Respondents Marvin-Neil-Silver-et-al

Transcription

SCC File Number: 35811
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF CANADA
(ON APPEAL FROM THE COURT OF APPEAL FOR ONTARIO)
BETWEEN:
IMAX CORPORATION, RICHARD L. GELFOND, BRADLEY J. WECHSLER,
FRANCIS T. JOYCE, NEIL S. BRAUN, KENNETH G. COPLAND,
GARTH M. GIRVAN, DAVID W. LEEBRON and KATHRYN A. GAMBLE
APPELLANTS
(Defendants)
- and MARVIN NEIL SILVER and CLIFF COHEN
RESPONDENTS
(Plaintiffs)
- and –
CANADIAN FOUNDATION FOR ADVANCEMENT OF INVESTOR RIGHTS and
ONTARIO SECURITIES COMMISSION
INTERVENERS
Proceeding under the Class Proceeding Act, 1992
RESPONDENTS’ FACTUM
(MARVIN NEIL SILVER AND CLIFF COHEN, RESPONDENTS)
(Pursuant to Rule 42 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Canada)
SISKINDS LLP
680 Waterloo Street, P.O. Box 2520
London, Ontario N6A 3V8
SUPREME ADVOCACY LLP
340 Gilmour St., Suite 100
Ottawa, ON K2P 0R3
A. Dimitri Lascaris
Michael Robb
Daniel E. H Bach
Serge Kalloghlian
Tel: 519-672-7872
Fax: 519-672-7873
Email: [email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
[email protected]
Eugene Meehan, Q.C.
Marie-France Major
Tel: 613-695-8855
Fax: 613-695-8580
[email protected]
Ottawa Agents for the Respondents
SUTTS STROSBERG LLP
251 Goyeau Street, Suite 600
Windsor, ON N9A 6V2
William V. Sasso
Tel: 519-258-9333
Fax: 519-258-9527
Counsel for the Respondents
MCCARTHY TETRAULT LLP
Suite 5300, TD Bank Tower
Toronto, Ontario M5K 1E6
GOWLING LAFLEUR HENDERSON LLP
160 Elgin Street – Suite 2600
Ottawa, ON K1N 8S3
R. Paul Steep
Dana M. Peebles
Carole Piovesan
Tel: 416-362-1812
Fax: 416-868-0673
[email protected]
[email protected]
D. Lynne Watt
Tel: 613-786-0139
Fax: 613-563-9869
Ottawa Agent for the Appellants
Counsel for the Appellants
PALIARE ROLAND ROSENBERG
ROTHSTEIN LLP
155 Wellington Street West, 35th Floor
Toronto, ON M5V 3H1
SUPREME ADVOCACY LLP
340 Gilmour Street, Suite 100
Ottawa, ON K2P 0R3
Margaret Waddell
Denise Cooney
Tel.: (416) 646-4329
Fax: (416) 646-4301
[email protected]
Marie-France Major
Tel.: (613) 695-8855
Fax: (613) 695-8580
Counsel for the Intervener, Canadian
Foundation for Advancement of Investor
Rights/
Fondation
canadienne
pour
l’avancement des droits des investisseurs
(FAIR Canada)
Ottawa Agent for Counsel for the
Intervener, Canadian Foundation for
Advancement of Investor Rights/ Fondation
canadienne pour l’avancement des droits
des investisseurs (FAIR Canada)
ONTARIO SECURITIES
COMMISSION
20, Queen Street West
Toronto, ON M5H 3S8
MICHAEL J. SOBKIN
331 Somerset Street West
Ottawa, ON K2P 0J8
Tel: (613) 282-1712
Fax: (613) 288-2896
Anna Perschy
Tel: (416) 595-8782
Fax: (416) 593-8321
Counsel for the Intervener,
Securities Commission
Ottawa Agent for Counsel for the
Intervener, Ontario Securities Commission
Ontario
TABLE OF CONTENTS
PAGE
PART I - OVERVIEW AND STATEMENT OF FACTS ..............................................................1
Overview ..........................................................................................................................................1
Statement of Facts ............................................................................................................................2
PART II - RESPONDENTS’ POSITION WITH RESPECT TO THE APPELLANTS’
QUESTIONS ...................................................................................................................................6
PART III - STATEMENT OF ARGUMENT .................................................................................6
Issue #1 – The Limitation Period Was Suspended by the Filing of the Claim ................................6
A. The Legislature’s Search for Balance Did Not Include the Limitation Period........................ 7
B. Appellants’ Arguments Are Inconsistent with the Legislative History ................................. 11
C. Section 28 of the CPA is Clear – The Limitation Period is Suspended when the
Cause of Action is Pleaded .................................................................................................... 13
D. The Purposes of both Section 28 of the CPA and Part XXIII.1 of the OSA Support
the Court of Appeal’s Interpretation ...................................................................................... 19
E. The Appellants’ Interpretation Frustrates the Purpose of Part XXIII.1 ................................. 22
F.
The Appellants’ Position Cannot Be Reconciled With The Realities of Part XXIII.1
Litigation................................................................................................................................ 23
Issue #2 – The Motions Judge Correctly Exercised Her Authority To Protect the Interests of
Justice.............................................................................................................................................29
A. The Motions Below ............................................................................................................... 31
B. The Superior Court has Inherent Jurisdiction to Grant Nunc Pro Tunc Relief ..................... 32
C. There is no Distinction Between the Jurisdiction to Backdate the Leave Order and
the Jurisdiction to Backdate the Fresh as Amended Claim ................................................... 33
D. The Court’s Reliance on Actus Curiae Was Correct ............................................................. 35
E. The Motions Judge Properly Exercised Her Discretion ........................................................ 36
PART IV - SUBMISSIONS CONCERNING COSTS..................................................................39
PART V - ORDER SOUGHT .......................................................................................................40
PART VI - TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ......................................................................................41
PART VII - STATUTES AND REGULATIONS .........................................................................47
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PART I - OVERVIEW AND STATEMENT OF FACTS
Overview
1.
This appeal arises from the first action brought under Part XXIII.1 of the Securities Act 1
(the “OSA” and “Part XXIII.1”), Ontario’s secondary market civil liability regime proclaimed in
force on December 31, 2005. This action was commenced less than nine months after Part
XXIII.1 came into effect and less than two months after the Appellant, IMAX Corporation
(“IMAX”), made a corrective disclosure.
2.
At issue in this appeal is whether a meritorious securities class action should be barred,
and class members should be denied access to justice, because of delays inherent in the
adjudication of the very first motion for leave pursuant to s. 138.8 of the OSA (the “Leave
Motion”). The Appellants seek to terminate a meritorious Part XXIII.1 right of action asserted
against them despite the fact that they were on full notice of the basis of that action, and indeed
were actively litigating the claims, long before the Part XXIII.1 limitation period could possibly
have run.
3.
In essence, the Appellants argue that the Legislature created a regime that promotes
uncertainty and inefficiency, that obliges plaintiffs to embark on complex, high-stakes litigation
even though they can be denied access to the Courts despite their best efforts, and that affords
defendants the unilateral ability to extinguish meritorious claims through delay. That is not the
law, nor could it be.
4.
First, the Legislature designed Part XXIII.1 to promote meritorious securities class
actions, and with the knowledge that class plaintiffs would have the benefit of a provision under
the Class Proceedings Act, 1992 (the “CPA”) 2 which tolls “any limitation period” applicable to
the “cause of action,” or the factual matrix that is pleaded. If this were not so, each and every
class member would be required to bring their own motion for leave to ensure their claim was
filed before the expiry of the limitation period, burdening the justice system and hindering access
to justice.
1
2
RSO 1990, c S5 [OSA].
SO 1992, c 6 [CPA].
-2-
5.
Second, even if the Appellants were correct about the interplay between the CPA and the
OSA, Courts would still have the inherent jurisdiction to grant nunc pro tunc relief especially
where, as is the case here, delay was caused by the Court system itself. Justice van Rensburg (as
she then was) properly exercised her discretion to grant that relief.
6.
In sum, the Appellants argue that the Legislature, after over 7 years of research and fact-
finding, created a right of action that would be, for many plaintiffs, illusory. There is nothing in
the legislative history to support such a result.
Statement of Facts
Background
7.
IMAX overstated its revenue and net income for the year ended December 31, 2005, and
overstated the number of IMAX theatre systems installed in the fourth quarter of 2005
(“Q4/05”). As a result, the trading price of IMAX’s shares was artificially inflated during the
period of February 17, 2006 to August 9, 2006 (the “Class Period”). Accordingly, persons who
bought IMAX shares during the Class Period, and who continued to hold some or all of those
shares when the truth was at least partially revealed on August 9, 2006 (the “Class Members”),
sustained damages as a result of the 40% decline in IMAX’s share price that occurred that day. 3
8.
IMAX’s revenue reporting issues arose largely in Q4/05 when, “in order to achieve the
lower end of the 2005 [Earnings per Share] guidance published in March 2005, [IMAX had] to
generate more than twice as much [Earnings per Share] in the fourth quarter as it had generated
in the first three quarters combined. There was a significant concern about meeting revenue
targets in Q4 2005.” 4
9.
As a result of these pressures, IMAX went to extraordinary lengths to create the
appearance of theatre installations so that it could recognize revenue on those systems. Those
lengths included offering cash inducements to clients to expedite the purported installation of
3
Silver v Imax Corporation, [2009] OJ no 5573 at paras 4-6 (Sup Ct) [Silver], Respondents’ Book of Authorities
(“Respondents’ BOA”), Tab 81.
4
Silver, supra note 3 at para 119, Respondents’ BOA, Tab 81.
-3-
theatres, and ‘installing’ but then removing theatre system components while other theatre work
was completed.
10.
In particular, IMAX recognized revenue from a theatre in Kazan, Russia, where “the
silver screen was not installed until October 19, 2006, and theatre construction at the end of 2005
was at a stage where there was no roof on the building;” 5 indeed, “it was snowing in the theatre
in Kazan, and . . . the temperature of the theatre was below zero.” 6 In Hong Kong, IMAX
recognized revenue even though “the [IMAX theatre] system had been installed in a temporary
location as a ‘demonstration theatre’ because the customer had not complied with its obligation
to identify a permanent location for the first theatre system under a multi-system Contract.” 7
With regard to that theatre, IMAX’s Manager of Business Operations (described as the
company’s “control guru” 8) “raised a concern about [the] theatre system possibly violating . . .
revenue recognition in that the product may have been delivered for demonstration purposes.” 9
11.
Accordingly, IMAX recognized revenue prematurely, and relied on its “record” 2005
revenues to court a buyer or merger partner. When the truth was partially revealed on August 9,
2006, the class lost millions.
Procedural History
12.
This action was commenced by a statement of claim issued on September 20, 2006. 10 It
was the first action that sought to assert the statutory right of action under Part XXIII.1 of the
OSA, and thus the parties had no precedents to guide them. 11
13.
From the outset, the Respondents declared their intention to seek leave under Part
XXIII.1; 12 the original statement of claim (and every amendment thereto) pleaded all factual
elements of the Part XXIII.1 claim. The Respondents’ notice of motion for the Leave Motion
5
Silver, supra note 3 at para 188 [emphasis added], Respondents’ BOA, Tab 81.
7
8
9
10
Silver v IMAX, 2012 ONSC 4881 at para 5, Appellants’ Record Tab 1A [Motion Decision], p 4.
11
Motion Decision, supra note 10 at para 9, Appellants’ Record, Tab 1A, p 4.
12
Motion Decision, supra note 10 at paras 5-6, Appellants’ Record, Tab 1A, p 4.
6
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was served on November 28, 2006.
Attached to that notice of motion was a draft Fresh
Statement of Claim (the “Proposed XXIII.1 Claim”). 13
14.
The Leave Motion, the certification motion, and a Rule 21 motion brought by the
Appellants were initially scheduled to be heard together in December 2007. 14 The Respondents
filed their initial motion record, which was later supplemented by five supplementary motion
records and a reply record, amounting to 10 affidavits in total. 15 In opposition, the Appellants
filed affidavits from each of the 10 defendants and proposed defendants to the Part XXIII.1
claim, as well as the affidavit of a law clerk and an expert affidavit on damages issues. 16 The
Respondents cross-examined all of the Appellants’ affiants (other than the law clerk) at least
once, and cross examined certain of them a second time after the Respondents brought and
prevailed on a refusals motion from which the Appellants unsuccessfully sought leave to
appeal. 17 As a result, the Leave Motion record comprised 48 volumes, 18 and the Leave Motion
hearing was re-scheduled to June 2008 and then again to December 15 to 19, 2008 (a year’s
delay from the original schedule).
15.
At no time during the litigation of the Leave Motion did the Appellants communicate to
the Respondents or the Court any concern that the Respondents were not litigating the Leave
Motion with sufficient dispatch. 19 Rather, the motions judge found that the Respondents “moved
expeditiously to advance the motion for leave.” 20
16.
On December 14, 2009, nearly one year after the conclusion of argument on the Leave
Motion and certification and Rule 21 motions, the motions judge granted the Leave Motion (the
“Leave Order”), certified the action (the “Certification Order”), and largely dismissed the
Appellants’ Rule 21 motion (the “Rule 21 Order”). The Appellants then filed with the Court of
13
15
Affidavit of Michael G. Robb, sworn March 26, 2012, at paras 8, 17, 20, 22, 39 [Affidavit], Respondents’ Record,
Tab 1, pp 3, 6 & 10.
16
Affidavit, supra note 15 at para 16, Respondents’ Record, Tab 1, p 5.
17
Affidavit, supra note 15 at paras 23, 31-32, 35-39, Respondents’ Record, Tab 1, pp 7-10.
18
19
20
14
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Appeal a notice of appeal from the Leave Order, which the Respondents successfully quashed.21
The Appellants then sought leave to appeal from the Leave, Certification and Rule 21 Orders.
Corbett J. denied leave as to all three Orders on February 14, 2011. 22
17.
Following the dismissal of the Appellants’ motion for leave to appeal, the Appellants
requested a draft of the amended statement of claim for the purpose of ensuring that the claim to
be issued conformed to the terms of the Leave Order. The Respondents provided a draft on a
“without prejudice” basis on July 27, 2011. During a case conference on November 10, 2011,
the Appellants advised that they would provide their comments no later than November 30,
2011. 23
18.
On December 8, 2011, the Appellants advised that they had no comments on the draft
claim. 24 The Respondents filed the Fresh Statement of Claim on December 12, 2011. 25 The
paragraphs of the Fresh Statement of Claim pleading Part XXIII.1 were consistent with the
Proposed XXIII.1 Claim (which the Appellants had received on November 28, 2006, some five
years earlier), with some added detail. 26
19.
The Appellants delivered a Statement of Defence on February 6, 2012. That defence
made no reference to the limitation period under Part XXIII.1. The Appellants amended their
defence on February 16, 2012, the day on which the Ontario Court of Appeal released its
decision in Timminco.
The only substantive change to the defence was the addition of a
limitation defence pursuant to s. 138.14 of the OSA. 27 The Appellants subsequently moved for
summary judgment on the limitation defence. It is the order dismissing that motion from which
this appeal originates.
21
Affidavit, supra note 15 at para 48-52, Respondents’ Record, Tab 1, p 12.
23
Motion Decision, supra note 10 at para 12, Appellants’ Record, Tab 1A, p 4; Affidavit, supra note 15 at paras 5455, Respondents’ Record, Tab 1, p 13.
24
25
26
27
22
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PART II - RESPONDENTS’ POSITION WITH RESPECT TO THE APPELLANTS’
QUESTIONS
20.
The Respondents take the following positions on the questions posed by the Appellants:
(a)
Was the limitation period suspended by the filing of the statement of claim on
September 20, 2006?
Answer: yes.
(b)
If not, can the expiry of the limitation period be cured by an order nunc pro tunc?
Answer: yes.
PART III - STATEMENT OF ARGUMENT
Issue #1 – The Limitation Period Was Suspended by the Filing of the Claim
21.
Misrepresentations in Canada’s capital markets harm investors (who lose money when
the truth is revealed), issuers (who see their cost of capital rise when investors lack confidence in
the market) and the Provinces (which have an interest in protecting the public from securities
fraud). An important tool that Ontario adopted to combat misrepresentations is Part XXIII.1,
which creates a statutory right of action for investors. It was the Legislature’s stated intention to
arm plaintiffs with a “realistic remedy” 28 in order to fulfil the Part XXIII.1 goal of deterring
corporate misconduct.
22.
In order to ensure that issuers would not be harassed by unmeritorious “strike suits,” 29 the
Legislature enacted a screening mechanism. In this appeal, IMAX proposes to use the Part
XXIII.1 limitation period to block a meritorious right of action long after the Respondents were
granted leave to proceed, and even though the action was filed well inside the Part XXIII.1
limitation period and the leave motion was heard before it expired.
28
Committee on Corporate Disclosure, Final Report: Responsible Corporate Disclosure: A Search for Balance
(Toronto: Toronto Stock Exchange, 1997) at 40, s 5.14 [Final Allen Report], Respondents’ BOA, Tab 94.
29
As described by Justice Cumming in Epstein v First Marathon Inc, [2000] OJ no 452 at para 41 (Sup Ct)
[Epstein], a “strike suit” is a “class proceeding where the merits of the claim are not apparent but the nature of the
claim and targeted transaction is such that a sizeable settlement can be achieved with some degree of probability.
The term suggests a class proceeding that is properly regarded as an abuse of process.” Respondents’ BOA, Tab 28.
-7-
23.
If a secondary market securities class action is to fail, it should do so because it is
unmeritorious and does not pass muster under the leave test, not because the leave motion could
not be adjudicated within three years of the time at which the misrepresentation was made. 30
The Appellants’ proposed arbitrary restriction on securities class actions cannot be reconciled
with the Legislature’s objectives in enacting Part XXIII.1.
A.
The Legislature’s Search for Balance Did Not Include the Limitation Period
24.
The Appellants assert that the s. 138.14 OSA limitation period was part of the
legislature’s “search for balance” in designing Part XXIII.1. In so arguing, they ignore the
legislative history, which belies the Appellants’ assertions.
25.
The Toronto Stock Exchange Committee On Corporate Disclosure (the “Allen
Committee”) was formed in 1994 to review continuous disclosure in Canada. It concluded that
there was a sufficient degree of non-compliance with the continuous disclosures rules in Canada
to cause concern, 31 that regulators were inadequately equipped to properly monitor and enforce
compliance, and that the remedies available to investors in secondary market trading were, as a
practical matter, largely academic. 32
26.
As a result, the Allen Committee proposed a secondary market, statutory right of action.
This new right of action would allow investors to recover damages for misrepresentations
without the need to prove reliance. The Allen Committee noted the apprehension in the issuer
community that the creation of this right of action might expose some issuers to meritless class
actions, or “strike suits,” as had purportedly occurred in the United States. 33 The Committee
concluded, however, that the rules by which Canadian class actions were conducted were
30
The leave test has been applied to wholly defeat two proposed Part XXIII.1 actions to date: Gould v Western Coal
Corporation, 2012 ONSC 5184; Bayens v Kinross Gold Corp, 2013 ONSC 6864, Respondents’ BOA, Tabs 31 and
11.
31
Final Allen Report, supra note 28 at 15, s. 2.29, Respondents’ BOA, Tab 94.
32
Final Allen Report, supra note 28 at vii, Respondents’ BOA, Tab 94.
33
Final Allen Report, supra note 28 at 29, s 4.10, Respondents’ BOA, Tab 94.
-8-
sufficiently different from U.S. rules that there was no practical risk that such a right of action in
Canada would facilitate strike suits. 34
27.
