Evaluation of the Education Benefit Program of PNAFN in

Transcription

République Tunisienne
Ministère des Affaires
Sociales
Evaluation of the Education Benefit
Program of PNAFN in Tunisia
VISA du Conseil National de la Statistique
N° 002/2014
EVALUATION REPORT
(01/08/2013 – 06/30/2014)
Version 2.0
30 September 2014
Jan Ostermann, PhD, Duke University, USA
Martine Bellanger, PhD, EHESP Paris, France
Volker Grzimek, PhD, Berea College, USA
Andrew Weinhold, MPH, Duke University, USA
Amy Hobbie, MPH, Duke University, USA
Hosni Nemsia, ISTIS, Tunisie
Tom Ricketts, PhD, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, USA
Nancy Hill, PhD, Harvard University, USA
1
Evaluation of Tunisia’s Education Benefit Program of PNAFN – FINAL REPORT
Table of contents
List of abbreviations ......................................................................................................................... 4
Introduction ...................................................................................................................................... 5
Executive summary ........................................................................................................................... 6
1.
Context ..................................................................................................................................... 8
2.
Introduction to the evaluation ................................................................................................ 10
3.
Consistency with UNEG norms for evaluations ....................................................................... 12
4.
Overview of methods ............................................................................................................. 13
5.
Development of a poverty model ........................................................................................... 14
Summary ....................................................................................................................................... 14
Conceptual approach .................................................................................................................... 14
Model estimation .......................................................................................................................... 15
6.
Sampling and data collection .................................................................................................. 20
Sampling of beneficiary households.............................................................................................. 20
Selection of comparison households ............................................................................................. 20
Key informant interviews .............................................................................................................. 21
Surveys with local decision makers ............................................................................................... 22
Household surveys ......................................................................................................................... 23
Focused review of other education-focused transfer programs ................................................... 24
7.
Results - Part I: Relevance ....................................................................................................... 25
Relevance of a program to increase school enrollment and retention ......................................... 25
Relevance of a program that targets poor and vulnerable households........................................ 27
Summary of relevance ................................................................................................................... 30
8.
Results - Part II: Implementation ............................................................................................ 31
Program administration and implementation .............................................................................. 31
Program eligibility and (non) conditionality of benefits................................................................ 32
Oversight and information flow .................................................................................................... 32
Capacity of local social welfare offices ......................................................................................... 35
Comparisons with other education-focused transfer programs ................................................... 36
Summary of program implementation ......................................................................................... 38
9.
Results - Part III: Targeting ...................................................................................................... 39
The concepts of inclusion and exclusion error............................................................................... 39
2
Program coverage ......................................................................................................................... 40
Assessment of program targeting by key informants ................................................................... 41
Local decision makers’ perception of program targeting ............................................................. 42
Characteristics of children in beneficiary households ................................................................... 46
Economic wellbeing of beneficiary and non-beneficiary households............................................ 51
Other characteristics of beneficiary and non-beneficiary households .......................................... 57
Estimates of exclusion error .......................................................................................................... 59
Targeting experiences from other cash transfer programs .......................................................... 60
Summary of program targeting .................................................................................................... 61
10. Results - Part IV: Impact .......................................................................................................... 62
Expectations of program impact among key informants.............................................................. 62
Social workers’ perception of program impact ............................................................................. 65
Recommendations by social workers to increase program impact .............................................. 66
Impact on household budgets and education expenses ............................................................... 70
School attendance and school performance ................................................................................. 74
School progression, grade repetition, and drop-out ..................................................................... 75
Estimates of impact from other cash transfer programs .............................................................. 80
Summary of program impact ........................................................................................................ 80
11. Recommendations .................................................................................................................. 81
Immediate recommendations ....................................................................................................... 81
Short-term recommendations ....................................................................................................... 83
Medium-term recommendations .................................................................................................. 84
12. Works cited ............................................................................................................................. 88
13. Appendix................................................................................................................................. 95
3
List of abbreviations
AMG
BCS
BEPP
BTS
CCT
CRES
DGPS
EPI
ISTIS
MAS
MICS
MOE
P1 … P9
PNAFN
PPAS
S1 … S9
TDR
UNESCO
UNICEF
UTSS
WHO
Assistance Médicale Gratuite
Budget and Consumption Survey
Bureau des Etudes, de la Planification et de la Programmation
Back to school education benefit (annual)
Conditional cash transfer program
Centre de Recherches et des Etudes Sociales
Direction Générale de la Promotion Sociale
Expanded Programme on Immunization
Institut de Sondage et de Traitement de l’Information Statistique
Ministry of Social Affairs
Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey
Ministry of Education
Primary School, levels 1-9
Programme d'aide aux familles nécessiteuses
PNAFN programme d’allocations scolaires (monthly)
Secondary School, levels 1-4
Termes de Référence de la mission
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
United Nations Children’s Fund
Union Tunisienne de la Solidarité Sociale
World Health Organization
4
Introduction
The objective of this report is to summarize the findings of an evaluation of a program that provides
a monthly financial assistance for the education of children in families that are benefiting from
Tunisia’s Programme National d'Aide aux Familles Nécessiteuses (PNAFN; National Program of
Assistance to Needy Families). The objective of the evaluation was to assess the targeting of
PNAFN’s Programme d’Allocations Scolaires (PPAS; PNAFN’s education benefit program), to estimate
its impact on households’ investment in children’s education and children’s educational outcomes,
and to provide practical recommendations for enhancing the program’s effectiveness.
The evaluation was conducted between August 2013 and June 2014 by Duke University (North
Carolina, USA) in collaboration with the Institut de Sondage et de Traitement de l’Information
Statistique (ISTIS; Tunis, Tunisia) and partners at the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill,
Berea College, and Harvard University in the United States and the École des Hautes Études en Santé
Publique (EHESP) in France.
This report summarizes the evaluation activities, the methodological approach, and the findings and
recommendations resulting from the program’s evaluation.
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
Section 1 provides a summary of the PPAS program and describes the context of the
evaluation.
Section 2 describes the logic model of the program and provides a general overview of the
evaluation strategy.
Sections 3 and 4 summarize the methodological approach, including the development of a
poverty model that was used to describe the geographic variation in poverty and
characterize the relative economic wellbeing of beneficiary households.
Sections 5 and 6 describe the sampling strategy for household surveys with beneficiary
households and matched non-beneficiary comparison households and the types of data
collected from key informants, households, and local decision makers.
Sections 7, 8, 9 and 10 describe the results of the evaluation with respect to the program’s
relevance, implementation, targeting, and impact.
Section 11 provides recommendations to improve the program’s effectiveness.
Appendices include the Terms of Reference, the questionnaires used to collect the data, and
a comparison of key characteristics of the PPAS program with other education-focused
transfer programs.
This evaluation’s findings and recommendations will enable policy makers in Tunisia to enhance the
program’s implementation, targeting and effectiveness, in order to improve the educational
outcomes of children in poor families.
5
Executive summary
In 2007 the Ministry of Social Affairs (MAS) launched a program intended to aid children from poor
and disadvantaged families to receive schooling. The program provides a monthly financial
assistance for the education of children in families that are benefiting from Tunisia’s Programme
National d'Aide aux Familles Nécessiteuses (PNAFN). The PNAFN Programme d’Allocations Scolaires
(PPAS) currently covers nearly 80,000 children from more than 40,000 families. This report
summarizes the findings of an evaluation of the program’s relevance, targeting and impact, and
provides recommendations to increase the program’s effectiveness.
The multi-faceted, mixed-methods evaluation approach combined information from in-depth
interviews with key informants about the program, household surveys with beneficiary households
and comparison households that do not benefit from the program, surveys with local decision
makers who determine households’ eligibility for the program, and administrative program data,
census data, and nationally representative sample survey data. Below we summarize the results of
the evaluation, and recommendations to strengthen the program and improve its effectiveness.
Relevance: National survey data showing high rates of grade repetition and drop-out before the
completion of a full course of primary schooling suggest a need for programs to improving
educational performance and attainment of children in Tunisia. Substantial variation in educational
outcomes suggests that efforts should be targeted at poorer families, those with other
vulnerabilities such as disabled household members, those with lower education among the heads
of households, and families residing in rural areas. Great variation in educational outcomes between
rural and urban areas and by age and grade level, gender differences in drop-out rates at older ages,
and sub-optimal educational outcomes even among children from middle-income families suggest
that multiple different approaches may be needed to broadly improve grade progression and reduce
rates of school drop-out.
Implementation: The implementation of PPAS on the basis of the administrative infrastructure of the
PNAFN program suggests low marginal cost of program administration, but also limits to the
program’s scale, scope, and efficacy. Specifically, an exclusive focus on PNAFN households limits the
program’s coverage rate, and exclude children in non-PNAFN households who may also be at risk of
drop-out. Vague eligibility criteria and a lack of conditionality of PPAS benefits limit the program’s
evaluability as well as efficacy. The evaluation identified substantial regional variation in program
implementation, capacity constraints at local offices, and limited communication of local and
national decision makers with other stakeholders in children’s education.
Targeting: The lack of explicit eligibility criteria that determine a household’s eligibility for PPAS
precludes a precise estimate of inclusion and exclusion errors. At present, the only consistently
implemented eligibility restriction is a household’s eligibility for PNAFN. On average, households
benefiting from PPAS tend to be poorer than the national average and poorer than neighboring
households who do not benefit from financial assistance for their children’s schooling; however,
there is substantial geographic variation in the extent to which the program appears to target the
poorest populations, and in the extent to which beneficiaries of monthly benefits differ from
households who receive only annual back-to-school benefits. Broadly defined eligibility criteria such
as having a child age 6-24 in the household imply inclusion errors among beneficiary households of
6
10.5%, while the program’s limit of 3 beneficiary children per household results in an exclusion error
of 23.6% of the program budget. If program eligibility were limited to children enrolled in school and
continued benefit receipt were dependent on children’s continued enrollment in school, an
estimated 23.4% of beneficiary households would not be eligible for the program, whereas the
exclusion error decreases to 10.6% of the budget. Any additional restrictions imposed on households
or children to be eligibility for PPAS benefits are associated with a substantial increase in the
estimates of inclusion error and a concurrent decrease in exclusion error. The program’s objectives
need to be clarified in order to optimize program targeting.
Impact: Interviews with program stakeholders indicated little or no expectations of a measurable
impact of PPAS on educational outcomes. While analyses of household survey data generally
support this expectation, there is some indication of positive program effects on households’
investment in education and potentially on children’s educational outcomes. In simple comparisons,
beneficiary households indicated lower educational expenditures and poorer educational outcomes
than non-beneficiary comparison households. This finding is consistent with the program’s focus on
poorer and disadvantaged households, who face greater barriers to education and educational
achievement. However, detailed econometric analyses indicate that, after controlling for
households’ economic characteristics, attitudes toward child education, education of the head of
household, geographic variation, and other characteristics, beneficiary households actually spent
more money on education for each child that is currently enrolled in school, and there were trends
towards a positive effect of program benefits on educational outcomes. However, the effect was
small, occurred only during the year in which the household first received benefits, and did not
continue over time; instead there are indications that children in beneficiary households continue to
fare worse than children in other households, with respect to educational expenditures and
educational outcomes.
On the basis of the findings from the key informant interviews, surveys with local social welfare
offices, household surveys with beneficiary households and comparison households, and a review of
literature on other education-focused cash transfer programs we derived a variety of immediate,
short-term, and medium-term recommendations to strengthen the program’s implementation and
effectiveness. Among the recommendations are the following:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Clarification of the program's objectives, especially the disambiguation between educational
outcomes vs. poverty reduction
Sensitization of beneficiary households to the objectives of the program
Clarification of eligibility criteria, and regular re-certification and enforcement of eligibility
Greater standardization of information flow and oversight, and closer collaboration between
MAS and the Ministry of Education (MOE), including the development of a joint information
system to track eligibility and educational performance
Re-evaluation of the program's relationship with other national programs, and of the
program’s exclusive focus on children in PNAFN households
Alignment of program benefits with the objectives, including potentially varying benefit
amounts for different levels of schooling, by geographic region, or by household need
Alignment of program resources with the objectives, to ensure that the scale and scope of
the program are supported by adequate resources and capacity at local social welfare offices
Orientation on successfully implemented cash transfer programs in other countries
7
1.
Context
PNAFN was initiated in 1987, and now covers approximately 235,000 families across Tunisia. The
program provides 110 dinars per month to each eligible family (1 Tunisian Dinar equals
approximately 0.60 US Dollars and 0.45 Euro). In order to be eligible for PNAFN, a family must
provide proof that the head of the household is unable to work due to old age or disability. Eligibility
is assessed by social specialists based in delegation-level offices of the Direction Regionale de la
Promotion Sociale (Regional Directorate for Social Promotion). Local and regional committees
review applicant profiles and hand down final decisions on PNAFN enrollment. Household eligibility
is reviewed every two years, while beneficiaries are required to visit their local office annually for
official renewal of benefits. Families that receive PNAFN support also automatically receive an
Assistance Médicale Gratuite (AMG-II; Free Medical Care) card that entitles them to subsidized
health care at public health centers.
In addition to PNAFN, in 2007 the Ministry of Social Affairs (MAS) launched a program intended to
aid children from PNAFN families to receive schooling in order to improve children’s educational
outcomes and reduce drop-out. The program provides monthly monetary transfers worth 10 dinars
per child enrolled in school for up to three children per family. This transfer is the program around
which the current evaluation is centered. In this evaluation report, the program is referred to as the
PNAFN Programme d’Allocations Scolaires (PPAS). This acronym was created by the evaluation
team for the sake of clarity within this report.
PPAS has grown steadily in recent years. In 2011, benefits were paid for 60,365 children from
31,593 PNAFN households; as of December 2013 the program reached 79,613 children from 41,482
PNAFN households. Aside from photo verification and proof of PNAFN enrollment, each child must
have proof of previous grade completion or enrollment in a new grade level when first applying for
PPAS. Thereafter, updated documents or the child’s birth certificate may be used to renew
eligibility. On paper, PPAS eligibility criteria include school enrollment; in practice, the option to use
a birth certificate for re-certification makes the program more of a means-tested transfer program,
since continued school enrollment or attendance are neither tracked nor required.
The monthly education benefit complements another existing aid program that focuses on enabling
needy students from PNAFN families and other low-income households to purchase school supplies.
In this evaluation report we refer to this program as the back-to-school (BTS) program. Prior to
2011, BTS provided in-kind support, whereas since 2011, the BTS assistance has taken the form of
direct monetary transfers in the amount of 30 Dinars per child enrolled in school, also for up to three
children per family. Rather than monthly, this benefit is allocated at the beginning of the school
year, when one-time expenses for school supplies tend to be high. This benefit also applies to
university students, who receive 100 Dinars per year. For the 2013-2014 school year, 309,805 of
these transfers were distributed, representing a total budget of almost 9.3 million Dinars. The
application period for this back-to-school aid includes July and August, a period during which time
each child must provide proof of enrollment and proof of need (PNAFN enrollment or a home visit
from a social specialist). According to these eligibility criteria, every child that qualifies for the
monthly cash transfer should also qualify for the back-to-school transfer. Other interventions are
also implemented nationally by ministerial structures to assist needy students with in-kind aid such
as the national campaign to collect books, free transportation in rural areas, school lunch assistance,
8
and others. While the PPAS evaluation was conducted in the context of these other programs and
interventions, it was not designed to separately estimate the relative efficacy of those interventions
on school drop-out.
As part of the cooperation program between the Ministry of Social Affairs and UNICEF for the period
of 2012-2013, in the area of "Strengthening the system of social protection of children in Tunisia,"
the Ministry of Social Affairs (Bureau of Studies, Planning and Programming) commissioned a study
to evaluate the impact of PNAFN’s education benefit program, and to make recommendations for
enhancing the effectiveness of this program.
This study was conducted by Duke University (North Carolina, USA) with technical and financial
support from UNICEF. It was overseen by a steering committee consisting of the following members:
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
Bureau des Etudes, de la Planification et de la Programmation (BEPP; Mr Hafedh Bouktif,
Mme Maha Mezrioui et Mr Hassen Chedly)
Direction Générale de la Promotion Sociale (DGPS; Mr Mohamed Zribi et Mme Najet Dkhil)
Centre de Recherches et des Etudes Sociales (CRES; Mr. Nidhal Ben Cheikh et Mr. Adnan
Lassoued)
Ministère de l’Education (Mr Hedi Saidi et Mme Ahlem Bouchiba)
Ministère de la Femme et de la Famille (Mr Sami Yahiaoui)
Institut National de la Statistique (Mr Taha Khsib)
Bureau UNICEF Tunis (Mr Georges Gonzales et Mr Samir Bouzekri)
In May 2013, two Duke faculty members met with the steering committee and other informants to
assess the evaluability of the PPAS program, outlined an evaluation plan, and submitted an
evaluation proposal. A multi-disciplinary team, including local and international partners,
implemented the PPAS evaluation between August 2013 and June 2014. The evaluation team
consisted of the following members:
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
Jan Ostermann, PhD, Duke University, North Carolina, USA
Martine Bellanger, PhD, EHESP Paris, France
Andrew Weinhold, MPH, Duke University, North Carolina, USA
Amy Hobbie, MPH, Duke University, North Carolina, USA
Volker Grzimek, PhD, Berea College, Kentucky, USA
Hosni Nemsia, MS, ISTIS, Tunis, Tunisia
Tom Ricketts, PhD, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill, North Carolina, USA
Nancy Hill, PhD, Harvard University, Massachusetts, USA
This version of the report incorporates detailed comments and requests for revisions from a peer
review committee appointed by the steering committee for the PPAS evaluation. At Duke University,
the evaluation was conducted with support from the Center for Health Policy and Inequalities
(CHPIR) and the Duke Global Health Institute (DGHI).
9
2.
Introduction to the evaluation
To guide the evaluation, we developed a logic model for the program that describes the situation
that the program is intended to address, the inputs and outputs of the program, and the expected
results. The logic model is shown in Figure 1. The evaluation addressed each component of this
logic model.
Figure 1. Program logic model
The assessment of program relevance addresses the issue of whether there is a need for a program
to improve the educational outcomes of children from poor households. Specifically, it answers
questions such as:
• When do children drop out of school?
• What is the relationship between poverty and educational outcomes?
The assessment of inputs describes the implementation of the program and assesses its targeting. It
answers questions such as:
• Who benefits from the program but should not?
• Who should benefit from the program, but does not benefit?
The assessment of program outputs assesses questions such as:
• What is the impact of the education benefit on households’ budgets?
• How does the benefit amount compare to the cost of children’s education?
Finally, the assessment of results describes whether the program has an impact on children's
education. It answers questions such as:
• Are children in beneficiary households more likely to go to school?
• Are children in beneficiary households more likely to drop out of school?
10
To answer these questions, we implemented a multi-faceted, mixed-methods evaluation approach.
As shown in Figure 2, the evaluation approach combined information from:
•
•
•
•
•
•
in-depth interviews with key informants about the program,
household surveys with beneficiary households and comparison households that do not
benefit from the program,
surveys with local decision makers who determine households’ eligibility for the program,
administrative program data,
census data, and
nationally representative sample survey data.
We also conducted a focused literature review of other education-related cash transfer programs.
Figure 2. Combining a variety of data sources to assess program relevance, targeting and impact
Enquêtes
beneficiaires
Enquêtes nonbeneficiaires
Recensement
Enquête sur le
budget et
consommation
Pertinence
Ciblage
Impact
Entretiens
avec
décideurs
locaux
Entretiens
avec parties
prenantes
MICS,
Enquête
l’emploi
PNAFN
données
11
3.
Consistency with UNEG norms for evaluations
Every effort was made to ensure that the evaluation conforms to the guidelines from the United
Nations Evaluation Group (UNEG): “Norms for Evaluation in the UN System.”1
Consistent with the UNEG norms, the evaluation took on a broad focus, including examining
relevance (“Are we doing the right thing”), considering effectiveness (“Are we doing it right”), and
identifying options for improvement (“Are there better ways of achieving the results?”).
The evaluation team was made up of independent professionals with multidisciplinary expertise and
evaluation experience, without vested interest in the results of the evaluation. The evaluation was
impartially planned, and implemented with methodological rigor. A mixed methods approach,
including qualitative and quantitative data collection and primary and secondary data analyses of a
variety of sources, was used for the evaluation. Divergent views among interested parties are
reflected in the evaluation report, and every effort was made to present evidence, findings,
conclusions, and recommendations in a balanced way.
The evaluation process was inclusive, involving relevant government agencies and other
stakeholders; it used transparent methodological approaches; and was conducted in a way that
fostered local evaluation capacity building. A pre-evaluation mission was used to meet key
stakeholders, to assess evaluability, and to plan the design of the evaluation. A capacity building
workshop was held at the end of the evaluation to share evaluation methods and findings with
stakeholders, policy makers and other interested parties.
To ensure sensitivity to beliefs, manners and customs of the social and cultural environments in
which the evaluation was conducted, an established local survey company implemented household
surveys and surveys with local decision makers. Approval for the evaluation methodology and
implementation was obtained from Tunisia’s National Statistics Council. To protect participant
identities, all data were anonymized prior to analysis. De-identified data are available for secondary
analysis to key stakeholders.
Adequate financial and logistical resources were provided to allow for the evaluation to operate
effectively and with due independence, and regular communication with an evaluation steering
committee, representatives of relevant government agencies, and other stakeholders ensured an
enabling environment for the evaluation. The final report accounts for comprehensive feedback
received on an interim report from a peer-review committee.
12
4.
Overview of methods
Figure 3 provides an overview of the methods employed in this evaluation; detailed methods are
described in the following sections.
First, we used nationally representative survey data from the 2011/12 Multiple Indicator Cluster
Survey (MICS) and the 2010 Budget and Consumption Survey (BCS) to assess the relevance for a
program to improve the educational outcomes and reduce dropout of children in poor families in
Tunisia.
Next, we used Tunisia’s 2010 Budget and Consumption Survey (BCS) data to develop a poverty
model that would allow us to estimate the relative economic wellbeing of households, as well as
geographic variation in the distribution of poverty. The BCS was designed only to provide regional
estimates; however, the evaluation required estimates of poverty at lower levels of geographic
aggregation. In Tunisia, regions are split into gouvernorates, which are composed of delegations. To
develop poverty estimates at the gouvernorate and delegation levels we also incorporated data
from the 2004 Census, the 2005 BCS, and the 2010 Employment survey.
Third, we combined delegation-level estimates of poverty with administrative data from PPAS to
randomly select 50 delegations for household surveys. To develop the survey instruments we used
information from key informant interviews and existing household surveys in Tunisia, and reviewed
the literature on education-focused transfer programs. We then conducted household surveys with
20 beneficiary households and 20 non-beneficiary households in each delegation. In addition we
conducted surveys with local decision makers in each delegation.
Finally, we combined the data collected from administrative and survey data, key informant
interviews, beneficiary and non-beneficiary household surveys, and surveys with local decision
makers to evaluate program implementation, targeting, and impact.
Figure 3. Overview of methods
13
5.
Development of a poverty model
The evaluation of program targeting depends on an accurate characterization of households’
economic status. At the individual household level, only an accurate definition of each household as
either “poor” or “not poor” would allow for a precise determination of inclusion error among
beneficiary households and exclusion error among non-beneficiary households. However,
predictions at the individual household level are subject to error. Therefore, instead of attempting
to classify each household as either poor or not poor, this evaluation created a continuous measure
of households’ relative economic wellbeing. The continuous measure allows for better comparisons
of the economic wellbeing of beneficiary and non-beneficiary households, relative to each other and
relative to other households. It also allows for the comparison of the relative economic wellbeing
across different geographic areas.
Summary
Consistent with Tunisia’s official method for establishing poverty thresholds, this evaluation used a
household’s “estimated per-capita annual expenditures, minus extraordinary expenses” as a
measure of economic status. However, unlike the official method, this evaluation does not classify
individual households as either poor or not poor. Poverty is not an easily-defined construct, and any
individual-level binary poverty estimate is likely to misclassify a substantial number of poor
households as not poor, and vice versa. Instead, the approach employed here retained the full
variability in economic wellbeing in national survey data and among households who participated in
this evaluation. We used national survey data to develop a poverty model that describes the
associations between various observable household characteristics and annual per-capita
expenditures. The poverty model was subsequently applied to any data that did not contain
expenditure data, to estimate each household’s economic wellbeing relative to other households.
The approach implies that this evaluation relies on a ranking of households rather than an absolute
determination of poverty, with the advantage that the measure is not likely to be sensitive to
changes in the official definition of poverty, or other changes, such as inflation for staple goods, that
may have similar effects on all households’ expenditures.
Conceptual approach
The goal was to use nationally representative “reference data” to develop a robust statistical model
that describes a household’s economic wellbeing as a function of a variety of characteristics. The
poverty model is subsequently applied to “target data” that do not contain a poverty measure but
contain other characteristics that
Figure 4. Conceptual approach for the poverty model
allow for an estimate of each
household’s economic status. To
accomplish this goal, we developed
a model of annual per-capita
expenditures that included only
variables that are available in both
the reference and target data. The
approach is illustrated in Figure 4.
14
Model estimation
We used household data from Tunisia’s 2010 Budget and Consumption Survey (BCS) and both
variance-weighted least squares (VWLS) and quantile regression (QR) methods to estimate the
association between households’ annual per-capita expenditures, minus extraordinary expenses, as
the dependent variable and a variety of household assets, household composition, and other
household characteristics as covariates. The public release version of the 2010 BCS data, provided by
Tunisia’s National Institute of Statistics, contained the variables necessary for this analysis.
The following variables entered the poverty model:
• Presence of household assets
o Radio recorder, television, satellite dish, bookshelf, refrigerator, freezer, stove,
washer, dishwasher, air conditioner, computer, internet, fixed-line phone, mobile
phone, car, motorcycle, bicycle
• Physical characteristics of the household
o Type of house (villa/apartment/studio vs. all others)
o Number of rooms (1, 2, 3, 4, or 5+ rooms)
o Connection to water (Sonede) and natural gas
o Flush toilet
o Bathroom with hot water
o Kitchen with sink
o Electric heating
• Household composition
o Number of children ages 0-17 (1, 2, 3, 4, 5+)
o Number of young adults ages 18-24 (0, 1, 2, 3+)
o Number of adults ages 25-59 (0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5+)
o Number of adults ages 60+(0, 1, 2+)
• Characteristics of household members
o Number of adults ages 18-59 unable to work
o Average # of months worked, per person
o Head of family has secondary education (yes/no)
• Indicator variables for each region
The dependent variable was transformed using the natural log. Separate models were estimated for
urban (communal) and rural (non-communal) areas. We compared the distribution of actual
expenditures with the distributions of predicted values of annual per-capita expenditures obtained
from simultaneous-quantile regressions centered on the 15th, 25th, and 50th percentiles, as well as
VWLS models (see Figure 5). In VWLS models, residuals from ordinary least squares regression
models were used as weights in subsequently estimated variance-weighted regression models with
the same specification. Household weights included with the public release dataset were used to
ensure the national representativeness of estimates. The resulting distributions suggest that
quantile regressions tend to predict a greater concentration of households at the lower end of the
expenditure distribution, i.e., the curves are shifted to the left and tend to over-estimate poverty
rates. By contrast, VWLS tends to predict a lower concentration of households at the lower end of
the expenditure distribution, i.e., the curve is shifted to the right and tends to underestimate
poverty rates. Note that the 50th percentile curve and the VWLS curve overlap in Figure 5.
15
Figure 5. Comparison of variance-weighted least squares and quantile regression models
Non-communal
.001
.0015
Communal
0
.0005
15th percentile
25th percentile
50th percentile
VWLS
Actual expenses
0
2000
4000
6000
0
Predicted annual per-capita expenditures, in Dinars
2000
4000
6000
After comparing the distributions of estimated per-capita expenditures from each model with the
actual per-capita expenditures we decided on the use of VWLS estimates as a conservative (low)
estimate of poverty (blue line in Figure 6), whereas quantile regressions centered on the 25th
percentile of expenditures were used as a loose (high) estimate of poverty (black line in Figure 6).
Analyses that used poverty as an explanatory variable were repeated with both measures of poverty
to ensure that the estimated conclusions are robust to the specification of the poverty model.
Figure 6. Bracketing poverty estimates with variance-weighted least squares and quantile
regressions
Non-communal
.0006
.0008
.001
Communal
0
.0002
.0004
Predictions: Quantile regression
Predictions: VWLS regression
Actual per-capita expenditures
0
2000
4000
6000
0
2000
4000
6000
Parameter estimates from the poverty models are shown in Tables 1: separately for rural and urban
areas and for VWLS (Table 1a), and quantile regressions (Table 1b). The parameter estimates
describe the estimated contribution of each covariate to households’ per-capita expenditures. Green
shading indicates a positive contribution whereas red shading indicates a negative contribution.
Darker shading indicates a greater contribution. An individual parameter estimate β could be
interpreted as follows: (eβ-1)*100 is the estimated percentage difference in annual per-capita
consumption for a one-unit difference in the explanatory variable.
16
Table 1a. Parameter estimates from VWLS poverty models
Communal
β
p
Non-communal
β
p
Assets
Radio recorder
Television
Satellite dish
Bookshelf
Refrigerator
Freezer
Stove
Washer
Dishwasher
Air-conditioner
Computer
Internet
Phone_Mobile
Car
Motorcycle
Bicycle
Housing
Villa/apartment/studio
2 rooms
3 rooms
4 rooms
5+ rooms
Connected to Sonede
Connected to natural gas
Flush toilet
Bathroom with hot water
Kitchen with sink
Electric heating
# of children, ages 0-17
1
2
3
4
5+
# of young adults, ages 18-24
1
2
3+
# of adults, ages 25-59
1
2
3
4+
# of adults, ages 60+
1
2+
# of adults ages 18-59 who are unable to work
# of months worked, per person (average)
Head of family has secondary education
Region
Nord Est
Nord Ouest
Centre Est
Centre Ouest
Sud Est
Sud Ouest
0.070
0.061
0.051
0.075
0.146
0.114
0.041
0.123
0.180
0.125
0.101
0.089
0.152
0.166
0.077
0.043
0.055
0.058
0.130
0.207
0.234
0.089
0.095
0.069
0.093
0.084
0.046
-0.126
-0.294
-0.451
-0.613
-0.636
-0.045
-0.163
-0.247
-0.210
-0.356
-0.422
-0.557
-0.082
-0.173
-0.051
0.022
0.070
-0.103
-0.172
0.003
-0.174
-0.072
-0.185
0.069
0.065
0.030
0.107
0.139
0.033
0.087
0.098
0.200
0.094
0.075
0.062
0.185
0.224
0.152
0.128
0.024
0.087
0.162
0.258
0.310
0.071
0.032
0.067
0.068
0.105
0.108
-0.135
-0.282
-0.473
-0.561
-0.725
-0.027
-0.097
-0.196
-0.146
-0.262
-0.281
-0.425
-0.123
-0.222
-0.090
0.023
0.027
0.006
-0.089
0.004
-0.063
-0.125
-0.217
N
R-square
4,753
0.6368
17
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
0.024
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
2,619
0.5460
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
0.004
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
0.041
<0.001
0.211
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
Table 1b. Parameter estimates from quantile regression poverty models (25th percentile)
Communal
β
p
Non-communal
β
p
Assets
Radio recorder
Television
Satellite dish
Bookshelf
Refrigerator
Freezer
Stove
Washer
Dishwasher
Air-conditioner
Computer
Internet
Phone_Mobile
Car
Motorcycle
Bicycle
Housing
2 rooms
3 rooms
4 rooms
5+ rooms
Connected to Sonede
Flush toilet
Kitchen with sink
Electric heating
# of children, ages 0-17
1
2
3
4
5+
# of young adults, ages 18-24
1
2
3+
# of adults, ages 25-59
1
2
3
4+
# of adults, ages 60+
1
2+
# of adults ages 18-59 who are unable to work
# of months worked, per person (average)
Region
Nord Est
Nord Ouest
Centre Est
Centre Ouest
Sud Est
Sud Ouest
0.059
0.050
0.070
0.095
0.129
0.064
0.035
0.119
0.132
0.114
0.091
0.074
0.156
0.186
0.095
0.068
0.036
0.061
0.147
0.201
0.261
0.083
0.086
0.097
0.076
0.099
0.058
-0.143
-0.295
-0.438
-0.630
-0.640
-0.050
-0.170
-0.236
-0.229
-0.348
-0.441
-0.602
-0.101
-0.186
-0.074
0.027
0.064
-0.118
-0.213
-0.005
-0.201
-0.066
-0.215
0.072
0.056
0.042
0.094
0.141
0.092
0.105
0.068
0.156
0.002
0.139
-0.075
0.217
0.225
0.135
0.165
0.077
0.088
0.169
0.273
0.291
0.028
0.026
0.051
0.087
0.122
0.023
-0.124
-0.267
-0.460
-0.574
-0.764
-0.001
-0.080
-0.200
-0.081
-0.164
-0.230
-0.348
-0.080
-0.215
-0.132
0.018
0.020
-0.045
-0.157
-0.096
-0.135
-0.188
-0.234
N
R-square
4,753
0.6341
18
<0.001
0.334
0.031
<0.001
0.005
0.033
0.054
<0.001
0.001
<0.001
<0.001
0.002
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
0.005
0.026
0.165
0.001
<0.001
<0.001
0.156
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
0.025
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
0.007
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
0.012
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
0.832
<0.001
0.012
<0.001
2,619
0.5391
0.008
0.284
0.175
0.048
<0.001
0.231
<0.001
0.030
0.150
0.969
0.029
0.536
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
0.003
0.031
0.038
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
0.290
0.748
0.166
0.100
<0.001
0.788
0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
<0.001
0.986
0.019
<0.001
0.301
0.035
0.005
<0.001
0.005
<0.001
0.002
0.003
0.542
0.475
0.013
0.137
0.032
0.007
0.001
Parameter estimates from the poverty models can be applied to any data that contains information
on the household characteristics included in the model; the result is an estimate of the household’s
relative economic wellbeing, as expressed by the estimated annual per-capita expenditures.
In combination with another poverty model using the 2005 Budget and Consumption Survey, the
2004 Census data, and data from the 2010 Employment survey, estimates from the poverty model
can also be used to describe gouvernorate-level and delegation-level variation in annual per-capita
expenditures. The distribution of this measure across the delegations in Tunisia was used a) to
ensure an adequate representation of poor delegations in the household sample and b) to analyze
the representativeness of sampling areas relative to the national distribution (details available upon
request). A sample map describing the geographic distribution of the 25th percentile of estimated
per-capita expenditures is shown in Figure 7. The different colors represent quintiles, i.e.,
delegations are split into 5 equally-sized groups according to their estimated economic wellbeing.
The darkest shade represents the 20% of delegations with the lowest annual per-capita
expenditures; the lightest shade represents the 20% of delegations with the highest annual percapita expenditures.
Figure 7. Geographic variation in estimated per-capita annual expenditures, by quintile among
delegations
19
6.
Sampling and data collection
Sampling of beneficiary households
The objective of the sampling approach was to enroll a nationally representative sample of
households who benefited from the monthly school allowance, and an appropriate comparison
sample to allow for an assessment of the program’s targeting and impact.
A stratified two-stage cluster-randomized sampling approach was used to select beneficiary
households. In the first stage, two delegations were randomly selected from each of Tunisia’s 24
gouvernorates, for a total of 48 delegations. Each delegation’s estimated poverty level was used as a
weight in the randomization,1 in order to maximize the evaluation’s chances of identifying program
impact, if present. To compensate for an under-representation of delegations with high population
density and delegations with high growth in program coverage, two additional delegations were
randomly selected from all delegations scoring at least 2 standard deviations above the mean on
either of these measures. In total, the evaluation included 19% of Tunisia’s 262 delegations.
In the second stage, 20 PPAS beneficiary households were randomly selected from each delegation.
In total, 1,000 beneficiary households were selected from all 11,848 PPAS beneficiary households
residing in these 50 delegations and received benefits from the program in July of 2013. The 1,000
sampled beneficiary households represent 8.4% of all beneficiary households in the 50 delegations.
In each delegation, 20 additional beneficiary households were randomly selected to compensate for
surveyors’ inability to locate households, non-response, or refusals to participate in the evaluation.
Selection of comparison households
For two reasons, a random sample of non-PPAS households was not considered an appropriate
comparison group. First, randomly selected households differ from beneficiary households with
respect to many observable and unobservable characteristics other than the monthly benefit. Some
of these differences (e.g., better parental
Figure 8. EPI selection of neighbors
education, higher income, distance to the
nearest school) may be correlated with
children’s schooling and could mask the
program’s impact. Second, a random
selection of households is unlikely to include
a sufficiently large number of poor and very
poor households to allow for an assessment
of exclusion error, i.e. households who should
receive benefits from the program but who
do not. In this evaluation, we took advantage
of the fact that households who are close to
Source: WHO (2008). Training for mid-level managers. Module 7:
The EPI coverage survey
each other have many characteristics in
common (e.g., distance to the nearest
1
The 25th percentile of estimated annual per-capita expenditures, minus extraordinary expenses, was used
to describe each delegation’s poverty level. Poverty was used as a weight in the randomization by
multiplying a random number for each delegation’ with the natural log its estimated poverty value.
Delegations with fewer than 50 beneficiary households were excluded from the randomization.
20
school), and are more likely than other households to share other characteristics (e.g., a neighbor of
a poor household is also more likely to be poor household.) For purposes of this evaluation,
therefore, a beneficiary household’s nearest neighbor was considered to be an appropriate
comparison household to analyze the program’s targeting and impact. Thus, after the enrollment of
a beneficiary household, the WHO’s Expanded Programme on Immunization (EPI) methodology was
used to sequentially approach each beneficiary household’s neighboring households until an eligible
comparison household was identified. EPI methodology defines the next household to be the
household whose front door is closest to the previously contacted household (Figure 8).
Two additional factors had to be considered in the selection of the comparison group. First, PPAS
benefits are intended for households with children who are enrolled in school. Therefore, only
neighboring households with at least one child ages 5-17 were eligible for the comparison group.
Second, the evaluation of the monthly benefit program was conducted in the context of the back-toschool (BTS) program, another, larger program which provided an annual financial benefit for
children’s schooling to large numbers of households throughout the country. Stakeholders in the
evaluation, when asked to prioritize the focus of the impact evaluation on either a) the impact of
monthly vs. annual benefits or b) the impact of monthly vs. no benefits, requested that both
objectives be met, if possible. Therefore, a comparison sample had to be selected that includes both
a sufficient number of comparison households who received annual benefits and a sufficient number
of comparison households who received no benefits. However, the number and distribution of
households with annual vs. no benefits was not known a priori. Therefore, the selection approach
was modified to ensure adequate enrollment of both types of households. The goal was to maximize
the statistical power for the analyses by splitting the comparison sample as equally as possible
between households who received no benefits and those who received annual benefits.
Within each delegation, an ‘alternating selection’ approach was implemented, i.e., after enrolling a
beneficiary household, surveyors alternated between the two types of comparison households. First,
up to three neighboring households with age-eligible children were sequentially contacted in order
to enroll a household who received no benefits. When two neighboring households did not meet this
criterion, the third household was eligible regardless of whether they received any benefits. Once
such a household was enrolled, the objective for the next comparison household was one who
received the annual (BTS) benefit. Again, when two neighboring households did not meet this
criterion, the third household was eligible regardless of whether they received the annual BTS
benefit. The process was repeated until 20 beneficiary and 20 comparison households were enrolled
in the delegation.
Key informant interviews
Ten key informant interviews were conducted in the fall of 2013 to document the opinions and
attitudes of high-level decision makers regarding the cash transfer for education program. The
individuals who participated played various roles in the administration and implementation of the
cash transfer program. Participants mostly represented offices within the Tunisian government,
including the Bureau for the Study of Planning and Programming, the Ministry of Social Affairs, the
Ministry of Women and Children, the Ministry of Education, the General Directorate of Social
Promotion, and one Regional Directorate of Social Promotion. Government-associated interviewees
21
represented two offices: an NGO involved in the program’s distribution logistics, and a social
research agency with expertise in studying the country’s social assistance system.
The research team compiled a purposive sample of available contacts from ministries and offices
relevant to this evaluation. Semi-structured qualitative interviews were conducted in French and
English with one designated respondent, but occasional input from other co-workers who were
present was also collected. The interviews aimed to outline the respondent’s role in the
administration of PPAS, as well as his/her opinions on the program’s objectives, administrative
structure, targeting and eligibility, implementation, impact, and room for improvement. The second
round of interviews additionally included respondents’ basic numeric rating of the program in terms
of targeting, scale, implementation, impact, monitoring and evaluation, efficiency, and the
appropriateness of transfer amounts. The Key Informant Survey instrument is included as
Appendix 2. The ideas and suggestions provided at this stage were used to begin gauging the
feasibility, appropriateness, and utility of potential changes to the cash transfer program.
Interviews were each thoroughly reviewed multiple times. After initial readings, the first round of
the analytical process consisted of adding investigator remarks (memos) on quotes, themes,
patterns, and observations. Next, codes were developed and applied across all transcripts to label
concepts of interest to the evaluation team and/or the interviewees. This allowed the team to
search for and compile response excerpts with specific reference to social workers, benefit timing, or
policy suggestions, to name a few. The analytic product of this was a narrative focusing mostly on
the program's relevance, targeting, impact, and potential steps for improvement. Illustrative quotes,
included in text boxes, have been added to relevant sections of this evaluation report.
Surveys with local decision makers
To assess the implementation of PPAS at the local level we conducted surveys with local decision
makers in each of the delegations in which household surveys were conducted. One or more staff
from the responsible delegation-level offices of the Direction Regionale de la Promotion Sociale
(hereafter referred to as “social workers”) were asked questions that covered the following
domains:
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
Staffing and resources, including the number of personnel, their education, computer
literacy, and time allocation between in-office and out-of-office activities
Staff ratings of office resources, familiarity with the education benefit program, and
effectiveness in meeting the needs of the population
Outreach activities and interactions with other organizations
Perceived needs for the school benefit program and eligibility determination
Challenges and barriers faced on the job
Perceived effectiveness of the program
Suggestions for improvement
The full local office survey is included in Appendix 3. In total, 48 surveys were returned, one per
delegation, with one or more local office staff jointly responding to these questions. Data were
analyzed descriptively; results are presented alongside the results from the key informant interviews
and the surveys with beneficiary and non-beneficiary households, in the implementation, targeting,
and impact sections of this evaluation.
22
Household surveys
Household surveys with beneficiary and non-beneficiary households covered a wide variety of
domains. These domains are summarized in Figure 9. Questionnaires captured the composition of
and socio-economic status of households and the characteristics of household members, as well as
elements of program implementation, targeting, and impact. Specific sections included:
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
o
Economic status and living conditions
Household composition
Characteristics of all household members, including employment status and disability
Characteristics of children
Detailed education history of all children including school enrollment, grade progression,
grade repetition, drop-out
Current school attendance and performance
Household expenses on children’s education and other household expenses
Household support, including PNAFN, AMG-2, and financial and in-kind support for schooling
Knowledge, attitudes and experiences with PNAFN and the education benefit program
Parental attitudes towards child education
The full household questionnaire is included in Appendix 4. In total, 1986 households participated
in the assessment, including 994 beneficiary households and 992 neighboring households.
Figure 9. Conceptual schema of the household questionnaire
23
Focused review of other education-focused transfer programs
To place the structure, targeting and impact estimates of PPAS in the context of experiences from
other countries, we conducted a focused literature review of national-level education-focused cash
transfer programs. The objective was to assess various characteristics of other cash transfer
programs with educational components and draw comparisons to the program in Tunisia. The two
main sets of search terms were: 1) (cash transfer) AND (education OR school) and 2) (cash transfer)
AND nation* AND poverty. These terms were entered in the online databases at PAIS International,
Columbia International Affairs Online, Web of Science, PubMed, SocIndex, PopLine, Sociological
Abstracts, EconLit, Political Science Complete, Scopus, and Social Care Online, returning a total of
501 unique articles and reports.
Further narrowing occurred based on predetermined exclusion criteria, omitting entries that:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
were published before 2009
were written in a language other than English
focused on the United States, United Kingdom, or Australia
described old-age, disability, pension, or in-kind aid programs
described studies or programs conducted at the sub-regional level
investigated biomedical topics or physical development as the only outcomes
mentioned cash transfer as a recommendation only, or
focused on different topics (i.e. farming, ATMs, and crime)
Supplemental searches returned relevant documents via Google Scholar, the World Bank, Oxford
Policy Management, and the Overseas Development Institute, among others.
Of the resulting list of 261 total documents, 118 referred to specific cash transfer programs and
contributed to the generation of Appendix 5.2-119 The remaining entries from the literature search
that covered other topics of possible interest (i.e. conditional cash transfers in general, effects on
household dynamics, macroeconomic contextual factors, etc.) were kept for further reference in this
report and for further inquiries from stakeholders. It is worth noting that the literature search did
not return any documents pertaining to Tunisia’s educationally targeted cash transfer program. This
may be in part due to the language restriction, but it still underscores the need for further study and
