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SESSION 2 : Réponses technologiques et facteur humain
9 Communication introductive
Ch. CLADEN, Commandant de l’Abeille Flandre - France
9 Table Ronde n°3 – Conception, Construction, Maintenance et Contrôles :
Comment prendre les mesures appropriées - Débats
9 Table Ronde n°4 – Replacer l’équipage au centre de l’approche de
sécurité – Débats
9 Communication de J.Y Le Drian, Député, Secrétaire d’Etat à la Mer
9 Rapport de la session – Jean-Paul Quéméneur, Directeur de l’ENSIETA
9 Contributions écrites de la session 2
SESSION 2 : Réponses Technologiques et facteur humain
9 Contributions écrites :
•
Charles CLADEN, Abeille Flandre - France
•
Jacques LOISEAU, AFCAN - France
•
Volker BERTRAM et Ould M El MOCTAR, HSVA - Allemagne
•
Rafael GUTIERREZ FRAILE, Association of European Shipbuilders - Belgique
•
Michael VOOGEL, Paris MOU – Pays Bas
•
Nikos MIKELIS, INTERTANKO – United Kingdom
•
Daniel RETUREAU, Comité Economique et Social Européen - France
•
Martha GRABOWSKI, Collège Le Moyne - USA
•
Rodger MAC DONALD, IFSMA – United Kingdom
•
Tony LANE, Seafarers International Research Centre – United Kingdom
•
Frederic VAN WIJNEN, CESMA – Pays-Bas
•
Dani APPAVE, B.I.T - Suisse
Introduction
François GROSRICHARD
Après les aspects administratifs, réglementaires et formels, nous allons aujourd'hui observer
les problèmes techniques et humains de la Sécurité Maritime. La conception des navires
comme les compétences, l'homogénéité et la rigueur des équipages sont en effet
essentielles.
Le Président de cette table ronde sera Monsieur Fabio FAGO, adjoint au Maire de la ville
italienne de Tarente.
Nous ouvrons cette session en écoutant Monsieur Charles CLADEN, Commandant de
l'Abeille-Flandre, ce saint-bernard de la mer qui quotidiennement patrouille et intervient au
large d'Ouessant.
After the administrative aspects, which are statutory and categorical, today we are going
to look at the technical and human problems of Maritime Safety. The design of ships and
the skills, homogeneity and rigour of the crews are, in fact, essential.
The chairman of this round table will be Mr Fabio FAGO, deputy mayor of Tarante in Italy.
We will open this session by listening to Charles CLADEN, Captain of the Abeille Flandre,
this ‘Saint Bernard’ of the sea who daily patrols and intervenes off Ouessant.
Communication de Monsieur Charles CLADEN,
Commandant de l'Abeille Flandre, remorqueur d'intervention, Brest
Captain of the Abeille Flandre, emergency tugboat, Brest
Les propositions que je vais vous présenter émanent de Monsieur Michel GIRIN, Directeur
du CEDRE, de Monsieur Shoichi HARA, Directeur de l'Institut National de Recherche Marine
du Japon, et de moi-même.
Depuis une trentaine d'année, le sujet de la sécurité maritime a beaucoup évolué,
notamment en termes de perception. Jusqu'alors, les problèmes ne concernaient que le
monde maritime lui-même, ils touchent aujourd'hui aussi le grand public. Les passages
maritimes sont une menace permanente pour les côtes concernées. Cependant, la
disparition de 20 marins en mer ne fait plus "la une" que de quelques quotidiens régionaux,
alors que le déversement de 2 000 tonnes de produits polluants occupera "la une" de
l'actualité nationale pendant plusieurs mois.
Les gouvernements, les assureurs ou les structures concernées ont bien entendu
conscience de ces problèmes. Chaque pollution génère un flot de propositions, dont
certaines aboutissent. Elles vont toutes vers le "Never again concept", le "plus jamais ça".
Nouvelles ou pas, ces propositions contribuent donc toutes à l'amélioration de la sécurité du
transport maritime. Mais nous connaîtrons toujours, malheureusement, des accidents.
Des propositions secondaires, issues des expériences des différents intervenants en matière
de sauvetage et de recherche scientifique appliquée, peuvent aussi émerger. C'est le cas
des propositions que nous ferons ici.
Conférence "Sécurité Maritime et Protection de l'Environnement " Evolution et Perspectives 11-13 Mars 02
Nous proposerons tout d'abord d'avoir un retour d'expérience sur le remorquage d'urgence.
Nous travaillons pour le moment uniquement dans le cadre de compagnies privées affrétées
pour la plupart par des autorités en charge, les "emergency towing vessels", et il est très
difficile d'établir des échanges entre ces compagnies.
Une autre proposition concerne les dispositifs de remorquage d'urgence établis à l'avance
sur les navires, notamment pour le cas des navires chavirés et brisés en deux.
Une rapide transmission des informations sur le navire et sa cargaison, au moment où le
navire lance sa demande d'assistance, s'avère également nécessaire, tout comme une
formation basique des capitaines sur leurs responsabilités environnementales.
D'autres propositions pratiques sont en cours d'étude, comme le remplacement des étraves
rigides par des étraves qui amortiraient le choc en cas de collision.
Le retour d'expérience sur le remorquage d'urgence repose pour le moment exclusivement
sur l'expérience des équipages. Nous constatons que beaucoup d'accidents présentent des
caractéristiques similaires. Nous proposons donc qu'un groupe international de spécialistes
collecte ces données en une base qui soit ensuite diffusée entre les professionnels, ceci
sous la houlette des autorités en charge.
Le but de cette action serait d'améliorer la prévention de second niveau, c'est-à-dire
l'intervention entre incident et accident et la limitation des conséquences de l'accident
lorsque celui-ci est avéré. Il s'agit d'aider à la prise de décision en situation d'urgence.
Un tel groupe de travail international permettrait de présenter conjointement des propositions
issues de plusieurs pays.
Concernant les dispositifs de remorquage sur les navires, l'expérience de l'Erika a montré
l'utilité des "emergency towing arrangements", dispositifs obligatoires pour les pétroliers audessus de 20 000 tonnes depuis 1999. Il faudrait sans doute élargir l'obligation de ces
installations à des tonnages inférieurs, et nous considérons même que cela devrait être
rendu obligatoire pour tous les navires transportant des produits dangereux ou polluants,
quelle que soit leur taille.
Dans le cas de navires brisés en deux, il est nécessaire qu'existent des points de
remorquage validés dans toutes les situations : en flottaison ou chaviré. Nos collègues
japonais mènent actuellement des études en ce sens. Celles-ci font évidemment appel à
l'industrie du transport maritime. Ce projet est proche des dispositifs de remorquage
d'urgence que nous évoquions plus haut.
Cela pourrait également faire l'objet d'un groupe de travail international qui identifierait les
études en cours pour ensuite s'attacher à motiver les institutions compétentes dans la
définition et l'amélioration des projets de recherche en la matière.
La transmission rapide des informations concernant le navire et sa cargaison doit être
efficiente. En cas d'abandon du navire, le capitaine est responsable de son navire et de son
équipage, mais lorsque l'on évacue celui-ci, on ne pense qu'à sauver les vies, l'aspect
environnemental est souvent négligé. Nous pensons qu'il est possible de mettre en œuvre
des systèmes relativement simples de transmission des informations. Un capitaine formé à
ces aspects pourrait, de manière très simple, donner le maximum de renseignements sur la
structure du navire et transmettre les manifestes de la cargaison, ceci entre le moment où
l'accident est signalé et l'évacuation proprement dite, qui se déroule fréquemment après
plusieurs heures.
La formation des capitaines, enfin, devrait à notre avis inclure une part concernant la
sensibilité environnementale.
Nous pouvons continuer de rêver au "plus jamais ça", mais quoi qu'il en soit, l'application de
ces propositions ou d'autres encore réduirait sensiblement les conséquences des incidents
ou des accidents.
Un tel groupe de travail est déjà constitué de manière informelle, il est envisageable de se
joindre à nous pour un acte volontaire de coopération internationale.
The proposals, which I am going to present, come from Mr Michel GIRIN, Director of CEDRE
(Oil Pollution Research and Experimentation Centre), Mr Shoichi HARA, Director of the
National Marine Research Institute of Japan, and myself.
For thirty years now, the subject of maritime safety has greatly advanced, particularly in
terms of perception. Until then, these problems only affected the maritime world itself; today
they also affect the general public. Sea crossings are a permanent threat for the coasts
concerned. However, the loss of 20 sailors at sea now only makes the headlines of a few
local daily papers, while the discharge of 2,000 tonnes of pollutants fills the national news
headlines for several months.
Governments, insurance companies and other concerned bodies are, of course, well aware
of these problems. Each pollution incident generates a flood of suggestions, some of which
lead to results. They all lead towards the “never again” concept. New or not, all these
proposals, therefore, contribute to the improvement of marine transport safety. Yet,
unfortunately, we will always experience accidents.
Secondary proposals, resulting from the experiences of different contributors in rescue
materials and applied scientific research, may also emerge. Proposals are what we are
making here.
First of all, we propose a return on the experience of emergency towing trials. We work, for
the moment, solely with private companies mostly chartered by the authorities in charge –
the “emergency towing vessels” – and it is very difficult to set up exchanges between these
companies.
Another proposal concerns establishing emergency towing arrangements on the ships in
advance, particularly in case of ships capsized or broken in two.
A speedy transmission of information on the ship and its cargo, at the time the ship requests
assistance, proves to be equally necessary, as well as basic training for captains on their
environmental responsibilities.
Other practical proposals are being studied, such as the replacement of rigid stems, by
stems which absorb the shock in case of collision.
The return on the experience of emergency towing trials rests exclusively, for the moment,
on the crews’ experience. We note that many accidents show similar characteristics. We
therefore propose that a group of international specialists collect this information in a
database that would then be circulated among the professionals. This would be under the
leadership of the authorities in charge.
The aim of this action would be to improve prevention at the second level, meaning
intervention between incident and accident and the limitation of the consequences of the
accident, when this is known. It is a question of aiding decision making in an emergency
situation.
Such an international working group would allow joint proposals from several countries to be
put forward.
Concerning towing arrangements on ships, the Erika experience showed the usefulness of
emergency towing arrangements, arrangements which have been compulsory for oil tankers
over 20,000 tonnes since 1999. There is no doubt that the obligation to have these
installations must be widened to cover lesser tonnages, and we even consider that it should
be made compulsory for all ships transporting dangerous or polluting products, whatever
their size.
In the case of ships broken in two, towing points must exist which are valid in all situations –
afloat or capsized. Our Japanese colleagues are currently carrying out studies in this
direction, and they are of course appealing to the maritime transport industry. This project is
close to the emergency towing arrangements we mentioned earlier.
This could also be the subject of an international working group, which would identify the
studies in course, and then endeavour to motivate the relevant institutions in the definition
and improvement of research projects on the subject.
The speedy transmission of information concerning the ship and its cargo must be efficient.
When a ship is abandoned, the captain is responsible for his ship and his crew, but when the
ship is being evacuated we only think of saving lives, and the environmental aspect is often
neglected. We think it possible to implement relatively simple information transmission
systems. A captain trained in these aspects could give maximum information on the ship’s
structure in a very simple way and transmit the cargo manifests. This could be done
between the moment the accident is reported and the evacuation proper, which often occurs
after several hours.
Finally, captains’ training, must, in our opinion, include a part concerning environmental
sensitivity.
We can continue to dream of ”never again”, but whatever it be, the application of these
proposals, or even of others, will appreciably reduce the consequences of these incidents or
accidents.
Such a working group has already been formed in an informal manner, and it is conceivable
that it could join with us for a voluntary action of international cooperation.
Table ronde N°3
Conception, Construction, Maintenance et Contrôles :
"Comment prendre les mesures appropriées ?"
Design, Construction, Maintenance and Controls :
"How can we take the appropriate measures ?
Je voudrais demander à Monsieur BERTRAM, architecte naval, si sur le plan de la
conception des navires il est possible d'imaginer des bateaux plus "intelligents", plus sûrs.
Comment cela est-il envisagé en amont de la construction ? Plus de technologie signifie-t-il
plus de sécurité ?
I would like to ask Mr BERTRAM, naval architect, if, on the level of ship design, more
“intelligent”, safer boats can be devised. How is that envisaged before construction? Does
more technology mean more safety ?
Volker BERTRAM
Les progrès réalisés dans la conception des navires pour les rendre plus sûrs sont
nombreux. Il se peut même qu'un jour ceux-ci seront entièrement automatisés. Nous
possédons la technologie et nous sommes capables d'installer des systèmes de contrôle
pouvant éviter tout risque de collision de façon plus performante que des systèmes gérés par
l'homme. Ces systèmes sont d'ailleurs commercialisés et quatorze d’entre eux ont déjà été
installés.
Néanmoins, l'importance du sujet débattu aujourd'hui va au-delà du simple fait de constater
qu'à Brest un grand nombre de personnes sont tuées dans les accidents de la route faute
d'avoir mis leur ceinture de sécurité. Notre débat est davantage orienté sur la manière de
concevoir des ceintures de sécurité plus sûres !
L'approche n'est pas la même !
Nous avons un projet de navires plus sûrs ; il suffit de le mettre en application !
Safety has come a long way with many more possibilities for safer ships. One day there may
even be unmanned ships. We have the technology and can install expert systems to avoid
collisions even better than if the systems are totally manned by humans. Indeed, these
systems are now commercially available on the market and a total of 14 have now been
installed.
Nevertheless, the discussion we are currently having is paramount to a realisation that many
people in Brest are being killed in car accidents, discovering that these people were not
wearing safety belts and so focusing the discussion as to whether you can design better
safety belts !
This is not the right approach !
We have safer ships; we just have to implement them !
Oui, mais ma question concernait la conception d’un navire. Un navire d’aujourd’hui, en
2002, est différent d’un navire datant de 1980, il peut y avoir une seule ligne d’arbres, deux
lignes d’arbres, il peut y avoir différents types de moteurs, une double coque, pas de double
coque. Il y a des navires très, très rapides, qui desservent les îles grecques ou qui
desservent un certain nombre d’îles françaises ou de la Méditerranée. Les technologies des
navires sont donc très différentes aujourd’hui, de celles d’hier, mais est-ce que plus de
technologie, c’est nécessairement plus de sécurité ?
Yes, but my question concerned the ship’s design. A ship today, in 2002, is different from a
ship of 1980, it can have only one line of shafts, two lines of shafts, it can have different
types of engines, a double hull or a single hull. There are some very, very fast ships which
serve the Greek Islands or a certain number of French islands or the Mediterranean. Ship
technology, today, is very different from yesterday, but more technology, is it necessarily
more safety ?
Volker BERTRAM
This could be the case. We know how to make ships safer, but then we enter the realm of
the human factor. I do not hold the key for effectively managing human nature, which
reasons that in a safer ship, one can take more risks. Compensating for human nature is not
primarily an engineering task, and certainly goes beyond my capabilities.
This could be the case. We know how to make ships safer, but then we enter the realm of
the human factor. I do not hold the key for effectively managing human nature, which
reasons that in a safer ship one can take more risks. Compensating for human nature is not
primarily an engineering task, and certainly goes beyond my capabilities.
Nikos MIKELIS, président du Comité de la Sécurité et de l'Environnement
INTERTANKO (Directeur de ‘LYRAS Shipping Limited’, Londres, RU)
Ce que j'ai constaté durant les trente dernières années, c'est que nous possédons la
technologie de pointe, mais également la concurrence à tout prix, d'où une conception de la
construction des navires revue à la baisse en matière de qualité de matériaux. Il existe bien
sûr de bons équipements technologiques en termes de navigation et de prévention, mais
aussi des équipages n'ayant pas nécessairement la même envergure que ceux d’autrefois.
Par conséquent, nous constatons une évolution globale dans le temps qui n'apporte pas les
meilleures améliorations.
In the last, maybe, 30 years, the changes that I have seen are that, although we have the
final technology, we also have the final competition. This has resulted in ships being refined
in their design and built in a less robust, lighter way. Of course there is a lot of good
technology in terms of the navigational, warning equipment, but we also have crews who are
not necessarily of the same calibre that they were several years ago. Overall, therefore, we
have a progression through time, which does not necessarily bring the best improvements.
Restons sur les questions technologiques pour l'instant, nous en viendrons ensuite aux
facteurs humains. Monsieur MAGELSSEN…
Let us stay with the technological questions for the moment; we will come to the human
factors next. Mr MAGELSSEN …
Wilhelm MAGELSSEN, Vice-President Det Norske Veritas, NORWAY
Premièrement, la technologie intégrée aux navires modernes nous a permis de progresser.
Cependant, l'équipage à bord doit posséder les compétences et les connaissances
nécessaires en vue de manœuvrer ces navires.
Deuxièmement, les systèmes de maintenance et la manière dont les armateurs les
considèrent et les maintiennent à niveau sont des éléments très importants pour la sécurité
du navire au cours de sa durée de vie, qui peut atteindre vingt-cinq ans.
Firstly, the technology in modern ships has allowed us to take big steps forward. However,
the crew aboard must have the necessary skill and knowledge in order to operate these
ships.
Secondly, the maintenance systems, and the way in which owners perceive these and keep
these up to date, is very important for the safety of the ship during its life span, a life span
which may last up to 25 years.
A propos de maintenance, les sociétés de classification ont-elles pouvoir de contraintes, je
dis bien de contraintes, sur les armateurs pour faire les réparations lorsque cela s'avère
nécessaire ?
With regard to maintenance, do the classification societies have power of constraint, and I
mean constraint, on owners to make repairs when proved necessary ?
Wilhelm MAGELSSEN
Je pense que, dans une certaine mesure, nous détenons ce pouvoir. Afin d'inspecter
correctement certains pétroliers, il est nécessaire de parcourir une surface représentant plus
de 10 000 mètres. Dans ces conditions, il serait tout à fait facile à l'armateur de cacher des
anomalies, telles que des pièces de moteur défectueuses.
Par conséquent, nous avons besoin d'instaurer un climat de confiance dans l’objet
d’atteindre un objectif commun : la sécurité des navires. Nous avons le droit d'exiger la
réparation de toute anomalie et, en cas de refus de l'armateur, nous pouvons déclasser le
navire et en informer l'Etat du pavillon correspondant.
I think that, to some extent, we have that power. To inspect certain tankers correctly, one
must climb around a surface area of more than 10,000 meters. In these conditions it would
be quite easy for the owner to keep anomalies, such as faulty engine parts, hidden.
Therefore, we need to build up trust in order to have a common goal for safer ships. We can
right any wrongs, if the owner refuses, then we can delete the class of the vessel and inform
the flag state accordingly.
Il y a donc de bons armateurs et de mauvais armateurs, de bons navires et de mauvais
navires…
So, therefore, there are good owners and bad owners, good ships and bad ships…
Eric BERDER, directeur de la Sous-direction Sécurité maritime, Ministère de
l’Equipement, des transports et du logement
Le vrai problème concerne les navires de plus de 15 ans : au-delà de 15 ans, la courbe des
sinistres passe au-dessus de la moyenne. La question de la maintenance est donc cruciale,
mais aussi celui de la rétro activité des règlements.
Il est par ailleurs nécessaire d'avoir, sur ces sujets, des réglementations internationales, tout
simplement parce que les navires sous pavillon français par exemple ont pu être construits
au
Japon, en Corée ou ailleurs.
The real problem concerns ships older than 15 years: after 15 years, the accident curve rises
above the average. The question of maintenance is therefore crucial, but, also, so are
retroactive regulations.
