucconi montre les enjeux des relations de l’UE et de la Turquie, il met en évidence le
besoin de favoriser l’émergence d’un nouveau « modèle turc ».
En conclusion de cet ouvrage sur l’avenir de l’Union européenne et des banlieues de
l’Europe, Jacques Rupnik incite le lecteur à réfléchir à la question essentielle des frontières de
l’Europe et de l’Union européenne, et par ce biais à la définition même du projet politique
européen.
Fabienne Maron, [email protected]
Dusan Sidjanski, François Saint Ouen, Dialogue des cultures à l’aube du XXIe
siècle, Bruxelles Bruylant, 2008
Fondé par Denis de Rougemont en 1950, le Centre européen de la culture est issu des
délibérations du Congrès de La Haye de mai 1948.
Il a pour mission de contribuer à l'union de l'Europe en ralliant les forces vives de la
culture dans tous nos peuples et en offrant un lieu de réflexion, un foyer d'études et d'initiatives,
des instruments de communication et de coordination et des moyens de promotion de l'idée de
fédération européenne. La culture européenne à la fois commune et riche de sa diversité
constitue le fondement de la quête d'un nouveau fédéralisme européen.
La devise du Centre comme celle de l'Union européenne est "L'union dans la
diversité". Renouant avec la tradition de l'éducation européenne et du dialogue des cultures, le
Centre en collaboration avec l'Institut européen de l'Université de Genève se propose de
relancer les ateliers européens et la plateforme euro-cité. A la suite d'une longue interruption
après les premiers dialogues des cultures animés par Denis de Rougemont à Genève en 1961
puis à Bâle en 1964, le Centre a inauguré une nouvelle série de dialogues des cultures à
l'Université de Genève en janvier 2004 et à Lisbonne en avril 2004 sous le patronage du
Premier Ministre du Portugal José Manuel Barroso.
A présent, face aux conflits qui prennent l'allure de chocs de civilisation, l'Europe se
doit de faire entendre sa voix à travers des dialogues des cultures fondés sur le respect mutuel.
C'est ainsi que le Centre contribue notamment au dialogue avec les mondes arabe, musulman et
juif qui par ailleurs ont enrichi l'héritage culturel européen. En proclamant 2008 l'année du
dialogue interculturel, la Commission européenne reconnaît la vocation de l'Europe à
poursuivre des dialogues avec d'autres régions du monde.
Le présent ouvrage, qui a bénéficié des encouragements du Président de l’Union
européenne, José Manuel Barroso qui en signe l’introduction, vise à donner une nouvelle
impulsion aux dialogues des cultures tant à l’intérieur qu’à l’extérieur de l’Union.
Denis de Rougemont plaide l’absolue nécessité d’un dialogue des cultures organisé en
mettant en évidence deux tendances antagonistes : l’uniformisation des cultures et par réaction
le renouveau des nationalismes culturels. La nécessité du dialogue existe pour chaque culture.
L’auteur met en évidence les besoins spécifiques de la culture européenne à instaurer ce
dialogue que sont : l’Europe a besoin du dialogue car elle est elle-même une synthèse difficile
et inachevée d’influences ; elle cherche à réunir en un seul corps ses quelques vingt-sept pays
divisés par un siècle de nationalisme. Enfin, l’Europe a été le foyer de la civilisation
technicienne qui s’est développée dans un certain contexte religieux et philosophique.
Largement diffusée aujourd’hui dans le monde entier, la civilisation européenne est placée hors
de son contexte culturel, ce qui porte l’Europe à expliquer aux autres que l’essentiel de sa
culture ne se limite pas uniquement à la technique. Mais au moment de présenter les éléments
de sa culture aux autres régions, l’Europe se heurte à la difficulté de présenter celle-ci aux
Européens. Le dialogue des cultures doit alors s’établir non seulement entre membres de
diverses disciplines dans le cadre de congrès et forums mais surtout entre des ensembles de
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praticiens (acteurs de changement).Il doit porter sur des problèmes concrets. Il faut aussi bien
identifier les interlocuteurs et les partenaires de ce dialogue.
Les contributions ici réunies apportent, sous des angles multiples, un éclairage et une
perspective à cette recherche de dialogues. Il fournit l’exemple d’un choix original : le dialogue
entre des cultures qui se côtoient et qui s’interpénètrent suivant un processus qui couvre
plusieurs domaines en partant des fondements religieux et de civilisation et en cherchant à en
saisir les effets sur la paix ou la guerre. Cette démarche implique un présupposé, à savoir que
l’absence de dialogue fait le lit des conflits. De plus, dans recherche des dialogues
interculturels, l’éducation est apparue comme un instrument incontournable.
Dusan Sidjanski esquisse une conclusion : Le dialogue des cultures est notre avenir. Le
dialogue culturel est cependant conditionné par notre capacité d’approfondir des dialogues
sectoriels en tenant compte de toutes les œuvres et créations des hommes et en situant dans des
contextes globaux. C’est le va-et-vient du sectoriel (le dialogue sur les systèmes de
gouvernance politique ou économique par exemple) au général qui procure une vision
d’ensemble et détermine le succès futur des dialogues des cultures.
Fabienne Maron, [email protected]
Jean–Pierre Filiu, Les frontières du jihad, Fayard, 2006, 366 p,
ISBN 2-213-62950-1.
Jihad is a specific phenomenon of Muslim history and its signification in Islamic
religion is, in the opinion of Jean-Pierre Filiu, that of armed mobilisation of Islamic community
for self defence or islamisation of new territories. Moreover, besides military jihad of offensive
or defensive aspect, Jean Pierre Filiu underlines the importance of “grand jihad” which involves
the pietistic work of the Muslim with the view of strengthening his faith.