visibility of this particular program.
An effort was made to provide the most accurate and up-to-date information on each of these cash
transfer programs. Still, it should be noted that governments often modify transfer amounts and
conditions based on the economy and feedback from ongoing evaluations. Appendix 5 represents
the most recent available information at the time of this report’s publication. In cases where
discrepancies arose between sources, the research team used their discretion to either include all
findings or to select the most recent information available. When literature published between
2009 and the present did not exist or did not contain needed details about a program, information
was gleaned from the World Bank’s online database of cash transfer programs 120. This country-level
information draws mainly from Fiszbein and Schady’s 2009 World Bank research report, "Conditional
Cash Transfers: Reducing Present and Future Poverty" 121.
24
7.
Results - Part I: Relevance
In this section we describe the relevance of a program to support the education of children in poor
and needy families. We use data from the 2011/12 Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey to analyze
school performance and rates of drop-out among children from poor and non-poor families, and
among children in households facing other vulnerabilities.
Relevance of a program to increase school enrollment and retention
The United Nations’ second Millennium Development Goal is to achieve universal primary education.
The specific target is to “ensure that, by 2015, children everywhere, boys and girls alike, will be
able to complete a full course of primary schooling.” Progress toward this goal is assessed by three
indicators:
•
•
•
2.1 Net enrolment ratio in primary education
2.2 Proportion of pupils starting grade 1 who reach the last grade of primary education
2.3 Literacy rate of 15-24 year-olds, women and men
Tunisia has made dramatic progress with respect to school enrollment over the past few decades,
with rates of people who did not attend school steadily declining (Figure 10). According to the World
Bank and the UNESCO Institute for Statistics, Tunisia’s net enrolment ratio in primary education has
met or exceeded 99% each year since 2008.2
Figure 10. Highest level of schooling completed in 2011/2012, by year of birth
100%
Highest education completed
None
80%
Primaire
Preparatoire
Higher
60%
40%
20%
0%
1960
1964
1968
1972
1976
1980
1984
1988
1992
1996
2000
2004
Year of birth
However, youth literacy among 15 to 24 year olds was estimated at only 97% in 2010; 3 and 2008
estimates of primary school completion rates suggest that the country falls short on indicator #2.2.,
with only 95% of pupils who start grade 1 reaching the last grade of primary school.4
2
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.PRM.NENR
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.ADT.1524.LT.ZS
4
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SE.PRM.PRSL.ZS
3
25
The latter numbers may be optimistic: Analyses of data from the 2011/12 Multiple Indicator Cluster
Survey (MICS) suggest that a large proportion of Tunisian children do not complete a full course of
primary school (Figure 11). Among children ages 19-24, only 83% had completed primary school
grade 6; only 61% completed all 9 grades of primary school.
Figure 11. Education gap: Highest grade levels completed by 19-24 year olds, 2011/2012
% des enfants
100%
97%
97%
95%
94%
91%
83%
74%
80%
67%
61%
60%
40%
20%
0%
P1
P2
P3
P4
P5
P6
Niveau d’instruction accompli
P7
P8
P9
Source: MICS, Tunisia 2011/2012
There is a marked increase in the rate of children who are not in school starting around age 13
(Figure 12). In 2011/12, fewer than 2% of children below age 13 were not enrolled in school. By
contrast, for older children, the rate increased rapidly with every year of age, reaching 29% among
17 year olds, and 46% among 19 year olds.
Figure 12. Percent of children who are not in school, by child age
% des enfants en dehors de
l’école
100%
80%
60%
43% 46%
40%
12%
20%
18%
24% 29%
0%
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
Âge de l'enfant
Source: MICS, Tunisia, 2011/12
Increasing dropout rates are reflected in lower rates of grade progression. Grade progression
describes the extent to which a child moves from one grade level to the next grade level. In the ideal
scenario each child progresses one grade level with each year of age after he or she enters school.
Temporary or permanent drop-out reduces rates of grade progression by the number of years that a
child is not enrolled in school. The deviation from this ideal scenario is shown in Figure 13. On
average, by age 15, each child has “lost” nearly 0.8 grade levels relative to his/her age. On average,
the 9th grade level is completed only at age 17, at which time a child is 1.7 years behind in schooling.
26
Grade levels
Figure 13. Grade progression slows with age
Dropout is only one reason for the lack of
grade progression. Another reason is high
# of grade levels completed
12
rates of grade repetition among children. In
# of grade levels "lost"
fact, rates of grade repetition are much
10
higher than rates of drop-out. Figure 14
8
shows MICS data on rates of grade repetition
and drop-out between the school years of
6
2009/10 and 2010/11. Similar to drop-out,
rates of repeated grade levels increase over
4
2.5
time, and may be precursors to children
1.7
2
dropping out of school. As expected, the
0.8 1.3
number of children who stopped schooling
0
increased after the 6th grade of primary
7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
Child age
school, i.e., completion of enseignement
Source: MICS, Tunisia, 2011/12
primaire. However, many more children
repeated that grade level than dropped out.
Rates of grade repetition were largest in the 7th grade of primary school and remained high
thereafter. Rates of grade repetition started increasing at age 13, followed by an increase of dropout at age 14. Across all students enrolled in primary school grades 1 through 8 in school year
2009/10, 10.4% repeated the grade level in school year 2010/11 and 1.7% dropped out of school.
Figure 14. Drop-out and grade repetition between 2009/10 and 2010/11 by grade level and by age
Source: MICS, 2011-12
Relevance of a program that targets poor and vulnerable households
PPAS is targeted specifically at children in poor and needy families. Substantial prior evidence,
including data from Tunisia, suggests that children in poor and vulnerable households are more likely
to drop out of school. Thus, a program for poor and vulnerable households may in fact be
appropriate in order to reach those who are at particularly high risk of drop-out. To test this
assumption, we analyzed the extent to which educational outcomes in Tunisia vary with poverty.
27
The Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey assigns households to 5 wealth groups, allowing us to evaluate
the association between households’ economic wellbeing and rates of drop-out. In Figure 15 we
combined the two middle groups as well as the two richer groups of households. In 2011/12,
children in the poorest households were most likely to drop out of school, and drop out earlier,
while children from the wealthiest households were most likely to remain in school.
% of children estimated
to remain in school
Figure 15. Children from poor households are less likely to be in school
100%
90%
Le plus pauvre
Moyen
80%
Le plus riche
70%
P1
P2
P3
P4
P5
P6
P7
P8
P9
Similarly, children in poorer households exhibited higher rates of grade repetition (“redoublement”)
throughout primary school, suggesting poorer school performance (Figure 16), which is an important
precursor to drop-out. Importantly, elevated rates of repeated grade levels and drop-out in the
“middle group”, relative to the two richest groups of households, suggest that the dropout problem
in Tunisia is not limited to the poorest households
Figure 16. Children from poor households are more likely to repeat grade levels
% of children who
repeated the grade level
30%
20%
Le plus pauvre
Moyen
10%
Le plus riche
0%
P1
P2
P3
P4
P5
P6
P7
P8
P9
Several other factors are associated with poorer school performance and elevated rates of drop-out.
Figure 17 shows that the education level of the head of household is strongly associated with the
educational attainment of children and young adults. Among 19-25 year old participants in MICS,
those whose head of household only had a primary school education or less were much more likely
28
to drop out of school before preparatory school and secondary school than children whose heads of
household had secondary education or higher.
Figure 17. Highest grade level among 19-24 year olds, by education of the head of household
education des enfants (%)
100%
80%
Secondary +
60%
Preparatoire
Primaire
40%
None
20%
0%
Néant
Primaire
Secondaire
Supérieur
Education du chef de ménage
Similar results were obtained using data from the 2010 Budget and Consumption Survey, in which
each household’s per-person expenditures were used to classify the household as either poor or not
poor. At very young ages, children in poor households were less likely to be in school. Between the
ages of 6 and 10, rates of school enrollment were comparable between both groups. Differences in
the rates of dropout started emerging around age 11 and subsequently increased with age (Figure
18). Differences were also observed when comparing households with or without disabled adults;
households with disabled heads of household are an important focus of the PNAFN program.
Figure 18. Elevated rates of drop-out in poor households and those with disabled adults
Source: 2010 Enquête sur le budget et consommation
When comparing the drop-out rates of boys and girls, there appear to be no differences until around
age 15, after which more boys than girls started to drop out of school (Figure 19). We also observed
29
large geographic differences in drop-out rates, with much higher rates of drop-out in rural vs. urban
areas.
Figure 19. Rates of drop-out by gender and in rural vs. urban areas
Source: 2010 Enquête sur le budget et consommation
Summary of relevance
High rates of grade repetition and high rates of drop-out before the completion of a full course of
primary schooling suggest a need for programs to improve educational performance and
attainment of children in Tunisia. Analysis of variation in educational outcomes suggests that
efforts should be targeted at poorer families, those with other vulnerabilities such as disabled
household members, those with lower education among the heads of households, and families
residing in rural areas. Additional characteristics of households and children most likely to benefit
from such program are described in other sections of this report.
Great variation in educational outcomes between rural and urban areas and by age and grade level,
gender differences in drop-out rates at older ages, and sub-optimal educational outcomes even
among children from middle-income families suggest that multiple different approaches may be
needed to broadly improve grade progression and reduce rates of school drop-out. The
widespread prevalence and diverse causes of drop-out suggest that a program limited to PNAFN
beneficiary households, despite that program’s large beneficiary base and inclusion of many needy
families, may not be sufficient to create measurable, country-wide improvements in Tunisia’s
performance on key MDG indicators. For such improvements, the scale of PPAS must be expanded.
Finally, as described in other sections of the report, a substantial portion of program funds currently
appears to support children beyond compulsory primary school education. The scope of PPAS,
specifically its relative emphasis on complimentary, yet different, objectives such as poverty
reduction, reducing drop-out among children from poor families, maximizing education attainment
of individual children, and/or measurable improvements in MDG indicators that focus on primary
school education, will have to be clarified.
30
8.
Results - Part II: Implementation
This description of program implementation compiles information obtained from key informants,
program documents, discussions with program stakeholders and stakeholders in the evaluation,
interviews with local decision makers, and household beneficiary surveys. These data represent the
evaluators’ current understanding of the program’s administration and implementation.
Program administration and implementation
As a benefit program developed specifically for PNAFN households, PPAS is implemented on the
basis of the administrative infrastructure, including offices, information system, payment
mechanisms, and staff, of the PNAFN program.
Only families enrolled in PNAFN are eligible for PPAS benefits. Households that are new to PNAFN
must present a series of documents and follow several steps in order to start receiving benefits. The
documents include an enrollment request form, two pictures for identification, a photocopy of their
government-issued identification card, and a certificate of non-affiliation with the national social
security fund (CNSS). Once these forms are presented to their delegation’s local social welfare
office, a social worker conducts a home visit and checks that nobody in the household is enrolled in
either CNSS or CNRPS (for retirees). The application is then reviewed before a local commission
comprising a member of the local social welfare office, a representative of CNSS, and a social
worker. The regional commission—composed of the head of the local office, a gouvernorate-level
official, and one delegate each from CNSS and CNRPS—then reviews the application. Once
approved, applicants may pick up their free health care card (AMG-1), at which point their data are
saved electronically at the regional office and in paper form at the local office. PNAFN payments
begin approximately one month thereafter. PNAFN beneficiaries must visit the social welfare office
every year for a stamp on their free health care card. The card and their PNAFN status can be
revoked at this point if the social worker deems that the household is no longer eligible. The social
worker can then begin the process of adding a member of the waiting list to the PNAFN list.
If a family enrolled in PNAFN wants to benefit from the PPAS program they need to bring the
parents’ government-issued ID, their AMG-1 card, and the child’s school enrollment form.
Enrollment certificates (for the current school year) or completion certificates (for the prior school
year) may alternatively be used to document a child’s school enrollment. After eligibility is
determined, monthly payments of 10 Dinars per child are made for up to three children per
household and sent to the PNAFN beneficiary, on behalf of the target child(ren). There were reports
of benefits being extended to other children in the household, regardless of school enrollment, e.g.,
in the case of disability of other children.
Importantly, the program’s information system contains information on benefit amounts paid to
each household (identified by the government ID number of the PNAFN beneficiary); however, no
information was available indicating for which children these benefits were paid. Key informants
emphasized the potential for a new, shared database and unique identification system, which they
believe could address many of the issues currently faced by the program.
31
Program eligibility and (non) conditionality of benefits
There was no indication of clear guidelines or decision rules regarding eligibility restrictions or
benefit termination once a child drops out of school or graduates. Alternative age cut-offs were
mentioned as eligibility criteria for benefit receipt, ranging
from mandatory primary school age to age 24.
The lack of clearly specified program eligibility criteria and
the lack of clear decision rules for the continuation or
discontinuation of benefits represented particular
challenges for the evaluation of PPAS. The evaluation
sought to account for ambiguity in eligibility criteria and/or
enforcement by presenting alternative scenarios for the
estimation of inclusion and exclusion errors.
“If you don’t have crystal
clear eligibility criteria and
people are asking for
assistance, you don’t have
reasonable grounds to deny
them that assistance.”
We clarify that in this report the term eligibility refers to characteristics of an individual household
and/or child associated with participation in the PPAS program. The primary PPAS eligibility criterion
is the presence of a child of school-eligible age in a PNAFN household. To account for variation in
stated age eligibility across participants, a variety of different age ranges were analyzed. Because
the program’s stated focus was on reducing school dropout, and the (often not enforced)
requirement that parents demonstrate a child’s school enrollment
in order to start receiving benefits, children ever having attended
“It is a problem with
school was considered an additional eligibility criterion. In our
the eligibility
recommendations we suggest that eligibility criteria be enforced
criteria, rather than
(by verifying the presence of school-eligible and/or in-school
errors of inclusion.”
children in the household) as well as expanded (by dropping the
program’s exclusive focus on PNAFN households).
Conditionality of program benefits refers to a specific behavior or action that leads to continued
receipt of the program benefits. At present the program is implemented as an unconditional cash
transfer program. In this report we recommend that children’s continued school enrollment, and
potentially school attendance, should be considered as conditions for continued benefit receipt.
Oversight and information flow
Discussions with top-level key informants included many comments on the transfer program’s
administrative structure. The coordination of work between ministries and offices was commonly
seen as a key area for potential improvement. This would address current inefficiencies in
communication, information sharing, and monitoring and evaluation practices. Multiple complaints
indicated that communication regarding program changes
and issues was inadequate. Key informants explained that
“This program is not
communication typically took the form of memos
structured in an effective way
originating in the national office, and that these memos
as regards the circulation of
essentially represented the entire regulatory system. It
information either upward or
was also noted that government officials conducted
downward.”
internal monitoring and evaluation activities only in
reaction to issues or discrepancies as they arose.
32
According to several respondents, a more systematic and scheduled method of program oversight
would help to prevent issues from arising in the first place, while also providing more real-time
updates on the program’s performance and impact.
The same points arose from analyses of surveys with local social welfare offices. Offices reported
limited interactions with other stakeholders (Figure 20). Importantly, while nearly all respondents
reported annual or more frequent interactions with school administrators, only half of the offices
reported ever interacting with teachers, and fewer than half reported interacting with school
outreach workers or NGOs.
Figure 20. Limited interactions with other stakeholders in children’s education
Frequency of interactions with ...
Teachers
School outreach workers
School administrators
Regional decision makers
National decision makers
NGOs
Other social workers
Monthly
Quarterly
Annually
Never
There appears to be limited interaction of local offices with regional decision makers, with only half
of respondents reporting annual or more frequent interactions. Further, while nearly 90% of local
offices reported a visit from the central or regional
office during 2013, the reasons for these visits varied
“There should be a better
greatly across offices (Figure 21), suggesting lack of a
exchange of information that is
standardized protocol or inconsistent implementation
regular and systematic—not
of local capacity building and maintenance, quality
reactionary.”
control, and program standardization and oversight.
33
Figure 21. In 2013, was your office visited by officials from the central/regional office for any of
the following reasons? (% of offices responding affirmatively, multiple responses possible)
Training
22%
Compliance/quality control
40%
Program updates
32%
Data management and reporting
16%
Personnel issues
16%
Regular check-in
8%
Other
18%
No visit during 2013
14%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
There was evidence of large geographic variation of the role of the regional administration in
eligibility determination. Local social welfare offices were asked what percentage of eligibility
decisions were overturned at the regional level. The rates of overturned decisions at the delegation
level ranged from 0 to 80 percent; when averaged within regions the rates of overturned decisions
ranged from 9 to 25 percent (Figure 22).
Figure 22. In 2013, approximately what share of this office’s PNAFN eligibility decisions were
overturned at the regional level? (%, average across sampled delegations within each region)
34
Capacity of local social welfare offices
The number of staff at the local offices ranged from 2 to 15 with a
median of 5 staff. When asked what role an additional staff member, if
available, should fill, the most common roles included home visits for
participants’ eligibility determination and re-certification (each 38% of
offices), and identification of potential new beneficiaries (32%). In total,
two thirds indicated that an additional staff member should fill an out-ofoffice role.
“There are not
enough social
workers to meet
demand.”
Overall, local office staff rated their offices highly on most aspects of their work, except for staff
motivation and qualifications (Figure 23).
Figure 23. Self-ratings of local social welfare offices on their knowledge and capacity
Familiarity with PNAFN regulations
Familiarity with PPAS regulations
Linking eligible children to PPAS
Verifying continued eligibility
Connecting with other agencies
Office management and reporting
Staff motivation
Staff training & qualifications
Low or very low
Medium
High or very high
Lack of resources, in particular transportation, a high work load, and lobbying by applicants were
cited most frequently as challenges faced by social welfare workers (Figure 24).
35
Figure 24. Barriers and challenges reported by local social welfare workers
Which challenges do you face as a part of your job?
Lack of resources
85%
Transportation
83%
Lobbying by applicants
79%
Workload too high
63%
Lack of coordination
31%
Lack of guidance
23%
Bureaucracy/inefficiency
21%
Data management
19%
Other
21%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
90%
Comparisons with other education-focused transfer programs
Appendix 5 summarizes key characteristics of the PPAS program and compares PPAS to 32 other
cash transfer programs that should be relevant to decision-makers in Tunisia and the MENA region
who are in the process of developing and refining education-focused cash transfer programs. Most
of these programs operate on the national level, while some were included to represent regional,
pilot, or experimental study programs. Reviewing this table provides useful insight into the range of
transfer amounts, coverage, distribution strategies, targeting protocols, conditions, performance,
and guidelines across programs.
The selected programs show a striking amount of variation in key elements. National-level
programs vary in the size of their beneficiary pool, from around 5,000 households in Tanzania to
approximately 11 million children in Brazil and South Africa. The primary objectives of these
programs varyingly address poverty alleviation and human capital development, in addition to
educational quality, performance, and access. Payments of cash transfers are distributed monthly,
every two months, quarterly, every four months, twice a year, or annually, depending on the
program. The programs also employ different strategies for delivering transfers. Some deliver the
transfer on a per-child basis, while others deliver by household. There are programs that set
different transfer amounts for boys and girls. Other programs deliver larger amounts as a child
progresses from primary to secondary and post-secondary school. While it is difficult to assess the
impact these structural characteristics have on program success, it remains important for decision
makers in Tunisia to be aware of the existing options.
The table also provides a rough estimate of the percentage of per capita household consumption
expenses that are covered in one month’s equivalent of each transfer. A quick analysis of this
information indicates that cash transfers to individual children in these programs amount to a
median of 3.1% of monthly per capita consumption expenses, while transfers to households
represent a median of 6.1% of monthly per capita consumption expenses. While this does not
specifically represent educational expenses, it does indicate that Tunisia’s monthly transfer amount
is comparatively low (1.2% of monthly per capita consumption expenses). The gross amount of
36
cash transfers vary widely, ranging from $1.45 per household per month in Bangladesh to $70.67 per
child per month in Singapore. The median monthly amount of transfers distributed to households
was $15, while payments made on a per-child basis had a monthly median amount of $10.50.
Of the 33 programs analyzed, 29 contain a conditional cash transfer (CCT) component, while the
other four are unconditional cash transfers (UCT). Of the CCT programs, 23 require both school
enrollment and attendance, and 18 of those define attendance as an explicit percentage of school
days present (checked monthly or bimonthly). Ten of these set the attendance threshold at 85%, six
at 80%, and two at 90%. These standard practices provide useful guidelines for any country
attempting to integrate attendance conditionality into a cash transfer program. Additional
conditions cover a wide range of topics, from educational performance (grades, end-of-year exam
results) to community participation (parenting and capacity building workshops), the child’s health
(vaccinations, clinic visits), and family health behavior (growth monitoring, prenatal check-ups).
Looking at the list of countries sampled in Appendix 5, it is important to note which programs could
be the most relevant to Tunisia and its fellow MENA members. The most obvious among these are
Yemen and Morocco, based on their geography and cultural backgrounds. The program in Yemen
(the Basic Education Development Project) focuses on girls only, and is currently in the second round
of a World Bank pilot. It uses geographic targeting and focuses strongly on school performance—
maintaining passing grades, completing each grade level, and passing end-of-year exams—in
determining eligibility and transfer amounts. It appears to have increased the enrollment levels of
girls, but hasn’t shown evidence of closing the large gender gap in Yemen 122.
The Tayssir pilot program in Morocco, which ran from 2008-10, provides insight into an alternative
option to conditionality. An impact evaluation first compared labeled cash transfers (LCT) with
conditional cash transfers (CCT) within this program. To qualify as an LCT, a program places no
conditions on beneficiaries, but instead provides an explicit suggestion, or “label,” to encourage
them to use the money for a specific purpose. In the case of Tayssir, the label was used to “nudge”
households to spend the cash transfer on educational expenses. Specifically, this encouragement
was based on the principle that schools would serve as the primary location of program enrollment.
The evaluation found that the LCT component of the pilot was generally more cost effective and, in
some cases, even encouraged higher rates of educational participation than its CCT counterpart. In
addition, the LCT reduced the dropout rate by around 70% among students enrolled at baseline,
increased re-entry by 85% among those who had dropped out before baseline, and cut the share of
never-schooled by 43% 5. The value of cognitively linking a cash transfer to its objective (in this case,
education) among its recipients has been demonstrated in the Tayssir program, which could serve as
an example to its neighbors in the MENA region. It is important to note that the Tayssir program
employed geographic targeting; its specific focus on highly disadvantaged rural areas and the schoolwide implementations of the program were likely instrumental to its success, and differentiate
Tayssir substantively from PPAS’ nation-wide focus on specific disadvantaged households.
A handful of other countries in Appendix 5 are economically similar to Tunisia, and would also
warrant attention in the search for relevant exemplary cash transfer programs. Ecuador, Jamaica,
Colombia, and Peru are all ranked similarly to Tunisia in terms of GDP per capita; Nicaragua, the
Philippines, and Ghana are close to Tunisia in terms of the GINI coefficient of inequality 6,7.
Additionally, there are a handful of cash transfer programs with notable programmatic similarities to
37
Tunisia’s PPAS program. The labeled cash transfer of Morocco’s Tayssir program is probably the
closest to Tunisia’s in terms of implementation. Mozambique’s Basic Social Subsidy combines selftargeting with means testing to deliver an unconditional transfer to labor-constrained households.
Chile’s government internally funds a small unconditional transfer called Solidario, which is delivered
based on each household’s Social Protection Card score. The LEAP program in Ghana is similar in
size to Tunisia’s cash transfer program, and uses school enrollment as its only condition. Finally,
Singapore’s School Pocket Money Fund shares a focus on educational resource-focused objectives
while delivering transfers to children conditional on their school enrollment and living situation.
Summary of program implementation
The implementation of PPAS on the basis of the administrative infrastructure of the PNAFN program
suggests that the marginal administrative cost of the education benefit program is likely small
compared to the cost of an independently implemented program. At the same time, PPAS inherits
key characteristics of the PNAFN program, including its focus on specific beneficiary populations,
limits to the program’s scope of coverage, and characteristics of program implementation and
administration. These characteristics have significant implications for the program’s coverage rate,
limit the program’s focus on children in non-PNAFN households who may also be at risk of drop-out,
and may contribute to the program’s dual focus on children’s school vs. poverty reductions, as
indicated by vague or non-existing eligibility criteria and the lack of conditionality of PPAS benefits.
These points are explored in detail in the targeting and impact sections, below.
The evaluation noted the efficient use of existing resources for the eligibility determination, benefits
distribution and program administration. The evaluation also identified substantial regional
variation in program implementation, limits to the resources and capacity of local offices to identify
additional eligible households and link them to benefits, limited communication with teachers, NGOs
and other stakeholders in children’s education, and variable and/or limited information flow and
oversight by regional offices.
Recommendations, described in detail in Section 11, include a re-evaluation of the program’s
limitation to PNAFN beneficiary households, greater standardization of information flow and
oversight, an improved information management system that allows for the tracking of eligibility
and benefits for individual children, and improved communication, coordination and integration of
PPAS with school-based and other (e.g., NGO-based) education support programs and efforts to
reduce drop-out. Additional efforts should ensure that the scale and scope of the program is
supported by adequate capacity at local social welfare offices, including for outreach, eligibility
determination and verification, eligibility re-certification, and information management.
38
9.
Results - Part III: Targeting
In this section we characterize the beneficiary population of PPAS, and the extent to which the
program reaches the population it intends to reach. We provide the results of surveys with key
informants, local decision makers, beneficiary households, and non-beneficiary households, and give
estimates of inclusion and exclusion errors, i.e., the extent to which the intended target populations,
and only the intended target populations, participate in the program.
The concepts of inclusion and exclusion error
Conceptually, targeting of a program describes the extent of overlap between a program’s
beneficiary population and the intended or eligible target population (Figure 25). The
appropriateness of targeting is described by two concepts: inclusion error and exclusion error. The
concept of inclusion error describes households who are currently benefiting from the program but
who do not meet eligibility criteria and should not be receiving benefits. The concept of exclusion
error describes the characteristics of households who should benefit from the program but do not.
Figure 25. The concept of targeting
Calculations of inclusion and exclusion errors depend on the availability of explicit eligibility criteria.
Considering the program’s reliance on PNAFN eligibility determination, the use of both subjective
and objective criteria to determine a household’s eligibility for PNAFN, and the dual focus of PPAS on
poverty and schooling, this evaluation takes a more pragmatic approach and assesses
a) economic and demographic characteristics of PPAS beneficiary households
b) what share of potentially eligible households receives benefits from the program; and
c) whether beneficiary households are more appropriate recipients of financial support than
non-beneficiary households.
39
Program coverage
In July 2013, PPAS covered 40,592 households. Within these households, benefits were paid for
77,705 children. Beneficiary households represent 18.6% of all PNAFN households, and may
represent as many as 50% of the estimated 80,000 PNAFN households with children.
The 2004 Census counted just over 1 million households with approximately 2.2 million children ages
6 to 17. A simple comparison between the number of beneficiary households and children and the
total number of households and children in Tunisia would suggest an estimated coverage rate of
3.8% of households and 3.5% of children.
There was great geographic variation in rates of PNAFN households benefiting from PPAS (Figure
26), ranging from 7% to 41% across delegations, and from 11% to 29% across gouvernorates. Similar
variation was found in the estimated share of children who were covered by the program, ranging
from 3% to 23% of all children ages 6 to 17 residing in the delegation.
Figure 26. Geographic variation in PPAS coverage among PNAFN beneficiaries and children
Coverage by PNAFN and PPAS increased dramatically over the past few years. Between 2010 and
2013, the number of PNAFN families increased by 65%; the number of families benefiting from PPAS
increased by 45%, and the number of children covered by the program increased by 46%. There was
also substantial geographic variation in program growth rates (not shown).
40
Assessment of program targeting by key informants
Program targeting and eligibility criteria were important components of the interviews with key
informants. While most of the key informants had a grasp of the program’s general requirements
and connection to PNAFN, substantial variety in responses
suggests a need to universally define the target population
“People know the
and which criteria they must meet to receive PPAS. Overall,
respondents indicated that no clear or agreed-upon set of
criteria very well, and
eligibility criteria existed at the time of the interviews. It
they profit from the fact
appears that both the interpretation of and adherence to
that they are vague.”
any existing eligibility criteria were seen to vary across
offices. For instance, there was some concern that social
workers and local staff often allowed familiarity with clients
to influence decisions about eligibility. On the one hand, closeness with clients provided a more
thorough picture of households’ needs profiles. At the same time, however, conflicts of interest
(especially when working in small towns and/or the hometown of the staff member) could interfere
with the fairness and efficiency of the program’s targeting. Importantly, respondents expressed a
need for the eligibility criteria to target not only households living in poverty, but also those just
above the poverty threshold and those otherwise
struggling to provide for their children. On the other
“Better targeting is needed
hand, errors of inclusion (those receiving benefits who
should not be) hurt the efficiency of the program, but
to save money, to supply
could be objectively addressed via a thorough eligibility
better protection, and to
review. This could potentially save the program money
improve efficiency.”
by redirecting program funds to legitimate existing
beneficiaries or those currently left out as errors of
exclusion.
While the program currently provides monthly transfers on a mostly unconditional basis (no
requirement of a specific action/behavior for continued receipt of benefits after initial enrollment),
key informants believed that PPAS was at a critical point in terms of decision-making. Conditional
cash transfer programs have received heightened attention recently in both research literature and
the media. Some of the key informants believed that conditionality could play a role in maximizing
the impact of Tunisia’s cash transfer for education strategy. Although proof of a child’s enrollment is
required to initially sign up as a beneficiary household, this documentation is currently only required
once; a birth certificate suffices for renewal. Some interviewees mentioned that a shift toward
conditionality via continued monitoring of
enrollment (yearly, via school certificates) or
“Based on what it is right now,
attendance (daily, via classroom records) could
it should be called “aid for
focus the program’s impact more closely on
improved educational outcomes. According to one
families taking care of kids,”
key informant, such changes would likely require
instead of “aid for families
better record keeping, in addition to the full
with kids in school.”
cooperation of teachers and the Ministry of
Education (Key Informant #5). Other potential
41
conditions discussed were academic performance and behavior in school. Both ideas were said to
warrant particular caution though, since they could place undue psychological burden on struggling
students while potentially requiring significant amounts of time and effort to implement. Along
these lines, conditionality as a whole only received mixed support among respondents. Some
pointed out that adding conditions could effectively act to exclude the worst-off portion of the
target population, while others insisted that adding multiple conditions would lead to redundancies
in the targeting process.
Local decision makers’ perception of program targeting
Social workers from local social welfare offices were asked a variety of questions about the
program’s targeting criteria. Respondents were nearly evenly split when asked whether current
criteria were acceptable, too flexible, or too strict (Figure 27).
Figure 27. Social workers' perceptions of the appropriateness of current PNAFN eligibility criteria
30.86%
Criteria are acceptable
Criteria are too flexible
Criteria are too strict
44.44%
24.69%
Several questions in the local office survey asked for opinions on which eligibility criteria should be
included or excluded for PNAFN and PPAS (See Table 2). The responses provide a picture of how
social workers think eligibility should be defined for these programs. It is also noteworthy that
several answers (starred) indicate that the local level implementation of PPAS may not match the
program's eligibility criteria as they exist on paper.
42
Table 2. Social workers’ suggestions for changes to program targeting criteria
Consider…
Don’t consider…
PNAFN
• Income
• Emotions
• Degree of disability
• Favoritism
• Support (family or institutions)
• Housing situation
• Family size
• Family support
• Ability to work
• Social security status
• Orphans
• Objective criteria
PPAS
• Household assets
• Emotions
• Income
• Favoritism
• Timing of employment
• School attendance
• Number of children
• School performance*
• Distance from school
• Dropout*
• Enrollment*
Social workers reported moderate amounts of inclusion error. Figure 28 shows social workers’
estimates of the share of PNAFN beneficiaries they would expect to not be eligible if they were to
apply newly today. While half of the delegations reported no inclusion error for PNAFN, in 3
delegations the estimated inclusion error was expected to be 50% or higher. These numbers are
consistent with the long ‘tail’ in the distributions in estimated per-capita expenditures among
beneficiary households (see Figure 36, below).
Figure 28. Social workers' estimate of inclusion error for PNAFN
What % of those households in your district currently receiving PNAFN benefits would not be
eligible if they were to apply newly today?
55%
60%
50%
40%
30%
21%
20%
10%
11%
6%
6%
0%
No-one
1 to 9 percent
10 to 24 percent
25 to 49 percent 50 percent or more
There appeared to be some systematic geographic variation in social workers’ estimates of inclusion
error, with higher rates in the South, East and Grand Tunis, and lower rates in the West (Figure 29).
43
Figure 29. Social workers' estimates of inclusion error for PNAFN (%, averaged within each region)
Social workers indicated high rates of applicants who lied about their eligibility, either during the
initial eligibility determination or for re-certification (Figure 30). More than one third of respondents
indicated that half or more applicants lied. Importantly, these numbers do not necessarily
characterize errors of inclusion, as they likely include large numbers of households whose
applications were ultimately rejected at the local or regional level. However, they indicate the
limited value of self-reports for evaluating eligibility for social assistance programs.
Figure 30. Social worker reported accuracy of household eligibility reporting
30%
25%
20%
When applying for benefits or re-certification, in your opinion what is the percentage of
households that have lied about their eligibility?
28%
23%
16%
16%
Less than 10
percent
10 to 24 percent
16%
15%
10%
5%
0%
25 to 49 percent
44
50 to 74 percent 75 percent or more
Social workers listed a variety of reasons that result in errors of exclusion (Figure 31). More than half
of respondents indicated that low benefit amounts and lack of information among potential
beneficiary households constitute barriers to enrolling eligible families into PPAS. Administrative
hurdles were mentioned by one quarter of respondents; one in ten mentioned stigma associated
with participation in the program.
Figure 31. Social worker reported sources of exclusion error
Do any of the following constitute barriers to enrolling eligible families into the PPAS program?
Insufficient benefit amount
73%
Lack of information among eligible families
56%
Geographic dispersion
54%
Narrow application window
33%
Difficult application process
25%
Conditionality on school enrollment
17%
Stigma associated with program participation
10%
Other
6%
0%
10%
45
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
70%
80%
Characteristics of children in beneficiary households
Figure 32 shows the age distribution of children and young adults ages 6 to 24 among sampled PPAS
beneficiary households. Importantly, children ages 20 to 24 accounted for approximately 38% of all
children in beneficiary households; only half of all children were between the ages of 6 to 17.
Figure 32. Age distribution of children and young adults ages 6-24 among beneficiary households
24
7%
Age 6 7
2% 2%
23
7%
8
3%
Age 6
7
9
3% 10
3%
8
9
11
4%
22
7%
10
11
12
5%
12
13
14
21
8%
13
6%
15
16
17
14
5%
18
19
20
10%
15
5%
19
4%
18
7%
16
6%
17
7%
20
21
22
23
24
Despite the program’s focus on school-age children, eligibility criteria did not explicitly specify an age
limit for households or children to receive monthly program benefits. Therefore we describe in
Figure 33 the percentage of households that would meet specific upper age cut-offs for program
eligibility. The figure indicates that eleven percent of PPAS beneficiary households did not have
any children ages 6 to 24 in the household; these households represent clear inclusion error. For
other households the definition of inclusion error depends on the age limit imposed, if any. Only
72% of beneficiary households had any children ages 6 to 19. By contrast, 80% of households who
received monthly program benefits had at least one child between the ages of 13 to 24 (not shown).
The share of households who would meet other age cut-offs for program eligibility can be identified
using this figure.
46
% of households meeting an upper age cut-off
Figure 33. Percentage of beneficiary households who would meet age-based program eligibility
criteria with an upper age limit
100%
84%
78%
80%
69%
87% 89%
81%
72%
63%
56%
60%
50%
44%
39%
40%
33%
28%
22%
18%
20%
% of households without any children ages 6-24 (11%)
14%
8%
% of households who would meet an upper age cut-off
3%
0%
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
Potential upper upper or lower age cut-offs for program eligibility
Figure 34 shows the estimated effect of alternative upper and lower age cut-offs for estimates of
inclusion error in the program. The X axis describes a range of scenarios for the lower age cut-off for
program eligibility; the Y axis describes a range of scenarios for the upper age cut-off. The color at
the intersection of the two scenarios describes the current estimated inclusion error if the eligibility
criteria were imposed today. For example, the dark blue areas in Figure 34, Panel A, show that
inclusion error is below 20% if eligibility is based on the presence of any children between ages 5-21,
or an even wider age range, in the household. When tighter age-related eligibility criteria are
imposed, either by lowering the upper age threshold or raising the lower age threshold, estimates of
inclusion error increases rapidly. If at least one child ages 6-19 must be present in the household in
order to be eligible for monthly program payments, inclusion error is estimated at 28%; the error
increases to 37% if children ages 6-17 must be present in the household.
Given the program’s focus on reducing drop-out, we also analyzed how these estimates of inclusion
error change if program benefit receipt were dependent on school enrollment. Figure 34, Panel B,
shows rates of inclusion error among PPAS beneficiary households if eligibility for monthly benefit
receipt in July 2013 were based on children’s ages and on children’s school enrollment in either of
the last two school years. A loose, two-year criterion was used because qualitative process
assessments with local decision makers indicated that either school enrollment certificates (for the
current school year) or completion certificates (for the prior school year) may be used to document a
child’s school enrollment for initial or continued receipt of PPAS benefits. Comparisons between
Panels A and B indicate that due to a large number of children who are not enrolled in school, the
estimated rates of inclusion error would be even higher if program eligibility or benefit
conditionality included school enrollment and exceed 20% regardless of age-based eligibility
criteria.
47
Figure 34. Estimates of inclusion error based on alternative age-based eligibility restrictions,
without (Panel A) and with (Panel B) additional eligibility restrictions based on school enrollment
20%-40%
40%-60%
60%-80%
80%-100%
24
23
22
21
20
19
18
17
16
15
14
13
12
11
10
9
8
7
6
Panel A.
Inclusion error
based on age
eligibility only
Upper age limit for program eligibility
0%-20%
6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
Lower age limit for program eligibility
20%-40%
40%-60%
60%-80%
80%-100%
24
23
22
21
20
19
18
17
16
15
14
13
12
11
10
9
8
7
6
Panel B.
Inclusion error
based on age
eligibility and
school
enrollment in
the past 2 years
6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24
Lower age limit for program eligibility
48
Upper age limit for program eligibility
0%-20%
PPAS rules stipulate that monthly payments are made for up to three children per household. To
assess over- and/or under-coverage by the program, our analysis of beneficiary households
compares the number of children in the household, the number of children enrolled in school, and
the number of children for whom benefits were paid. Unfortunately, lack of clarity with respect to
age restrictions and other eligibility criteria made it difficult to determine the optimal reference
group, and different eligibility criteria lead to dramatically different conclusion regarding inclusion
and exclusion error (Table 3).
We therefore considered 4 different scenarios: Panel A describes inclusion and exclusion error if the
program is intended to benefit all children of school-eligible age (broadly defined as ages 6-24);
Panel B describes inclusion and exclusion error if the program eligibility includes only children ages
6-24 who have ever attended school; Panel C describes inclusion and exclusion error if program
benefits are only intended for children ages 6-24 who were recently enrolled in school. Finally,
Panel D further limits eligibility only to children of primary school age, ages 6-17, who were recently
enrolled in school.
If PPAS payments to PNAFN households are intended to benefit children of school-eligible age (Panel
A), broadly defined to include ages 6-24, without consideration of actual enrollment in school, the
coverage levels indicate an inclusion error of 12.8% of funds in 2013. This number includes 10.5% of
beneficiary households who had no age-eligible children and families who received payments for
more than the number of age-eligible children in the household. At the same time, the program limit
of 3 children indicates that many children cannot benefit from PPAS, because 18% of beneficiary
households had 4 or more children between the ages of 6-24. In addition, some households with 2
or 3 children received benefits for fewer than the number of age-eligible children residing in the
household. This exclusion error amounts to 23.6% of the total program funding level in 2013.
Combining both inclusion error (households with no age-eligible children or too few age-eligible
children) and exclusion error (households with more age-eligible children than benefit recipients)
indicates that an additional 18.1% of funds would be needed to cover all age-eligible children
residing in current beneficiary households.
If tighter eligibility criteria are applied (e.g., if program benefits are only payable for children ages 624 who ever attended school), the estimated inclusion error increases while the estimated exclusion
error decreases (Panel B). In 2013, an estimated 19% of beneficiary households reported no
children ages 6-24 who ever attended school. At the same time, 7.1% of beneficiary households had
4 or more children who ever enrolled in school. Comparisons of the number of children (ages 6-24,
ever went to school) residing in the household with the number of children receiving benefits results
in estimates of an inclusion error of 27.8% and an exclusion error (eligible children for whom no
benefits were received) of 10.7%. If funds could be perfectly targeted to include only children ages 624 who ever enrolled in school, 15.9% of program funds could be re-allocated to expand program
coverage or increase benefit amounts.
Panel C describes inclusion and exclusion error for the case where program eligibility is based on
child age and recent school enrollment. More than 23% of beneficiary households had no children
ages 6-24 who were in school during the current or previous school year. Additional households
received benefits for more than the number of children (ages 6-24, enrolled in school in the past 2
years) residing in the household. This amounts to an inclusion error equivalent to 32.6% of program
49
funds. Six percent of households had more than 3 children enrolled in school in either of the past
two years; in total the number of households who had more eligible children than benefit recipients
amounted to an estimated exclusion error of 9.6%. In this scenario, eliminating both inclusion and
exclusion error would allow for 22% of program funds to be re-allocated toward expansion of
benefits or coverage.
Finally, in Panel D we describe the scenario where benefit eligibility is limited to children ages 6 to
17 who are or were recently enrolled in school. In this scenario, the estimated inclusion error
exceeds 53%, with only 4.5% exclusion error. More than 40% of beneficiary households had no
children who met these eligibility criteria. In this scenario, elimination of inclusion and exclusion
error would allow for nearly half of all program funds to be used for an expansion of coverage to
additional children or an increase in benefit amounts among eligible beneficiaries.
Table 3. Relationship between the number of children residing in the household and benefit
receipt among beneficiary households
Nombre d'enfants pour lesquels le
paiement a été fait durant 2013/14
Estimates of inclusion and
exclusion error
1
2
3
Total
Aucun
1
2
3
4 ou plus
Total
7.8%
16.0%
8.8%
4.3%
1.0%
37.9%
1.7%
3.2%
15.6%
6.8%
5.1%
32.4%
1.0%
1.6%
3.9%
11.2%
12.1%
29.7%
10.5%
20.8%
28.2%
22.2%
18.3%
100.0%
Inclusion error 12.8%
Exclusion error 23.6%
Net effect on budget -18.1%
Panel B. Nombre
d'enfants âgés de 6-24
qui ont fréquenté
l'école
Aucun
1
2
3
4 ou plus
Total
12.9%
19.1%
4.4%
1.4%
0.1%
37.9%
3.3%
7.3%
16.3%
4.5%
0.9%
32.4%
2.7%
5.1%
7.2%
8.7%
6.1%
29.7%
19.0%
31.5%
27.9%
14.5%
7.1%
100.0%
Inclusion error
Exclusion error
Net effect on budget
27.8%
10.7%
15.9%
Panel C. Nombre
inscrits à l'école dans
l'une des deux
dernières années
Aucun
1
2
3
4 ou plus
Total
14.8%
18.1%
3.9%
1.0%
0.1%
37.9%
5.0%
7.8%
14.7%
4.0%
0.8%
32.4%
3.5%
5.3%
7.3%
8.5%
5.1%
29.7%
23.4%
31.2%
25.9%
13.5%
6.1%
100.0%
Inclusion error
Exclusion error
32.6%
9.6%
22.0%
Panel D. Nombre
inscrits à l'école dans
l'une des deux
dernières années
Aucun
1
2
3
4 ou plus
Total
22.3%
12.2%
2.6%
0.7%
0.0%
37.9%
10.9%
8.1%
11.2%
2.1%
0.1%
32.4%
8.5%
8.9%
6.2%
4.4%
1.9%
29.7%
41.6%
29.2%
19.9%
7.2%
2.0%
100.0%
Inclusion error
Exclusion error
53.6%
4.5%
48.9%
Panel A. Nombre
dans le ménage
50
There was substantial regional variation in the estimated rates of inappropriate benefit receipt
(based on the definition in Panel C). Rates of inappropriate benefit receipt appeared to be lowest in
the Nord Est and Sud Est regions; the largest apparent rates of inclusion error were observed in the
Centre West and Sud West regions (Figure 35).
Figure 35. Regional variation in rates of inappropriate benefit receipt
% of beneficiary households
100%
More children in
school than benefits
80%
Same benefits as
children in school
60%
More benefits than
children in school
40%
No children in
school
20%
No children
0%
Grand Nord Est Nord
Tunis
West
Centre Centre Sud Est
Est
West
Sud
West
Total
While the numbers in Table 2 and Figure 35 are large and suggest an urgent need for a clear
definition and enforcement of PPAS eligibility criteria, they are not fully unexpected. Two
characteristics of the PPAS program have likely contributed to these numbers: PPAS’ reliance on
PNAFN eligibility suggests that beneficiary households are more likely to have older children; and the
lack of regular eligibility re-certification suggests that many children in beneficiary households may
have aged out of the eligible age range, but benefits continued. Recommendations include 1) a reevaluation of the optimal age range for program eligibility 2) a re-evaluation of the program’s
restriction to PNAFN beneficiaries, and 3) a regular re-certification of program eligibility.
Economic wellbeing of beneficiary and non-beneficiary households
As a part of PNAFN, PPAS is intended to benefit poor and needy families. To assess targeting with
respect to poverty, we compared whether beneficiary households, on average, are more likely than
non-beneficiary households to be poor.
Beneficiary and non-beneficiary households’ economic status was estimated on the basis of a
poverty model (see Section 4). The poverty model was developed using data from the 2010 Budget
and Consumption Survey; it describes the association between a household’s composition,
characteristics of household members, a variety of household assets, other characteristics of the
household, and the household’s average annual per-capita expenditures. The poverty model is used
51
to estimate each beneficiary household’s and each non-beneficiary household’s relative economic
status: higher predicted expenditures are indicative of a lower likelihood of poverty, whereas lower
expenditures represent a higher likelihood of poverty.
Figure 36. Distribution of estimated per-capita annual expenditures in PPAS beneficiary
households and in the entire population in Tunisia
250000
Estimated total number of households
with children ages 6-24
# of households
200000
150000
Estimated number of eligible households
who benefit from the program
100000
50000
0
0
500
1000 1500 2000 2500 3000 3500 4000 4500 5000 5500 6000+
Figure 36 shows the distribution of beneficiary households and the general population with respect
to their estimated annual per capita expenditures; Table 4 compares the characteristics of eligible
beneficiary households (households with at least one child age 6-24 enrolled in school who received
program benefits in the 2013/2014 school year) with the characteristics of all Tunisian households
with children and young adults ages 6-24, as estimated from the 2010 Budget and Consumption
Survey.
On most indicators, eligible beneficiary households were worse off than the national average. The
only exception was the number of children in the household: beneficiary households had fewer
children, on average, than the national average. This observation may be explained by a) PNAFN’s
primary focus on older caregivers, b) the (sometimes not enforced) requirement that at least one
child had to be in school at enrollment; and c) the fact that many beneficiary “children” are in fact
already above age 18. All would tend to result in larger number of siblings above age 18, either
within or outside the household.
Somewhat smaller differences were observed between beneficiary households and comparison
households (Table 5), supporting the notion that neighbors of a poor household are also more likely