Furthermore, we must have international regulations on these matters, quite simply because
ships under the French flag, for example, could have been built in Japan, or Korea or
elsewhere.
Les contrôles étant si nombreux et émanant de divers organismes ou structures, comment
se fait-il qu'il y ait encore des navires dangereux en service ?
With the controls being so numerous and emanating from various bodies or structures, how
is it that there are still dangerous ships in service ?
Eric BERDER
Entre autres parce que les contrôles par Etat du port ont été mis en place pour pallier
l'insuffisance des contrôles par Etat du pavillon, mais ils n'y suppléent que partiellement. On
ne dispose que de quelques heures pour inspecter un navire, on ne peut donc procéder à
ces inspections dans le détail. Une réglementation a été mise en place par l'OMI, qui
permettra de faire des contrôles plus approfondis sur des pétroliers ayant un certain âge.
En France, le nombre d'inspecteurs a longtemps été insuffisant, et il est vrai que des
arbitrages en matière de budget ont été rendus sans qu'ils soient favorables à la sécurité
maritime. Des inspecteurs au sortir de formation sont en recrutement, mais il leur faudra du
temps, deux ans environ, pour pouvoir diriger une équipe d'inspection. Le nombre
d'inspecteurs que nous estimons nécessaire sera atteint vers 2004 – 2005.
Comment faire pour attirer ces inspecteurs vers le service public où les rémunérations ne
sont pas à la hauteur de ce qu'ils pourraient prétendre dans le privé ?
How can these inspectors be attracted into public service when the remuneration is not as
high as they could demand in the private sector ?
Jacques LOISEAU, ancien commandant, Vice-président AFCAN, Association
Française des Capitaines de Navires
Au-delà de la limitation de rémunération que présentent les grilles de la fonction publique,
nous avons valorisé les primes de manière à rendre la fonction plus attractive. Des
développements de carrière sont également aujourd'hui envisageables.
Beyond the remuneration limitations presented by the public service salary scales, we have
increased bonuses in a way that renders the service more attractive. Career development is
also conceivable.
Nikos MIKELIS
J'aimerais revenir sur la remarque selon laquelle les navires de plus de quinze ans
présentaient trop de problèmes pour être encore efficaces.
Il est vrai que les statistiques démontrent une augmentation du taux d'incidents sur des
navires entre quinze et dix-neuf ans, mais ces mêmes statistiques révèlent également une
diminution du taux d'incidents sur ceux de plus de vingt ans.
On doit considérer les navires individuellement : certains navires âgés de 15 ans nécessitent
une sérieuse maintenance, ce dont de nombreux armateurs se soucient. Juger tout navire
hors d'usage dès sa quinzième année d'utilisation signifiera que des navires âgés de 13 ans
seront considérés sous-normes car les armateurs ne seront pas encouragés à investir de
fortes sommes d'argent dans un navire dont la durée de vie restante sera limitée à deux ans.
I would like to take exception to the remark made by the gentleman who stated that ships
over the age of 15 years pose enough of a problem in order to no longer be of any use.
It is true that statistics indicated an increasing level of incidents in ships between the ages of
15 and 19 years, but, equally well, the same statistics show that there is a decreasing level of
incidents beyond the age of 20 years.
One must study individual ships; some 15-year-old ships are in need of serious maintenance,
which many owners carry out. To legislate all ships out of existence once they reach the age
of 15 will result in 13-year-old ships being sub standard, because the owners will not be
encouraged to pump any considerable amount of finance into a ship with a remaining life
expectancy of only 2 years.
Michael VOOGEL, Secrétaire Délégué, Paris MOU (Convention européenne pour
l'inspection des navires), la Hague, Pays-Bas
Beaucoup de personnes considèrent le contrôle par l'Etat du port comme la police de la
navigation internationale. Parallèlement, le secteur maritime semble considérer les
armateurs ou affréteurs des pavillons comme responsables de la sécurité de fonctionnement
des navires.
En effet, l'importance de l'Etat du port et, en particulier, des accords régionaux, est un filet de
sécurité, mais ce n’est nullement en raison des pouvoirs plus importants que les conventions
maritimes ont apporté à l'Etat du port et des changements relationnels entre les Etats de
pavillon et les Etats de port.
Le contrôle par l'Etat du port a engendré une nouvelle réglementation. A l'origine, elle fut
introduite à la suite de la catastrophe de « l'Amoco Cadiz » en mars 1978 et lors d'une
conférence ministérielle qui s'est tenue à Paris en janvier 1982. Le Mémorandum de l'Etat du
port fut adopté et signé par les autorités maritimes de quatorze Etats et celui-ci est entré en
vigueur le 1er juillet de cette même année.
Depuis lors, la Pologne, le Canada, la Fédération russe, la Croatie et l'Islande l'ont
également signé, et ce statut de coopération a été accordé à la Coast Guard américaine, à
Tokyo et à l'Estonie. Au cours de ces vingt dernières années, l'approche harmonisée du
contrôle par l'Etat du port selon le Mémorandum de Paris a permis un grand nombre de
réalisations.
Un système informatique de centralisation des informations fournit un historique transparent
du contrôle par l'Etat du port. Cependant, malgré les réalisations entreprises, la catastrophe
de l'Erika a placé les demandes de renforcement de la réglementation concernant la sécurité
maritime sur le devant de la scène politique et publique.
Un récent rapport de l'Organisation pour la Coopération et le Développement Economique
(OCDE) indiquait qu'un changement dans l'allure des navires entraînait une réduction de
15 % des coûts d'exploitation. Bien que la concurrence soit l'un des composants
commerciaux essentiels, l’équilibre entre les investissements et les retours sur
investissements est indispensable.
L'armateur est le principal responsable du bon fonctionnement du navire. Il choisit le registre,
la société de classification, l'équipage, le personnel à quai et tout l'équipement. A la suite de
trois cas sérieux en 1991, dans lesquels l'erreur humaine a provoqué des pertes
considérables en vies humaines et en dégâts occasionnés à l'environnement maritime, il a
été décidé lors d'une conférence européenne de s'assurer de la conformité des besoins
opérationnels.
A l'initiative de plusieurs participants à la conférence de Paris, les directives de contrôle de
ces besoins opérationnels ont été soumises à l'OMI, puis adoptées en 1991. Dix ans plus
tard, supporté par l'Accord régional, le contrôle par l'Etat du port a considérablement enrichi
son expérience au cours des inspections opérationnelles, particulièrement celles concernant
les ferries transportant jusqu'à 3 000 passagers.
Ces inspections harmonisées sont basées sur les instruments correspondants, fournis selon
les conventions maritimes internationales et l'Accord régional, comme stipulé dans le
Mémorandum, qui lie juridiquement les membres de l'UE à la directive 95/2/EC de la
Communauté européenne relative au contrôle par l'Etat du port.
L'adhésion de la Pologne, du Canada, de la Fédération russe, de la Croatie et de l'Islande
est l'objectif final de la réduction du nombre de navires sous-normes au sein de la
Communauté européenne.
Le Mémorandum de Paris comprend les accords suivants : suppression du traitement de
faveur au regard des Etats non-signataires des conventions de l'OMI et de l'OIT ; concernant
les instruments juridiques en vigueur, les Etats signataires ont l’obligation d'inspecter 25 %
des arrivées de l'étranger, sans avis préalable, mais celles-ci ne doivent pas être effectuées
plus d'une fois par semestre et tout retard doit être évité ; enfin, les informations doivent
également être échangées, via une base de données commune située à Saint-Malo.
Les autorités maritimes fournissent également les services d'inspection aux Etats les plus
démunis.
Les services de documentation du Comité conseillent en matière de politique et
d'informations techniques du Mémorandum. Plusieurs services collaborent avec l'OMI et
l'OIT, et un dialogue s'est établi entre le Comité et des constructeurs du secteur, comme
AISC, Intertanko et ISF, pour n'en citer que quelques-uns.
Concernant le Facteur Cible, les autorités maritimes du Mémorandum de Paris donnent une
priorité majeure aux inspections : celles-ci peuvent être provoquées à la suite d’une
demande de contrôle formulée par une autre autorité, ou d’un rapport de membres
d'équipage, ou par toute personne intéressée par la sécurité de fonctionnement du navire, ou
par des conditions de travail et de vie à bord, ou par les navires transportant des produits
dangereux.
Pour appliquer le Mémorandum de Paris à l'Etat du port, il existe un dispositif de navires
ciblés pour les besoins d'inspection. Un formulaire cible informatisé a été introduit dans la
base de données, générant un Facteur Cible pour chaque navire et aidant à établir le degré
de priorité de son inspection. Les navires qui sembleraient sous-normes seraient prioritaires.
Grâce au Facteur Cible, les Etats du port peuvent faire un meilleur usage de leurs
ressources tout en enlevant la charge pesant sur les navires qui présentent un bon niveau
de sécurité.
Le programme cible est composé de deux modules : le facteur générique et le facteur
historique.
Le facteur générique est actualisé lors du changement des détails spécifiques au navire (son
pavillon existant ou sa classe, l'âge, l'état du pavillon, l'adhésion à une société de
classification reconnue, etc.).
Le facteur historique est appliqué au facteur générique et reflète la condition réelle du navire
durant le processus des inspections de contrôle de l'Etat du port dans la région. Chaque
inspection de contrôle du navire effectuée par l'Etat du port durant les douze mois
précédents signale si c'est son premier passage dans la région ou si aucune inspection n'a
été menée au cours des six derniers mois.
Le Facteur Cible global est calculé en rassemblant les facteurs générique et historique, mais
le total ne doit pas être inférieur au facteur générique. Ces critères de risque génèrent une
sélection automatique d'inspection sur une base journalière, au sein du système
d'information.
Un bon commandement moderne implique la sincérité dans la transmission d'informations.
La transparence des informations de contrôle des Etats de port présente un historique
conséquent sur les années écoulées. L’ensemble des informations de contrôle des Etats de
port du Mémorandum de Paris sont disponibles.
Au cours de l'année 2000, 18 559 inspections ont été menées durant lesquelles 67 735
défauts ont été décelés, soit une augmentation de 12 %. C'est la résultante directe de la
mise en application de notre politique Cible.
Tout navire battant pavillon inscrit sur liste noire, et signalé dans la région, a fait l'objet d'au
moins une inspection durant l'année 2000. Cette année-là, 1 764 mises en arrêt ont été
constatées dans la région. Il ne s'agit pas nécessairement d'une indication en relation à la
dégradation de l’état du navire ; cela signifie simplement que le contrôle de l'Etat du port
dans la région s'est amélioré.
Des mesures supplémentaires sont prévues et, en 2002, nous débuterons un programme de
formation spécialisée en coopération avec le secteur de l'industrie. Des échanges
d'informations ont commencé et la liste des armateurs et des affréteurs faisant l'objet d'une
mise en arrêt sera publiée, dans le sillage du Code de la gestion de la sécurité
bord/entreprises (ISM). Une publication des chartes et des mises en arrêt est en cours
d'élaboration et les jugements débuteront cette année. Des améliorations supplémentaires
concernant la sélection des navires sont en cours de préparation et les essais
commenceront en mai prochain.
Quelles sont les responsabilités des Etats de pavillon et leur conformité avec la
réglementation internationale ? Ces Etats doivent :
• mettre en place et renforcer les instruments de l'OMI et de l'OIT ;
• superviser la certification réglementaire ;
• superviser la qualification et la certification des effectifs ;
• maintenir le niveau de performances des sociétés de classification ;
• se conformer aux interventions de contrôle de l'Etat du port.
En particulier, les informations du Rapport annuel sur certaines administrations d'Etats de
pavillon, ayant présenté des résultats médiocres persistants selon les bases de données de
certains navires, ont engendré une source substantielle de renseignements. Ces navires ont
été informés qu'ils pourraient faire l'objet d'une inspection prioritaire.
Le Mémorandum de Paris publie trois listes d'Etats de pavillon : la liste blanche indiquant les
pavillons de qualité, la liste grise pour les pavillons présentant des résultats moyens de
contrôle par l'Etat du port, et la liste noire pour les pavillons présentant des résultats de
sécurité très médiocres. Les informations relatives à notre base de données sont disponibles
sur notre site Web.
Le Mémorandum de Paris est également destiné à la mise à disposition d'autres sources
d'informations d'inspection. L'évolution la plus marquante du secteur a été le développement
d'une base de données axée sur une accentuation de la transparence des conditions des
navires.
De nouvelles procédures d'interdiction vont entrer en vigueur. Une réglementation pour un
régime plus strict d'interdiction de navires dans la région a été adoptée. La résultante étant
que tout navire battant pavillon d'un Etat inscrit sur la liste noire et ayant été mis en arrêt
deux fois au cours des 24 mois précédents, ou battant pavillon d'un Etat apparaissant sur la
liste noire et ayant été mis en arrêt plus d'une fois au cours des 36 derniers mois, se verra
refuser l'accès aux ports des Etats membres.
Toutefois, ces conséquences ne s'appliquent qu'aux pétroliers transportant du gaz, des
produits chimiques ainsi qu’aux navires transportant des passagers.
Le Mémorandum de Paris entretient un dialogue ouvert avec les Etats de pavillon. Les
rapports sont soumis chaque année à l'OMI. Des réunions se tiennent régulièrement pour
échanger les points de vue, transmettre des informations et examiner les plaintes.
Malgré les efforts de tous nos Etats membres et des améliorations prévues, il faut
reconnaître que le contrôle de l'Etat du port n'est pas le remède à tous les problèmes ; ce
n'est pas la police maritime, comme cela a été supposé.
Le contrôle de l'Etat du port ne peut pas se substituer aux responsabilités incombant à l'Etat
du pavillon, au regard de l'application de la conformité aux normes adéquates.
Toutes les parties concernées devraient coopérer en vue de l'objectif final consistant à
mettre un terme à l'exploitation de navires sous-normes. Ce type de navires représente une
véritable honte pour l'ensemble de l'industrie maritime et ils ont fait suffisamment de tort, non
seulement en termes de dollars et d'euros, mais aussi en termes de réputation et de
prestige.
Port State control is seen by many to be the police of world shipping. At the same time, the
maritime sector seems to agree, that those really responsible for the safe operation of ships
are the owner or operator of the flags head.
Indeed, the importance of port state and, in particular, regional agreements is a safety net.
Not in the least, because maritime conventions have given greater policy power to port state
and changes in relations between flag states and port states.
Port State control has created new legislations. It was primarily introduced following the
‘Amoco Cadiz’ disaster in March 1978, and in a Ministerial conference in Paris in January
1982, the Port State Memorandum was adopted and signed by the maritime authorities of 14
states and this memorandum control came into operation on July 1st of that same year.
Since that time, Poland, Canada, the Russian Federation, Croatia and Iceland have also
joined and the cooperation status has been granted to the United States Coast Guard, Tokyo
and Estonia. Much has been accomplished, during the past twenty years, by the harmonised
approach of Port State control of the Paris Memorandum.
A central computer information system provides a transparent history of Port State control.
However, much may have been achieved, but the Erika disaster has placed even more
public and political demands for stronger regulations with regard to the safety of shipping.
A recent report from the ‘Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development’ indicated
a shift in shipping pace resulting in a reduction of operational costs of 15%.
Although competition is one of the essential components in doing business, there has to be a
balance between investment and returns of profits.
The person most responsible for the safe operation of the ship is the owner. He chooses the
register, classification society, crew, shore staff and all the equipment.
Following three serious casualties, in 1991, in which human error caused considerable loss
of life and damage for the marine environment, a European conference decided to ensure
compliance for operational requirements.
At the initiative of several of the Paris conference members, the guidelines for the control of
these operational requirements were submitted to IMO and were eventually adopted in 1991.
Now, ten years later, with the Regional Agreement, Port State control have gained
considerable experience in operational inspections, especially concerning passenger ferries
that carry up to 3,000 passengers.
These harmonised inspections are based on the relative instruments as provided by the
international maritime conventions.
The Regional Agreement, as laid down in the
Memorandum that legally bound the EU Members to the European Community Directive
95/2/EC concerning Port State control.
The membership of Poland, Canada, the Russian Federation, Croatia and Iceland is the
ultimate aim in the reduction of sub-standard shipping in the region of the EC.
The Paris Memorandum includes the following agreements: no more favourable treatment
regarding states that are not signatories to the IMO and ILO conventions. Concerning the
legal instruments in force, the Member States have to inspect 25% of foreign arrivals, these
inspections are not announced before they are carried out, but should not be carried out
more than once every six months and any undue delay must be avoided. Information must
also be exchanged via a common database in Saint Malo.
The maritime authorities also provide the inspection services for the poorer states.
The advisory bodies of the committee advise on the matters of Memorandum policy and
technical information. There are different services cooperating with IMO and ILO and a
dialogue has been established between the committee and the industry, such as IACS,
Intertanko and ISF, to name but a few.
Concerning the Target Factor, the maritime authorities of the Paris Memorandum make use
of an overriding priority for inspections: this may follow the request for inspection by another
authority, or a report from crew members or any person interested in the safe operation of
the ship, or working and living conditions onboard, or for ships carrying dangerous goods.
In order to provide the Paris Memorandum Port State, there is a mechanism of targeting
ships for inspection purposes. A computerised targeting form has been introduced into the
database. This results in the Target Factor for each individual ship, assisting in establishing
the level of priority for its individual inspection. Ships that may be potentially sub-standard,
receive a higher priority. By using the Target Factor, Port States can make more effective
use of their resources and, at the same time, remove the burden from those ships with a
good safety record.
The targeting system is composed of two modules: the generic factor and the historic factor.
The generic factor is updated when the particular details of the ship, its existing flag or its
class changes, also concerning details such as age, flag state, membership of recognised
classification society etc.
The historic factor is applied to the generic factor and reflects the actual condition of the ship
found during the process of Port State controlling inspections in the region.
Each Port State control inspection of the ship as carried out during the previous last twelve
months concerns the elements as to whether it is the first time in the region for the particular
ship or whether no inspection record has been carried out for the last six months.
The overall Target Factor is calculated by adding the generic and historic factors together,
but this total cannot be lower than the generic factor. These risk criteria result in an
automatic selection for inspection within the information system on a daily basis.
Good and modern governing implies the sincerity of information; the transparency of Port
State control information has a consequent history over the past years. All Port State control
information from the Paris Memorandum is available.
During the year 2000, 18,559 inspections were carried out during which 67,735 deficiencies
were found, an increase of 12%. This is the direct result of our Target policy in practice.
Any ship flying a black listed flag, and which entered the region was subject to at least one
inspection during the year 2000. In this year there were 1,764 detentions in the region. This
is not necessarily an indication that the ships are any worse than before, it merely indicates
that Port State control in the region is improving.
Further measurements are planned and in 2002 we will start an expert training programme in
cooperation with the industry, exchanges of information have started and publication of
owners and operators on detentions will be established in the wake of ISM. Publications of
charters and detentions are under development and trials will start this year. Further
improvements concerning the selection of ships are under construction and the tests will start
next May.
What are the responsibilities of the flag states and the accordance of international
regulations? These states must:
Implement and enforce the IMO and ILO instruments,
Supervise the statutory certification,
Supervise the qualification and certification of manning,
Guard the performance of the classification societies,
Follow up on the Port State control interventions.
In particular, information from the Annual Report on certain flag states administrations, which
have had a persistently poor record according to the databases of certain ships, has
generated a substantial source of information. These ships were informed that they would
be subject to priority inspections.