Accordingly, the Allen Committee’s proposed legislation did not include a preliminary
merits test. Nonetheless, the Allen Committee’s recommendation still contained many features
that protected defendants, including:
(a)
limits on damages awards:
(i)
for issuers, the greater of (i) 5% of the issuer’s market capitalization; and
(ii) $1 million; 35
(ii)
for directors and officers, the greater of (i) $25,000; and (ii) 50% of the
aggregate of such person’s total compensation for the twelve-month
period preceding the misrepresentation or failure to make timely
disclosure; 36 and
(iii)
for experts, the greater of (i) $1 million; and (ii) the revenue that such
experts and their affiliates have earned from the issuer during the twelvemonth period preceding the misrepresentation; 37
(b)
proportionate rather than joint and several liability, except in cases of fraud; 38
(c)
express statutory defences, including a due diligence defence; 39
(d)
a requirement that the plaintiff prove more than negligence in regard to public
oral statements and misrepresentations made by a director or officer contained in “noncore” documents; 40
34
Final Allen Report, supra note 28 at vii; See also p 33, s 4.19: “in Canada, there are enough disincentives to
litigation to render it unlikely that entrepreneurial lawyers will bring class actions unless they have made a genuine
assessment of the merits of the case. There is too much risk to proceed with an action simply on the basis of a drop
in share price.” These disincentives included i) “loser pays” costs rules; ii) limited access to jury trials; iii) narrower
discovery rights; iv) the requirement to plead particulars; v) lack of “forum shopping” opportunities in Canada; vi)
the liability limits recommended to be built into the regime; and vii) the Committee’s recommendation of
proportionate instead of joint and several liability (p 32-33, s 4.18), Respondents’ BOA, Tab 94.
35
Final Allen Report, supra note 28 at 69, s 3(3), Respondents’ BOA, Tab 94.
36
Final Allen Report, supra note 28 at 70, s 3(5), Respondents’ BOA, Tab 94.
37
Final Allen Report, supra note 28 at 70, s 3(7).The monetary limits have not been raised since they were first
proposed by the Allen Committee. Accordingly, due to inflation, the monetary limits are substantially lower than
they were when the regime was first proposed by the Allen Committee, Respondents’ BOA, Tab 94.
38
Final Allen Report, supra note 28 at 70-71, s 4, Respondents’ BOA, Tab 94.
39
Final Allen Report, supra note 28 at 67, s. 2(3) and (4), Respondents’ BOA, Tab 94.
40
Final Allen Report, supra note 28 at 66, s. 2(2). A “non-core” document refers to any document other than a
prospectus, a take-over bid circular, an issuer bid circular, a directors’ circular, a notice of change or variation in
respect of a take-over bid circular, issuer bid circular or directors’ circular, a rights offering circular, management’s
discussion and analysis, an annual information form, an information circular, annual financial statements, an interim
financial report, and, in certain instances, a material change report, OSA, s. 138.1 Respondents’ BOA, Tab 94.
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28.
(e)
mandatory costs to be paid by the unsuccessful party; 41 and
(f)
a safe harbour for forward-looking information. 42
Plaintiffs, by contrast, were given fewer advantages, particularly:
(a)
no requirement to prove reliance on the misrepresentation or failure to make
timely disclosure (although the defendant can defeat the claim by demonstrating that the
plaintiff knew of the misrepresentation at the time it was made);
(b)
a reverse onus on the due-diligence defense; and
(c)
a reverse onus on damages (however, the defendant retained the ability to prove
that some or all of the fluctuation in the price of the security was caused by factors
unrelated to the misrepresentation). 43
29.
Thus, even in the absence of a leave requirement, the Allen Committee’s proposed
legislative scheme was weighted heavily in favour of defendants.
In fact, the “search for
balance” was realized long before the CSA recommended the addition of a preliminary merits
test to the legislation. Indeed, as Philip Anisman, a member of the Allen Committee, noted in
dissent, the proposed regime “compromis[ed] [investors’] potential recovery to [a] greater extent
than is demonstrably justifiable.” 44
In Mr. Anisman’s view, these unjustified restrictions
included the scope of the proposed plaintiff class, the standard of liability, and the limits on
liability. Mr. Anisman expressed these concerns even though the proposed scheme contained no
preliminary merits test at all. 45
30.
In respect of the standard of liability, Mr. Anisman expressed concern that the
Committee’s move to a gross negligence standard for non-core documents might be “too
41
Final Allen Report, supra note 28 at 71, s 5, Respondents’ BOA, Tab 94.
Final Allen Report, supra note 28 at 67-68, s. 2(6), Respondents’ BOA, Tab 94.
43
Final Allen Report, supra note 28 at 63,66-69, s. 1, 2(1), 2(3), and 3(2), Respondents’ BOA, Tab 94.
44
Final Allen Report, supra note 28 at 87 Respondents’ BOA, Tab 94.
45
Indeed, the Canadian Securities Administrators Notice 53-302, Proposal for a Statutory Civil Remedy for
Investors in the Secondary Market and Response to the Proposed Change to the Definitions of “Material Fact” and
“Material Change” (2000) 23 OSCB 7383 [CSA Notice 53-302], which first introduced the leave test, indicated
that the Allen Committee established checks and balances “through the availability of due diligence defences and
through limitations on liability by means of damages caps” at 7387; and that “Providing compensation for investor
damages is a secondary objective, which should be balanced against the interests of long term security holders of the
issuer, who effectively pay the cost of any damages awards. In order to achieve this balance, the proposed
legislation would limit the potential exposure of issuers and other potential defendants” at 7383[emphasis added],
Respondents’ BOA, Tab 93.
42
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lenient” 46 and that a number of the proposed limits on liability were unjustified: the proposed
ceiling on directors’ and officers’ liability was too low, as it “would not provide a level of
compensation for investors that would warrant a class, or even an individual, action” or “provide
adequate deterrence.” 47 Similarly, proportionate liability as proposed by the Allen Committee
“would both diminish the deterrent effect of the Committee’s recommendations and reduce the
potential compensation available.” 48
31.
Despite this, the Appellants argue that the limitation period is part of a “balancing” in
favour of defendants. That is not so. A preliminary gatekeeper function was rejected by the
Allen Committee, and the draft amendments published by the Canadian Securities
Administrators (“CSA”) in 1998 (“1998 Draft Amendments”) did not contain a leave
provision. 49 The leave test did not form any part of the liability regime until 2000, when it was
grafted on to the statute at the 11th hour due to the appearance of a strike suit in Ontario. 50 At
that point, the proposed limitation period provision had already existed in isolation (i.e. not tied
to the leave motion) for two years, and it was modeled on the already-existing limitation period
applicable to prospectus liability in section 138 of the OSA. 51 The history is clear:
(a)
The Allen Committee’s “checks and balances” did not include a leave test;
(b)
The 1998 Draft Amendments introduced a limitation period provision for the first
time (without a leave test), but said nothing of the limitation period being one of the
checks and/or balances.
(c)
CSA Notice 53-302, issued in November 2000, added the leave test to the existing
legislation, which already included the limitation period provision. Again, the CSA
Notice said nothing of the limitation period being one of the checks and/or balances.
This is particularly significant because the CSA Notice did explicitly refer to other
mechanisms as constituting checks and balances.
46
Final Allen Report, supra note 28 at 92. See also Final Allen Report, supra note 28 at 94 (“the standard of liability
of issuers, directors and officers for these documents should be ordinary negligence, with the burden of proof placed
on them.”), Respondents’ BOA, Tab 94.
47
Final Allen Report, supra note 28 at 103, Respondents’ BOA, Tab 94.
48
Final Allen Report, supra note 28 at 108, Respondents’ BOA, Tab 94.
49
OSC Bulletin, Proposal for a Statutory Civil Remedy for Investors in the Secondary Market and Request for
Comments (1998), 21 OSCB 3335 and 21 OSCB 3367 [1998 OSC Bulletin], Respondents’ BOA, Tab 97.
50
CSA Notice 53-302, supra note 45 at 7389-7390. The CSA reacted to the first strike suit in Ontario, Epstein,
supra note 29, in which the court was asked to approve a settlement agreement that paid counsel their fees and
disbursements but did not confer any benefit onto the shareholders of the corporation, Respondents’ BOA, Tabs 93
and 28.
51
1998 OSC Bulletin, supra note 49 at 3384 (“The limitation period under this provision is similar to that applicable
to prospectus liability under existing section 138 of the Act”), Respondents’ BOA, Tab 97.
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32.
Indeed, when introducing the leave test, CSA Notice 53-302 explicitly envisioned that
“[t]his screening mechanism, coupled with the new provision . . . requir[ing] court approval of a
settlement agreement are procedural protections that supplement the ‘loser pays’ cost and
proportionate liability provisions.” These protections would ensure that Canada remain “a
litigation environment different from that in the United States and less conducive to coercive
strike suits.” 52
33.
Noticeably absent from this list of balancing factors is any mention of the limitation
period provision, which is consistent with the Legislature’s intention to arm plaintiffs with a
“realistic remedy” 53 to deter corporate misconduct. The limitation period was not one of the
methods the Legislature employed to prevent strike suits. Indeed, forcing plaintiffs to bring
cases hastily—without sufficient investigation—increases the chances that unmeritorious cases
will be filed, contrary to the goals of Part XXIII.1. Worse still, meritorious cases will not be
pursued if plaintiffs’ counsel fear that, despite their best efforts, those cases will become timebarred due to delays beyond their control, such as those arising from scarce judicial resources.
B.
Appellants’ Arguments Are Inconsistent with the Legislative History
34.
The Appellants’ arguments are inconsistent with the Legislature’s stated intention of
crafting a “realistic remedy” 54 for “private plaintiffs.” 55 In response to the Court of Appeal’s
concern that “an investor [who] only learns about the misrepresentation two years and eleven
months after it was made . . . would have only one month not only to commence the action, but
to obtain leave to do so,” the Appellants argue that the legislature clearly accepted that the s.
138.14 limitation period (which is not subject to the discoverability rule) would bar s. 138.3
claims before an investor could have any knowledge of the claim at all. 56 This is beside the
point: the Legislature did not intend that the investor be required to learn of a claim, retain
counsel, and secure a final adjudication of the leave motion within three years from the initial
publication of the misrepresentation in order to file a claim within the limitation period.
52
CSA Notice 53-302, supra note 45 at 7390, Respondents’ BOA, Tab 93.
54
55
Final Allen Report, supra note 28 at 36, s 5.3., Respondents’ BOA, Tab 94.
56
Appellants’ factum at para 72.
53
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35.
As support for their contention that the limitation period is part of the balance in favour
of defendants, the Appellants point to statements in CSA Notice 53-302 that the leave motion is
designed to screen out unmeritorious actions “as early as possible in the litigation process.” 57
None of those statements make any connection between the leave test and the limitation
provision. They refer, rather, to the desirability of there being a preliminary evaluation of the
proposed action early in the litigation process, which is to say, before the commencement of
discovery and prior to the incursion of the considerable expense and distraction that discovery
entails.
36.
The Appellants assert that an objectionable result of the Court of Appeal’s interpretation
is that it could cause an “indefinite suspension of the limitation period.” 58 That is what occurs,
however, whenever a statement of claim is filed in any context. Moreover, the Legislature is
aware of all of Ontario’s laws, including the tools defendants have at their disposal to combat
delay. 59 The Rules of Civil Procedure allow actions to be dismissed for delay 60 and, as all class
actions are case-managed, 61 a defendant facing inordinate delay can seek scheduling relief from
the case-management judge.
37.
The Legislature did not intend the limitation period be tied to the adjudication of the
leave motion, nor that it be used as some sort of balancing mechanism.
In response to a
comment that raised the spectre of a flood of strike suits, the CSA “made significant changes to
the Proposal,” adding the leave test, and stated that the “rules of civil procedure”—not the
limitation period—would ensure that unmeritorious claims were struck out early on in the
litigation process. 62
57
Appellants’ Factum at para 4.
59
65302 British Columbia Ltd v Canada, [1999] 3 SCR 804 at para 7 [65302 British Columbia], citing Ruth
Sullivan, Driedger on the Construction of Statutes, 3d ed (Toronto: Butterworths, 1994) (“The legislature is
presumed to know its own statute book and to draft each new provision with regard to the structures, conventions,
and habits of expression as well as the substantive law embodied in existing legislation.”) See also Lévis (Ville) c
Côté, 2007 SCC 14 at para 89 [ Lévis (Ville)]; R v Dineley, 2012 SCC 58 at para 76 [Dineley]; R v Negridge (1980),
54 CCC (2d) 304 at para 31 (Ont CA) [Negridge], Respondents’ BOA, Tabs 1, 45, 72 & 73.
60
Rules of Civil Procedure, RRO 1990, Reg 194, r 24 [Rules of Civil Procedure].
61
“Consolidated Provincial Practice Direction, Part II: Proceedings under the Class Proceedings Act, 1992”, online:
Ontario Courts < http://www.ontariocourts.ca/scj/practice/practice-directions/provincial/>, Respondents’ BOA, Tab
95.
62
CSA Notice 53-302, supra note 45 at 7410, Respondents’ BOA, Tab 93.
58
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38.
In any event, in meritorious cases, defendants generally have no interest in a rapid
resolution of claims asserted against them due to the time value of money. 63 On the contrary,
defendants generally prefer to prolong the proceeding to ensure that they retain, for as long as
possible, use of the money that they may ultimately be ordered to pay. 64
39.
Further, the Appellants assert that s. 138.14(ii) “is not silent about the leave requirement,
but specifically contemplates that the limitation period may expire before a date that is linked to
the leave decision.” 65 In fact, s. 138.14(ii) only affects what occurs after leave is granted; it does
not affect the three-year time frame in which a plaintiff must commence the claim. The sixmonth period is directed at ensuring that other actions under s. 138.3 or “comparable legislation
in other provinces or territories” are commenced in a timely manner once leave has been granted
in a case alleging the same misrepresentation.
C.
Section 28 of the CPA is Clear – The Limitation Period is Suspended when the Cause
of Action is Pleaded
40.
The Court of Appeal, after considering the text, purpose, and context of the legislation,
correctly held that s. 28 of the CPA tolls the s. 138.14 OSA limitation period upon the filing of
the statement of claim that sets out the facts supporting the Part XXIII.1 right of action.
41.
At issue in this appeal is the interpretation of s. 28 of the CPA. While much ink has been
spent in the Appellants’ factum parsing, comparing, and reconciling the different sections of Part
XXIII.1, the language of s. 28 of the CPA is determinative:
63
Notably, plaintiffs infrequently comply with s. 2(3)(a) of the CPA, which requires, absent leave of the Court, that
certification motions be brought within the later of 90 days of the close of pleadings or the delivery of the last notice
of intent to defend. In Attis v Canada (Minister of Health) (2005), 75 OR (3d) 302 at para 9 (Sup Ct), Winkler J., as
he then was, observed that this was due in large part to the fact that class proceedings are complex, and certification
motions are hotly contested. These observations apply with even greater force to leave motions under Part XXIII.1,
because leave motions descend into the underlying merits of the action, whereas certification motions do not.
Moreover, defendants rarely complain that plaintiffs fail to comply with s. 2(3)(a) of the CPA. Respondents’ counsel
have identified only one instance in which a defendant in an Ontario class proceeding argued that a plaintiff should
not be granted leave to file a certification motion beyond the 90-day limit: in Pardhan v Bank of Montreal, 2012
ONSC 2229 a defendant unsuccessfully argued that the plaintiff should not be granted leave to file a certification
motion over two years after the pleadings had closed. See also Kherani v Bank of Montreal, 2012 ONSC 2230. The
paucity of such complaints undermines the suggestion that defendants prefer that claims against them be litigated
with dispatch, Respondents’ BOA, Tabs 9, 71 and 40.
64
See Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, Ensuring Corporate Misconduct: How Liability Insurance Undermines
Shareholder Litigation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010) at 137, Respondents’ BOA, Tab 99.
65
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28. (1) Subject to subsection (2), any limitation period applicable to a cause of
action asserted in a class proceeding is suspended in favour of a class member on
the commencement of the class proceeding . . . 66
The Court of Appeal Properly Interpreted Section 28 of the CPA
42.
The Court of Appeal’s reasoning was simple: to come within s. 28 of the CPA, a cause of
action must be “asserted.” The word “assert” means to “make a claim” or “invoke a legal right.”
Therefore, by pleading the facts giving rise to the Part XXIII.1 claim and announcing the
intention to seek leave under s. 138.8, the representative plaintiff is “making the claim” or
“invoking the legal right” given by the OSA. 67
43.
The Appellants’ proposed interpretation of s. 28 is properly rejected for at least two
reasons: it is inconsistent with the well-established definition of “cause of action” and it renders
s. 28 useless in the context of a Part XXIII.1 action.
44.
First, the Appellants’ proposed interpretation misconstrues the meaning of the phrase
“cause of action.” Section 28 suspends “any limitation period applicable to a cause of action
asserted in a class proceeding . . . on the commencement of the class proceeding.” 68
45.
A “cause of action” is not a synonym for a “claim” or “right of action” i.e. the method by
which damages are claimed (such as conspiracy, negligent misrepresentation, battery or
conversion). 69 It is the factual matrix that gives rise to the claims asserted. In this Court’s
words, a “‘cause of action’ is only a set of facts that provides the basis for an action in court.” 70
46.
This Court’s 1967 decision in Cahoon v Franks makes clear that the conflation of “cause
of action” and “claim” was then a relic of the ancient “‘forms of action’ that were abolished by
66
CPA, s. 28.
Green v Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 2014 ONCA 90 at paras 46-47, Appellants’ Record Tab 1C, p 37
[Appeal Decision].
68
CPA, s. 28 [Emphasis added].
69
Las Vegas Strip Ltd v Toronto (City) (1996), 30 OR (3d) 286 at para 18 (Sup Ct), aff’d (1997) 32 OR (3d) 651
(CA), Respondents’ BOA, Tabs 44A &B.
70
Markevich v Canada, 2003 SCC 9 at para 27, Respondents’ BOA, Tab 54.
67
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the Supreme Court of Judicature Act, 1873.” 71 In the modern parlance a “cause of action” is, in
Lord Diplock’s words (as adopted by this Court), “the factual situation.” 72
47.
In this case, the “cause of action” is the factual matrix that is pleaded, essentially IMAX’s
various false statements and their effect on the market price of the company’s shares. That cause
of action gives rise to a number of rights of action or claims, including negligent
misrepresentation, conspiracy, and the Part XXIII.1 right of action. 73
48.
Indeed, only this interpretation is consistent with s. 28, which tolls “any limitation period
applicable to a cause of action,” i.e. all limitation periods, if there is more than one. While there
is only one limitation period per “claim,” there can be more than one limitation period applicable
to a cause of action, because one cause of action—one set of facts—can give rise to many
claims, as is the case here. 74
49.
The Legislature’s language in Part XXIII.1 is clear: the OSA describes a Part XXIII.1
claim as a “right of action,” not a “cause of action,” 75 and the leave provision prevents an
“action” from being “commenced,” not a factual matrix from being asserted in a pleading. 76
50.
Second, the Court of Appeal’s interpretation is also the only one that would give
meaningful effect to s. 28 in the context of a Part XXIII.1 action. Section 28 suspends the
limitation period in favour of a class member “on the commencement of the class proceeding.”
A proceeding can be “commenced” only once. 77
51.
Giving effect to the Appellants’ proposed interpretation would mean that, upon the filing
of the statement of claim in this action on September 20, 2006 (i.e. the commencement of the
71
Cahoon v Franks, [1967] SCR 455 at 458 [Cahoon], Respondents’ BOA, Tab 15.
Cahoon, supra note 71 at 459, Respondents’ BOA, Tab 15.
73
The Appellants argue (at para 16) that the statement of claim gave notice that the Respondents intended to assert
the s. 138.3 cause of action in the future, and then reproduce paragraphs 2 and 75 from the statement of claim.
However, the 73 paragraphs in between those two paragraphs (excised via ellipses) contain the cause of action
pleaded from which the s. 138.3 claim arises.
74
OSA, s. 28 [Emphasis added].
75
OSA, s. 138.3; See also Bill 198, An Act to implement Budget measures and other initiatives of the Government,
3rd Sess, 37th Leg, 2002 at xii (“In the new Part, rights of action are created”), Respondents’ BOA, Tab 91.
76
OSA, s. 138.8.
77
Mai v Mississauga (City), [1990] OJ no 391 at para 13 (HCJ) (“There logically can only be one commencement of
a proceeding”), Respondents’ BOA, Tab 50.
72
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class proceeding), the limitation period was suspended for all claims arising from the facts
pleaded except the Part XXIII.1 claim. The limitation period for the Part XXIII.1 claim would
continue to run until leave was granted. The Appellants then argue that the granting of leave
would somehow trigger s. 28 in respect of the Part XXIII.1 claim, because that would mark the
“commencement” of the s. 138.3 “action” (even though no new action was commenced, only an
amendment made to an existing pleading 78).