to be poor. On average, beneficiary households were worse off than neighboring households that
did not receive any benefits, and, with respect to many characteristics, also worse off relative to
households that received back-to-school (BTS) benefits only. On average, PPAS beneficiary
households’ annual per-capita expenditures were 660-808 Dinars below the national average, 239288 Dinars below that of neighboring households who received no benefits, and 34-61 Dinars below
those who received back-to-school benefits only.
52
Table 4. Comparison of beneficiary households with a representative sample of households from
the 2010 Budget and Consumption Survey
Household characteristics
Characteristics of
eligible beneficiary
households
Characteristics of households in
the 2010 Budget & Consumption
Survey
Mean (SD)
or percent
Mean (SD)
or percent
Difference
in mean or %
Assets
Radio recorder
Television
Satellite dish
Bookshelf
Refrigerator
Freezer
Stove
Washer
Dishwasher
Air-conditioner
Computer
Internet
Mobile phone
Car
Motorcycle
Bicycle
27%
95%
83%
2%
75%
1%
20%
18%
0%
3%
5%
3%
70%
0%
5%
4%
42%
97%
88%
13%
94%
5%
65%
60%
2%
17%
22%
12%
92%
16%
14%
7%
15%
2%
6%
11%
20%
4%
46%
43%
2%
14%
17%
9%
22%
16%
9%
2%
***
*
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
*
Housing
# of rooms
Connected to Sonede
Flush toilet
Kitchen with sink
Electric heating
21%
2.2 (1.1)
74%
8%
48%
5%
20%
1%
25%
3.2 (1.8)
83%
10%
52%
27%
68%
6%
5%
0.9
9%
1%
4%
22%
48%
5%
**
***
***
(1.4)
(0.9)
(1.6)
(0.2)
0.3
-0.3
-0.3
-0.4
***
***
***
***
1.4 (1.5)
9%
3.0 (2.0)
34%
1.6
25%
***
***
1196.0 (445.2)
922.9 (345.8)
2004.8 (1136.0)
1583.2 (886.7)
808.8
660.4
***
***
Household
# of children ages 0-17
# of young adults ages 18-24
# of adults ages 25-59
# of adults unable to work
Average # of months worked, per person
Predicted per-capita expenditures (VWLS)
Predicted per-capita expenditures (Q25)
Number of households
1.5
1.2
3.7
0.4
789
(1.2)
(1.0)
(1.9)
(0.7)
1.8
0.9
3.4
0.1
7438
Colors represent estimated associations with annual per-capita expenditures:
53
positive
negative
*
***
***
***
Table 5. Comparisons of PPAS beneficiary households with neighboring households
Household characteristics
Assets
Housing
Household
Difference of neighboring households
relative to beneficiary households
Characteristics of
program
beneficiary
households
Households with
back-to-school
benefits
Households
receiving no
benefits
Mean (SD)
or percent
Difference
in mean or %
Difference
in mean or %
Radio recorder
Television
Satellite dish
Bookshelf
Refrigerator
Freezer
Stove
Washer
Dishwasher
Air-conditioner
Computer
Internet
Phone_Mobile
Car
Motorcycle
Bicycle
27%
95%
83%
2%
75%
1%
20%
18%
0.0 (0.0)
3%
5%
3%
70%
0%
5%
4%
9%
2%
6%
3%
5%
1%
6%
2%
0.0
0%
-1%
-1%
1%
2%
5%
3%
# of rooms
Connected to Sonede
Flush toilet
Kitchen with sink
Electric heating
21%
2.2 (1.1)
74%
8%
48%
5%
20%
1%
0%
0.3
-3%
-4%
-6%
2%
-6%
1%
# of children ages 0-17
# of young adults ages 18-24
# of adults ages 25-59
# of adults unable to work
Average # of months worked, per person
Estimated per-capita expenditures (VWLS)
Estimated per-capita expenditures (Q25)
Number of households
1.5
1.2
3.7
0.4
**
**
**
*
**
**
*
**
*
*
9%
3%
8%
7%
11%
2%
15%
21%
1%
8%
9%
8%
9%
11%
7%
6%
***
**
***
***
***
**
***
***
**
***
***
***
***
***
***
***
12%
0.3
5%
4%
11%
10%
9%
6%
***
***
*
*
***
***
***
***
(1.2)
(1.0)
(1.9)
(0.7)
0.8
-0.4
-0.6
-0.2
***
***
***
***
0.8
-0.5
-0.7
-0.2
***
***
***
***
1.4 (1.5)
9%
0.4
7%
***
**
0.8
18%
***
***
288.5
239.4
***
***
1196.0 (445.2)
922.9 (345.8)
789
-60.7
-33.7
354
Colors represent estimated associations with annual per-capita expenditures:
54
*
616
positive association
negative association
PPAS beneficiary households’ higher rates of poverty are also indicated by differences in the
distributions of per-capita expenditures across beneficiary and non-beneficiary households (Figure
37). Distributions further to the left are reflective of poorer populations, whereas distributions
further to the right are reflective of wealthier populations. The red beneficiary curve is substantially
shifted to the left compared with the general population (gray curve), and to some extent relative to
neighbors who do not receive any benefits (green curve). There appears to be a (comparatively
small) group of beneficiary households who are well off and likely should not benefit from PPAS,
which is intended for children in poor households.
Figure 37. PPAS beneficiary households tend to be poorer than the general population
.001
.0015
Density
Program beneficiaries
Neighbors, BTS benefit
Neighbors, no benefits
0
.0005
National distribution
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
There was evidence of substantial geographic variation in the economic status of PPAS
beneficiaries relative to non-beneficiaries and other households. While, on average, beneficiaries
were economically worse off, the extent of economic targeting appeared to vary between regions
(Figure 38). Beneficiaries were poorer than the comparison populations in the Nord Est, Center Est
and Sud West regions. However, in Grand Tunis, Sud Est, and Center West, neighboring households
who benefited from the periodic BTS education support at the beginning of the school year were
worse off than those who received PPAS support. In the Nord West and Centre West regions, by
contrast, there was no discernable difference in the economics status of beneficiaries relative to
non-beneficiary neighbors, those who received annual support, or the general population. However,
in the latter two regions, all populations were more likely to be poor. If the program intends to
target the poorest nationally, a greater focus toward poor areas may be needed. If the program
intends to target the poorest within each region, different targeting criteria may be needed for
different geographic areas.
55
Figure 38. Regional variation in the relative economic wellbeing of beneficiary households (Estimated Dinars per person per year)
2000
3000
4000
5000
1000
2000
3000
.0005 .001 .0015
4000
5000
.0005 .001 .0015
Centre Est
0
0
.0005 .001 .0015
Nord West
0
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
4000
5000
Centre West
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
0
1000
2000
3000
.0005 .001 .0015
Sud West
Program beneficiaries
Neighbors, BTS benefit
Neighbors, no benefits
0
0
.0005 .001 .0015
Sud Est
0
.0005 .001 .0015
1000
0
0
Nord Est
0
.0005 .001 .0015
Grand Tunis
0
0
Density
.0005 .001 .0015
All households
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
0
1000
2000
3000
4000
5000
National distribution
Notes: Predictions are based on a poverty model from the 2010 Budget and Consumption Survey.
Distributions are for households with children ages 5-17; predicted expenditures are capped at 5000 Dinars in this graph.
56
Other characteristics of beneficiary and non-beneficiary households
Several other differences exist between beneficiary and non-beneficiary households. Children in
PPAS beneficiary households are older, on average, have a larger number of older siblings, and are
more likely to live without either their mother or their father, compared with children in nonbeneficiary households (Table 6). These observations are consistent with the focus of PNAFN on the
elderly and on single-parent households.
Table 6. Characteristics of children in PPAS beneficiary and non-beneficiary households
Non
Child characteristics
Bénéficiaires bénéficiaires
Average age
Mother died or absent
Father died or absent
# of older siblings
Child labor, past week
13.6
4%
36%
2.0
6%
11.9
2%
6%
1.5
6%
N
1390
2132
***
**
***
***
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 levels, respectively
UNICEF defines child labor as 28 hours or more of any work, youth younger than age 12 working for
financial compensation, or youth aged 12 or older working 14 or more hours per week for pay.
According to this definition, among beneficiary households and non-beneficiary households, six
percent of children ages 5-17 were engaged in child labor, with girls (8.4%) more than twice as
likely than boys (3.9%) to be engaged in child labor.
57
Table 7. Decision-making about schooling and school-related needs in PPAS beneficiary and nonbeneficiary households
Non
Bénéficiaires bénéficiaires
Qui dans votre foyer décide si l’enfant va à l’école ou pas?
Père
Mère
Enfant
Grands-parents
Quelqu'un d'autre
55%
57%
9%
1%
1%
Qui dans votre foyer décide quand un enfant doit arrêter d’aller à l’école?
Père
48%
Mère
47%
Enfant
22%
Grands-parents
1%
Quelqu'un d'autre
1%
86%
45%
5%
1%
1%
***
***
**
78%
34%
14%
1%
1%
***
***
***
Pour l’un de vos enfants actuellement inscrits à l’école, quels sont les éléments manquants
pour des contraintes financières?
Cartable d’école
27%
23%
*
Livres scolaires
50%
43%
**
Cahiers et autres fournitures scolaires
54%
49%
*
Transport scolaire
35%
26%
***
Uniforme scolaire
56%
52%
Leçons particulières et études
75%
76%
Frais de scolarité, droit d’inscription
27%
22%
*
Autres
17%
13%
*
No contact with school officials in the past year
42%
27%
***
*, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 levels, respectively
Decision-making about children’s school enrollment and continuance in school differs between
beneficiary and non-beneficiary households, likely in part due to higher rates of paternal absence
(Table 7). Children in PPAS beneficiary households are more likely to participate in the decisionmaking process, but overall rates are low. Beneficiary households have slightly higher rates of unmet
school-related needs, including for school transport, school supplies, and fees. More than 40% of all
beneficiary households reported no contact with school officials during the previous school year.
58
Estimates of exclusion error
The program, as currently structured, can cover approximately 3.8% of households and 3.5% of
children in Tunisia. Thus, unless strict criteria limit program eligibility to a very small share of the
population, the program is likely subject to substantial exclusion error. By definition, PPAS can
only benefit PNAFN households, and 40,000 program beneficiary households may represent as many
as 50% of all PNAFN households with children. However, it is not clear how these households
compare with other poor households, and how children in beneficiary families compare to other
children at risk of poor school performance and drop-out.
Direct one-to-one comparisons between PPAS beneficiary households and the neighboring
households who do not benefit from the program suggest that there is substantial variation in
beneficiary households’ relative economic wellbeing. Figure 39 shows the distribution of
differences in estimated annual per-capita expenditures between the respective neighbors. The
distribution of differences is shown separately relative to neighboring households receiving annual
back-to-school benefits and relative to neighboring households who received neither monthly nor
annual benefits. A positive difference indicates that the beneficiary household is better off than its
nearest neighbor; a negative difference indicates that the beneficiary household is worse off than
the neighbor. If all PPAS beneficiary households were worse off than their neighbors, the curves
would be right-censored (truncated) at zero.
Difference to neighbors (back-to-school benefits only)
Difference to neighbors (no benefits)
0
.0002
Density
.0004
.0006
.0008
.001
Figure 39. Distribution of differences in estimated per-capita expenditures between PPAS
beneficiary households and their nearest neighbors (Dinars per person per year)
-8000
-6000
-4000
-2000
0
2000
The results suggest that most beneficiary households are worse off than their neighboring
households who received no benefits (blue line); however, on average, PPAS beneficiary households
do not seem to be better or worse off than other households who received only the annual back-toschool benefits (red line). Thus, a program that provides school support only to PNAFN
households, while reaching many poor, likely misses many other poor households, and sometimes
poorer households, that do not benefit from PNAFN.
59
Targeting experiences from other cash transfer programs
The compilation of literature in Appendix 5 presents a range of targeting strategies used in
education-focused transfer programs. Five main types of program are represented: means tests,
geographic targeting, community-based targeting, categorical targeting, and self-targeting.
Means tests are used to evaluate the economic status of a given household. Standard means tests
typically collect information on household income and/or wealth, and can be either verified or
unverified, depending on whether the information is checked against official records or from selfreport only. A verified means test is regarded as the gold standard of targeting strategies, but also
costs the most and takes the longest to perform 125. Tunisia’s cash transfer program uses an
unverified means test (PNAFN eligibility assessment) to determine household economic status, but
this leaves room for misreporting that could severely impact the makeup of program beneficiaries.
One solution gaining popularity among social policymakers is the proxy means test. This type of test
usually assesses a (verified) list of various goods, appliances, and aspects of the dwelling, producing
a score that approximates a household’s economic status. Fourteen of the programs in Appendix 5
utilize a proxy means test, indicating that there is growing experience and support for it as an
efficient targeting method. Programs in Chile, Colombia, and Ecuador, for example, have established
national indices or score-based welfare cards based on proxy means tests to indicate the degree of a
household’s poverty. If policymakers in Tunisia deem it necessary to improve the targeting process
of PPAS, formal proxy means testing may represent the next step in this direction.
Geographic targeting, typically conducted on the national level, assesses available aggregate data
about factors such as poverty, health, literacy, or education. It links this information to
administrative areas (i.e. region, gouvernorate, or school district) and thus informs the selection of
priority areas for the cash transfer. Some documents imply that there may have been regional-level
geographic targeting earlier in the PNAFN’s history 126, but there are no indications that this has
continued apart from variation in regional quotas for the program. In the studies presented in
Appendix 5, only smaller programs used geographic targeting exclusively, while a handful of larger
programs used it as a complement to other strategies.
Community-based targeting can take several different forms. In principle, it relies on the knowledge
of local schools, committees, social workers, or others to identify households that should receive a
transfer. While this strategy utilizes valuable first-hand experience of local leaders, its subjectivity
allows room for bias and small-scale corruption. Hossain describes one particularly negative
experience with community-based targeting in the Bangladesh Primary Education Stipend. She
blames the failures of this program on the local-level bias and corruption rooted in its beneficiary
selection process, arguing that teachers often chose students as beneficiaries based on merit rather
than poverty 67. This example shows why successful community-based targeting often requires clear
communication of program objectives and strong checks on those making selections.
Categorical targeting and self-targeting, respectively, represent the purest top-down and bottom-up
approaches. Categorical targeting involves a review of existing government records to generate a
list of those who match a firm set of inclusion criteria such as age, gender, or enrollment in a certain
grade range. This method is primarily used for programs that are universally targeted (i.e. to all
children), when national-level records are considered complete and accurate, or to expedite the
60
targeting of programs that are aimed towards a subset of the population (e.g. girls). Self-targeting
occurs when a program establishes eligibility criteria and depends on potential beneficiaries to
identify themselves. This is one part of the targeting strategy used in Tunisia, since the beneficiary
household typically initiates the application processes for PNAFN as well as PPAS.
Coady et al. 125 provide an overview of the range of targeting strategies used worldwide, concluding
that interventions using means testing, geographic testing, or self-selection tend to yield the best
targeting performance. They also conclude that using more targeting methods results in better
targeting performance. Many countries have implemented multiple targeting strategies: 14 of the
33 programs reviewed used two different strategies, and one (Peru) used three strategies. Not all of
the programs in this sample appear to have undergone targeting evaluations. Of those whose
targeting has been evaluated, most are described in only a short paragraph or section embedded
within a larger impact evaluation. A vast majority of these describe targeting as positive or
effective, with exceptions in Bangladesh, Mozambique, and some regions of Chile 63,67,127.
Summary of program targeting
The lack of explicit eligibility criteria that determine a household’s eligibility for PPAS precludes a
precise estimate of inclusion and exclusion errors. At present, the only consistently implemented
eligibility restriction is a household’s eligibility for PNAFN. Errors of inclusion and exclusion for the
PNAFN program could not be evaluated in this study.
Households benefiting from PPAS tend to be poorer than the national average and poorer than
neighboring households who do not benefit from financial assistance for their children’s schooling.
However, there is substantial geographic variation in the extent to which the program appears to
target the poorest populations, and in the extent to which beneficiaries of monthly benefits differ
from non-beneficiary households and households who receive only annual back-to-school benefits.
The lack of a clear focus of the program is reflected in inadequate targeting performance: while
the program tends to benefit poorer households with children of school-eligible age, loose eligibility
criteria would suggest that PPAS is currently subject to a large error of exclusion, whereas a tighter
specification of eligibility criteria, such as a focus on only children enrolled in school or only on the
poorest, would suggest that the program is currently subject to a large error of inclusion.
Further, limiting PPAS eligibility only to PNAFN households precludes many poor non-PNAFN
households from accessing these benefits.
The key recommendation is that the program’s objectives be clarified in order to optimize
program targeting. Clear eligibility criteria, consistent with the program’s objectives, need to be
identified and enforced, in order to ensure that program benefits reach the intended target
populations. Multiple targeting methods may need to be employed, and different eligibility criteria
may need to be considered in different areas, to ensure that the program reaches those most in
need, however, efforts to minimize exclusion and inclusion error need to take into consideration the
cost of confirming and monitoring eligibility. Sources of geographic variation in targeting should be
explored (and addressed), and the extent to which the program is intended to reduce within-area
inequalities vs. between-area inequalities needs to be clarified. Experiences from education-related
cash transfer programs in other countries may help inform the optimal re-design of targeting
strategies for PPAS. Specific recommendations are provided in Section 11.
61
10.
Results - Part IV: Impact
This section describes the extent to which PPAS reached its objectives, including both short-term
and longer-term objectives:
o
o
o
to improve households’ economic status,
to increase households’ investment in children’s education, and
to improve children’s school enrollment, attendance, performance and retention.
We first describe key informants’ expectations of program impact, followed by an analysis of data
from the surveys with local decision makers and with beneficiary and non-beneficiary households.
Expectations of program impact among key informants
Key informants were asked about their opinions of the program’s impact on beneficiary households’
education expenses, on school enrollment, and on dropout rates of recipients. Informants were also
asked, on a scale of 1 (bad) to 5 (very good), how they would rate the current performance of the
program on various categories, including targeting, the appropriateness of the benefit amount, and
its impact. Figure 40 summarizes these ratings. While targeting was perceived as neither good nor
poor, on average, the appropriateness of the benefit amount was rated poor and opinions regarding
the program’s impact were worst.
Figure 40. Average ratings of stakeholders
Several ideas raised in key informant interviews suggested that the benefit structure of the cash
transfer program should vary based on certain non-behavioral
criteria. As it exists now, this national program delivers an equal
amount of aid to each child living in an eligible household (up to 3
“Living with DT 500
children per household). Interviewees almost all suggested that
in Gabés is not the
increased PPAS benefit amounts would make more of a difference
same as living with
than the current amount in terms of educational outcomes.
DT 500 in Tunis.”
Characteristics such as region, urbanicity, poverty level, and school
level could be used to tailor benefit amounts to reflect each
62
household’s specific circumstances. Of particular interest was the idea that cash transfer amounts
should mirror the changes to schooling costs that occur as students progress to higher grade levels.
There was some disagreement, however, around whether geography should play a role in the
benefit amount. Several informants pointed out that the cost of living varies considerably between
urban and rural areas, while Key Informant #1 pointed out that even designating a household as
urban or rural is not always easy. This informant also noted that an urban/rural parameter
influencing benefit amounts could create a gradient between locations that some would likely
perceive as unfair.
Respondents also recommended that evaluators and program
“Other programs
officials consider modifying the timing and delivery of the aid
have failed due to
transfers. Several respondents pointed out that the scheduling of
benefits can affect how households perceive and ultimately use the
isolation and
money they receive. Careful coordination with (or around) other
failure to work
payments such as PNAFN, back to school benefits, and regular
together.”
paychecks could subtly remind families that the monthly cash
transfers are separate from other sources of income and intended for
use on educational expenses. There was also discussion about
whether the transfers have more impact on spending behaviors in smaller, monthly payments (the
current strategy), or if it would be better to lump these together and distribute them less frequently.
Another topic covered was the idea of in-kind aid (namely school supplies) as a more direct way of
offsetting educational costs for households. Even in the form of a voucher/card system,
respondents saw logistical challenges to implementing this idea as a part of the current transfer
program. Still, it was noted that a non-transferrable voucher system with a proper identification
system could optimize the program’s impact while directly supporting local markets for school
supplies. One respondent felt that in-kind aid is a “thing of the past” as far as this program is
concerned, and that it instead falls into the realm of NGOs, charities, and other government-run
assistance strategies. Others were still open to the idea of in-kind support once a year and/or in
combination with the existing transfers for education. One should note that Union Tunisienne de la
Solidarité Sociale (UTSS) and the Ministry of Women and Children, both key stakeholders in the
transfer program, still work to deliver in-kind aid to poor and vulnerable children. A clear divide
remains among all stakeholders regarding the proper role of in-kind aid: left alone as a remnant of
the past regime, entrusted to NGOs and civil society, or formally utilized in conjunction with cash
transfers.
While the key informant interviews intended to explore awareness of the existence of the cash
transfer for education program, respondents focused mostly on the idea that few members of the
public share an accurate understanding of PNAFN and PPAS. Social workers, word of mouth, and
some multimedia advertising currently serve as the key conduits for information. It was expressed in
interviews that virtually everyone in Tunisia is familiar with the program, but not everyone has a
correct grasp of the details. This information includes not only eligibility criteria or where to enroll in
the program, but also the core principles that the program exists independently of PNAFN and
intends to help offset household educational expenses. Interviewees believed that awareness of
these key facts can be reinforced through attempts to enhance cognizance among household
leaders. Key Informant #1 commented specifically on households making the psychological link
63
between education and payments: “make sure people are thinking about it, and this would probably
improve the impact” (September, 2013). Proposed methods for increasing this form of awareness
among households ranged from explicit reminders (e.g., national advertising, social worker
communication) to subtle changes in scheduling (e.g., aligning payments with the beginning of each
academic trimester). Several respondents expressed that a simultaneous focus on making both
monetary and psychological impact at the household level is the key for improving the overall
educational impact of the cash transfer system.
Each respondent shared the belief that social workers and outreach staff play key roles in the
success of this program. As the main point of contact with beneficiaries, they bear much of the
responsibility for following up with their clients. Several key informants see them as critical players
in the “protection” of children from the harms of poverty and dropout, and recommended that
further efforts be made to ensure regular (at least annual) home visits—not just when issues arise.
Although the scale of the program seems to be manageable for the current outreach workforce,
several respondents mentioned a need for more logistical support for these personnel. Specifically
mentioned were barriers resulting from the need to share computers or automobiles with
colleagues in order to thoroughly fulfill their duties. Social workers were also said to possess an
important combination of knowledge and power regarding program awareness and eligibility. This
power can be harnessed to improve impact and monitoring on the household level, but it could also
backfire in the form of personal bias, familiarity, or political clientelism. Either way, social workers
are in a unique position to observe the household as a whole (rather than just in terms of financial
and demographic statistics) and gather subjective information that is otherwise difficult to obtain. If
effective, a social worker is seen as having the potential to identify all of a household’s needs and
connect them to the appropriate services.
Finally, respondents provided input on both internal and external evaluation efforts relating to the
cash transfer program. In terms of monitoring and evaluation by program administrators, interviews
revealed a clear need for more regular, continuous, and systematic efforts to track the status and
progress of the program. As it stands, the monitoring and evaluation system is said to depend
mostly on site visits and the circulation of memos, but these tend to happen only when problems
arise. Key Informant #5 also mentioned that internal evaluation would benefit from increased
collaboration with diverse organizations throughout civil society (September 2013). Respondents’
overall interest in the current external evaluation focused mostly on 1) the program’s impact on
educational spending, 2) efficiency in targeting and delivery, and 3) effectiveness in terms of
communication and awareness. One informant specifically expressed the expectation that the
evaluation would provide a much-needed evidence-based figure for benefit amounts, which appear
to have been chosen somewhat arbitrarily. Another notable area of interest was the impact on the
child itself; one individual wondered how much of the money provided actually benefits the children
rather than just the parents, while another expressed a desire to know more about the long-term
impact of the cash transfer program as a way to prevent a child’s future need for social assistance.
As these individuals will likely be involved in the program’s next steps, it is important to take into
account their experiences and perspectives.
64
Social workers’ perception of program impact
Social workers perceived a limited impact of the PPAS program on the educational outcomes of
children. While a narrow majority felt that the benefit amount was sufficient to impact households’
educational expenses, one third indicated no impact at all and fewer than 20% felt that the program
had a positive impact on school enrollment, school performance, and/or school attendance (Figure
41).
Figure 41. Social workers’ perception of the adequacy of the benefit amount
In your opinion, is the benefit amount sufficient to have a positive impact on…
Education expenses
52%
School attendance
13%
School performance
17%
School enrollment/dropout
23%
None of the above
35%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
Asked about the most appropriate monthly payment amount, more than half of respondents
indicated that the amount should be more than doubled, with one quarter of respondents
suggesting that the amount be increased to more than 30 Dinar per child per month (Figure 42).
Figure 42. Social workers’ perception of the optimal benefit amount
In your opinion, what would be the most appropriate monthly payment amount for this
program? (Dinar per month per child)
50%
43%
40%
30%
26%
23%
20%
10%
9%
0%
10 Dinar or less
11-20 Dinar
21-30 Dinar
More than 30 Dinar
Social workers had diverse perceptions of schooling attendance among PPAS beneficiaries.
Consistent with the findings on program targeting, only a minority (40%) of social workers thought
that all children who benefit from the program regularly go to school (Figure 43, Panel A); however,
approximately half of the respondents felt that at least some beneficiary children who regularly go
to school would not go to school without the program (Figure 43, Panel B).
65
Figure 43. Social workers’ perceptions of the program’s impact on children’s schooling
PANEL A.
Of 10 random children who currently receive PPAS payments, how many do you believe
regularly go to school?
60%
40%
40%
20%
30%
17%
6%
6%
0-4
5-7
0%
8-9
10
Don't know
PANEL B.
Of 10 random children who currently receive PPAS payments, how many would not go to
school without the benefit?
40%
32%
30%
23%
19%
20%
19%
6%
10%
0%
None
1-2
3-5
6-10
Don't know
Recommendations by social workers to increase program impact
In addition to the appropriateness of the benefit amounts, local social welfare workers were asked
about ways in which the program could be modified to increase its impact. Responses were split
when social workers were asked whether program benefits should be paid monthly, quarterly, or at
the beginning of the school year (Figure 44).
Figure 44. To have the greatest impact on school enrollment, attendance, and performance, when
should PPAS benefits be paid?
33%
38%
Monthly
Quarterly
At the beginning of the school year
29%
66
Social welfare workers’ opinions also varied on the optimal re-certification interval for PPAS benefits
(Figure 45). When asked how often households should re-certify their children’s eligibility, the most
frequent response was quarterly re-certification; nearly two thirds of respondents preferred either
quarterly or monthly re-certification to maintain PPAS benefits.
Figure 45. To have the greatest impact on school enrollment, attendance, and performance, how
often should households re-certify their children’s eligibility for PPAS benefits?
2%
Monthly, 13%
At the beginning
of the school year,
33%
Monthly
Quarterly
At the beginning of the school year
Less frequently
Quarterly, 52%
This finding suggests a preference among social workers for a program that provides benefits
conditional on maintaining school attendance in addition to children’s annual re-enrollment in
school. Further support for a conditional transfer program is provided by the answers to a question
about the expected impact of conditionality on school enrollment, attendance, and performance.
Figure 46 indicates that the majority of respondents expected a greater impact of the program if
benefits were tied to presence of the children in school and not only to children’s enrollment.
Figure 46. Expected impact of conditionality on school enrollment, attendance, and performance
If benefits were bound to presence in school, do you think the impact of the program on school
enrollment, attendance and performance would be the same, slightly higher, or much higher?
Much higher
impact, 35%
Same impact,
40%
Slightly higher
impact, 25%
67
In total, approximately two thirds of social workers preferred that continued receipt of benefits be
conditional on incurring educational expenses (52%), children’s school attendance (38%), and/or
children’s school performance (15%; Figure 47).
Figure 47. Social workers’ perceptions regarding conditionality of PPAS benefits
In your opinion, should the continuation of monthly benefits be dependent on…
Education expenses
52%
School attendance
38%
School performance
School enrollment
15%
0%
None of the above
33%
0%
10%
20%
30%
40%
50%
60%
Importantly, when asked to choose between cash payments to households and in-kind assistance as
a means of improving children’s school enrollment, attendance and performance, the majority of
respondents preferred the provision of in-kind assistance through schools to the direct financial
assistance to households (Figure 48).
Figure 48. Social workers’ preferences for cash vs. in-kind provision of school support
In-kind
assistance
to children
through
schools,
59%
Cash
assistance
to
households,
41%
Further, and conceptually related: one third of respondents felt that PPAS beneficiaries cognitively
link PPAS and PNAFN benefits, i.e., that most beneficiaries consider PPAS benefits as a regular part
of PNAFN. By contrast, 45% indicated that most beneficiary families think that PPAS payments are
specifically for the education of their children. These findings are in line with responses from key
informants that indicate that at present, there is no direct link of program benefits to children’s
education.
68
Variation in benefit amounts was a common topic in interviews with key informants. Social workers
were asked about 18 different characteristics of households and/or children, and whether the
benefit amount should vary with these characteristics. Social workers broadly supported variation in
benefits, for a minimum of 3, mean of 10, and maximum of 16 criteria across respondents. Economic
characteristics and household composition were most frequently mentioned, followed by children’s
school enrollment and attendance (Figure 49). Respondents generally opposed varying benefit
levels with children’s gender or grade level, or school performance.
Figure 49. Social welfare workers’ attitudes toward variation in the PPAS benefit amounts
Please tell us about your agreement with the following statements:
“The monthly benefit amount for a child should depend on ...”
Disagree
Neutral / undecided
Household income
Agree
91%
6%
Household assets
10%
85%
Number of children in the family
9%
87%
Parental employment
13%
Child’s school enrollment
83%
15%
Child’s school attendance
79%
11%
Land ownership
80%
15%
72%
Disability of a household member
21%
68%
Cost of living
25%
69%
Eligibility for other social programs
20%
Distance of child’s residence to school
27%
Child’s health status
54%
38%
Rural vs. urban residence
52%
46%
39%
Gender of the head of household
52%
Child’s school performance
33%
32%
55%
Parents’ engagement in school activities
55%
Child’s grade level
Child’s gender
70%
19%
66%
15%
85%
100%
50%
69
0%
50%
100%
Impact on household budgets and education expenses
Household surveys assessed educational expenditures, in order to compare them with the PPAS
monthly benefit amount and with expenditures for food and other household expenses. Table 8
shows the average household-reported expenditures on children’s education in primary school and
in colleges and lycées. Expenditures are shown per child in order to assess economies of scale.
Table 8. Household expenditures for children’s education
PANEL A. Expenses per child in écoles publiques d'enseignement primaire
1 enfant 2 enfants 3 enfants Moyenne
Dépenses le mois dernier :
46
40
29
42
31
3
11
28
2
10
22
2
5
29
3
10
496
387
264
442
173
111
103
2
108
133
85
86
1
83
79
64
72
2
48
152
99
95
1
95
repas à l'école
transport scolaire
cours particuliers
Dépenses totales pendant année scolaire :
frais de scolarité (inscription, cours particuliers,…)
tenues scolaires
fournitures scolaires
dortoir/internat à temps partiel à l'école
autres dépenses reliées à la scolarité (repart, …)
PANEL B. Expenses per child en collèges et lycées publics
Dépenses le mois dernier:
75
63
51
70
38
16
21
32
16
16
28
12
11
36
16
19
Dépenses totales pendant année scolaire:
638
458
401
573
tenues scolaires
autres dépenses reliées à la scolarité (repart, …)
220
137
131
5
146
143
112
98
13
92
106
94
98
9
93
191
127
119
8
128
repas à l'école
transport scolaire
cours particuliers
Note: Numbers represent self-reports from beneficiary and non-beneficiary households; numbers are
rounded to the nearest Dinar.
The column on the right shows the average expenditures per child in primary (Panel A) or secondary
(Panel B) school, respectively. The data suggest substantial monthly and annual costs, and
differences between the costs of primary and secondary school. In primary school, the program’s 10
Dinars per month per child amount covers nearly 25% of the monthly cost of schooling; in secondary
school only one-seventh of the monthly cost is covered by the program. The largest householdreported monthly cost of education related to school meals. When comparing the cost of schooling
to the monthly payment of 10 Dinars per child for up to 3 children, the program payments seem to
be small but not negligible.
70
There are substantial annual costs for children’s schooling: enrollment fees constitute the largest
cost, followed nearly equally by school supplies, uniforms and other items. It is plausible that these
annual costs constitute significant barriers to schooling
among the poorest students.
“The aid amount needs to
reflect the responsibility
we’re putting on the
parents to get or keep
their kids in school.”
Aggregating the monthly cost of schooling across all
children who currently attend primary or secondary
school, households’ self-reported educational expenses
appeared to constitute a substantial portion of
households’ overall budgets (Table 9). Without
attempting to validate individual households’ responses,
the self-reported education expenses may be as high as
one-half of households’ monthly food expenses and more than one-quarter of households’ total
monthly expenses.
Table 9. Household expenditures for children’s education, nutrition, and total expenses
Dépenses mensuelles du ménage
Dépenses totales
Dépenses pour la nourriture
376
210
388
221
406
233
387
219
67
644
122
971
196
1329
117
922
Dépenses pour l'éducation primaire et secondaire
Dépenses mensuelles
Dépenses annuelles
Note: Numbers represent self-reports from beneficiary and non-beneficiary households; numbers are
rounded to the nearest Dinar.
Monthly household expenditures on education varied greatly across households (Figure 50), and
there was little difference between PPAS beneficiary and non-beneficiary households. The plurality
of households spent between 25 and 50 Dinars per month per child on educational expenses.
Figure 50. Distribution of monthly expenses for primary and secondary education in beneficiary
households and their nearest neighbors
40%
35%
30%
25%
Beneficiary households
20%
Neighbors
15%
10%
5%
0%
0 - 24
25 - 49
50 - 74
75 - 99
100 - 124
125+
Dépenses mensuelles pour l'éducation primaire et secondaire, par enfant
71
Similar variation was observed in the distribution of annual expenditures, with the plurality of
households spending between 250 and 500 Dinars per year per child (Figure 51).
Figure 51. Distribution of annual expenses for primary and secondary education in PPAS
beneficiary households and their nearest neighbors
40%
30%
Beneficiary households
Neighbors
20%
10%
0%
0 - 249
250 - 499
500 - 749
750 - 999 1000 - 1249 1250 - 1499
1500+
Dépenses annuelles pour l'éducation primaire et secondaire, par enfant
When directly comparing the educational expenditures of PPAS beneficiary and non-beneficiary
households, non-beneficiary households had greater educational expenditures (100 Dinars per
month) than beneficiary households (63 Dinars per month). Similarly, annual education expenses
were higher in non-beneficiary households (890 Dinars) than beneficiary households (550 Dinars).
Once we control for the number of children in school, however, the differences disappear, with
beneficiary households (60 Dinars per child per month, 539 Dinars per child per year) and nonbeneficiary households (56 Dinars per child per month, 522 Dinars per child per year) spending
similar amounts.
Table 10 shows adjusted differences in educational expenditures between beneficiary households
and non-beneficiary households. The dependent variable represents total monthly (left column) and
annual (right column) expenditures on education; each expense was transformed using the natural
log. Positive parameters indicate higher spending associated with the variables listed on the left,
whereas negative parameters indicate lower spending. As expected, household expenses increase
with additional children in school, and they increase more for children in secondary school than for
those in primary school. Households’ economic status (expressed by estimated per-capita annual
expenditures, total monthly expenditures, and food expenditures) are strongly associated with
increased monthly expenditures for schooling, but less so with annual expenditures. Distance to
school is associated with higher monthly expenditures, whereas urban residence is associated with
higher annual schooling-related expenses.
Effects estimates can be obtained by exponentiating the estimated coefficients; the coefficient of
0.101 for beneficiary households indicates that, controlling for other characteristics, households
receiving PPAS, on average, spent 10.6% more each month for their children’s primary and
secondary education than households that do not receive these benefits. There was no difference
in annual expenditures.
72
Table 10. Estimated effect of the program on households’ expenses for children’s education
Estimated effect on households'
expenditures for children's education
Log(monthly expenses)
beta (se)
Beneficiary household
Log(annual expenses)
beta (se)
0.101 (0.045) *
-0.002 (0.040)
Per-capita annual expenditures (log)
0.316 (0.061)
***
Monthly nutrition expenditures (log)
0.156 (0.064)
*
-0.058 (0.057)
Monthly total expenditures (log)
0.172 (0.075)
*
0.21 (0.066)
**
1
0.432 (0.057)
***
0.376 (0.051)
***
2
0.843 (0.068)
***
0.689 (0.060)
***
3
0.917 (0.106)
***
0.774 (0.093)
***
1
0.79 (0.053)
***
0.647 (0.047)
***
2
1.282 (0.066)
***
0.907 (0.059)
***
3
1.441 (0.118)
***
1.1 (0.103)
***
0.377 (0.076)
***
# of children in primary school
# of children in secondary school
Urban residence
0.072 (0.086)
Distance to nearest primary school
0.034 (0.011)
Distance to nearest college
-0.004 (0.005)
Distance to nearest lycess
0.007 (0.003)
**
0.049 (0.054)
0.005 (0.010)
-0.008 (0.004)
*
-0.001 (0.003)
Notes: Estimates are derived from linear regression models of monthly (left) and annual (right)
household expenditures for children’s primary and secondary education. Dependent variables were
transformed using the natural log. *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.05, 0.01,
and 0.001 levels, respectively.
73
In Table 7 we described the households’ self-reported unmet needs for children’s education. Asked
how much money would be needed to meet all of their children’s education needs in the current
school year, most households mentioned amounts that substantially exceed the cumulative annual
benefit amount provided by PPAS (Figure 52). More than half of the households reported unmet
needs exceeding 500 Dinar for the current school year. There were few differences between
beneficiary and non-beneficiary households.
Figure 52. Unmet needs of PPAS beneficiary and non-beneficiary households for children’s
schooling
% of households
De combien d’argent supplémentaire avez-vous besoin pour fournir les éléments
manquants pour tous vos enfants au cours de cette année scolaire? (Dinars par an)
35
30
25
20
15
Beneficiaries
10
Non-beneficiaries
5
0
<100
100-199 200-299 300-499 500-749 750-999 1000+
School attendance and school performance
Past-week school attendance for those in school was high: 95.5% among beneficiary households and
94.5% among non-beneficiary households; the difference was not statistically significant. Household
surveys asked about each child’s performance relative to other children in the same class. The
results suggest that, on average, children in beneficiary households performed worse than children
in non-beneficiary households (Figure 53). This result is not surprising, as these households are
poorer, on average, and children in these households have likely faced and are still facing many
difficulties that affect school performance.
Figure 53. Children’s school performance in comparison with their peers
Par rapport à son/ses camarades de classe,
comment est sa performance à l'école?
100%
Supérieure
80%
Similaire
60%
Inférieure
40%
20%
0%
Non bénéficiaires
Bénéficiaires
74
Importantly, there were significant differences in parents’ expectations regarding the minimum
amount of schooling for children in beneficiary vs. non-beneficiary households. PPAS beneficiaries
were less likely to feel that their children should get post-secondary education (Figure 54).
Figure 54. Au minimum, un garçon / une fille devrait rester scolarisé jusqu’à quel niveau d’études?
100%
Ne sait pas
80%
Supérieur
60%
67%
75%
67%
77%
40%
20%
Secondaire
Collège
Primaire
21%
17%
20%
18%
Beneficiaries
Non-beneficiaries
Beneficiaries
Non-beneficiaries
0%
Males
Females
School progression, grade repetition, and drop-out
The primary objective of PPAS is to improve children’s school performance and decrease rates of
school drop-out. To evaluate the effect of the program on drop-out, we assessed the entire
educational history of each child age 6-17 who had ever attended school. The analysis of not only
the current year’s schooling but the entire schooling history allowed us to analyze children’s annual
progression to the next grade level, grade repetition, and dropout, from the year in which they first
enrolled in school until the current school year (Figure 55). Due to the lack of national data that
would allow for comparisons of school performance across schools, annual rates of children’s
progression to the next grade level were considered the primary measure of school performance.
Figure 55. Example from the form used to assess each child’s schooling history (comparable data
were collected for all school years from 1999/2000 to 2013/2014)
75
Schooling histories were collected from PPAS beneficiary households and neighboring households
for all children ages 6-24 who ever attended school. In total, schooling histories were collected for
2,583 children. For each school year after the child first enrolled in school until the current school
year, we determined a) whether the child was enrolled in school, b) whether at the end of the school
year the child progressed to the next higher grade level, c) whether the child repeated the current
grade level, or d) whether the child dropped out of school. Because of extensive changes in the
macro context in Tunisia over time, and in view of the fact that the education benefit program
started only in 2007, the analyses presented below are limited to the school years from 2005/2006
until 2013/2014. Thus, for each child, school enrollment and grade level were observed up to 9
consecutive times, with educational outcomes of each school year (grade progression, grade
repetition, or drop-out) observed up to 8 times. Because schooling decisions differ after the 9th
grade level, only outcomes through the 8th grade of primary school were included in the analysis.
Using these data, we created a panel dataset with one record per school year per child. In total the
data included 13,485 observations on education outcomes, i.e. we observed for each of 13,485
school years whether the child continued to the next grade level, repeated the grade level, or
dropped out of school. We linked each school year to administrative data from the education
benefit program to determine whether the household benefited from the education benefit or not
(yet). This information was analyzed in a multivariate regression framework, implemented in the
form of a random effects model, which accounted for the effect of each child’s time-invariant
characteristics on grade progression, grade repetition, and drop-out.
To estimate the effect of program benefits on education outcomes we first used data from
beneficiary households prior to the onset of benefits, and for all school years from neighboring
households, to predict what would have happened in the absence of the program. Parameter
estimates from separate models were estimated to predict for each child and each school year the
probability of grade progression, grade repetition, and drop-out. The results of these models are
shown in Table 11. The interpretation of the parameters is similar to those from a standard logistic
regression model: an odds ratio greater than 1 indicates that a variable is positively associated with
the outcome (higher rate of grade progression, higher rate of grade repetition, and higher drop-out);
an odds ratio below 1 indicates that a variable is negatively associated with the outcome. Asterisks
indicate the statistical significance of the association.
The results of the models suggest that prior to PPAS benefit receipt, children in beneficiary
households had worse educational outcomes than children in non-beneficiary households (an odds
ratio for neighboring households greater than 1 for progression to the next grade level, and odds
ratios below than 1 for grade repetition and drop-out). Children who currently repeat a grade level
are unlikely to repeat the grade level again and have significantly elevated chance of dropping out.
Female children, children whose parents expect them to reach a higher level of education, and
children in economically better-off households, as well as children in households whose head has at
least a secondary education, are more likely to continue to the next grade level, less likely to repeat
a grade level, and less likely to drop out of school. Greater distance to the nearest college was
associated with increased rates of drop-out (odds ratio greater than 1 for distance), and there
appeared to be a trend toward higher rates of grade repetition over time (odds ratio greater than
one for the time trend).
76
Table 11. Estimates of random effects models of grade progression, repetition, and drop-out in the
absence of PPAS
Odds
ratio
Confidence
interval
Progression to the next grade level
Child lives in a neighboring household
Child is currently repeating a grade level
Child is female
Child expected is to reach "superior" level
1.38
1.74
2.01
2.16
***
***
***
***
[1.16 - 1.63]
[1.41 - 2.14]
[1.70 - 2.39]
[1.79 - 2.61]
Head of household has secondary education
Log(predicted per-capita expenditures)
Distance to the nearest primary school (km)
Time trend (calendar years)
2.32 ***
2.89 ***
1.00
0.94 **
[1.75 - 3.09]
[2.23 - 3.73]
[0.98 - 1.01]
[0.91 - 0.98]
Child is female
0.81
0.24
0.54
0.58
**
***
***
***
[0.69 - 0.95]
[0.18 - 0.32]
[0.46 - 0.63]
[0.49 - 0.70]
0.51 ***
0.43 ***
0.99
1.05 **
[0.39 - 0.66]
[0.34 - 0.54]
[0.98 - 1.00]
[1.01 - 1.09]
Child is female
0.68
7.73
0.70
0.45
**
***
**
***
[0.54 - 0.86]
[6.09 - 9.81]
[0.55 - 0.88]
[0.35 - 0.57]
0.37 ***
0.41 ***
1.03 **
0.99
[0.21 - 0.65]
[0.29 - 0.60]
[1.01 - 1.05]
[0.93 - 1.06]
Grade repetition
Temporary or permanent drop-out
Notes: Estimates from random effects logistic regression models of annual grade progression,
repetition, and drop-out following grades P1 through P8. Models include the entire schooling history
of all children ages 5-19, including 8,455 outcomes among 2,276 children in both non-beneficiary
households and beneficiary households prior to benefit receipt. Models control for variation in grade
progression between individual grade levels and over time, and for regional variation. *, **, and
*** indicate statistical significance at the 0.05, 0.01, and 0.001 levels, respectively. Estimated
associations between poverty and educational outcomes as well as other estimates were roughly
identical for models based on quantile regressions and variance-weighted least squares models.
77
Using parameter estimates from these models, we compared the educational outcomes of children
in beneficiary households after the onset of benefits to what would be expected in the absence of
benefits. Specifically, we included the predicted values of grade progression, grade repetition, and
drop-out from the models shown in Table 11 as explanatory variables in a second set of random
effects logistic regression models with the same outcome variables. The second set of models was
only estimated for beneficiary households. Because applications for financial support may be the
result of prior difficulties, which also may influence children’s educational outcomes, we assessed
trends in children’s educational outcomes prior to and after the onset of benefit, relative to the year
in which the household first started receiving benefits from the program. The results of these
analyses are shown in Table 12 and displayed graphically in Figure 56.
Table 12. Results of logistic regression models of progression to the next grade level, rates of
repeating grade levels, and rates of drop-out prior to and after the onset of program benefits
Progression to the
next grade level
Odds
Confidence
ratio
interval
Grade repetition
Odds
Confidence
ratio
interval
Temporary or
permanent drop-out
Odds
Confidence
ratio
interval
School year relative to benefit onset
3 or more years prior
0.71
[0.36 - 1.41]
1.69
[0.88 - 3.27]
0.26
[0.03 - 2.06]
2 years prior
0.67
[0.37 - 1.21]
1.38
[0.75 - 2.55]
1.26
[0.45 - 3.54]
1 year prior
0.76
[0.46 - 1.26]
1.18
[0.70 - 1.99]
1.44
[0.63 - 3.29]
Year of onset
(ref)
(ref)
(ref)
1 year after
0.65 ** [0.48 - 0.89]
1.45 * [1.05 - 1.99]
1.26
2 years after
0.65 *
[0.46 - 0.93]
1.24
[0.85 - 1.81]
1.57
[0.89 - 2.77]
3 years after
0.70
[0.47 - 1.04]
1.36
[0.91 - 2.04]
1.07
[0.55 - 2.06]
4 or more years after
0.76
[0.50 - 1.17]
1.27
[0.81 - 1.99]
0.98
[0.49 - 1.95]
[0.74 - 2.16]
Estimates from random effects logistic regression models controlling for the probability of grade progression,
repetition, and drop-out, respectively. * and ** indicate statistical significance at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels.
The results indicate a trend toward poorer educational outcomes of children in PPAS beneficiary
households in all years except the school year in which the household started to receive benefits
from the program. Conversely, there appears to be a temporary improvement in rates of grade
progression, reduced rates of grade repetition, and reduced rates of drop-out, in the school year in
which the household first received benefits from the program. For progression to the next grade
level and grade repetition, these improvements were statistically significant. These results are
consistent with an interpretation of a temporary positive effect on children’s educational outcomes.
78
Figure 56. Graphical representation of the estimated effect of PPAS benefit receipt on progression
to the next grade level, rates of repeating grade levels, and rates of drop-out
1.2
Repeated grades
Grade progression
Drop-out
1.8
Odds of Drop-out relative to onset of benefits
1
1.6
Odds of repeating a grade level
Odds of continuing to the next grade level
1.8
0.8
0.6
0.4
1.4
1.2
1
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.2
0
0
1.6
1.4
1.2
1
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0
The small, but likely positive, effect of the program is also reflected in responses from beneficiary
households about the effect of the program benefit on their decision to keep a child in school.
While one-third of households indicated that the program had influenced their decision, nearly one
in four households indicated no effect, or probably no effect (Figure 57).
Figure 57. Self-reported effect of PPAS on schooling
Pour chacun de vos enfants, est-ce que les allocations ont influencé
votre décision de l’envoyer ou ne pas l’envoyer à l’école?
Bien sûr que non
16%
Bien sûr que oui
35%
Probablement
pas
8%
Bien sûr que oui
Probablement
Peut-être
Probablement pas
Bien sûr que non
Peut-être
32%
Probablement
9%
79
Estimates of impact from other cash transfer programs
The literature review summarized in Appendix 5 describes key results of the many impact
evaluations of other educational-focused cash transfer programs. No two evaluations investigated
the same combination of variables, so it helps to first look at the range of outcomes measured,
including enrollment, attendance, dropout, re-entry, access to education, participation in education,
test scores, grade repeats and progression, regular school performance, % never schooled, female to
male ratio, poverty, child labor, age at marriage, spending on education, spending on household
goods and food, and psychosocial factors such as self-confidence. While it is difficult to generalize
across most variables, a majority of the programs saw increases in enrollment and attendance. This
is not surprising, given that almost all cash transfers in this list are conditional on these two factors.
Impacts on school performance were mixed, possibly due to the fact that they encourage the
enrollment of students who had previously dropped out and/or had been absent for an extended
period of time. Mexico’s Oportunidades and Brazil’s Bolsa Familia are commonly described as the
most successful conditional cash transfer programs in the world 107, but it is generally difficult to