The Paris Memorandum publishes three lists of flag states. The white list indicating quality
flags, the grey list for flags with an average Port State control record, and the black list for
flags with a consistently poor safety record. Information concerning our database is available
on our web site.
The Paris Memorandum is also dedicated to provide other sources of inspection information.
The major step forward in the area was the development of a database aimed at the filing of
greater transparency on the condition of ships.
New banning procedures are coming into force. Regulations for a more stringent regime in
the banning of ships in the Region were adopted. This has resulted in a situation wherein
ships flying the flag of a state appearing on the black list and which have been detained twice
in the preceding 24 months, or fly the flag of a state appearing on the black list and which
has been detained more than once in the last 36 months, will be refused access to the ports
of the Member States.
These consequences, however, are only applicable to tankers carrying gas, chemicals and
passenger ships.
The Paris Memorandum has a frequent dialogue with the flag states. The report is submitted
to the IMO on a yearly basis. There are regular meetings with exchanges of views,
information is provided and complaints are investigated.
Notwithstanding these efforts of all our Member States and our future improvements, it must
be realised that Port State control is not the remedy for all evil, it is not the maritime police,
as has been assumed.
Port State control can never be a substitute for the efforts that should be made by the flag
state with respect to the enforcement of the compliance with adequate standards.
All parties concerned should cooperate with the ultimate aim to put a stop to the operation of
sub-standard shipping. Indeed sub-standard shipping is a sheer disgrace to the whole of the
maritime industry and has done more than enough harm, not only in terms of dollars and
euros, but also in terms of reputation and prestige.
Remercions le Mémorandum de Paris pour son travail : plus les informations circulent, plus
les listes de navires bannis seront connues et moins il y aura de "navires-poubelles" sur les
océans.
Let us thank the Paris Memorandum for its work: the more information circulates, the more
the lists of banished ships will be known and there will be fewer “rust buckets” on the oceans.
Rafael GUTTIEREZ FRAILE,
Constructeurs de Navires
Directeur
Européen
de
la
Chambre
des
Je vais vous parler tout particulièrement des navires.
La sécurité maritime et la protection de l'environnement sont basées sur trois éléments : la
mer, les navires et les personnes.
Les pertes maritimes ont été largement réduites avec le temps. De 1950 à 1980, les pertes
en bâtiments et en tonnage ont représenté respectivement 0,6 % et 0,4 % chaque année,
soit un navire sur 200 perdu par an. Ce furent des années de complaisance et de peu
d'égards pour les problèmes environnementaux. Cette période d'irresponsabilité s'est
achevée à la fin des années 1970, début des années 1980, à la suite de très sérieux
accidents et catastrophes naturelles.
Depuis lors, le taux d'accidents au niveau du transport maritime international a
considérablement baissé, représentant ces dernières années approximativement 0,1 % à
0,2 %. Ainsi, de nos jours, seul un navire sur 500 à 2 000 sombre chaque année.
Cette amélioration marquante s'est réalisée sous la pression sociale, qui s'est révélée
surtout avec une prise de conscience de l'environnement et, c'est triste à dire, dans une
moindre mesure, de la vie humaine. La pression a été renforcée avec le temps et cette
tendance se poursuivra dans les années à venir.
Le seuil de tolérance sociale pour les accidents les plus graves, à la suite du développement
économique, se rapproche du niveau zéro et, par conséquent, les industries maritimes
doivent se préparer à agir dans un environnement à ce niveau de tolérance, comme cela est
pratiqué dans les compagnies aériennes ou dans les industries nucléaires.
Il est heureusement tout à fait possible d'améliorer les niveaux de sécurité maritime. Nous
connaissons les causes et possédons la technologie pour y arriver. Il ne s'agit plus
maintenant que d'une question de décisions et d'emploi des moyens nécessaires à son
application.
On dit souvent que 80 % des accidents maritimes sont dus à l'erreur humaine. Cependant, il
s'agit là d'une généralisation qui dévie notre attention du fait qu'une grande part des
accidents maritimes sont dus à des pannes, non pas du facteur humain, mais des navires et
de leurs équipements.
C'est un fait prouvé que les vieux navires présentent plus de risque d'accidents que les
nouveaux. Un rapport démontre que de 1989 à 1998 le taux d'accidents augmente de
manière exponentielle avec l'âge. Ainsi, un navire récent présente une probabilité de perte
moyenne de 0,03 % alors qu'un navire de 23 ou 24 ans présente un taux de risque vingt fois
plus élevé.
Ces différences importantes ne sont pas dues à l'erreur humaine ; l'élément humain est le
même sur les vieux navires comme sur les nouveaux et les risques de mer sont les mêmes
pour tous. Par conséquent, la différence réside dans le matériel informatique et l'équipement.
Les nouveaux navires sont plus sûrs que les anciens pour deux raisons : d’une part l'âge et
d’autre part parce que les vieux navires deviennent obsolètes.
Les nouveaux navires ne sont pas concernés par certains problèmes liés à l'usure et à la
corrosion. L'usure, en particulier, est un ennemi insidieux car invisible. Le métal s'use
irréversiblement chaque fois qu'il est confronté à une charge cyclique et les structures de
navires travaillent toujours sous des charges cycliques. Les navires ont donc une durée de
vie limitée, y compris en s’assurant une maintenance optimale et une absence de corrosion.
Jusqu'à récemment, l'usure structurale des navires n'était pas un phénomène très bien perçu
et leur conception et construction n'en tenaient pas compte. De récents calculs, effectués
grâce à la technologie moderne, démontrent que plusieurs navires actuellement en service
présentent une durée d'usure ne dépassant pas cinq ans et peu atteignent l'âge de 25 ans,
l'âge courant pour la démolition de navires modernes. Les mêmes effets d'usure s'appliquent
aussi à la machinerie et à l'équipement des navires. Les systèmes de structure des navires
deviennent donc de moins en moins sûrs et efficaces avec le temps.
Tous ces facteurs contribuent à rendre les navires peu sûrs et, après un certain âge, les
navires en service nécessitent une maintenance importante pour remédier aux effets de
l'usure. Même si la structure et la machinerie semblent neuves à l'œil nu, elles ont vieilli.
Dans quelques cas, malheureusement, la maintenance est insuffisante et entraîne des
défaillances catastrophiques et la perte des navires.
Les navires modernes sont également plus sûrs que les anciens car ils sont de meilleure
qualité. Les nostalgiques peuvent penser que les anciens navires sont supérieurs et plus
résistants, mais c’est l'inverse qui est vrai. Les vieux navires sont incapables de répondre
aux exigences spécifiques actuelles de sécurité ; leur niveau de qualité est en dessous des
normes, même s'ils bénéficient d'une maintenance correcte.
Jamais auparavant les navires n'ont été construits avec autant de savoir-faire et de superbes
outils comme ceux utilisés de nos jours. Jamais auparavant la qualité et la sûreté des
matériaux de construction et des systèmes des navires n'ont égalé celles d'aujourd'hui. De
plus, la réglementation n'a jamais été aussi stricte et si bien adaptée aux périls actuels de
mer que maintenant.
Les navires modernes sont mieux conçus à tous points de vue :
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
la connaissance des charges structurales ;
les outils de conception de la structure ;
les outils de conception de l'environnement ;
les armatures métalliques et profilés ;
les matériaux et équipement de soudure ;
les détails de structure et leur alignement ;
la préparation de la surface : peinture, moteurs, machines, systèmes mécaniques et
électroniques.
Selon des méthodes de classification, les fractures structurales sont beaucoup moins
courantes sur des pétroliers modernes que sur ceux construits il y a seulement dix ans. Les
intervalles entre les révisions des systèmes de machinerie et électroniques sont aujourd'hui
beaucoup plus espacés qu'il y a vingt ans, en raison d'une meilleure conception et d’une plus
grande sécurité. Pour chacun des aspects liés à la sécurité, les navires modernes sont
technologiquement supérieurs à leurs compagnons de route plus âgés.
Le renouvellement périodique de la flotte est, par conséquent, une nécessité en vue
d’améliorer la sécurité maritime. Les vieux navires, comme les vieilles voitures,
appartiennent aux musées. Pour rester à la pointe de la technologie et répondre à la
pression sociale, la réglementation doit être actualisée en permanence, assurant ainsi un
niveau de technologie avancée aux nouveaux navires.
La réglementation devra s'assurer que les navires existants soient bien en conformité avec
les nouvelles mesures. La coutume de faire bénéficier les navires existants d'une exemption
aux nouvelles mesures est appelée « grand fathering » dans le monde de la marine et une
telle pratique est contraire à l'objectif d'améliorer la sécurité maritime et la protection
environnementale. Non seulement cela permet à des navires obsolètes de continuer à
commercer, mais c'est aussi une source de concurrence déloyale envers des navires plus
récents, conçus et construits conformément aux normes.
A l'avenir, il sera donc demandé aux navires souhaitant prolonger leur durée de
fonctionnement au-delà de dix ou quinze ans de se conformer aux mêmes règlements que
les nouveaux navires.
Au cours des douze dernières années, on a assisté à une lutte acharnée concernant la
nécessité d'installer des double-coques sur les pétroliers. Grâce au « grand fathering », on
verra encore des pétroliers à coque simple pendant au moins treize à quinze ans, y compris
après les récents amendements de l'OMI. Sans ces amendements, les pétroliers à coque
simple seraient encore restés en service jusqu'en 2026 !
A l'avenir, les pétroliers pourraient être construits avec des systèmes de direction et de
propulsion de rechange, des coques plus résistantes, des réservoirs de cargaison plus
petits, des systèmes de remorquage de cargaison, etc. Les pétroliers géants pourraient et
devraient être construits avec des coques plus résistantes, des franc-bord accrus, des
gaillards d'avant relevés et des double-coques.
Les porte-conteneurs devraient être construits avec des franc-bord plus hauts, avec moins
de conteneurs sur les ponts exposés et, en raison de la puissance énorme de leurs moteurs,
les mesures devraient être augmentées afin de réduire leurs effluents.
Le nombre de transporteurs de combustibles sur mer est en augmentation constante et
pourrait même devenir une menace pour la sécurité. Ils devraient absolument être dotés de
systèmes de direction et de propulsion de rechange, ainsi que de moteurs économes et de
systèmes de réfraction des gaz de charge.
Qui paiera la facture ? Les entreprises du secteur, seules, en sont incapables. Ceux qui
édictent les lois devraient s'assurer que les normes en adéquation avec la pression sociale
soient adoptées et appliquées de manière équitable et uniforme pour tous.
I am going to talk to you specifically about ships.
Marine safety and the protection of the environment are based on three elements: the sea,
the ships and the people.
Marine losses have been reduced greatly over time. From 1950 to 1980, there were 0.6%
vessel losses every year and about 0.4% of vessel tonnage. One ship in every 200 was,
therefore, lost every year. These were the years of complacency and of little regard for
environmental issues, this period of carelessness ended in the late 1970’s and the early
1980’s, following several very serious casualties and environmental disasters.
Since that time there has been continuous improvement in the world’s marine casualty rates,
which are, in recent years, approximately 0.1% to 0.2% meaning that nowadays, only one
ship in 500 or 2000 sinks every year.
It is social pressures that have brought about this marked improvement, pressures arising
mainly from environmental concerns and, it is sad to say, to a lesser extent, concern for
human life. These pressures have become stronger over time and they will continue this
trend for the foreseeable future.
Social tolerance for the more serious incidents in the wake of economic development is
approaching zero and, therefore, the marine industries must prepare themselves for
operation in a zero tolerance environment, such as is found in the airlines or the nuclear
industries.
Fortunately, it is quite possible to improve marine safety levels; we have the knowledge of
the causes and the technology to do the job, it is now only a matter of decisions and of
putting the necessary means to work.
It is often heard that 80% of marine casualties are due to human error. However, this is a
generalisation and deviates our attention from the fact that a very large number of marine
casualties are due to failures, not of the human element, but failures of the ships and their
equipment.
It is a proven fact that old ships suffer many more casualties than new ones. From 1989 to
1998 one report shows that the casualty rate grows exponentially with age; for instance, a
new ship has an average total loss probability of 0.03%, but a ship of 23 or 24 years of age
has a 20 times greater risk.
These huge differences are not due to human error, the human element is similar on new
and old ships and the perils of the sea are the same for all. Therefore, the difference is in the
hardware and the equipment. New ships are much safer than old ships for two reasons: for
aging and because old ships become obsolete.
New ships are free from certain problems related to fatigue and corrosion. Fatigue, in
particular, is an insidious enemy because it is invisible. Metal ages irreversibly every time it
is subject to a cyclic load and ships’ structures always work under cyclic loads. Therefore,
ships have limited lives, even in the absence of corrosion and with optimum maintenance.
Until recently, the structural fatigue of ships was not a very well understood phenomenon and
ships were designed and built without regard to this. Recent calculations, only possible
thanks to modern technology, demonstrate that many ships currently in service have fatigue
lives as short as 5 years and few reach the age of 25 years, the current age for destruction of
modern ships. The same effects of fatigue also apply to the ships’ machinery and
equipment. Consequently, the ships’ structural systems become less and less reliable and
efficient as time passes.
All these factors contribute to making all ships unsafe and after a certain age, ships in
service require substantial maintenance to remedy the effects of fatigue, even if the
structures and machinery appear new to the naked eye, they are old.
In some cases, unfortunately, maintenance is insufficient and the results are the catastrophic
failures and ship losses.
Modern ships are also safer than older ships because they are better. Old romantics may
believe that the older ships were better and stronger, but the opposite is true. Old ships are
unable to meet the exacting safety requirements of today, they become sub-standard even
when they receive proper maintenance.
Ships have never before been built with such great know-how and the superb tools which we
have today. Never before has today’s quality and reliability of ship building materials and
systems ever been matched. Furthermore, the regulations have never before been so tight
or so well adapted to the actual perils of the sea.
Everything is better in modern ships:
• The knowledge of the structural loads,
• The structural design tools,
• The environmental design tools,
• The steel plates and profiles,
• The welding materials and welding machines,
• The structural details and their alignment,
Surface preparation: painting, engines, machines, mechanical and electronic systems.
According to classification methods, structural fractures are far less common on modern
tankers than in those built only 10 years ago. Time intervals for overhauls in the machinery
and electronic systems today are several times longer than 20 years ago, due to better
design and higher reliability. In every aspect related to safety, modern ships are
technologically superior to their older companions.
The periodical renewal of the fleet is, consequently, a necessity in order to improve marine
safety. Old ships, like old cars, belong in museums. In order to keep abreast of technology
and social demands, regulations must be continuously updated and this will ensure that new
ships are state of the art.
Regulations shall require that existing ships are not exempt from compliance with the new
rules. The custom of granting permanent exemption from new regulations to the existing
ships is called ‘grand fathering’ in the marine business and such practice is contrary to the
goal of improving marine safety and environmental protection. Not only does this allow
obsolete ships to continue trading, but also it is a source of unfair competition against newer
ships that are designed and built to more exacting standards.
Therefore, in the future, ships intending to extend their operating lives beyond 10 or 15 years
should be required to adapt to exactly the same regulations as new ones.
In the last 12 years, there has been an uphill struggle for the implementation of double-hull
requirements for tankers. Thanks to ‘grand fathering’, we will see single hull tankers for at
least another 13 to 15 years, even after the recent IMO amendments. Furthermore, without
these amendments, single hull tankers would have stayed in service until the year 2026!
In the future, tankers could be built with duplicated and redundant propulsion and steering
machinery, with stronger hulls, with smaller cargo tanks, with cargo recovery systems etc.
Bulkers could and should be built with stronger hulls, with increased freeboard, with a raised
fore castle and with double hulls.
Container ships should be built with higher freeboards, fewer containers on the exposed
decks and, given the enormous power of their engines, they should maximise measures to
reduce their emissions.
The number of energy carriers on the seas is increasing and may eventually become a threat
to safety. These should definitely be built with duplicated and redundant propulsion and
steering, as well as with fuel-efficient engines and cargo vapour refraction systems.
Who will pay for all of this? Market forces alone cannot achieve this; regulators should
ensure that the standards adequate to the social demands are adopted and applied fairly and
uniformly for all.
Merci pour vos propositions et pour cet exposé.
Jacques LOISEAU est un praticien. Il a navigué sur des bateaux neufs ou plus anciens.
Quelle synthèse faites-vous des débats de cette matinée ?
Thank you for your proposals and for that report.
Jacques LOISEAU is a practitioner. He has navigated on new and older boats. How would
you summarise this morning’s debates ?
Jacques LOISEAU - AFCAN
J'ai noté le fait que Monsieur BERTRAM a immédiatement mis en avant le facteur humain,
faisant remarquer que les gens s'adaptaient aux navires. On fabrique effectivement des
bateaux qui sont plus sûrs, mais les armateurs profitent des avancées technologiques pour
réduire les équipages, qui se reposent un peu, au sens propre comme au sens figuré, sur la
fiabilité de ces navires. Il n'est donc pas certain que la navigation soit plus sûre.
Nous avons pu, hier, être convaincus que les catastrophes maritimes, lorsqu'elles sont bien
médiatisées, peuvent être à l'origine de l'amélioration de la sécurité maritime. Mais
fréquemment, des décisions sont prises dans la précipitation, sans étude approfondie des
conséquences à long terme. Les marins sont rarement associés à la conception ou à la
construction des navires, la maintenance est le plus souvent réduite au minimum. Les
contrôles sont nécessaires et doivent être effectués par de vrais professionnels. Si un
commandant n'est pas convaincu que le contrôle est effectué pour son bien, c'est que
l'inspecteur n'a pas bien fait son travail.
Nous n'avons pas encore assisté à l'ensemble des possibilités de catastrophes maritime en
termes de pertes de vies humaines ou de conséquences écologiques. Imaginons le porteconteneurs chargé de 12 000 boîtes que des armateurs veulent construire venir s'échouer
sur la côte ! Imaginons, à la place de l'Amoco Cadiz, un bâtiment de 75 000 m3 chargé de
propane : que seraient devenues alors la population et la vie côtière ? Imaginons l'abordage
loin des côtes d'un transport de passagers par un transport de gaz ! Certains constructeurs
imaginent déjà des paquebots emportant 10 000 passagers… N'oublions pas que tout navire
peut devenir abordeur et être à l'origine de catastrophes. Pourquoi donc les administrations
acceptent-elles des effectifs si squelettiques et donc les risques corollaires ?
J'égrène cette liste apocalyptique pour que se posent les vraies questions. Les décideurs et
les organismes de protection et de sauvetage sont-ils prêts à affronter de tels désastres ?
Chaque accident semble encore aujourd'hui surprendre. Se donnera-t-on les moyens de
lutter contre la course au gigantisme ?
La prévention passe par la formation, et la convention STCW 95 doit être strictement
appliquée. Les règles doivent être identiques pour tous. Une formation adéquate signifie une
meilleure qualité des équipages et donc de leur travail.
A-t-on fait le nécessaire pour la qualité de vie des marins, pour la qualité des navires et du
traitement de leurs effluents ?
En juillet 2002, le code ISM sera obligatoire sur tous les navires. Depuis le 11 septembre, les
armateurs, les navigateurs et surtout les autorités doivent envisager la présence de
terroristes sur les navires et continuer de travailler contre les pirates dont les méfaits ne
cessent d'augmenter.
I noted the fact that Mr BERTRAM immediately brought the human factor to the fore,
remarking that people adapted to ships. We really do make safer boats, but the owners
profit from the technological advances to reduce the crews, who depend a little, in the real as
well as the figurative sense, on the reliability of these ships. It is not, therefore, certain that
navigation is safer.