52.
However this is simply not contemplated by s. 28, which tolls the limitation period “on
the commencement of the class proceeding,” and not at any other time. In this case, it was
commenced with the filing of the statement of claim in 2006.
53.
If the Appellants are correct that the s. 138.14 limitation period is not tolled until leave is
granted, then that would lead to one of two results:
(a)
Section 28 never tolls the s. 138.14 limitation period for absent class members,
because the “commencement” occurred earlier (upon the filing of the statement of claim)
and s. 138.14 was exempt from that tolling; or
(b)
the granting of leave retroactively tolls the limitation period as of the date of the
commencement of the class proceeding, i.e. the date that original statement of claim was
filed.
54.
Given the CPA’s goal of judicial economy and access to justice, the specific goals of s.
28 of the CPA (discussed below), and the fact that Part XXIII.1 was intended to be used through
the mechanism of a class proceeding, the first potential result (i.e. that s. 28 never tolls s. 138.14)
could not have been the Legislature’s intention. 79
78
Canadian Industries Ltd v Canadian National Railway Co, [1940] OJ no 266 at para 18 (CA) [Canadian
Industries], aff’d [1941] SCR 591; Dee Ferraro Limited v Pellizzari, 2012 ONCA 55 at para 14 [Dee Ferraro];
Bank of Montreal v Maple City Ford Sales (1986) Ltd, [2000] OJ no 1345 at para 1 (CA) [Maple City]; Gladstone v
Canadian National Transportation Ltd, [2009] OJ no 3118 at para 44 (Div Ct) [Gladstone]; Sweda Farms Ltd et al v
Ontario Egg Producers et al, 2011 ONSC 6146 at para 24 [Sweda Farms], Respondents’ BOA, Tabs 18A & B, 20,
10, 30 & 87.
79
The Appellants’ purport to closely parse the language of Part XXIII.1, but they ignore more than half of the words
in s. 138.8. Section 138.8 states that no action may be commenced under s. 138.3 without leave of the court
“granted upon motion with notice to each defendant.” A motion can only be brought in the context of an action or
application (with exceptions irrelevant here) and a “defendant” is defined as “a person against whom an action is
commenced” (words that closely parallel s. 138.8). If an action could not be commenced before leave is granted,
there would be no motion nor any defendants. Properly constructed, and giving effect to the entirety of the section,
s. 138.8 requires that an action under s. 138.3 must be granted leave of the court in order to progress beyond filing.
That is, it can be filed (tolling the s. 138.14 limitation period) to create the required “action” with “defendants” to be
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Section 28 Tolls the Limitation Period for All Class Members
55.
The Appellants take issue with the fact that the Court of Appeal’s interpretation of s. 28
would confer a benefit to plaintiffs in the class action context that a plaintiff in an individual
action would not enjoy; i.e. a proposed representative plaintiff is able to suspend the s. 138.14
limitation period by commencing the class proceeding, whereas the plaintiff in an individual
action can only suspend the limitation period by obtaining leave under s. 138.8. The Court of
Appeal noted that this was the effect of its interpretation, and correctly found that this result was
neither inappropriate nor unintended. 80
56.
As noted by the Court of Appeal, the Part XXIII.1 right of action was designed to be used
through the procedural vehicle of a class proceeding. 81 While it did not prohibit individual
plaintiffs from using the Part XXIII.1 right of action, the Legislature made the decision to allow
a class plaintiff to receive the benefit of tolling (through s. 28), and not to extend that benefit to
an individual plaintiff. After all, a class plaintiff must contend with a myriad of procedural steps
and faces motions not typically faced by an individual plaintiff, all of which greatly extend the
time required between the filing of the statement of claim and the ultimate hearing of the leave
motion. 82
57.
The Appellants argue that s. 28 of the CPA was intended only to “suspend the limitation
period for absent class members upon the commencement of the representative plaintiff’s
individual action, not to suspend the representative plaintiff’s limitation period as well”
[emphasis in original].83 Their support for this proposition are comments made in the OLRC
Report and the Attorney General’s Advisory Committee which discuss absent class members’
put on notice of the “motion” for leave and who will “serve and file . . . affidavits setting forth the material facts
upon which intends to rely.” If an action cannot be filed without leave, as the defendants assert, there can be no
“defendants,” no “motion” and no “notice,” but that is not what the section provides.
80
Appeal Decision, supra note 67 at paras 52-54, Appellants’ Record, Tab 1C, p 38.
81
Appeal Decision, supra note 67 at para 53, Appellants’ Record, Tab 1C, p 38; Final Allen Report, supra note 28 at
25, s 4.1, Respondents’ BOA, Tab 94.
82
As indicated below, these steps include motions unique to class action, such as the mandatory certification
motion, as well as carriage motions which are sometimes required. It is also no secret that class actions are typically
more hotly contested and vigorously defended than individual actions. Class plaintiffs are routinely faced with
motions to strike, jurisdictional motions, and refusals motions that do not arise with the same frequency in individual
actions.
83
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needs for protection from a running limitation period, and make no mention of the representative
plaintiff’s need for such protection by s. 28. None of these excerpts state that the tolling
provisions do not protect the representative plaintiff. Indeed, the CPA makes clear that the
tolling provisions benefit the representative plaintiff as well. 84
58.
The explanation for the language the Appellants cite is simple. At the time of the OLRC
report in 1982, and the Attorney General’s report in 1990, no limitation period similar to s.
138.14 of the OSA existed. Indeed, as the Court of Appeal noted, s. 138.14 is the only limitation
period of its kind. 85 Therefore, at the time of those reports, no plaintiff could confront the issue
confronting a Part XXIII.1 class plaintiff.
59.
When crafting Part XXIII.1, however, the Legislature, which knows the law, 86
recognized that s. 28 of the CPA could operate to toll the limitation period for the Part XXIII.1
class plaintiff and crafted the legislation accordingly. The result is that the s. 138.14 limitation
period is suspended by s. 28 of the CPA upon the filing of the statement of claim that pleads the
factual matrix giving rise to the Part XXIII.1 claim.
60.
The Appellants argue that allowing s. 28 to toll the s. 138.14 limitation period for a class
plaintiff but not an individual one runs afoul of the rule that a class action is merely a procedural
vehicle and its use cannot change the substantive rules applicable to individual actions. 87 This
ignores the fact that s. 28 always confers a benefit in the class context that it does not confer in
an individual context. Only in the class action context are non-parties to the litigation, or absent
class members, afforded the benefit of a suspended limitation period on the filing of a claim by
another individual. This is a far cry from the case Appellants cite for this proposition, Bou
Malhab, where the plaintiffs attempted to use a class action to avoid proving an element of the
tort of defamation.
84
The tolling provisions operate “in favour of a class member,” and the representative plaintiff is, by definition, a
class member. CPA, s. 2(1) (“One or more members of a class of persons may commence a proceeding”). The
balance of the CPA is consistent with this interpretation. See e.g. s. 15(2) (“After discovery of the representative
party, a party may move for discovery under the rules of court against other class members”).
85
Appeal Decision, supra note 67 at para 27, Appellants’ Record, Tab 1C, p 33.
86
See 65302 British Columbia, Lévis (Ville), Dineley and Negridge, all supra note 59, Respondents’ BOA, Tabs 1,
45, 72 & 73.
87
Appellants’ factum at 61-62.
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D.
The Purposes of both Section 28 of the CPA and Part XXIII.1 of the OSA Support the
Court of Appeal’s Interpretation
61.
Section 28 of the CPA tolls “any limitation period applicable to a cause of action asserted
in a class proceeding,” which is any limitation period applicable to any claim arising from the
factual matrix pleaded. The purpose of s. 28 is to allow class members to ‘wait and see’ how a
class action will progress before deciding if they should launch individual litigation. If this were
not the case, then each class member would be required to commence individual actions,
defeating the goal of judicial economy in the CPA, and unnecessarily over-burdening Ontario’s
courts at a time when our justice system suffers from a scarcity of judicial resources. 88
62.
This interpretation of s. 28 is consistent with its legislative history and judicial treatment,
which indicate that the purpose of the tolling provision is to promote judicial economy and
access to justice, two of the policy goals underpinning Canada’s class actions regime. 89 The
OLRC’s consideration of how the (s. 28) tolling provision should operate with respect to
limitation periods for absent class members supports the Court of Appeal’s conclusion that the s.
138.14 limitation period is tolled upon the issuance of the statement of claim, or “the
commencement of the class proceeding.”
63.
Judicial economy was a goal of the Ontario Law Reform Commission (“OLRC”) Report
on Class Actions which described the purpose of the tolling provision as “promot[ing] the most
efficient use of judicial resources.” 90 The OLRC considered whether the s. 28 tolling provision
should begin to operate for class members upon the commencement of the class proceeding, or
upon the granting of certification:
. . . the Commission sees the main policy objectives of class actions to be judicial
economy and increased access to the courts. A general rule that the
commencement of a class action suspends the running of limitation periods
against absent class members, whether certification is granted or denied, would
serve to promote the most efficient use of judicial resources. If the
commencement of a class action did not have this effect, absent class members,
where a class suit is filed shortly prior to the expiration of the statutory limitation
period, would be forced to institute precautionary individual actions or to file
88
See e.g. Galganov v Russel (Township), 2012 ONCA 409 at para 15, Respondents’ BOA, Tab 29.
Hollick v Toronto (City), 2001 SCC 68 at para 15, Respondents’ BOA, Tab 35.
90
Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report on Class Actions, vol 3 (Toronto: Ministry of the Attorney General,
1982) at 779 [OLRC Report], Respondents’ BOA, Tab 96.
89
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formal motions to intervene as parties in order to preserve their legal rights.
Moreover, even where, at the filing of a class action, the running of the limitation
period had only commenced, protective measures would still be encouraged.
Absent class members would be unsure whether certification would be granted
and, in addition, they would be unable to ascertain with certainty the time that
would elapse between the filing of the suit and the final resolution of the
certification motion, particularly bearing in mind the possibility of appeal
proceedings. In our view, such a result would be in direct contradiction to the
class action goals of efficiency and economy of litigation. 91
64.
The findings of the OLRC—and the intention of the Legislature—have clear import here.
Indeed, as the Appellants note in their factum, 92 the OLRC’s view was that “the approach that
would most clearly further the policies underlying class actions would be one that called for a
general suspension of the limitation period upon the commencement of an action in class
form,” 93 i.e. all limitation periods, including ones such as s. 138.14, are to be suspended on the
commencement of the class proceeding, which is the date on which the original statement of
claim is filed.
65.
The Appellants’ interpretation not only undermines judicial economy, but it also
undermines access to justice. Without tolling, class members will be required to hire counsel
and litigate to protect their rights. In the OLRC’s words, that burden “militate[s] against the
policy of increased access to the courts and the vindication of small claims” because it is
“uneconomical for absent class members . . . to incur the expense of filing precautionary motions
to intervene” 94 or, in this case, litigating a Part XXIII.1 leave motion.
66.
As Winkler J. (as he then was) noted in Logan, in the context of a non-Part XXIII.1 class
action, “requiring each class member to file an individual claim could go a long way toward
eliminating the economic advantage of class proceedings for any class member with a small
claim.” 95 Further, requiring class members to file precautionary claims creates an opt-in regime
91
OLRC Report, supra note 90 at 779 [emphasis added], Respondents’ BOA, Tab 96.
93
OLRC Report, supra note 90 at 780 [emphasis added], Respondents’ BOA, Tab 96.
94
OLRC Report, supra note 90 at 779-780, Respondents’ BOA, Tab 96.
95
Logan v Canada (Minister of Health), [2003] OJ no 418 at para 23 (Sup Ct), Respondents’ BOA, Tab 48.
92
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in that it requires absent class members to take a step to effectively remain in a class action. Optin class actions are impermissible in Ontario. 96
67.
Because s. 28 of the CPA allows absent class members to ‘wait and see,’ the word
“asserted” in s. 28 includes claims that are invoked or are capable of being invoked, and s. 28
tolls the limitation period applicable to any claim that is made or could be made by any class
member arising out of that cause of action. The Appellants’ interpretation would put absent class
members at the mercy of a process they do not control; a “Draconian” result that “could have the
effect of turning a class action procedure into a trap for the unwary.” 97
68.
The Court of Appeal recognized that the Appellants’ interpretation of s. 28 would render
the class action procedure unviable, and accordingly would result in neither the goals of
deterrence nor access to justice being achieved. 98 It would also force class members to do what
the Legislature intended to obviate: commence their own action with leave in order to try to
ensure that their action is brought within the limitation period. 99
69.
The judicial economy and access to justice concerns are acute here.
The class
encompasses thousands of current or former IMAX shareholders. Without the benefit of s. 28,
each would have been required to seek Part XXIII.1 leave, at their own cost. The Leave Motion
consumed millions of dollars in legal fees and months of court time in this class action. It is in
no one’s interest that Ontario’s courts be flooded with duplicative leave motions, all racing to
conclusion before the purported three-year limitation applicable to Part XXIII.1 claims expire. It
is doubtful that even the defendants would prefer that outcome. The alternative they demand to
s. 28 tolling is not ‘more actions.’ Rather, it is ‘no actions.’
96
Durling v Sunrise Propane Energy Group Inc, 2011 ONSC 7506 at para 41 (opt-in process is “contrary to how the
Class Proceeding Act works”); Ramdath v George Brown College of Applied Arts and Technology, 2010 ONSC
2019 at para 150 (opt-in “proposal stands class proceedings on their head”); Lambert v Guidant Corp, [2009] OJ no
1910 at para 117 (Sup Ct) (no jurisdiction under CPA to use opt-in process), Respondents’ BOA, Tabs 27, 74 & 43.
97
OLRC Report, supra note 90 at 782, Respondents’ BOA, Tab 96.
98
Appeal Decision, supra note 67 at paras 64-65, Appellants’ Record, Tab 1C, pp 39-40.
99
Appeal Decision, supra note 67 at para 65, Appellants’ Record, Tab 1C, pp 39-40.
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E.
The Appellants’ Interpretation Frustrates the Purpose of Part XXIII.1
70.
The Appellants urge this Court to ignore the detrimental effect their proposed
interpretation would have on access to justice because, they assert, the primary purpose of Part
XXIII.1 was deterrence, and compensation was only a secondary goal.
According to the
Appellants, this moots the analysis of the Court of Appeal, and disposes of any concerns that
access to justice and judicial economy will not be fulfilled. 100 They are incorrect.
71.
First, the Court of Appeal repeatedly acknowledged the legislation’s goal of deterrence
and considered it in its analysis. 101
72.
Second, the Court of Appeal correctly noted that the goal of deterring corporate
misconduct will be significantly weakened if Part XXIII.1 actions are not brought as class
actions. 102 Access to justice is required to fulfill the goal of deterrence of corporate misconduct.
The legislative history demonstrates that the means of effecting these goals go hand-in-hand.
The Allen Committee noted that “[t]he objective [of Part XXIII.1] is to provide aggrieved
investors with a remedy the potential exercise of which would act as a deterrent to
misrepresentations,” 103 and that “the additional deterrence represented by private plaintiffs
armed with a realistic remedy will be important in ensuring compliance with continuous
disclosure rules in Canada.” 104
73.
Similarly, the CSA realized that “damage exposure must, if the system is to have
deterrent value, be sufficient to make it worthwhile for a plaintiff to undertake an action” 105 and
that, although “deterrence should outweigh compensation . . . any deterrent effect requires a
plausible element of compensation.” 106
100
Appellants’ factum at paras 49-51.
Appeal Decision, supra note 67 at paras 36, 38, 41, 53 and 64, Appellants’ Record, Tab 1C, pp 35, 36, 38 & 39.
102
Appeal Decision, supra note 67 at para 41, Appellants’ Record, Tab 1C, p 36.
103
Final Allen Report, supra note 28 at 27, s 4.6 [Emphasis added]. See also p 59 s 6.56 “What remains clear to the
Committee is that damage exposure must, if the system is to have deterrent value…be sufficient, when all
defendants’ exposure is aggregated, to make it worthwhile for a plaintiff to undertake an action…”[Emphasis
added], Respondents’ BOA, Tab 94.
104
Final Allen Report, supra note 28 at 40 s 5.14 [Emphasis added], Respondents’ BOA, Tab 94.
105
CSA Notice 53-302, supra note 45 at 7391 [Emphasis added], Respondents’ BOA, Tab 93.
106
CSA Notice 53-302, supra note 45 at 7391 footnote 23 [Emphasis added], Respondents’ BOA, Tab 93.
101
- 23 -
74.
As was intended, for Part XXIII.1 to have its deterrent effect, plaintiffs must be “armed
with a realistic remedy.” The Appellants’ interpretation of the limitation period will curtail
meritorious class actions, with the result that the goal of deterring corporate misstatements will
never be realized. This would harm not only investors, but issuers as well, because a secondary
market liability regime that insufficiently deters misrepresentations will raise their cost of
capital.
F.
The Appellants’ Position Cannot Be Reconciled With The Realities of Part XXIII.1
Litigation
75.
The Legislature designed Part XXIII.1 to facilitate securities class actions to deter
corporate malfeasance and ensure investor compensation. The Appellants’ interpretation is
inconsistent with that intention. The Allen Committee and the CSA concluded that a statutory
right of action was necessary to foster access to justice for secondary market investors. 107 The
method that the drafters of Part XXIII.1 adopted to achieve these ends was the class action. 108
76.
The Legislature’s intent was to have the same “beneficial result as the existing statutory
civil liability regime for a misrepresentation in a prospectus” through “the context of class
actions.” 109 This is the lens through with the OSA must be interpreted: “there is only one
principle or approach [to statutory interpretation], namely, the words of an Act are to be read in
their entire context and in their grammatical and ordinary sense harmoniously with the scheme of
the Act, the object of the Act, and the intention of Parliament.” 110 Where Legislation is designed
to work with class actions, as is the case here, it must be interpreted to facilitate class actions.
77.
As this case shows, given the myriad steps that must occur prior to the adjudication of the
Part XXIII.1 leave motion, the Appellants’ proposed interpretation will defeat and discourage the
prosecution of meritorious secondary market securities class actions.
107
CSA Notice 53-302, supra note 45 at 7386 (“…the remedies available to investors in secondary trading markets
who are injured by misleading disclosure as so difficult to pursue and to establish, that they are as a practical matter
largely academic.”). See also Abdula v Canadian Solar Inc, 2012 ONCA 211 at paras 54-55 and 81, Respondents’
BOA, Tabs 93 & 4.
108
Final Allen Report, supra note 28, ch 4, Respondents’ BOA, Tab 94.
109
Final Allen Report, supra note 28 at 34 s 4.24 [emphasis added], Respondents’ BOA, Tab 94.
110
Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership v Rex, 2002 SCC 42 at para 26. See also Legislation Act, 2006 SO 2006, c
21, Schedule F, s. 64(1) (OSA is “remedial and shall be given such fair, large and liberal interpretation as best
ensures the attainment of its objects”), Respondents’ BOA, Tab 13.
- 24 -
78.
Following an exhaustive consideration of voluminous evidence, the motions judge
determined that the Part XXIII.1 right of action was meritorious. Leave to appeal from her
decision was then sought and denied. Despite this, and despite the fact that the Appellants were
placed on full notice of the Part XXIII.1 claim sought to be asserted against them long before the
three-year limitation period expired, 111 they now attempt to invoke the s. 138.14 limitation
period in order to defeat that right of action.
79.
This issue is broader than the cases on this appeal. Generally, the event that gives rise to
the claim under Part XXIII.1 is the correction of a secondary market misrepresentation. The
Appellants’ interpretation of s. 28 is that if leave is not granted within three years of the issuance
of a document containing the misrepresentation, the claim is barred. This interpretation has the
potential to defeat the claim due to the practical exigencies of securities litigation. In particular,
once a misrepresentation has been corrected, a myriad of events must occur before the
adjudication of the leave motion, as set out below:
111
PRE-LEAVE EVENT FOLLOWING
THE CORRECTION OF THE
MISREPRESENTATION
PART XXIII.1 CASES TO DATE IN
WHICH THE EVENT HAS
OCCURRED
Plaintiff retains counsel to investigate a
potential Part XXIII.1 claim
All
Following counsel’s investigation and their
determination that the action is both
meritorious and economically viable,
counsel prepare a Statement of Claim
All
Action commenced
All
Service of originating process, including
pursuant to the Hague Convention where
necessary
All
Hague Convention issues: SNC-Lavalin,
Sino-Forest, Zungui Haixi Corporation,
Cathay Forest
The IMAX Defendants do not deny, nor could they do so plausibly, that, long before the three-year limitation
period expired, they were placed on full notice of the Part XXIII.1 claim sought to be asserted against them.