The author defines the meaning of the word “jihad” as saint war (“guerre sainte”),
having a religious connotation “jihad sur la voie de Dieu” (al-jihâd fî sabîl Allah). The verb
“jâhada” means in Arabic language to militate, to fight against the difficulties (“lutter contre les
difficultés”, “militer”). The noun “jihad” has thus the meaning of fighting against all obstacles,
as the author explains.
Jean Pierre Filiu considers that jihad in his militant sense is not a pillar of Islamic
religion (the five pillars are: the profession of faith, ritual prayer, alms giving, fasting during the
month of Ramadan and the pilgrimage to Mecca at least once in life).
The author tries to analyse to a large extent the frontiers of jihad from self defence or
offensive battle, as it was understood centuries ago to the aggressive terrorist attacks toward
western civilization, especially in United States of America.
Filiu describes the campaigns of Mohammed and of his descendants who conquered
the Persian Empire, the byzantine territories and during Umayyad dynasty it conquered
Maghreb, Al-Andalus (in Iberian Peninsula, the previous Visigoth Hispania) and the Narbonese
Gaul. Then he describes the confrontations between Christians and Muslims during the crusades
asserting that these confrontations were a tool of military cast from both sides and the
population from both camps did not want in fact the war.
After an offensive epoch of Ottoman Empire, the expedition of General Bonaparte in
Egypt in 1798 represented the beginning of a period of deep colonialist expansion. Jihad took
the form of anti-colonialist resistance. The liberation of Algeria in the 1960’s is just one of the
cases to which the author refers.
In more recent times (years 1980), in Afghanistan took place a defensive jihad against
the setting of communism by Russian forces. When Afghanistan was occupied by the Russians,
the local population created a movement of resistance with the help of other Muslim countries
and western support. After the Russians left Afghanistan, a civil war began between the Taliban
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faction and the other inner forces. The Taliban won the battle and their support for terrorist
movements caused the intervention of the USA and NATO.
The prominent figure of Ben Laden was also underlined by the author. Ben Laden
supported the mujahedeen, Muslim armed forces who fought in Afghanistan against the Soviet
Union. Ben Laden was responsible, as the author explains, for two attacks at USA’s embassies
in Dar Es-Salam and Nairobi. In October 2000, the aggressions of Al Qaida continued when
attacking an American destroyer near Aden. Ben Laden was responsible for this attack too. Ben
Laden and his organization Al Qaeda played an important role in the events of September 11,
2001, when World Trade Center and the Pentagon were hit by planes controlled by Ben Laden’s
terrorists. Initially, Ben Laden denied his involvement, but later he acknowledged it. In the
opinion of Jean-Pierre Filiu, Ben Laden, although wanting to provoke the Americans, could not
imagine that so many countries will support the American cause and such an international
mobilization against terrorism would follow.
On the European area, Jean-Pierre Filiu analyses the implication of foreign Muslim
fighters during the decomposition of Yugoslavia, in the civil war from Bosnia-Herzegovina
where the Muslim population was the main victim. The Muslims from Bosnia were helped by
international Islamic fighters under the command of Abou Abdelaziz. The author stresses that
these foreign fighters were no more than a few hundreds. Filiu quotes Abou Abdelaziz who
talked about this war: “Ceci n’est pas une crise, mais une bénédiction. Sans cette épreuve, nous
n’aurions pas connu Allah, nous n’aurions pas retrouvé le chemin de la mosque”. These foreign
Islamic fighters were responsible for several crimes of war and were sent back when the war
finished.
The author describes also the defeat of Iraq by the United States after the campaign of
2003. Iraq was a factor of instability after invading Iran, attacking Kuwait or using chemical
weapons. The dictatorial regime of Saddam Hussein was becoming a threat for the security of
the world.
Jihad, Al Qaida and religious extremism are still dangers for contemporary world. The
book brings into the spotlight the historical roots of the present day Islamic terrorism and its
contemporary forms of expression and action. The present book is worth reading for offering us
a perspective of the Muslim world with a focus on its extremist aspects.
Anca Oltean, [email protected]
A határok és határon átnyúló (CBC) kapcsolatok szerepe a kibıvült Európai Unió
keleti perifériáján (The Role of Borders and Cross-Border Co-operation in the
Eastern Periphery of the Enlarged European Union), Edited by István Süli-Zakar,
Debrecen, Debreceni Egyetem Kossuth Egyetemi Kiadója, 2007, 417 p,
ISBN 978-963-473-085-9
The book is considered as a new result of the common research institute (Institute for
Euroregional Studies „Jean Monnet” European Centre for Excellence) – based on the research
basis of the University of Oradea and the University of Debrecen – that has been working for
two years. The title of the book draws the attention to its relation to the two study books that
came out so far („Challenges and Perspectives in the Regional and Euroregional Issues in the
New Europe” published in Oradea and „Regional Development in the Romanian-Hungarian
Cross-border Space – from National to European Perspective” published in Debrecen) and to
the journal “Eurolimes” published by the institute.
The timeliness of the book is given by the accession of Romania to the European
Union and by the forming idea of the Debrecen-Oradea cross-border agglomeration that gets
publicity in more and more forum. Most of the studies in this book can even be appropriate to
establish the scientific-professional “groundwork” of the development conception for the given
area. Almost every author aspired to study the social-economic problems and the development
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opportunities of the Hungarian-Romanian border area from the aspect of both sides of the state
border.
As a matter of fact, most of the 14 analysis in the chapter “Border co-operations”
focuses on the Hungarian-Romanian state border, mainly Bihor and Hajdú-Bihar County. There
are historical studies in this chapter that reviewed the regional co-operations of the mentioned
counties and called the attention to the problems of the areas separated by state borders. Some
participants focused on the demographical, economical, euroregional, law enforcement and
regional developmental aspects. Studies about the financial management of local governments
and the territorial features of unemployment illustrated the complex problems at the eastern
border area of Hungary. Mathematical-statistical methods were applied to model the spatial
pattern of Bihor and Hajdú-Bihar County – the characteristics of geographical and social
networks were analysed on the one hand and on the other hand, the effects of unifying
economic space were presented. Case studies about the border areas near the Austrian,
Slovakian and Ukrainian state border are also parts of this chapter.