Yesterday, we could be convinced that maritime disasters, when they are given good media
coverage, can be at the root of improvement in maritime safety. However, frequently,
decisions are made in haste, without in-depth study of the long-term consequences.
Seamen are rarely associated with the design or construction of ships, and maintenance is
most often reduced to a minimum. Inspections are necessary and must be carried out by
true professionals. If a captain is not convinced that the inspection is carried out for his own
good, then the inspector has not done his job properly.
We have not yet looked at the whole potential of maritime disasters in terms of loss of human
life or ecological consequences. Imagine the container ships, that some owners want to
build, loaded with 12,000 container units running aground on the coast! Imagine, instead of
the Amoco Cadiz, a 75,000m³ vessel loaded with propane: what would become of the
population and costal life then? Imagine the collision, far from the coast, of a passenger
carrier with a gas carrier! Some builders are already considering liners able to carry up to
10,000 passengers… Not forgetting that any ship can collide and cause a disaster. So why
do the authorities accept these skeleton crews and thus the corollary risks?
I draw up this apocalyptic list in order that the real questions may be asked. Are those who
decide and the protection and safety organisations ready to confront such disasters? Each
incident today still seems to cause surprise. Will we be given the means to fight against the
course of gigantism?
Prevention comes through training, and the STCWS 95 (Standards for Training Certification
and Watch keeping for Seafarers) convention must be strictly applied. The rules must be
identical for everyone. Adequate training means better quality crews and thus better work
carried out.
Have we done the necessary for seamen’s quality of life, for the quality of ships and the
treatment of their effluents?
In July 2002, the ISM code will be compulsory for all ships. Since 11th September, owners,
navigators, and especially the authorities, must consider the presence of terrorists on ships
and continue to work against pirates whose misdeeds continue to rise.
Débat avec le public
Jean-Paul DECLERCQ, responsable de la Commission Mer et Littoral – les Verts
Je voudrais intervenir concernant la formation des capitaines relativement à l'environnement.
Je distinguerai les règlements et la sensibilisation.
La réglementation est en général connue à bord des navires, mais comment est-elle
comprise ? Un équipage peut connaître les règlements, mais penser que cela ne concerne
que les inspecteurs, étant donné la manière dont les marins doivent travailler à bord ! La
réglementation devient ainsi faite uniquement pour remplir des rapports.
Le Commandant CLADEN nous parlait de la possibilité de transmettre les manifestes des
navires en cas d'accident. Mais ces manifestes sont fréquemment absents alors même que
les navires quittent le port ! Les capitaines ne savent pas ce que contiennent les conteneurs,
toutes les marchandises dangereuses ne sont pas déclarées par les chargeurs…
I would like to make a point concerning the training of captains relative to the environment. I
will distinguish between regulations and raising awareness.
The regulations are known in general on board ships, but how are they understood? A crew
can know the regulations, but think they only affect the inspectors, given the way in which
seamen have to work on board! The regulations have therefore been made like that, just in
order to fill in reports.
Captain CLADEN spoke to us about the possibility of transmitting the ships’ manifests in the
case of accidents. Yet these manifests are frequently absent even as the ships leave port!
The captains do not know what is in the containers, not all dangerous merchandise is
declared by the loaders…
Erik RANHEIM
Je suis surpris par les propos de M. GUTIERREZ-FRAILE. Nous ne pouvons pas
simplement faire l'éloge des nouveaux navires. L'Amoco Cadiz était un navire récent et le
Torry Canyon un navire relativement récent. Vraiment, la plus grande catastrophe
écologique de l'année dernière a été causée par un navire à double coque ultra moderne !
Listening to Mr GUTIERREZ-FRAILE, I am amazed. We cannot just have and praise new
ships, the Amoco Cadiz was a new ship, and the Torry Canyon was a relatively new ship.
Indeed, the biggest pollution accident of last year was with a brand new double hull ship!
Volker BERTRAM
Je suis d'accord. On ne doit pas tenir compte uniquement de l'âge, mais considérer
également la condition du navire. Toutefois, il existe des moyens de compenser les
imperfections naturelles des vieux navires, qui ne sont pas mis en place.
En effet, des recherches ont abouti à comprendre qu'une petite pièce de métal attachée à la
structure s'usait plus rapidement que la structure elle-même. Après environ 80 % de la durée
de vie de la structure principale, cette pièce aura vraiment disparu ; c’est un signe révélateur
de l'attention qui doit être portée à la structure principale.
I agree; aspects should not just be kept on an age level but also on a condition level.
However, there are means of compensating for the natural shortcomings of older ships,
which are not implemented.
In fact, research has come up with a small piece of metal that can be attached to structures,
and which ages and fatigues faster than the actual structure. Indeed after about 80% of the
life span of the main structure, this piece will have disappeared and this is an indication that
attention needs to be given to the main structure.
Rafael GUTIERREZ FRAILE
Comme indiqué dans le Rapport annuel de l'Association internationale des Assurances
maritimes, on constate une augmentation importante en perte totale de navires à mesure
qu'ils vieillissent. C'est un fait de la vie et c'est ce qui se produit en mer.
As reported in the Annual Report of the International Underwriting Association, there is a
tremendous increase in total losses of ships as age increases. This is a fact of life and is
what is happening at sea.
Vous avez raison. Si la maintenance est sérieuse, le bateau peut durer vingt ans, vingt cinq
ans : l’Abeille Flandre a vingt ans et c’est toujours un très bon bateau.
You are right. If carefully maintained, a boat can last for 20 or 25 years – the Abeille Flandre,
at the age of 20, is still a very good boat.
Nikos MIKELIS
Comme pour une voiture, la valeur d'un bateau décroît avec l'âge. Il est très facile de démolir
une voiture à la suite d’une simple collision, et la même chose se produit avec les bateaux.
Lorsque leur valeur assurée est très faible, ils sont tout simplement bons pour la casse, et
c'est trompeur.
The value of the ship, like a car, decreases with age. It is very easy to write-off a car after
just one small collision and the same thing happens with ships. When their insurance value
is very low, they are simply written off and that is misleading.
Charlotte NITHART, association Robin des Bois
Y a-t-il actuellement des discussions pour élargir la présence des pays membres au
Mémorandum de Paris ? Des navires bannis par cet organisme changent de nom au-delà du
Canal de Suez pour repartir vers de nouvelles aventures, mettant en péril les marins et la
sécurité de la navigation et de l'environnement.
Y a-t-il par ailleurs des discussions au niveau de l'Europe du Nord au sens large pour mettre
en place un chantier de démolition qui empêcherait le départ de tels navires ?
Are there discussions under way for increasing the number of member countries to the Paris
Memorandum ? Ships banished by this organisation change their name after they go
through the Suez Canal and leave for new adventures, putting the sailors, navigation safety
and the environment in peril.
Furthermore, are there discussions at the Northern European level, broadly speaking, to set
up a demolition site which would prevent the departure of such ships ?
Michael VOOGEL
Pour le moment, c'est dans les intentions de l'OMI, mais pas du Mémorandum de Paris. Si
un navire s'éclipse d'un port du Mémorandum de Paris, il sera automatiquement banni car,
même s'il change de nom, son numéro OMI restera le même.
Concernant l'autre question au sujet de la démolition, l'OMI procède actuellement à la
coordination du Mémorandum au niveau mondial.
This is the intention of the IMO, but not of the Paris Memorandum at the moment.
If a ship sneaks out of a port of the Paris Memorandum, it will automatically be banned from
returning because even if the name is changed, there is still the IMO number.
Regarding the other question on demolition, IMO is currently coordinating the worldwide
memorandum.
Philippe CROZON, CFDT, représentant IFT, International Transportworkers Federation,
syndicat international des travailleurs du transport
Les pavillons de complaisance sont issus de l'économie occidentale. Les navires concernés
sont en général revendus par des pavillons "blancs", par souci de commodité.
Flags of convenience derive from the western economy. The ships concerned are generally
re-sold by “white” flags, out of concern for convenience.
Gilles DENIGUE, Conseil municipal à Saint- Nazaire, Responsable du syndicat des
Dockers
Que pensent les spécialistes ici présents des niveaux de recherches des fameux pétroliers
3E ?
What do the specialists, here today, think of the level of research on the famous 3E
tankers?
Volker BERTRAM
La seule façon de renforcer la sécurité, c'est de la rendre attrayante aux banquiers ; cela
signifie que nous devons proposer des incitations financières plutôt que des règlements. Les
hommes de loi élaborent les règlements, mais ils seraient avisés de se tenir informés des
procédés techniques.
Des porte-conteneurs géants sont en cours de conception, comportant des unités de
tonnage de 10 000 tonnes. Les réservoirs à combustible pour ces porte-conteneurs
renferment plus de combustible que celui déversé par l'Erika. Il n'existe pas de
réglementation en termes de double protection dans ce cas.
The only way to increase safety is by making this interesting for bankers, which means that
we must give some sort of financial incentive, rather than having regulations. Lawyers make
the regulations, but they may take time to keep up with technical processes.
Jumbo container vessels are under design, which hold 10,000 container units. The fuel
tanks for these container vessels contain more fuel than the Erika spill. There are no
regulations in terms of double protection relating to this.
Jean-Paul HELLEQUIN, CGT des Marins de Brest
Nous parlions de l'âge des navires… l'Abeille Flandre a 25 ans et reste un bon navire, parce
que l'armateur a choisi de faire du pavillon national, alors que la France a aussi son pavillon
"de complaisance" : le pavillon de Kerguelen.
Il faut par ailleurs distinguer les navires-poubelles d'une part et les navires qui subissent
l'effet du sous-effectif d'autre part.
We spoke of the age of ships. The Abeille Flandre is 25 years old and is still a good ship,
because the owner has chosen to sail under the national flag, even though France also has
its flag of convenience: the Kerguelen flag.
We must therefore, moreover, distinguish between the “rust buckets” on the one hand and
ships which suffer from the effects of under-manning on the other.
Mohamed ELJILANI
Je viens d'une compagnie maritime internationale basée en Arabie Saoudite.
Un navire respectant l'environnement est un navire de qualité, indépendamment de son état
ou de son âge.
Si les armateurs se conforment à la réglementation internationale et aux règlements, nous
aurons des navires de qualité. Les double-coques pourraient poser problème à la longue. Il
ne s’agit réellement que de mesures préventives visant à éviter toute catastrophe lors d'un
échouage ou d’une collision. Elles ne sont pas en soi une protection écologique ; elles
n'empêcheront pas les incendies ou les explosions sur les pétroliers.
I am from an international marine company in Saudi Arabia.
An environmentally friendly ship is a quality ship, regardless of its status or age.
If the ship owner complies with the international rules and regulations, we will have quality
ships. Double hull problems have yet to be discovered in the future. Indeed, double hulls
are only preventive measures to avoid incidents during grounding or collision; they are not, in
themselves, environmentally friendly, they will not prevent fires or explosions on tankers.
Nikos MIKELIS
Nous sommes nombreux à nous sentir concernés par les problèmes de pollution
environnementale, mais très peu à prêter attention à l'annexe 6 de la convention pour la lutte
contre les pollutions (MARPOL). Elle a été débattue et élaborée, et les années ont passé,
mais les pays ne l'ont pas ratifiée. C'est pourquoi des organisations comme la nôtre se sont
créées pour tenter de faire du lobbying auprès des gouvernements afin que l'annexe 6 ait
force de loi.
De plus, jusqu'à présent, on ne s'est pas intéressé au problème des effluents, qui représente
l'autre moitié des problèmes de pollution.
There are many people concerned with environmental pollution, but very little attention has
been paid to Annex 6 of MARPOL. This has been discussed and formulated and the years
pass, but countries are not ratifying this. This results in organisations such as ourselves,
having to lobby governments in order to make Annex 6 the law.
Furthermore, so far there has been no interest shown on the subject of emissions, which is
the other half of the pollution topic.
Wilhelm MAGELSSEN
Je suis d'accord sur le fait que notre objectif vis à une navigation de qualité, et c'est
essentiel.
Pour un navire à coque double, la maintenance représenterait la question majeure,
concernant une surface exposée à l'eau de mer 2,5 fois supérieure à celle d'un navire à
coque simple.
La surface couverte équivaut à 50 000 mètres carrés, soit la taille de quarante terrains de
football. Si elle n'est pas bien protégée, l'armateur comme les sociétés de classification
seront confrontés à des problèmes dans les années à venir.
I agree that we are aiming for quality shipping and that is quite essential.
For a double hull ship, maintenance would be the major question and concerns an area that
is exposed to seawater 2.5 times greater than that of single hull ships.
Indeed, the area covered is the equivalent of 50,000 square meters, about the size of 40
football grounds and if this is not well protected, both the owner and the class societies will
face problems in the future.
Nous allons interrompre là notre débat, pour nous retrouver ensuite, afin de visionner un film
sur le naufrage de l'Erika.
We are going to interrupt our debate here in order to watch a film on the wreck of the Erika,
and we will meet up again afterwards.
Table ronde N°4
Replacer l'équipage au centre de l'approche de sécurité
Putting the crew back at the centre of the approach to safety
Il me semble que Hervé HAMON, l'auteur du film que nous venons de visionner, cite en
exergue d'un de ses ouvrages une phrase de Victor HUGO : "La mer est un espace de
liberté et de responsabilité". Cette phrase est parfaitement bienvenue pour introduire cette
troisième table ronde pour laquelle nous allons tout d'abord entendre Madame Martha
GRABOWSKI.
I think that Hervé HAMON, the author of the film we have just seen, quotes in epigraph a
phrase from one of the works of Victor Hugo: “The sea is a space of liberty and of
responsibility”. This phrase is perfectly fitting to introduce this fourth round table, where we
are going to hear from Mrs Martha GRABOWSKI, first of all.
Martha
GRABOWSKI,
Directrice
du
département
Systèmes
de
l'information&Recherche, Professeur en Sciences de la décision, New York,
Etats Unis.
Je voudrais vous parler du Pont Intelligent reliant l'aide à la navigation et l'élément humain.
La propension de risque dans les systèmes à grande échelle, dont le transport, provient de
plusieurs facteurs. L'un de ces facteurs concerne les tâches du système, qui sont une cause
de risque. Elles sont réparties au niveau d'une surface géographique étendue et sont
critiques en termes de temps.
La technologie à la base du système est également une source de risque. L'erreur humaine
et organisationnelle est présente dans le système, qui limite la surveillance physique et rend
difficile l'évaluation du risque et l'identification des chaînes d'erreur dominantes dans les
stratégies de risque. De plus, notre culture organisationnelle des systèmes peut envoyer des
messages confus ou contradictoires au sujet de l'importance de la sécurité et de la tolérance
de risque.
Les nouvelles technologies sont souvent prescrites comme un antidote au risque. Les gens
installent ces nouvelles technologies sous la promesse de réduction de coûts et/ou la
possibilité de faire face à des volumes de travail plus importants dans des conditions
différentes. Cependant, l'introduction de la technologie dans les systèmes de transport
maritime présente certaines faiblesses introduisant de nouvelles formes d'erreurs dans le
système.
Un exemple d'application de la technologie visant à limiter les risques ou stratégies qui
pourraient avoir un impact plus important serait d'introduire le Pont Intelligent sur les navires
Exxon et le transport par pipelines de la Trans-Alaska, mis en place il y a environ cinq ans.
L'un de nos projets de recherche concernait le développement de ce Pont Intelligent, sa
construction, son déploiement et ensuite son évaluation sur une période de trois ans.
Des contrôles supplémentaires sont réalisés de chaque côté de l'axe d'affichage pour la
direction. L'architecture comprend plusieurs capteurs et microprocesseurs système.
L'affichage est largement pris en charge par le graphique électronique sur lequel le balayage
radar apparaît, les informations sur l'état du système défilent et le Pont Intelligent fournit les
directives de conduite du navire aux officiers.
Le point important, cependant, concerne l'impact d'évaluation de la technologie mené après
l'introduction du Pont Intelligent : son impact sur les gens l'utilisant, sur le système au sein
duquel elle est déployée et au niveau du pont du navire.
Pendant une période de trois ans, suivant le développement du système, nous avons évalué
la sûreté de l'impact de celui-ci sur le navire, l'équipage et le système de transport maritime
du ‘Prince William Sound’.
Globalement, le déploiement du Pont Intelligent améliore les performances générales de
l'équipe de surveillance du pont, augmentant la prise de décision, affinant la précision et
permettant une plus grande participation et communication.
Le capitaine et le pilote ont mieux profité du système, ayant en charge des tâches d'un
niveau de connaissances plus élevé concernant les opérations de navigation. Ils ont
grandement apprécié l'affichage devant le pont fournissant les directives en temps réel pour
l'environnement externe, la conduite du navire, et traduisant ce qui est indiqué sur
l'affichage.
Cependant, le troisième homme de quart a exprimé un grand sentiment de frustration et de
tension psychologique car, en plus de ses nombreuses tâches habituelles (responsabilités
de télégraphie d'ordres moteur, fixation des amarres, fermeture des portes étanches,
immobilisation des calots, éclairage, appels de garde, appels téléphoniques et
communication des ordres de direction), il a également été encouragé à participer et à
communiquer dans la conduite du navire sur voie navigable.
Il faut retenir au moins deux leçons de ceci :
Tout d'abord, lorsque nous intégrons la technologie dans tout système à grande échelle,
nous devons soigneusement considérer l'impact de cette technologie, non seulement sur les
utilisateurs, mais aussi sur tous les membres composant ce système de sécurité critique.
Non seulement le troisième homme a vu sa situation empirer, mais les tâches du capitaine et
du pilote ont changé et occasionné un surcroît de possibilités d'erreur humaine et
d'organisation.
Du point de vue de la limitation du risque, il est important de comprendre le rôle de la
technologie et de son interaction avec les hommes, les structures et la culture
organisationnelles et les tâches réalisées au sein de ce système.
Nous devons être très attentifs aux différents rôles joués par ces éléments du système. Nous
devons comprendre ce qui se passe lorsqu'on introduit une stratégie de limitation de risque
dans l’un des éléments du système et les interactions qui viennent s'ajouter aux autres
éléments de celui-ci si nous voulons le gérer comme un système et pas simplement
solutionner des cas ponctuels éparpillés aux quatre coins de ce système spécifique.
My topic is navigational aids and the human element, the Intelligent Bridge.
Risk propensity in large-scale systems including transportation stems from a number of
factors. One of these factors is that tasks in the system are a cause of risk. They are
distributed across a wide geographical area and are time critical.
Technology used in the system is also a source of risk. Human and organisational error is
present in the system, which limit physical oversight, and make risk litigation and the
identification of leading error chains in risk strategies difficult. In addition, our systems’
organisational culture can send out confusing or contradictory messages about the
importance of safety and risk tolerance.
New technology is often prescribed as an antidote to risk. People implement new technology
following promises of reduced costs and, or, the ability to cope with greater amounts of work
under different conditions. However, technology introduction to marine transportation
systems presents a number of downfalls in which new error forms are introduced into the
system.
An example of technology in mitigating risk or strategies that may have a broader impact
would be the introduction of the ‘Intelligent Bridge’ aboard Exxon vessels and the TransAlaskan pipeline trade, which occurred about 5 years ago. One of our research projects was
to develop this Intelligent Bridge for Exxon, build it, deploy it and then evaluate it for a period
of 3 years.