compare programs across the varied contexts in which they exist. The rapid spread of educationfocused transfer programs over the past two decades, however, is no coincidence. Within their
particular context, each of the evaluated programs demonstrated at least some positive impact.
An important debate centers on the relative efficacy of conditional cash transfer (CCT) vs.
unconditional cash transfer (UCT) programs. Akresh et al. found that CCTs and UCTs are generally
equally effective, but that among marginal children (those who are initially not enrolled in school or
are less likely to go to school) conditionality positively impacts educational outcomes.128 Similarly, a
Cochrane systematic review by Baird et al. found that while differences between CCT and UCT
programs overall are not significant, well-regulated conditional programs consistently lead to greater
effects on school enrollment.20 Finally, in a major World Bank report, Fiszbein and Schady conclude
that conditions should be applied to cash transfers when economically and politically appropriate:
"In sum, when there is a strong rationale to redistribute, a CCT can be justified under two broad sets
of conditions: first, when private investment in human capital among the poor is suboptimal from a
social point of view and, second, when conditions are necessary for political economy reasons (that
is, redistribution is politically feasible only when conditioned on good behavior)."121 Since both
conditions likely apply in the Tunisian context, we recommend that an element of conditionality be
added to PPAS, i.e., that benefits be based at a minimum on continued school enrollment and ideally
on school attendance.
Summary of program impact
Interviews with program stakeholders indicated little or no expectations of a measurable impact
of PPAS on outcomes. While analyses of household survey data generally support this expectation,
there is some indication of positive program effects on households’ investment in education and
potentially on children’s educational outcomes. In simple comparisons, beneficiary households
indicated lower educational expenditures and poorer educational outcomes than non-beneficiary
comparison households. This finding is consistent with the program’s focus on poorer and
disadvantaged households, who face greater barriers to education and educational achievement.
However, detailed econometric analyses indicate that, after controlling for households’ economic
characteristics, attitudes toward child education, education of the head of household, geographic
80
variation, and other characteristics, beneficiary households actually spent more money on
education for each child that is currently enrolled in school, and there were trends towards a
positive effect of program benefits on educational outcomes. However, the effect was small,
occurred only during the year in which the household first received benefits, and did not continue
over time; instead there are indications that children in beneficiary households continue to fare
worse than children in other households, with respect to educational expenditures, and educational
outcomes.
A variety of strategies, suggested by key informants, social workers and other successful transfer
programs, hold potential to increase the impact of PPAS on educational outcomes of children.
Benefit amounts that adequately reflect the priorities of the program, address household needs, and
account for variation in the cost of education, geographically and over time, are a critical component
of a successful program. While unconditional transfer programs have been shown to be effective,
direct comparisons between conditional and unconditional programs point to a greater impact of
conditional programs. Key informants and local social welfare workers shared such expectations of
greater impact from a program that requires regular re-certification of benefits and is conditional on
school attendance, in addition to school enrollment.
11.
Recommendations
On the basis of this evaluation we developed several recommendations for the strengthening of the
program. While key informants identified multiple objectives for the program, the
recommendations are based on the assumption that the primary purpose of the program is to
improve educational outcomes among children in poor households and to reduce rates of drop-out.
The recommendations are divided into immediate recommendations, short-term recommendations,
and medium-term recommendations. The recommendations are described in detail below and
summarized in Tables 13-15.
Immediate recommendations
1) Regularly re-certify program eligibility
–
There is evidence of substantial inclusion error, even if very loose eligibility criteria are
applied. At a minimum, the existence in the household of at least one child of schooleligible age should be confirmed. Benefit amounts should be adjusted accordingly if no
children are documented, or if benefits are paid for more than the number of eligible
children in the household.
–
While beneficiary households, on average, tend to be poorer than non-beneficiary
households, some households do not appear to qualify as poor. However, very few
households were ever required to re-certify their eligibility for PNAFN. Thus, we
recommend a periodic re-evaluation of households’ economic eligibility. Given the cost
of household visits, economic re-certification is recommended only every 2-5 years.
–
Appropriate resources (staff, transport) and clear guidelines must be available to local
MAS offices to conduct the regular re-certification of households’ eligibility.
81
2) Make program benefits conditional
–
Given the program’s focus on educational outcomes we recommend that the benefit be
made conditional on school enrollment, and that enrollment be re-certified annually.
–
Clear guidelines should be established and circulated describing when and how benefits
are to be discontinued if the conditions or eligibility are no longer met. Potential
repercussions for local social welfare office workers, teachers, and others involved in the
eligibility determination and enforcement must be considered and accounted for in the
development of these guidelines.
3) Drop the limit of 3 children per household
–
No clear reason was identified for limiting the education benefit to 3 children per
household. If children can be uniquely identified and a child’s belonging to a specific
household can be established by means of birth certificates or similar documentation,
we recommend dropping the limit. The additional cost of the program’s expansion to all
eligible children in the household is estimated to be significantly smaller than the
current inclusion error, as long as eligibility is limited to children who were ever enrolled
in school. The estimated cost will be even lower if other conditions (e.g., poverty,
current school enrollment, and/or school attendance) are added and enforced. More
than two-thirds of respondents to the local office survey supported dropping the limit,
whereas 29% supported the limit.
Table 13. Immediate recommendations
RECOMMENDATION
DESCRIPTION
1) Regularly re-certify
program eligibility
At the minimum, the existence in the household of at least one child
of school-eligible age should be confirmed.
Benefit amounts should be adjusted if no children are documented,
or if benefits are paid for more than the number of eligible children
in the household.
Re-certification of households’ economic eligibility is recommended
only once every 2-5 years.
Appropriate resources (staff, transport) must be available to local
MAS offices to conduct the regular re-certification of households’
eligibility.
2) Make program benefits
conditional
We recommend that the benefit be made conditional on school
enrollment, and that enrollment be re-certified annually.
Clear guidelines and procedures should be established that
determine when and how benefits are to be discontinued if the
conditions or eligibility are no longer met.
3) Drop the limit of 3
children per household
No clear reason was identified for limiting the education benefit to 3
children per household.
82
Short-term recommendations
1) Clarify the program’s objectives: Stakeholders and decision makers
–
At present the program has no clear objectives, and its present scale and scope are
unlikely to result in measurable improvements in national education indicators. The
program appears to simultaneously focus on poverty reduction and schooling, but as a
result does not address either optimally. We recommend that SMART (specific,
measurable, achievable, relevant/realistic, and time-bound) objectives be identified, and
if needed periodically revised, in order to guide the program’s design, implementation,
monitoring, and evaluation.
–
Resources, program eligibility criteria, program implementation, and the program’s
information system should be clearly matched to the program’s objectives. In the
context of limited resource availability, a narrower focus on a specific objective (e.g.,
reducing drop-out from primary school) is more likely to result in measureable, programattributable outcomes improvements than the current program’s broad focus across the
entire education spectrum.
2) Clarify the program’s objectives: Beneficiary households
–
The lack of clear program objectives is also evident among beneficiaries, who are not
clear as to whether the program principally targets education vs. poverty. For the
program to have meaningful effects on children’s schooling it is critical that beneficiary
households recognize the program’s intent, and conditionality, if applicable. We
recommend the sensitization of beneficiary families to the objectives of the program.
Table 14. Short-term recommendations
RECOMMENDATION
DESCRIPTION
1) Clarify the program’s
objectives:
Stakeholders and
decision makers
We recommend that SMART (specific, measurable, achievable,
relevant/realistic, and time-bound) objectives be identified, and if
needed periodically revised, in order to guide the program’s
design, implementation, monitoring, and evaluation.
2) Clarify the program’s
objectives: Beneficiary
households
We recommend the sensitization of beneficiary families to the
objectives of the program.
83
Medium-term recommendations
1) Make program benefits conditional on school attendance
–
Poor school performance, measured in this evaluation by grade repetition, is a critical
precursor to drop-out. Thus, the success of a program to improve educational outcomes
hinges on children attending school. We therefore recommend that program benefits be
conditional on school attendance.
–
In household surveys, almost half of all beneficiary households had no contact with
school officials in the past year. By encouraging parental involvement in schooling the
program has an opportunity to positively impact children’s school performance.
2) Develop an information system
–
MAS administrative data can be used to track the distribution of benefit amounts to
beneficiary households. However, at present, it is not possible to link benefits to
individual children, or to track eligibility criteria or program outcomes as part of an
integrated information system. We recommend that a system be developed that tracks
program eligibility, enrollment in school, and children’s educational outcomes.
3) Ensure cooperation and information sharing between MAS and schools
–
MAS infrastructure is well-suited for determining households’ economic needs and
households’ continued eligibility for PNAFN. However, MAS infrastructure is not wellsuited for determining children’s education needs and outcomes, to verify the continued
enrollment of children in school, or to preemptively identify children at risk of drop-out.
Local MAS offices, at present, do not have the resources to implement a regular recertification of school enrollment or attendance. Schools are better suited to implement
these tasks. We therefore recommend a close collaboration between MAS and MOE (at
the national level) and between the local social welfare offices and schools (at the local
level), as well as the implementation of a shared information system.
4) Understand geographic variation
–
Our analyses indicate great geographic variation in children’s educational outcomes, as
well as program implementation, program coverage, and rates of program growth. We
recommend the regular analysis of all available data (administrative and census data,
sample survey data, and education data) to identify sources of geographic variation.
–
It is critical to identify plausible and implausible variation, and to differentiate variation
in need from variation in the implementation of the program (e.g., eligibility
determination, enforcement of eligibility) in different areas.
–
The Ministry of Education has data that allow for the identification of schools and areas
with particularly high rates of grade repetition and drop-out. A close cooperation
between MAS and MOE will allow for the targeting of education benefits toward areas
and populations with the greatest need.
84
5) Reconsider the structure of the benefit
–
The analysis suggests great variation in the characteristics of household who are
currently benefiting from the program, and large variation in beneficiary households’
resources and needs. We recommend re-evaluating benefit levels and the current onesize-fits-all approach of the program.
–
Households’ educational expenses vary with a number of characteristics, including
households’ economic status, the number of children in school, primary vs. secondary
schooling, rural vs. urban residence, and distance to school. We therefore recommend
considering a « benefit scale « that allows for geographic variation in the benefit
amount, and variation with household needs and/or other characteristics. The
advantages of varying benefit amounts have to be weighed against the associated
logistical and administrative cost.
–
Welfare theory suggests that the household will optimally allocate additional resources,
which may or may not involve additional investment in children’s education. If the
program’s goal is to increase household investment in education, we recommend
exploration of vouchers or in-kind options to meet specific schooling-related needs of
children, such as transport, meals, books, or supplies.
6) Re-evaluate the relationship of PPAS to other programs
–
We recommend an optimization of the program’s relationship with PNAFN and other
programs. With its focus on the elderly, disabled, and single parent households, PNAFN
targets several characteristics that are associated with an increased risk of school
dropout. However, an exclusive focus on PNAFN households represents an important
source of exclusion error if the goal is to broadly improve school enrollment and to
reduce drop-out. Comparisons of the economic status of beneficiary households with
neighboring households suggest that many non-PNAFN households are as poor as, or
even poorer than, PNAFN households.
–
We also recommend integration, or at least coordination, of PPAS with BTS and other
education support programs in order optimize targeting, and to maximize the programs’
impact on children’s educational outcomes. The extent to which PPAS and BTS function
as substitutes or complements is currently not clear.
7) Learn from other cash transfer programs (see Appendix 5)
–
Comparisons with other transfer programs suggest the possibility of a proxy means test
to determine eligibility. While this may require additional fieldwork, its results could be
integrated within the new government data sharing system and used for other social
programs. A thorough verified proxy means test may provide a more reliable measure
of households’ economic status than the existing unverified means test used for PNAFN.
This strategy could ultimately allow for the expansion of PPAS beyond PNAFN. An
effective proxy means test also holds potential to reduce some of the paperwork and
beneficiary burden currently required for applications and re-certifications.
85
–
Changes to the payment structure could be modeled on programs in Singapore, Jamaica,
Turkey, Colombia, Mexico, or Uruguay, which specify different benefit levels based on
school level and other considerations. Only five programs in Appendix 5 place a limit on
the number of children covered per household; consideration might be given to
removing the three-child limit to reach out to larger (and often poorer) families.
–
Several other ideas to consider in Tunisia emerged from the sample of existing
programs, such as school attendance thresholds if this is to be added as a program
condition. One particular condition that could benefit PPAS comes from Panama’s Red
de Oportunidades program. This transfer requires a parent from the beneficiary
household to attend parent-teacher conferences, thus further connecting the cash
transfer to their child’s education 13. In Honduras and Nicaragua, conditional payments
have been made directly from the government to teachers, schools, or parent
associations to directly reinforce educational improvements 54,78. Looking even deeper
into the sample of programs, one could even learn more about existing re-certification
timelines and strategies to keep beneficiary information up-to-date.
8) Consider the study in the context of other studies and data on drop-out
–
The findings in this report should be considered complementary to other studies and
data on drop-out. For example, this study shares some recommendations with the 2014
OOSCI report, e.g., the improved communication among stakeholders, and attention to
regional variation in needs, such as transportation in rural areas and school meals in
disadvantaged areas. While the OOSCI study focused primarily on the education system,
this evaluation focused on the needs of households. A successful program for improving
school enrollment, attendance, performance, and retention will need to take into
consideration both structural components (e.g., quality of schooling) and household
needs and decision making.
–
OOSCI’s recommendation for decentralized education policies should be seen in the
context of existing variation in the implementation of the PPAS program. Efforts should
be made to ensure that decentralized education policies complement, but do not
conflict with, national education goals and objectives. This evaluation highlights the
need for appropriate oversight of the decentralized implementation of educationfocused programs.
–
We recommend that the optimal re-design of PPAS, including its benefit structure,
eligibility determination, and re-certification be identified in one or more pilot tests, to
avoid the full-scale implementation of a potentially ineffective or sub-optimal national
program that requires multiple iterative revisions.
86
Table 15. Medium-term recommendations
RECOMMENDATION
DESCRIPTION
1) Make program benefits
conditional on school
attendance
We recommend that program benefits be conditional on school
attendance, and that the program encourage at least annual
contact of parents or primary guardians with the school.
2) Develop an information
system
We recommend that a system be developed that tracks program
eligibility, enrollment in school, and children’s educational
outcomes.
3) Ensure cooperation and
information sharing
between MAS and schools
We recommend a close collaboration between MAS and MOE (at
the national level) and between the local social welfare offices and
schools (at the local level), as well as the implementation of a
shared information system.
4) Understand geographic
variation
We recommend the regular analysis of all available data to
understand geographic variation in the implementation of the
program, program coverage and educational outcomes, and to
allow for the targeting of the education benefit program toward
areas and populations with the greatest need
5) Reconsider the structure of
the benefit
We recommend re-evaluating benefit levels and the current onesize-fits-all approach of the program.
We recommend considering a “benefit scale” that allows for
geographic variation in the benefit amount, and variation with
household needs and/or other characteristics.
If the program’s goal is to increase household investment in
education, we recommend exploration of vouchers or in-kind
options to meet specific schooling-related needs of children.
We recommend that the optimal re-design of the program be
identified in one or more pilot tests.
6) Re-evaluate the relationship
of PPAS to other programs
We recommend re-evaluation of the program’s exclusive focus on
PNAFN households, and integration, or at least coordination, of
PPAS with other education support programs.
7) Learn from other cash
transfer programs
We recommend a careful review of approaches taken by other
countries to evaluate what options could feasibly be implemented
or adapted to the Tunisian context
8) Consider the study in the
context of other studies and
data on drop-out
We recommend this evaluation be considered alongside other
recent data on drop-out such as the MICS and the OOSCI report. A
successful program to improve educational outcomes will take into
consideration systems-level characteristics (e.g. quality of
schooling), regional variation in resources and needs, as well as
household needs and decision making.
87
12.
Works cited
1.
United Nations Evaluation Group. Norms for Evaluation in the UN System. 2005;
http://www.uneval.org/document/download/562.
Brazil's Bolsa Familia: How to Get Children Out of Jobs and into School. The Economist. Jul
2010 2010;396(8693):19-20.
Agostini CA, Brown PH. CASH TRANSFERS AND POVERTY REDUCTION IN CHILE. Journal of
Regional Science. Aug 2011 2011;51(3):604-625.
Agosto G, Nunez E, Citarroni H, Briasco I, Garcette N. From impact evaluations to paradigm
shift: a case study of the Buenos Aires Ciudadana Portena conditional cash transfer
programme. Journal of Development Effectiveness. Sep 2013;5(3):305-318.
Ahmed V, Zeshan M. An analysis of the social impact of the stipend program for secondary
school girls of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Educational Research for Policy and Practice. 2013:1-15.
Al-Samarrai S. The impact of governance on education inequality: Evidence from
Bangladesh. Public Administration & Development. 2009;29(3):167-179.
Alam A, Baez JE, Del Carpio X. Does Cash for School Influence Young Women's Behavior in the
Longer Term? Evidence from Pakistan. Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit/Institute for
the Study of Labor (IZA); 2011.
Alatas V. Program Keluarga Harapan : impact evaluation of Indonesia's Pilot Household
Conditional Cash Transfer Program. Washington, D.C.: World Bank;2011.
Amaral EFD, Monteiro VD. An Evaluation of the Impact of the Educational Conditions of
Brazil's Bolsa Familia Program (2005 and 2009). Dados-Revista De Ciencias Sociais.
2013;56(3):531-570.
Amarante V, Arim R, de Melo G, Vigorito A. Family Allowances and Child School Attendance:
An Ex-ante Evaluation of Alternative Schemes in Uruguay. 2010.
Amarante V, Arim R, Vigorito A. Cash transfer programmes, income inequality and regional
disparities. The case of the Uruguayan Asignaciones Familiares. Cambridge Journal of
Regions, Economy & Society. 2011;4(1):139-154.
Araujo GS, Ribeiro R, Neder HD. Impactos do Programa Bolsa Familia sobre o Trabalho de
Criancas e Adolescentes Residentes na Area Urbana em 2006. (With English summary.).
Economia (University of Brazil). 2010;11(4):57-102.
Arraiz I, Rozo S. Red de Oportunidades: Conditional Cash Transfer Evidence from Panama.
2010.
Attanasio O, Fitzsimons E, Gomez ANA, Gutierrez MI, Meghir C, Mesnard A. Children's
Schooling and Work in the Presence of a Conditional Cash Transfer Program in Rural
Colombia. Economic Development & Cultural Change. 2010;58(2):181-210.
Attanasio OP, Meghir C, Santiago A. Education Choices in Mexico: Using a Structural Model
and a Randomized Experiment to Evaluate PROGRESA. Review of Economic Studies. Jan
2012;79(1):37-66.
Ayala F. The Programme for Advancement through Health and Education (PATH). London:
Overseas Development Institute; February 2006.
Azevedo V, Robles M. Multidimensional Targeting: Identifying Beneficiaries of Conditional
Cash Transfer Programs. Social Indicators Research. Jun 2013 2013;112(2):447-475.
Baez J, Camacho A. Assessing the Long-term Effects of Conditional Cash Transfers on Human
Capital: Evidence from Colombia. Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit/Institute for the
Study of Labor (IZA); 2011.
Baird S, McIntosh C, Ozler B. Cash or Condition? Evidence from a Cash Transfer Experiment.
Quarterly Journal of Economics. Nov 2011;126(4):1709-1753.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.
10.
11.
12.
13.
14.
15.
16.
17.
18.
19.
88
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
Baird SJ, Chirwa E, de Hoop J, Ozler B. Girl Power: Cash Transfers and Adolescent Welfare.
Evidence from a Cluster-Randomized Experiment in Malawi. National Bureau of Economic
Research, Inc, NBER Working Papers: 19479; 2013.
Barham T, Macours K, Maluccio JA. More Schooling and More Learning?: Effects of a ThreeYear Conditional Cash Transfer Program in Nicaragua after 10 Years. Inter-American
Development Bank; 2013.
Baulch B. The medium-term impact of the primary education stipend in rural Bangladesh.
Journal of Development Effectiveness. 2011;3(2):243-262.
Benhassine N, Devoto F, Duflo E, Dupas P, Pouliquen V. Turning a Shove into a Nudge? A
'Labeled Cash Transfer' for Education. National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc, NBER
Working Papers: 19227; 2013.
Bichir R. New Policies against Poverty in Brazil: Analyzing Access to CCT in Metropolitan
Areas. International Sociological Association; 2010, 2010.
Borges Sugiyama N. Bottom-up Policy Diffusion: National Emulation of a Conditional Cash
Transfer Program in Brazil. Publius. Jan 2012 2012;42(1):25-51.
Borraz F, Gonzalez N. Impact of the Uruguayan Conditional Cash Transfer Program.
Cuadernos de Economia, Latin American Journal of Economics. Nov 2009 2009;46(134):243271.
Bracamontes-Nevarez J, Camberos-Castro M. Poverty in Mexico and its regions: an analysis
of impact of Oportunidades Program in the 2002-2006 period. Papeles de Poblacion. Jan
2011 2011;17(67):135-175.
Brandt N. Reducing Poverty in Chile: Cash Transfers and Better Jobs. OECD Publishing, OECD
Economics Department Working Papers: 951; 2012.
Bryant JH. Kenya's cash transfer program: Protecting the health and human rights of orphans
and vulnerable children. Health and Human Rights. 2009 2009;11(2).
Bustelo M. Three Essays on Investments in Children's Human Capital, University of Illinois;
2011.
Cardoso E, de Souza APF. The Impact of Cash Transfers on Child Labor and School Enrollment
in Brazil. 2009.
Carrington RD. Firing silver bullets with caution: Does Mexico's Progresa impact parental
demand for education equally among indigenous and non-indigenous populations 2012.
Coetzee M. Finding the Benefits: Estimating the Impact of The South African Child Support
Grant. The South African Journal of Economics/Die Suid-Afrikaanse Tydskrif vir Ekonomie. Sep
2013 2013;81(3):427-450.
Colina J, Giordano O, Torres A, Cardenas M. Heads of household programme in Argentina: a
human rights-based policy? International social science journal. 2009;60(197-198):337-351.
Covarrubias K, Davis B, Winters P. From protection to production: productive impacts of the
Malawi Social Cash Transfer scheme. Journal of Development Effectiveness. 2012;4(1):50-77.
Curry MS, Cadiogan AT, Giugliano RG. Brazil's Bolsa Familia and the Philippines' "4Ps" CCT
Programs: Considering South-South Cooperation for Social Protection. Asia-Pacific Social
Science Review. 2013;13(1):1-15.
D’Elia VV, Navarro AI. Universal Child Allowance and School Delay of Children In Argentina.
Revista de Análisis Económico–Economic Analysis Review. 2013;28(2):63-90.
Dammert AC. Heterogeneous Impacts of Conditional Cash Transfers: Evidence from
Nicaragua. Economic Development & Cultural Change. 2009;58(1):53-83.
de Brauw A, Hoddinott J. Must conditional cash transfer programs be conditioned to be
effective? The impact of conditioning transfers on school enrollment in Mexico. Journal of
Development Economics. 2011;96(2):359-370.
de Janvry A, Finan FS, Sadoulet E. Local Electoral Incentives and Decentralized Program
Performance. Forschungsinstitut zur Zukunft der Arbeit/Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA);
2010.
89
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
de la Jara FH. The Difficult Articulation between Universal Policies and Targeted Programs:
Institutional Ethnography of the Bolsa Familia Program in Brazil. Gestion y Politica Publica.
2011 2011;20(2):331-379.
Debowicz D, Golan J. The impact of Oportunidades on human capital and income
distribution in Mexico: A top-down/bottom-up approach. Journal of Policy Modeling. Jan-Feb
2014;36(1):24-42.
Del Carpio XV, Macours K. LEVELING THE INTRA-HOUSEHOLD PLAYING FIELD:
COMPENSATION AND SPECIALIZATION IN CHILD LABOR ALLOCATION. Vol 312010.
Díaz Langou G. Validating one of the world's largest conditional cash transfer programmes. A
case study on how an impact evaluation of Brazil's Bolsa Família Programme helped silence
its critics and improve policy. Journal of Development Effectiveness. 2013;5(4):430-446.
Diniz MS, Assunção AÁ, Caiaffa WT, Abreu MNS. The practice of child labor between
beneficiary of "Bolsa-Escola Program" in Belo Horizonte: A study of the socio-demographic
determinants. A Prática do Trabalho Infantil Entre os Beneficiários do Programa Bolsa-Escola
Belo Horizonte: Um Estudo Sobre os Determinantes Sociodemográficos. 2012;33(118):149169.
Dorosh P, Debowicz D, Golan J. The Impact of Oportunidades in Mexico: An Integrated CGEmicrosimulations Modeling Approach. International Food Policy Research Institute; 2011.
Dotson R. Mi familia progresa: Motherhood, citizenship, and conditional cash transfers in
Guatemala 2013.
Dubois P, de Janvry A, Sadoulet E. Effects on School Enrollment and Performance of a
Conditional Cash Transfer Program in Mexico. Journal of Labor Economics. Jul
2012;30(3):555-589.
Edmonds EV, Schady N. Poverty Alleviation and Child Labor. American Economic JournalEconomic Policy. Nov 2012;4(4):100-124.
Farah Quijano MA. Social Policy for Poor Rural People in Colombia: Reinforcing Traditional
Gender Roles and Identities? Social Policy & Administration. 2009;43(4):397-408.
Fernald LC, Gertler PJ, Neufeld LM. 10-year effect of Oportunidades, Mexico's conditional
cash transfer programme, on child growth, cognition, language, and behaviour: a
longitudinal follow-up study. Lancet. Dec 12 2009;374(9706):1997-2005.
Ferro AR, Kassouf AL, Levison D. THE IMPACT OF CONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFER PROGRAMS
ON HOUSEHOLD WORK DECISIONS IN BRAZIL. Child Labor and the Transition between School
and Work. 2010;31:193-218.
Francken N. Reducing Corruption in Public Education Programs in Africa: Instruments and
Capture in Madagascar. Review of Business and Economics. 2009;54(3):383-397.
Galiani S, McEwan PJ. The heterogeneous impact of conditional cash transfers. Journal of
Public Economics. Jul 2013;103:85-96.
Garcia S, Hill J. Impact of conditional cash transfers on children's school achievement:
evidence from Colombia. Journal of Development Effectiveness. 2010;2(1):117-137.
Gee KA. Reducing Child Labour Through Conditional Cash Transfers: Evidence from
Nicaragua's Red de Proteccion Social. Development Policy Review. Nov 2010 2010;28(6):711732.
Gitter SR, Barham BL. Conditional Cash Transfers, Shocks, and School Enrolment in
Nicaragua. The Journal of Development Studies. Nov 2009 2009;45(10):1747-1767.
Glewwe P, Kassouf AL. The impact of the Bolsa Escola/Familia conditional cash transfer
program on enrollment, dropout rates and grade promotion in Brazil. Journal of
Development Economics. Mar 2012;97(2):505-517.
González-Flores M, Heracleous M, Winters P. Leaving the Safety Net: An Analysis of
Dropouts in an Urban Conditional Cash Transfer Program. World Development.
2012;40(12):2505-2521.
90
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.
70.
71.
72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
Grimes M, Wangnerud L. Organizing against Clientelism? A Study of Mexico's
PROGRESA/Oportunidades Program. Conference Papers -- International Studies Association.
2009 Annual Meeting 2009:1.
Hall A. The Last Shall be First: Political Dimensions of Conditional Cash Transfers in Brazil.
Journal of Policy Practice. Jan 2012 2012;11(1-2):25-41.
Han C-K, Rothwell DW, Lin E. Cash transfers and child well-being in Singapore: an exploratory
study of the School Pocket Money Fund. Asia Pacific Journal of Social Work & Development
(Routledge). 2012;22(1/2):36-49.
Handa S, Huang C, Hypher N, Teixeira C, Soares FV, Davis B. Targeting effectiveness of social
cash transfer programmes in three African countries. Journal of Development Effectiveness.
2012/03/01 2012;4(1):78-108.
Handa S, Park M, Osei Darko R, Osei-Akoto I, Davis B, Daidone S. Livelihood Empowerment
Against Poverty Program Impact Evaluation. University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill;
February 2014.
Hatta ZA, Sarkawi DT. The Poverty Situation in Indonesia: Challenges and Progress of the
Marginalized Group. Asian Social Work & Policy Review. 2011;5(2):92-106.
Hermosillo R, Gonzalez A, Ruesga C. Process Evaluation of the Community Based Conditional
Cash Transfer Pilot Programme in Tanzania.: GESOC, AGENCIA PARA EL DESARROLLO, A.C.;
October 30 2011.
Hossain N. School Exclusion as Social Exclusion: the Practices and Effects of a Conditional
Cash Transfer Programme for the Poor in Bangladesh. The Journal of Development Studies.
Aug 2010 2010;46(7):1264-1282.
Innerarity F, Risden CR. Social Safety Net Reform in Jamaica Experience of the Programme of
Advancement through Health and Education (PATH). Social and Economic Studies.
2010;59(1-2):181-209.
Jeni V. Proteção social no Brasil: o que mudou na assistência social após a Constituição de
1988. (Portuguese). Social protection in Brazil: what has changed in social assistance after
the 1988 Constitution. (English). 2009;14(3):731-741.
Krishnan A, Amarchand R, Byass P, Pandav C, Ng N. "No one says 'No' to money" - a mixed
methods approach for evaluating conditional cash transfer schemes to improve girl
children's status in Haryana, India. Int J Equity Health. 2014;13(1):11.
Lalive R, Cattaneo MA. SOCIAL INTERACTIONS AND SCHOOLING DECISIONS. Review of
Economics and Statistics. Aug 2009;91(3):457-477.
Lavigne M. Social protection systems in Latin America and the Caribbean: Paraguay. 2012:38.
Levy D, Ohls J. Evaluation of Jamaica's PATH conditional cash transfer programme. Journal of
Development Effectiveness. 2010;2(4):421-441.
Lora AC. Evaluating the impacts of Bolsa Escola programs on student performance in Brazil
2010.
Lund F. A step in the wrong direction: linking the South Africa Child Support Grant to school
attendance. Journal of Poverty & Social Justice. 2011;19(1):5-14.
Maluccio JA. Education and Child Labor: Experimental Evidence from a Nicaraguan
Conditional Cash Transfer Program. Child Labor and Education in Latin America: An Economic
Perspective. 2009:187-204.
Maluccio JA. The Impact of Conditional Cash Transfers on Consumption and Investment in
Nicaragua. Journal of Development Studies. 2010;46(1):14-38.
Maluccio JA, Murphy A, Regalia F. Does supply matter? Initial schooling conditions and the
effectiveness of conditional cash transfers for grade progression in Nicaragua. Journal of
Development Effectiveness. 2010;2(1):87-116.
Mardones Poblete C. Robin Hood strategy in Chile: Distribution and incidence. El Trimestre
Economico. Oct 2011 2011;78(4):781-812.
91
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
Martorano B, Sanfilippo M. INNOVATIVE FEATURES IN POVERTY REDUCTION PROGRAMMES:
AN IMPACT EVALUATION OF CHILE SOLIDARIO ON HOUSEHOLDS AND CHILDREN. Journal of
International Development. Nov 2012 2012;24(8):1030-1041.
Mayer PE. Double or nothing: Transfer amounts, educational aspirations and familial
resource allocations: A comparative analysis of Ecuador's Bono de Desarrolo Humano 2013.
McGuire J. Conditional Cash Transfers in Bolivia: Origins, Impact, and Universality: a Work-inProgress paper. 2013;No. Work-in-Progress paper 33. Located at: Comparative Politics
Workshop, Department of Political Science, University of Pennsylvania.
Melo RdMS, Duarte GB. Impact of the Family Grant Program on school attendance: the case
of family farming in northeastern Brazil. Revista de Economia e Sociologia Rural. Jul 2010
2010;48(3):635-657.
Miller C. Cash Transfers and Economic Growth: A Mixed Methods Analysis of Transfer
Recipients and Business Owners in Malawi. Poverty & Public Policy. 2011 Sep 22 2011;3(3).
Miller C, Tsoka M. Cash Transfers and Children's Education and Labour among Malawi's
Poor. Development Policy Review. 2012;30(4):499-522.
Miller CM, Tsoka M, Reichert K. Targeting Cash to Malawi's Ultra-Poor: A Mixed Methods
Evaluation. Development Policy Review. Jul 2010 2010;28(4):481-502.
Miller CM, Tsoka M, Reichert K, Hussaini A. Interrupting the intergenerational cycle of
poverty with the Malawi Social Cash Transfer. Vulnerable Children & Youth Studies.
2010;5(2):108-121.
Mo D, Zhang L, Yi H, Luo R, Rozelle S, Brinton C. School Dropouts and Conditional Cash
Transfers: Evidence from a Randomised Controlled Trial in Rural China's Junior High Schools.
The Journal of Development Studies. Feb 2013 2013;49(2):190-207.
Nayar A. CONDITIONING CASH TRANFERS: BIHAR'S BICYCLE SCHEME. In: Chova LG, Martinez
AL, Torres IC, eds. Inted2012: International Technology, Education and Development
Conference2012:6580-6585.
Oecd. OECD Economic Surveys: Chile 2012. Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development/Organisation de Cooperation et de Developpement Economiques; 2012.
Ospina M. The indirect effects of conditional cash transfer programs: An empirical analysis of
Familias en Accion 2011.
Peng Z, Ding Y. Tackling urban poverty in China: the Minimum Living Standard Scheme and
its limitations. The Journal of Poverty and Social Justice. Oct 2012 2012;20(3):261-276.
Perova E, Vakis R. Welfare impacts of the “Juntos” Program in Peru: Evidence from a nonexperimental evaluation. The World Bank. 2009:1-59.
Pires A. After all, what are the reasons for conditionalities on education in brazilian "bolsa
família" cash transfer program? 2013;21(80):513-531.
Ponce J, Bedi AS. The Impact of a Cash Transfer Program on Cognitive Achievement: The
Bono de Desarrollo Humano of Ecuador. Economics of Education Review. 2010;29(1):116125.
Quijano MAF. Social Policy for Poor Rural People in Colombia: Reinforcing Traditional Gender
Roles and Identities? Social Policy and Administration. Aug 2009 2009;43(4):397-408.
Robertson L, Mushati P, Eaton JW, et al. Effects of unconditional and conditional cash
transfers on child health and development in Zimbabwe: a cluster-randomised trial. Lancet.
Apr 13 2013;381(9874):1283-1292.
Rocha C. Developments in National Policies for Food and Nutrition Security in Brazil.
Development Policy Review. Jan 2009 2009;27(1):51-66.
Rubio-Codina M. INTRA-HOUSEHOLD TIME ALLOCATION IN RURAL MEXICO: EVIDENCE FROM
A RANDOMIZED EXPERIMENT. Child Labor and the Transition between School and Work.
2010;31:219-257.
Sanchez-Ancochea D, Mattei L. Bolsa Familia, poverty and inequality: Political and economic
effects in the short and long run. Global Social Policy. Dec 2011 2011;11(2-3):299-318.
92
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.
113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
Sandberg J. Conditional Cash Transfers and Social Mobility: The Role of Asymmetric
Structures and Segmentation Processes. Development & Change. 2012;43(6):1337-1359.
Santos CRB, Magalhaes R. Poverty and Social Policy: the implementation of complementary
programs for the Bolsa Familia Program. Ciencia & Saude Coletiva. May 2012
2012;17(5):1215-1224.
Santos LM, Pasquim EM, Santos SM. [Cash transfer programs in Brazil: a multidimensional
study of Bolsa Escola, Bolsa Alimentacao and Cartao Alimentacao Program implementation].
Cien Saude Colet. Mar 2011;16(3):1821-1834.
Silveira Melo RdM, Duarte GB. Impacto do Programa Bolsa Família sobre a Frequência
Escolar: o caso da agricultura familiar no Nordeste do Brasil. (Portuguese). Revista de
Economia e Sociologia Rural. 2010;48(3):635-656.
Skovdal M, Mushati P, Robertson L, et al. Social acceptability and perceived impact of a
community-led cash transfer programme in Zimbabwe. BMC Public Health. 2013;13:342.
Slavin RE. Can financial incentives enhance educational outcomes? Evidence from
international experiments. Educational Research Review. 2010;5(1):68-80.
Soares FV, Ribas RP, Guerrerio Osorio R. Evaluating the Impact of Brazil's Bolsa Familia: Cash
Transfer Programs in Comparative Perspective. Latin American Research Review. 2010
2010;45(2):173-190.
Soares FV, Ribas RP, Hirata GI. Impact evaluation of a rural conditional cash transfer
programme on outcomes beyond health and education. Journal of Development
Effectiveness. 2010;2(1):138-157.
Sugiyama NB. Bottom-up Policy Diffusion: National Emulation of a Conditional Cash Transfer
Program in Brazil. Publius-the Journal of Federalism. Win 2012;42(1):25-51.
Syukri M, Arif S, Rosfadhila M, Isdijoso W. Making the Best of all Resources: How Indonesian
Household Recipients Use the CCT Allowance. IDS Bulletin. Jul 2010 2010;41(4):84-94.
The Kenya C. T. O. V. C. Evaluation Team. The impact of Kenya's Cash Transfer for Orphans
and Vulnerable Children on human capital. Journal of Development Effectiveness.
2012;4(1):38-49.
The Kenya C. T. O. V. C. Evaluation Team. The Impact of Kenya's Cash Transfer for Orphans
and Vulnerable Children on Human Capital. Journal of Development Effectiveness. 2012;4:3849.
Usui N. Searching for Effective Poverty Interventions: Conditional Cash Transfer in the
Philippines. Asian Development Bank; 2011.
Vaitsman J, de Andrade GRB, Farias LO. Social protection in Brazil: what has changed in social
assistance after the 1988 Constitution. Proteção social no Brasil: o que mudou na assistência
social após a Constituição de 1988. 2009;14(3):731-741.
Woldehanna T. Productive Safety Net Program and Children's Time Use Between Work and
Schooling in Ethiopia. 2010.
World Bank Development Research Group. Pakistan -- Towards an Integrated National
Safety Net System: Assisting Poor and Vulnerable Households, An Analysis of Pakistan's Main
Cash Transfer Program. International Bank for Reconstruction and Development; 2013.
Yanes P. Mexico's targeted and conditional transfers: Between oportunidades and rights.
Economic and Political Weekly. 2011;46(21):49-54.
Yanez-Pagens M. Empirical Essays in Development Economics: Evidence from Bolivia,
University of Illinois; 2012.
Yildirim J, Ozdemir S, Sezgin F. A Qualitative Evaluation of a Conditional Cash Transfer
Program in Turkey: The Beneficiaries’ and Key Informants’ Perspectives. Journal of Social
Service Research. 2014;40(1):62-79.
The World Bank. Conditional Cash Transfers - Country Overviews & Project Information.
2009;
http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTSOCIALPROTECTION/EXTSAFETYN
93
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
ETSANDTRANSFERS/0,,contentMDK:22055402~pagePK:148956~piPK:216618~theSitePK:282
761,00.html. Accessed 30 April 2014.
Fiszbein A, Schady N. Conditional Cash Transfers: Reducing Present and Future Poverty.
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development; 2009.
Jones N, Malachowska A, Samuels F. Holding cash transfers to account: beneficiary and
community perspectives. Overseas Development Institute; 2013.
Country Comparison: Distribution of Family Income - GINI Index. The World Factbook 2013;
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2172rank.html.
Accessed May 5, 2014.
Country Comparison: GDP-Per Capita (PPP). The World Factbook 2013;
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2004rank.html.
Accessed May 5, 2014.
Coady D, Grosh ME, Hoddinott J. Targeting of transfers in developing countries: Review of
lessons and experience. Vol 1: World Bank Publications; 2004.
Silva J, Levin V, Morgandi M. Inclusion and Resilience: The Way Forward for Social Safety
Nets in the Middle East and North Africa. World Bank Publications; 2013.
Agostini CA, Brown PH. Local Distributional Effects of Government Cash Transfers in Chile.
The Review of Income and Wealth. Jun 2010 2010;56(2):366-388.
Akresh R, de Walque D, Kazlanga H. Cash Transfers and Child Schooling: Evidence from a
Randomized Evaluation of the Role of Conditionality. The World Bank; 2013.
94
13.
Appendix
Appendix 1: TOR
Appendix 2: Enquête avec parties prenantes
Appendix 3: Enquête Niveau Local
Appendix 4: Enquête beneficiaires et non-beneficiaires
Appendix 5: Focused literature review of education-focused cash transfer programs
95
Appendix 1: TOR
RFPS–TUN–2012-1101 - Revised
UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN’S FUND (UNICEF)
Wishes to invite you to submit a proposal for
Une évaluation du programme d’allocations scolaires en Tunisie.
Sealed Proposals should be delivered/placed in the Bid Box (located in the Reception area of the UNICEF office).
Proposals forwarded by mail or courier services must contain written instructions on the external envelope that
allows the receiving mail agents to place the envelope in the Bid Box. The address for Proposals is:
UNICEF Tunisia
58 Avenue Tahar Ben Achour
1082, Mutuelleville
Tunis – Tunisie
Ne pas Ouvrir
Attention: Mr Le Chargé des Opérations
IMPORTANT – ESSENTIAL INFORMATION
The reference “RFPS-TUN-2012-1101” Subject: ”Evaluation du programme d’allocations scolaires en Tunisie.”
must be written/typed on the envelopes containing the Technical and on the envelope containing the Financial
Proposals, as well as on the outer packaging containing both envelopes. Proposals must be submitted in one
copy in a securely sealed envelope in accordance with the instructions to Institutions/Contractors attached to the
RFP.
The Proposal MUST be received at the above address by latest 15:00 p.m. Tunis local Time on
Tuesday 18th March 2013 and will be opened on the same day.
IMPORTANT: Proposals will be invalidated if received after the stipulated date and time or if mailed to different
address or sent by e-mail, even if received before the stipulated deadline.
Requests for any additional information should be directed in writing by email to
Mehdi Molla, [email protected]
Georges Gonzales, [email protected]
Due to the nature of this Request for Proposal for Services, there will be no public opening of proposals.
It is important that you read all of the provisions of the Request for Proposal for Services, to ensure that you
understand UNICEF’s requirements and can submit a proposal in compliance with them. Note that failure to
provide compliant proposals may result in invalidation of your proposal.
Page 1 of 12
THIS REQUEST FOR PROPOSAL FOR SERVICES HAS BEEN:
PREPARED BY:
Date
Samir Bouzekri
(To be contacted for additional information)
Email: [email protected]
APPROVED BY
Date
Georges Gonzales
Deputy Representative
Page 2 of 12
INDEX
INDEX ......................................................................................................................................................................................... 3
PROPOSAL FORM ................................................................................................................................................................... 4
1.
PROCEDURES AND RULES ............................................................................................................................................. 5
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
1.7
1.8
1.9
1.10
1.11
1.12
1.13
1.14
2.
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
2.5
2.6
3.
ORGANIZATIONAL BACKGROUND; SPECIFIC PROJECT SITUATION ................................................................................... 5
PURPOSE OF THE RFPS ..................................................................................................................................................... 5
WORK ASSIGNMENTS AND TERM OF REFERENCE ............................................................................................................. 5
FORECAST SCHEDULE ....................................................................................................................................................... 5
RFPS RESPONSE FORMAT ................................................................................................................................................. 6
PROPOSER RESPONSE ...................................................................................................................................................... 6
CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION ......................................................................................................................................... 7
PROPOSAL OPENING ........................................................................................................................................................ 7
RIGHTS OF UNICEF............................................................................................................................................................ 8
PROPERTY OF UNICEF ....................................................................................................................................................... 8
VALIDITY ........................................................................................................................................................................... 8
GENERAL CONTRACTUAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS ........................................................................................................ 9
FULL RIGHT TO USE........................................................................................................................................................... 9
PAYMENT TERMS ............................................................................................................................................................. 9
INSTRUCTIONS TO PROPOSERS ....................................................................................................................................... 9
MARKING AND RETURNING PROPOSALS ........................................................................................................................ 9
TIME FOR RECEIVING PROPOSALS .................................................................................................................................... 9
WITHDRAWAL ................................................................................................................................................................ 10
CURRENCY OF PROPOSALS ............................................................................................................................................. 10
ERROR IN PROPOSALS .................................................................................................................................................... 10
REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ........................................................................................................................................ 10
PROPOSAL EVALUATION CRITERIA .............................................................................................................................. 10
3.1
3.2
3.3
3.4
3.5
3.6
3.7
3.8
3.9
EVALUATION PROCESS ................................................................................................................................................... 10
MANDATORY REQUIREMENTS ....................................................................................................................................... 11
OVERALL EVALUATION GRID .......................................................................................................................................... 11
TECHNICAL EVALUATION ............................................................................................................................................... 11
TECHNICAL PASS CRITERIA ............................................................................................................................................. 11
FINANCIAL EVALUATION ................................................................................................................................................ 11
VERIFICATION PROCESS ................................................................................................................................................. 12
UNETHICAL BEHAVIOUR ................................................................................................................................................. 12
CORRUPT AND FRAUDULENT PRACTICES ....................................................................................................................... 12
Page 3 of 12
PROPOSAL FORM
THIS PAGE/PROPOSAL FORM must be completed, signed and returned to UNICEF.
Proposal must be made in accordance with the instructions contained in this Request for Proposal for
Services.
TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF CONTRACT
Any Contract resulting from this Request for Proposal for Services shall incorporate (a) relevant provisions of
the UNICEF Generic General Terms and Conditions for Institutional Contracts for Services; and (b) any Specific
Terms and Conditions detailed in this Request for Proposal for Services.
INFORMATION
The Undersigned, having read and understood RFPS-TUNA-2012-1101, and having accepted the terms and
conditions set out in this Request for Proposal for Services, hereby offers to supply the services specified in
the Appendices to this Request for Proposal for Services at the fee or fees quoted, in accordance with any
specifications stated and subject to the Terms and Conditions set out or specified in this Request for
Proposals for Services.
Signature:
_____________________________________
Date:
_____________________________________
Name & Title:
_____________________________________
Company:
_____________________________________
Postal Address:
_____________________________________
Tel. No.:
_____________________________________
E-mail:
_____________________________________
Validity of Offer
_____________________________________
Currency of Offer:
_____________________________________
(US dollars)
No Price Proposal value details are to be included within this form.
Please indicate, after having read UNICEF Payment Terms, which of the following Payment Terms are offered
by you:
10 Days, 3.0%___ 15 Day, 2.5%__ 20 Days, 2.0%___ 30 Days, Net__Other Discounts: ____
Page 4 of 12
1.
PROCEDURES AND RULES
1.1
ORGANIZATIONAL BACKGROUND; SPECIFIC PROJECT SITUATION
UNICEF is the agency of the United Nations mandated to advocate for the protection of children’s rights, to help
meet their basic needs and to expand their opportunities to reach their full potential. Guided by the Convention
on the Rights of the Child UNICEF strives to establish children’s rights as international standards of behaviour
towards children. UNICEF’s role is to mobilise political will and material resources to help countries ensure a “first
call for children”. UNICEF is committed to ensuring special protection for the most disadvantaged children.
UNICEF carries out its work through its headquarters in New York, eight regional offices and 125 country offices
word-wide. UNICEF also has a research centre in Florence, a supply operation based in Copenhagen and offices in
Tokyo and Brussels. UNICEF’s thirty-seven national committees in industrialised countries raise funds and spread
awareness about the organisation’s mission.
1.2
PURPOSE OF THE RFPS
The purpose of this Request for Proposal for Services (this “RFPS”) is to solicit proposals for
1.3
WORK ASSIGNMENTS and TERM OF REFERENCE
The work assignment and the Term of Reference is part of this RFP and included in the Annexe2
1.4
FORECAST SCHEDULE
The schedule of the contractual process is as follows:
A. RFP opened for bids
March 18, 2013
B. Technical and Cost proposals received not later than
(noon) 15:00 p.m, at UNICEF Tunis Country Office,
Tunis, Tunisia.
March 18, 2013
C. Opening of Bids received - Technical
March 19, 2013
D. Opening of Bids received - Financial
March 19, 2013
E. Internal review and selection process completed
March 22, 2013
F. Award of contract
March 22, 2013
G. Proposed commencement date
April 01, 2013
H. Proposed completion date
February 28, 2014
It is understood that UNICEF Tunis Country office reserve the right to alter this schedule according to
its own needs.
Page 5 of 12
1.5
RFPS RESPONSE FORMAT
The contractors will be asked to make the bid in two parts: one will be the Technical proposal and the other will
be the Financial/budget proposal.
All proposals (Technical and Financial) must be prepared in English or French to ensure that the UNICEF Tunis
Country office team can make fair assessment of the bidder’s ability to successfully carry out the contract.
The reference “RFPS-TUN-2012-1101” Subject: ”Evaluation du programme d’allocations scolaires en Tunisie”
must be written/typed on the envelopes containing the Technical and on the envelope containing the Financial
Proposals, as well as on the outer packaging containing both envelopes.
Any information that the Bidder considers proprietary should be clearly marked “proprietary”, next to the
relevant part of the text. UNICEF Tunisia will treat such information accordingly.
The contractors must submit the Technical Proposal and the Financial Proposal for evaluation purposes in one
sealed envelope. Costs shall not appear in any part of the Technical Proposal.
The contractors must provide sufficient information in the proposals to address each area of the evaluation
criteria (see Annex 1), to ensure that the evaluation team can make a fair assessment of the consultancy firm
based only on its proposals.
The contractor should deliver one copy of the Technical and financial Proposals by a sealed envelope to the
Operation Officer, at UNICEF, 58 avenue Taher Ben Achour, 1082 Mutuelleville – Tunis, Tunisie no later than
15.00 p.m. on the designated date, March 18, 2013.
1.6
PROPOSER RESPONSE
A.
Formal submission requirements
The formal submission requirements as outlined in this RFPS must be followed, e.g. regarding form and timing of
submission.
B.
Proposal Form
The completed and signed Proposal Form must be submitted together with the Proposal to UNICEF Tunis
Office, Bid Section at the address stated on the front page of this RFPS.
C.
Mandatory criteria
All mandatory (i.e. “must”/”have to”/”shall”/”will”) criteria mentioned throughout this RFPS have to be
addressed and met in the Proposal.
D.
Technical Proposal
The Technical Proposal should address all aspects and criteria outlined in this Request for Proposal, especially in
The Terms of Reference detailed in Annex 1 of this Request for Proposal. UNICEF welcomes new ideas and
innovative approaches. Technical Proposals must be complete and provide all relevant support documentation to
enable the RFP Evaluation Team to adequately assess and evaluate the Proposal
At a minimum, the Technical Proposal must include:
Page 6 of 12