The chapter entitled “Human resources, migration” includes studies about the
attraction zones of educational establishments in Debrecen. Two authors analysed the
characteristics of migration between Austria and Hungary and in the north-western part of
Romania at the end of the 19th century and at the beginning of the 20th century. A relatively new
research field is represented by a study about the relations of civil youth organisations and local
governments and by the article about the role of websites of settlements in public information.
Issues of “Regional development” have taken place in the third chapter of the book, in
which eighteen different studies reflects the complexity of this problem. These studies inform
the reader about the topic of transportation, energy-supply, attractions, tendencies and potential
opportunities in tourism (shopping tourism, health tourism). Two articles focus on the
conditions of environment in Bihor and Hajdú-Bihar County, while one of them draw a parallel
between the meteorological situations and the mortality of local inhabitants. A case study
analysed the medical attraction zone of the health institutions in Târgu Mureş. Two other
Romanian towns (Satu Mare and Valea lui Mihai) were introduced from a cultural and a
geostrategical point of view. The correlation between the regional administration and the
location of national minorities was observed in a study about France. In several studies the
regional development issues are approached from the point of view of the allocation of financial
resources for regional development, the regional planning for Hungary in the period between
2007-2013 and the role of information society in the territorial planning. The structure and
working mechanism of regional and rural development is presented by a Danish and a
Hungarian case-study.
Various, nevertheless actual and relevant research topics and aspects are provided by
the studies of this book published in Hungarian. A significant part of the different kind of
analysis reflects the core problem; namely the issues of the border that segregates the areas of
North-Eastern-Hungary and North-Western-Romania less and less, but connects them more and
more.
János Pénzes, e-mail: [email protected]
Riva Kastoryano (coord.), Quelle identité pour l’Europe? Le multiculturalisme à
l’épreuve, Presses de Sciences Po, Paris, 2005, 348 p, ISBN 2-7246-0962-X
This book deals with the extremely timely problem of the European Union, namely the
problem of the European identity, connected with the existence of a European society and of a
European public space. Where does this problem derive from? It derives from the need to
clarify and explain what is happening in the new space of the Europen Union, in which the
frontiers which are in permanent movement create the necesity of constructing the Europen
identity.
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The book is structured in three major parts, which are dealing with the concepts of
identity and multiculturalism from three different perspectives, but interrelated: the cultural
production of the European multiculturalism, the juridical production of the European
multiculturalism and the trinominal: state, nation and frontiers.
Marc Abélès speaks about „Homo communautaris” as a new cultural actor
representing Europe, who works within the European institutions, having a different status from
the one of his national opposite numbers. These people work together within the communitary
constitutions, having different nationalities, but having to serve the European interest. Their
national self disappears when confronted with the interest of the community, which has to face,
however, the multitude of national interests of the Union’s members.
Dominique Wolton thinks that for the political unification of Europe has to be
accomplished a unitary project and that the differences among the nations, regions or
communities have to be respected. This is the situation because the communication techniques
cannot create links among people but when they start from a political and social existing
project. And multiculturalism is considered by Wolton as being one of the keys to the success
or faliure of the European project. The cultural differences represent at the same time an
advantage that Europe holds and one of the main causes of the project’s faliure. He also
emphasizes the extremely important role of culture in the European construction because of its
character of mass democracy (not one of the elite) of the European political project.
Wolton recommends the expression „cultural coabitation” instead of multiculturalism,
in order to emphasize the complexity of this phenomenon at the European level and the fact that
multiculturalism does not represent a completed phenomenon. The problem in Europe is not
represented by the conservation of the cultural diversity within a community, but by the
construction of this community.
Yves Hersant, in his article „The Critique of Euroculture” notices that Europe’s
architects give more and more importance to culture: this subject is brought about in every
debate concerning Europe and in any cultural project appears also the European dimension. The
cooperation and the exchanges in all fields lead to the formation of a „euroculture” which has
its good parts, but which, in Hersant’s opinion, risks to cause the disappearance of European
culture. He considers that euroculture, seen either as an aim in the competition among the states,
as an economic division or as a flux of intereuropean exchanges, represents a diminution of the
real European culture, a rejection of diversity and differences.
Joseph Weiler analyses the way in which the fundamental human rights ilustrate the
problem of multiculturalism, of uniformity and diversity, of the cultural rules, getting to the
conclusion that the solving of the human rights problem represents the admission of the
European cultural diversity. The human rights are both a source and an indicator of the
transnational differences, not only of the transnational assimilation. Emmanuel Decaux
approaches the problem of the rights that the national minorities have, affirming that a global
juridical approach of this issue is not always applicable, considering that there can appear
extremely different situations. He recommends as the best method to solve the problem of the
minorities the combination of a general diplomatic frame with a web of multilateral treaties,
which will also ensure the preservation of the sovereignty that the states have, the abidance of
the human rights and of the principles of democracy.
Virginie Guiraudon, in the article dedicated to the state of juridical production which
concerns the foreigners at a supernational level, says that the achievement of multiculturalism
implies the institutionalization of the differences and the implementation of juridical guarantees
which will protect the cultural practices and peculiarities. So, the settlement of a juridical
equality among groups not individuals is needed.