There are redundant controls on either side of the centre line display for steering; the
architecture includes a variety of system sensors and processors. The display is largely
taken up by the electronic chart, upon which radar overlay appears, system status
information runs across and the Intelligent Bridge provides the recommendations of vessel
conduct to the ship’s officers.
The important point, however, is the impact evaluation of the technology conducted after
introduction of the Intelligent Bridge; its impact on the people using this, on the system within
which it is deployed and aboard the bridge of the ship.
For a period of 3 years, following the development of the system we evaluated the safety of
the impact of this system on the vessel, the crew and the marine transportation system in
Prince William Sound.
Taken as an aggregate, the deployment of the Intelligent Bridge enhanced the performance
of the bridge watch team as a whole; leading to greater decision-making, better accuracy,
more participation and more communication.
The captain and the pilot benefited most from the system, charged with higher level cognitive
tasks in the navigation of the vessel, they greatly appreciate the display at the front of the
bridge providing recommendations in real time for the outside picture, the conduct of the
vessel and conversing about what the display is showing.
However, the third man on watch expressed great frustration and psychological tension
because, in conjunction with his many usual tasks: engine order telegraph responsibilities,
tugs fastened, watertight doors closed, scuppers secured, lights on, watch called, telephones
answered and steering commands communicated, he was also encouraged to participate
and communicate in the conduct of the vessel in the waterway.
There are at least two lessons that can be learnt from this:
Firstly, when we introduce technology in any large-scale system, we must carefully consider
the impact of that technology not only on the users, but also on all members of the safety
critical system. Not only was the third mate’s life worsened, but the tasks of the captain and
pilot changed and there were opportunities for new human and organisational errors to be
made.
From a risk mitigation point of view, it is important to understand the role of technology and
its interactions with people, organisational structures, and organisational culture and with the
tasks performed in that system.
We must be attentive to the different roles played by these elements of the system; we must
understand what happens when one introduces a risk mitigation strategy in one element of
the system and the interactions that accrue in the other elements of the system, if we are to
manage the system as a system and not simply administer single point solutions in each of
the corners of this particular system.
Merci beaucoup, Madame, pour cet apport novateur sur les plans sociologiques et
techniques.
Nous allons entendre maintenant Messieurs VAN WIJNEN et MAC DONALD.
Thank you very much for that innovative contribution on the sociological and technical level.
We are now going to hear from Mr VAN WIJNEN and Mr McDONALD.
Frederic VAN WIJNEN, General Secretary of CESMA, Confederation of European
ShipMasters Associations, NETHERLANDS
Je suis un capitaine de navire gros porteur à la retraite et secrétaire général de la
Confédération européenne des Associations de Capitaines de navires et vice-président de
l'Association hollandaise des capitaines.
J'aimerais intervenir sur l'élément humain dans le transport maritime…
I am a retired shipmaster of big container ships and General Secretary of the European
Confederation of Ship Masters Associations and Vice President of the Dutch Captains’
Association.
I would like to talk about the human element in maritime transport …
Rodger MacDONALD, Secrétaire Général de l'IFSMA, Fédération Internationale
des Associations de Capitaines de navires, Londres, R.-U.
Les nouvelles exigences s'appliquant au système d'identification automatique (AIS) des
navires sont un exemple où l’on impose la technologie aux capitaines sans recherche
adéquate. Malheureusement, j'ai maintenant appris que nombre d'entre eux considèrent le
système d'identification automatique comme une alternative au radar, ce qui est dangereux.
Le radar reste, et restera, le système électronique fondamental pour éviter les collisions. Le
capitaine et les hommes de quart ont confiance en ses informations car il les transmet à
partir du navire et ne dépend pas de sources tierces. Ceux qui l'utilisent sont compétents et
le suivi d'enregistrement est sûr. Son affichage dépouillé offre la réalité de base de toutes les
cibles relatives au navire.
Toutefois, le système AIS dépend de sources externes telles que le GPS et le BHO. Il
n'indiquera pas chaque navire car il s'applique uniquement à un certain tonnage et le
capitaine est libre de l'éteindre s'il le souhaite. Il ne montre certainement pas les dangers non
cartographiés, tels que les icebergs, et il affiche beaucoup trop d'informations superflues.
Entre juillet 2002 et juin 2008, tous les navires seront équipés du système d'identification
automatique. Les Etats-Unis, via l'OMI, cherchent à ramener cette période à quatre ans pour
des raisons de sécurité. Cependant, la plupart des marins n'en voient pas le bénéfice ; aucun
accord n'a été signé et, par conséquent, aucune formation n'a ou ne peut être prise en
compte pour l'appliquer. Ce manque de formation conduit aux collisions et l'utilisation
de la VHF afin de se soustraire à la réglementation concernant les collisions est une
procédure très hasardeuse.
L'assistance électronique qui, d'un navire à un autre, a apporté des changements, nécessite
à bord une familiarisation et une formation lorsque l'officier assume une nouvelle fonction.
Nombre de marins pensent maintenant qu'une remise à niveau devrait être obligatoire pour
tous les systèmes d'assistance électronique. La normalisation de cette assistance aurait un
impact important sur la formation des marins.
Il est également important de noter que les changements technologiques apportés aux
navires modernes ne se reflètent pas sur les cours à terre. Si l'on considère la formation
maritime en général, les amendements de 1995 à la convention pour la formation des
équipages (STCWS) de 1978 avaient introduit le principe de compétences basées sur la
formation, l'évaluation et la certification.
Le lieu de travail est le meilleur endroit pour former et évaluer les compétences. Par
conséquent, un nouveau concept serait d'accentuer la formation en mer. Les chirurgiens
forment les étudiants en médecine dans les hôpitaux. Nous devrions utiliser les marins en
mer pour renforcer la formation des hommes à bord. C'est toutefois actuellement irréalisable
en raison de la réduction des effectifs sur les navires.
La formation à bord serait financièrement avantageuse. Du point de vue d'un armateur, cela
réduirait considérablement le temps d'études nécessaire dans les écoles à terre. Les
économies réalisées permettraient d'embaucher des officiers formateurs à bord des navires,
aptes à diriger un groupe de stagiaires, et cela éviterait la mise en place d'un programme
chargé à l'école navale.
Surtout, du point de vue d'un capitaine, la formation complémentaire d'officiers compétents à
bord lui offrirait l'occasion d'être secondé par un officier supplémentaire en cas de fatigue, si
nécessaire.
Ceux assurant la formation devraient posséder les compétences nécessaires pour l'assumer
et une façon d'y arriver serait d'inclure une « formation formateurs » dans le programme de
cours aux niveaux d'encadrement pour la certification pont et salle des machines.
On constate plusieurs approches différentes de pays d'horizons variés concernant le niveau
de certification. Pour un capitaine, cela rend la comparaison difficile. Une formation standard
à bord faciliterait peut-être les choses.
Pour conclure, je pense qu'il reste encore beaucoup à faire en matière de recherche
concernant la manière d'afficher les informations avec l'assistance électronique afin que des
données inutiles ne viennent pas les perturber et, en fin de compte, augmenter la fatigue. Un
cours de remise à niveau est essentiel pour toutes les nouvelles technologies. La formation à
bord est rentable et devrait contribuer à résoudre les problèmes de fatigue.
The new requirement for AIS to be fitted to ships is one example where technology is being
forced on the shipmaster without adequate research. Unfortunately, I have now heard that
many are considering AIS as an alternative to radar and this is dangerous thinking.
Radar remains, and will remain, the primary electronic system for collision avoidance. The
master and watch keepers have confidence in its information, because its operation is ship
based, it is not reliant on third party sources, its users are skilled and it has a proven track
record, its uncluttered display offers the basic reality of all targets relative to the ship.
AIS, however, relies on external sources such as GPS and BHO, it will not indicate every
vessel, as it only applies to certain tonnage and the master is at liberty to turn it off if he
wishes. It certainly does not show uncharted dangers, such as icebergs, and it gives out too
much unnecessary information.
Between July 2002 and June 2008, ships will be fitted with AIS. The USA is seeking,
through IMO, to reduce this period to 4 years for security reasons. However, most seafarers
cannot see its benefit, there has been no approval, therefore no training can or has been
considered for its use. Indeed, lack of training leads to collisions and using VHF to
circumvent the collision regulations is a very dangerous procedure.
The electronic aids that have provided changes from ship to ship require on board
familiarisation and training as the officer takes up a new appointment. Most seafarers now
believe that refresher training should be mandatory for all electronic aids. Standardisation of
these aids would have an important impact on the training of seafarers.
It is also important to consider that the change in technology provided in modern ships may
not be reflected in the classrooms ashore. Considering maritime training in general, the
1995 amendments to STCW convention of 1978, introduced the principle of competency
based training, assessment and certification.
The work place is the best place to train and assess competence; therefore a new concept
would be to put more emphasis on training at sea. Surgeons train the new medical students
in the hospitals; we should use the seafarers at sea to carry out more training of the people
on board. This is currently impossible because of the reduced manning on ships.
There is financial benefit to be gained from onboard training; from a ship owner’s point of
view, this would considerably reduce the time required to study in colleges ashore. The
savings generated could place training officers on board the ships, who are equipped to lead
a group of trainees and eliminating the tight scheduling in the college timetable.
Above all, from a ship masters point of view, the additional competent officers training on
board would give the master the opportunity to use a further officer when needed, in times of
fatigue.
Those providing the training should receive the necessary skills to do so and one way to do
this would be to include the training provision in the syllabus at management levels for deck
and engine room certification, within a ‘training the trainer’ course.
One finds many different approaches taken by differing countries concerning the quality of
certification. For a shipmaster, this makes comparison difficult; perhaps standardised
training on board ship could help.
By way of conclusion, I believe that considerable research is still necessary concerning how
electronic aids display information, so that unnecessary data does not add to distraction and,
ultimately, to fatigue. A training refresher course is essential for all new technology. On
board training is cost effective and should help reduce fatigue problems.
Merci Monsieur MAC DONALD pour cet exposé du point de vue des praticiens, ceux qui sont
à la jointure de la technologie et de la conduite.
La parole est maintenant à Monsieur Tony LANE.
Thank you Mr McDONALD for that account from the point of view of the practitioners, those
who are at the point where technology and skills meet.
Mr Tony LANE will speak now.
Tony LANE, Directeur du SIRC, Centre international de recherches pour les
droits des Marins, Cardiff, RU.
A l'université de Cardiff, je suis entouré d'une équipe de dix scientifiques de six nationalités,
dont le travail est entièrement focalisé sur les aspects du travail des marins : emploi, santé,
sécurité, fatigue, marché de l'emploi et économie politique des marchés de l'emploi, dont je
vais précisément vous entretenir.
Je vais vous parler du terme réglementation ; non pas du terme utilisé dans l'industrie de
transport maritime, mais de celui emprunté à la science politique, où il a un sens bien
particulier.
Dans ce contexte, la réglementation se réfère aux réseaux d'institutions et d'organisations
qui cherchent à négocier un système consensuel de lois, de règles et de pratiques en usage.
La réglementation présuppose un Etat administrativement compétent dont les rouages sont
supervisés par des agences professionnelles et impartiales dans l’objet de maintenir des
procédures consultatives ad hoc et permanentes prévues pour la participation de
représentants de toutes les parties intéressées.
C'est le genre de système qui semblerait avoir été utilisé par les nations pratiquant la
navigation maritime traditionnelle dans les années 70 : structures juridiques, registres
spécifiques et contrôlés des marins, normes des compétences techniques, sécurité navale,
discipline de travail, complaisance minimale, engagement et congé des équipages, formation
et entraînement fournis par l'Etat, avec des institutions gouvernementales de représentants
de toutes les parties intéressées. Enfin, les conditions d'emploi ainsi que l'engagement et le
congé des équipages étaient contrôlés par des agences appliquant la loi convenue entre les
parties des armateurs et des marins.
Ces différentes pratiques organisationnelles formaient un système régulateur unifié, cohérent
et non officiel. Les représentants des armateurs et marins, les inspecteurs et les contrôleurs,
les fonctionnaires, les directeurs d'écoles navales et les travailleurs sociaux communiquaient
régulièrement de manière interactive et trouvaient le moyen de prendre des décisions
consensuelles.
Ce système régulateur était si uniforme, s'appliquant par ailleurs de manière très étendue
aux navires marchands de part le monde, qu'il a effectivement permis d'établir des normes
internationales.
Sa capacité à améliorer en permanence les pratiques à un certain rang pour les étendre à
l'ensemble de ses niveaux a représenté sa grande force.
La réglementation était alors facilement applicable, dynamique et influente
transnationalement, et cela pour trois raisons principales :
1. Premièrement, la grande majorité des marins et armateurs étaient citoyens des
mêmes entités politiques, c’est-à-dire des Etats ou coalitions d'Etats.
2. Deuxièmement, ces entités avaient des niveaux comparables de développement
technique, politique et administratif.
3. Troisièmement, il existait des routes bien établies pour le transfert transnational des
connaissances techniques, opérationnelles et sociales.
A partir de la fin des années 70, tout cela a disparu dans la précipitation d'échapper à ces
régimes régulateurs tandis que nous évoluions vers la zone franche régulatrice des pavillons
de complaisance.
En dépit de l’attrait économique initial pour les armateurs, les résultats des pavillons de
complaisance et des registres secondaires pour éviter la réglementation du marché de
l'emploi n'ont pas réellement généré des bénéfices à long terme, mais plutôt des coûts à
long terme. Les économies de main-d'œuvre ne pouvaient être réalisées qu'une seule fois.
Simultanément à ce processus de pavillon de complaisance, des réductions substantielles
au niveau des effectifs furent réalisées, mais, ici, il n'existe plus aucun domaine permettant
de réaliser des économies supplémentaires. A plus long terme, la conséquence de ce
processus de complaisance et de réduction des effectifs pour l'industrie du transport
maritime, c'est la crise actuelle.
Celle-ci a plusieurs dimensions et ne peut pas être simplement réduite à une question de
manque d'effectifs en postes clés. Il peut y avoir un consensus dans l'industrie à propos d'un
manque éminent de personnel chez les officiers convenablement formés et expérimentés de
rang supérieur, mais il devient également évident que nombre d'autres gradés présentent
des lacunes en formation. L'étude que nous avons menée pour l'OMI révèle des pratiques de
certification frauduleuses largement étendues au niveau des officiers subalternes et
supérieurs.
On observe aussi des problèmes importants concernant les efforts de motivation. Varier la
composition des postes de travail par rang et nationalité parmi les membres d'un même
équipage n'est pas favorable à un travail en équipe. Le rallongement des tours de garde,
spécialement à bord de navires de petit commerce ayant des rotations rapides ont provoqué
une isolation sociale, ce problème nécessitant une enquête d'urgence.
Plus généralement, les occasions de débarquer à terre sont, pour la grande majorité des
marins, devenues rares dans la plupart des secteurs de la navigation. Il devient ainsi difficile
aux marins de s'échapper périodiquement et encore plus dur d'entretenir et de renouer des
relations familiales.
L'industrie maritime mondiale n'est pas simplement confrontée à une éventuelle crise de
main-d'œuvre ; cette crise est bien réelle. Tous les gradés peuvent encore bénéficier de
formation, d’entraînement et d’une certification d'un bon niveau, mais ce n'est pas le cas
partout et c’est insuffisant dans certains pays.
Les conditions socio-économiques sont parfois relativement bonnes, mais elles sont en
général limitées aux rangs supérieurs. Cependant, ces conditions ne sont pas encore
suffisantes pour attirer et retenir les nouveaux dans ce secteur.
La solution éventuelle à la crise viendra avec la reconnaissance que celle-ci a autant de
rapport avec les conditions socio-économiques qu'avec la formation et l'entraînement.
La solution devra être le produit d'un système régulateur mondial. L'industrie doit évoluer
plus rapidement vers ce système et devenir plus cohérente pour pouvoir gérer de manière
adéquate les problèmes très graves auxquels sont confrontés les équipages.
At Cardiff University I have a staff of ten scientists of six nationalities, whose work is wholly
focused on aspects of seafarers work: employment, health, safety, fatigue, operation of
labour markets and the political economy of labour markets, the latter which I will discuss.
I will discuss the term regulation, not the term as used in the shipping industry, but that
borrowed from political science, where it has a very particular meaning.
Regulation in this context refers to the networks of institution and organisations, which seek
to negotiate a consensual system of law, rule, convention and customary practice.
Regulation presupposes an administratively competent state whose machinery is supervised
by professional and impartial agencies on maintained permanent and ad-hoc consultative
processes, providing for the participation of representatives of all interest groups.
This is the sort of system that could be said to have existed in the traditional maritime nations
by the 1970’s: legal frameworks, specified and supervised seafarer’s registries, standards of
technical competence, ship safety, work discipline, minimum accommodation, crew
engagement and discharge. Training and education was provided by the State, with
governing bodies of representatives of all interested parties. At the very least, employment
conditions and the engagement and discharge of crews were supervised by agencies guided
by laws, agreeded by joint bodies of ship owners and seafarers.
These various organisational practices formed a coherent and informally unified regulatory
system. Ship owners and seafarers representatives, examiners and surveyors, civil
servants, principles of nautical colleges, welfare workers routinely interacted and found ways
of making consensual decisions.
This regulatory system was so similar and applied to such a large proportion of the world’s
internationally trading ships, that it effectively set international standards.
The great strength of the system was its ability to continuously develop best practice, in one
part of the system and then export this to all other parts.
Regulation was, therefore, workable, dynamic and trans-nationally influential and this for
three main reasons:
4. Firstly, the great majority of seafarers and ship owners were citizens of the same
political entities, that is to say, states or coalitions of states,
5. Secondly, these entities were at comparable levels of technical, political and
administrative development,
6. Thirdly, there were well-established routes for the trans-national transfer of technical,
operational and socio-technical knowledge.
From the late 1970’s onwards, this all disappeared in the rush to escape these regulatory
regimes as we moved into the regulatory free zone of flags of convenience.
Despite its initial economic attractiveness to ship owners, the results of flags of convenience
and second registers as a means of avoiding labour market regulation, has not actually
delivered any long-term gains, but, rather, long-term costs. Labour cost savings from flagging
out could only be made once.
Concurrent with the flagging out process were substantial reductions in manning levels, but,
hereto, there is no longer any scope for further savings. The longer-term consequence for
the shipping industry of flagging out and reducing manning levels has been, what we now
have, a crisis.
This crisis has several dimensions and it cannot simply be reduced to a question of
shortages of key officer personnel. There may be a consensus in the industry about an
imminent shortage in suitably trained and experienced senior officer ranks, but it is also
becoming apparent that many of the other ratings are also poorly trained.
The study, which we carried out for the IMO, indicates that fraudulent certification at junior
officer and ratings levels is widespread.
There are also important issues concerning effort motivation. Varying layouts of tours of duty
by rank and nationality among members of the same crew, are not conducive to team
working. Lengthier tours, especially where served aboard ships with small trades and rapid
turnarounds have led to social isolation, a matter needing urgent enquiry.
More generally, shore leave opportunities for the great majority of seafarers are now
negligible in most trades. This makes it difficult for seafarers to periodically escape and even
harder for them to sustain and renew family connections.
The global shipping industry is not simply facing the prospect of a manpower crisis, it already
has the crisis. Good training, education and certification are still available for all ranks, but
this is not the case everywhere and is insufficient in some countries.
Relatively good socio-economic conditions can also be found, but are, for the most part,
restricted to senior ranks. However, these conditions are still not sufficient to attract and
retain new entrants to the industry.