- 25 -
112
Motions for service-related relief
SNC-Lavalin, Zungui Haixi Corporation,
Cathay Forest , SouthGobi, 112
Defendants retain counsel
All
Defence counsel familiarize themselves, at
least preliminarily, as to the basis of the
claims being asserted
All
Case Management Judge appointed
All
Carriage motion
Armtec, Sino-Forest, Timminco,
Barrick. 113
Leave to appeal from carriage order
Armtec, Barrick 114
Appeal from carriage order
Armtec, 115 Barrick (pending)
Jurisdictional Motions
Juniper v AIG, Canadian Solar, BP 116
Appeal from jurisdictional motions
Canadian Solar, BP. 117
Motion for leave to appeal jurisdictional
order to the Supreme Court
Canadian Solar, BP. 118
Contested scheduling motion
Sino-Forest, SNC-Lavalin 119
Gray v SNC-Lavalin Group Inc, 2012 ONSC 3735; Zaniewicz v Zungui Haixi Corp et al, 2012 ONSC 4904;
Order of Justice Rady in Killoran v Cathay Forest Products Corp. dated January 19, 2012; Order of Justice Rady in
Killoran v Cathay Forest Products Corp dated April 23, 2012; Order of Justice Belobaba in Rahimi v SouthGobi
Resources Ltd dated December 10, 2014, Respondents’ BOA, Tabs 32, 90, 68, 69 & 67.
113
Simmonds v Armtec Infrastructure Inc, 2012 ONSC 44; Smith v Sino-Forest Corp, 2012 ONSC 24; Sharma v
Timminco Ltd (2009), 99 OR (3d) 260 (Sup Ct); Mancinelli v Barrick Gold Corp, 2014 ONSC 6516, Respondents’
BOA, Tabs 84, 85, 78 & 51.
114
Locking v Armtec Infrastructure Inc, 2012 ONSC 5228; Mancinelli v. Barrick Gold Corp, 2014 ONSC 7431,
Respondents’ BOA, Tabs 46 & 52.
115
Locking v Armtec Infrastructure Inc, 2013 ONSC 331 (Div Ct), Respondents’ BOA, Tab 47.
116
Abdula v Canadian Solar Inc, 2011 ONSC 5105; Kaynes v. BP plc, 2013 ONSC 5802, Respondents’ BOA, Tabs
2 & 37.
117
Abdula v Canadian Solar Inc, 2012 ONCA 211; Kaynes v BP plc, 2014 ONCA 580, Respondents’ BOA, Tabs 4
& 38.
118
Abdula v Canadian Solar Inc, 2012 CarswellOnt 14887 (SCC); Kaynes v BP plc, 2014 CarswellOnt 15791 (CA),
Respondents’ BOA, Tabs 3 & 39.
119
Labourers’ Pension Fund of Central and Eastern Canada v Sino-Forest Corp, 2012 ONSC 1924 [Labourers’],
Scheduling Direction of Justice Perell in The Trustees of the Drywall Acoustic Lathing and Insulation Local 675
Pension Fund et al v SNC-Lavalin Group Inc et al dated July 29, 2010 [Scheduling Direction], Respondents’ BOA,
Tabs 41 & 98.
- 26 -
120
Plaintiff files Part XXIII.1 leave motion
record
All
Defendants file responding motion records
Armtec, Canada Lithium, CIBC, Imax,
Western Coal, Sino-Forest, Kinross,
Silvercorp, Pysznyj v Orsu Metals Corp.
Motions regarding motion records
(propriety of affidavits, further evidence
from Defendants, etc.)
CV Technologies, Manulife, Gildan
Activewear, Arctic Glacier, Silvercorp 120
Leave to appeal from motion record
motions
CV Technologies, Manulife, Silvercorp 121
Motions to strike (heard prior to
certification)
Gildan Activewear, Manulife 122
Cross-examinations on affidavits
All
Refusals motion
Imax, Sino-Forest, Canadian Solar,
Silvercorp 123
Leave to appeal from refusals motions
Imax, Canadian Solar, Silvercorp 124
Hearing of motion for leave
All
Decision on motion for leave
All
Leave to appeal from leave decision
Imax, Arctic Glacier, Manulife 125
Appeal from leave decision
CIBC, Kinross 126
Ainslie v CV Technologies (2008), 93 OR (3d) 200 (Sup Ct); Dugal v Manulife Financial Corporation, et al. (7
December 2012), Toronto CV-09-383998-00CP (Ont Sup Ct), Metzler Investment GmbH v Gildan Activewear Inc,
[2009] OJ no 3394 (Sup Ct), Dobbie v Arctic Glacier Income Fund, 2010 ONSC 4577; Mask v Silvercorp Metals
Inc., 2014 ONSC 4161, Respondents’ BOA, Tabs 7, 24, 62, 21 & 57.
121
Ainslie v CV Technologies, [2009] OJ no 730 (Sup Ct); Dugal v Manulife Financial Corporation et al, 2013
ONSC 327 (Div Ct).; Mask v Silvercorp Metals Inc., 2014 ONSC 4647, Respondents’ BOA, Tabs 8, 25 & 58.
122
Dugal v Manulife Financial Corp, 2011 ONSC 6761; Metzler Investment GmbH v Gildan Activewear Inc, [2009]
OJ no 5695 (Sup Ct), Respondents’ BOA, Tabs 23 & 63.
123
Silver v Imax Corp, [2008] OJ no 1844 (Sup Ct); Labourers’ Pension Fund of Central and Eastern Canada v
Sino-Forest Corp, 2014 ONSC 6236; Abdula v Canadian Solar, 2013 ONSC 5035; Mask v Silvercorp Metals Inc.,
2014 ONSC 5727, Respondents’ BOA, Tabs 79, 42, 6 & 59.
124
Silver v Imax Corp, [2008] OJ no 2751 (Sup Ct); Abdula v Canadian Solar, 2013 ONSC 5993; Mask v Silvercorp
Metals, Inc., 2014 ONSC 7381, Respondents’ BOA, Tabs 80, 5 & 60.
125
Silver v Imax Corp, 2011 ONSC 1035; Dobbie v Arctic Glacier, 2012 ONSC 773; Dugal v Manulife, 2014
ONSC 1347, Respondents’ BOA, Tab 82, 22 & 26.
126
Green v CIBC, 2014 ONCA 90, Appellants’ Record, Tab 1C, p 25; Bayens v Kinross Gold Corporation, 2014
ONCA 901, Respondents’ BOA, Tab 12.
- 27 -
80.
Notably, there is no basis to the claim that combining a Part XXIII.1 leave motion with a
certification motion causes delay. 127 The latter does not descend into the merits, whereas the
former does, and it is principally the need to evaluate the merits through expert and fact
affidavits, and cross-examinations thereon, that inevitably delays final adjudication of the leave
motion.
81.
As experience to date demonstrates, rarely if ever will a leave motion be adjudicated
within a few months of the correction of a misrepresentation. The amount of time that is
required varies from one case to another, but in virtually all such cases, the issues are complex,
the stakes are high, and the defendants possess the motivation and resources to mount a vigorous
and protracted defence of the leave motion.
82.
Inevitably, therefore, many plaintiffs who advance meritorious claims will fail to obtain
leave within the requisite time despite their best efforts, and despite their having placed the
defendants on notice of the Part XXIII.1 claim prior to the expiration of the s. 138.14 limitation
period. Notably, to the knowledge of Respondents’ counsel, no contested leave motion has been
finally resolved within the three-year limit.
83.
Courts must avoid interpretations that are “incompatible . . . with the object of the
legislative enactment [ . . . or] which defeat the purpose of a statute.” 128 Further, and as this
court noted in Ordon Estate, “any ambiguity [in a limitations provision] found upon the
application of the proper principles of statutory interpretation should be resolved in favour of the
person whose right of action is being truncated.” 129 The Appellants argue that the Court of
Appeal was wrong to rely on this principle of statutory interpretation because ss. 138.14 and 28
working together are not ambiguous. This argument fails; there is no question that those sections
are ambiguous, (i.e. “after full consideration of the context, multiple interpretations of the words
127
Scheduling the motions separately “is unfair to the plaintiffs and to the proposed class and will impede fulfilling
the purposes of the class proceedings legislation,” and will lead “[a]s night follows day,” to years of delay.
Labourers’, supra note 119 at paras 80-81, Respondents’ BOA, Tab 41.
128
Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), [1998] 1 SCR 27 at para 27, Respondents’ BOA, Tab 77.
129
Ordon Estate v Grail, [1998] 3 SCR 437 at para 136 [Ordon Estate SCC], citing Berardinelli v Ontario Housing
Corp, [1979] 1 SCR 275 at 280, Respondents’ BOA, Tabs 70B & 14.
- 28 -
arise that are equally consistent with Parliamentary intent”) 130 as demonstrated by the fact that
the numerous judges who have examined the sections to date have adopted a variety of
interpretations.
84.
Accordingly, given the goal of Part XXIII.1 and the reality of leave motions, s. 28 of the
CPA and the limitation provision of Part XXIII.1 must be interpreted harmoniously and in such a
manner that the Part XXIII.1 leave motion is tolled upon the pleading of a cause of action, i.e.
the factual matrix from which the Part XXIII.1 right of action arises.
85.
The contrary interpretation urged by the Appellants will restrict the prosecution and
management of secondary market securities class actions. In the wake of Timminco, many
plaintiffs had no alternative but to seek, and many case-management judges had no alternative
but to impose, highly truncated schedules for the leave motion. 131 This leads to various negative
outcomes.
86.
First, rushed litigation schedules, or “rocket dockets,” are problematic, especially in
complex matters. The Federal Court of Canada has criticized “seriously curtailed” schedules in
complex actions as unfair to the parties. 132 Indeed, the Appellants’ proposed interpretation will
force plaintiffs’ to expedite their investigations of proposed Part XXIII.1 claims, 133 and hasty
decisions as to whether a proposed Part XXIII.1 claim is meritorious will diminish the quality of
counsel’s judgment as to the merits of the claim. This would undermine the legislature’s intent
to facilitate meritorious securities class actions.
130
Re Canada 3000 Inc, [2006] 1 SCR 865 at para 84, Respondents’ BOA, Tab 75.
Scheduling Direction, supra note 119; Labourers’, supra note 119, Respondents’ BOA, Tabs 98 & 41.
132
Canada (Canadian Wheat Board) v Canada (Attorney General), 2007 FC 39 at paras 21-22 (Man Fed Ct). See
also Martel v County of Los Angeles, 56 F (3d) 993 at 1005 (9th Cir 1995) Kleinfeld, dissenting (too much speed
makes the case more expensive to litigate, has a corrosive effect on civility and reduces reliability), Respondents’
BOA, Tabs 17 & 55.
133
According to NERA, the median time from the end of the class period to the filing of an action is 3.1 months, and
the average is 4.6 months: Bradley A. Heys & Mark L. Berenblut “Trends in Canadian Securities Class Actions:
2012 Update” (13 February 2013) at 8.
<http://www.nera.com/publications/archive/2013/trends-in-canadian-securities-class-actions-2012-update-paceof.html>, Respondents’ BOA, Tab 92.
131
- 29 -
87.
Second, case-management judges may be compelled to give priority to Part XXIII.1
proceedings, thereby disadvantaging family, criminal or other non-Part XXIII.1 litigants whose
actions were commenced earlier in time.
88.
Third, defendants can decline in the first instance to enter into a tolling agreement and
thereby compel the plaintiffs to assemble their motion record with haste. Then, following
delivery of the plaintiffs’ motion record, the defendants can accede to a tolling agreement and
afford themselves ample time to respond. This confers an unfair advantage on defendants.
89.
Fourth, and above all, if Part XXIII.1 plaintiffs cannot unilaterally toll the limitation
period, they are at the mercy of the schedules of defendants, their counsel, non-party witnesses
and the Court, 134 not to mention the time required to effect service, including foreign service. If
a defendant has the ability to extinguish a large, meritorious claim through delay, inevitably
some defendants will engage in delay for that purpose. 135
90.
Ontario designed Part XXIII.1 to work with the CPA. 136 Had Ontario intended to exempt
Part XXIII.1 from the application of s. 28 it could have easily “expressly so stated.” It did not.
Issue #2 – The Motions Judge Correctly Exercised Her Authority To Protect the
Interests of Justice
“the co-existence of a short limitation period and a rule for its
postponement is not an absurd result.”137
91.
The Court of Appeal, having found that s. 28 of the CPA tolls the s. 138.14 OSA
limitation period, found it unnecessary to address the application of the common law doctrines
134
The Queen v Justices of County of London and London County Council, [1893] 2 QB 476 at 488 (“There might
be general illness among the justices, or, as in this case, an extraordinary glut of business, which was a matter with
which each person desiring to appeal had nothing to do, and could not help, could not anticipate, and could not
obviate or calculate upon”), Respondents’ BOA, Tab 88.
135
See e.g. Manitoba Hydro Electric Board v John Inglis Co, [1996] MJ no 128 at para 23 (CA) (rejecting
construction of limitation provision to avoid “a construction which would enable potential defendants to defeat a
claim by delay”), Respondents’ BOA, Tab 53.
136
Section 28 of the CPA was no mystery to the Legislature because “Parliament is presumed to know the existing
state of the law, and if it had wished to alter such a well-established rule it would have expressly so stated.”,
Negridge, supra note 59 at para 31, Respondents’ BOA, Tab 73.
137
Murphy v Welsh; Stoddard v Watson, [1993] 2 SCR 1069 at 1079 [Murphy][Emphasis added], Respondents’
BOA, Tab 66.
- 30 -
that would relieve against the harsh application of the Timminco version of the limitation
period. 138
92.
In February 2012, promptly following the release of the Ontario Court of Appeal’s
decision in Timminco, the Appellants amended their Statement of Defence to raise, for the first
time, a limitation defence under s. 138.14 of the OSA and moved for summary judgment. The
Respondents brought a motion for an order granting leave nunc pro tunc and deeming the
amended Part XXIII.1 pleading to have been filed as of a date prior to the expiration of the
alleged s. 138.14 limitation period.
93.
On August 27, 2012 the motions judge dismissed the Appellants’ summary judgment
motion and granted the Respondents’ motion such that the order granting the Respondents leave
pursuant to s. 138.8 of the OSA, and the amended Part XXIII.1 pleading, were backdated to the
day that argument on the Leave Motion ended.
94.
At the core of Justice van Rensburg’s (as she then was) reasons was her determination
that “[n]o public interest would be served by permitting a cause of action to be defeated by
delays inherent in the litigation process.” 139
95.
On this appeal, the Appellants ask this Court to set aside a discretionary order that
ensures fairness to all parties, and to have that discretionary order replaced with one that would
deprive the Respondents of their day in Court for no sound reason. Apart from the injustice that
would result from granting it, the appeal should fail for two reasons.
96.
First, the Appellants incorrectly assert that the Superior Court does not have the
jurisdiction to grant nunc pro tunc relief in these circumstances. This Court and the Ontario
Court of Appeal have been clear, however, that in order to oust the Superior Court’s inherent
138
There is therefore nothing “telling” about the Court of Appeal’s decision not to explore Justice van Rensburg’s
application of the common law doctrines, as suggested in the Appellants’ factum at para 97.
139
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jurisdiction to grant such relief, the Legislature must have enacted “an absolute prohibition
against a nunc pro tunc order.” 140 It did not do so.
97.
Second, the Appellants argue that the motions judge erred in the exercise of her
discretion. However, her order, animated by an intention to do justice, is consistent with the
nunc pro tunc jurisprudence. In any event, the standard of review applicable to that exercise of
discretion is exacting, and the Appellants fail to meet it.
A.
The Motions Below
98.
The motions judge held that the authority to make an order nunc pro tunc is part of the
court’s inherent jurisdiction, and that nunc pro tunc orders are available where there is a statutory
requirement for leave before an action can be commenced. 141
99.
The motions judge then considered whether such relief was warranted in these
circumstances. In holding that it was, the motions judge found that: (i) the statutory cause of
action was referenced in the original statement of claim and was based on essentially the same
facts as the common law claims; (ii) the affidavits filed by the Respondents in support of the
Leave Motion gave the Appellants detailed notice far in excess of what would have been pleaded
in the statement of claim; (iii) the Appellants had notice of all of the claims against them,
including the Part XXIII.1 claim, long before three years had elapsed from the release of the
impugned IMAX disclosure documents; (iv) the Respondents brought the Leave Motion
promptly and litigated it with reasonable dispatch, and “there was nothing more the
[Respondents] could have done to comply with the limitation period;” 142 (v) the expiry of the
limitation period had nothing to do with any act or default by any party; (vi) had the parties
turned their minds to the limitation period, the Leave Order would have been antedated to an
earlier date; (vii) unless the court is able to grant leave nunc pro tunc, there is nothing a plaintiff
with a s. 138.3 claim can do to ensure that the limitation period will be met; and (viii) without
140
Re New Alger Mines Limited (1986), 54 OR (2d) 562 at para 36 (CA) [New Alger Mines], Respondents’ BOA,
Tab 76.
141
Motion Decision, supra note 10 at paras 43, 45, and 84-85, Appellants’ Record, Tab 1A, pp 10, 17-18.
142
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nunc pro tunc relief, the statutory claim could often be defeated by the time required to litigate a
leave motion. 143
B.
The Superior Court has Inherent Jurisdiction to Grant Nunc Pro Tunc Relief
100.
The Appellants incorrectly assert that the Superior Court lacks the inherent jurisdiction to
grant a nunc pro tunc order under the OSA. 144
101.
This Court has held that it is a “basic principle of statutory construction that a statute
should not be interpreted as abrogating the inherent jurisdiction of the superior courts unless it
employs clear language to this effect.” 145 In New Alger Mines, the plaintiff had commenced a
derivative action without the required leave of the Court. After the limitation period had expired,
the plaintiff sought and was granted an order granting leave on a nunc pro tunc basis to a date
before the expiry of the limitation period. The Ontario Court of Appeal held that, “the institution
of the action [. . . without leave] was not a nullity” and in the absence of an “absolute prohibition
against a nunc pro tunc order,” the Superior Court retains the jurisdiction to grant such an
order. 146 Thus, the Appellants must show that there is an “absolute prohibition” against such an
order in the OSA. There is none. The phrase “nunc pro tunc” (or any equivalent phrase) appears
nowhere in Part XXIII.1, or indeed anywhere in the OSA.
102.
The Appellants rely on Green, but in that case Strathy J. (as he then was) failed to
identify any prohibition in the OSA which stripped the superior court of its inherent jurisdiction
143
Motion Decision, supra note 10 at paras 89-92, Appellants’ Record, Tab 1A, pp 18-19.
McKenna Estate v Marshall (2005), 37 RPR (4th) 222 at para 12 (Ont Sup Ct) [McKenna Estate] (Nunc pro tunc
is part of the Court’s inherent jurisdiction), Respondents’ BOA, Tab 61.
145
Ordon Estate SCC, supra note 129 at para 61 [emphasis added], Respondents’ BOA, Tab 70B.
146
New Alger Mines, supra note 140 at paras 36 and 37. The Ontario Court of Appeal reached a similar conclusion
in Montego Forest Products Ltd (Re) (1998), 37 OR (3d) 651 (CA) [Montego], where it granted a nunc pro tunc
leave order after the expiry of a limitation period and held that an action commenced without leave “is an
irregularity only, which may be cured through the mechanism of an order nunc pro tunc.” (para 6). Indeed, the
Court’s jurisdiction to grant a nunc pro tunc order is codified in the Rules of Civil Procedure, rule 59.01 (“An order
of the court is effective from the date on which it is made, unless it provides otherwise”), and rule 2.01 (failure to
comply with the Rules is an irregularity and not a nullity, and permits the court to grant relief “to secure the just
determination of the real matters in dispute”). The Ontario Court of Appeal has used rule 59.06 to grant nunc pro
tunc relief. See e.g. Martin v Goldfarb, [2001] OJ No 1886 (CA). The Ontario Court of Appeal has previously
connected the court’s inherent jurisdiction to provide nunc pro tunc relief to Rule 1.04(1), noting that the Rules
emphasize that all steps should be taken “in the interests of justice.” See New Alger Mines, supra note 140 at para
34, Respondents’ BOA, Tabs 76, 65 & 56.