Jean-Marc Ferry, in „The European State”, emphasises the impossibility of
constructing a political Europe as a federal state without creating a political environment as its
foundation. This is a nonexistent state at the moment. The author asks himself if a culture of
European citizenship is really possible and he considers, with prudence, that three progressive
stages are necessary to obtain it: the stage of intergovernmental cooperation, the hypothetical
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stage of a political European society (underlining that this is different from the European state)
and the third stage (as a foreknowledge) in which a culture of European citizenship can be
created, which implies the introduction in the decizional process of some procedures which
should associate the interests of different categories of citizens. Didier Lapeyronnie thinks that
the states are confronted with the demands of the national minorities and, more recently, with
the multicultural demands of the groups that are manifesting their interests, their peculiarities
(immigrants, ethnic minorities, etc). The main forms by which the problem of identity is
represented are the popular national movements, the nationlist movements and the multicultural
demands. The European Union is accused, at the same time that it brakes and encourages these
movements. The solution offered by the author concerning the conflict between the
multicultural model and the national one, between Europe and the nation-state consists of the
defining and of the reconstruction of some authentic „national” consciences inside Europe.
The problem of multiculturalism is linked to the one of national identity, of state
sovereignty, of democracy, justice, and human rights, of the cultural one or, even better, of the
European cultures. This book offers a series of pertinent answers and solutions in order to
manage the multicultural processes and, at the same time, it opens new paths in approaching the
extremely complex phenomenon of the European multiculturalism.
LuminiŃa Şoproni, [email protected]
Istvan Suli-Zakar, Ioan Horga (ed) Regional Development in the Romanian –
Hungarian Cross – Border Space – from National to European Perspective,
Debrecen, 2006, Debreceni Egytem, Kossuth Egytemi Kiadoja, 420 p, ISBN: 978963-473-035-407-79
The volume entitled “Regional Development in the Romanian – Hungarian Crossborder Space – From National to European Perspective”, edited by Prof. Istvan Suli-Zakar and
Prof. Ioan Horga is made up of eight sections, each approaching a certain field, as follows:
cross-border cooperation, regionalism, human resources, migration, transport and infrastructure,
interethnic relations, regional differences, settlements development and a last chapter on the
IERS conferences.
On the level of cross-border cooperation, it is the Romanian – Hungarian border that is
mostly dealt with, as well as the North-Western Development Region (Northern Transylvania),
the cooperation on the level of the French – German border and, last but not least, a Romanian –
Hungarian historical perspective. The North-Western Development Region of Romania is
analysed through the perspective of looking for a new brand, a new regional identity on the
level of workgroups. Throughout the survey, several aspects have been considered: regional
identity, priority of sectors that need to be promoted, investment opportunities, capitalisation of
foreign investments. Identity cannot be conceived without the territorial values, such as:
tolerance, traditions, respect for nature, yet considering the frontier dimension.
The historical perspective conveys the alterations of the Romanian – Hungarian border
throughout history, starting with 1888. The regimes that played a role on the level of the borders
are also mentioned, as well as several congresses and decisions.
On the level of the Romanian – Hungarian border, cross-border cooperation is debated
in two Euroregions: Bihor – Hajdu-Bihar and the Carpathian Euroregion, which plays an
important role on the level of the Romanian – Hungarian border and beyond. This border is also
conceived from two great perspectives: normalisation of the relations between the two
neighbouring peoples and the Euro-Atlantic integration, and the analysis of the border as an
integrating factor to the European Union.
The regionalism is conveyed in several topics, such as the Bihar County throughout
several centuries (11th – 17th centuries). The Partium is analysed in its historical evolution with
core moments that played an important role in the evolution and administrative presentation.
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The costs and benefits of Romania’s integration to the EU, a comparative analysis
from the perspective of the integration or non-integration, through different economic
indicators, are tackled; the winners and the losers of the market reorientation are mentioned.
An important role in unifying Europe is granted to town associations; this factor has
promoted and influenced cooperation.
There is a general presentation of the Carpathian Euroregion, the political – regional
and territorial – administrative aspects, internal borders v. external borders, limits, means of
communication, and human mobility. As compared to this Euroregion through a sociological
research, the degree of knowledge on the Euroregion mentioned above, as well as other
Euroregions on the territory of Romania are shown; other elements of Euroregional interest for
students as target group are shown.
Regions are conceived as an important factor of rural development in the Vajdasag –
Cork region, considering a field of great interest nowadays, that is, rural tourism, which may
become an important development vector.
The Hungarian Rakoczi Ferenc II College of Transcarpathia is the only Hungarian
higher education institution in Ukraine. Most of the students are female, and it is considered as
the only important Hungarian higher education institution outside Hungary. Another important
higher education institution for human resources is the University of Debrecen, where students
belonging to different nationalities and cultures are brought together (Slovakia, Ukraine,
Romania, and Serbia).
Investment in human capital and in technology, know-how, research and development
are but a few fields that are to be observed for a harmonious development.
International migration is analysed in the Szabolcs – Szatmar – Bereg County, as well
as the attitude of the inhabitants towards foreign citizens.
Romanian migration during the economic transition period is shown from four
perspectives: rural – urban, urban – rural, urban – urban, rural – rural, considering different
sources of information on migration.
Hungarian migration in different areas of Transcarpathia and their comparison with
other nationalities in the area are compared to migration in other countries.
Transport networks and regional accessibility is seen through certain accessibility
conditions: spatial, temporal, and quality.
Debrecen and Lyon are compared on the level of transport system by analysing the
past and the present. There is an attempt of picturing the field of transport in the future and the
European perspective on a “local border traffic” at the Romanian – Hungarian border.
Migration policy, effects of migration on ethnic and demographic structure in the
Szatmar County are analysed through the distribution of the former migrants, as well as the
balance of migration in the county and the city of Satu Mare.