The eventual solution to the crisis will come with the recognition that it has as much to do
with socio-economic conditions, as it does with training and education.
The solution will have to be the product of a global regulatory system. The industry needs to
move much faster towards this system and to be much more coherent in order to adequately
manage the very serious problems that we face in the area of crewing.
Merci pour le point que vous venez de présenter sur la formation des équipages et des
personnels.
Nous allons maintenant entendre Monsieur RETUREAU.
Thank you for the point you have just presented on the training of crews and personnel.
We are now going to hear from Mr RETUREAU.
Daniel RETUREAU, membre du Comité Economique et Social Européen
Partageant en partie les propos des intervenants précédents, j'éviterai de les répéter.
L'un des éléments majeurs de la sécurité est la condition des équipages, leur formation et
leur entraînement. Ceci suppose une continuité qui n'existe plus : on engage en effet en
CDD ou au voyage, pour rémunérer au plus bas.
Le chiffre de 80% de responsabilité humaine dans les incidents m'étonne toujours,
notamment parce que je me demande comment on peut évaluer ce critère. De quoi parle-ton ? S'agit-il du capitaine et de son équipage ou de toute la chaîne humaine qui a contribué
à ce qu'un navire soit en mer, avec sa cargaison ? Si l'on considère cette chaîne dans son
ensemble, l'élément humain avoisine alors les 100% ! C'est ce qui se passe dans la plupart
des cas. Les armateurs recourent à des pavillons de complaisance, la propriété du navire est
difficile à déterminer etc., et donc les responsabilités deviennent difficiles elles aussi à mettre
en lumière.
En ce qui concerne le choix des équipages, si le capitaine est seul maître à bord après Dieu,
d'autres éléments interviennent avant de monter à bord ! L'armateur fait les choix
économiques et sociaux, et ces choix sont évidemment minimalistes. Travailler avec un
équipage motivé et soudé implique formation et continuité, ce qui présente un coût dont je ne
suis pas sûr qu'il puisse être assumé par les affréteurs ou les consommateurs finaux.
L'économie globalisée fait peser sur le transport une charge disproportionnée pour ce qui
concerne le coût de fonctionnement de cette économie. Les conséquences à court terme
sont effectivement des réductions de coût, mais à long terme elles peuvent être des pertes
énormes, notamment en vies humaines.
Au niveau européen on a tenté d'imposer des régulations. Si les Etats du pavillon
n'assument pas leurs responsabilités, il faut bien que d'autres le fassent : les Etats du port
mais aussi l'OMI et l'OIT, qui n'ont cependant pas de pouvoir de sanction, contrairement aux
Etats. Une norme ne constitue du droit réel que dans la mesure où il y a une sanction
effective. Des possibilités de sanctions diverses existent, mais il faut que les Etats ou les
groupes d'Etats aient la volonté et la possibilité de les mettre en œuvre. Notons que ces
sanctions pourraient aussi être appliquées relativement au non-respect de normes sociales.
Mais les dernières conventions de l'OIT n'ont pas été ratifiées par certains des membres de
l'Union européenne : la France, par exemple, au hasard… Nous verrons ce que fera la
prochaine législature. La ratification de ces conventions par tous les Etats-membres serait
pourtant une excellente base pour établir ces normes sociales que nous voudrions voir
appliquées par tous les navires qui passent dans les eaux européennes ou qui y font escale,
quels que soient leurs pavillons.
Sharing in part the points of the previous speakers, I will avoid repeating them. One of the
major elements of safety is the condition of the crews, their education and training. This
supposes a continuity that no longer exists: in fact we hire on limited term contracts or per
voyage, in order to pay the least possible amount.
The figure of 80% human responsibility in incidents always astonishes me, particularly
because I wonder how we can evaluate this criterion. What are we talking about? Is it the
captain and his crew, or is it the whole human chain which has contributed to a ship being at
sea, with its cargo? If we consider this chain in its entirety, the human element then verges
on 100%! That is what happens in most cases. The owners turn to flags of convenience, the
ownership of ships is difficult to determine etc., and so responsibility also becomes difficult to
bring to light.
Concerning the choice of crews, if the captain is the sole master on board after God, other
elements play a part before boarding! The owner makes economic and social choices, and
these choices are obviously minimal. To work with a motivated and united crew implies
training and continuity, which presents a cost which I am not sure can be assumed by the
charterer or by the end consumer. The globalised economy has led to a disproportionately
heavy charge on transport as far as the running costs of this economy are concerned. The
short-term consequences are in fact a reduction in costs, but the long-term consequences
could be enormous, particularly in human lives.
We have tried to impose regulations at the European level. If the Flag States do not assume
their responsibilities, others will have to: the Port States, but also the IMO and the ILO
(International Labour Organisation), who do not, however, have the power of sanction,
contrary to the States. A standard only constitutes an actual law to the extent where there is
an effective sanction. Possibilities for various sanctions do exist, but the States, or group of
States, must be willing to use them. We note that these sanctions could also be applied in
relation to the non-respect of social standards.
However, some members of the European Union have not ratified the last OIT conventions:
France, for instance, springs to mind… We will see what the next legislature does. All the
same, the ratification of these conventions by all Member States would be an excellent basis
to establish these social standards, which we would like to see applied to all ships that sail or
put into port in European waters, whatever their flag.
Merci beaucoup, Monsieur RETUREAU.
Monsieur APPAVE va peut-être pouvoir nous dire si le droit social maritime peut devenir une
réalité crédible.
Thank you very much Mr RETUREAU.
Maybe Mr APPAVE will be able to tell us if maritime social law can become a credible reality.
Dani APPAVE, Chef de l'équipe des industries maritimes, OIT, Organisation
Internationale du Travail
Il faudrait sans doute des règles plus rigoureuses et plus claires que l'on puisse appliquer et
dont on puisse vérifier l'application.
Je recommande la lecture des excellentes conclusions du Comité économique et social sur
les conditions de travail et d'emploi des marins de la Marine marchande. Relevons
immédiatement la première phrase de ce texte, citation de Patrick Chaumette, juriste
français : "Un navire sous normes est toujours un navire sous normes sociales".
Mais le taux de ratification des normes en matière sociale que nous adoptons depuis 80 ans
à l'OIT reste très bas, ceci même pour les normes les plus acceptées, comme la convention
147 par exemple, ratifiée seulement par 55% de la flotte mondiale. En revanche, nous
constatons que le Mémorandum d'entente de Paris a amélioré l'application de certaines
parties de cette convention. La leçon est donc évidemment qu'il faut plus de contrôle par les
Etats du port, mais cela ne constitue pas une panacée : la vérification par les Etats du
pavillon reste ce qui doit être renforcé. Je tiens à souligner que la France est en voie de
ratifier ces conventions et qu'elle nous soutient dans nos actions.
Il faudra, pour les nouvelles normes de l'OIT, utiliser tous les moyens possibles pour en
exiger une meilleure application.
Les heures de travail et de repos à bord, par exemple, sont sujettes à une convention qui
n'entrera en vigueur qu'au mois d'août. Mais elle n'est encore ratifiée que par très peu de
pays qui l'ont pourtant votée et adoptée depuis 1996 ! Cela nous montre le décalage entre le
vœu et l'action ! Les blocages qui entraînent ce décalage doivent évidemment être gérés aux
niveaux nationaux. Les efforts de l'OIT vont dans le sens d'une amélioration de cette
situation.
Des normes existant sur la continuité de l'emploi, sur le recrutement ou encore sur
l'inspection des navires présentent les mêmes problèmes.
Nous constatons finalement que les problèmes relatifs aux équipages ne sont pas
considérés comme une priorité. L'inspection maritime commence à connaître des
améliorations dans un certain nombre de pays, mais cette inspection concernant le domaine
social demeure le parent pauvre.
There is no doubt a need for more rigorous and clearer rules which could be applied and
whose application could be verified.
I recommend reading the excellent conclusions of the Economic and Social Committee on
the conditions of work and employment of seamen in the Merchant Navy. We immediately
pick out the first sentence: the quote from Patrick Chaumette, French jurist: “A ship under
norms is always a ship under social norms”.
Yet the ratification rate of the norms on social matters, that we at the ILO adopted 80 years
ago, remains very low, and this is even so for the most accepted standards, like convention
147 for example, ratified by only 55% of the world fleet. On the other hand, we notice that
the Paris Memorandum of Understanding has improved the application of certain parts of this
convention. The lesson therefore is evidently that there must be more controls by the Port
States, but this does not constitute a panacea: the verification by the Flag States still has to
be reinforced. I am anxious to underline that France is on the way to ratifying these
conventions and supports us in our actions.
We must use all means possible to insist on better application of the new ILO standards.
The number of hours of work and rest on board, for example, are subject to a convention that
does not come into force until August. Yet it has still only been ratified by very few countries
who, nevertheless, voted and adopted it in 1996! This shows us the time lapse between the
word and the deed! The sticking points, which drag out these time lapses, should obviously
be managed at national levels. The ILO’s efforts are moving towards an improvement of this
situation.
Existing standards on the continuity of employment, recruitment and even boat inspections
present the same problems.
Finally, we notice that problems relating to crews are not considered a priority. Maritime
inspectorates are beginning to show improvements in a certain number of countries, but the
inspectorate concerning the social field remains the poor relation.
Monsieur GAYSSOT, Ministre de l'Equipement et des Transports, lors d'une réunion au
Japon, disait s'intéresser tout autant aux questions sociales qu'aux questions techniques
pour le domaine qui nous occupe : dans quelle mesure cela est-il vrai, Monsieur BERDER ?
During a meeting in Japan, Mr GAYSSOT, Minister of Development and Transport, said he
was just as much interested in social questions as in technical questions in this field: in what
measure is this true, Mr BERDER ?
Eric BERDER
C'est un aspect majeur de l'action du ministère. Ainsi la France soutient fortement l'action de
l'OMI, et pour son propre compte, elle renforce actuellement l'inspection du travail maritime.
Nous n'avons pas évoqué la détermination des équipages nécessaires aux navires. Il y a en
ce sens deux philosophies : celle du "safe manning", c'est-à-dire la détermination de
l'équipage minimum à un instant T, et celle qui ajoute à cela la capacité pour l'équipage de
durer. Cette deuxième idée implique évidemment qu'il y ait plus de personnels. Ce sujet
aiguise les concurrences, mais renforce la possibilité de mettre en œuvre des navires de
manière saine et sûre.
It is a major aspect of Ministry action. Thus France strongly supports the ILO’s action and is
currently reinforcing the marine factory inspectorate on its own account.
We have not spoken about determining the crew level necessary for the ships. There are
two philosophies in this sense: that of “safe manning”, meaning determining the crew level at
a given moment, and that which adds on the crew’s ability to last. This second idea
obviously implies that there are more personnel. This subject sharpens competition, but
reinforces the possibility of using ships in a safe and sound manner.
Débat avec le public
Public Debate
Un intervenant de la salle
J'interviens au nom de la CFDT de Brest, qui a eu l'occasion, il y a quelques mois pour ITF,
d'aider un certain nombre de marins pakistanais bloqués dans le port de Brest. Nous avons
obtenu pour eux rapatriement et salaires.
Ils avaient au départ, pour obtenir leur embarquement, investi quelque 1 800 $ auprès d'un
courtier de Karachi. Ils ont dû faire une croix sur cette mise…
Par ailleurs, nous avons reçu des courriers alarmés de la part du maître d'équipage, qui nous
dit être aujourd'hui dans l'incapacité de trouver du travail, à Karachi, étant accusé d'avoir été
l'instigateur de cette "rébellion" dont le but était… d'obtenir les salaires de l'équipage ! Que
peut-on faire ? Je lance un appel aujourd'hui dans cet amphithéâtre international.
I am speaking for the Brest CFDT (French Democratic Confederation of Labour), which had
occasion a few months ago, on behalf of the ITF (International Transport Federation), to help
a certain number of Pakistani seamen who were stuck in the port of Brest. We were able to
obtain repatriation and salaries for them.
In the beginning they had invested some $1,800 with a broker in Karachi to obtain their place
on board. They must have given up on that bet…
On the other hand, we have received some alarming letters from the boatswain, who tells us
he cannot find any work now in Karachi as he is accused of having been the instigator of this
“rebellion”, whose aim was to… get the crew’s salary! What can be done ? I am launching
an appeal today in this international amphitheatre.
Michelle BECDELIEVRE, les Verts, Commission Mer et Littoral
Dans le Livre Blanc des Transports, a été inclus le renouveau du cabotage européen. Je
voudrais être sûre, en tant que femme de marin, que l'Europe ne fonctionnera pas a minima
au niveau des équipages, notamment en embauchant via des marchands d'hommes issus
du Tiers-monde. C'est aussi un appel que je lance au niveau international et surtout
européen.
In the White Paper on Transport, the revival of European cabotage has been included. I
would like to be sure, as a seaman’s wife, that Europe will not function at minimum crew
levels, and in particular by not hiring via the dealers of men from the third world. I, too, am
launching an appeal at the international level, and particularly at the European level.
Dani APPAVE
Pour les questions de rapatriement, il y a également des normes internationales, peu
ratifiées elles aussi. Nous n'empêcherons jamais que des sociétés soient en faillite et donc
que de tels problèmes se posent, mais des garanties existeraient si les normes étaient
appliquées. Il est très difficile de faire appliquer, dans un pays souverain, des normes qui
pourtant sont acceptées par tous.
En ce qui concerne la question de Madame, il est vrai que les normes de l'OIT ont souvent
été à minima. Mais je pense que de plus en plus, les Etats de l'Union européenne et les
autres sont conscients que les normes minimales européennes en l'occurrence doivent
devenir les normes minimales pour tous.
For questions of repatriation, there are also international standards, which are not well
ratified either. We will never prevent companies from going bankrupt and neither, therefore,
such problems as arise, but guarantees would exist if the standards were applied. It is very
difficult to make a sovereign country apply the standards, which are nevertheless accepted
by everyone.
Concerning the lady’s question, it is true that the ILO standards have often been at a
minimum. Nevertheless, I think more and more that the European Union States and others
are conscious that the European minimal standards in this case must become the minimal
standards for all.
Jan FRANSEN, Directeur Général Délégué de ‘Green Award Foundation’,
Rotterdam, Pays-Bas
Lorsqu'on considère la navigation en général, comme les normes de formation de l'équipage,
suivant l'exigence des codes ISM, il est évident que les capitaines sont soumis à une forte
pression.
Ces dernières années, j'ai remarqué que les écoles navales européennes et internationales
étaient très en retard en termes d'enseignement fourni par rapport à la demande maritime
actuelle.
Ainsi, les compétences en encadrement et en instruction requises par le capitaine pour
former son équipage ne sont pas disponibles.
Les membres d'équipage peuvent bien connaître la réglementation, mais ils ne sont pas
conscients des effets que leur manipulation de l'huile et du plastique peut avoir sur
l'environnement marin. Je pense qu'il est temps que nous prenions en compte ces éléments
et que nous les incluions dans l'enseignement destiné aux marins.
When one considers shipping in general, such as crew training standards, as demanded by
the ISM codes, it is evident that a lot of burden is put on the masters.
In the last few years, I have noticed that European and worldwide nautical colleges are very
behind in terms of the education they provide in comparison to the shipping demands of
today.
For example, management and tutorial skills required by the master in order to train his crew
are not available.
Crewmembers may be well aware of legislation, but are not aware of the effects of their
handling of oil and plastics on the maritime environment. I believe that it is about time that
we addressed those elements and established these in the nautical education for seafarers.
Daniel RETUREAU
Je répondrai à la question concernant le Livre Blanc relatif aux Transports. Le Comité
économique et social est actuellement consulté sur celui-ci. Ce Livre est encore loin d'une
législation effective…
L'orientation de la Commission a été de privilégier une approche par le marché, une
approche très libérale, ce qui a été remis en question par le grand public, notamment suite
aux accidents routiers dans les grands tunnels alpins. La Commission tente donc de revoir
cette orientation, mais il faudra des pressions beaucoup plus fortes pour arriver à une
véritable multi-modalité des transports.
En ce qui concerne les marins, un projet de directive communautaire est "en panne" depuis
1998. Récemment est parue une communication de la Commission sur la formation des
gens de mer. Notre Comité a été sollicité pour avis, celui-ci pourra être communiqué aux
personnes intéressées.
I will reply to the question concerning the White Paper relating to Transport, to which the lady
referred. The Economic and Social Committee is currently consulting on this. This Paper is
still far from an effective legislation. The Commission’s position has been to privilege a
market approach, a very liberal approach, which has been put back into question by the
general public, especially following the road accidents in the big Alpine tunnels. The
Commission is therefore attempting to review this position, but the pressure must be a lot
stronger to arrive at real multi-terms for transport.
Concerning the seamen, a draft Community directive has been “hove to” since 1998. A
Commission report appeared recently on the training of seafarers. Our Committee has been
solicited for advice, this could be sent out to those interested.
Capitaine Andreas CONSTANTINOU, Haut inspecteur des navires, Département Marine
Marchande, représentant l'Etat de Chypre
En tant que marin, j'ai été bien placé pour expérimenter l'impact des normes inférieures
lorsque j'étais chef d'équipe sur un navire. On a prétendu que les registres ouverts étaient
responsables de la réduction drastique d'effectifs de sécurité sur les navires. D'après mon
expérience personnelle, dans nombre de cas, nous avons perdu des navires simplement
parce que nous avons refusé d'embaucher les effectifs de même qualification que dans
d'autres pays européens.
La réduction drastique du niveau des effectifs de sécurité a commencé en Europe. Un AB
norvégien coûte ainsi 7 à 10 fois plus qu'un AB philippin et, comme la loi exige la nationalité
du pays d'origine, pour que la flotte norvégienne arrive à survivre, elle devait réduire ses
niveaux d'effectifs.
As a seafarer, I experienced first hand the impact of lower standards, when I was a Chief
Mate on a ship. It has been said that the open registries were responsible for the drastic
reduction of safe manning of ships. Speaking from personal experience, in many cases we
lost ships simply because we refused to issue exactly the same manning in place in other
European countries.
The drastic reduction of safe manning levels originated in Europe. For example, a
Norwegian AB cost 7 to 10 times more than a Philippino AB and, as the law required origin
nationals, for the Norwegian fleet to survive it was very important to reduce their manning
levels.
Philippe CROZON
Il a été dit que le renversement du contrôle par l'Etat du port vers le contrôle par l'Etat du
pavillon était essentiel. Mais encore faut-il que les navires viennent à port, or beaucoup de
navires ne regagnent jamais l'Etat du pavillon. Ceci me semble donc un vœu pieu, d'autant
que les navires qui utilisent un pavillon de complaisance proviennent fréquemment d'Etats
dont l'économie est très faible et qui n'ont donc pas les moyens de mettre en place ces
services.
Nous savons par ailleurs, pour revenir sur les propos de Monsieur Berder, que l'inspection
du travail dans le domaine maritime est aujourd'hui quasiment inexistante, ceci même en
France. On ne peut donc espérer voir cela en place dans bien d'autres pays.
It has been said that turning over control by the Port State to control by the Flag State was
essential. However, ships must still dock at port, whereas a lot of ships never go back to the
Flag State. So this seems to me a pious hope, especially since ships, which use a flag of
convenience, frequently come from States with very weak economies and who do not,
therefore, have the means to put these services into place.
We know in other respects, to come back to the words of Mr BERDER, that the factory
inspectorate in the maritime field is today almost nonexistent, even in France. So we cannot
hope to see this in place in a lot of other countries.