144
- 33 -
to grant a nunc pro tunc order. 147 Respectfully, the reasoning in that case was properly criticized
on this issue in Celestica.148
103.
Other courts have approached similar issues in a manner consistent with Justice van
Rensburg’s approach. In McKenna Estate, Justice Sproat granted a nunc pro tunc order to
regularize an action that had been commenced without leave. In so doing, he noted that “the
authority of the Court to issue an order nunc pro tunc is not of recent origin, and certainly all
current legislation that requires a Court order prior to taking action has been drafted in the
recognition that the Court has this jurisdiction,” 149 a conclusion consistent with this Court’s
decision in Ordon Estate. He further held that the jurisdictional issue focuses on “determining
whether the statute in question prohibits a nunc pro tunc order and not whether the action, if
viewed at the time it was taken, would properly be regarded as a nullity.” 150
104.
In order to strip the Superior Court of its inherent jurisdiction to grant nunc pro tunc
relief, there must be a “clear,” “express” “absolute prohibition” in the OSA. The Appellants
point to none, because there is none.
C.
There is no Distinction Between the Jurisdiction to Backdate the Leave Order and the
Jurisdiction to Backdate the Fresh as Amended Claim
105.
As explained above, the Superior Court has the inherent jurisdiction to cure the expiry of
the limitation period (if that in fact occurred, which is denied) nunc pro tunc. That is the end of
the analysis. However, the Appellants attempt to create a distinction between the granting of the
Leave Order nunc pro tunc and the issuance of the statement of claim nunc pro tunc. The
distinction is artificial.
147
Strathy J. held that “There is nothing in the statute to suggest that the limitation period can be extended as a result
of common law principles.” Green v Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 2012 ONSC 3637 at para 524. This
holding is inconsistent with New Alger Mines, supra note 140 at para 36, in which the Ontario Court of Appeal
concluded that there must be an absolute bar preventing nunc pro tunc relief, rather than permissive language in the
statute. This Court reached the same conclusion in Ordon Estate SCC, supra note 129 at para 61, Respondents’
BOA, Tabs 33, 76 & 70B.
148
Millwright Regional Council of Ontario Pension Trust Fund (Trustees of) v Celestica, 2012 ONSC 6083,
Respondents’ BOA, Tab 64.
149
McKenna Estate, supra note 144 at para 27 [emphasis added], Respondents’ BOA, Tab 61.
150
McKenna Estate, supra note 144 at para 33, Respondents’ BOA, Tab 61.
- 34 -
106.
The Appellants argue that amending the Statement of Claim was equivalent to the
commencement of a new action, rather than what it was—an amendment to add a Part XXIII.1
claim to the statement of claim that had been filed five years earlier. 151 Their argument rests on a
paragraph from a textbook which purports to define the word “commencement,” but discusses
“typical” situations (claims by a person who is the subject of a vexatious litigant order, claims
against a person protected by a court-ordered stay, etc.), where leave is a precondition to
commencing any action at all. That text does not consider the situation presently before this
Court, where an action is commenced and leave is required to later amend the existing claim to
assert a statutory right of action. Indeed, according to that text “the applicable date for the
determination of whether a limitation period has been met is the date when the original statement
of claim or notice of application was issued.” 152 In this case, that was September 20, 2006.
107.
This is a case like Ordon Estate, where the motions judge granted leave to the plaintiffs
to amend their statement of claim nunc pro tunc to plead relevant provisions of the Canada
Shipping Act. The effect of this order was that the defendant could not invoke a one-year
limitation period in that Act. In upholding the order, the Ontario Court of Appeal held that the
“issue concerns the rights of a motion judge to amend the pleadings on a nunc pro tunc basis.
We do not think [the motions judge] erred in exercising his discretion as he did. The defendant
was aware of the claim being made against him, which we note was made within one year of the
accident. In our view, to accede to the defendant’s position on the issue would result in a gross
injustice,” 153 words with clear application here.
151
Numerous cases hold that the addition of a fresh claim based on pleaded facts is permissible even if a limitation
period has expired. See, e.g., Canadian Industries at para 18, Dee Ferraro at para 5; Maple City at para 1;
Gladstone at para 44, and Sweda Farms at para 24, all supra note 78, Respondents’ BOA, Tabs 18A, 20, 10, 30 &
87.
152
LS Abrams & K.P McGuiness, Canadian Civil Procedure Law, 2nd ed (Markham, Ont.: LexisNexis Canada Inc,
2010) at 376-377, s 4.78 [Emphasis added], Respondents’ BOA, Tab 100.
153
Ordon Estate v Grail (1996), 30 OR (3d) 643 at para 123 (CA); aff’d [1998] 3 SCR 437; See also Wu v Bollers,
[1996] OJ no 2633 at para 2 (CA) (“Assuming, without deciding, that the interpretation of s. 17 allows for such a
limitation defence, we are of the view that on the particular circumstances of this case, [the motions judge] did not
err in exercising his discretion to permit the amendment of the claim nunc pro tunc”), Respondents’ BOA, Tabs 70A
& 89.
- 35 -
108.
This on its own is enough to dispose of the Appellants’ argument. The cases cited by the
Appellants 154 do not assist them, as they all involved plaintiffs that sought to use the special
circumstances doctrine to extend a limitation period when no action had been commenced in
time.
D.
The Court’s Reliance on Actus Curiae Was Correct
109.
The Appellants incorrectly characterize actus curiae as a separate doctrine from the
Court’s inherent nunc pro tunc jurisdiction. Actus curiae is one of several established branches
of the nunc pro tunc jurisdiction. 155 In any event, actus curiae was only one of a number of
factors the motions judge considered in deciding whether to exercise her discretion to grant nunc
pro tunc relief. 156
110.
Unwilling to argue—as they must—that the Court was unable to relieve against the effect
of its reserve, they assert that the “Respondents were not prejudiced by an ‘act of the court’”
(despite the fact that the purported limitation period expired while the decision was under
reserve) “but by their own delay in filing the Statutory Claim after leave was obtained.” 157 To
mount this argument, they assert that (i) there were 79 days remaining on the limitation period
when the leave argument commenced; and (ii) “[e]ven if the 79 days remaining on the limitation
period were tolled for the entire time between the argument of the leave motion and the denial of
leave to appeal from the resulting Leave Order, the limitation period would have expired on May
4, 2011 . . . and [the Respondents] did not commence the Statutory Claim until December 12,
2011.” 158 In fact, the Appellants demanded the right to review the claim, which was provided to
them on July 27, 2011. The Appellants have invented this argument based on no precedent or
authority in an attempt to manufacture a scenario where the limitation period expired through
154
Murphy, supra note 137 at 1079; Joseph v Paramount Canada’s Wonderland, 2008 ONCA 469; Chimienti v
Windsor (City), 2011 ONCA 16, Respondents’ BOA, Tabs 66, 36 & 19.
155
Canada (Attorney General) v Hislop, 2007 SCC 10 at para 77. The Appellants also claim that “several courts
have held that actus curiae cannot be used to circumvent a limitation period” and then cite a 1905 case, a 1929
English case, and an Australian case. They ignore New Alger, Montego and Ordon Estate, recent appellate cases in
this jurisdiction. See Appellants’ factum para 116, fn 120 and Respondents’ BOA, Tab16.
156
Motion Decision, supra note 10 at paras 42, 50, 51, 55, 58 and 89-92, Appellants’ Record, Tab 1A, p 10, 11, 12,
13 & 18-19.
157
158
- 36 -
some fault of the Respondents and to distract from the fact that the Appellants suffer no unfair
prejudice from the granting of nunc pro tunc relief. The argument fails for three reasons.
111.
First, there is no support for the proposition that the s. 138.14 limitation period was
suspended during the period that the Leave decision was under reserve or subject to appeal. The
jurisprudence establishes that Justice van Rensburg had the jurisdiction to grant nunc pro tunc
relief in the interest of justice and because of the length of her reserve. The exercise of her
discretion is, tellingly, not challenged by the Appellants.
112.
Second, even if there was a “suspension,” the Appellants do not take into account the
reserve on the refusals motion, their seeking of leave to appeal from that motion, the sealing
order motion, the adjournment of the leave motion from June to December 2008 because of the
Appellants’ failure to answer proper questions, nor all the other scheduling delays caused by the
availability of counsel or the courts. 159
113.
Finally, the Appellants’ argument is that the Respondents ought to have known that: (i)
the limitation period continued to run even after the Appellants were placed on full notice of the
proposed Part XXIII.1 claim against them, and despite the fact that the Respondents litigated the
Leave Motion with dispatch; (ii) the running of the limitation period was suspended while a
decision on the Leave Motion was under reserve; and (iii) the limitation period began running
again after the decision on the Leave Motion. None of this was known; notably, the Appellants
did not plead a limitation defence when they first filed a statement of defence because, in Justice
Strathy’s words, Timminco was a “thunderbolt” that “resulted in a motion . . . by the defendants
to strike the claim in Silver v Imax, post certification and leave, in view of the fact that the
limitation period expired in that case while the matter was under reserve.” 160
E.
The Motions Judge Properly Exercised Her Discretion
Take the case of a statutory requirement for leave to commence an action.
Assume a saintly plaintiff, a meritorious claim, a dastardly defendant with
159
160
Affidavit, supra note 15 at paras 24-36, Respondents’ Record, Tab 1, pp 7-9.
Green v Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 2012 ONSC 3637 at para 475, Respondents’ BOA, Tab 33.
- 37 -
assets and the intervention of a limitation period. If a nunc pro tunc order is
available justice is done. 161
114.
Having correctly established that she had the jurisdiction to grant nunc pro tunc relief, the
motions judge determined that she should do so. As far back as 1875, it has been recognized that
a nunc pro tunc order “is granted to answer the purposes of justice, but never to do an
injustice.” 162 In the words of the Court of Appeal, “the appellant has not been prejudiced nor has
substantial injustice been caused by the nunc pro tunc order in the sense of the appellant being
taken by surprise by an action already proceeding by leave,” 163 all of which is true in this case. 164
115.
The decision below is consistent with the nunc pro tunc jurisprudence. In Montego
Forest Products, after finding that the superior court had the jurisdiction to grant a nunc pro tunc
order for leave pursuant to s. 38 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, the Ontario Court of
Appeal considered whether the motions judge properly exercised her discretion in doing so.
While it “is not every case that will lend itself to the granting of a sec. 38 order nunc pro tunc,”
in that case the order was required because the case “proceeded for more than four years without
objection by the appellants. Such objection was first raised the day before the scheduled pretrial
conference, on the eve of the expiry of the limitation period . . . [‘despite the fact that] the
defendant . . . must have known of the absence of a s. 38 order.’ In these circumstances, it was
open to Lax J. to exercise her discretion as she did, and we are not persuaded that she made any
error in so doing.” 165
161
McKenna Estate, supra note 144 at para 24 [Emphasis added], Respondents’ BOA, Tab 61.
McKenna Estate, supra note 144 at para 35, citing Bouvier’s Law Dictionary (1875) Vol 11 at 275, Respondents’
BOA, Tab 61.
163
New Alger Mines, supra note 140 at para 36, Respondents’ BOA, Tab 76.
164
In Spirito Estate v Trillium Health Centre, 2008 ONCA 762, the Ontario Court of Appeal allowed an
amendment, in a case of misnomer. In finding that the defendants suffered no prejudice, the Court stated: “The
appellants did not make any allegation of prejudice, other than the passage of time. The motion judge noted that the
appellants did not allege that they were unaware of the claims. There are other circumstances that strongly suggest
no prejudice, in particular the fact that Dr. Tin was able to dictate the detailed discharge summary on May 19, 2005,
some eighteen months after Mr. Spirito’s death. I see no reason to interfere with the motion judge’s decision” at para
14. As in that case, the Defendants here were aware of the claims upon receipt of the statement of claim in
September, 2006, Respondents’ BOA, Tab 86.
165
Montego, supra note 146 at para 7, Respondents’ BOA, Tab 65.
162
- 38 -
116.
The decision below is consistent with this Court’s admonition that “any ambiguity found
upon the application of the proper principles of statutory interpretation should be resolved in
favour of the person whose right of action is being truncated.” 166
117.
The motions judge correctly held that limitation periods are not intended to arbitrarily
extinguish a cause of action that has been vigorously pursued.
There are three rationales
underlying limitation periods:
118.
(a)
Certainty – “[t]here comes a time when a potential defendant should be secure in
his reasonable expectation that he will not be held to account for ancient
obligations”;
(b)
Evidentiary – “the desire to foreclose claims based on stale evidence”; and
(c)
Diligence – “plaintiffs are expected to act diligently and not ‘sleep on their
rights.’” 167
None of these principles is offended by the granting of nunc pro tunc relief in the
circumstances of this case. In regard to the certainty and evidentiary rationales, the motions
judge found that (i) the statement of claim, issued in September 2006 (approximately 6 months
after the last alleged misrepresentation) referenced the statutory right of action, which was based
on essentially the same facts as the common law claims; (ii) the affidavits filed by the
Respondents in support of their Leave Motion gave the Appellants detailed notice far in excess
of what would have been pleaded in the statement of claim; (iii) the Appellants had notice of all
of the proposed Part XXIII.1 claim well within the limitation period; and, (iv) the paragraphs of
the Fresh Statement of Claim pleading Part XXIII.1 were consistent with the Proposed XXIII.1
Claim (with some additional details added to the pleading), and the Appellants received the
Proposed XXIII.1 Claim on November 28, 2006, long before three years had elapsed from the
time at which IMAX’s impugned disclosure documents were released. 168
119.
In regard to the diligence rationale, the motions judge found that (i) the Leave Motion
was brought promptly and vigorously and without any inappropriate delay on the part of the
Respondents; (ii) the expiry of the limitation period had nothing to do with any act or default by
166
Ordon Estate SCC, supra note 129 at para 136, citing Berardinelli v Ontario Housing Corp, [1979] 1 SCR 275 at
280, Respondents’ BOA, Tabs 70B & 14.
167
M (K) v M (H), [1992] 3 SCR 6 at paras 21-24, Respondents’ BOA, Tab 49.
168
Motion Decision, supra note 10 at paras 7, 13, and 89, Appellants’ Record, Tab 1A, p 4, 5 & 18
- 39 -
any party; and, (iii) “there was nothing more the plaintiffs could have done to comply with the
limitation period.” 169
120.
121.
The factors identified in the jurisprudence 170 support nunc pro tunc relief:
(a)
no surprise or prejudice: the parties have been engaged in litigation for nearly six
years and have actively litigated the Respondents’ Part XXIII.1 claim throughout
that period. The Appellants do not and cannot argue that they are unfairly
prejudiced by the grant of a nunc pro tunc order;
(b)
the action is brought in good faith; 171
(c)
the claim is not frivolous or vexatious: the Court below determined that there is a
“reasonable possibility of success,” and the Appellants were denied leave to
appeal from the Leave Order; 172 and
(d)
no injustice will result from the granting of the Respondents’ cross-motion; rather,
a denial of nunc pro tunc relief would result in an obvious injustice to the
Respondents by depriving them of a meritorious claim which they have litigated
in a vigorous and timely fashion.
In any event, the decision to grant nunc pro tunc relief is discretionary. Thus, to prevail
on this appeal, the Appellants must demonstrate that the motions judge committed a palpable and
overriding error, proceeded on a wrong principle of law, or reached a conclusion that is so
clearly wrong as to amount to an injustice. For all of the reasons stated above, the Appellants
fall short of that standard.
PART IV - SUBMISSIONS CONCERNING COSTS
122.
The Appellants seek to overturn the conclusive decision of a 5-member panel of
Ontario’s highest Court, occasioning further delay upon a proceeding that is over seven years
old. Accordingly, the Respondents ought to be awarded costs on this appeal.
169
Motion Decision, supra note 10 at paras 22 and 90, Appellants’ Record, Tab 1A, p 6 & 18-19.
McKenna Estate, supra note 144 at paras 12- 20 (collecting cases), Respondents’ BOA, Tab 61.
171
172
170
- 41 -
PART VI - TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Tab
Authority
Paragraph
reference(s)
1.
65302 British Columbia Ltd v Canada, [1999] 3 SCR 804
36, 59
2.
Abdula v Canadian Solar Inc, 2011 ONSC 5105
79
3.
Abdula v Canadian Solar Inc, 2012 CarswellOnt 14887 (SCC)
79
4.
Abdula v Canadian Solar Inc, 2012 ONCA 211
5.
Abdula v Canadian Solar, 2013 ONSC 5993
79
6.
Abdula v Canadian Solar, 2013 ONSC 5035
79
7.
Ainslie v CV Technologies (2008), 93 OR (3d) 200 (Sup Ct)
79
8.
Ainslie v CV Technologies, [2009] OJ no 730 (Sup Ct)
79
9.
Attis v Canada (Minister of Health) (2005), 75 OR (3d) 302 (Sup
Ct)
38
10.
Bank of Montreal v Maple City Ford Sales (1986) Ltd, [2000] OJ no
1345 (CA)
11.
Bayens v Kinross Gold Corp, 2013 ONSC 6864
23
12.
Bayens v Kinross Gold Corporation, 2014 ONCA 901
79
13.
Bell ExpressVu Limited Partnership v Rex, 2002 SCC 42
76
14.
Berardinelli v Ontario Housing Corp, [1979] 1 SCR 275
83, 116
15.
Cahoon v Franks, [1967] SCR 455
46
16.
Canada (Attorney General) v Hislop, 2007 SCC 10
109
17.
Canada (Canadian Wheat Board) v Canada (Attorney General),
2007 FC 39 (Man Fed Ct)
86
18.
Canadian Industries Ltd v Canadian National Railway Co, [1940]
OJ no 266 (CA), aff’d [1941] SCR 591
75, 79
51, 106
51, 106
- 42 -
Tab
Authority
Paragraph
reference(s)
19.
Chimienti v Windsor (City), 2011 ONCA 16
20.
Dee Ferraro Limited v Pellizzari, 2012 ONCA 55
21.
Dobbie v Arctic Glacier Income Fund, 2010 ONSC 4577
79
22.
Dobbie v Arctic Glacier Income Fund, 2012 ONSC 773
79
23.
Dugal v Manulife Financial Corp, 2011 ONSC 6761
79
24.
Dugal v Manulife Financial Corporation, et al. (7 December 2012),
Ontario CV-09-383998-00CP (Ont Sup Ct)
79
25.
Dugal v Manulife Financial Corporation et al, 2013 ONSC 327
(Div Ct)
79
26.
Dugal v Manulife, 2014 ONSC 1347
79
27.
Durling v Sunrise Propane Energy Group Inc, 2011 ONSC 7506
66
28.
Epstein v First Marathon Inc, [2000] OJ No 452 (Sup Ct)
29.
Galganov v Russel (Township), 2012 ONCA 409
30.
Gladstone v Canadian National Transportation Ltd, [2009] OJ No
3118 (Div Ct)
31.
Gould v Western Coal Corp, 2012 ONSC 5184
23
32.
Gray v SNC-Lavalin Group Inc, 2012 ONSC 3735
79
33.
Green v Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 2012 ONSC 3637
34.
Green v Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce, 2014 ONCA 90
108
51, 106
22, 31
61
51, 106
102, 113
42, 55, 56,
58, 68, 71,
72, 79
35.
Hollick v Toronto (City), 2001 SCC 68
62
36.
Joseph v Paramount Canada’s Wonderland, 2008 ONCA 469
108
37.
Kaynes v. BP plc, 2013 ONSC 5802
79
38.
Kaynes v BP plc, 2014 ONCA 580
79
- 43 -
Tab
Authority
Paragraph
reference(s)
39.
Kaynes v BP plc, 2014 CarswellOnt 15791 (CA)
79
40.