The methods used by the European Court of Human Rights in the relation between the
right to life and the defence of discrimination are shown in the methods largely used in Central
and Eastern Europe. Article 14 of the European Convention on Human Rights and the fields
where it may be applied through a specific methodology is presented with concrete cases. Other
aspects are the civil and commercial fields as competences of the European Community, the
harmony between private law and internal market.
Regional differences are even higher in the North Great Plain Region (Hungary) and
on the level of the Romanian – Hungarian border.
Settlements development is seen through the territorial-administrative framework,
centres and polarisation areas, typical of the settlements systems. There are suggestions for
optimisation of the settlements network.
The concept of twinned towns is presented when speaking of the city of Oradea, as
well as partnership and friendly relations.
The LEADER funds for rural development have led to considerable results on the level
of different areas by resorting to several specific actions and activities in this sense. It is still
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from the rural perspective that the socio-economic and cultural indicators are analysed; they are
mainly targeted towards rural settlements in the Crish Plain.
Tourism in Debrecen brings to the foreground the commercial side of the city, the
concept of commercial tourism. The main shopping spots preferred by the visitors are
identified, followed by representative statistics in this sense.
In conclusion, the volume brings to the foreground several research fields on the
regional and Euroregional levels. The most detailed analyses refer to the regions at the border
between Romania and Hungary.
Constantin łoca, [email protected]
International Scientific Conference "Ukraine – Romania – Moldova:
Historical, Political and Cultural Relations in the Context of Modern European
Processes" (18 -19 September 2007, Chernivtsi, Ukraine)
Department of Political Science and Public Administration of the Faculty of History,
Political Science and International Relations of Yuri Fedkovych Chernivtsi National University
and Bukovinian Center for Political Studies, in close cooperation with and financially supported
by Friedrich Ebert Foundation in Ukraine and the Canadian Institute for Ukrainian Studies,
University of Alberta, and with participation of Chernivtsi Regional State Administration,
hosted the 3rd International Scientific Conference ‘Ukraine – Romania – Moldova: Historical,
Political and Cultural Relations in the Context of Contemporary European Processes’. The
Conference was hold at Yuri Fedkovych Chernivtsi National University on September 18-19,
2007, on the premises of the Faculty of History, Political Science and International Relations.
Main objectives of the conference were as follow:
1. Further strengthening ties among the academia as regards topical problems of
cooperation and present-day relations between Ukraine, Romania and Moldova;
2. Defining problem areas in relations between Ukraine, Romania and Moldova and
elaborating up-to-date approaches for solving them on constructive and objective
grounds;
3. Making proposals for follow-up scientific and practical events, drafting and
implementing bilateral and trilateral models of interaction between historians, political
scientists, cultural anthropologists and NGO activists of Ukraine, Romania and
Moldova, drafting recommendations for central and regional authorities and bodies of
local self-government, aimed at streamlining bilateral and trilateral cooperation.
The conference included the following main panels. First panel "Ukrainian-RomanianMoldovan relations: lessons from the past" vividly analyzed and interpreted historical
experience of three countries and nations coexisting in the past. The most interest attracted key
reports. First one has been presented by Prof. Olexander Dobrzhanky (Chernivtsi, Ukraine) who
dealt with topic of Bukovina in Ukrainian-Romanian relations of XX centuries. After him
Serhiy Popyk (Kyiv, Ukraine) reported on the role of Ukrainian Ministry of Foreign Affairs in
building up contemporaneous Ukraine-Moldavian and Ukraine-Romanian inter-state
cooperation. Another presentation has been made by Dr. Teophil Ryndiuk, who spoke about
famous Ukrainian hetman Ivan Mazepa and carefully regarded this historical actor in a context
of Ukrainians-Romanians interaction. Dr. Cornel Grad (Selazh, Romania) considered historic
role of Maramures and Bukovina while bilateral relations of Romanians and Ukrainians are
concerned. He mostly had concentrated on period of 1918-1939. Dr. Olimpia Mitric (Suceava,
Romania) contributed to the panel with report on Bukovina history and culture. Key speakers
touched upon a lot of questions reflected later in some more presentations. For instance, there
were contributions of Catharine Cassidy (Birmingham, GB), Vitaly Makar (Chernivtsi,
Ukraine) and some other Colleagues.
Second panel "Security dimension of trilateral relations: energy and military-political
188
aspect" gathered together some national experts, who discussed and generalized new dominant
trends in some crucial regional and all-European issues. Started with Dr. Serhiy Herasimchuk
(Kyiv, Ukraine) reflections on security problems in triangle of Ukraine-Romania-Moldavia, the
panel is being concluded with report of Prof. Serhiy Feduniak (Chernivtsi, Ukraine), who
observed Romanian experience as with regard to Euro-Atlantic integration. These reports were
added and deepened with presentations proposed by Maksym Petrov, who characterized new
strategy of Romania's external policy and suggested what Ukraine has to do facing with them.
Some newest empirical data analyzed Dr. Olexander Pelin (Uzhgorod, Ukraine) and the rest of
panel attendants.
Many of points were being regarded at third panel "Political, legal, socioeconomic and
civil ties between Ukraine, Romania and Moldova". As for this panel key-speakers were: Prof.
Vira Burdiak (Chernivtsi, Ukraine), followed up with reports of Prof. Valeriu Mosneaga and
Prof. Valentina Teosa (Chisinau, Moldavia). Most and foremost these speakers pointed out at
the EU Eastern policy and its meaning for new neighboring countries, their European
aspirations and chances for them to be realized. More aspects of the same problems covered
also Natalya Belitser presentation (Kyiv, Ukraine) as well as Prof. Mykola Prymush, (Donetsk,
Ukraine), Dr. Vldalen Makukh (Odessa, Ukraine) and some other participants of the panel.