Jean-François MASSON, ancien officier de la Marine marchande
Me référant au récent accident survenu à Molène, je signale que la compétence et
l'expérience des capitaines ne sont plus suffisantes aujourd'hui pour que les populations
côtières aient confiance en la navigation qui passe le long de leurs côtes. Il est temps de
prévoir des "boîtes noires" sur les passerelles de navigation.
Referring to the accident which happened recently at Molène, I would point out that the
captains’ competence and experience today is no longer sufficient for the coastal population
to have confidence in the traffic sailing the length of their coasts. It is time to put “black
boxes” on the navigation bridge.
Communication de Monsieur Jean-Yves LE DRIAN,
Député, Secrétaire d'Etat à la Mer, rapporteur de la
Commission d'enquête parlementaire sur l'Erika
Jean-Yves LE DRIAN
Je me suis livré au petit exercice consistant à vérifier si les préconisations livrées par la
Commission d'enquête parlementaire sur l'Erika étaient en œuvre.
Les rapports finissent souvent dans les tiroirs… Notre préoccupation était donc de savoir si,
une fois l'émotion passée, les bonnes intentions distillées par les responsables politiques
n'avaient pas disparu.
L'ensemble des préconisations avait été largement soutenu lors de la publication du rapport.
Le pointage de ces préconisations nous montre que depuis le milieu de l'année dernière, un
certain nombre d'avancées réelles ont vu le jour. La volonté et la prise de conscience
semblent donc affirmées dans divers domaines. J'en donnerai quelques exemples.
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Il avait été demandé que les sociétés de classification fassent l'objet d'une
surveillance plus forte : cela est inscrit au niveau européen dans le paquet Erika 1.
Tout en étant nous-mêmes réservés sur la question des pétroliers à double coque,
nous constatons une avancée assez sensible au niveau européen et au niveau
international dans l'élimination des pétroliers à simple coque. Cela permet donc au
moins un renouvellement important, voire total d'ici à 2015, de la flotte pétrolière.
Un renforcement des dispositions des Etats du port était souhaité, de même qu'un
renforcement des bannissements et des contrôles pour les bâtiments âgés : cela a
également été mis en œuvre dans le paquet Erika 1 adopté à la fin de l'année
passée.
La mise en œuvre de la "boîte noire" est aussi inscrite, même si les délais
d'application sont encore un peu trop longs.
La généralisation de la transparence par EQUASIS est actée, tout comme la mise en
œuvre des transpondeurs.
Dans le paquet Erika 2, ont été décidées l'harmonisation et l'homogénéisation dans
les ports des dispositifs de contrôle global de la cohérence des interventions au
niveau européen.
Le renforcement du contrôle maritime en particulier en Manche et Mer du Nord sera
accéléré.
Nous devons donc apprécier ces avancées réelles, d'autant que nous avions souhaité, à la
Commission, que l'Europe puisse, à un moment donné, parler seule. La progression est
nette en ce sens.
Par ailleurs, pour ce qui concerne notre niveau national, il avait été demandé dans les
préconisations de moderniser les CROSS : les budgets 2000, 2001 et 2002 ont prévu ce
plan de modernisation, de manière sans doute encore insuffisante mais assez fortement
engagée. La signalisation maritime est également en cours de renforcement, de même
qu'une amélioration du dispositif de surveillance aérienne.
Le Gouvernement a enfin modifié ses circulaires d'instruction pour une meilleure articulation
entre POL MAR Mer et POL MAR Terre.
Il reste encore des textes à prévoir, bien sûr, mais la prise de conscience effective a amené
des progrès sensibles.
Mais le chantier est loin d'être terminé.
Au niveau européen, le paquet Erika 2 n'est pas achevé. De nombreux sujets ne sont pas
épuisés, notamment la modification du fonctionnement du FIPOL et l'extension de sa
capacité de couverture. C'est une question qui concerne la responsabilisation des chargeurs
et des armateurs, qui n'a pas encore abouti même si la volonté est présente.
De même ne sont pas encore actées les obligations et les contraintes liées à l'organisation
du trafic, à sa transparence et son suivi.
Enfin, toute une partie des préconisations concernant l'aspect social commence seulement à
être étudiée. Cela concerne la formation, le respect des normes d'encadrements, la
vérification des niveaux de qualification, la validation des normes de l'OIT, le renforcement
des actions entre l'Union européenne et l'OIT, etc.
Tout cela constitue le chantier de demain, sur ce champ qu'il nous paraît impératif de
cultiver.
Il ne faut pas, par ailleurs, sous-estimer la part de responsabilité au niveau national.
La capacité de contrôle dans nos ports reste notoirement insuffisante. Il nous faut également
renforcer la prévention et les moyens d'intervention en mer. En matière de lutte contre la
pollution, nous avions demandé que les moyens d'intervention en mer soit renforcés… ou
qu'au moins ils existent ! Des intentions ont en ce sens été affichées, mais aucune mesure
n'a encore été prise. Il manque encore les outils permettant les déballastages dans les ports,
ceci même si l'appareil législatif concernant cette question a été modernisé.
Ajoutons à tout ceci que nous avions signalé la croissance du trafic maritime : celle-ci nous
mènera, même avec les meilleures normes sociales et techniques, à une impossibilité de
gérer le trafic en Manche et Mer du Nord. Il faut donc, en termes d'aménagement du
territoire, envisager en Europe une réorganisation de l'accueil portuaire. Cela va de pair avec
le fait que le Livre Blanc dont nous parlions va amener un renforcement du cabotage.
Enfin, nous avions conclu que l'élément majeur de la sécurité était celle du pavillon, tant
techniquement que socialement et humainement. Cela reste d'actualité.
Deux ans après la publication de ce rapport d'enquête, nous pouvons estimer que nous
sommes à mi-chemin. Il ne faudrait pas que l'attention des responsables à cet égard
s'émousse.
Un colloque comme celui-ci permet aux uns et aux autres de rappeler les responsabilités de
chacun.
Rapport de la session 2
Réponses technologiques et facteur humain
(Tables rondes n° 3 et 4 )
Jean-Paul QUEMENEUR
Directeur de l'ENSIETA
Rue François Verny
29806 BREST CEDEX 9
Tél : 02.98.34.88.00 – Fax : 02.98.34.88.46
Les deux tables rondes ont révélé une réelle convergence dans l’analyse et les propositions.
Le risque zéro n’existe pas, on peut toutefois viser à le réduire au niveau le plus bas qu’il soit
raisonnablement possible d’atteindre
Il convient de souligner que les actions à mener concernent le navire, l’équipage et
l’intervention, le tout constituant un système complexe qui se doit d’être cohérent et
convergent.
Pour le navire la relation vieillissement/accident est incontestable. Des solutions
technologiques existent, elles doivent toutefois être mise en œuvre à bon escient:
• Elimination des bâtiments anciens et mal entretenus.
• Fabrication de bâtiments modernes et sécurisés proposant des solutions
« équilibrées », en association avec les marins. A cet effet, si la double coque permet
le renouvellement de la flotte, elle nécessite encore des études approfondies sur
plusieurs secteurs qui touchent en particulier aux domaines de l’entretien et du
contrôle.
• Intégration des nouvelles technologies comme « les aides à la décision »: oui, mais là
encore, en gardant constamment à l’esprit les conditions d’emploi liées à la
qualification des équipages et des conditions d’emploi( interface homme/machine)
Pour l’équipage, comme pour le navire, la problématique ne peut pas être dissociée de la
pratique du pavillon de complaisance dont les préoccupations sont trop souvent éloignées du
« pavillon de port ». L’équipage est parfois une véritable tour de Babel, mal rémunéré, peu
considéré, non qualifié à la maîtrise des outils et aux exigences de contrôle, et non
sensibilisé aux problèmes d’environnement.
Les aspects socio-économiques étant le facteur commun de cette situation que chacun se
plait à déplorer. Certains progrès notables pourraient toutefois être obtenus à très faible coût
en associant en temps utile les marins aux orientations.
Le rôle du capitaine reste prééminent, notamment dans ses aptitudes à manager et à former
son équipage, dont la qualité de vie à bord ne peut plus être oubliée.
Il est impératif d’intégrer ces apports sociologiques à l’étude globale des facteurs de risques.
Pour l’intervention, la maîtrise des risques et des moyens est un impératif qui suppose :
• Une prévention à la mesure des risques encourus par des contrôles efficaces et
adaptés.
• Une sanction car toute règle qui n’a pas de sanction n’est pas de droit.
• Une transparence et un transfert en temps réel des informations concernant le navire
et surtout sa cargaison.
Les organisations internationales doivent intégrer ces propositions dans l’élaboration
et la mise en application de la réglementation, charge aux organismes nationaux et à
l’Europe de mettre en place les moyens adaptés.
Mr J-Y Le Drian, rapporteur de la commission d’enquête parlementaire sur l’ERIKA, relève
que s’il reste encore beaucoup à faire, la moitié des recommandations de cette enquête est
en voie d’adoption ou d’application
Résumés des présentations et interventions:
Capt. C. CLADEN (Abeille Flandre), Dr S. HARA & Dr M. GIRIN
Propositions visant à limiter les conséquences environnementales liées au trafic
maritime.
Les auteurs démontrent, exemples à l’appui, que la mise en application de quelques
pratiques simples dont le coût serait négligeable, permettrait de considérablement limiter les
conséquences des accidents maritimes sur l’environnement en facilitant la tâche des
sauveteurs et autorités locales. La première proposition concerne des échanges
d’expériences entre services de sauvetage à l ‘échelle internationale afin d’accélérer les
prises des (bonne) décisions. De plus, les auteurs suggèrent la mise en place des règles
suivantes :
• Généralisation à tous les navires transportant de polluants de l’obligation de présenter
des attaches de remorquage.
• Formation minimum pour les capitaines de navire en matière de responsabilité
environnementale.
• Transmission rapide des informations numérisées concernant le navire et sa cargaison.
Les exemples évoqués par les auteurs en arguments pour l’application de ces mesures sont
extrêmement convaincants. Un exemple parmi ces exemples, celui du capitaine du Levoli
Sun et de son équipage qui grâce aux autorités françaises sont arrivés saufs mais, à cause
de leur négligence, sans le moindre document décrivant la nature du chargement.
Table Ronde N°3
Conception, Construction, Maintenance et Contrôles
Interventions :
Dr V. BERTRAM, (HSVA , Hambourg)
Les accidents désastreux sont le résultat d’une suite de circonstances. Une approche
globale est essentielle mais ici seuls les aspects techniques sont évoqués. L’intervenant
évoque d’abord des techniques existantes avancées, comme les systèmes anti-collisions,
qui ne sont pas utilisées. Les nouveaux concepts de pétroliers sont tous raisonnablement
sûrs. Le principe de la double-coque est très peu convaincant par rapport à d’autres
solutions techniques existantes. L’utilisation d’un meilleur acier ne coûtant que 20% plus
cher, à poids égal, augmenterait la résistance du navire de près de 50%. Les exemples
évoqués par l’intervenant nous montre que la technologie permettant de construire des
navires plus sûrs existe mais ils coûteraient plus cher. Deux forces sont en balance, le profit
financier et la législation. Finalement le Dr Bertram nous rappelle que la législation n’a de
sens que si elle s’appuie sur un système de contrôle et d’application stricte et rappelle qu’un
état peut agir jusqu’à 200 miles de ses côtes.
M. R. GUTIERREZ (Chambre Européenne des Constructeurs de Navires, Espagne)
M. Gutierrez commence par nous rappeler, statistique à l’appui, que la sécurité maritime
s’est considérablement améliorée au cours des deux dernières décennies. La mise en place
des conventions SOLAS et MARPOL dans les années soixante-dix sont à l’origine de cette
amélioration. Les navires devront être de plus en plus sûrs et les vieux bâtiments n’auront
plus droit de cité dans nos eaux. L’intervenant donne quelques exemples d’améliorations
visant à rendre les navires plus sûrs en insistant sur la double motorisation obligatoire pour
les transporteurs les plus dangereux.
M. W. MAGELSSEN (Norske Veritas, Norvège)
L’intervenant s’adresse à la question de la double-coque qui est loin d’avoir la faveur des
architectes navals. M. Magelssen commence par un intéressant comparatif entre les navires
construits avant et après la convention MARPOL.
De nombreux arguments souvent très convaincants sont ensuite évoqués en défaveur de la
double coque. M. Magelssen représentant une grande société de classification, il évoque la
question de la maintenance et surtout de la difficulté d’appliquer des règles de manière
internationale, M. Berger confirme les difficultés et annonce l’arrivé de nouveaux inspecteurs
maritimes.
M. M. VOOGEL (Pays-Bas)
L’intervenant fait le point après 20 ans de mise en vigueur des règles internationales. Tout
comme le Dr. Bertram il mentionne les forces en balance : profit et respect de
l’environnement. Il rappelle les accords du Mémorandum de Paris (www.parismou.org). Les
statistiques indiquent encore qu’un grand nombre de navires sont immobilisés après
inspection (10%). Le MOU classe les pavillons en deux catégories : noir ou blanc; les
sanctions appliquées à un navire ne satisfaisant pas aux critères d’inspection devront l'être
avec plus de sévérité qu’un navire portant pavillon blanc.
M. J. LOISEAU
L’intervenant représente les équipages : commandants et marins et voudrait voir le facteur
humain mis plus en avant. Il fait également un réquisitoire contre la course actuelle au
gigantisme qui expose le public à des catastrophes de même échelle. Tout navire peut
devenir abordeur.
Dr N. MIKELIS (INTERTANKO, Londres)
Le Dr. Nikelis aborde la question de la définition de standards pour l’inspection et la
maintenance des navires. Tout comme M. Guttieriez, il rappelle les progrès des deux
dernières décennies dus à la réglementation IMO. L’exemple de l’Erika vient rappeler qu’il
reste des progrès à faire. Il jette une nouvelle pierre sur les doubles coques en affirmant que
la source du problème est une question d’attitude humaine. Il y a une réelle nécessité à
améliorer les visites d’inspection des navires pour l’ensemble des sociétés de classification.
Table Ronde N°4 - Replacer l’équipage au centre de l’approche de sécurité
Dr. M. GRABOWSKI (New-York, USA)
Le Dr Bertram avait mentionné l’existence de système informatique avancé pour l’aide à la
navigation. Le Dr Grabowski en explique dans son intervention le principe et la fonctionnalité.
Les aspects en termes de sécurité sont bien sûr soulignés mais également en terme de
coûts et d’efficacité. Le temps réel est la caractéristique principale du système qui traite les
informations en temps réel comme la météo.
Le but de l’intégration d’un tel système est d’éviter l’erreur humaine tout en laissant la
décision à l’équipage à partir d’une ou plusieurs recommandations. La technologie n’est pas
forcément la solution miracle si elle ne prend pas compte du facteur humain.
Dr. R. McDONALD (IFSMA, Londres)
Sous peu les navires devront être équipés d’un Système Automatique d’Identification (AIS).
La motivation derrière ce système est d’éviter les accidents dus à la fatigue humaine. Le Dr
McDonald ne voit pas que des avantages à ce système.
Pour lui l’AIS est imposé sans considération pour l’équipage, sans harmonisation à tous les
navires et sans qu’une formation au système n’ait été mise en place. C’est surtout sur ce
dernier point que se concentrent les critiques au AIS apportées par l’intervenant.
Pr. T. LANE (Seafarers’ International Research Center, Londres)
Le Professeur Lane aborde le sujet si souvent évoqué de ce que nous appelons les pavillons
de complaisance qui va de pair avec la dérégulation et les nationalités des équipages. Un
équipage digne de ce nom devrait avoir suivi une formation adéquate sanctionnée par un
diplôme et devrait de ce fait recevoir un salaire décent.
Capt. F. VAN WIJNEN (CESMA, Pays-Bas)
Le capitaine Van Wijnen nous rappelle que l’erreur humaine est souvent le principal facteur à
l’origine d’un accident. Les conventions SOLAS et MARPOL remplissent bien leurs rôles
pour le navire mais le code ISM, plus récent, s’il améliore la sécurité ne peut avoir la même
efficacité en raison de la nature de la cible qui est humaine. Saturer un équipage de plus en
plus réduit par une masse d’information n’est pas vraiment la solution optimale. On compare
à nouveau le navire et son équipage à une tour de Babel où la communication et les
échanges d’information sont laborieux. L’intervenant apprécie l’esprit derrière le code ISM
mais regrette un contexte qui le rend difficilement applicable et risque de le transformer en
une pure perte de temps.
M. D. APPAVE (Bureau International du Travail, Genève)
La convention des Nations Unies sur le droit de la mer oblige chaque Etat à exercer sa
juridiction mais ne l’oblige pas à ratifier les Conventions internationales en matière de
navigation maritime et de sécurité. Donc, nombre de pays ne veulent pas appliquer
pleinement le droit international pour ne pas mettre leurs navires en situation de
désavantage commercial.
L’OIT a adopté des Conventions et des recommandations sur divers aspects des conditions
de travail et de vie des gens de mer, mais de nombreux Etats ne les appliquent pas pour des
raisons de concurrence. L’application obligatoire des normes internationales par les Etats
d’immatriculation et la vérification de l’application par les Etats du port assureraient une
meilleure sécurité en mer. L’adoption d’une nouvelle convention qui consoliderait les normes
existantes dans un texte unique faciliterait l’application uniforme du droit international en
matière de conditions du travail des gens de mer. La volonté des états et des autres parties
intéressées à faire disparaître les violations des droits des travailleurs et à assurer une
meilleure sécurité maritime sera mise à l’épreuve lors des travaux de préparation de la
nouvelle convention.
CONCLUSION : J.-Y. LE DRIAN – Secrétaire d'Etat à la Mer, Député, rapporteur de la
commission d'enquête parlementaire sur l'Erika
Les listes de mesures après Erika : double coque (avec réserve), renforcement et
accélération des contrôles, boîtes noires, homogénéisation des interventions et des
équipements portuaires, renforcement de la signalisation, surveillance aérienne accrue,
meilleure définition des autorités politiques montrent des avancées significatives dans le
traitement des urgences.Malgré toutes ces mesures et ces avancées, certains aspects et
règles doivent encore être travaillés. Les moyens de contrôle dans les ports ne sont pas à la
hauteur des règles que l’on souhaite voir appliquer. Ce manque de moyen est une constante
qui a été plusieurs fois évoquée lors des deux tables rondes. M. Le Drian fait finalement une
mise en garde : le contrôle ne doit pas être un système fluctuant soumis au rythme des
accidents.
Jean-Paul QUEMENEUR
Rapporteur de la Session 2
Practical proposals to shipmasters and rulemakers
For environmentally safer shipping
Capitaine Charles CLADEN
Shoichi HARA
Les Abeilles International
Quai Commandant Malbert
29200 BREST
Tél :02.98.80.47.76 – [email protected]
National Maritime Research Institute
6-38-1 Shinkawa Mitaka
181004 TOKYO
Tél : +81.422.41.31.44 - [email protected]
Michel GIRIN
Directeur
CEDRE
Rue Alain Colas – BP 20413
29604 BREST CEDEX
Tél : 02.98.33.10.10 – Fax : 02.98.44.91.38 – [email protected]
Introduction
Only 3 decades ago, the major concern of the general public at the time of a major ship
casualty was the loss of sailors and property. The resulting safer shipping moves were all
centred on reducing losses of human lives and minimising the economic consequences for
the ship and cargo owners. Since then, a number of major incidents have given rise to
another major concern : the impact of a ship casualty on the environment and those living
from that environment. Passing ships have become a threat to the coastal populations. The
death of 20 sailors in the sudden wreckage of a bulk ore vessel now makes no more than the
headlines of local newspapers for a day or two. The spill of 200 tonnes of oil or another
marine pollutant makes the headlines of the same newspapers for weeks. That of 2000
tonnes of pollutant makes the headlines of the national televisions and national press.