Completed profile form provided in Annex 4
Physical Location of offices with telephone, fax and e‐mail address.
Description of the services offered.
Information on the expertise and capabilities of the organization submitting the proposal.
Number of employees and organizational chart
Please provide in a tabular form the number of teams you will form for this contract.
Use a Gantt chart for each team to indicate the projected timeframe of, in what time you intend to
complete the works
Expertise and experience of proposed personnel
CVs of key personnel to be involved in implementation of the Contract. List of current clients with
particular emphasis on international and humanitarian organizations.
Compliance with UNICEF General Terms and Conditions (signed Proposal Form, page 4 of RFP.)
No price information shall be contained in the technical proposal.
E.
Fee Proposal
The contractor’s financial proposal shall be prepared using the forms provided in Annex 2. It shall list all prices
associated with the assignment, including remuneration for Personnel and travel expenses. All activities and items
described in the Technical Proposal shall be assumed to be included in the price offered in the Financial Proposal.
1.7
CONFIDENTIAL INFORMATION
Any Information which the Proposer considers proprietary should be clearly marked, by including the word
“Proprietary” in the left hand margin next to the relevant part of the text. The UNICEF evaluation team will treat
such information accordingly.
1.8
PROPOSAL OPENING
There will not be a public opening of the Technical Proposal. The Technical Proposals will be opened by a
internal UNICEF Bidding Committee at the stipulated date and time mentioned above. Acknowledgments
of Proposals from participating Institutions/Contractors will be communicated in writing by 19 March 2013. All
Proposals will then be reviewed by a Technical Evaluation Panel.
Following successful conclusion of the Technical Proposal, the Financial Proposals of Institutions/Contractors that
have obtained the minimum qualifying points for their Technical Proposals will be invited to attend the
public opening of the Financial Proposals currently planned for 10:00 a.m. on 19 March 2013. Qualifying
institutions/Contractors may attend this public opening or send an authorized representative with
appropriate identification to attend the public opening of the Financial Proposal.
The Financial Proposals will be combined with the evaluation results of the Technical Proposal for a final
adjudication to identify the Best and Final Offer (BAFO) no later than Thursday, 21 March 2013.
Page 7 of 12
1.9
RIGHTS OF UNICEF
UNICEF reserves the right to accept any Proposal, in whole or in part; or, to reject any or all Proposals. UNICEF
reserves the right to invalidate any Proposal received from a Proposer which, in the opinion of UNICEF, has
previously failed to perform satisfactorily or properly or to complete a contract on time, or any Proposal received
from a Proposer which, in the opinion of UNICEF, is not in a position to perform the contract to be awarded as a
result of this procurement action. UNICEF shall not be held responsible for any cost incurred by any Proposer in
connection with this RFPS. The Proposer agrees to be bound by the decision of UNICEF as to whether its Proposal
meets the requirements stated in this RFPS. Without limiting the generality of the rights set out above, UNICEF
expressly reserves the right to, and by submitting its Proposal the Proposer expressly accepts UNICEF’s right to:
contact any or all references supplied by the Proposer(s);
request additional supporting or supplementary data (from the Proposer(s));
arrange interviews with any, some, or all of the Proposer(s), individually or collectively;
reject any or all Proposals;
accept any Proposal in whole or in part;
negotiate with the Proposer or Proposers which has or have, as the case may be, attained the
best rating/ranking in the evaluation of Proposals;
award contracts to such number of Proposers as, in UNICEF’s opinion, is required to achieve the
overall objectives of this RFPS.
By submitting a Proposal, the Proposer agrees to accept the decision of UNICEF as to whether the Proposal meets
the requirements stated in this RFPS.
1.10
PROPERTY OF UNICEF
This RFPS, along with any responses thereto, shall be considered the property of UNICEF and the Proposals will
not be returned to the Proposers.
1.11
VALIDITY
Proposals should be valid for a period of not less than 90 days after proposal opening, unless otherwise specified
in the Specific Terms and Conditions. Proposers are requested to indicate the validity period of their proposal, as
UNICEF may issue contracts against the most responsive evaluated proposal if requests for identical services are
received from our offices/divisions during the proposal validity period. UNICEF may also request the validity
period to be extended.
Page 8 of 12
1.12
GENERAL CONTRACTUAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS
The UNICEF Generic General Terms and Conditions for Institutional Contracts for Services are attached [Annex 2].
The relevant provisions of these Generic General Terms and Conditions, together with any designated Special
Terms and Conditions [Annex 2, will form part of any contract resulting from this RFPS.
1.13
FULL RIGHT TO USE
The Proposer warrants that it has not and shall not enter into any agreement or arrangement that restrains or
restricts UNICEF’s or any implementing partner’s rights to use, dispose of or, otherwise, deal with any of the
goods that are the subject of this RFPS.
1.14
PAYMENT TERMS
Payment will be made only upon UNICEF’s acceptance of the work performed in accordance with the contractual
milestones. The terms of payment are payment of the uncontested part of any invoice “Net 30 days”, after
receipt of invoice and proof of delivery. Payment will be effected by bank transfer in a local currency. Proposers
may offer early payment discounts, i.e. payment within a specified period of time faster than UNICEF’s standard
payment term of Net 30 days.
2.
INSTRUCTIONS TO PROPOSERS
2.1
MARKING AND RETURNING PROPOSALS
Proposals must be sent by 15.00 p.m [Tunis] time Date: [18.03.2013] as indicated on Page 1 of this RFPS. “RFPSTUN-2012-1101” : Subject: ”Evaluation du programme d’allocations scolaires en Tunisie” must be indicated on
the front page of the Proposal.
Proposers should note that Proposals sent by e-mail will be INVALIDATED.
2.2
TIME FOR RECEIVING PROPOSALS
Proposals received prior to the stated closing time and date will be secured by Bid Section until the specified
deadline for submission of Proposals, at which time the Officer of the Bid Section will open the Proposals and no
Proposal received thereafter will be considered.
UNICEF will accept no responsibility for the premature opening of a Proposal not properly addressed or identified.
Modification of Proposals already submitted will be considered if received BY courier prior to the closing time and
date. All modifications to and possible withdrawals of Proposals must be sent to UNICEF Tunisia
58 Avenue Tahar Ben Achour
1082, Mutuelleville
Tunis – Tunisie
Ne pas Ouvrir
Attention: Mr Le Chargé des Opérations
Page 9 of 12
2.3
WITHDRAWAL
Proposals may be withdrawn at any time during the open period of the RFPS, but withdrawal of final submitted
Proposals is not possible after the stated closing time of the RFPS. Negligence on the part of the Proposer confers
no right for the withdrawal of the Proposal after it has been opened.
2.4
CURRENCY OF PROPOSALS
Fee proposals must be stated in [US Dollars].
2.5
ERROR IN PROPOSALS
Proposers are expected to examine all schedules and all instructions pertaining to the work or Proposal. Failure
to do so will be at the Proposer’s own risk.
2.6
REQUEST FOR INFORMATION
All requests for formal clarification or queries on this RFPS must be submitted in writing to:


Mehdi Moalla, [email protected]
Georges Gonzales, [email protected]
Only written inquiries will be entertained. Please make sure that the e-mail mentions the RFPS reference
number. Please be informed that if the question is deemed of common interest to all possible Proposers, the
answers will be shared with all invitees.
3.
PROPOSAL EVALUATION CRITERIA
3.1
EVALUATION PROCESS
The established evaluation process and steps for finalising this procurement are:
(a)
RFPS Mandatory Requirements. UNICEF will only evaluate Proposals complying with the four
mandatory requirements set out in section 3.2 below.
(b)
Proposal Technical evaluation. Proposals passing the minimum technical pass score will continue
into the Commercial evaluation.
(c)
Proposal Financial evaluation. The lowest fee Proposal will be awarded the full score assigned to
the commercial proposal i.e. 30 points.
(d)
Recommendation. The recommendation for award of contract will be based on best combination
of technical and price score.
(e)
Final award and contracts. Based on verified nominations, contracts negotiations will be initiated
with one or more successful Proposer(s).
The UNICEF evaluation team will be composed of technical staff from UNICEF. The evaluation team will first
evaluate each Proposal for compliance with the requirements of this RFPS. Proposals deemed not to meet all of
the mandatory requirements will be considered non-compliant and rejected at this stage without further
consideration. Failure to comply with any of the terms and conditions contained in this RFPS, including provision
of all required information, may result in a Proposal being disqualified from further consideration.
Page 10 of 12
3.2
MANDATORY REQUIREMENTS
A Proposal MUST meet the following requirements. Documents to support these requirements must be
submitted with the Proposal.
Legal Status
The Contractor shall attach a copy of its letter of incorporation, or other such document, indicating its legal status,
as well as any other document showing that it intends to associate, or it has associated with, the other associates
who are submitting a joint proposal. In case the Consultant is a joint venture, letters of incorporation, or other
such documents, shall be attached for all associates of the joint venture.
Financial Criteria
The Contractor shall provide evidence showing that its liquid assets and access to credit facilities are adequate for
this RFPS.
3.3
OVERALL EVALUATION GRID
Each Proposal will be evaluated against a weight allocation of [70%] for the technical proposals and [30%] for the
fee proposal. The total maximum obtainable points is 100.
Technical Proposal
Fee Proposal
[70] points
[30] points
The UNICEF evaluation team will select the Proposal which is of high quality, clear and meets the stated
requirements and offers the best combination of technical and price score.
3.4
TECHNICAL EVALUATION
The Technical evaluation is part of this RFP and included in the Annexe3
3.5
TECHNICAL PASS CRITERIA
The minimum technical score required to pass is 80 points
3.6
FINANCIAL EVALUATION
The maximum number of points will be allotted to the lowest price proposal that is opened and compared among
those invited firms/institutions that obtain the threshold points in the evaluation of the technical component. All
other price proposals will receive points in inverse proportion to the lowest price; e.g.:
Max. score for price proposal * Price of lowest priced proposal
Score for price proposal X =
Price of proposal X
All prices/rates quoted must be exclusive of all taxes as UNICEF is a tax-exempt organization.
At this point, the most favorable proposals will be selected for short-listing. The proposers on the short list
may be given the opportunity to give UNICEF an oral presentation in order to be asked detailed questions for
clarification of their proposals
Page 11 of 12
3.7
VERIFICATION PROCESS
It is expected that during the evaluation, UNICEF will be requesting clarifications from Proposers.
UNICEF will not divulge nor discuss the Proposals and merits except with the Proposer who made the Proposal.
To ensure fairness towards all Proposers, the established technical evaluation criteria will be the basis for the
evaluation; however, it is envisioned that the final evaluation may contain conclusions not only deriving from the
method grid.
3.8
UNETHICAL BEHAVIOUR
UNICEF strictly enforces a policy of zero tolerance concerning unethical, unprofessional or fraudulent acts of
UNICEF suppliers / contractors. Accordingly, any registered company that is found to have undertaken unethical,
unprofessional or fraudulent activities will be suspended or forbidden from continuing business relations with
UNICEF.
3.9
CORRUPT AND FRAUDULENT PRACTICES
UNICEF requires that all suppliers / contractors associated with this Institutional/Corporate Contract observe the
highest standard of ethics during procurement and execution of the work. In pursuance of this policy UNICEF
(a) Defines for the purpose of this provision the terms set forth as follows:
(i) 'corrupt practice' means the offering, giving, receiving or soliciting of anything of value to influence the
action of a public official in the procurement process or in the execution of a contract, and
(ii) 'fraudulent practice' means a misrepresentation of facts in order to influence a procurement process
or the execution of a contract to the detriment of the client, and includes collusive practice among
proposers (prior to or after bid submission) designed to establish bid prices at artificial non-competitive
levels and to deprive the client of the benefits of free and open competition;
(b) Will reject a proposal for award if it determines that the selected supplier / contractor have engaged in any
corrupt or fraudulent practices in competing for the contract in question;
(c) Will declare a supplier / contractor ineligible, either indefinitely or for a stated period of time, to be awarded a
UNICEF-financed contract if at any time it determines that it has engaged in any corrupt or fraudulent practices in
competing for, or in executing a UNICEF-financed contract.
Page 12 of 12
RFPS–TUN–2012-1101 – revised - ANNEX 1
STATEMENT OF WORK AND TERM OF REFERENCE
I. Contexte et justification
Une étude menée par le Ministère de l’éducation sur une cohorte de 70.000 élèves a mis en exergue
l’impact déterminant du faible statut socioéconomique et du faible niveau de scolarité des parents sur le
phénomène d’abandon scolaire d’où l’importance des allocations monétaires pour alléger la privation
de revenu des ménages pauvres et rompre la transmission intergénérationnelle de la pauvreté. La
définition de la pauvreté des enfants qui sera retenue sera celle fixée par l’UNICEF pour qui la pauvreté
des enfants est constituée par : « les enfants qui vivent dans la pauvreté [sont ceux qui] sont victimes de
privation de ressources matérielles, spirituelles et affectives nécessaires à la survie, au développement et
à la réussite, ce qui les laisse dans l’incapacité de jouir de leurs droits et d’atteindre pleinement leur
potentiel ou même de participer dans la société en tant qu’individu à part entière » (UNICEF, 2005).
Parmi les privations multiples auxquelles sont soumis les enfants, la privation d’une éducation de qualité
est parmi les plus importantes.
La politique sociale adoptée par la Tunisie n’a pas réussi durant les deux dernières décennies à réduire
de manière suffisante la pauvreté, l’exclusion sociale et l’ampleur des inégalités. Un besoin urgent se
manifeste pour concevoir une nouvelle politique sociale plus efficace dans la réduction de la pauvreté et
des disparités interindividuelles, sociales et régionales. Parmi les axes proposés pour améliorer l’équité
et l’efficacité de ces dispositifs, on souligne l’importance de l’évaluation des programmes actuels d’aide
sociale et la révision des modalités de leurs fonctionnements.
L’UNICEF de commun accord avec le Gouvernement s’est engagé dans le cadre du plan d’action en cours
à appuyer le gouvernement dans l’évaluation et la révision du volet du programme de protection sociale
en faveur des enfants. Cette action paraît de plus en plus importante pour vérifier la réussite des
programmes mis en œuvre, et déterminer l’allocation la plus efficace des ressources publiques.
II. Le programme d’allocations scolaires
Outre le Programme National d’Aide aux Familles Nécessiteuses (PNAFN) initié en 1987 et qui couvre
actuellement 235.000 familles, le Ministère des Affaires Sociales (MAS) a lancé depuis 2007 un dispositif
d’aides destiné aux enfants scolarisés issus des familles nécessiteuses bénéficiaires du PNAFN qui
consiste en des transferts monétaires mensuelles d’une valeur de 10 dinars par enfant scolarisé (dans la
limite de 3 enfants par famille).
Ce dispositif est venu s’ajouter à un programme d’aides déjà existant qui consiste à distribuer des
fournitures scolaires aux élèves issus des familles nécessiteuses (bénéficiaires du PNAFN) et à revenus
limités (bénéficiaires des cartes de soins à tarifs réduits essentiellement) à l’occasion de la rentrée
scolaire. Depuis 2011, cette aide prend la forme de transferts monétaires directs d’un montant de 30
dinars par enfant scolarisé (dans la limite de 3 enfants par famille) alloués à l’occasion de la rentrée
scolaire. Pour l’année scolaire 2012-2013, 333.000 aides ont été distribuées aux familles pour une
enveloppe globale de 10 millions de dinars. D’autres interventions sont également mises en place par
d’autres structures ministérielles et nationales pour assister davantage les élèves nécessiteux telles que
la campagne nationale de collecte de livres, le transport gratuit en milieu rural, les cantines scolaires…
Les données issues de ce fichier qui caractérisent les profils socio-économiques des bénéficiaires sont
confinés dans une base de données qui sera accessible pour la conduite de l’analyse.
III. But de l’évaluation
Le but ultime de cette consultation est d’évaluer les aspects d’incidence du programme d'allocations et
d'aides financières aux ménages plus défavorisés, en complément des politiques et programmes
éducatifs et autres programmes sociaux, sur la performance scolaire mais aussi de recommander des
solutions efficaces en vue de renforcer ce programme, son système de collecte de données et de mettre
en place un dispositif sur une plus grande période permettant d’examiner sur le long terme l’incidence
des aides sociales ciblées sur l’investissement des familles bénéficiaires dans l’éducation de leurs
enfants, en plus d'autres interventions. Cette analyse se fera en tenant compte de l'impact principal des
politiques et programmes éducatifs, surtout ceux prévus dans les zones les plus défavorisées (tenant
compte des disparités géographiques et plus des disparités socio-économiques) sur la performance
scolaire.
IV. Objectifs de l’évaluation
Cette analyse fournira aux instances décisionnelles du gouvernement, aux acteurs du développement et
au grand public des informations suffisantes pour:
•
Apprécier globalement et de manière indépendante les résultats du programme et formuler des
recommandations pratiques pour le renforcement de l’efficacité de ce système d’aides scolaires,
notamment pour les régions, milieux et familles les plus vulnérables ainsi que des indications en terme
d’approches alternatives à adopter.
•
Produire des preuves empiriques qui aideront le gouvernement et autres parties prenantes non
seulement dans la conception des politiques et des programmes visant à atteindre une plus grande
équité, mais aussi des données requises pour un suivi et évaluation adéquats de tels programmes.
•
Analyser l’incident socio-économique du programme et déterminer les seuils et la variation des
aides selon le groupe d’âge et le niveau d’enseignement, afin de pouvoir produire le meilleur impact sur
la performance scolaire des enfants.
A cet effet, l’analyse répondra aux critères et questions suivants :
A/ PERTINENCE
1/ Dans quelle mesure, cette aide vient-elle en complément ou de manière isolée dans le dispositif
d’aide sociale du gouvernement à ces familles ?
2/ Dans quelle mesure le programme d’aide scolaire correspond-il à un besoin de la part des familles
soutenues ?
3/ Quels sont les niveaux de transparence dans le choix des bénéficiaires, de la gouvernance du système,
de la participation de certains acteurs à son établissement et à son fonctionnement, et de la
décentralisation dans la prise de décision et dans quelles mesures ces facteurs jouent-ils dans le succès
du programme d’allocations scolaires?4/ Le programme cible-t-il les familles réellement privées de leur
droit à une éducation de qualité ?
B/ INCIDENCE
5/ Dans quelle mesure contribuent-elles à aider les familles dans la scolarisation de leur enfants ?
6/ Est ce que les familles ciblées investissent significativement davantage dans l’éducation que les
familles de même niveau social ne recevant pas d’aides dans la scolarité de leurs enfants ?
7/ Quelle est l’incidence des allocations sur la performance scolaire des enfants bénéficiaires ?
8/ Est-ce que le montant actuel des allocations scolaires permet d’assurer un impact significatif sur la
performance scolaire ?
IV. Tâches à mener
Le consultant devra mener les tâches suivantes :
•
Description et analyse des mécanismes du programme d’allocations scolaires, et revue d’autres
sources documentaires (études, évaluations, enquêtes, etc), en vue d’en ressortir les aspects à
améliorer.
•
Développement d’une feuille de route technique présentant la méthodologie détaillée, itinéraire
des travaux de terrain, et table des matières du rapport final.
•
Revue de données collectées dans le cadre du programme d’allocations scolaires et également
des autres interventions en relation avec l’assistance des enfants scolarisés issus de familles
nécessiteuses (cantine scolaire, transport gratuit,..)en vue d’en proposer une amélioration pour le suivi
et l’évaluation future de son impact.
•
Proposition de méthodologies appropriées et réalisation d’enquêtes de terrain, aussi bien
qualitatives que quantitatives, afin de collecter les données requises pour répondre aux questions
posées par cette évaluation.
•
Présentation, discussion et validation des résultats de cette étude lors d’un atelier organisé par
le comité de suivi du projet (Ministères, UNICEF, autres intervenants).
V. Méthodologie de l’étude
Les méthodes et techniques d’analyse ainsi que le plan de rédaction seront présentées dans l’offre
technique qui sera élaborée par le (s) consultant(s) impliqué(s). Ces éléments seront détaillés dans la
feuille de route qui sera établie par le consultant sélectionné après le dépouillement de l’offre technique.
La méthodologie de cette évaluation devra combiner des méthodes qualitatives et quantitatives à définir
et détailler par le consultant dans son premier livrable, c’est-à-dire la feuille de route. Toutefois, le
consultant devra prendre en compte les spécifications suivantes :
Pour répondre aux questions liées à la pertinence du programme d’allocations scolaires, il sera
nécessaire de faire une revue documentaire du programme (mécanismes, défis, gouvernance,
transparence, etc) et complémenter celle-ci avec des consultations sous formes d’interviews avec le
personnel du programme et les familles bénéficiaires (groupes de discussions ou interviews individuels).
L’impact du programme pourrait être mesuré selon différentes méthodes que le consultant aura
la charge de proposer. La revue des fichiers du PNAFN et d’autres sources de données permettra au
consultant d’élaborer en détails la base du choix des techniques quasi-expérimentales les plus
appropriées. Cette revue permettra aussi au consultant de faire des recommandations tangibles sur
l’amélioration de la collecte des données pour un suivi et évaluation adéquats des programmes de
protections sociales en Tunisie.
Afin de renforcer l’analyse, les conclusions et les recommandations des différentes techniques
empruntées lors de cette évaluation, il sera important de mener une enquête sur un échantillon
représentatif du groupe d’élèves issus des familles bénéficiant des allocations scolaires et sur un
échantillon comparatif n’en bénéficiant pas. Puisque certaines des techniques quantitatives et
qualitatives requièrent des données (Baseline) relatives à la période d’avant 2011 (lorsque le programme
d’allocations n’était pas sur place), le consultant devra reconstituer de telles données à partir du fichier
PNAFN ou en posant des questions rétrospectives lors des enquêtes par échantillonnage mentionnées cidessus.
VI. Sources de données potentielles.
A titre indicatif, l’analyse d’incidence des différents programmes d’aides destinés aux familles
pauvres et vulnérables ainsi que l’analyse de la qualité des acquis scolaires pourraient se baser en partie
sur les données d’enquêtes disponibles auprès de l’institut national de statistique et du ministère de
l’éducation. Les enquêtes TIMSS fournissent des informations de qualité sur la distribution géographique
des acquis scolaires et le lien entre les conditions de vie de l’enfant et ses performances scolaires. Par
ailleurs, le module niveau de vie des ménages, administré parallèlement aux enquêtes quinquennales sur
la consommation et le budget des ménages, pourrait être utilisé dans l’analyse d’incidence des aides
scolaires et les programmes de transferts directs aux profits des familles pauvres. Ces micro-données
permettent l’évaluation des erreurs d’inclusion et d’exclusion des enfants pauvres des programmes
d’aides, étant données que la quasi-totalité des bénéficiaires actuels sont sélectionnées des familles
bénéficiant des aides médicales gratuites (AMG 1 et AMG2). Cette même source de données permet
d’effectuer des exercices de simulation des corrélations qui pourraient exister entre l’accès aux
différentes aides directes et certains indicateurs de performance scolaire telle que l’assiduité scolaire.
VII. Composition de l’équipe d’évaluation
L’équipe d’évaluation sera composée d'un ou de plusieurs experts dont le consultant principal qui devra
être titulaire d'un diplôme universitaire (BAC + 5) en sciences économiques ou sociales ou en méthodes
quantitatives et avoir une expérience d'au moins quinze (15) ans dans l’évaluation des programmes de
développement, surtout celles portant sur la protection sociale. Il devra avoir d’excellentes capacités de
communication et maîtriser l’outil informatique.
VIII. Calendrier des livrables
L'expert devra présenter les livrables suivants, transmis en version papier (format A4) et sur support
informatique en format Word, et en version SPSS pour les bases de données constituées :
•
Fin de Semaine no.2 : Une feuille de route dans laquelle le consultant sélectionné pour cette
consultation présentera d’une façon détaillée l’approche, la méthodologie et le calendrier des travaux de
terrain, d’analyse et de soumission des livrables.
•
Fin de Semaine no. 24 : Un aide-mémoire de 10 pages maximum (avec des annexes chiffrées
basées sur les données existantes et celles nouvellement collectées) qui servira de base à la restitution
des principales observations et conclusions relevées. Il doit être remis à la fin de la mission, 4 jours avant
la séance de restitution qui sera organisée au MAS.
•
Fin de Semaine no.30 : Un rapport provisoire tenant compte des observations formulées lors de
la réunion de présentation sera envoyé au plus tard 7 jours après la fin de la mission en Tunisie. A noter
que le rapport ne devra pas dépasser 40 pages, y compris le résumé exécutif.
•
Fin de Semaine no. 40 : Un rapport final présentant les conclusions de l’évaluation, la
méthodologie de travail, un examen de situation, l’évaluation, les leçons à tirer et les recommandations.
IX. Modalités de paiement
Le consultant sera rémunéré comme suit :
•
30% du budget total lui sera versé dès signature du contrat pour lui permettre une planification
et mise en œuvre des éléments de sa feuille de route.
•
Le deuxième paiement (30%) se fera dès réception de l’aide-mémoire et la tenue de la séance de
restitution.
•
Le paiement final (40%) sera fait dès réception du rapport final.
Tout paiement sera conditionné au satisfecit donné par l’UNICEF et ses partenaires.
X. Rôles et responsabilités
Le consultant devra recruter au moins un membre de son équipe localement pour s'assurer d'une bonne
maitrise de certains paramètres (connaissances des bases de données, des contacts clés, bonne
coordination, connaissance technique approfondie du domaine à évaluer, etc). Par ailleurs, la réalisation
de cette étude sera faite autour d’une collaboration entre plusieurs institutions nationales attitrées
ayant l’expertise requise pour l’évaluation des programmes et politiques publiques tels que le CRES, la
DGPS et le BEPP (MAS) et d’autres structures dépendant du Ministère de l’éducation tels que le BEPP
(ME). Une assistance technique internationale sera mise à la disposition du projet par le bureau de
l’UNICEF. Ce consultant international, supervisé par le Chef des Politiques Sociales de l’UNICEF, et aura
la responsabilité de produire et soumettre les livrables ci-dessus selon le calendrier établi.
Un comité technique national de pilotage et de suivi suivra le déroulement technique de l’évaluation, de
l’élaboration de l’approche technique à la revue du rapport final. Ce comité technique facilitera les
aspects logistiques et opérationnels de la collecte de nouvelles données, ainsi que l’accès aux données
existantes, afin de supporter le consultant à mener à bien et à temps son travail. Les consultants
devront, dans leur soumission d’offre technique, détailler les éléments précis qui nécessiteront l’appui
du comité technique et en quoi consistera cet appui.
XI. Questions éthiques
Tous les produits (rapports, bases de données, questionnaires) seront accessibles sans restrictions à
l’UNICEF, au Gouvernement de Tunisie et à tous les partenaires impliqués dans cet évaluations. Le
consultant ne peut les partager sans la permission de l’UNICEF.
XII. Spécifications de l’offre technique
Toute offre technique postulant à cette évaluation devra être envoyée à l’adresse suivante :
UNICEF Tunisie ; 58 Avenue Tahar Ben Achour 1082. Mutuelleville -Tunis –Tunisie
Ne pas Ouvrir/ Attention: Mr Le Chargé des Opérations
1.
Profil du postulant (individuel ou équipe): qualifications, expérience en évaluation des systèmes
de protection sociale et CV.
2.
Vue d’ensemble des méthodologies/approches proposées pour répondre à chacune des
questions de cette évaluation. Celles-ci pourront être ajustées/détaillés dans le premier livrable (feuille
de route) une fois le consultant sélectionné.
3.
Plan de travail couvrant tous les livrables et respectant les délais, avec une précision du nombre
personne-jours requis pour chaque livrable.
4.
Budget détaillé (sous plis fermé et séparé de l’offre technique).
Le soumissionnaire sélectionné sera notifié par email.
RFPS–TUN–2012-1101 – ANNEX 2
UNICEF GENERAL TERMS AND CONDITIONS
FOR INSTITUTIONAL/CORPORATE CONTRACTS
1. ACKNOWLEDGMENT COPY
Signing and returning the acknowledgment copy of a contract issued by UNICEF or beginning work under that
contract shall constitute acceptance of a binding agreement between UNICEF and the Contractor.
2.
DELIVERY DATE
Delivery Date to be understood as the time the contract work is completed at the location indicated under
delivery Terms.
3. PAYMENT TERMS
(a) UNICEF shall, unless otherwise specified in the contract, make payment within 30 days of receipt of the
contractor's invoice which is issued only upon UNICEF's acceptance of the work specified in the contract
(b) Payment against the invoice referred to above will reflect any discount shown under the payment terms
provided payment is made within the period shown in the payment terms of the contract
(c) The prices shown in the contract cannot be increased except by express written agreement by UNICEF.
4. LIMITATION OF EXPENDITURE
No increase in the total liability to UNICEF or in the price of the work resulting from design changes,
modifications, or interpretations of the statement of work will be authorized or paid to the contractor unless such
changes have been approved by the contracting authority through an amendment to this contract prior to
incorporation in the work.
5. TAX EXEMPTION
Section 7 of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations provides, inter alia, that the
UN, including its subsidiary organs, is exempt from all direct taxes and is exempt from customs duties in respect
of articles imported or exported for its official use. Accordingly, the Vendor authorizes UNICEF to deduct from the
vendor's invoice any amount representing such taxes or duties charged by the Vendor to UNICEF. Payment of
such corrected invoice amount shall constitute full payment by UNICEF. In the event any taxing authority refuses
to recognize the UN exemption from such taxes, the Vendor shall immediately consult with UNICEF to determine
a mutually acceptable procedure.
Accordingly, the Contractor authorizes UNICEF to deduct from the Contractor's invoice any amount representing
such taxes, duties, or charges, unless the Contractor has consulted with UNICEF before the payment thereof and
UNICEF has, in each instance, specifically authorized the Contractor to pay such taxes, duties or Charges under
protest In that event, the Contractor shall provide UNICEF with written evidence that payment of such taxes,
duties or charges has been made and appropriately authorized.
Page 1 of 6
6.
LEGAL STATUS.
The Contractor shall be considered as having the legal status of an independent contractor vis-a-vis UNICEF. The
Contractor's personnel and sub-contractors shall not be considered in any respect as being the employees or
agents of UNICEF.
7.
CONTRACTOR'S RESPONSIBILITY FOR EMPLOYEES
The Contractor shall be responsible for the professional and technical competence of its employees and will
select, for work under this Contract, reliable individuals who will perform effectively in the implementation of the
Contract, respect the local customs and conform to a high standard of moral and ethical conduct.
8.
INDEMNIFICATION
The Contractor shall indemnify, hold and save harmless and defend, at its own expense, UNICEF, its officials,
agents, servants and employees, from and against all suits, claims, demands and liability of any nature or kind,
including their costs and expenses, arising out of the acts or omissions of the Contractor or its employees or subcontractors in the performance of this Contract This provision shall extend, inter alia, to claims and liability in the
nature of workmen's compensation, product liability and liability arising out of the use of patented inventions or
devices, copyrighted material or other intellectual property by the Contractor, its employees, officers, agents,
servants or sub-contractors. The obligations under this Article do not lapse upon termination of this Contract
9.
INSURANCE AND LIABILITIES TO THIRD PARTIES
(a) The Contractor shall provide and thereafter maintain insurance against all risks in respect of its property and
any equipment used for the execution of this Contract
(b) The Contractor shall provide and thereafter maintain all appropriate workmen's compensation and liability
insurance, or its equivalent, with respect to its employees to cover claims for death, bodily injury or damage to
property arising from the execution of this Contract The Contractor represents that the liability insurance includes
sub-contractors.
(c) The Contractor shall also provide and thereafter maintain liability insurance in an adequate amount to cover
third party claims for death or bodily injury, or loss of or damage to property, arising from or in connection with
the provision of work under this Contract or the operation of any vehicles, boats, airplanes or other equipment
owned or leased by the Contractor or its agents, servants, employees or sub-contractors performing work or
services in connection with this Contract.
(d) Except for the workmen's compensation insurance, the insurance policies under this Article shall:
(i) name UNICEF as additional insured;
(ii) include a waiver of subrogation of the Contractor's rights to the insurance carrier against UNICEF;
(iii) provide that UNICEF shall receive thirty (30) days written notice from the insurers prior to any
cancellation or change of coverage.
(iv) The Contractor shall, upon request, provide UNICEF with satisfactory evidence of the insurance
required under this Article.
10. SOURCE OF INSTRUCTIONS
The Contractor shall neither seek nor accept instructions from any authority external to UNICEF in connection
Page 2 of 6
with the performance of its services under this Contract. The Contractor shall refrain from any action which
may adversely affect UNICEF or the United Nations and shall fulfill its commitments with the fullest regard to the
interests of UNICEF.
11. ENCUMBRANCES/LIENS
The Contractor shall not cause or permit any lien, attachment or other encumbrance by any person to be placed
on file or to remain on file in any public office or on file with UNICEF against any monies due or to become due for
any work done or materials furnished under this Contract, or by reason of any other claim or demand against the
Contractor.
12. TITLE TO EQUIPMENT
Title to any equipment and supplies which may be furnished by UNICEF shall rest with UNICEF and any such
equipment shall be returned to UNICEF at the conclusion of this Contract or when no longer needed by the
Contractor. Such equipment when returned to UNICEF shall be in the same condition as when delivered to the
Contractor, subject to normal wear and tear.
13. COPYRIGHT, PATENTS AND OTHER PROPRIETARY RIGHTS
UNICEF shall be entitled to all intellectual property and other proprietary rights including but not limited to
patents, copyrights and trademarks, with regard to documents and other materials which bear a direct relation to
or are prepared or collected in consequence or in the course of the execution of this contract. At UNICEF's
request, the Contractor shall take all necessary steps, execute all necessary documents and generally assist in
securing such proprietary rights and transferring them to the UNICEF in compliance with the requirements of the
applicable law.
14. CONFIDENTIAL NATURE OF DOCUMENTS
(a) All maps, drawings, photographs, mosaics, plans, reports, recommendations, estimates, documents and all
other data compiled by or received by the Contractor under this Contract shall be the property of UNICEF, shall
be treated as confidential and shall be delivered only to the UN authorized officials on completion of work under
this Contract.
(b) The Contractor may not communicate any time to any other person, Government or authority external to
UNICEF, any information known to it by reason of its association with UNICEF which has not been made public
except with the authorization of the UNICEF; nor shall the Contractor at any time use such information to private
advantage. These obligations do not lapse upon termination of this Contract with UNICEF.
15. FORCE MAJEURE; OTHER CHANGES IN CONDITIONS
(a) In the event of and as soon as possible after the occurrence of any cause constituting force majeure, the
Contractor shall give notice and full particulars in writing to UNICEF of such occurrence or change if the
Contractor is thereby rendered unable, wholly or in part, to perform its obligations and meet its responsibilities
under this Contract. The Contractor shall also notify UNICEF of any other changes in conditions or the occurrence
of any event which interferes or threatens to interfere with its performance of the Contract. On receipt of the
notice required under this Article, UNICEF shall take such action as, in its sole discretion, it considers to be
appropriate or necessary in the circumstances, including the granting to the Contractor of a reasonable extension
of time in which to perform its obligations under the Contract.
Page 3 of 6
(b) If the Contractor is rendered permanently unable, wholly, or in part, by reason of force majeure to perform
its obligations and meet its responsibilities under this Contract, UNICEF shall have the right to suspend or
terminate this Contract on the same terms and conditions as are provided for in Article 14, 'Termination', except
that the period of notice shall be seven (7) days instead of thirty (30) days.
(c) Force majeure as used in this Article means acts of God, war (whether declared or not), invasion, revolution,
insurrection or other acts of a similar nature or force.
16. TERMINATION
If the Contractor fails to deliver any or all of the deliverables within the time period(s) specified in the contract, or
fails to perform any of the terms, conditions, or obligations of the contract, or should the Contractor be judged
bankrupt, or be liquidated or become insolvent, or should the contractor make an assignment for the benefit of
its creditors, or should a Receiver be appointed on account of the insolvency of the contractor, UNICEF may,
without prejudice to any other right or remedy it may have under the terms of these conditions, terminate the
contract, forthwith, in whole or in part, upon thirty (30) days notice to the Contractor.
UNICEF reserves the right to terminate without cause this Contract at any time upon thirty (30) days prior written
notice to the Contractor, in which case UNICEF shall reimburse the Contractor for all reasonable costs incurred by
the Contractor prior to receipt of the notice of termination.
In the event of any termination no payment shall be due from UNICEF to the Contractor except for work and
services satisfactorily performed in conformity with the express terms of this contract.
Upon the giving of such notice, the Contractor shall have no claim for any further payment, but shall remain liable
to UNICEF for reasonable loss or damage which may be suffered by UNICEF for reason of the default. The
Contractor shall not be liable for any loss or damage if the failure to perform the contract arises out of force
majeure.
Upon termination of the contract, UNICEF may require the contractor to deliver any finished work which has not
been delivered and accepted, prior to such termination and any materials or work-in-process related specifically
to this contract. Subject to the deduction of any claim UNICEF may have arising out of this contract or
termination, UNICEF will pay the value of all such finished work delivered and accepted by UNICEF.
The initiation of arbitral proceedings in accordance with Article 22 'Settlement of Disputes' below shall not be
deemed a termination of this Contract.
17. SUB-CONTRACTING
In the event the Contractor requires the services of subcontractors, the Contractor shall obtain the prior written
approval and clearance of UNICEF for all sub-contractors. The approval of UNICEF of a sub-contractor shall not
relieve the Contractor of any of its obligations under this Contract. The terms of any sub-contract shall be subject
to and in conformity with the provisions of this Contract.
18. ASSIGNMENT AND INSOLVENCY
a. The Contractor shall not, except after obtaining the written consent of UNICEF, assign, transfer, pledge or
make other dispositions of the Contract, or any part thereof, of the Contractor's rights or obligations under the
Contract.
Page 4 of 6
b. Should the Contractor become insolvent or should control of the Contractor change by virtue of insolvency,
UNICEF may, without prejudice to any other rights or remedies, terminate the Contract by giving the Contractor
written notice of termination.
19. USE OF UNITED NATIONS AND UNICEF NAME AND EMBLEM
The Contractor shall not use the name, emblem or official seal of the United Nations or UNICEF or any
abbreviation of these names for any purpose
20. OFFICIALS NOT TO BENEFIT
The Contractor warrants that no official of UNICEF or the United Nations has received or will be offered by the
Contractor any direct or indirect benefit arising from this Contract or the award thereof. The Contractor agrees
that breach of this provision is a breach of an essential term of the Contract.
21. PROHIBITION ON ADVERTISING
The Contractor shall not advertise or otherwise make public that the Vendor is furnishing goods or services to
UNICEF without specific permission of UNICEF.
22. SETTLEMENT OF DISPUTES
Amicable Settlement
The Parties shall use their best efforts to settle amicably any dispute, controversy or claim arising out of, or
relating to this Contract or the breach, termination or invalidity thereof. Where the parties wish to seek such an
amicable settlement through conciliation, the conciliation shall take place in accordance with the UNCITRAL
Conciliation Rules then obtaining, or according to such other procedure as may be agreed between the parties.
Arbitration
Any dispute, controversy or claim between the Parties arising out of this Contract or the breach, termination or
invalidity thereof, unless settled amicably under the preceding paragraph of this Article within sixty (60) days after
receipt by one Party or the other Party's request for such amicable settlement, shall be referred by either Party to
arbitration in accordance with the UNCITRAL Arbitration Rules then obtaining. The arbitral tribunal shall have no
authority to award punitive damages. In addition, the arbitral tribunal shall have no authority to award interest in
excess of six percent (6%) and any such interest shall be simple interest only. The Parties shall be bound by any
arbitration award rendered as a result of such arbitration as the final adjudication of any such controversy, claim
or dispute.
Page 5 of 6
23. PRIVILEGES AND IMMUNITIES
The privileges and immunities of the UN, including its subsidiary organs, are not waived.
24. CHILD LABOUR
UNICEF fully subscribes to the Convention on the Rights of the Child and draws the attention of potential
suppliers to Article 32 of the Convention which inter alia requires that a child shall be protected from performing
any work that is likely to be hazardous or to interfere with the child's education, or to be harmful to the child's
health or physical, mental, spiritual, moral or social development.
25. ANTI-PERSONNEL MINES
UNICEF supports an international ban on the manufacture of anti-personnel mines. Anti-personnel mines have
killed and maimed thousands of people, of whom a large proportion are children and women. Anti-personnel
mines present a serious obstacle to the return of populations displaced from their residences by fighting around
their villages and homes. UNICEF has, therefore, decided not to purchase products from companies that sell or
manufacture anti-personnel mines or their components.
26. AUTHORITY TO MODIFY
No modification or change in this Contract, no waiver of any of its provisions or any additional contractual
relationship of any kind with the Contractor shall be valid and enforceable against UNICEF unless provided by an
amendment to this Contract signed by the authorized official of UNICEF.
27. REPLACEMENT OF PERSONNEL
UNICEF reserves the right to request the Contractor to replace the assigned personnel if they are not performing
to a level that UNICEF considers satisfactory. After written notification, the Contractor will provide curriculum
vitae of appropriate candidates within three (3) working days for UNICEF review and approval. The Contractor
must replace the unsatisfactory personnel within seven (7) working days of UNICEF's selection.
If one or more key personnel become unavailable, for any reason, for work under the contract, the Contractor
shall (i) notify the project authority at least fourteen (14) days in advance, and (ii) obtain the project authority's
approval prior to making any substitution of key personnel. Key personnel are designated as follows:
(a) Personnel identified in the proposal as key individuals (as a minimum, partners, managers, senior auditors) to
be assigned for participation in the performance of the contract.
(b) Personnel whose resumes were submitted with the proposal; and
(c) Individuals who are designated as key personnel by agreement of the Contractor and UNICEF during
negotiations.
In notifying the project authority, the Contractor shall provide an explanation of circumstances necessitating the
proposed replacement(s) and submit justification and qualification of replacement personnel in sufficient detail to
permit evaluation of the impact on the engagement.
Acceptance of a replacement person by the project authority shall not relieve the Contractor from responsibility
for failure to meet the requirements of the contract.
Page 6 of 6
Récapitulatif des formulaires d’évaluation
des Propositions techniques
Coefficien
t de la
note
Note
maximu
m
Société / Autre entité
A
1.
2.
3.
Expertise de la Société /
Organisation soumissionnaire
Projet de plan de travail et
d’approche
Personnel
35%
35
35%
35
30%
30
Total
B
C
D
E
100
Les formulaires d’évaluation des offres techniques figurent dans les deux pages suivantes. La note
maximum spécifiée pour chacun des critères d’évaluation indique l’importance relative ou le coefficient de
l’article dans le contexte du processus d’évaluation globale. Les formulaires d’évaluation de la Proposition
technique sont :
Formulaire 1: Expertise de la Société / Organisation soumissionnaire
Formulaire 2: Projet de plan de travail et d’approche
Formulaire 3: Personnel
Formulaire d’évaluation de la Proposition
technique -- Formulaire 1
Nbre de
points
maximum
Compagnie/ Autre entité
A
B
C
D
E
Expertise de la Compagnie/ Organisation soumissionnaire
1.1
Réputation de l’Organisation et de son
personnel (Compétence/Fiabilité)
10
1.2
Capacité organisationnelle générale
susceptible d’affecter l’exécution
(moyens humains, matériels)
Procédures d’assurance de qualité,
garantie
Pertinence des connaissances
spécialisées et expérience
professionnelle surtout avec les
organisations internationales.
10
1.3
1.4
8,5
6,5
35
Page 1 of 3 -
Formulaire d’évaluation de la Proposition
technique – Formulaire 2
Nbre
de
points
maxim
um
A
B
C
D
E
Projet de plan de travail et d’approche
2.1
2.2
2.3
2.4
2.5
2.6
Dans quelle mesure le soumissionnaire
comprend-il bien la tâche ?
Les aspects importants de la tâche ont-ils
été traités de manière suffisamment
détaillée ?
La proposition est-elle basée sur les détails
techniques des services requis ?
Le cadre de travail proposé est-il
approprié ?
Le champ de la tâche est-il bien défini et
correspond-il à la mission ?
La présentation est-elle claire, et la