Forth panel "Developing joint approaches to studying and managing ethnonational
processes in relations between Ukraine, Romania and Moldova" has mainly dealt with
Transdnistrian conflict. Beside report of Prof. Jury Makar (Chernivtsi, Ukraine) on current
situation with Ukrainians in Romania, hot discussions arose presentations of Dr. Ihor Burkut
and Dr. Natalya Lazar (Chernivtsi, Ukraine), Вкю Iryna Petrova, and Ivan Voit (Tiraspol) and
Oleh Kaptar (Kyiv, Ukraine).
Last panel had been devoted to cultural, academic and educational dimensions of
relations between Ukraine, Romania and Moldova. Here the topicality of further deliberations
reflected reports of Prof. Anatoliy Kruglashov (Chernivtsi, Ukraine) and Prof. Andrei Balitsky
(Belts, Moldavia). They spoke about some positive chances appeared in relationship between
neighbors and criticized shortcomings and omissions in there cooperation, stressing the fact of
NGO and experts role rather neglected by authorities.
Finally, the concluding session of the Conference thoroughly outlined principal results
of panels work and proposed some recommendations addressed to power institutions of three
countries and their academic society. There were proposed to go on with solidifying new-born
tradition of Chernivtsi Conference (launched at May, 2001) once per every three years.
Speakers proposed new step towards intensifying dialogue amidst tree countries elite, making
some more practically oriented and regular ones. Participants suggest publications of the
Conference proceedings in Chernivtsi and supported the idea, put forward with the Conference
organizer to make Chernivtsi a City, where trilateral 'Chernivtsi Forum' has to take place in the
future, aiming at gathering together political, administrative, and intellectual as well business
elite from all three countries concerned.
Anatoliy Kruglashov, [email protected]
About the Authors
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Banús Enrique, director of the Centro de Estudios Europeos, the initiator of the
Congreso Cultura Europea that is organised twice a year in Pamplona (Spain), with the
participation of specialists and young researchers who are interested in the cultural dimension
of Europe. He is editor of four volumes belonging to the Coleccion Europa, EUNSA, three
volumes belonging to the Studia Europea Navarrensis. He is author of twelve publications and
twenty-four contributions to conferences focused on history and European integration and four
publications and three contributions to conferences focused on intercultural dialogue. He has
published 17 works and has 15 contributions concerning European culture, culture and identity,
and cultural policy in the European Union. Other fields of interest are sociology and culture (12
publications and 11 contributions), literature (34 publications and 12 contributions), languages
(1 publication and 2 contributions), as well as fields of general interest (8 publications and 13
contributions to conferences). He has published 12 articles in general magazines and has edited
12 volumes. Enrique Banus has translated 11 words into Spanish. [email protected]
Margarita Cabanna: she is associate professor at the Department of Political Science,
National University of Kyiv-Mohyla Academy. She lectures courses in PoliticalScience,
Ukrainian Political Paries, Political Parties and Party Systems.
Publications: “The means of formation of new personality in totalitarian society”. Scientific
transactions of NaUKMA. Political Science 20 (2002), pp. 264-267; „Authoritarianism and
totalitarianism. Imaginary similarity and essential differences”. Political management 2 (2003),
pp. 83-92; The critics of mass society in Western European political thought”. Scientific
transactions of NaUKMA. Political Science 31 (2004), pp. 4-9; “The meaning of economic
policy of totalitarian state for the establishment of total control over society”. Perspectives 4
(2004), pp. 114-120; “Censor politics of totalitarian state and ideological monism”. Political
management 4 (2005), pp. 99-106; “The meaning of totalitarian organization for the
government of society”. Scientific transactions of NaUKMA. Political Science 57 (2006), pp.
10-14; Comparative analysis of ultra-right Ukrainian parties. In Moklak, J., ed. New Ukraine.
Historical-political transactions. Krakow, 2006/2. E-mail: [email protected]
Klára Czimre Teacher of English and Geography – Kossuth Lajos Unibersity of
Debrecen, Faculty of Sciences 1993-1998; PhD in Geography/Geosciences, 2003
Current employment: University of Debrecen Institute of Geography (Department of Social
Geography and Regional Development Planning) – assistant professor
Education activity: World economic geography (North, Central and South America, Australia);
Economy of the neighbouring countries; Central European co-operations; General social
environment; Social geography seminar; Real estate promotion; Community law and the
application of EU funds; Communication within the institutional systems of the EU; The EU
and Hungary; Enlargement processes of the EU. Research fields: euroregions, cross-border cooperation, regionalism, EU enlargement; Central European relations, Schengen borders, real
estate economy Selected publications of the past five years: Az eurorégiók szerepe a határon
átnyúló kapcsolatok erısítésében. In: Süli-Zakar, I. (ed.) A terület- és településfejlesztés alapjai.
Dialóg Campus Kiadó, Budapest-Pécs, pp.285-304; A bıvítési szempontok és a határon átnyúló
együttmőködések kapcsolata. Tér és Társadalom – MTA RKK folyóirata, 13 (4). pp.117-134;
Euroregionális fejlıdés az EU csatlakozás küszöbén – különös tekintettel Magyarország
eurorégióira. Doktori (PhD) értekezés. Acta Geographica. Debreceni EgyetemKossuth
Egyetemi Kiadója. 228p; Debrecen és a regionalizmus. Debreceni Disputa, 2006. május. pp. 411; Cross-border Co-operation: Theory and Practice. Debreceni Egyetem Kossuth Egyetemi
Kiadó, Debrecen. 146p; A határon átnyúló (CBC) kapcsolatok Magyarország körül. Debreceni
Szemle. 2007/1. pp.27-51. E-mail: [email protected]
Gerard Delanty is Professor of Sociology and Social & Political Thought, University
of Sussex). He was previously Professor of Sociology, University of Liverpool. In 2006 he was
192
a visiting professor at Deakin University Melbourne and previously held visiting professorships
at Doshisha University, Kyoto and York University, Toronto. He has written on various issues
in social and political theory, European identity and the cultural and historical sociology of
modernity. His books include Community (Routledge 2003) and (with C. Rumford) Rethinking
Europe: Social Theory and the Implications of Europeanization (Routledge 2005). He has
edited the Handbook of Contemporary European Social Theory (Routledge 2005), Europe and
Asia Beyond East and West (Routledge, 2006) and (with Krishan Kumar) The Handbook of
Nations and Nationalism (Sage 2006). His main current research concerns cosmopolitanism
theory and with an application to issues of Europeanization and modernity in comparative
perspective. Email: [email protected]
Gunilla Edelstam,
[email protected]
Assoc.