Kherani v Bank of Montreal, 2012 ONSC 2230
38
41.
Labourers’ Pension Fund of Central and Eastern Canada v SinoForest Corporation, 2012 ONSC 1924
79, 80, 85
42.
Labourers’ Pension Fund of Central and Eastern Canada v SinoForest Corp, 2014 ONSC 6236
79
43.
Lambert v Guidant Corp, [2009] OJ No 1910 (Sup Ct)
66
44.
Las Vegas Strip Ltd v Toronto (City) (1996), 30 OR (3d) 286 (Sup
Ct), aff’d (1997), 32 OR (3d) 651 (CA)
45
45.
Lévis (Ville) c Côté, 2007 SCC 14
46.
Locking v Armtec Infrastructure Inc, 2012 ONSC 5228
79
47.
Locking v Armtec Infrastructure Inc, 2013 ONSC 331 (Div Ct)
79
48.
Logan v Canada (Minister of Health), [2003] OJ no 418 (Sup Ct)
66
49.
M (K) v M (H), [1992] 3 SCR 6
117
50.
Mai v Mississauga (City), [1990] OJ no 391 (HCJ)
50
51.
Mancinelli v Barrick Gold Corp, 2014 ONSC 6516
79
52.
Mancinelli v. Barrick Gold Corp, 2014 ONSC 7431
79
53.
Manitoba Hydro Electric Board v John Inglis Co, [1996] MJ no 128
(CA)
89
54.
Markevich v Canada, 2003 SCC 9
45
55.
Martel v County of Los Angeles, 56 F (3d) 993 (9th Cir 1995)
86
56.
Martin v Goldfarb, [2001] O.J. No. 1886 (CA)
101
57.
Mask v Silvercorp Metals Inc., 2014 ONSC 4161
79
58.
79
36, 59
- 44 -
Tab
Authority
Paragraph
reference(s)
59.
79
60.
Mask v Silvercorp Metals, Inc., 2014 ONSC 7381
79
61.
McKenna Estate v Marshall (2005), 37 RPR (4th) 222 (Ont Sup Ct)
100, 103,
113, 114,
120
62.
Metzler Investment GmbH v Gildan Activewear Inc, [2009] OJ no
3394 (Sup Ct)
79
63.
Metzler Investment GmbH v Gildan Activewear Inc, [2009] OJ no
5695 (Sup Ct)
79
64.
Millwright Regional Council of Ontario Pension Trust Fund
(Trustees of) v Celestica, 2012 ONSC 6083
102
65.
Montego Forest Products Ltd (Re) (1998), 37 OR (3d) 651 (CA)
101, 109,
115
66.
Murphy v Welsh; Stoddard v Watson, [1993] 2 SCR 1069
67.
Order of Justice Belobaba in Rahimi v SouthGobi Resources Ltd
dated December 10, 2014
79
68.
Order of Justice Rady in Killoran v Cathay Forest Products Corp.
dated January 19, 2012
79
69.
Order of Justice Rady in Killoran v Cathay Forest Products Corp
dated April 23, 2012
79
70.
Ordon Estate v Grail (1996), 30 OR (3d) 643 (CA); aff’d [1998] 3
SCR 437
71.
Pardhan v Bank of Montreal, 2012 ONSC 2229
72.
R v Dineley, 2012 SCC 58
73.
R v Negridge (1980), 54 CCC (2d) 304 (Ont CA)
74.
Ramdath v George Brown College of Applied Arts and Technology,
2010 ONSC 2019
90, 108
83, 101,
102, 103,
107
38
36, 59
36, 59, 90
66
- 45 -
Tab
75.
Authority
Re Canada 3000 Inc, [2006] 1 SCR 865
76.
Re New Alger Mines Limited (1986), 54 OR (2d) 562 (CA)
Paragraph
reference(s)
83
96, 101,
102,
109,114
77.
Rizzo & Rizzo Shoes Ltd. (Re), [1998] 1 SCR 27
83
78.
Sharma v Timminco Ltd. (2009), 99 OR (3d) 260 (Sup Ct)
79
79.
Silver v Imax Corp, [2008] OJ no 1844 (Sup Ct)
79
80.
Silver Imax Corp, [2008] OJ no 2751 (Sup Ct)
79
81.
Silver v Imax Corporation, [2009] OJ No 5573 (Sup Ct)
82.
Silver v Imax Corp, 2011 ONSC 1035
83.
Silver v Imax Corporation, 2012 ONSC 4881
7, 8, 10, 120
79
12, 13, 14,
15, 16, 17,
18, 19, 94,
98, 99, 109,
118, 119
84.
Simmonds v Armtec Infrastructure Inc, 2012 ONSC 44
79
85.
Smith v Sino-Forest Corp, 2012 ONSC 24
79
86.
Spirito Estate v Trillium Health Centre, 2008 ONCA 762
114
87.
Sweda Farms Ltd et al v Ontario Egg Producers et al, 2011 ONSC
6146
88.
The Queen v Justices of County of London and London County
Council, [1893] 2 QB 476
89
89.
Wu v Bollers, [1996] OJ No 2633 (CA)
107
90.
Zaniewicz v Zungui Haixi Corp et al, 2012 ONSC 4904
79
51, 106
SECONDARY SOURCES
91.
Bill 198, An Act to implement Budget measures and other initiatives
of the Government, 3rd Sess, 37th Leg, 2002
49
- 46 -
Tab
92.
93.
Authority
Bradley A. Heys & Mark L. Berenblut “Trends in Canadian
Securities Class Actions: 2012 Update” (13 February 2013)
Paragraph
reference(s)
86
Canadian Securities Administrators Notice 53-302, (2000) 23 OSCB
7383
29, 31, 32,
35,37, 73,
75
Committee on Corporate Disclosure, Final Report: Responsible
Corporate Disclosure: A Search for Balance (Toronto: Toronto
Stock Exchange, 1997)
21, 25, 26,
27, 28, 29,
30, 33, 34,
56 72, 75,
76
94.
95.
Consolidated Provincial Practice Direction, Part II: Proceedings
under the Class Proceedings Act, 1992 <
http://www.ontariocourts.ca/scj/practice/practicedirections/provincial/
96.
Ontario Law Reform Commission, Report on Class Actions, vol 3
(Toronto: Ministry of the Attorney General, 1982)
97.
Proposal for a Statutory Civil Remedy for Investors in the
Secondary Market and Request for Comments (1998), 21 OSCB
3335 and 21 OSCB 3367
31
98.
Scheduling Direction of Justice Perell in Gray v SNC-Lavalin Group
Inc., et al. dated July 29, 2010
79
99.
Tom Baker & Sean J. Griffith, Ensuring Corporate Misconduct:
How Liability Insurance Undermines Shareholder Litigation
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010)
38
100. .... LS Abrams & K.P McGuiness, Canadian Civil Procedure Law, 2nd
ed (Markham, Ont.: LexisNexis Canada Inc, 2010)
36
57, 58, 63,
64, 65, 67
106
- 47 -
PART VII - STATUTES AND REGULATIONS
Class Proceedings Act, 1992, SO 1992, c 6, ss. 2(1), 2(3)(a), 15(2), 28
Legislation Act, 2006, SO 2006, c 21, Schedule F, s. 64(1)
Rules of Civil Procedure, RRO 1990, Reg 194, r 1.04(1), 2.01, 24, 59.01, 59.06
Securities Act, RSO 1990, c S5, ss. 28, 138.1, 138.3, 138.8
- 48 -
Class Proceedings Act, 1992, SO 1992, c 6, ss. 2(1), 2(3)(a), 15(2), 28
Plaintiff’s class proceeding
2. (1) One or more members of a class of persons may commence a proceeding in the court on
behalf of the members of the class. 1992, c. 6, s. 2 (1).
Motion for certification
(2) A person who commences a proceeding under subsection (1) shall make a motion to a judge
of the court for an order certifying the proceeding as a class proceeding and appointing the
person representative plaintiff. 1992, c. 6, s. 2 (2).
Idem
(3) A motion under subsection (2) shall be made,
(a) within ninety days after the later of,
(i) the date on which the last statement of defence, notice of intent to defend or
notice of appearance is delivered, and
(ii) the date on which the time prescribed by the rules of court for delivery of the
last statement of defence, notice of intent to defend or a notice of appearance
expires without its being delivered; or
(b) subsequently, with leave of the court. 1992, c. 6, s. 2 (3).
Discovery of class members with leave
15(2) After discovery of the representative party, a party may move for discovery under the
rules of court against other class members. 1992, c. 6, s. 15 (2).
Limitations
28. (1) Subject to subsection (2), any limitation period applicable to a cause of action asserted
in a class proceeding is suspended in favour of a class member on the commencement of the
class proceeding and resumes running against the class member when,
(a) the member opts out of the class proceeding;
(b) an amendment that has the effect of excluding the member from the class is made to
the certification order;
(c) a decertification order is made under section 10;
(d) the class proceeding is dismissed without an adjudication on the merits;
(e) the class proceeding is abandoned or discontinued with the approval of the court; or
(f) the class proceeding is settled with the approval of the court, unless the settlement
provides otherwise. 1992, c. 6, s. 28 (1).
- 49 -
Loi de 1992 sur les recours collectifs, L.O. 1992, CHAPITRE 6, ss. 2(1), 2(3)(a), 15(2), 28
Recours collectif du demandeur
2. (1) Une instance peut être introduite devant le tribunal au nom des membres d’un groupe de
personnes par un ou plusieurs membres du groupe. 1992, chap. 6, par. 2 (1).
Motion en vue de faire certifier le recours collectif
(2) La personne qui introduit une instance en vertu du paragraphe (1) demande à un juge du
tribunal, par voie de motion, de rendre une ordonnance certifiant que l’instance est un recours
collectif et nommant la personne représentant des demandeurs. 1992, chap. 6, par. 2 (2).
Idem
(3) La motion visée au paragraphe (2) est présentée, selon le cas:
a) dans les quatre-vingt-dix jours après celle des deux dates suivantes qui est postérieure
à l’autre:
(i) la date à laquelle la dernière défense, le dernier avis d’intention de présenter une
défense ou le dernier avis de comparution a été remis,
(ii) la date à laquelle expire le délai prescrit par les règles de pratique pour la remise
de la dernière défense, du dernier avis d’intention de présenter une défense ou
du dernier avis de comparution sans que celui-ci n’ait été remis;
b) par la suite, avec l’autorisation du tribunal. 1992, chap. 6, par. 2 (3).
Interrogatoire préalable avec autorisation
15(2) Après avoir interrogé au préalable le représentant, une partie peut demander, par voie de
motion, de procéder à l’interrogatoire préalable d’autres membres du groupe aux termes des
règles de pratique. 1992, chap. 6, par. 15 (2).
Prescription
28. (1) Sous réserve du paragraphe (2), tout délai de prescription applicable à une cause
d’action invoquée dans un recours collectif est suspendu en faveur d’un membre du groupe à
l’introduction du recours collectif et reprend au détriment du membre au moment où, selon le
cas:
a) ce membre se retire du recours collectif;
b) est apportée une modification de l’ordonnance certifiant le recours collectif qui a pour
effet d’exclure du groupe le membre;
c) une ordonnance annulant l’ordonnance certifiant le recours collectif est rendue en vertu
de l’article 10;
d) le recours collectif est rejeté sans décision sur le fond;
e) il y a désistement du recours collectif avec l’approbation du tribunal;
f) le recours collectif fait l’objet d’une transaction avec l’approbation du tribunal, à moins
que la transaction ne prévoie autre chose. 1992, chap. 6, par. 28 (1).
- 50 -
Idem
(2) Lorsqu’il existe un droit d’appel à l’égard d’un des événements décrits aux alinéas (1) a) à f),
le délai de prescription reprend dès l’expiration du délai d’appel, si aucun appel n’a été introduit,
ou dès le règlement d’un appel. 1992, chap. 6, par. 28 (2).
- 51 -
Legislation Act, 2006, SO 2006, c 21, Schedule F, s. 64(1)
Rule of liberal interpretation
64. (1) An Act shall be interpreted as being remedial and shall be given such fair, large
and liberal interpretation as best ensures the attainment of its objects. 2006, c. 21, Sched. F, s. 64
(1).
Solution de droit
64. (1) La loi est censée apporter une solution de droit et s’interprète de la manière la plus
équitable et la plus large qui soit compatible avec la réalisation de ses objets. 2006, chap. 21,
annexe F, par. 64 (1).
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Rules of Civil Procedure, RRO 1990, Reg 194, r 1.04(1), 2.01, 24, 59.01, 59.06
General Principle
1.04 (1) These rules shall be liberally construed to secure the just, most expeditious and least
expensive determination of every civil proceeding on its merits. R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194,
r. 1.04 (1).
EFFECT OF NON-COMPLIANCE
2.01 (1) A failure to comply with these rules is an irregularity and does not render a proceeding
or a step, document or order in a proceeding a nullity, and the court,
(a) may grant all necessary amendments or other relief, on such terms as are just, to
secure the just determination of the real matters in dispute; or
(b) only where and as necessary in the interest of justice, may set aside the proceeding or
a step, document or order in the proceeding in whole or in part. R.R.O. 1990, Reg.
194, r. 2.01 (1).
(2) The court shall not set aside an originating process on the ground that the proceeding
should have been commenced by an originating process other than the one employed. R.R.O.
1990, Reg. 194, r. 2.01 (2).
WHERE AVAILABLE
24.01 (1) A defendant who is not in default under these rules or an order of the court may move
to have an action dismissed for delay where the plaintiff has failed,
(a) to serve the statement of claim on all the defendants within the prescribed time;
(b) to have noted in default any defendant who has failed to deliver a statement of
defence, within thirty days after the default;
(c) to set the action down for trial within six months after the close of pleadings; or
(d) Revoked: R.R.O. 1990. Reg. 194, r. 24.01 (2).
(e) to move for leave to restore to a trial list an action that has been struck off the trial list,
within thirty days after the action was struck off. R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, r. 24.01;
R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, r. 24.01 (2); O. Reg. 770/92, s. 7; O. Reg. 533/95, s. 4 (1).
(2) Spent: O. Reg. 533/95, s. 4 (2).
Note: On March 31, 2015, subrule (2) is revoked and the following substituted: (See: O.
Reg. 259/14, ss. 6, 12)
(2) The court shall, subject to subrule 24.02 (2), dismiss an action for delay if either of the
circumstances described in paragraphs 1 and 2 of subrule 48.14 (1) applies to the action, unless
the plaintiff demonstrates that dismissal of the action would be unjust. O. Reg. 259/14, s. 6.
NOTICE WHERE PLAINTIFF UNDER DISABILITY
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24.02 Where the plaintiff is under disability, notice of a motion to dismiss the action for delay
shall be served on,
(a) the litigation guardian of the plaintiff; and
(b) on the Children’s Lawyer, unless,
(i) the Public Guardian and Trustee is litigation guardian of the plaintiff, or
(ii) a judge orders otherwise. R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, r. 24.02; O. Reg. 69/95,
ss. 18-20.
Note: On March 31, 2015, rule 24.02 is revoked and the following substituted: (See: O. Reg.
259/14, ss. 7, 12)
WHERE PLAINTIFF UNDER DISABILITY
24.02 (1) Where the plaintiff is under disability, notice of a motion to dismiss an action for
delay shall be served on the plaintiff’s litigation guardian and, if the litigation guardian is not the
Children’s Lawyer or the Public Guardian and Trustee,
(a) on the Children’s Lawyer, if the plaintiff is a minor; or
(b) on the Public Guardian and Trustee, in any other case. O. Reg. 259/14, s. 7.
No Order Without Confirmation
(2) Where the Children’s Lawyer or the Public Guardian and Trustee has been served under
subrule (1) but is not the plaintiff’s litigation guardian, the action may be dismissed under this
Rule only if the Children’s Lawyer or the Public Guardian and Trustee, as the case may be,
confirms to the court that he or she was served and takes no position on the dismissal, unless a
judge orders otherwise. O. Reg. 259/14, s. 7.
NOTICE OF ORDER
24.02.1 If the defendant is successful on the motion to dismiss an action for delay, the defendant
shall serve a copy of the order dismissing the action on every defendant to the action who has
crossclaimed against him or her. O. Reg. 394/09, s. 9.
EFFECT OF DISMISSAL ON COUNTERCLAIM
24.03 Where an action against a defendant who has counterclaimed is dismissed for delay, the
defendant may within thirty days after the dismissal deliver a notice of election to proceed with
the counterclaim (Form 23B), and if the defendant fails to do so, the counterclaim shall be
deemed to be discontinued without costs. R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, r. 24.03.
EFFECT OF DISMISSAL ON CROSSCLAIM OR THIRD PARTY CLAIM
24.04 (1) Unless the court orders otherwise, where an action against a defendant who has
crossclaimed or made a third party claim is dismissed for delay, the crossclaim or third party
claim shall be deemed to be dismissed. O. Reg. 394/09, s. 10 (1).
(1.1) Where an action against a defendant against whom a crossclaim has been made is
dismissed for delay, the crossclaim shall be deemed to be dismissed thirty days after a copy of
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the order dismissing the action is served on the crossclaiming defendant under rule 24.02.1,
unless the court orders otherwise during the thirty-day period. O. Reg. 394/09, s. 10 (1).
Effect of deemed dismissal on subsequent action
(2) A deemed dismissal under this rule is not a defence to a subsequent action unless the order
dismissing the action provides otherwise. O. Reg. 770/92, s. 8; O. Reg. 394/09, s. 10 (2).
EFFECT ON SUBSEQUENT ACTION
24.05 (1) The dismissal of an action for delay is not a defence to a subsequent action unless the
order dismissing the action provides otherwise. R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, r. 24.05 (1).
(2) Where a plaintiff’s action has been dismissed for delay with costs, and another action
involving the same subject matter is subsequently brought between the same parties or their
representatives or successors in interest before payment of the costs of the dismissed action, the
court may order a stay of the subsequent action until the costs of the dismissed action have been
paid. R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, r. 24.05 (2).
COSTS OF DISMISSAL, DEEMED DISMISSAL
24.05.1 (1) If an action is dismissed for delay, any party to the action may, within thirty days
after the dismissal, make a motion respecting the costs of the action. O. Reg. 394/09, s. 11.
(2) If a crossclaim or third party claim is deemed to be dismissed, any party to the
crossclaim or third party claim may, within thirty days after the deemed dismissal, make a
motion respecting the costs of the crossclaim or third party claim. O. Reg. 394/09, s. 11.
APPLICATION TO COUNTERCLAIMS, CROSSCLAIMS AND THIRD PARTY
CLAIMS
24.06 Rules 24.01 to 24.05.1 apply, with necessary modifications, to counterclaims, crossclaims
and third party claims. R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, r. 24.06; O. Reg. 394/09, s. 12.
EFFECTIVE DATE
59.01 An order is effective from the date on which it is made, unless it provides otherwise.
R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, r. 59.01.
AMENDING, SETTING ASIDE OR VARYING ORDER
Amending
59.06 (1) An order that contains an error arising from an accidental slip or omission or requires
amendment in any particular on which the court did not adjudicate may be amended on a motion
in the proceeding. R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, r. 59.06 (1).
Setting Aside or Varying
(2) A party who seeks to,
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(a) have an order set aside or varied on the ground of fraud or of facts arising or
discovered after it was made;
(b) suspend the operation of an order;
(c) carry an order into operation; or
(d) obtain other relief than that originally awarded,
may make a motion in the proceeding for the relief claimed. R.R.O. 1990, Reg. 194, r. 59.06 (2).
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Règles de procédure civile, RRO 1990, Reg 194, r 1.04(1), 2.01, 24, 59.01, 59.06
Principe général
1.04 (1) Les présentes règles doivent recevoir une interprétation large afin d’assurer la
résolution équitable sur le fond de chaque instance civile, de la façon la plus expéditive et la
moins onéreuse. R.R.O. 1990, Règl. 194, par. 1.04 (1).
2.01 (1) L’inobservation des présentes règles constitue une irrégularité et n’est pas cause de
nullité de l’instance ni d’une mesure prise, d’un document donné ou d’une ordonnance rendue
dans le cadre de celle-ci. Le tribunal peut soit :
a) autoriser les modifications ou accorder les mesures de redressement nécessaires, à des
conditions justes, afin d’assurer une résolution équitable des véritables questions en
litige;
b) annuler l’instance ou une mesure prise, un document donné ou une ordonnance rendue
dans le cadre de celle-ci, en tout ou en partie, seulement si cela est nécessaire dans
l’intérêt de la justice. R.R.O. 1990, Règl. 194, par. 2.01. (1).