succession des activités ainsi que la
planification sont-elles logiques,
réalistes et augurent-elles suffisamment
d’une bonne exécution du projet?
4
4
4
6,5
10
6,5
35
Page 2 of 3 -
Nbre de
points
maximum
Evaluation de la proposition technique -Formulaire 3
A
3.1
Qualification et effectif du
personnel
B
C
D
E
15
Le personnel affecté est-il
suffisant ?
7,5
Le personnel affecté est-il
bien formé ?
7,5
Sous-total
3.2
Expérience du personnel
Chef d’équipe
7,5
Autres membres de l’équipe
7,5
Sous-total
Total Général
Page 3 of 3 -
15
30
100
SUPPLIER PROFILE FORM
To be completed by Supplier and submitted to UNICEF Office
58 rue Avenue Tahar Ben Achour, Tel. (216) 71 802700, Fax: (216) 793001.
Requested information is for UNICEF official use only and will be treated as confidential
(Please TYPE or PRINT, attach additional pages if space provided is not enough for information)
Please find below UNICEF General Terms and Conditions for reference
Section 1: Supplier Profile
Name of Company:
Address:
CP
City
Tél
Country
Fax
email
Contact Person
Title
Type of Organization
State company 
Private company 
Offshore company 
Year Established
Other 
RC °
(Please attach a copy of your Register of Commerce)
Page 1 of 4
UNICEF Tunisia
Section 2: Activity category
Manufacturer 
Trading 
Consulting 
Other 
Other (Please Specify)
Number of Employees
Name and title of principals:
Name
Title
Bank details
Bank name and address
IBAN account N° for US dollars
IBAN account N° for Tunisian Dinars
Bank Swift Code
Page 2 of 4
UNICEF Tunisia
Section 3: Activities
Current year estimate
(US$ _________________ )
Last year
(US$ _________________ )
Gross annual turnover:
Previous contracts (during the last 2 years) with United Nations/International or Governmental
Organizations/Private Companies, for below products/services (provide at least three references):
Date
Value
Product Organization
Name/address
1
2
3
4
Main products/services offered (please provide product list or catalogue if available):
Storage/warehousing
capacity
(in square meters):
Transportation
Yes 
(If yes, please specify number and capacity)
No 
Section 4: Others
Should your company have a Quality Assurance Policy, please indicate person(s) responsible together
with title and telephone number:
1
2
Any other information (Check as applicable):
Yes 
No 
(if yes, please specify. Use additional paper if needed)
Page 3 of 4
UNICEF Tunisia
I hereby certify that the information provided above and in all the annexure is correct and that no
person in any connection with this establishment, as a supplier for providing material, supplies or
services, or as a principal or employee, is employed by UNICEF, or barred by UNICEF:
Name
Title
Date
Signature and Seal
Page 4 of 4
UNICEF Tunisia
Appendix 2: Enquête avec parties prenantes
TOP LEVEL INTERVIEW
version 09-Sept-2013
A. Introductions
B. Intro script
Merci d’avoir pris le temps de nous retrouver aujourd’hui.
Quand nous avons pris ce rendez-vous, nous vous avons demander de participer a
l'évaluation d’un programme d’aide scolaire qui fourni de l’assistance financière a
des familles avec des enfants scolarises en Tunisie. Ce programme est lie
directement au programme de PNAFN mais va être évalué en tant qu’un programme
indépendant. Vous êtes parmi 30 décisionnaires, législateurs et intervenants au
niveau national qui participerons au entretiens des informateurs clefs.
Cet entretien dura environ 60-90 minutes.
Nous allons vous demander des questions sur des sujets tel que::
● Votre opinion du programme
● Votre compréhension du programme et ses objectifs
● Vos expériences au sein du programme
Vous pouvez refuser de répondre ou arrêter cet entretien a tout moment. Avec votre
permission, nous allons enregistrer notre discussion. Ceci nous aidera a documenter
tout ce dont vous partagez avec nous aujourd’hui. Tout les records de notre étude
seront confidentiels, garde en sécurité et examine sans information identifiant.
Nous espérons que notre rendez-vous aujourd’hui sera plutôt une discussion qu’un
entretien stricte, donc nous vous invitons a partager vos idées, vos anecdotes, vos
questions..etc mémé s’il ne sont pas en réponse directe a nos questions. Nous
voulons savoir votre perspectives et vos expériences, il n’y a pas de réponses justes
au fausses. N'hésitez pas de nous demander quoi que ce soit, surtout s’il y a des
questions que vous ne comprenez pas parfaitement.
C. Rôle / Connections
1. Nous allons commencer par vous demander de décrire votre connections a ce
programme. Est-ce que vous avez un rôle spécifique dans ce programme, lie a ce
programme?
2. Pour chacun des domaines suivantes, classez votre connaissance dans ce domaine
comme::
1 - très bonne connaissance
2 - quelques connaissance
3 - aucune connaissance
A. Les Objectives du programme
B. Structure Administrative
C. Les décisionnaires clés
D. Critères d'éligibilité
E. Distribution du programme au niveau local
F. Impacte du programme
G. Surveillance et Évaluation
H. Autre programmes de protection sociale
OBJECTIFS:
1. Selon vous, quels sont les objectifs clefs du programme d’aide scolaire ?
a. Premier Objectif
b. Objectifs secondaires
2. Est-ce que vous pensez que d’autres personnes clefs de cet agence ou d’autre
agences impliques dans ce programme ont des objectifs différents ?
a. Qui ?
b. Quels genres d’objectives ont-ils ?
c. Quels problèmes/désaccords sont les résultats de ces différences ?
3. A quel point sont les objectives de ce programme alignes avec les lois et le financement
de ce programme ?
STRUCTURE ADMINISTRATIVE:
4. De quelle façon est-ce que vous dériverez la structure administrative de ce programme ?
a. Financement
b. Création de règles
c. Mise en œuvre
d. Contrôle et surveillance
CIBLAGE ET ÉLIGIBILITÉ:
5. Basé sur votre compréhension quels sont les critères d’éligibilité pour ce programme ?
6. Est-ce que vous croyez que les critères d’éligibilité actuels identifient convenablement les
personnes qui devraient être cibles par ce programme ?
a. Qui est actuellement cible et ne devrait pas l’être ?
b. Qui n’est pas cible et devrait l’être ?
7. Est-ce que vous pensez que les critères d’éligibilité sont
a. Assez précis ?
b. Assez objectifs ?
c. Communiques clairement aux niveaux régionaux et locaux ?
8. Le clientelisme est défini comme l'échange de biens et de services pour le soutien
politique. Est-ce vous pensez que le clientélisme est un problème
a. de la conception du programme au niveau politique ?
i. lois et réglementations en ce qui concerne les critères d’éligibilité
ii. budget global, allocation du budget au niveau régional
b.dans l’exécution du programme au niveau local et régional ?
i. détermination d’éligibilité local/régional
ii. propagation sélective
9.. A votre avis, quel part de la population cible est au courant de ce programme ? Que
devrait être fait pour améliorer la reconnaissance ?
DISTRIBUTION
10. Est-ce que vous pensez que ce programme est structuré de manière efficace en ce qui
concerne
a. La circulation de l’information
i. Vers le haut
ii. Vers le bas
b. Mise en œuvre
c.
d.
La mainmise interne et surveillance
S’occuper des besoins de la population ciblée
IMPACTE
11. A votre avis, quel est l’impacte des avantages du programme sur
a. Les dépenses scolaires des ménages bénéficiaires
b. Les inscriptions scolaires
c. Les taux d’abandons parmi les bénéficiaires
AMÉLIORATIONS
12.. Ou sont les occasions pour
a. Faire des économies
b. Fournir une protection meilleure
c. Améliorer l’efficacité
13.. A votre avis, est-ce que les programmes d’aide et de protection sociale devraient être
combinés ?
a. Le partage de données et surveillance/évaluation
b. La dotation en personnel
c. Critère d’éligibilité
d. Allocation
14. Comment est-ce que l’organisation des allocations de ce programme peut être
améliorée ?
a. Calendrier des paiements
b. Le montant des allocations
c. Le total d’enfants couverts (actuellement 3 enfants par famille)
d. Est-ce-que le montant des allocations devrait varie selon les bénéficiaires ?
i. Âge/niveau scolaires des enfants
ii. La mesure de la pauvreté
iii. Variation géographique
e. Bénéfices en nature
i. Fourniture scolaires, cantine scolaire…
15.
Est-ce que l’aide scolaire mensuel devrait dépendre de certaines conditions ?
i. Inscription scolaire, assiduité
ii. Résultats scolaires
iii. Autre
SURVEILLANCE ET ÉVALUATION
16.. Quels sont les forces et faiblesses du système de surveillance et évaluation de ce
programme ?
a. Qu’est-ce que vous changerez du système actuel de surveillance et évaluation ?
AUTRE
17.. Qu’est ce que nous avons négligé de demander ?
18. Qu’est ce que nous aurions pu faire mieux ou différemment ?
Appendix 3: Enquête Niveau Local
ENQUÊTE NIVEAU LOCAL
‫المستوى المحلي المسح‬
_______________
_______________
_______________
Gouvernorat
Délégation
Addresse
A. Ressources ‫موارد‬
A1 - Combien d’autres bureaux servent cette délégation? _____
A2 - A quelle distance se situe le bureau le plus proche? ‫؟‬
‫ _____ ما ھي مسافة أقرب مكتب‬km
A3 - Avec combien de ménages avez-vous eu des contacts en 2013? ‫؟‬2013
_____ Ménages
A4 - Combien de personnes travaillent dans ce bureau?
‫ماھو عدد األسر الذين وقع االتصال بھم في سنة‬
‫أسر‬
‫ كم عدد الموظفين في ھذا المكتب؟‬Personnel _____ ‫الموظفون‬
Remplir une colonne pour chaque travailleur
Personnel
Personnel
Personnel
Personnel
Personnel
‫ملء عمود واحد عن موظف ظظ‬
A-5 Position ‫الوظيفة‬
‫موظف‬#1
‫ موظف‬#2
‫ موظف‬#3
‫ موظف‬#4
‫ موظف‬#5
____
h/semaine
‫أسبوعس‬/
____
h/semaine
‫أسبوعس‬/
____
h/semaine
‫أسبوعس‬/
____
h/semaine
‫أسبوعس‬/
____
h/semaine
‫أسبوعس‬/
____
h/semaine
‫أسبوعس‬/
____
h/semaine
‫أسبوعس‬/
____
h/semaine
‫أسبوعس‬/
____
h/semaine
‫أسبوعس‬/
____
h/semaine
‫أسبوعس‬/
____
h/semaine
‫أسبوعس‬/
____
h/semaine
‫أسبوعس‬/
____
h/semaine
‫أسبوعس‬/
____
h/semaine
‫أسبوعس‬/
____
h/semaine
‫أسبوعس‬/
____
h/semaine
‫أسبوعس‬/
____
h/semaine
‫أسبوعس‬/
____
h/semaine
‫أسبوعس‬/
____
h/semaine
‫أسبوعس‬/
____
h/semaine
‫أسبوعس‬/
____
h/semaine
‫أسبوعس‬/
____
h/semaine
‫أسبوعس‬/
____
h/semaine
‫أسبوعس‬/
____
h/semaine
‫أسبوعس‬/
____
h/semaine
‫أسبوعس‬/
____
h/semaine
‫أسبوعس‬/
____
h/semaine
‫أسبوعس‬/
____
h/semaine
‫أسبوعس‬/
____
h/semaine
‫أسبوعس‬/
____
h/semaine
‫أسبوعس‬/
A-6 A participé à l’interview (oui/ non)
(‫ ال‬/‫شارك في المقابلة )نعم‬
A-7 Genre (F/M)
‫أ( الجنس‬/‫)ذ‬
A-8 Education (1 = primaire, 2 = secondaire, 3 = supérieur)
(‫=عالي‬3, ‫=ثانوي‬2 ,‫=ابتدائي‬1)‫تعليم‬
A-9 Connaissances en informatique (1= bonne, 2=moyenne, 3=néant)
(‫=الشىء‬3,‫=متوسطة‬2,‫=جيدة‬1) ‫معرفة باالعالمية‬
A-10 Heures de travail hebdomadaires
‫ساعات العمل األسبوعية‬
En dehors du bureau : ‫خارج المكتب‬
Combien d'heures sont consacrées, en moyenne par semaine à
ces activités: ‫كم عدد الساعات التي تنفق في المتوسط أسبوعيا على ھذه األنشطة‬
A-11 Sensibilisation à identifier de nouveaux bénéficiaires potentiels
‫التوعية لتحديد المستفيدين المحتملين الجدد‬
A-12 Les visites à domicile afin de déterminer l'admissibilité des
nouveaux bénéficiaires
‫الزيارات المنزلية لتحديدأھلية المنتفعين الجدد‬
A-13 Re-certification de l'éligibilité des bénéficiaires
‫إعادة تحديد أھلية المستفيدين‬
Au bureau :‫في المكتب‬
Combien d'heures sont consacrées, en moyenne par semaine à
ces activités: ‫كم عدد الساعات التي تنفق في المتوسط أسبوعيا على ھذه األنشطة‬
A-14 Interagir avec les nouveaux candidats ou les bénéficiaires
‫التفاعل مع المنتفعين الجدد أو المستفيدين‬
A-15 Traitement
‫معالجة‬
A-16 Autres activités
‫أنشطة أخرى‬
A17- Si vous aviez la possibilité d'embaucher une personne supplémentaire pour travailler dans ce bureau, quel serait son rôle principal?
(réponses multiples)
(‫ ماذا يكون دوره)إجابات متعددة‬،‫إذا كان لديك الفرصة لتوظيف شخص واحد إضافي للعمل في ھذا المكتب‬
A (A-10)
B (A-11)
C (A-12)
D (A-13)
E (A-14)
F (A-15)
Autre ‫_________ ___اخر‬
1
(Pour l’enquêteur : CT: programme d’allocation scolaire allouée dans le cadre du PNAFN (aides scolaires) ‫)برنامج المنح‬
‫المدرسية‬
A-18: Comment évalueriez-vous votre bureau
‫كبف تقيم مكتبك على‬
Très élevé
‫عالية جدا‬
Elevé
‫عالية‬
Moyen
‫متوسط‬
Faible
‫ضعيف‬
Très
faible
‫ضعيف جدا‬
Familiarité avec les règles et les règlements du programme PNAFN
PNAFN ‫األلفة مع القواعد واللوائح للبرنامج‬
Familiarité avec les règles et les règlements du programme CT
CT ‫األلفة مع القواعد واللوائح للبرنامج‬
Identifier et relier tous les enfants admissibles dans votre quartier
à des prestations de CT
CT ‫تمكين جميع األطفال المؤھلين في منطقتكم بفوائد برنامج‬
Vérification de l'admissibilité continue des bénéficiaires
‫التحقق من األھلية المستمرة للمستفيدين‬
Relations avec d'autres organismes et intervenants
‫التواصل مع الوكاالت األخرى وأصحاب المصلحة‬
La gestion et le reporting bureau
‫إدارة المكاتب وإعداد التقارير‬
Compétences en informatique
‫مھارات الحوسبة‬
La motivation du personnel
‫تحفيز الموظفين‬
La formation du personnel et des qualifications
‫تكوين الموظفين والمؤھلت‬
A19- Quels sont les trois types les plus communs de prestations que les gens demandent ici?
‫ما ھي األنواع الثالث األكثرالمطلوبة من االعانات فيھذا المنصب؟‬
A. Cartes de soins de santé gratuits ou subventionnés ‫بطاقات الرعاية الصحية المجانية أو المدعومة‬
B. Appui pour l'éducation des enfants _ ‫دعم تعليم األطفال‬
C. Les allocations de chômage _ ‫منح البطالة‬
D. Subventions de chômage _ ‫منحة البطالة‬
E. Les prestations d'invalidité _‫خدمات العجز و االعاقة‬
F. Professionnel / formation à l'entreprenariat _ ‫تكوين لبعث المشاريع‬/‫عمل‬
G. L'aide au logement _‫دعم اإلسكان‬
H. Autres __‫_______________________ ___ اخر‬
B. Surveillance / normalization ‫ توحيد‬/ ‫الرقابة‬
B1- En 2013, votre bureau a-t-il été visité par des fonctionnaires du bureau central / régional pour l'une des raisons
Suivantes (choix multiples):
(‫ اإلقليمي ألي من األسباب التالية )امكانية تعدد االجابات‬/ ‫ كان مكتبكم يزوره مسؤولون من المكتب المركزي‬،2013 ‫في سنة‬:
A. Formation_ ‫تكوين‬
B. Conformité / contrôle qualité _ ‫ مراقبة الجودة‬/ ‫االمتثال‬
C. Mises à jour du programme _‫تحين البرنامج‬
D. La gestion des données et des rapports _‫إدارة البيانات وإعداد التقارير‬
E. Les questions au personnel_‫أسئلة للموظفين‬
F. Enregistrement régulier_‫تسجيل إجراءات الوصول بصفة منتظمة‬
G. Autre (préciser) (‫_____ اخر)أذكره‬
H. Aucune de ces réponses_‫ال أحد مما سبق‬
B2- En 2013, environ, quelle part de décisions d’admissibilité de PNAFN prises à votre niveau ont été annulées au niveau
régional?
‫ المتخذة على مستواكم و التي تم رفضھا على المستوى الجھوي ؟‬PNAFN ‫ ما ھي نسبة القرارات النأھيلية لبرنامج‬2013 ‫في‬
____ %
2
C. Sensibilisation-‫التوعية‬
(CT: programme d’allocation scolaire allouée dans le cadre du PNAFN (aides scolaires) ‫)برنامج المنح المدرسية‬
C1 Est-ce que votre bureau se livre à l'une des activités suivantes pour informer le public sur
.. ‫بأي طريقة يقوم مكتبكم باعالم المواطنين‬
PNAFN
CT
Médias_ ‫_ وسائل اإلعالم‬
Réunions publiques / Événements info ‫ أحداث معلومات‬/ ‫االجتماعات العامة‬
Autre (préciser) (‫__________________أخر )أذكره‬
Aucune de ces réponses ‫ال أحد مما سبق‬
C2- Quel est le pourcentage de ménages éligibles dans votre délégation
‫ما ھي النسبة المئوية لألسر المؤھلة في برنامج‬
a) PNAFN ___%
b) CT ___%
C3- Le cas échéant, par quels moyens arrivez vous à identifier les bénéficiaires potentiels du programme CT.
CT.‫ما ھي الوسائل المستعملة لتحديد المستفيدين المحتملين من برنامج‬،‫إن وجدت‬
A. Les visites à domicile_‫_الزيارات المنزلية‬
B. Visites dans les écoles _ ‫زيارات إلى المدارس‬
C. Les appels téléphoniques _ ‫المكالمات الھاتفية‬
D. Sensibilisation des dirigeants_ ‫تحسيس المسؤولين‬
E. Autre (préciser) (‫_________ اخر)أذكره‬
F. Aucune de ces réponses_‫ال أحد مما سبق‬
C4Combien de fois quelqu'un de votre bureau interagir avec …
..... ‫كم من مرة مكتبكم يتفاعل مع‬
Au moins tous
les mois
‫على األقل شھريا‬
Trimestriel
‫كل ثالثة أشھر‬
Annuellement
‫سنويا‬
Jamais
‫أبدا‬
Enseignants_ ‫المعلمون‬
Personnels de proximité de l'école _ ‫العاملين في مجال التوعية المدرسية‬
Les administrateurs scolaires_ ‫مديري المدارس‬
D'autres travailleurs sociaux / bureaux _ ‫ مكاتب‬/ ‫غيرھا من األخصائيين االجتماعيين‬
Responsables politiques locals/ de décision_‫القرار على المستوى المحلي‬
Responsables politiques régionals/ de décision_‫القرار على المستوى الجھوي‬
Responsables politiques nationaux/ de décision_‫القرار على المستوى الوطني‬
ONG _ ‫المنظمات غير الحكومية‬
3
D. Besoins et évaluation des besoins _ ‫االحتياجات وتقييم االحتياجات‬
D1- Quel est le pourcentage des ménages dans votre district qui reçoivent actuellement des prestations de PNAFN et ne
seraient pas admissibles si elles devaient s'appliquer de nouveau aujourd'hui?
‫ وليست مؤھلة في الوقت الحالي؟‬PNAFN ‫ما ھي النسبة المئوية من األسر في ھذه المنطقة الذين يتلقون حاليا فوائد برنامج‬
_____%.
D2- Pour assurer l'équité, combien de fois les ménages doivent-ils re-certifier leur admissibilité à PNAFN?
___ ‫كل سنة‬
Tous les ___ ans
‫؟‬PNAFN ‫كم من مرة يجب إعادة التصديق رأھلية األسرالمستفيدين ببرنامج‬,‫لضمان النزاھة‬
D3- Pensez-vous que les critères d'admissibilité actuels pour le PNAFN sont …  Trop stricte
 Souple
 Acceptable
‫ مقبولة‬
‫ لينة‬
‫ صارمة جدا‬ ... ‫ ھي‬PNAFN ‫ھل تعتقد أن معايير األھلية الحالية لبرنامج‬
D4- Pour déterminer l'admissibilité d'un ménage, les assistants sociaux doivent donner ....
 des règles plus claires pour guider leurs décisions  plus d'espace pour le personnel
 aucun changement
‫ ينبغي إيتاء المرشدين االجتماعيين‬،‫في تحديد أھلية األسرة‬
‫ مساحة أكبر للحكم الشخصية‬
‫ قواعد أكثر وضوحا لتوجيه قراراتھم‬
‫ أي تغيير‬
D5- Dans l'évaluation de l'admissibilité d'un ménage, le jugement personnel de l’assistant social doit être accordé
 plus de poids
 moins de poids
 aucun changement
‫ يجب أن يتم منح الحكم الشخصي للمرشد االجتماعي‬،‫في تقييم أھلية األسر‬
‫ ال تغيير‬
‫ أقل وزن‬
‫ أكثر وزن‬
D6-Lors de la demande de prestations ou la re-certification, à votre avis quel est le pourcentage de ménages qui ont menti sur leur
admissibilité?
‫ في رأيك ما ھي النسبة المئوية من األسر الذين كذبوا بشأن أھليتھم؟‬،‫عند التقدم بمطلب لفوائد البرنامج أو إعادة التصديق‬
____%
D7- Quels sont les critères d'admissibilité actuels qui devraient être exclus pour déterminer l'admissibilité:
:‫ما ھي معايير األھلية الحالية التي ينبغي استبعادھا عند تحديد األھلية‬
PNAFN: __________________________________
CT: _________________________________________
D8-Quels sont les nouveaux critères d'admissibilité qui vous permettraient de mieux identifier les personnes dans le besoin
‫ما ھي المعايير األھلية الجديدة التي تسمح بتحديد أفضل للمحتاجين‬
PNAFN: __________________________________
CT: _________________________________________
D9-Pensez-vous que l'éligibilité pour le programme de CT de l'éducation doit être liée au PNAFN  Oui
‫ال‬
‫نعم‬
 Non
PNAFN ‫ ببرنامج‬CT ‫ھل تعتقد أنه يجب ربط األھلية لبرنامج‬
D10- S'il vous plaît pouvez-vous décrire comment l'information sur les changements dans l'admissibilité pour le programme CT des
ménages est communiquée au bureau régional (fréquence, méthode, ect ...)
(... ‫ إلخ‬،‫ األسلوب‬،‫ لألسر إلى المكتب الجھوي )تردد‬CT ‫من فضلكم ھل يمكن وصف كيف يتم اإلبالغ عن المعلومات حول التغييرات في األھلية للبرنامج‬
________________________________________________________________________________________________________
________________________________________________________________________________________________________
4
E. Obstacles_ ‫الحواجز‬
E1-Quels sont les défis que vous rencontrez-vous dans votre travail? (lire les modalités)
(‫ما ھى االتحديات التي تواجكم في وظيفتكم؟ )قراءة االحتماالت‬
A. Charge de travail trop élevée _
‫عبء العمل عالية جدا‬
B. Transport_ ‫_النقل‬
C. L'organisation et les données de gestion des dossiers_‫والبيانات‬
D. Manque d'orientation de niveaux supérieurs_‫العليا‬
E. Manque de resources_‫الموارد‬
‫إدارة تنظيم السجالت‬
‫عدم وجود توجيه من المستويات‬
‫نقص‬
F. Manque de coopération / coordination avec d'autres organisms‫أخرى‬
G. Bureaucratie / inefficacité _ ‫الكفاءة‬
‫ التنسيق مع وكاالت‬/ ‫ عدم التعاون‬-
‫ عدم‬/ ‫البيروقراطية‬
H. Les pressions exercées par les candidats_‫من قبل المتقدمين‬
I. Autre (préciser) (‫________________________ اخر)أذكره‬
‫الضغط‬
E2- D’après vous, effectuer l'une des suivantes constitue des obstacles à l'inscription des familles admissibles au programme CT
‫؟‬CT ‫ القيام باإلجراءات التالية تشكل الحواجز التي تحول دون تسجيل أي األسر المستحقة في برنامج‬،‫بقدر ما كنت تعرف‬
A. Manque d'information des familles admissibles _
‫نقص المعلومات بين األسر المستحقة‬
‫اعطاء صورة سلبية المرتبطة المشاركة في البرنامج‬
B. La stigmatisation associée à la participation au programme _
‫عملية التطبيق‬
D. Fenêtre d'application étroite_‫نافذة التطبيق الضيق‬
E. La dispersion géographique_‫التوزيع الجغرافي‬
F. Montant de la prestation insuffisante_ ‫مبلغ االعانة غير كافي‬
G. Conditions sur la scolarisation_‫الشروط لاللتحاق بالمدارس‬
C. Processus de demande difficile_‫صعبة‬
H. Autre‫________________ _________ اخر‬
F. Efficacité _‫الفعالية‬
F1- Sur 10 enfants aléatoires qui reçoivent actuellement les paiements CT ...
... CT ‫ أطفال عشوائية لديھم اعانات‬10 ‫كل‬
a)
Combien pensez-vous aller régulièrement à l'école ...
____enfant
Ne sait pas
‫ال يعرف‬
____‫طفل‬... ‫كم تعتقد يذھب بانتظام إلى المدرسة؟‬
b) Combien ne serait pas aller à l'école sans les paiements … ____ enfant
Ne sait pas
‫كم من ھؤالء ال يذھبون إلى المدرسة في المستقبل دون اعانات؟ طفل____ ال يعرف‬
F2- À votre avis, le montant de la prestation est-il suffisant pour avoir un impact positif sur ...
... ‫ مقدار االعانة كافي ليكون لھا تأثير إيجابي على‬،‫في رأيك‬
A. Les dépenses des ménages bénéficiaires pour l'éducation? ‫نفقات التعليم األسر المستفيدة؟‬
B. Le nombre de jours d’absence à l'école?_ ‫عدد أيام تغيب عن المدرسة؟‬
C. Le rendement scolaire des enfants?_‫أداء األطفال في المدارس؟‬
D. La scolarisation des enfants ou l’abandon scolaire? _ ‫التحاق األطفال بالمدارس أو التخلي؟‬
E. Aucune de ces réponses_‫ال أحد مما سبق‬
5
F3- À votre avis, si le maintien des prestations mensuelles de CT dépend...
... ‫ تعتمد على‬CT ‫ يجب استمرار الفوائد الشھرية‬،‫في رأيك‬
A. Les dépenses des ménages bénéficiaires pour l'éducation?_ ‫نفقات التعليم األسر المستفيدة؟‬
B. La fréquentation régulière de l'école?_‫؟‬... ‫االلتحاق بالمدارس بصفة عادية‬
C. Le rendement scolaire?_‫؟‬.. ‫األداء المدرسي‬
D. La scolarisation des enfants_‫التحاق األطفال بالمدارس‬
E. Aucune de ces réponses_‫ال أحد مما سبق‬
F4- À votre avis, les familles pensent recevoir des versements mensuels du programme CT dans le cadre de PNAFN, ou pensentelles que ces paiements sont séparés du PNAFN pour la scolarisation de leurs enfants?
.‫ لتعليم أطفالھم‬PNAFN ‫ أو أنھا منفصلة عن برنامج‬، PNAFN‫ ھل األسر تعتقد أنھا تتلقي دفعات شھرية داخل برنامج‬،‫في رأيكم‬
 La plupart des familles pensent que ces paiements sont une partie régulière de PNAFN
PNAFN ‫ معظم األسر تعتقد أن ھذه المدفوعات ھي جزءا منتظما من‬
 Certaines familles pensent que les avantages sont pour la scolarité, d'autres pensent qu'ils sont une partie régulière de
PNAFN
PNAFN ‫ والبعض اآلخر يعتقدون أنھم جزءا منتظما من‬،‫ بعض األسر تعتقد أن الفوائد للتعليم‬
 La plupart des familles pensent que les paiements sont spécifiquement pour la scolarité de leurs enfants
‫ معظم األسر تعتقد أن المدفوعات خصيصا لتعليم أبنائھم‬
 Ne sait pas
‫ ال يعرف‬
.
G. Suggestions d'amélioration_‫اقتراحات للتحسين‬
G1- À votre avis, quel serait le montant le plus approprié de remboursement mensuel pour ce programme?
______ Dinar par mois par enfant
‫______ دينار شھريا لكل طفل‬
‫ ما من شأنه أن يكون مبلغ السداد الشھري األنسب لھذا البرنامج؟‬،‫في رأيك‬
G2-À votre avis, le montant de la prestation doit être toujours limité à seulement 3 enfants par famille?
 Oui
 Non
‫ال‬
‫نعم‬
‫ أطفال لكل أسرة؟‬3 ‫ مبلغ االعانة يجب أن تقتصرعلى‬،‫حسب رأيك‬
G3-Pour améliorer la scolarisation, l’assiduité et la performance scolaire est-il préférable
 d'apporter une aide en espèces aux ménages de fournir une aide en nature (livres, etc) pour les enfants dans les écoles
‫ وأنه من األفضل‬،‫ واألداء‬،‫لتحسين التسجيل والحضور في المدارس‬
‫( لألطفال في المدارس‬.‫ الخ‬،‫ تقديم الدعم العيني )الكتب‬
‫إعطاء الدعم النقدي لألسر‬
G4-Pour avoir le plus grand impact sur la scolarisation, l'assiduité et la performance, les prestations en espèces
devraient être payés ...
 Au début de l'année scolaire
 chaque trimestre
 chaque mois
... ‫ واإلعانات النقدية ينبغي أن تدفع‬،‫ليكون لھا أكبر األثر على االلتحاق والحضور واألداء‬
‫ كل شھر‬
‫كل ثالثة أشھر‬
‫ في بداية السنة الدراسية‬.
6
G5-Pour avoir le plus grand impact sur la scolarisation, l'assiduité et la performance, combien de fois les ménages doivent recertifier l'admissibilité de leurs enfants pour CT?
 chaque mois  chaque trimestre
 Au début de l'année scolaire
 moins fréquemment
‫ ؟‬CT‫أھلية أبنائھم لبرنامج‬- ‫ كم مرة يجب إعادة التصديق األسر‬،‫ واألداء‬،‫ والحضور‬،‫ليكون لھا أكبر األثر على معدالت االلتحاق بالمدارس‬
‫في قليل من األحيان‬
‫كل سنة دراسية‬
‫كل ثالثة أشھر‬
‫ كل شھر‬
G6- Si vous aviez le pouvoir de réaffecter les ressources actuellement consacrées à la CT -vous ...
o augmenter le nombre de bénéficiaires, mais réduire les prestations par enfant
o réduire le nombre de bénéficiaires, mais augmenter les prestations par enfant
 ne changera rien
... ‫ كنت‬CT ‫إذا كان لديك القدرة على إعادة تخصيص الموارد التي تنفق حاليا على‬
‫زيادة عدد المستفيدين و تخفيض الفوائد للطفل الواحد‬
‫تخفيض عدد المستفيدين و زيادة قيمة االعانة لكل طفل‬
‫ لن يغير شيئا‬
G7-S'il vous plaît, êtes-vous d’accord avec :
Le montant de la prestation mensuelle pour un enfant devrait
dépendre ...
‫ مبلغ االعانة الشھرية للطفل ينبغي أن يعتمد على‬...
A-Rural vs urbain résidence
‫اإلقامة الريفية مقابل الحضرية‬
B- Distance de la résidence de l'enfant à l'école
‫مسافة من اإلقامة الطفل إلى المدرسة‬
C- La scolarisation de l'enfant
‫تعليم الطفل‬
D’accord
‫موافق‬
Neutre
‫محايد‬
Pas d’accord
‫غير موافق‬
D-La fréquentation régulière de l'école
‫االلتحاق بالمدارس بصفة عادية‬
E-Le rendement scolaire de l'enfant
‫األداء المدرسي الطفل‬
F- Le niveau scolaire de l'enfant
‫الرتبة الطفل في المدرسة‬
G-L'état de santé de l'enfant
‫الحالة الصحية لطفل‬
H- Sexe de l'enfant
‫جنس الطفل‬
I-La participation des parents aux activités scolaires
‫إشراك االولياء في األنشطة المدرسية‬
J-L'emploi des parents
‫عمل األولياء‬
K-La propriété foncière
‫ملكية األراضي‬
L-Le revenu des ménages
‫دخل األسرة‬
M-Les actifs des ménages
‫ممتلكات األسر‬
N- Le genre du chef de ménage
‫جنس رب األسرة‬
O-L'invalidité d'un membre du ménage
‫إعاقة من أحد أفراد األسرة‬
P- Nombre d'enfants dans la famille
‫عدد األطفال في األسرة‬
Q- Coût de la vie
‫تكلفة المعيشة المحلية‬
R-Admissibilité à d'autres programmes sociaux
‫األھلية للحصول على برامج اجتماعية أخرى‬
G8- À votre avis, quel critère est le plus important?
______ (A…R)
‫ي‬JJJJJ‫ركم وجھة ف‬JJJJ‫نظ‬، ‫ار ھي ما‬JJJJJJJ‫أھم؟ ھو المعي‬
G9- Si la prestation PNAFN serait liée à la présence à l'école (ne dépend pas seulement de la scolarisation), selon vous, l'impact
du programme sur la scolarisation, l'assiduité et la performance des enfants serait:
o Le même
o Un peu plus
 Beaucoup plus elévé
7
Appendix 4 : Enquête beneficiaires et non-beneficiaires
République Tunisienne
Ministère des Affaires
Sociales
Enquête d’évaluation du programme
d’allocation scolaire allouée dans le cadre
du PNAFN
VISA du Conseil National de la Statistique N° 002/2014
Questionnaire ménage
Les dispositions de la loi N° 99-32 du 13 avril 1999, relative au système national de la statistique, sont applicables à la
présente enquête
L'article 5 : relatif au secret statistique signifie que les données individuelles, figurants sur les questionnaires des
enquêtes statistiques ne peuvent êtres divulguées en aucun cas, ces données ne seront utilisées à d'autres fins que
statistiques, ces informations individuelles ne peuvent pas êtres utilisées à des fins ayant une relation avec le contrôle
fiscal, économique ou social. Par ailleurs, les agents des services statistiques sont astreints au respect du secret
professionnel.
L'article 6 : Relatif à l'obligation de réponse avec exactitude et dans les délais impartis aux questionnaires des enquêtes
statistiques ayant une autorisation.
L'article 26 : Relatif aux sanctions au moyen d'une amende pécuniaire pour toute personne qui refuse de répondre aux
questionnaires des enquêtes statistiques ayant une autorisation ou qui donne des réponses incomplètes ou inexactes.
Gouvernorat
|__|__|
Délégation
|__|__|
Identifiant
|__|__|-|_1_|-|__|__|-|__|
Nom du chef de ménage : ______________________________________________________________
Adresse : ____________________________________________________________________________
Téléphone
|__|__|__|__|__|__|__|__|
Num ID du répondant |__|__|
Enquêteur ……………………………..…………………………
Code |__|__|
Codes Résultat
1
ère
visite
2
ème
visite
3
ème
visite
1 Complet
Date visite
|__|__|/|__|__|
|__|__|/|__|__|
|__|__|/|__|__|
2 Partiellement complet
Heure début
|__|__| : |__|__|
|__|__| : |__|__|
|__|__| : |__|__|
3 Aucun répondant
Heure fin
|__|__| : |__|__|
|__|__| : |__|__|
|__|__| : |__|__|
4 Refus
|__|
|__|
|__|
5 Autre
Code Résultat
1
Une évaluation du programme d’allocation scolaire
B. Caractéristiques des membres du ménage
B1
Num ID
B2
Prénom
Liste des
membres du
ménage en
commençant
par le chef du
ménage.
B3
Lien de
parenté avec
le chef du
ménage
B4
Sexe
B5
Age
1=Homme
2=Femme
B6
Etat
matrimonial
1=Célibataire
2=Marié(e)
3=Divorcé(e)
4=Veuf(ve)
1=Chef de ménage
2=Conjoint
3=Fils/Fille
4=Autre parent
5=Aucun lien de
parenté
B7
Bénéfici
e-t-il de
PNAFN
/AMG-2
(carnet
jaune)
B8
Savezvous lire
et écrire
une
langue
1=Oui
2=Non
1 - PNAFN
2 - AMG-2
3 - Non
B9
B10
Poursuivezvous
actuellemen
t un cycle
d’éducation
ou de
formation
Quel est le
niveau
d’étude le
plus élevé
que vous
avez
atteint
1=Oui
2=Non
01
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
02
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
03
1
2
3
4
5
1
04
1
2
3
4
5
05
1
2
3
4
06
1
2
3
07
1
2
08
1
09
(Voir Table
B10)
|__|__|
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
1
2
1
2
|__|__|
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
1
2
1
2
2
|__|__|
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
1
2
1
2
1
2
|__|__|
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
1
2
1
2
5
1
2
|__|__|
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
1
2
1
2
4
5
1
2
|__|__|
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
1
2
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
|__|__|
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
1
2
1
2
2
3
4
5
1
2
|__|__|
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
1
2
1
2
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
|__|__|
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
1
2
1
2
10
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
|__|__|
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
1
2
1
2
11
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
|__|__|
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
1
2
1
2
12
1
2
3
4
5
1
2
|__|__|
1
2
3
4
1
2
3
1
2
1
2
B11
B12
B13
B14
Réservé aux personnes âgées de 6 ans et plus
Quelle
Avez-vous
Quel est
Combien
année
eu un
votre
de mois
d’étude
diplôme
diplôme
avez-vous
avez-vous
d’étude ou
travaillé
terminée
un diplôme
durant
avec succès
de
l’année
(Voir Table
formation
dernière
(Voir Table 1
page 4)
1
2
|__|__|
1
2
|__|
|__|__|
1
2
|__|
|__|__|
1
2
|__|
|__|__|
1
2
|__|
|__|__|
1
2
|__|
|__|__|
1
2
|__|
|__|__|
1
2
|__|
|__|__|
1
2
|__|
|__|__|
1
2
|__|
|__|__|
1
2
|__|
|__|__|
1
2
|__|
Table code question B13:
0
1
2
01
02
03
Diplôme avant bac
Bac ou équivalent
Technicien supérieur
1
2
3
Administration ou établissement public
Société publique
Société privée tunisienne
Ancien régime
3
Primaire
4
Secondaire
04
05
06
Maîtrise en Lettre et sciences sociales
Maîtrise d’économie, gestion, droit
Maîtrise en sciences exactes
4
5
6
Société privée étrangère
Local privé
Logement
5
Professionnel
Nouveau régime
6
Ecole de base
7
Secondaire
Supérieur
8
Supérieur court
9
Supérieur long
07
08
09
10
11
12
13
14
Autres maîtrises
Diplôme d’ingénieur
Médecin ou pharmacien
Master ou équivalent
Doctorat
Diplôme formation CAP
Diplôme formation BTP
Diplôme formation BTS
7
8
9
10
Ambulant
Exploitation agricole
Chantier bâtiment
Autre
15
Autre Diplôme formation
2
1=Oui
2=Non
|__|__|
|__|
Néant
Ecole coranique
Cours d’alphabétisation
B13)
B15
B16
Est-ce que vous
travaillez (ou
vous avez
travaillé)
Quel est
le lieu de
votre
emploi
1=Indépendant avec
salariés
2=Indépendant sans
salarié
3=Salarié
4=Apprenti
5=Aide familial
6=Autre
(Voir Table
B16)
|__|__|
1
2
3
4
5
6
|__|__|
|__|__|
1
2
3
4
5
6
|__|__|
|__|__|
|__|__|
1
2
3
4
5
6
|__|__|
|__|__|
|__|__|
1
2
3
4
5
6
|__|__|
|__|__|
|__|__|
1
2
3
4
5
6
|__|__|
|__|__|
|__|__|
1
2
3
4
5
6
|__|__|
|__|__|
|__|__|
1
2
3
4
5
6
|__|__|
|__|__|
|__|__|
1
2
3
4
5
6
|__|__|
|__|__|
|__|__|
1
2
3
4
5
6
|__|__|
|__|__|
|__|__|
1
2
3
4
5
6
|__|__|
|__|__|
|__|__|
1
2
3
4
5
6
|__|__|
|__|__|
|__|__|
1
2
3
4
5
6
|__|__|
|__|__|
|__|__|
B17. Y a-t-il d'autres enfants, 5-19 ans, qui ne vivent pas dans ce
ménage (Si oui, s'il vous plaît ajouter à la liste ci-dessus.)
B18. Y a-t-il dans le ménage un membre ayant une difficulté
physique ou mentale qui l’empêche de mener une vie normale
B19. Si oui, combien de personnes se
trouvent dans cette situation
Numéro
Type de difficultés
|__|
Avez-vous une carte d’handicapé
d’ordre
Physique
Physique
Physique
Physique
Mentale
Mentale
Mentale
Mentale
Oui
Non
Oui
Non
Oui
Oui
Oui
Oui
Non
Non
Non
Non
C. Environnement familial (Remplissez une colonne pour chaque enfant 5-19 ans
C1. Numéro d'ordre de l'enfant au sein du ménage
|__|__|
C2. Prénom de l’enfant
|__|__|/|__|__|__|__|
Mois /
année
|__|__|
C3. Mois et Année de naissance de l’enfant
C4. Nombre de frères et sœurs plus âgés que cet enfant
C5. Est-ce que l’enfant habite dans ce ménage ?
C6. Est-ce que la mère biologique de l’enfant habite dans ce
ménage ?
C7. Est-ce que le père biologique habite dans ce ménage ?
C8. Si aucun parent n’est présent :
Qui est le principal responsable de l’enfant
C9. Lien de parenté de l’enfant avec la personne interrogée :
Oui
ID…………………………
1. Fils ou fille
2. Beau-fils / belle fille
3. Autre lien de parenté
4. Aucun lien de parenté
C10. Au cours de la semaine passée, combien d’heures est-ce
que l’enfant a passé aux activités suivantes ?
•
Tâches ménagères (garde d’enfants, nettoyage, etc.)
•
Travail quelconque pour quelqu’un qui est en dehors
du ménage
C11. Si l’enfant a passé au moins 1 heure d’activité
économique au cours de la semaine dernière : Combien
d’argent est-ce que l’enfant a gagné ?
C12. Est-ce que l’enfant a suivi l’année préparatoire
(préscolaire) ?
C13. Est-ce que l’enfant est allé à l’école ?
C14. Si non, pour quelle raison l’enfant n’a pas fréquenté
l’école ?
C15. Quel enfant a-t-il le potentiel le plus élevé ?
C16. Quel enfant a-t-il le potentiel le moins élevé ?
C17. Pour le plus élevé ET le moins élevé :
Pourquoi êtes-vous de cette opinion
Non
1. Oui, ID…………………………
2. Non, absente
3. Non, Décédée
1. Oui, ID…………………………
2. Non, absent
3. Non, Décédé
|__|__|
|__|__|
|__|__|
|__|__|/|__|__|__|__|
Mois /
année
|__|__|
|__|__|/|__|__|__|__|
Mois /
année
|__|__|
|__|__|/|__|__|__|__|
Mois /
année
|__|__|
Oui
Non
1. Oui, ID…………………………
2. Non, absente
3. Non, Décédée
1. Oui, ID…………………………
2. Non, absent
3. Non, Décédé
ID…………………………
1. Fils ou fille
Oui
Non
1. Oui, ID…………………………
2. Non, absente
3. Non, Décédée
1. Oui, ID…………………………
2. Non, absent
3. Non, Décédé
ID…………………………
1. Fils ou fille
Oui
Non
1. Oui, ID…………………………
2. Non, absente
3. Non, Décédée
1. Oui, ID…………………………
2. Non, absent
3. Non, Décédé
ID…………………………
1. Fils ou fille
|__|__|
Heure(s)/ Semaine
|__|__|
Heure(s)/ Semaine
|__|__|
Heure(s)/ Semaine
|__|__|
Heure(s)/ Semaine
|__|__|
Heure(s)/ Semaine
|__|__|
Heure(s)/ Semaine
|__|__|
Heure(s)/ Semaine
|__|__|
Heure(s)/ Semaine
|__|__|__|Dinars
Travaux non rémunérés
|__|__|__|Dinars
|__|__|__|Dinars
|__|__|__|Dinars
a. Oui 3-4 ans
b. Oui 5-6 ans
c. Non
1. Oui Enfant suivant
2. Non
a. Ecole éloignée
b. Maladies ou handicap
c. Besoin de l’enfant pour le travail
d. Autre ; préciser ________________
a. Oui 3-4 ans
b. Oui 5-6 ans
c. Non
2. Non
a. Ecole éloignée
d. Autre ; préciser ________________
a. Oui 3-4 ans
b. Oui 5-6 ans
c. Non
2. Non
a. Ecole éloignée
d. Autre ; préciser ________________
a. Oui 3-4 ans
b. Oui 5-6 ans
c. Non
1. Oui C15
2. Non
a. Ecole éloignée
d. Autre ; préciser ________________
1. Plus élevé
2. Moins élevé
1. Plus élevé
2. Moins élevé
1. Plus élevé
2. Moins élevé
1. Plus élevé
2. Moins élevé
a. Rang d’âge de l’enfant
b. Garçon
c. Fille
d. Connaissances
e. Attitudes/comportements
f. Autres
b. Garçon
c. Fille
d. Connaissances
f. Autres
3
b. Garçon
c. Fille
d. Connaissances
f. Autres
b. Garçon
c. Fille
d. Connaissances
f. Autres
D. Parcours scolaire (remplissez un formulaire pour chaque enfant âgé de 5 à 19 ans qui a été scolarisé)
Numéro de famille :
D1. Indiquez l’année pendant laquelle l’enfant a commencé le Cycle primaire
D2. Quel âge avait-il
Année
scolaire
1999/2000
2000/01
2001/02
2002/03
2003/04
2004/05
2005/06
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
|__|__|__|__|
|__|__|-|_1_|-|__|__|-|__|
Numéro de l’enfant |__|__|
|__|__|
D3
D4
Est-ce que l’enfant
a fréquenté l’école
pendant cette
année là ?
Dans quelle classe était-il
inscrit
(Utilisez les codes du
tableau 1)
Oui
Non D5
___
A passé
A échoué
Suivant
Oui
Non D5
___
A passé
A échoué
Oui
Non D5
___
A passé
A échoué
___
A passé
A échoué
___
A passé
A échoué
___
A passé
A échoué
___
A passé
A échoué
___
A passé
A échoué
Oui
Non D5
___
A passé
A échoué
Oui
Non D5
___
A passé
A échoué
Oui
Non D5
___
A passé
A échoué
Oui
Non D5
___
Oui
Non D5
___
Oui
Non D5
___
Oui
Non D5
___
Oui
Non D5
Oui
Non D5
Oui
Non D5
Oui
Non D5
Oui
Non D5
Prénom de l’enfant
D5
Suivant
Suivant
Suivant
Suivant
Suivant
Suivant
Suivant
Suivant
Suivant
Suivant
A passé
A échoué
Suivant
A passé
A échoué
Suivant
A passé
A échoué
Suivant
_________________
Remplissez une rangée pour chaque
année scolaire, en commençant par la
toute première année. Prêtez attention
particulièrement aux classes répétées
et aux cas d’abandon temporaire.
Si l’enfant n’a pas fréquenté l’école au
courant de l’année : quelles sont les raisons
Activité économique
Travail à domicile
Mauvais résultats
Etudes suffisantes
Maladie ou handicap
Autre
Travail à domicile
Mauvais résultats
Etudes suffisantes
Maladie ou handicap
Autre
Travail à domicile
Mauvais résultats
Etudes suffisantes
Maladie ou handicap
Autre
Travail à domicile
Mauvais résultats
Etudes suffisantes
Maladie ou handicap
Autre
Travail à domicile
Mauvais résultats
Etudes suffisantes
Maladie ou handicap
Autre
Travail à domicile
Mauvais résultats
Etudes suffisantes
Maladie ou handicap
Autre
Travail à domicile
Mauvais résultats
Etudes suffisantes
Maladie ou handicap
Autre
Travail à domicile
Mauvais résultats
Etudes suffisantes
Maladie ou handicap
Autre
Travail à domicile
Mauvais résultats
Travail à domicile
Mauvais résultats
Travail à domicile
Mauvais résultats
Travail à domicile
Mauvais résultats
Travail à domicile
Mauvais résultats
Travail à domicile
Mauvais résultats
Travail à domicile
Mauvais résultats
Etudes suffisantes
Maladie ou handicap
Autre
Etudes suffisantes
Maladie ou handicap
Autre
Etudes suffisantes
Maladie ou handicap
Autre
Etudes suffisantes
Maladie ou handicap
Autre
Etudes suffisantes
Maladie ou handicap
Autre
Etudes suffisantes
Maladie ou handicap
Autre
Etudes suffisantes
Maladie ou handicap
Autre
Tableau 1
Jamais scolarisé
Année préparatoire
XX
P0
Cycle primaire
ère
1 année
ème
2 année
3ème année
4ème année
5ème année
6ème année
P1
P2
P3
P4
P5
P6
Collège
7ème année
ème
8 année
ème
9 année
P7
P8
P9
Lycée
1ère année
2ème année
3ème année
4ème année
S1
S2
S3
S4
Formation professionnelle
CAP
BTP
BTS
Diplôme FP
F1
F2
F3
F4
Combien d’argent -aurait-il suffit
pour vous inciter à garder votre
enfant à l’école/collège/lycée ?
|__|__|__| Dinars par mois
D6. Quelle école fréquente-t-il ? Nom de l’école : _______________________________________________ |__|__|__|__|__|__|
Si l’enfant
fréquente
l’école
actuellement
Tous les
enfants
D7. A quelle distance se trouve l’école ?
|__|__| km
D8. Combien de fois est-il allé à l’école pendant les 5 derniers jours ?
|__|
D9. Par rapport à son/ses camarades de classe, comment est sa performance à l'école?
☐Supérieure
☐Similaire
☐Inférieure
D10. Pendant quel mois et année a-t-il fréquenté l’école pour la dernière fois ?
D11. Quel est le niveau scolaire le plus élevé que
☐ Primaire
vous attendez de votre enfant ?
☐ Secondaire
4
|__|__| / 20|__|__|
☐ Supérieur
☐ Au delà
Année
scolaire
1999/2000
2000/01
2001/02
2002/03
2003/04
2004/05
2005/06
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
|__|__|__|__|
|__|__|-|_1_|-|__|__|-|__|
|__|__|
D3
D4
pendant cette
année là ?
inscrit
tableau 1)
Oui
Non D5
___
A passé
A échoué
Suivant
Oui
Non D5
___
A passé
A échoué
Oui
Non D5
___
A passé
A échoué
___
A passé
A échoué
___
A passé
A échoué
___
A passé
A échoué
___
A passé
A échoué
___
A passé
A échoué
Oui
Non D5
___
A passé
A échoué
Oui
Non D5
___
A passé
A échoué
Oui
Non D5
___
A passé
A échoué
Oui
Non D5
___
Oui
Non D5
___
Oui
Non D5
___
Oui
Non D5
___
Oui
Non D5
Oui
Non D5
Oui
Non D5
Oui
Non D5
Oui
Non D5
D5
Suivant
Suivant
Suivant
Suivant
Suivant
Suivant
Suivant
Suivant
Suivant
Suivant
A passé
A échoué
Suivant
A passé
A échoué
Suivant
A passé
A échoué
Suivant
_________________
Travail à domicile
Mauvais résultats
Etudes suffisantes
Maladie ou handicap
Autre
Travail à domicile
Mauvais résultats
Etudes suffisantes
Maladie ou handicap
Autre
Travail à domicile
Mauvais résultats
Etudes suffisantes
Maladie ou handicap
Autre
Travail à domicile
Mauvais résultats
Etudes suffisantes
Maladie ou handicap
Autre
Travail à domicile
Mauvais résultats
Etudes suffisantes
Maladie ou handicap
Autre
Travail à domicile
Mauvais résultats
Etudes suffisantes
Maladie ou handicap
Autre
Travail à domicile
Mauvais résultats
Etudes suffisantes
Maladie ou handicap
Autre
Travail à domicile
Mauvais résultats
Etudes suffisantes
Maladie ou handicap
Autre
Travail à domicile
Mauvais résultats
Travail à domicile
Mauvais résultats
Travail à domicile
Mauvais résultats
Travail à domicile
Mauvais résultats
Travail à domicile
Mauvais résultats
Travail à domicile
Mauvais résultats
Travail à domicile
Mauvais résultats
Etudes suffisantes
Maladie ou handicap
Autre
Etudes suffisantes
Maladie ou handicap
Autre
Etudes suffisantes
Maladie ou handicap
Autre
Etudes suffisantes
Maladie ou handicap
Autre
Etudes suffisantes
Maladie ou handicap
Autre
Etudes suffisantes
Maladie ou handicap
Autre
Etudes suffisantes
Maladie ou handicap
Autre
Tableau 1
Jamais scolarisé
XX
P0
Cycle primaire
ère
1 année
ème
2 année
3ème année
4ème année
5ème année
6ème année
P1
P2
P3
P4
P5
P6
Collège
7ème année
ème
8 année
ème
9 année
P7
P8
P9
Lycée
1ère année
2ème année
3ème année
4ème année