Prof.
Dr.
(Public
law),
Sweden,
Email:
Letitia – Mihaela Gavrila (1979) is associate lecrurer at the Faculty of History –
International Relations Department, Babes Bolyai University. She teaches International Public
Law, Regional Politics. She is also Advocate at Romanian Bar Association and has Individual
Advocate Office. She took part in 12th Edition of the International Summer School in Gorizia,
Italy in 2006, 2005, 2004, she attended International conferences in Cluj Napoca and Zurich in
2004. She is national primary researcher in European Law Students’ Association and counselor
at Organization of Human Rights’ Defence from Romania.
Ioan Horga, (1956) holds the “Jean Monnet” Chair in Euroregional Studies and is a
Co-director of Institute for Euroregional Studies Oradea-Debrecen. He is a member of the
Scientific Committee of the European Master “Building of Europe” at the University of Siena
and of the Master in “Specialistes en problemes politiques, juridiques de l’Europe Centrale” at
the University of Reims. He is the Secretary General of the Association of the Carpathian
Region Universities (ACRU). He is currently concerned whit issues regarding borders, of crossborders cooperation, regional development, media and religion contribution to shaping a
European awareness. He is the editor of the Eurolimes. He is a member of the Advisory
Committee of the Neighbourhood Collection, edited by Bruylard Publishing House. He is
author or co-author of the following work: Media and The Good Governance facing the
Challenge of the EU Enlargement, (Fabienne Maron, Renaud de La Brosse, Ioan Horga),
Brussels, IIAS, 2005,; Europe and Its Borders: Historical Perspective (Ioan Horga, Sorin Sipos,
Istvan Suli-Zakar), Oradea, 2006; Regional Development in the Romanian-Hungarian Crossborder Space. From the National to the European Perspective (Istavn Suli-Zakar, Ioan Horga),
Debrecen, 2006; Challenges and Perspectives in the Regional and Euroregional Issues in the
New Europe, (Ioan Horga, Istvan Suli-Zakar), Oradea, 2006. e-mail: [email protected]
Jaroslaw Kundera is professor at the Institute of Economics, University of Wroclaw,
Poland.He is Chief of Research and Documentation Center of the EU; holds Jean Monnet
Chair, is member of working group on the Agenda 2000. He is also Coordinator of Tempus
programme on European Studies, coordinator of post diploma French study – Public policy in
Europe (DESS) in cooperation with University R. Schumann in Strasbourg. Professor Kundera
is member of the Committee of National Researchin Warsaw, Dean at the Economic Faculty at
the High Professional School in Lubin and Director of the Institute of Economics, University of
Wroclaw. He lectures in Economics of the EU, elements of micro and macro economics and on
the Polish economy in the EU. His field of research is International Integration
E-mail address: [email protected]
Fabienne Maron was born in 1966 and is a Belgian citizen. She holds a Master’s and
a PhD in Political Sciences from the Catholic University of Louvain (UCL). She is currently
Scientific Administrator at the International Institute of Administrative Sciences (IIAS).
193
Previously, she was a Research Assistant at UCL in the “Avenir” Group and Associate
Researcher for the European Thematic Network of Political Science (epsNet). She also worked
for a research centre:
“Observatoire de la Francophonie” and for the “Agence
intergouvernementale de la Francophonie”. At the International Institute of Administrative
Sciences (IIAS), she is at this time in charge of the preparation of scientific activities, including
those of the Scientific and Programs Committee. She is also the European Affairs Manager for
the European Group of Public Administration (EGPA). Her research and study are focused on
the European dynamic (European integration, governance, and enlargement: political,
institutional and administrative aspects). Her research is mainly related to the role of political
actors in the process of change and the concept of project. She is also guest Professor at Reims
University (France) and Oradea University (Romania).
Molnár Ernı is assistant lecturer at the Department of Social Geography and Regional
Development Planning, University of Debrecen. He graduated as geographer in 2002 and as
German-Hungarian geographer special translator in 2006. He had Ph.D scholarship between
2002 and 2005, he is currently preparing for the defence of his dissertation (its title is “Spatial
characteristics of industry in the medium and small sized towns in the North Great Plain
Region”). His special field of interest is place marketing and the analysis of the regional
disparities. E-mail: [email protected]
Dana Pantea (1956) is lecturer at the Faculty of History, Geography, International
Relations, University of Oradea. She teaches English for Special Purposes, having courses in
Business English, Commercial Correspondence, British Culture and Civilization. She has
published articles in the following journals: The Contribution of the Mass-Media to Extension
of the European Union (Ariane Landuyt, Renaud de La Brosse and Ioan Horga), Brussels, IIAS,
2003 ; International and European Security versus the Explosion of the Global Media, (Maria
Manuela Tavares Ribeiro, Ioan Horga and Renaud de la Brosse), Brussels, IIAS, 2004, Media
and The Good Governance facing the Challenge of the EU Enlargement, (Fabienne Maron),
Renaud de La Brosse, Ioan Horga), Brussels, IIAS, 2005. She took part in a Leonardo Project
with universities in Spain for the development of teaching specific vocabulary and organizes
Summer Schools with teachers from York University, Canada. She has great interests in the
study of imagology. E-mail: [email protected]
János Pénzes is assistant lecturer at the Department of Social Geography and
Regional Development Planning, University of Debrecen. He graduated as geographer in 2004
and as English-Hungarian geographer special translator in 2007. He had Ph.D scholarship
between 2004 and 2007. He is currently writing his Ph.D thesis about the income inequalities of
North-Eastern Hungary. His special field of interest is the socio-economic problems in the
North-Eastern part of Hungary, especially the regional disparities, the using of mathematicalstatistical methods concerning the spatial analysis. E-mail: [email protected]
Frank R. Pfetsch is Professor of Political Science em. at the Ruprecht-KarlsUniversity of Heidelberg and Jean Monnet-Professor of European Political Science. His main
research interests are in the field of International Relations and, more particularly, in conflict
and negotiation analysis as well as in European Integration. He has widely published on
Political Theory, Foreign and Constitutional Policy, International Relations, Negotiation.