(2) Le tribunal n’annule pas un acte introductif d’instance pour le motif que l’instance
aurait dû être introduite par un autre acte. R.R.O. 1990, Règl. 194, par. 2.01. (2).
APPLICABILITÉ
24.01 (1) Le défendeur qui n’est pas en défaut en vertu des présentes règles ou d’une
ordonnance du tribunal, peut demander, par voie de motion, le rejet de l’action pour cause de
retard si le demandeur n’a pas, selon le cas :
a) signifié la déclaration à tous les défendeurs dans le délai prescrit;
b) fait constater le défaut d’un défendeur dans les trente jours qui suivent l’omission de
celui-ci de remettre sa défense;
c) inscrit l’action pour instruction dans les six mois qui suivent la clôture de la procédure
écrite;
d) Abrogé : R.R.O. 1990, Règl. 194, par. 24.01 (2).
e) demandé, par voie de motion, l’autorisation de réinscrire au rôle une action qui a été
radiée, dans les trente jours qui suivent la radiation. R.R.O. 1990, Règl. 194, règle
24.01; R.R.O. 1990, Règl. 194, par. 24.01 (2); Règl. de l’Ont. 770/92, art. 7; Règl. de
l’Ont. 533/95, par. 4 (1).
(2) périmé : Règl. de l’Ont. 533/95, par. 4 (2).
Remarque : Le 31 mars 2015, le paragraphe (2) est abrogé et remplacé par ce qui suit :
(Voir : Règl. de l’Ont. 259/14, art. 6 et 12)
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(2) Sous réserve du paragraphe 24.02 (2), le tribunal rejette une action pour cause de retard si
l’une ou l’autre des circonstances prévues aux dispositions 1 et 2 du paragraphe 48.14 (1)
s’applique à l’action, à moins que le demandeur ne démontre que le rejet de l’action serait
injuste. Règl. de l’Ont. 259/14, art. 6.
DEMANDEUR INCAPABLE
24.02 Si le demandeur est incapable, l’avis de motion en vue d’obtenir le rejet de l’action pour
cause de retard est signifié :
a) au tuteur à l’instance du demandeur;
b) à l’avocat des enfants, sauf si :
(i) soit, le Tuteur et curateur public agit en qualité de tuteur à l’instance du
demandeur,
(ii) soit, un juge ordonne autrement. R.R.O. 1990, Règl. 194, règle 24.02; Règl. de
l’Ont. 69/95, art. 18 à 20.
Remarque : Le 31 mars 2015, la règle 24.02 est abrogée et remplacée par ce qui suit :
(Voir : Règl. de l’Ont. 259/14, art. 7 et 12)
CAS OÙ LE DEMANDEUR EST INCAPABLE
24.02 (1) Si le demandeur est incapable, l’avis de motion en vue d’obtenir le rejet d’une action
pour cause de retard est signifié au tuteur à l’instance du demandeur et, si ce dernier n’est ni
l’avocat des enfants ni le Tuteur et curateur public :
a) à l’avocat des enfants, si le demandeur est un mineur;
b) au Tuteur et curateur public, dans les autres cas. Règl. de l’Ont. 259/14, art. 7.
Aucune ordonnance sans confirmation
(2) Si l’avocat des enfants ou le Tuteur et curateur public a reçu la signification prévue au
paragraphe (1), mais qu’il n’est pas le tuteur à l’instance du demandeur, l’action ne peut être
rejetée en vertu de la présente Règle que si l’un ou l’autre, selon le cas, confirme au tribunal qu’il
a reçu la signification et s’il ne prend pas position sur le rejet, sauf ordonnance contraire d’un
juge. Règl. de l’Ont. 259/14, art. 7.
AVIS D’ORDONNANCE
24.02.1 S’il a gain de cause dans la motion en rejet d’une action pour cause de retard, le
défendeur signifie une copie de l’ordonnance de rejet de l’action à chaque défendeur dans
l’action qui s’est porté demandeur contre lui. Règl. de l’Ont. 394/09, art. 9.
EFFET DU REJET SUR LA DEMANDE RECONVENTIONNELLE
24.03 En cas de rejet pour cause de retard d’une action contre un défendeur qui s’est porté
demandeur reconventionnel, celui-ci peut, dans les trente jours qui suivent le rejet, remettre un
avis de décision de donner suite à la demande reconventionnelle (formule 23B). Le défendeur
qui ne remet pas cet avis est réputé s’être désisté de la demande reconventionnelle sans dépens.
R.R.O. 1990, Règl. 194, règle 24.03.
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EFFET DU REJET SUR LA DEMANDE ENTRE DÉFENDEURS OU LA MISE EN
CAUSE
24.04 (1) Sauf ordonnance contraire du tribunal, en cas de rejet pour cause de retard d’une
action contre un défendeur qui s’est porté demandeur contre un autre défendeur ou dans une mise
en cause, la demande entre défendeurs ou la mise en cause, selon le cas, est réputée rejetée. Règl.
de l’Ont. 394/09, par. 10 (1).
(1.1) En cas de rejet pour cause de retard d’une action contre un défendeur visé par une
demande entre défendeurs, la demande entre défendeurs est réputée rejetée trente jours après la
signification d’une copie de l’ordonnance de rejet de l’action au défendeur qui s’est porté
demandeur contre lui aux termes de la règle 24.02.1, sauf ordonnance contraire du tribunal
rendue pendant ce délai de trente jours. Règl. de l’Ont. 394/09, par. 10 (1).
Effet du rejet réputé sur une action subséquente
(2) Un rejet réputé tel en vertu de la présente règle ne peut être opposé en défense à une action
subséquente, sauf disposition contraire de l’ordonnance rejetant l’action. Règl. de l’Ont. 770/92,
art. 8; Règl. de l’Ont. 394/09, par. 10 (2).
EFFET SUR UNE ACTION SUBSÉQUENTE
24.05 (1) Le rejet d’une action pour cause de retard ne peut être opposé en défense à une action
subséquente, sauf disposition contraire de l’ordonnance de rejet. R.R.O. 1990, Règl. 194, par.
24.05 (1).
(2) Si l’action d’un demandeur a été rejetée avec dépens pour cause de retard et qu’une autre
action relative au même objet est intentée subséquemment entre les mêmes parties, leurs
exécuteurs testamentaires ou administrateurs de la succession, ou leurs ayants droit avant le
paiement des dépens de l’action rejetée, le tribunal peut ordonner le sursis de l’action
subséquente jusqu’au paiement. R.R.O. 1990, Règl. 194, par. 24.05 (2).
DÉPENS DU REJET, DEMANDE ENTRE DÉFENDEURS OU MISE EN CAUSE
RÉPUTÉE REJETÉE
24.05.1 (1) En cas de rejet d’une action pour cause de retard, toute partie à celle-ci peut, dans
les trente jours qui suivent le rejet, présenter une motion à l’égard des dépens de l’action. Règl.
de l’Ont. 394/09, art. 11.
(2) Si une demande entre défendeurs ou une mise en cause est réputée rejetée, toute partie à la
demande entre défendeurs ou à la mise en cause peut, dans les trente jours qui suivent ce rejet,
présenter une motion à l’égard des dépens de la demande entre défendeurs ou de la mise en
cause. Règl. de l’Ont. 394/09, art. 11.
APPLICATION AUX DEMANDES RECONVENTIONNELLES, AUX DEMANDES
ENTRE DÉFENDEURS ET AUX MISES EN CAUSE
24.06 Les règles 24.01 à 24.05.1 s’appliquent, avec les adaptations nécessaires, aux demandes
reconventionnelles, aux demandes entre défendeurs et aux mises en cause. R.R.O. 1990, Règl.
194, règle 24.06; Règl. de l’Ont. 394/09, art. 12.
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DATE DE PRISE D’EFFET
59.01 L’ordonnance, à moins qu’elle ne contienne une disposition contraire, prend effet à
compter de la date à laquelle elle est rendue. R.R.O. 1990, Règl. 194, règle 59.01.
Modification
59.06 (1) L’ordonnance qui comporte une erreur d’écriture découlant d’un lapsus ou d’une
omission ou qui doit être modifiée relativement à un point sur lequel le tribunal n’a pas statué
peut être modifiée par voie de motion dans l’instance. R.R.O. 1990, Règl. 194, par. 59.06 (1).
Annulation ou modification d’une ordonnance
(2) Une partie peut demander, par voie de motion dans l’instance, selon le cas :
a) l’annulation ou la modification d’une ordonnance en raison d’une fraude ou de faits
survenus ou découverts après qu’elle a été rendue;
b) un sursis d’exécution d’une ordonnance;
c) l’exécution d’une ordonnance;
d) une mesure de redressement différente de celle qui a déjà été accordée. R.R.O. 1990,
Règl. 194, par. 59.06 (2).
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Securities Act, RSO 1990, c S5, s. 28, 138.1, 138.3, 138.8
Revocation or suspension of registration or imposition of terms and conditions
28. The Director may revoke or suspend the registration of a person or company or
impose terms or conditions of registration at any time during the period of registration of the
person or company if it appears to the Director,
(a) that the person or company is not suitable for registration or has failed to comply with
Ontario securities law; or
(b) that the registration is otherwise objectionable. 2009, c. 18, Sched. 26, s. 4.
Definitions
138.1 In this Part,
“compensation” means compensation received during the 12-month period immediately
preceding the day on which the misrepresentation was made or on which the failure to
make timely disclosure first occurred, together with the fair market value of all deferred
compensation including, without limitation, options, pension benefits and stock
appreciation rights, granted during the same period, valued as of the date that such
compensation is awarded; (“rémunération”)
“core document” means,
(a) a prospectus, a take-over bid circular, an issuer bid circular, a directors’ circular, a
notice of change or variation in respect of a take-over bid circular, issuer bid circular
or directors’ circular, a rights offering circular, management’s discussion and
analysis, an annual information form, an information circular, annual financial
statements and an interim financial report of the responsible issuer, where used in
relation to,
(i) a director of a responsible issuer who is not also an officer of the responsible
issuer,
(ii) an influential person, other than an officer of the responsible issuer or an
investment fund manager where the responsible issuer is an investment fund, or
(iii) a director or officer of an influential person who is not also an officer of the
responsible issuer, other than an officer of an investment fund manager,
(b) a prospectus, a take-over bid circular, an issuer bid circular, a directors’ circular, a
notice of change or variation in respect of a take-over bid circular, issuer bid circular
or directors’ circular, a rights offering circular, management’s discussion and
analysis, an annual information form, an information circular, annual financial
statements, an interim financial report and a material change report required by
subsection 75 (2) or the regulations of the responsible issuer, where used in relation
to,
(i) a responsible issuer or an officer of the responsible issuer,
(ii) an investment fund manager, where the responsible issuer is an investment
fund, or
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(iii) an officer of an investment fund manager, where the responsible issuer is an
investment fund, or
(c) such other documents as may be prescribed by regulation for the purposes of this
definition; (“document essentiel”)
“document” means any written communication, including a communication prepared and
transmitted only in electronic form,
(a) that is required to be filed with the Commission, or
(b) that is not required to be filed with the Commission and,
(i) that is filed with the Commission,
(ii) that is filed or required to be filed with a government or an agency of a
government under applicable securities or corporate law or with any exchange
or quotation and trade reporting system under its by-laws, rules or regulations,
or
(iii) that is any other communication the content of which would reasonably be
expected to affect the market price or value of a security of the responsible
issuer; (“document”)
“expert” means a person or company whose profession gives authority to a statement made in
a professional capacity by the person or company, including, without limitation, an
accountant, actuary, appraiser, auditor, engineer, financial analyst, geologist or lawyer,
but not including a designated credit rating organization; (“expert”)
“failure to make timely disclosure” means a failure to disclose a material change in the
manner and at the time required under this Act or the regulations; (“non-respect des
obligations d’information occasionnelle”)
“influential person” means, in respect of a responsible issuer,
(a) a control person,
(b) a promoter,
(c) an insider who is not a director or officer of the responsible issuer, or
(d) an investment fund manager, if the responsible issuer is an investment fund;
(“personne influente”)
“issuer’s security” means a security of a responsible issuer and includes a security,
(a) the market price or value of which, or payment obligations under which, are derived
from or based on a security of the responsible issuer, and
(b) which is created by a person or company on behalf of the responsible issuer or is
guaranteed by the responsible issuer; (“valeur mobilière d’un émetteur”)
“liability limit” means,
(a) in the case of a responsible issuer, the greater of,
(i) 5 per cent of its market capitalization (as such term is defined in the regulations),
and
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(ii) $1 million,
(b) in the case of a director or officer of a responsible issuer, the greater of,
(i) $25,000, and
(ii) 50 per cent of the aggregate of the director’s or officer’s compensation from the
responsible issuer and its affiliates,
(c) in the case of an influential person who is not an individual, the greater of,
(i) 5 per cent of its market capitalization (as defined in the regulations), and
(ii) $1 million,
(d) in the case of an influential person who is an individual, the greater of,
(i) $25,000, and
(ii) 50 per cent of the aggregate of the influential person’s compensation from the
responsible issuer and its affiliates,
(e) in the case of a director or officer of an influential person, the greater of,
(i) $25,000, and
(ii) 50 per cent of the aggregate of the director’s or officer’s compensation from the
influential person and its affiliates,
(f) in the case of an expert, the greater of,
(i) $1 million, and
(ii) the revenue that the expert and the affiliates of the expert have earned from the
responsible issuer and its affiliates during the 12 months preceding the
misrepresentation, and
(g) in the case of each person who made a public oral statement, other than an individual
referred to in clause (d), (e) or (f), the greater of,
(i) $25,000, and
(ii) 50 per cent of the aggregate of the person’s compensation from the responsible
issuer and its affiliates; (“limite de responsabilité”)
“management’s discussion and analysis” means the section of an annual information form,
annual report or other document that contains management’s discussion and analysis of
the financial condition and financial performance of a responsible issuer as required under
Ontario securities law; (“rapport de gestion”)
“public oral statement” means an oral statement made in circumstances in which a reasonable
person would believe that information contained in the statement will become generally
disclosed; (“déclaration orale publique”)
“release” means, with respect to information or a document, to file with the Commission or
any other securities regulatory authority in Canada or an exchange or to otherwise make
available to the public; (“publication”, “publier”)
“responsible issuer” means,
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(a) a reporting issuer, or
(b) any other issuer with a real and substantial connection to Ontario, any securities of
which are publicly traded; (“émetteur responsable”)
“trading day” means a day during which the principal market (as defined in the regulations)
for the security is open for trading. (“jour de Bourse”) 2002, c. 22, s. 185; 2004, c. 31,
Sched. 34, s. 10; 2006, c. 33, Sched. Z.5, s. 14; 2007, c. 7, Sched. 38, s. 11; 2010, c. 1,
Sched. 26, s. 6; 2010, c. 26, Sched. 18, s. 38.
Application
138.2 This Part does not apply to,
(a) the purchase of a security offered by a prospectus during the period of distribution;
(b) the acquisition of an issuer’s security pursuant to a distribution that is exempt from
section 53 or 62, except as may be prescribed by regulation;
(c) the acquisition or disposition of an issuer’s security in connection with or pursuant to
a take-over bid or issuer bid, except as may be prescribed by regulation; or
(d) such other transactions or class of transactions as may be prescribed by regulation.
2002, c. 22, s. 185; 2004, c. 31, Sched. 34, s. 11.
Liability for secondary market disclosure
Documents released by responsible issuer
138.3 (1) Where a responsible issuer or a person or company with actual, implied or apparent
authority to act on behalf of a responsible issuer releases a document that contains a
misrepresentation, a person or company who acquires or disposes of the issuer’s security during
the period between the time when the document was released and the time when the
misrepresentation contained in the document was publicly corrected has, without regard to
whether the person or company relied on the misrepresentation, a right of action for damages
against,
(a) the responsible issuer;
(b) each director of the responsible issuer at the time the document was released;
(c) each officer of the responsible issuer who authorized, permitted or acquiesced in the
release of the document;
(d) each influential person, and each director and officer of an influential person, who
knowingly influenced,
(i) the responsible issuer or any person or company acting on behalf of the
responsible issuer to release the document, or
(ii) a director or officer of the responsible issuer to authorize, permit or acquiesce in
the release of the document; and
(e) each expert where,
(i) the misrepresentation is also contained in a report, statement or opinion made by
the expert,
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(ii) the document includes, summarizes or quotes from the report, statement or
opinion of the expert, and
(iii) if the document was released by a person or company other than the expert, the
expert consented in writing to the use of the report, statement or opinion in the
document. 2002, c. 22, s. 185; 2004, c. 31, Sched. 34, s. 12 (1, 2).
Public oral statements by responsible issuer
(2) Where a person with actual, implied or apparent authority to speak on behalf of a responsible
issuer makes a public oral statement that relates to the business or affairs of the responsible
issuer and that contains a misrepresentation, a person or company who acquires or disposes of
the issuer’s security during the period between the time when the public oral statement was made
and the time when the misrepresentation contained in the public oral statement was publicly
corrected has, without regard to whether the person or company relied on the misrepresentation,
a right of action for damages against,
(b) the person who made the public oral statement;
(c) each director and officer of the responsible issuer who authorized, permitted or
acquiesced in the making of the public oral statement;
(d) each influential person, and each director and officer of the influential person, who
(i) the person who made the public oral statement to make the public oral statement,
or
the making of the public oral statement; and
(e) each expert where,
the expert,
(ii) the person making the public oral statement includes, summarizes or quotes
from the report, statement or opinion of the expert, and
(iii) if the public oral statement was made by a person other than the expert, the
expert consented in writing to the use of the report, statement or opinion in the
public oral statement. 2002, c. 22, s. 185; 2004, c. 31, Sched. 34, s. 12 (3).
Influential persons
(3) Where an influential person or a person or company with actual, implied or apparent
authority to act or speak on behalf of the influential person releases a document or makes a
public oral statement that relates to a responsible issuer and that contains a misrepresentation, a
person or company who acquires or disposes of the issuer’s security during the period between
the time when the document was released or the public oral statement was made and the time
when the misrepresentation contained in the document or public oral statement was publicly
corrected has, without regard to whether the person or company relied on the misrepresentation,
a right of action for damages against,
- 65 -
(a) the responsible issuer, if a director or officer of the responsible issuer, or where the
responsible issuer is an investment fund, the investment fund manager, authorized,
permitted or acquiesced in the release of the document or the making of the public
oral statement;
(b) the person who made the public oral statement;
(c) each director and officer of the responsible issuer who authorized, permitted or
acquiesced in the release of the document or the making of the public oral statement;
(d) the influential person;
(e) each director and officer of the influential person who authorized, permitted or
acquiesced in the release of the document or the making of the public oral statement;
and
(f) each expert where,
the expert,
(ii) the document or public oral statement includes, summarizes or quotes from the
report, statement or opinion of the expert, and
(iii) if the document was released or the public oral statement was made by a person
other than the expert, the expert consented in writing to the use of the report,
statement or opinion in the document or public oral statement. 2002, c. 22,
s. 185; 2004, c. 31, Sched. 34, s. 12 (4).
Failure to make timely disclosure
(4) Where a responsible issuer fails to make a timely disclosure, a person or company who
acquires or disposes of the issuer’s security between the time when the material change was
required to be disclosed in the manner required under this Act or the regulations and the
subsequent disclosure of the material change has, without regard to whether the person or
company relied on the responsible issuer having complied with its disclosure requirements, a
right of action for damages against,
(b) each director and officer of the responsible issuer who authorized, permitted or
acquiesced in the failure to make timely disclosure; and
(c) each influential person, and each director and officer of an influential person, who
(i) the responsible issuer or any person or company acting on behalf of the
responsible issuer in the failure to make timely disclosure, or
the failure to make timely disclosure. 2002, c. 22, s. 185; 2004, c. 31,
Sched. 34, s. 12 (5); 2006, c. 33, Sched. Z.5, s. 15.