S1
S2
S3
S4
CAP
BTP
BTS
Diplôme FP
F1
F2
F3
F4
Si l’enfant
fréquente
l’école
actuellement
Tous les
enfants
|__|__| km
|__|
☐Supérieure
☐Similaire
☐Inférieure
☐ Primaire
☐ Secondaire
5
|__|__| / 20|__|__|
☐ Supérieur
☐ Au delà
Année
scolaire
1999/2000
2000/01
2001/02
2002/03
2003/04
2004/05
2005/06
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
|__|__|__|__|
|__|__|-|_1_|-|__|__|-|__|
|__|__|
D3
D4
pendant cette
année là ?
inscrit
tableau 1)
Oui
Non D5
___
A passé
A échoué
Suivant
Oui
Non D5
___
A passé
A échoué
Oui
Non D5
___
A passé
A échoué
___
A passé
A échoué
___
A passé
A échoué
___
A passé
A échoué
___
A passé
A échoué
___
A passé
A échoué
Oui
Non D5
___
A passé
A échoué
Oui
Non D5
___
A passé
A échoué
Oui
Non D5
___
A passé
A échoué
Oui
Non D5
___
Oui
Non D5
___
Oui
Non D5
___
Oui
Non D5
___
Oui
Non D5
Oui
Non D5
Oui
Non D5
Oui
Non D5
Oui
Non D5
D5
Suivant
Suivant
Suivant
Suivant
Suivant
Suivant
Suivant
Suivant
Suivant
Suivant
A passé
A échoué
Suivant
A passé
A échoué
Suivant
A passé
A échoué
Suivant
_________________
Travail à domicile
Mauvais résultats
Etudes suffisantes
Maladie ou handicap
Autre
Travail à domicile
Mauvais résultats
Etudes suffisantes
Maladie ou handicap
Autre
Travail à domicile
Mauvais résultats
Etudes suffisantes
Maladie ou handicap
Autre
Travail à domicile
Mauvais résultats
Etudes suffisantes
Maladie ou handicap
Autre
Travail à domicile
Mauvais résultats
Etudes suffisantes
Maladie ou handicap
Autre
Travail à domicile
Mauvais résultats
Etudes suffisantes
Maladie ou handicap
Autre
Travail à domicile
Mauvais résultats
Etudes suffisantes
Maladie ou handicap
Autre
Travail à domicile
Mauvais résultats
Etudes suffisantes
Maladie ou handicap
Autre
Travail à domicile
Mauvais résultats
Travail à domicile
Mauvais résultats
Travail à domicile
Mauvais résultats
Travail à domicile
Mauvais résultats
Travail à domicile
Mauvais résultats
Travail à domicile
Mauvais résultats
Travail à domicile
Mauvais résultats
Etudes suffisantes
Maladie ou handicap
Autre
Etudes suffisantes
Maladie ou handicap
Autre
Etudes suffisantes
Maladie ou handicap
Autre
Etudes suffisantes
Maladie ou handicap
Autre
Etudes suffisantes
Maladie ou handicap
Autre
Etudes suffisantes
Maladie ou handicap
Autre
Etudes suffisantes
Maladie ou handicap
Autre
Tableau 1
Jamais scolarisé
XX
P0
Cycle primaire
ère
1 année
ème
2 année
3ème année
4ème année
5ème année
6ème année
P1
P2
P3
P4
P5
P6
Collège
7ème année
ème
8 année
ème
9 année
P7
P8
P9
Lycée
1ère année
2ème année
3ème année
4ème année
S1
S2
S3
S4
CAP
BTP
BTS
Diplôme FP
F1
F2
F3
F4
Si l’enfant
fréquente
l’école
actuellement
Tous les
enfants
|__|__| km
|__|
☐Supérieure
☐Similaire
☐Inférieure
☐ Primaire
☐ Secondaire
6
|__|__| / 20|__|__|
☐ Supérieur
☐ Au delà
Année
scolaire
1999/2000
2000/01
2001/02
2002/03
2003/04
2004/05
2005/06
2006/07
2007/08
2008/09
2009/10
2010/11
2011/12
2012/13
2013/14
|__|__|__|__|
|__|__|-|_1_|-|__|__|-|__|
|__|__|
D3
D4
pendant cette
année là ?
inscrit
tableau 1)
Oui
Non D5
___
A passé
A échoué
Suivant
Oui
Non D5
___
A passé
A échoué
Oui
Non D5
___
A passé
A échoué
___
A passé
A échoué
___
A passé
A échoué
___
A passé
A échoué
___
A passé
A échoué
___
A passé
A échoué
Oui
Non D5
___
A passé
A échoué
Oui
Non D5
___
A passé
A échoué
Oui
Non D5
___
A passé
A échoué
Oui
Non D5
___
Oui
Non D5
___
Oui
Non D5
___
Oui
Non D5
___
Oui
Non D5
Oui
Non D5
Oui
Non D5
Oui
Non D5
Oui
Non D5
D5
Suivant
Suivant
Suivant
Suivant
Suivant
Suivant
Suivant
Suivant
Suivant
Suivant
A passé
A échoué
Suivant
A passé
A échoué
Suivant
A passé
A échoué
Suivant
_________________
Travail à domicile
Mauvais résultats
Etudes suffisantes
Maladie ou handicap
Autre
Travail à domicile
Mauvais résultats
Etudes suffisantes
Maladie ou handicap
Autre
Travail à domicile
Mauvais résultats
Etudes suffisantes
Maladie ou handicap
Autre
Travail à domicile
Mauvais résultats
Etudes suffisantes
Maladie ou handicap
Autre
Travail à domicile
Mauvais résultats
Etudes suffisantes
Maladie ou handicap
Autre
Travail à domicile
Mauvais résultats
Etudes suffisantes
Maladie ou handicap
Autre
Travail à domicile
Mauvais résultats
Etudes suffisantes
Maladie ou handicap
Autre
Travail à domicile
Mauvais résultats
Etudes suffisantes
Maladie ou handicap
Autre
Travail à domicile
Mauvais résultats
Travail à domicile
Mauvais résultats
Travail à domicile
Mauvais résultats
Travail à domicile
Mauvais résultats
Travail à domicile
Mauvais résultats
Travail à domicile
Mauvais résultats
Travail à domicile
Mauvais résultats
Etudes suffisantes
Maladie ou handicap
Autre
Etudes suffisantes
Maladie ou handicap
Autre
Etudes suffisantes
Maladie ou handicap
Autre
Etudes suffisantes
Maladie ou handicap
Autre
Etudes suffisantes
Maladie ou handicap
Autre
Etudes suffisantes
Maladie ou handicap
Autre
Etudes suffisantes
Maladie ou handicap
Autre
Tableau 1
Jamais scolarisé
XX
P0
Cycle primaire
ère
1 année
ème
2 année
3ème année
4ème année
5ème année
6ème année
P1
P2
P3
P4
P5
P6
Collège
7ème année
ème
8 année
ème
9 année
P7
P8
P9
Lycée
1ère année
2ème année
3ème année
4ème année
S1
S2
S3
S4
CAP
BTP
BTS
Diplôme FP
F1
F2
F3
F4
Si l’enfant
fréquente
l’école
actuellement
Tous les
enfants
|__|__| km
|__|
☐Supérieure
☐Similaire
☐Inférieure
☐ Primaire
☐ Secondaire
7
|__|__| / 20|__|__|
☐ Supérieur
☐ Au delà
E. Attitudes vis-à-vis de la scolarité des enfants
E1. Qui dans votre foyer décide si l’enfant va à
E7. Pour l’un de vos enfants actuellement inscrits à
l’école ou pas?
l’école, quels sont les éléments manquants pour
des contraintes financières?
(Possibilités de plusieurs réponses)
a) Père
b) Mère
c) Enfant
d) Grands-parents
e) Quelqu'un d'autre
f) Ne sait pas
E2. Qui dans votre foyer décide quand un enfant doit
arrêter d’aller à l’école?
E8. De combien d’argent supplémentaire avez-vous
a) Père
b) Mère
c) Enfant
d) Grands-parents
e) Quelqu'un d'autre
f) Ne sait pas
besoin pour fournir les éléments manquants pour
tous vos enfants au cours de cette année
scolaire?
(Dinars par an)
|__|__|__| Dinars par an
E9. Cette année scolaire, votre enfant aîné inscrit est
E3. Au minimum, un garçon devrait rester scolarisé
allé régulièrement à l'école:
jusqu’à quel niveau d’études?
1) Primaire
2) Collège
3) Secondaire
4) Supérieur
5) Ne sait pas
E4. Au minimum, une fille devrait rester scolarisée
jusqu’à quel niveau d’études?
1) Primaire
2) Collège
3) Secondaire
4) Supérieur
5) Ne sait pas
a) Tous les mois
b) Aucun de ces mois
c) en Septembre
d) en Octobre
e) en Novembre
f) en Décembre
g) en Janvier
h) en Février
E10.
Si, au cours de la prochaine année scolaire,
vous deviez recevoir un supplément de 20 Dinars
pendant tous les mois que votre enfant
fréquente l’école, est-ce que vous enverrez votre
aîné à l’école ?
E5. Avez-vous déjà arrêté ou envisagé d’arrêter la
scolarité d’un de vos enfants avant ce niveau
d’études ?
a) Cartable d’école
b) Livres scolaires
c) Cahiers et autres fournitures scolaires
d) Transport scolaire
e) Uniforme scolaire
f) Leçons particulières et études
g) Frais de scolarité, droit d’inscription
h) Autres......................................
i) Ne sait pas
1) Oui
2) Non
3) Ne sait pas
1) Oui
2) Non
3) Ne sait pas
E11.
Si, au cours de la prochaine année scolaire,
vous ne recevez pas d’argent supplémentaire
pour la scolarité de vos enfants, est-ce que vous
enverrez votre aîné à l’école ?
E6. Si oui, pour quelle(s) raison(s)?
(Plusieurs possibilités de réponses)
Ne pas lire les options
a) La famille n'étais pas en mesure de payer les frais scolaires
b) L’école est éloignée du domicile
c) L'école n'enseigne pas ce qui devrait être enseigné
d) Manque de sécurité
e) L'enfant devait travailler à la maison
f) L'enfant devait gagner de l'argent
g) L'enfant ne travaillait pas suffisamment a l'école
h) L'enfant était malade/ handicapé
i) Autre..............................
8
1) Oui
2) Non
3) Ne sait pas
E12.
Pour votre enfant le plus âgé qui fréquente
l'école, combien d'argent chaque mois l'enfant
doit gagner en travaillant pour que vous le
retiriez de l'école?
E19.
Si vous avez des enfants ayant abandonné
l’école, avez-vous été contacté pour sa
réintégration à l’école par l’une des parties
suivantes :
(Mettre 888 si la réponse est : je le laisserai continuer ses
études / Mettre 998 si la réponse est : Ne sait pas)
E13.
Connaissez-vous une loi quelconque sur la
scolarité obligatoire des enfants?
1) Oui
2) Non
3) Ne sait pas
E20.
J’aide mes enfants à comprendre que bien
travailler à l’école peut les aider à gagner plus
d’argent dans le futur.
E14.
Si vous répondez “oui”: la scolarité pour les
enfants est obligatoire jusqu’à quel âge?
...............................................................
E15.
A quel point est-il important pour un parent
d’être impliqué dans la scolarité de ses enfants?
(Une seule réponse possible)
a) Un responsable de l’établissement scolaire
b) Une association
c) Le délégué régional des affaires sociales
d) Un ancien camarade de classe de votre enfant
1) Jamais
2) Occasionnellement
3) Souvent
4) Ne sait pas
E21.
Je montre à mes enfants à quel point ce qu’ils
apprennent en classe sera important dans le
futur.
1) Très important
2) Peu important
3) Pas important
1) Jamais
3) Souvent
4) Ne sait pas
E16.
Combien de fois avez-vous rencontré les
enseignants ou les autorités scolaires de vos
enfants au cours de l’année dernière
E22.
Je discute avec mes enfants à propos des
rentabilités associées à certaines carrières.
|__|__|
E17.
Est-ce qu’il y a un comité des parents dans
l’établissement scolaire de vos enfants?
1) Jamais
3) Souvent
4) Ne sait pas
E23.
J’utilise toujours les exemples des travaux
pour communiquer l’importance de l’éducation.
1) Oui
2) Non
3) Ne sait pas
E18.
Si vous répondez “oui”: avez-vous participé
ou bien participez-vous aux activités du comité?
(Une seule réponse possible)
1) Jamais
3) Souvent
4) Ne sait pas
E24.
Je discute avec mes enfants à propos de
certaines carrières pour les aider à planifier leurs
études secondaires.
1) Jamais
2) Moins d’une fois par an
3) Une fois par an ou plus
4) Ne sait pas
9
1) Jamais
3) Souvent
4) Ne sait pas
Je vais maintenant vous parler de quelques programmes d’appui. Pour chacun de ces programmes nous voudrions savoir si vous avez déjà entendu parler ou si quelqu’un dans votre famille en a déjà bénéficié
2008-09 ou avant
F. Soutien à la famille
Description du programme
F1). Carnet de soins médicaux gratuits ou à tarifs
réduits
Est-ce qu’il ya quelqu’un dans
votre famille qui en a déjà
bénéficié ?
Oui
Une carte octroyée par le gouvernement qui garantit des
soins médicaux gratuits ou subventionnés
Non F2
F2). Transferts d’argent mensuels pour la scolarité
Oui
Un programme gouvernemental qui fournit des payements Non F3
mensuels à des familles pour trois enfants scolarisés
Oui
Aides occasionnelles allouées à l’occasion de rentrée
scolaire
Non F4
Des programmes privés ou publics qui fournissent des
livres, uniformes, cours du soir, transport, ou repas à des
cantines scolaires ou subventionnés
2011-12
2012-13
Courant
Nombre d’enfants à
l’école :
|__|__|
l’école :
|__|__|
l’école :
|__|__|
l’école :
|__|__|
l’école :
|__|__|
Gratuits
Gratuits
Gratuits
Gratuits
Gratuits
A tarifs réduits
A tarifs réduits
A tarifs réduits
A tarifs réduits
A tarifs réduits
A tarifs réduits
Jamais
Jamais
Jamais
Jamais
Jamais
Jamais
Oui
Non
Oui
Non
Oui
Non
Oui
Non
Oui
Non
Oui
Non
|__|__| enfants
|__|__| enfants
Oui
Non
Nombre de bénéficiaires
Montant total
F4). Appui pour fournitures scolaires
2010-11
Gratuits
Nombre de bénéficiaires
F3). Montant au début de l’année scolaire
2009-10
Oui
Non
|__|__| enfants
Oui
Non
|__|__| enfants
Oui
Non
|__|__| enfants
Oui
Non
|__|__| enfants
Oui
Non
|__|__| enfants
|__|__| enfants
|__|__| enfants
|__|__| enfants
|__|__| enfants
|__|__| enfants
|__|__|__| dinars
|__|__|__| dinars
|__|__|__| dinars
|__|__|__| dinars
|__|__|__| dinars
|__|__|__| dinars
Oui
Non F5
Si vous répondez « Oui » :
De quel(s) genre de programme(s)
avez-vous bénéficié (s)
Quels groupes ou organisations
ont fourni cet appui pour
l’éducation des enfants ?
a. Livres scolaires
b. Uniformes
c. Repas / cantine
d. Cours du soir
e. Transport
f. Aucun
a. Gouvernement
b. Org. religieuse
c. ONG
d. Ecole
e. Autres
a. Livres scolaires
b. Uniformes
c. Repas / cantine
d. Cours du soir
e. Transport
f. Aucun
a. Gouvernement
b. Org. religieuse
c. ONG
d. Ecole
e. Autres
a. Livres scolaires
b. Uniformes
c. Repas / cantine
d. Cours du soir
e. Transport
f. Aucun
a. Gouvernement
b. Org. religieuse
c. ONG
d. Ecole
e. Autres
a. Livres scolaires
b. Uniformes
c. Repas / cantine
d. Cours du soir
e. Transport
f. Aucun
a. Gouvernement
b. Org. religieuse
c. ONG
d. Ecole
e. Autres
a. Livres scolaires
b. Uniformes
c. Repas / cantine
d. Cours du soir
e. Transport
f. Aucun
a. Gouvernement
b. Org. religieuse
c. ONG
d. Ecole
e. Autres
a. Livres scolaires
b. Uniformes
c. Repas / cantine
d. Cours du soir
e. Transport
f. Aucun
a. Gouvernement
b. Org. religieuse
c. ONG
d. Ecole
e. Autres
F5). Remises des fonds
Non
Remises ou transferts des fonds de la part des membres de Oui
(section suivante)
la famille ou amis
Si vous répondez «oui»,
indiquez le montant total par
an
Oui
Non
|__|__|__| dinars
Oui
Non
|__|__|__| dinars
10
Oui
Non
|__|__|__| dinars
Oui
Non
|__|__|__| dinars
Oui
Non
|__|__|__| dinars
Oui
Non
|__|__|__| dinars
G. PNAFN
G.1) Avez-vous déjà entendu parler du PNAFN?
G.7) Si NON: Pourquoi pas?
1) Oui
2) Non
3) Ne sait pas
➥Si NON: allez directement à la partie suivante (H)
G.2) Comment avez-vous connu ce programme ?
a)
b)
c)
d)
e)
f)
g)
Pas suffisamment pauvre
Incapable de prouver le besoin
Processus de demande d'application difficile
Corruption
Clientélisme/Appartenance politique
Raté la période d'application
Autre (à préciser ________________________)
➥Si la réponse à la question #6 est NON allez directement
à la partie suivante (H)
a) par des amis/voisins/membres de la famille
b) par l'école
G.8) Quel est votre degré de satisfaction global vis-
c) par un(e) assistant(e) social(e)
à-vis du PNAFN ?
d) par les autorités locales
e) par les autorités régionales ou nationales
1)
Tout à fait satisfait
f) par la radio, la télévision, ou un journal
2)
Plutôt satisfait
g) Autre .....................................
3)
Plutôt insatisfait
4)
Pas du tout satisfait
G.3) Selon vous, quels sont les avantages fournis
par ce programme ?
a)
Soins médicaux gratuits ou subventionnés
b)
Les paiements mensuels
c)
L'aide alimentaire
d)
L'argent pour l'éducation des enfants
e)
Autre .....................................
G.9) Quand avez-vous fait la première demande
d’adhésion à ce programme ?
Mois: _____/ Année: _____
G.10) Est-ce que quelqu’un a rendu visite à la
famille pour déterminer leur admissibilité pour
ce programme?
G.4) Quelles sont les conditions pour bénéficier de
1) Oui
2) Non
G.11) Vous avez attendu combien de temps pour
ce programme?
connaître la décision d’admissibilité au
programme?
a) Pauvreté
b) Handicap
1) < 1 mois
2) 1 à 3 mois
3) 4 à 11 mois
4) Une année et plus
c) Autre .....................................
G.12) Avez-vous reçu une quelconque aide pendant
que vous attendiez la décision ?
G.5) Croyez-vous qu’il y a un membre de cette
famille qui est qualifié pour ce programme?
1) Oui
2) Non
G.6) Avez-vous déjà fait une demande pour ce
e)
programme?
a)
b)
c)
d)
Soins médicaux gratuits ou subventionnés
Les paiements mensuels
L'aide alimentaire
L'argent pour l'éducation des enfants
Autre .....................................
G.13) Est-ce que votre première demande a été
1) Oui
2) Non
approuvée?
1) Oui
2) Non
➥Si OUI allez directement à la question #G19
11
G.14) A votre avis, quelles étaient les raisons pour
G.21) En quelles années avez-vous renouvelé votre
lesquelles votre demande n’a pas été
approuvée?
admissibilité pour continuer à recevoir vos
indemnités ?
(Reproduire la réponse mot par mot puis mettre le
code correspondant dans la question G15)
a) 2007 ou avant
...............................................................
b) 2008
G.15) Recodage de l’enquêteur
c) 2009
d) 2010
e) 2012
a) Pas assez pauvre
f) 2013
b) Incapable de prouver le besoin
g) 2014
c) Raté la période de demande
h) Jamais
d) Corruption
e) Affiliation politique/Clientélisme
G.22) Y a-t-il quelqu’un qui est venu chez vous pour
f) Autre .....................................
évaluer la continuation de votre admissibilité?
G.16) Avez-vous fait un recours contre la décision?
1) Oui
2) Non
1) Oui
2) Non
G.23) Quand avez-vous reçu vos indemnités pour la
dernière fois ?
G.17) Est-ce que vos demandes de recours avaient
Mois: _____ / Année: _____
été éventuellement acceptées?
1) Oui
2) Non
G.24) Au total, au cours des 12 derniers mois,
combien d’argent votre famille a reçu sous forme
d’assistance financière sociale de la part des
autorités?
➥Si NON allez directement à la partie suivante (H)
G.18) Avez-vous déjà reçu des allocations de ce
|__|__|__|__| (en
programme?
G.25) Combien avez-vous consacré de cet argent, le
1) Oui
2) Non
cas échéant, pour soutenir la scolarité de vos
enfants?
G.19) Quand est-ce que votre foyer a reçu des
|__|__|__|__| (en
allocations pour la première fois?
Mois: _____/ Année: _____
G.20) Etiez-vous obligé(e) de prouver la
continuation de votre admissibilité pour ce
programme?
dinars)
1) Oui
2) Non
➥Si NON: allez directement à la question G22
12
dinars)
H. Transfert Monétaire pour l’éducation
H.1) Connaissez-vous le programme destiné aux
H.9) Si NON: Pourquoi pas?
bénéficiaires de PNAFN qui fournit des paiements
annuels et mensuels aux familles dont les enfants
sont scolarisés?
1) Oui
2) Non
➥Si OUI, allez directement à la question #H5
H.2) Si NON: Connaissez-vous un programme ou
une structure quelconque qui fournit l’appui
financier aux familles dont les enfants sont
scolarisés?
a) Pas assez pauvre
c) Le processus de demande est difficile
d) Raté la période de demande
e) Corruption
f) Affiliation politique/Clientélisme
g) Autre .....................................
➥Si la réponse à la question #8 est NON allez
directement à la partie suivante (I)
H.10) Quand avez-vous fait la première demande
pour ce programme?
Mois: _____ / Année: _____
H.11) Est-ce que quelqu’un a rendu visite à la
famille pour déterminer leur admissibilité pour
ce programme?
1) Oui
2) Non
➥Si NON: allez directement à la partie suivante (I)
H.3) Quel est le nom de ce programme?
...............................................................
H.4) Selon vous, quels sont les avantages fournis
par ce programme ?
1) Oui
2) Non
H.12) Vous avez attendu combien de temps pour
connaître la décision d’admissibilité au
programme?
a) Paiement au début de l'année scolaire
b) Paiements mensuels
c) Soutien en nature (livres, fournitures...)
d) Autre .....................................
H.5) Comment avez-vous connu ce programme?
1) < 1 mois
2) 1-3 mois
3) 4-11 mois
4) Une année ou plus
H.13) Est-ce que votre première demande a été
a) par des amis/voisins/membres de famille
b) par l'école
c) par un(e) assistant(e) social(e)
d) par les autorités locales
e) par les autorités régionales ou nationales
f) par la radio, la télévision, ou un journal
g) Autre .....................................
approuvée?
1) Oui
2) Non
➥Si OUI allez directement à la question #18
H.14) A votre avis, quelles étaient les raisons pour
lesquelles votre demande n’a pas été approuvée?
(Reproduire la réponse mot par mot puis mettre la
réponse correspondante à la question H15)
H.6) Quelles sont les conditions pour bénéficier de
...............................................................
H.15) Recodage de l’enquêteur
ce programme?
a) Inscription de l'école
b) Fréquentation de l'école
c) Résultats scolaires
d) Pauvreté
f) Autre .....................................
e) Handicap
H.16) Avez-vous fait un recours contre la décision?
f) Autre .....................................
H.7) Croyez-vous qu’il y a un membre de la famille
qui est qualifié pour ce programme?
1) Oui
2) Non
1) Oui
2) Non
➥Si NON allez directement à la question (H28)
H.8) Avez-vous déjà fait une demande pour ce
H.17) Est-ce que vos demandes de recours avaient
programme?
a) Pas assez pauvre
c) Raté la période de demande
d) Corruption
e) Affiliation politique/Clientélisme
été éventuellement acceptées?
1) Oui
2) Non
➥ Si OUI: allez directement à la question #10
1) Oui
2) Non
➥Si NON allez directement à la question (H28)
13
H.18) Quand est-ce que votre foyer a reçu des
H.25) Quand est-ce que les allocations étaient
allocations pour la première fois?
Mois: _____ / Année: _____
bloquées?
Mois: _____ / Année: _____
H.26) Quand avez-vous reçu vos allocations le plus
H.19) En quelles années avez-vous renouvelé votre
récemment?
Mois: _____ / Année: _____
admissibilité pour continuer à recevoir vos
indemnités ?
H.27) Pour lequel des enfants étaient destinés ces
a) 2007 ou avant
allocations?
b) 2008
Numéro d’Ordre : Voir page 2
c) 2009
d) 2010
question B1
a) Numéro d’Ordre |__|__|
e) 2012
b) Numéro d’Ordre |__|__|
f) 2013
c) Numéro d’Ordre |__|__|
g) 2014
h) Jamais
H.28) Pensez-vous que les transferts d’argent pour la
scolarité des enfants font partie des allocations du
PNAFN en général, ou bien pensez-vous que ce sont
des allocations à part?
H.20) Vous a-t-on demandé de présenter au début
ou au cours de l’année scolaire un document
prouvant l’inscription ou la scolarité de votre
enfant (certificat de présence, bulletin, carnet…)
pour justifier la continuation de votre
admissibilité
1) Oui
2) Non
H.29) Si jamais vous devriez choisir, quel est le montant
d’allocation du programme le plus important pour
vous: le paiement de 10 Dinars par mois pendant 12
mois, ou bien le paiement de 30 Dinars une fois au
début de l’année scolaire.
H.21) Avez-vous déjà raté la période de
recertification (enregistrement dans le
programme)?
1) Oui
2) Non
H.22) A-t-on effectué au cours de l’année scolaire
suivants pour garder votre enfant à l’école, que
préféreriez-vous?
1) Oui
2) Non
H.23) Est-ce que ces allocations avaient été une fois
bloquées?
1) 12 paiements mensuels de 10 Dinars
2) 30 Dinars au début de l'année scolaire
H.30) Si vous aviez le choix entre les paiements
une visite ou une enquête sociale pour vérifier la
poursuite de la scolarité de votre enfant et par
conséquent la continuation de votre admissibilité
au programme
1) Font partis du PNAFN
2) Allocations à part
1) Oui
2) Non
1) 30 Dinars au début de l'année scolaire + 10
Dinars chaque mois
Dinars chaque trimestre
Dinars chaque mois
4) 0 Dinar au début de l'année scolaire + 15
Dinars chaque mois
➥Si NON, allez directement à la question H26
H.31) Pour chacun de vos enfants, est-ce que les
H.24) Si OUI: Pourquoi est-ce que les allocations
allocations ont influencé votre décision de
l’envoyer ou ne pas l’envoyer à l’école?
étaient bloquées?
a) L'enfant avait cessé d'aller à l'école
b) Pas suffisamment pauvre
c) Incapable de prouver le besoin
d) Raté la période de renouvellement/recertification
e) Corruption
f) Affiliation politique/ Clientélisme
g) Autre .....................................
14
1) Bien sûr que oui
2) Probablement
3) Peut-être
4) Probablement pas
5) Bien sûr que non
I. Dépenses scolaires
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
Combien de vos enfants fréquentent actuellement une école préparatoire, maternelle ou garderie?
Pour ces enfants, au total:
Combien est-ce que vous avez dépensé le mois dernier pour:
les repas à l'école
transport scolaire
Combien est-ce que vous anticipez dépenser au total pendant cette année scolaire pour:
frais de scolarité (inscription,…)
tenues scolaires
autres dépenses reliées à la scolarité (repas, transport,…)
si 0 passez à 9
Combien de vos enfants fréquentent actuellement des écoles publiques d'enseignement primaire?
transport scolaire
cours particuliers
Combien est-ce que vous anticipez dépenser au total pendant cette année scolaire pour
tenues scolaires
autres dépenses reliées à la scolarité (repart, transport,…)
si 0 passez à 18
Combien de vos enfants fréquentent actuellement des collèges et lycées publics?
transport scolaire
cours particuliers
Combien est-ce que vous anticipez dépenser au total pendant cette année scolaire pour:
tenues scolaires
si 0 passez à 27
31
32
33
34
35
Combien de vos enfants fréquentent actuellement des établissements privés?
transport scolaire
cours particuliers
Combien est-ce que vous anticipez dépenser au total pendant cette année scolaire pour :
tenues scolaires
36
37
En moyenne, à combien estimez-vous les dépenses mensuelles du ménage pour la nourriture?
En moyenne, à combien estimez-vous les dépenses mensuelles totales du ménage?
28
29
30
15
Dinars
Dinars
Dinars
Dinars
Dinars
Dinars
Dinars
Dinars
Dinars
Dinars
Dinars
Dinars
Dinars
Dinars
Dinars
Dinars
Dinars
Dinars
Dinars
Dinars
Dinars
Dinars
Dinars
si 0 passez à 36
Dinars
Dinars
Dinars
Dinars
Dinars
Dinars
Dinars
Dinars
Dinars
Dinars
J. Conditions de vie du ménage
J.1) Type de logement
J.8) Est-ce que votre ménage possède:
a) Radiocassette
1) Maison Arabe (Dar Arbi, Borj, Houch)
2) Une Villa, logement déduit d’une villa
3) Un appartement / Studio
4) Logement dans Oukala
5) Autre
b) Télévision
c) Parabole
d) Bibliothèque
e) Téléphone fixe
J.2) Nombre de pièces dans le logement
f) Téléphone portable
g) Ordinateur
|__|__|
h) Connexion à l'Internet
J.3) Est-ce que votre résidence est connectée aux
i) Frigidaire
réseaux suivants:
j) Congélateur
k) Cuisinière avec four
l) Machine à laver
a) Electricité
m) Machine à vaisselle
b) Gaz naturel
n) Climatiseur
c) Sonede
o) Chauffage électrique
d) Réseau d’assainissement
p) Chauffage central
e) [ aucun des ces réseaux ]
q) Toilette équipée d’une chasse d’eau
r) Salle de bain équipée (eau chaude)
J.4) Depuis combien d’années occupez-vous cette
s) Cuisine avec évier
résidence?
t) Voiture
|__|__|
u) Moto
v) Bicyclette
J.5) Où est-ce que vous habitiez auparavant
w) Une exploitation agricole
x) Bétail
1) Même ville/cité/village
2) Autre ville/cité/ *dans cette délégation*
3) Autre délégation *dans ce gouvernorat*
4) Autre gouvernorat
5) Autre pays
6) [Pas applicable: toujours vécu ici]
y) Compte bancaire/postal
J.9) Votre maison se trouve à quelle distance de
l’école primaire la plus proche?
|__|__| km
J.6) Quel est votre statut d’occupation de votre
J.10)
Votre maison se trouve à quelle
distance du collège le plus proche?
résidence
1) Propriétaire
2) Locataire
3) Gratuit (p.e., chez des parents, employeur)
|__|__| km
J.11)
distance du lycée le plus proche?
J.7) Comparée à la plupart des autres ménages
dans votre quartier, la situation économique
de votre ménage est …
|__|__| km
J.12)
1) Meilleure que les autres ménages
2) Semblable à d'autres ménages
3) Pire que les autres ménages
distance du centre de santé le plus proche?
|__|__| km
FIN DU QUESTIONNAIRE
16
Appendix 5:
Focused literature review of education-focused cash transfer programs
Enquête d’évaluation du programme d’allocation scolaire allouée dans le cadre du PNAFN – FINAL REPORT
Appendix 5. Characteristics of other education-focused transfer programs
Year
Started Funder
2007 Tunisia government
Country
Tunisia
Program
PNAFN-Scolaire
Argentina
2009
Argentina government-ANSES
Bangladesh
Asignacion Universal por
Hijo (AUH)
Primary Education Stipend
2002
Bangladesh government
Children of salaried informal workers (below minimum wage) and 3.5 million children (2013)
the unemployed
Primary students in rural government schools
4.6 million children (2005)
Bolivia
Bono Juancito Pinto
2006
Bolivia government
Public school children
Brazil
Bolsa Familia
2001
Brazil government, World Bank
Poor families with school-age children (up to 15 yrs old)
Chile
Solidario
2002
Chile government
Colombia
Familias en Accion
2002
Colombia government, external creditors
Indigent and high-risk households, especially those with female
heads
Extremely poor families with children 7-17
400,000 HH (2010)
Ecuador
Bono de Desarrollo Humano
2003
Ecuador government, World Bank
Poor mothers of children 6-15
1.1 million HH (2006)
Ghana
LEAP
2008
Ghana government, UK DFID, World bank
Households in extreme poverty (poorest 20%)
70,000 HH (2014)
Guatemala
2008
1998
Ladli (regional)
2005
Extremely poor families with minors aged 0–15 in the 130 most
vulnerable municipalities
Poor households with children aged 6–12 who have not
completed the 4th grade of primary school
Residents of Haryana State with >1 daughter
240,000 HH (2009)
India
Guatemala government, Inter-American
Development Bank
Inter-American Development Bank, World
Bank
Delhi government
250,000 HH (2009)
Honduras
Mi Familia Progresa
(Mifapro)
PRAF (education transfer)
Indonesia
Program Keluarga Harapan
2007
Indonesia government, World Bank
Mothers in chronically poor families
630,000 HH (2008)
Jamaica
PATH
2001
Jamaica government, World Bank
Families of children 0-19
210,000 children (2008)
Kenya
Cash Transfers for OVC
2004
Poor households fostering OVC 0-17
100,000 OVC (2012)
Malawi
2006
Ultra poor (10%) households who are also labor-constrained
30,000 HH (2013)
Mexico
Social Cash Transfer Scheme
(Mchinji)
Oportunidades/PROGRESA
Kenya government; Global Fund; UK DFID;
UNICEF; World Bank; SIDA
Malawi government, UNICEF
1997
Mexico government, World Bank
Extremely poor households
5.8 million HH (2011)
Morocco
Tayssir (pilot)
2008
Morocco government
Parents of children 6-15
300,000 children (2010)
Beneficiaries
Poor parents of school-age children
Coverage
77,705 children (July 2013)
1.6 million children (2010); Has since
expanded to include 9-12th grade
11 million children (2004)
256,000 HH (2009)
104,000 HH (cumulative-2010)
Year
Started Funder
2007 Tunisia government
Country
Tunisia
Program
PNAFN-Scolaire
Mozambique
Basic Social Subsidy Program
1992
Mozambique government
Nicaragua
Red de Proteccion Social
(RPS)
Punjab Female School
Stipend Program (regional)
Red de Oportunidades
2001
Nicaragua government, Inter-American
Development Bank
Punjab government, World Bank
Pakistan
Panama
2004
2006
2005
Peru
Red de Protección y
Promoción Social
Juntos
Philippines
4Ps (Education grant)
2008
Singapore
School Pocket Money Fund
South Africa
Tanzania
Paraguay
2005
Panama government, Inter-American
Development Bank, World Bank
Paraguay government, Inter-American
Development Bank
Peru government
Beneficiaries
Poor parents of school-age children
Coverage
77,705 children (July 2013)
Extremely poor households that are permanently labor
constrained (elderly, disabled, chronically ill, etc.)
Poor households with children 7-13 in grades 1-4
260,000 HH (2013)
36,000 HH (2009)
Girls in grades 6-10, 15/34 districts
455,259 children (2007)
Families living under the extreme poverty line with children 4-17
70,000 HH (2009-~16.6% of the population)
Children aged 0 to 14 and their families, and pregnant women
facing extreme poverty
Poor households with children less than 14 years old
5,350 HH (2006)
453,823 (2008)
Poor households with children aged 6-14 years old
380,000 HH (2009)
2001
Philippines government, Millenium Challenge
Corporation, World Bank
The Straits Times (newspaper)
Children from low-income families
105,000 children (cumulative-2014)
Child Support Grant
1998
South Africa government
Households in deep poverty with children under 15
10.8 million children (2012)
2009
2001
Tanzania government, Japanese Social Dev
Fund
Turkey government, EU, World Bank
Uruguay
Community-Based
Conditional Cash Transfer
Social Risk Mitigation Project
(Education grant)
Asignaciones Familiares
2008
Uruguay government
Poor households, especially those where elderly are caring for
4,998 HH (2011)
orphans
Poor families with children aged 0–6 or in primary or secondary
855,906 HH (2006)
school
Children that belong to households under the national poverty line 500,000 children (2008)
Uruguay
Ingreso Ciudadano
2005
Uruguay government
The first quantile of people below the poverty line
~125,000 HH (cumulative)
Yemen
Basic Education
Development Project (Pilot)
Manicaland (RCT)
2007
Yemen government, World Bank
Girls in grades 4-9, in 2/20 governorates
39,572 girls (2012)
2010
UNICEF, World Bank, Wellcome Trust
Households with children <18 years and head of household
constraints OR household in the poorest wealth quintile.
2,844 HH (2013)
Turkey
Zimbabwe
Amount per Month
$6.22 per child
% monthly HH
expenses (p.c.)
1.2%
$27.50 per child
4.8%
$1.25-$1.65 per HH
Bolivia
Frequency
Duration
Monthly
As long as eligible
(+ annual bonus)
Targeting Strategy
Unverified means testing (via PNAFN) and
community assessment
Review of government records
1.5%
Monthly (80%),
annually (20%)
2X per year
$2.33 per child
1.2%
Annually
As long as eligible
Brazil
$11-18 per child
2.4%
Monthly
As long as eligible
Chile
$15-$6.50 (decreasing over time) per
HH
$8 / $14-33 (primary / secondary) per
child
$15 per HH
1.0%
Bimonthly
5 years
3.1%
Bimonthly
As long as eligible
3.2%
Monthly
As long as eligible
$2.79-5.23 per HH
2.3%
Monthly
Not specified
Guatemala
$20 per HH
6.1%
Bimonthly
Honduras
$4.17 per child
1.8%
$4.17 per HH, invested
$4.34-$15.91 per HH
Country
Tunisia
Argentina
Bangladesh
Colombia
Ecuador
Ghana
India
Indonesia
Grade 6-10
Enrollment, attendance (85% under 16, 75%
16-18), health checks
School-based selection from those with at least Enrollment, 85% attendance, pass end of
one poverty attribute
year test
Review of school records
Enrollment, 80% attendance
Unverified (self-declared) means testing and
Enrollment, 85% attendance, vaccinations 0-7
geographic targeting
Proxy means test (Social Protection Card score) UCT
Proxy means test (SISBEN welfare index);
Geographic targeting
Proxy means test (Selben index)
Enrollment, 80% attendance (2-month cycle)
Enrollment, 90% attendance (by month)
As long as eligible
Proxy means test and community-based
targeting
Proxy means test and geographic targeting
Enrollment, 90% attendance
2X per year
As long as eligible
Enrollment, attendance (grades 1-4)
2.6%
Annually
5 years maximum
Review of government records
Enrollment, immunization (both daughters)
3.8% (20-80% among
beneficiaries)
3.6%
3X per year
6 years
Proxy means test
Bimonthly
As long as eligible
Proxy means test
Enrollment, 85% attendance, remedial
classes for 15-18, clinic visits
Enrollment, 85% attendance, health visits
29.2%
Bimonthly
5 years maximum
Not specified
Geographic targeting (HIV rate) and community UCT
assessment
Community-based
UCT, but bonuses for enrollment
As long as eligible
Enrollment and 85% attendance, health visits
Study duration
Geographic targeting (school sectors)
Enrollment and attendance (CCT)
Kenya
$10 base +$5/$7.50
(primary/secondary) per child
$24 per HH
Malawi
$4.30-$12.85 per HH
20.1%
Monthly
Mexico
$13-$74 per child
Bimonthly
Morocco
$8-$13 per child
5.6% (20% among
beneficiaries)
4.5%
Jamaica
As long as eligible
Conditionality
Enrollment (one time)
Annual
Enrollment
Amount per Month
$6.22 per child
% monthly HH
expenses (p.c.)
1.2%
$4.50-$13 per HH
15.4%
Monthly
14.3%
Pakistan
$7.50 per hh / $2.08 per year per
child
$3 per child
Panama
$50 per HH
Paraguay
Targeting Strategy
Unverified means testing (via PNAFN) and
community assessment
Conditionality
Enrollment (one time)
Not specified
Self-targeting and Means testing
UCT
Bimonthly
3 years
1.4%
Quarterly
As long as eligible
Geographic targeting (using literacy rate)
Enrollment and 85% attendance, grade
promotion
Enrollment and 80% attendance
Bimonthly
5 years
$5 per child
10.3% (20% in lowest
decile)
1.4%
Monthly
As long as eligible
$35.84 per HH
6.9%
Monthly
Philippines
$7 per child (for 10 months/yr)
2.9%
Quarterly
8 years (4 full, 4
partial)
5 years
Singapore
5.2%
Monthly
South Africa
$44 / $72 / $96 per child (primary/
secondary/post-secondary)
$27.09 per child
5.3%
Monthly
Tanzania
$3 per child (max HH payment $18)
4.7%
Bimonthly
Not specified
$15 per boy, $20 per girl (primary);
$25 per boy, $30 per girl (secondary)
$31 (primary), $45 (secondary)--first
child in each HH
$56 per HH
2.6%
Bimonthly
As long as eligible
6.0%
Monthly
As long as eligible
Proxy means testing in rural, indigenous, urban Enrollment, parent-teacher conferences,
areas (different cut-offs)
immunizations, capacity-building events
Enrollment and 85% attendance, pregnancy
check-ups, infant growth monitoring
Geographic targeting, proxy means testing, and Enrollment, 85% attendance (ages 6-14),
community validation
pregnant/child health visits, registration
Enrollment and 85% attendance
(140 poorest municipalities and 10 cities)
Community-based (family service centers)
Enrolled full-time, disadvantaged living
situation
Means tested (with focus on rural access to
Enrollment, regular attendance
transfers)
Community Management Committee, Proxy
Enrollment, 80% attendance (health checks
means test, Community verification
for younger children & elderly)
Proxy means test
Enrollment, 80% attendance, not to repeat
the same grade more than once
Means tested
Enrollment, Attendance
8.8%
Monthly
2.0%
3X per year
2 years (project
duration)
7 years
36.0%
Bimonthly
Study duration
Country
Tunisia
Mozambique
Nicaragua
Peru
Turkey
Uruguay
Uruguay
Yemen
Zimbabwe
$2.92-$3.33 per girl, + achievement
bonuses (max $10 per HH)
$9 + $2 per child
Frequency
Duration
Monthly
As long as eligible
(+ annual bonus)
2 years, or 4 years
post-secondary
As long as eligible
Proxy means test and income level
Means tested (survey), Community-based
targeting and verification
Enrollment, attendance, and regular health
status control
Enrollment, 80% attendance (2-month
cycle), passing grades
Birth certificate, vaccinations, 90% school
attendance, parenting skills classes
Country
Tunisia
Objective 1
Reduce dropout rates and increasing school performance among poor families
Objective 2
End the intergenerational cycle of poverty
Argentina
Improve quality of life, education, and health
Reduce poverty and homelessness
Bangladesh
Increase enrollment and completion rates
Establish equity in assistance for students (Also increase overall quality of education)
Bolivia
Increase enrollment, attendance, and completion
Help families pay for school supplies
Brazil
Alleviate the income deprivation of poor households
Break the intergenerational transmission of poverty
Chile
Immediate poverty alleviation
Colombia
Lessen poverty by increasing human capital among children in poor HH
Provide the poor with the tools to allow them to permanently escape poverty by their
own means
Substitute, in part, the income the household would forgo if increased schooling reduces
income-generating activities
Ecuador
Improve the formation of human capital among poor families in Ecuador
Ghana
Alleviate short-term poverty
Encourage long-term human capital development
Guatemala
Provide economic incentives
Contribute to human capital; Promote investment in education, health, and nutrition
Honduras
India
Create opportunities for vulnerable population groups in developing human capital and
production capacities of families.
Raise the status of the girl child in the family and in the society
Indonesia
Provide better access to education and health services
Support vulnerable groups through cash transfers supplemented with projects in the
social sector, particularly education and health
Change the mindsets of the people for proper rearing of the girl children, and provide
them the right to birth and the right to survival
Help children from chronically poor households escape the intergenerational poverty trap
Jamaica
Alleviate poverty by increasing the value of transfers to the poor
Kenya
Encourage fostering and retention of children
Malawi
Mexico
Reduce poverty, hunger, and starvation in all households which are ultra poor and labour
constrained
"Prevent parenting failures and market failures"
Morocco
Getting — and keeping — boys and girls in school
Increase educational attainment, improve health outcomes of the poor, break the
intergenerational cycle of poverty
Promote their human capital development
Increase school enrolment and attendance of children and invest in their health and
nutrition status
Increase the human capital of children of poor rural households, thus attempting to
break the intergenerational inheritance of poverty
Country
Tunisia
Objective 1
Reduce dropout rates and increasing school performance among poor families
Objective 2
End the intergenerational cycle of poverty
Mozambique
Provide direct assistance to individuals permanently unable to work
Nicaragua
Supplement household income for up to three years to increase expenditures on food
Create minimum conditions for survival, access to social services, satisfy basic needs of
target groups in absolute poverty
Reduce dropout rates during the first four years of primary school
Pakistan
Panama
improving enrollment, increasing retention, reducing gender disparities and enhancing
female prestige
Reduce extreme poverty
Increase supply of female teachers and other service providers , particularly in low literacy
and poorer regions of Punjab
Enhance human capital
Paraguay
Reduce extreme poverty
Increase the cluster of human and social capital comprised in beneficiary families
Peru
Develop human capital
Break inter-generational transfers of poverty
Philippines
Improve human capital and thus break the intergenerational cycle of poverty
Singapore
Alleviate current poverty by supplementing the income of the poor to address their
immediate consumption needs
Provide every child in need with the resources needed to do well in school-and beyond
South Africa
Directly reduce poverty and vulnerability
Help children in poverty increase their years of schooling
Turkey
Increase consumption and enable poor households and carers to participate in productive
economic activity (e.g. to look for work)
Reduce poverty among extremely poor and vulnerable: children, chronically ill, disabilities, Increase investment in health and education, improve health and educational attainment,
older people
economic growth, reduce poverty
Generate greater social inclusion
Provide mechanisms to cope with poverty as a market misery
Uruguay
Alleviate poverty
Uruguay
Reduce high poverty rates and indigence
Yemen
Expand the provision of quality basic education to all (grades 1-9) with special attention
on gender equity
Study
Tanzania
Zimbabwe
Promote school attendance (esp teenagers, among whom dropout is high)
Study

Evaluation of the Education Benefit Program of PNAFN in

Transcription

Documents pareils

Abortion overview - Classes

Surface : m² / Price : 230 000

Surface : 34.5m² / Price : 190 800

Revue de presse ANGLAIS Semaine du 31 octobre au 06 novembre

surfboard - Villard de Lans

Surface : 49.17m² / Price : 265 000

View - Prince George Digitization

[Descartes e il Seicento 5] Jean-Robert Armogathe, Vincent Carraud

Revue de presse ANGLAIS Semaine du 24 au 30 octobre 2011

Printable version [PDF | 591.2 Ko. ]