European Union and is author of several articles and books on these subjects, some of the most
recent ones are “Negotiating Political Conflicts” (London, 2007). “Das neue Europa”
(Wiesbaden, 2007). “Kant und der verhandelte Friede.” In: Dimensionen der Politik: Aufklärung –
Utopie – Demokratie. Festschrift für Richard Saage, hrsg. von A.Rüdiger und E.- M.Seng. Berlin
2006). „Old wine in new bottles: Democratic peace as empowerment of states in conflict
resolution.” In: European Journal of Political Research 45: 811-850 (2006). "Die Europäische
194
Union" (UTB München 2005). "Theoretiker der Politik. Von Platon bis Habermas" (UTB
München, 2003). ”National and International Conflicts, 1945-1995" (together with C. Rohloff,
London et al 2000). E-mail: [email protected]
Chris Quispel is an assistant professor of social history at Leiden University. He has
worked mainly on the history of racism, ethnicity and migration. He specializes in the history of
the difficult relationship between blacks and whites in the Unites States. He has published
several books and many articles in the English and Dutch language. At present he is taking up
historical border studies as a new field of interest.
E-mail: [email protected]
Rudolf Rezsohazy was born in Szeged, in 1929. He is emeritus professor of the
Catholic University of Louvain (Belgium). His teaching was focused on the social and political
changes. His research and publications cover the same area: values, life styles, political
structures, cultural phenomena and their transformations. His last books are : Les nouveaux
enfants d’Adam et Eve : les formes actuelles de couples et de familles (Louvain-la-Neuve,
Academia, 1991) ; Il est une foi. Valeurs et croyances des Belges (with Charles Delhez, NamurBruxelles, Fidélité-Racine, 1996) ; Combats idéologiques et conflits de valeurs (Paris, Presses
Universitaires de France, 2003) ; La sociologie des valeurs (Paris, Armand Colin, 2006).He
often participated in community development activities in Latin America, Africa as well as the
Far East.He is columnist in the daily newspaper La Libre Belgique and the weekly Dimanche
Express. He is member of the Belgian Royal Academy and foreign member fo the Hungarian
Academy
Csapó Tamás: is Head of department, private-docent, at Berzsenyi Daniel College,
Social Geography Department, Szombathely
Professional curriculum vitae: I was born in 1954 in Szolnok. I finished my degree, geographic
in 1984 on the József Attila University in Szeged. I did successful lmy doctor’s degree in 1989
in Szeged and got the Ph.D level in 1994. I was qualified as a lecturer in 2003 on the University
of Pécs. Since 1985 I am working at the Berzsenyi Dániel Academy in Szombathely, where I
am since 1996 the director of the socialgeographic department. Since 2004 I am university
Privatdocent, Professor. My research fields are: population- and settlementgeographic,
borderland co-operation, land- and settlement development. It was published 117 publications
of mine, form this were 6 books. E-mail: [email protected]
Károly Teperics Ph.D. assistant professor, educational expert, Department of Social
Geography and Regional Development Planning University of Debrecen, IERS (Institute for
Euroregional Studies) Oradea-Debrecen, researcher
Research areas: Role of human resources in regional development. Research of education:
Study of the relationships between higher education and labour market. Studies in gravitation
zones and regional competitiveness. Effect of the integration process on the human resources
and cross-border co-operations. Study of the reform processes in the European Union on the
basis of the characteristic electoral attitudes and referendums related to the Community. Most
significant publications: 2002: A Hajdú-Bihar megyei diplomások munkaerıpiaci helyzetének
vizsgálata (A Debreceni Egyetem hatása a humánerıforrásokra ).- Studia Geographica 10., 165
p. 2003: A humánerıforrások szerepe a területfejlesztésben. – In.: A terület- és
településfejlesztés alapjai. (szerk.: Süli-Zakar I.) – Dialóg-Campus Kiadó, Pécs-Budapest, pp.
393-410. Co-author: 2005: Süli-Zakar I. –Ekéné Zamárdi I. – Kozma G.: A kulturális gazdaság
szerepe Debrecen versenyképességének fokozásában. – In.: A magyar városok kulturális
gazdasága (Szerk.: Enyedi Gy. – Keresztély K.) MTA Társadalomkutató Központ, Budapest,
pp.179-215
195
Esther Gimeno Ugalde (1979), Lecturer at the University of Vienna and M.A. in
European Studies at the University of Vienna (Austria). PhD candidate on Sociolinguistics
(Language and national identity in Catalonia) at the University of Vienna. Fields of interest:
Multilingualism, EU Language Policy, Language and National Identity, Sociolinguistics.
Different publications in books and reviews on Language Diversity, Multilingualism, Spanish
Cinema, etc. E-mail: [email protected]

Europe from Exclusive Borders to Inclusive Frontiers

Transcription

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