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Multiple roles
(5) In an action under this section, a person who is a director or officer of an influential person is
not liable in that capacity if the person is liable as a director or officer of the responsible issuer.
2002, c. 22, s. 185; 2004, c. 31, Sched. 34, s. 12 (6).
Multiple misrepresentations
(6) In an action under this section,
(a) multiple misrepresentations having common subject matter or content may, in the
discretion of the court, be treated as a single misrepresentation; and
(b) multiple instances of failure to make timely disclosure of a material change or
material changes concerning common subject matter may, in the discretion of the
court, be treated as a single failure to make timely disclosure. 2002, c. 22, s. 185;
2004, c. 31, Sched. 34, s. 12 (7).
No implied or actual authority
(7) In an action under subsection (2) or (3), if the person who made the public oral statement had
apparent authority, but not implied or actual authority, to speak on behalf of the issuer, no other
person is liable with respect to any of the responsible issuer’s securities that were acquired or
disposed of before that other person became, or should reasonably have become, aware of the
misrepresentation. 2004, c. 31, Sched. 34, s. 12 (8).
Leave to proceed
138.8 (1) No action may be commenced under section 138.3 without leave of the court granted
upon motion with notice to each defendant. The court shall grant leave only where it is satisfied
that,
(a) the action is being brought in good faith; and
(b) there is a reasonable possibility that the action will be resolved at trial in favour of the
plaintiff. 2002, c. 22, s. 185; 2004, c. 31, Sched. 34, s. 17.
Same
(2) Upon an application under this section, the plaintiff and each defendant shall serve and file
one or more affidavits setting forth the material facts upon which each intends to rely. 2002,
c. 22, s. 185.
Same
(3) The maker of such an affidavit may be examined on it in accordance with the rules of court.
2002, c. 22, s. 185.
Copies to be sent to the Commission
(4) A copy of the application for leave to proceed and any affidavits and factums filed with the
court shall be sent to the Commission when filed. 2009, c. 34, Sched. S, s. 6 (1).
Requirement to provide notice
(5) The plaintiff shall provide the Commission with notice in writing of the date on which the
application for leave is scheduled to proceed, at the same time such notice is given to each
defendant. 2009, c. 34, Sched. S, s. 6 (2).
- 67 -
Same, appeal of leave decision
(6) If any party appeals the decision of the court with respect to whether leave to commence an
action under section 138.3 is granted,
(a) each party to the appeal shall provide a copy of its factum to the Commission when it
is filed; and
(b) the appellant shall provide the Commission with notice in writing of the date on
which the appeal is scheduled to be heard, at the same time such notice is given to
each respondent. 2009, c. 34, Sched. S, s. 6 (2); 2010, c. 1, Sched. 26, s. 7.
- 68 -
Loi sur les valeurs mobilières, L.R.O. 1990, CHAPITRE S.5, ss. 28, 138.1, 138.3, 138.8
Révocation ou suspension de l’inscription ou imposition de conditions
28. Le directeur peut, au cours de la période où une personne ou une compagnie est inscrite,
révoquer l’inscription, la suspendre ou l’assortir de conditions s’il lui semble, selon le cas :
a) qu’elle ne possède pas les qualités requises pour être inscrite ou qu’elle ne s’est pas
conformée au droit ontarien des valeurs mobilières;
b) que l’inscription prête par ailleurs à objection. 2009, chap. 18, annexe 26, art. 4.
Définitions
138.1 Les définitions qui suivent s’appliquent à la présente partie.
«déclaration orale publique» Déclaration orale faite dans des circonstances dans lesquelles une
personne raisonnable croirait que les renseignements qu’elle contient seront divulgués au
public. («public oral statement»)
«document» Toute communication écrite, y compris une communication préparée et transmise
uniquement sous forme électronique, qui, selon le cas :
a) doit être déposée auprès de la Commission;
b) n’est pas obligée d’être déposée auprès de la Commission, mais qui :
(i) soit est déposée auprès de la Commission,
(ii) soit est ou doit être déposée auprès d’un gouvernement ou d’un de ses
organismes en application du droit des valeurs mobilières ou des sociétés
pertinent ou auprès de toute bourse ou de tout système de cotation et de
déclaration des opérations en application de ses règlements administratifs, de
ses règles ou de ses règlements,
(iii) soit a un contenu dont il serait raisonnable de s’attendre à ce qu’il ait une
incidence sur le cours ou la valeur d’une valeur mobilière de l’émetteur
responsable. («document»)
«document essentiel» S’entend des documents suivants :
a) un prospectus, une circulaire d’offre d’achat visant à la mainmise, une circulaire
d’offre de l’émetteur, une circulaire des administrateurs, un avis de changement ou
de modification à l’égard de l’une ou l’autre de ces circulaires, une circulaire
d’émission de droits, un rapport de gestion, une notice annuelle, une circulaire
d’information, ainsi que les états financiers annuels et un rapport financier
intermédiaire de l’émetteur responsable, relativement à :
(i) soit un administrateur d’un émetteur responsable qui n’est pas également un
dirigeant de celui-ci,
(ii) soit une personne influente, à l’exclusion d’un dirigeant de l’émetteur
responsable ou encore d’un gestionnaire de fonds d’investissement, si
l’émetteur responsable est un fonds d’investissement,
- 69 -
(iii) soit un administrateur ou un dirigeant d’une personne influente qui n’est pas
également un dirigeant de l’émetteur responsable, à l’exclusion d’un dirigeant
d’un gestionnaire de fonds d’investissement;
b) un prospectus, une circulaire d’offre d’achat visant à la mainmise, une circulaire
d’offre de l’émetteur, une circulaire des administrateurs, un avis de changement ou
de modification de l’une ou l’autre de ces circulaires, une circulaire d’émission de
droits, un rapport de gestion, une notice annuelle, une circulaire d’information, les
états financiers annuels et un rapport financier intermédiaire de l’émetteur
responsable ainsi que les rapports sur des changements importants que l’obligent à
déposer le paragraphe 75 (2) ou les règlements, relativement à :
(i) soit un émetteur responsable ou un dirigeant de celui-ci,
(ii) soit un gestionnaire de fonds d’investissement, si l’émetteur responsable est un
tel fonds,
(iii) soit un dirigeant d’un gestionnaire de fonds d’investissement, si l’émetteur
responsable est un tel fonds;
c) les autres documents que prescrivent les règlements pour l’application de la présente
définition. («core document»)
«émetteur responsable» S’entend :
a) soit d’un émetteur assujetti;
b) soit de tout autre émetteur ayant des liens réels et importants avec l’Ontario et dont les
valeurs mobilières sont cotées en bourse. («responsible issuer»)
«expert» Personne ou compagnie dont la profession donne foi à une déclaration qu’elle fait à
titre professionnel, notamment un comptable, un actuaire, un évaluateur, un vérificateur,
un ingénieur, un analyste financier, un géologue ou un avocat, à l’exclusion toutefois d’un
organisme de notation désigné. («expert»)
«jour de bourse» Jour où le marché principal, au sens des règlements, des valeurs mobilières
est ouvert aux opérations. («trading day»)
«limite de responsabilité» S’entend des limites suivantes :
a) dans le cas d’un émetteur responsable, le plus élevé de ce qui suit :
(i) 5 pour cent de sa capitalisation boursière, au sens des règlements,
(ii) 1 000 000 $;
b) dans le cas d’un administrateur ou d’un dirigeant d’un émetteur responsable, le plus
élevé de ce qui suit :
(i) 25 000 $,
(ii) 50 pour cent de la rémunération totale que lui verse l’émetteur responsable et
les membres du même groupe;
c) dans le cas d’une personne influente qui n’est pas un particulier, le plus élevé de ce qui
suit :
- 70 -
(i) 5 pour cent de sa capitalisation boursière, au sens des règlements,
(ii) 1 000 000 $;
d) dans le cas d’une personne influente qui est un particulier, le plus élevé de ce qui suit :
(i) 25 000 $,
les membres du même groupe;
e) dans le cas d’un administrateur ou dirigeant d’une personne influente, le plus élevé de
ce qui suit :
(i) 25 000 $,
(ii) 50 pour cent de la rémunération totale que lui verse la personne influente et les
membres du même groupe;
f) dans le cas d’un expert, le plus élevé de ce qui suit :
(i) 1 000 000 $,
(ii) les sommes que lui-même et les membres du même groupe ont reçues à titre de
recettes de l’émetteur responsable et des membres du même groupe que ce
dernier pendant les 12 mois précédant la présentation inexacte des faits;
g) dans le cas de chaque personne qui a fait une déclaration orale publique et qui n’est pas
un particulier visé à l’alinéa d), e) ou f), le plus élevé de ce qui suit :
(i) 25 000 $,
les membres du même groupe. («liability limit»)
«non-respect des obligations d’information occasionnelle» Omission de divulguer un
changement important de la manière et aux moments qu’exigent la présente loi ou les
règlements. («failure to make timely disclosure»)
«personne influente» Relativement à un émetteur responsable, s’entend, selon le cas :
a) d’une personne qui a le contrôle;
b) d’un promoteur;
c) d’un initié qui n’est pas un administrateur ou un dirigeant de l’émetteur responsable;
d) d’un gestionnaire de fonds d’investissement, si l’émetteur responsable est un fonds
d’investissement. («influential person»)
«publication» Relativement à un renseignement ou à un document, s’entend de son dépôt
auprès de la Commission, d’un autre organisme de réglementation des valeurs mobilières
au Canada ou d’une bourse ou de sa mise à la disposition du public d’une autre façon. Le
verbe «publier» a un sens correspondant. («release»)
«rapport de gestion» La partie d’une notice annuelle, d’un rapport annuel ou d’un autre
document qui contient une analyse par la direction de la situation financière et de la
- 71 -
performance financière de l’émetteur responsable comme l’exige le droit ontarien des
valeurs mobilières. («management’s discussion and analysis»)
«rémunération» Le total de la rémunération reçue pendant la période de 12 mois précédant
immédiatement le jour où la présentation inexacte des faits a été faite ou celui où le nonrespect des obligations d’information occasionnelle s’est produit pour la première fois,
d’une part, et de la juste valeur marchande de toutes les rémunérations différées,
notamment les options, les prestations de retraite et les droits à la plus-value des actions,
accordées pendant la même période, évaluée à la date où une telle rémunération est
versée, d’autre part. («compensation»)
«valeur mobilière d’un émetteur» Valeur mobilière d’un émetteur responsable, y compris une
valeur mobilière :
a) d’une part, dont le cours ou la valeur ou les obligations de paiement qui lui sont
rattachées découlent d’une valeur mobilière de l’émetteur responsable ou sont fondés
sur elle;
b) d’autre part, que crée une personne ou une compagnie au nom de l’émetteur
responsable ou que ce dernier garantit. («issuer’s security») 2002, chap. 22, art. 185;
2004, chap. 31, annexe 34, art. 10; 2006, chap. 33, annexe Z.5, art. 14; 2007, chap. 7,
annexe 38, art. 11; 2010, chap. 1, annexe 26, art. 6; 2010, chap. 26, annexe 18, art.
38.
Documents publiés par l’émetteur responsable
138.3 (1) Lorsqu’un émetteur responsable ou une personne ou compagnie qui a le pouvoir
effectif, implicite ou apparent d’agir au nom d’un tel émetteur publie un document qui contient
une présentation inexacte des faits, la personne ou la compagnie qui acquiert ou aliène une valeur
mobilière de l’émetteur pendant la période comprise entre le moment où a été publié le document
et celui où a été publiquement rectifiée la présentation inexacte des faits qu’il contient a, que la
personne ou la compagnie se soit ou non fiée à celle-ci, le droit d’intenter une action en
dommages-intérêts contre les personnes suivantes :
a) l’émetteur responsable;
b) tout administrateur de l’émetteur responsable en poste au moment de la publication du
document;
c) tout dirigeant de l’émetteur responsable qui a autorisé ou permis la publication du
document ou qui y a acquiescé;
d) toute personne influente et tout administrateur ou dirigeant d’une telle personne qui ont
sciemment incité :
(i) soit l’émetteur responsable ou toute personne ou compagnie agissant en son nom
à publier le document,
(ii) soit un administrateur ou un dirigeant de l’émetteur responsable à autoriser ou à
permettre la publication du document ou à y acquiescer;
e) tout expert, si les conditions suivantes sont réunies :
- 72 -
(i) la présentation inexacte des faits figure également dans un rapport, une
déclaration ou une opinion de l’expert,
(ii) le document reproduit, résume ou cite des passages du rapport, de la déclaration
ou de l’opinion de l’expert,
(iii) si le document a été publié par une personne ou une compagnie autre que
l’expert, celui-ci a consenti par écrit à l’utilisation du rapport, de la déclaration
ou de l’opinion dans le document. 2002, chap. 22, art. 185; 2004, chap. 31,
annexe 34, par. 12 (1) et (2).
Déclarations orales publiques de l’émetteur responsable
(2) Lorsqu’une personne qui a le pouvoir effectif, implicite ou apparent de parler au nom d’un
émetteur responsable fait une déclaration orale publique qui a trait aux activités commerciales ou
aux affaires de celui-ci et qui contient une présentation inexacte des faits, la personne ou la
compagnie qui acquiert ou aliène une valeur mobilière de l’émetteur pendant la période comprise
entre le moment où a été faite la déclaration et celui où a été publiquement rectifiée la
présentation inexacte des faits qu’elle contient a, que la personne ou la compagnie se soit ou non
fiée à celle-ci, le droit d’intenter une action en dommages-intérêts contre les personnes
suivantes :
b) l’auteur de la déclaration;
c) tout administrateur ou dirigeant de l’émetteur responsable qui a autorisé ou permis que
soit faite la déclaration ou qui y a acquiescé;
d) toute personne influente et tout administrateur ou dirigeant d’une telle personne qui ont
sciemment incité :
(i) soit l’auteur de la déclaration à faire celle-ci,
permettre que soit faite la déclaration ou à y acquiescer;
e) tout expert, si les conditions suivantes sont réunies :
(ii) l’auteur de la déclaration reproduit, résume ou cite des passages du rapport, de
la déclaration ou de l’opinion de l’expert,
(iii) si la déclaration a été faite par une personne autre que l’expert, celui-ci a
consenti par écrit à l’utilisation du rapport, de la déclaration ou de l’opinion
dans la déclaration orale publique. 2002, chap. 22, art. 185; 2004, chap. 31,
annexe 34, par. 12 (3).
Personnes influentes
(3) Lorsqu’une personne influente ou une personne ou compagnie qui a le pouvoir effectif,
implicite ou apparent d’agir ou de parler au nom d’une telle personne publie un document ou fait
une déclaration orale publique qui a trait à un émetteur responsable et qui contient une
présentation inexacte des faits, la personne ou la compagnie qui acquiert ou aliène une valeur
- 73 -
mobilière de l’émetteur pendant la période comprise entre le moment où a été publié le document
ou celui où a été faite la déclaration et celui où a été publiquement rectifiée la présentation
inexacte des faits que contient le document ou la déclaration a, que la personne ou la compagnie
se soit ou non fiée à celle-ci, le droit d’intenter une action en dommages-intérêts contre les
personnes suivantes :
a) l’émetteur responsable, si un de ses administrateurs ou dirigeants ou, dans le cas d’un
fonds d’investissement, le gestionnaire du fonds d’investissement a autorisé ou
permis que soit publié le document ou que soit faite la déclaration ou qu’il y a
acquiescé;
b) l’auteur de la déclaration;
c) tout administrateur ou dirigeant de l’émetteur responsable qui a autorisé ou permis que
soit publié le document ou que soit faite la déclaration ou qui y a acquiescé;
d) la personne influente;
e) tout administrateur ou dirigeant de la personne influente qui a autorisé ou permis que
soit publié le document ou que soit faite la déclaration ou qui y a acquiescé;
f) tout expert, si les conditions suivantes sont réunies :
(ii) le document ou la déclaration reproduit, résume ou cite des passages du rapport,
de la déclaration ou de l’opinion de l’expert,
(iii) si le document a été publié ou que la déclaration a été faite par une personne
autre que l’expert, celui-ci a consenti par écrit à l’utilisation du rapport, de la
déclaration ou de l’opinion dans le document ou la déclaration. 2002, chap. 22,
art. 185; 2004, chap. 31, annexe 34, par. 12 (4).
Non-respect des obligations d’information occasionnelle
(4) Lorsqu’un émetteur responsable ne respecte pas les obligations d’information occasionnelle,
la personne ou la compagnie qui acquiert ou aliène une valeur mobilière de l’émetteur pendant la
période comprise entre le moment où devait être divulgué le changement important de la manière
exigée en application de la présente loi ou des règlements et celui où il l’a été a, que la personne
ou la compagnie se soit ou non fiée à ce que l’émetteur responsable ait respecté ses obligations
d’information, le droit d’intenter une action en dommages-intérêts contre les personnes
suivantes :
b) tout administrateur ou dirigeant de l’émetteur responsable qui a autorisé ou permis le
non-respect des obligations d’information occasionnelle ou qui y a acquiescé;
c) toute personne influente et tout administrateur ou dirigeant d’une telle personne qui ont
sciemment incité :
(i) soit l’émetteur responsable ou toute personne ou compagnie agissant en son nom
à ne pas respecter les obligations d’information occasionnelle,
- 74 -
permettre le non-respect des obligations d’information occasionnelle ou à y
acquiescer. 2002, chap. 22, art. 185; 2004, chap. 31, annexe 34, par. 12 (5);
2006, chap. 33, annexe Z.5, art. 15.
Rôles multiples
(5) Dans une action intentée en vertu du présent article, la personne qui est administrateur ou
dirigeant d’une personne influente n’encourt aucune responsabilité à ce titre si elle en encourt
une à titre d’administrateur ou de dirigeant de l’émetteur responsable. 2002, chap. 22, art. 185;
2004, chap. 31, annexe 34, par. 12 (6).
Multiples présentations inexactes des faits
(6) Dans une action intentée en vertu du présent article :
a) d’une part, de multiples présentations inexactes des faits dont le sujet ou le contenu est
le même peuvent, à la discrétion du tribunal, être traitées comme une seule
présentation inexacte des faits;
b) d’autre part, de multiples cas de non-respect des obligations d’information
occasionnelle relativement à un ou à plusieurs changements importants dont le sujet
est le même peuvent, à la discrétion du tribunal, être traités comme un seul cas de
non-respect. 2002, chap. 22, art. 185; 2004, chap. 31, annexe 34, par. 12 (7).
Absence d’un pouvoir implicite ou effectif
(7) Dans une action intentée en vertu du paragraphe (2) ou (3), si l’auteur de la déclaration orale
publique avait le pouvoir apparent, mais non le pouvoir implicite ou effectif, de parler au nom de
l’émetteur responsable, aucune autre personne n’encourt une responsabilité à l’égard des valeurs
mobilières de celui-ci qu’elle a acquises ou qu’elle a aliénées avant qu’elle ne prenne ou qu’elle
ne devrait raisonnablement avoir pris connaissance de la présentation inexacte des faits.
Autorisation de poursuivre
138.8 (1) Une action ne peut être intentée en vertu de l’article 138.3 qu’avec l’autorisation du
tribunal, accordée sur motion avec préavis à chaque défendeur, et que si le tribunal est convaincu
de ce qui suit :
a) l’action est intentée de bonne foi;
b) il est raisonnablement possible que l’action soit réglée au moment du procès en faveur
du demandeur. 2002, chap. 22, art. 185; 2004, chap. 31, annexe 34, art. 17.
Idem
(2) Sur requête présentée en vertu du présent article, le demandeur et chaque défendeur
signifient et déposent un ou plusieurs affidavits énonçant les faits importants sur lesquels ils ont
chacun l’intention de se fonder. 2002, chap. 22, art. 185.
Idem
(3) L’auteur d’un tel affidavit peut être interrogé au sujet de celui-ci conformément aux règles
de pratique. 2002, chap. 22, art. 185.
- 75 -
Copies envoyées à la Commission
(4) Les copies de la requête en autorisation de poursuivre et des affidavits et mémoires déposés
auprès du tribunal sont envoyées à la Commission au moment du dépôt. 2009, chap. 34, annexe
S, par. 6 (1).

Respondents Marvin-Neil-Silver-et-al

Transcription

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