Governments, regional organisations, the International Maritime Organisation and the
shipping insurers have started taking the problem into consideration. Any major ship
generated pollution now generates a flow of “never again” environment oriented initiatives.
Most of those initiatives never emerge from the long and difficult processes of regional and
international acceptance. Examples could be drawn from many incidents, among which in
particular those of the Nakhodka (1997) in Japan, of the Erika (1999) and Ievoli Sun (2000)
in France.
But some initiatives do make their way through. Unknown from the general public, most of
those successful initiatives are far from new : they had in fact been long debated without
success and are boosted by momentum for change generated by the casualty. New or not,
the successful “never again” initiatives are in general positive moves. They indeed contribute
to environmentally safer shipping in the long term. Recent examples are the acceleration of
the scraping of older, single hull oil tankers, or improved port state control. But no initiative,
whatever valuable, guarantees a real “never again”. Incidents will continue to occur and
other, complementary moves remain needed to make so that the consequences of future
incidents would be less damaging to the environment.
Those “lower consequences” initiatives can have no better source than comprehensive
feed-back of the operational experience of professionals who actually lived pollution
incidents and applied research by scientists who worked on the evidenced problems. This is
the case of the proposals presented here. They are not the only ones of potential interest.
But the authors intend to demonstrate here that they would have been major assets in recent
incidents. And they would not cost much to the industry in comparison with the
consequences they would prevent.
One is a systematic, internationally available, scientifically maintained database on routes,
tensions and meteorological parameters in key emergency towing operations, so that salvers
could better use the experience of past incidents for improved performance. A second one is
the installation on all vessels with dangerous cargoes of pre-set towing devices, or at least
pads, adapted to towing them when semi-submerged, capsized or broken in two. A third one
is a basic training of masters on environmental responsibility, so that they would actually feel
concerned to do their best in order to help those in charge of pollution response when their
ship may be the source of a pollution. A fourth one, directly related to the previous one,
would be tools and rules for masters to swiftly transmit ship and cargo information after a
mayday, in the form of pre-formatted electronic messages on ship structure, equipment and
cargo, and to take in their pocket, when evacuated, a detailed version in the form of a CD
Rom or equivalent, automatically downloaded from the cargo computer. More could be
envisaged. As an example, in Japan, a national project to seek new steps to protect
environment from oil spilled out from tankers has just started. In that project, research on the
replacement of sturdy bow bulbs by buffer bow is focused on.
Return of experience on emergency towing
When a vessel is impaired at sea, politicians, journalists and the general public assume
that the only matters of real importance are its acceptance by a suitable port of refuge and a
speedy settlement of its emergency towing agreement, would towing be needed. The actual
towing operation is considered as a pure technicality : professionals know their job and they
will deliver.
Professional indeed know their job and they are eager to deliver. They precisely know the
capabilities and limits of their vessel, crew and gear. But they can only guess those of the
stricken vessel, its crew and their reaction within the meteorological circumstances. They
would at times dearly appreciated to have immediate access to the full file of a similar
incident, involving a comparable vessel, in not too different circumstances. But, although
most high seas tugs are chartered by Public authorities, they are in general privately owned
and have little direct access to the information in the hands of other salvage companies.
For the time being, most of the return of experience relies on tug’s crew experience.
Would the men change, the experience is lost. The salvage record describes the towing
route, weather conditions, towline tension, towed ships condition. If electronic databases for
those various information can be available, salvers will have an access to actual computer
data.
This is of paramount importance as emergency towing is a full part of second level
prevention, that means the capability to limit the consequences of an incident or an accident
when it occurs. We have to deliver a response :
• In the shortest possible time
• With the best knowledge available
• With the highest efficiency
The goal is to act, and to act quickly and well. To aim this goal not only we have to be
trained to emergency response, but also we need to have access to files relating
former responses in the way to help in the decision making.
Generalisation of Emergency towing vessels under public authorities control, permanently
based in dangerous areas with important traffic, must enhance the ability to collect the return
of experience. A towing technology international working group, intending to facilitate mutual
access to towing files and joint return of experience would permit to elaborate proposals
which could be presented jointly to the International Maritime Organisation (IMO).
Such a project would not be costly. It could start on a voluntary basis, under the umbrella
of a bilateral or regional co-operation already in force, possibly as an extension of the
exchanges already started through the NMRI-Cedre co-operation (Girin, 2001). It would take
the form of periodical meetings of a small group of co-opted specialists. Each meeting would
be centred on the presentation and discussion of one or more towing operations of major
importance, with the agreement and support of the authority responsible in their country for
the existing high seas towing vessels under public control. A secretary of the group would
build and make available a permanent database of the information gathered and exchanged
at the meetings.
Group members would be invited to look for other members to be co-opted. The group could
later be formalised under IMO umbrella.
Pre-set towing devices for capsized/broken vessels
Modern pre-set towing devices, particularly stern towing devices on tankers, are a
considerable improvement for emergency fitting of towing lines. The example of the Erika
tanker has shown the efficiency of such towing arrangement. But, for the time being, it is
compulsory only for tankers over 20 000 tons dead-weight.
Independently of the size, all vessels carrying hazardous or pollutants materials should be
fitted with such devices, particularly containers vessels, arguing that the best response is to
act on the containment, that means, the vessel (see MSC CARLA incident, off the Açores
islands, in 1997 ).
But such devices are of no use at all with broken vessels. Most unfortunately some types
of vessels have an over average tendency to rupture by the middle in heavy seas. Bulk ore
carriers and heavy fuel tankers are typical examples.
Incident records show that the stern part of a broken vessel often floats first in normal
position, then more less rapidly sinks from the front end, the stern fully emerging for some
time. A stern towing device, when available, is of evident interest. The bow part often twists
and capsizes soon after separating, and any towing device on the bridge automatically
becomes unusable.
The ship is occasionally broken or separated due to old age, collision accident in rough
seas or often drifts due to the engine failure. The whole hull of the ship or its part drifting
ashore may cause a large-scale oil leakage accident and also another collision, an explosion
and a fire. The towing is needed to prevent the secondary disaster from occurring in those
cases. The set-up of the towline is especially difficult when it comes to the separated wrecks.
As the salvers could not get near her due to rough waves in the Nakhodka incident (SOF,
1997), two patrol boats of Japan Coast Guard cooperatively tried to prevent her from drifting
using the tow wire instead of setting up the towline. Friction around the edge of the hull due
to the motion in waves broke the tow wire.
The set-up of the towline on the wreck is generally done by the rescue forces or salvers
as a close to desperate operation. The success probability of towline setting up becomes
quite low under the rough sea conditions. If the pre-set towing pad for the towline exists on
the ship hull, the load of the rescue forces or salvers can be considerably reduced and the
success rate of the prevention of the secondary disaster would be remarkably increased.
Although the concrete ideas for this measure have not been proposed yet, the ships loading
dangerous cargoes should be equipped with effective device to be rescued.
As for the equipment requirement of the towing pad the followings should be considered.
(1) The degree of the strength of the towing pad should be investigated considering the
object of ships.
(2) When the underwater operation of divers is needed, at least one position under draft line
in order to set up the towline should be considered.
(3) Positions to be set should be properly selected both vertically and horizontally. One case
is that the manoeuvrability of the towed ship is primarily considered. The other case is
that the drift of the towed ship should be considered while getting near to set up the
towline.
(4) The increase of ship resistance due to the appendage of towing pad should be minimized
NMRI has started a research project on those points in the aftermath of the Nakhodka
incident. As the subject has close links with the emergency towing one discussed above, it
could be included in the terms of reference of the international working group on towing
proposed above. In that case, the group would screen existing or planned research on
towing pads in other countries and undertake to motivate competent research institution to
formulate and implement research projects on the subject.
Basic training of masters on their environmental responsibility
Shipmasters and shipowners often complain that masters are ill-treated by national
authorities when involved in a pollution incident, at times thrown into jail for months, and
prosecuted without consideration of the rules of their country or flag state. This is a valid
complaint. But, on another hand, the authorities in charge and the coastline population of the
impacted country are often amazed by the highly modest to totally absent environmental
knowledge/concern of most masters of potentially polluting or polluting vessels.
A typical example is the recent incident of the container carrier Melbridge Bilbao in France
(2001). En route from Vera Cruz (Mexico) and La Habana (Cuba) to Rotterdam
(Netherlands), the vessel approached the traffic separation system of Ushant, at the tip of
Brittany (France) at night, in good weather, with a single officer at the bridge. It missed the
upward lane of the TSS by more than 10 miles and ran ashore at 17 knots, at 7.20 a.m.,
between two rocks, on the island of Molène. It luckily could be removed from its uneasy
situation at high tide in the afternoon and was towed to the close-by Berthaume bay for
inspection (it had lost some fuel), to be entered the following day in the port of Brest.
The tip of Brittany has been the subject of considerable pollution from shipping over the
last 3 decades and the coastal population is highly sensitive to any environmental threat from
passing ships. Also, the explosion of a vessel loaded with ammonium nitrate in the port of
Brest shortly after the last world war took a heavy toll on the population and any entry of a
dangerous cargo in the port is a matter of heated discussions. All along that day, information
from the master to the French authorities was that none of the 218 containers on board
contained dangerous cargo, either potentially explosive or potentially marine pollutant. It was
only at mid-day, on the 13th, when final preparation for towing to the port was underway,
communication of the full manifest disclosed to the authorities the presence of a container of
potential marine pollutant, namely “catalytical products”, with contact information in Spanish,
leading to a company in Mexico.
French pollution specialists had to wait for office hours in Mexico to speak with the right
person and find out that the products were from European origin, returned in the supplier,
with no component more dangerous to the environment than diesel. The response
authorities, the port and the shipmaster could be informed of the absence of danger less than
one hour before the arrival of the vessel at harbour entrance, avoiding an unnecessary entry
refusal.
The incident ended without physical damage, but with little satisfaction of the French
authorities and local population. How was it possible that the master would no have cared to
inform the French salvers right from the first minute that he had a container of dangerous
cargo on board ? How was it possible that he felt unconcerned by the search for information
on the actual threat of that cargo ? There was only one answer : he had little concern for
environmental hazards from his ship.
When 60 of his containers fell overboard in the Bay of Biscayne on 1st February 2002,
one with 3 cisterns of chemicals highly reactive in air and seawater, some 135 miles SouthWest of Ushant island, the master of the Lykes liberator, en route from Bremerhaven
(Germany) to Charleston (USA), did no more than inform the French authorities of his loss. It
was only after 6 days and numerous phone calls that the French marine pollution responders
could inform the public of the actual nature of the chemicals, the related hazards, and the
precautionary measures to be taken, would the cisterns be washed ashore. Was it really
impossible for the ship master to help during those 6 days ? Or was he too busy to feel
concerned ? And was he conscious that he was all along little popular in the minds of the
French authorities and coastal population ?
Based on those examples and many others, we consider that there is an evident need
to inform shipmasters of how shipping pollution is seen by coastal populations. They
should be taught to understand how and why those populations feel condemned by
unbalanced international laws to be sitting ducks in front of the potential hazards of
what they view as the far from innocent passage of international shipping. A single 3
days training session on the subject in the whole career of a shipmaster could
dramatically change his attitude toward potential pollutants on board his vessel. He
would understand his actual responsibility as regards the countries he sails by.
Trainers in coastal areas close to major shipping lanes would be delighted to organise
such training sessions, at a nominal cost to shipping companies. And shipping companies
would gain a valid claim that trained masters who actually helped pollution responders to
better face a major incident would be spared imprisonment or any other form of unfair
treatment. Furthermore, crisis management should be included in the training of masters, not
only for the safety of the vessel and her crew, but also in the way to facilitate further
intervention after incident to prevent damages to coastal population and environment.
The adviser of the French marine pollution response authorities and an international
trainer in pollution response techniques, Cedre would be more than happy to initiate a model
short training session for masters, in co-operation with volunteer shipowners. Would parties
find it of value, the training could later be jointly presented to the IMO for possible
consideration in IMO model training courses.
Swift transmission of ship and cargo information
French salvers who volunteered to be helicoptered on the chemical tanker Ievoli Sun on
30 October 2000, (Girin, M., C. Rousseau, 2000) after the master and crew had been safely
rescued, and French pollution response specialists who assessed the related hazards, would
have dearly appreciated some demonstration that the master of the vessel was feeling
concerned by environmental preservation and willing to help. He and his officers arrived on
land without any document on the ship and its cargo in hands, only the information in their
minds. They were safe, thanks to the French authorities, their ship was to sink soon, and
they were unconcerned by what could result from the wreckage.
th
It might have been technically possible for the master to send immediately after his
mayday a fax or electronic message with information on ship structure, ship towing
equipment and cargo, for the benefit of those who would not only undertake to save him and
his crew, but who would afterward also face the pollution generated by his vessel.
And an environment conscious shipmaster, having experienced the training session
proposed above, might have made it his professional pride to bring with him, when rescued,
a full set of the key information available on ship structure, equipment and cargo, in the form
of a CD Rom or equivalent, quickly downloaded from the ship computers.
This is neither today in the agenda of a shipmaster, nor in that of the rulemakers to make
it a basic rule for shipmasters at evacuation time. As a consequence, in that particular
incident, the French salvers were obliged to investigate on spot, on a casualty ready to sink,
in a risky environment due to the bad weather, hazardous products and the possible risk of
explosion.
One of the major problems was to understand well the situation before intervention, to
prepare the logistics of the operation. Without reliable documents, we were obliged to work
on approximate schemes.
The lack of information can conduct to a miscellaneous assessment of the situation and
compromise all the operation as, when they are on spot, salvers are condemned to rely on
themselves.
In the same incident, the marine pollution responders were still trying to clear the exact
nature of one of the 3 chemicals of the ship cargo when the captain and officers arrived at
the marine pollution command centre. They did appreciate their verbal clarification. But, at a
time the media were eagerly asking multiple “what” on the exact nature of the cargo and its
hazards, they would very much have appreciated much more information in writing, including
the maritime safety data sheets of the products, which would arrive from the charterer only
hours later.
With the moderns means of communication, it should be quite easy to elaborate a
protocol to transfer in live, automatically from the ship, the data sheets concerning the
vessel and her cargo directly to the authorities in charge of the response. Nor
international rules are needed for that. Shipowners can decide by themselves to provide their
ships with the necessary means and to deliver relevant instructions to their masters. But
would they actually be prepared to do it on their own initiative ? Or will they, once again, wait
to start moving until international rules are proposed by others, lobbied for, negotiated and
entered into force. It has been stated many times that a shipowner “must not pay more than
his competitor” and that his main concern, once he is sure not to pay more, is the robustness
of his ship, not ways to help others would his ship become a source of trouble (Mikelis,
pers.com.). But there is also some evidence that the potential consequences of a pollution, in
terms of image, new rules, and finally increased business costs, are opening shipowners
minds to new concepts.
Conclusion
The ideas and proposals presented here are only examples, drawn out of the experience
of 3 specialists with far different but highly complementary professional backgrounds. It must
be clear that they have been formulated only because today’s shipping world has been
unable to demonstrate proper concern for the protection against accidental damage to those
living along coastlines endangered by the not so innocent passage of heavy maritime traffic.
The authors are technical specialists, not activists. They do not ask for traffic limitations,
increased punitive damage, or differential treatment. They understand the concern of
shipowners for fair competitiveness. They understand that safety, seen through the eyes of a
shipowner and master, is safety of the crew first, safety of the shipowner and charterer
property second, and anything more after.
But that “anything more” cannot remained ignored by shipowners on the ground that an
international compensation system exists for economic damage, within set financial limits.
Willingly or not, shipowners will have to show in the future their readiness to pay attention to
the coastal populations.
The ideas and proposals presented here could contribute to demonstrate a starting
concern of shipowners for the interests of others. They would not revolutionise the
international shipping world. None can fulfil the “never again” dream of the general public.
But each is a stone, and not a costly one, that could positively contribute to an
environmentally safer shipping.
The authors are conscious that others, in their countries and elsewhere, have experience,
ideas and proposals of interest, that could become other constructive stones toward
environmentally safer shipping. They would happily contribute, in the frame of the pending
projects of regional maritime safety agencies, to the setting up of one or several international
and informal think tanks or working groups to examine and discuss the ideas presented here,
as well as other ideas of interest, and to identify the most suitable ways to implement those
of greater value and most acceptable cost.
The think tanks would review the technical pro’s and con’s of each idea. They would take
into account the legitimate views of all parties concerned. They would foresee the global
objective of reaching commonly accepted technical terms for efficient implementation. Those
technical terms would then be made freely available, through any suitable means, to the
national, regional and international rulemakers, for possible ruling at any level, if deemed
appropriate.
In the same time, would some projects find acceptance from the authorities
concerned and from most innovative parties of the international shipping world, the
think tanks proposed would organise themselves into operational format, to start
implementing the accepted projects at pilot level, with the volunteer parties.
References
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Strength of the Buffer Bow Structures. Proc. of the 2nd International Conference on
Collision and Grounding of Ships (ICCGS 2001)
Girin, M. and C. Rousseau (2000). Naufrage du Ievoli Sun, Les Casquets, Manche, 31
octobre 2000 (wreckage of the Ievoli Sun, The Casquets, English Channel, 31 october
2000), Bulletin d’information du Cedre, n° 14, pp. 4-7.
Girin, M. ed. (2001). From the Nakhodka to the Erika : Exchange of Experience in At-Sea
Response to Offshore Oil Spills by Passing Ships. Conference Proceedings of Cedre,
Brest, France, 162 p. (also available in CDRom)
Ship and Ocean Foundation (1997). International Symposium on Marine Oil Spill Response,
16-17 July 1997, Tokyo, Japan, 313 p.
Mikelis, N. (pers.com.). Raising Newbuilding Standards : The Balance between Cost,
Competition and Enhanced Safety. Intertanko Safety Commission, mimeo, 24 p.
Scénario catastrophe
Jacques LOISEAU
Président
ASSOCIATION FRANCAISE DES CAPITAINES DE NAVIRES
Rue de BASSAM
29200 BREST
Tél : 02.98.46.37.60 - Fax : 02.98.46.83.61 - [email protected]
Certains accidents maritimes de ces dernières années ont été très médiatisés dans nos
régions et c'est excellent pour faire évoluer la sécurité maritime.
Sécurité maritime rime avec mers plus propres, certes, encore faudrait-il que les rejets
terrestres suivent la courbe décroissante des accidents et rejets volontaires des navires.
Nous constatons avec tristesse qu'un naufrage d'un ferry aux Philippines entraînant plus de
400 personnes dans la mort, ne fait pas plus qu'un entrefilet dans nos journaux alors qu'
ERIKA avec l'horreur de la pollution, sans une victime, dont les effets naturels et financiers
se résorberont dans quelques temps aura été l'occasion d'une production abondante
médiatique et livresque.
Nous n'avons pas encore assisté à toute la variété possible d'accidents maritimes avec leur
conséquence en perte de vie humaine ou de catastrophe écologique.
Peu d'accidents sont bénins au sens écologique, souvenez-vous de ce paisible cargo
"FENES" chargé de blé qui s'est éventré sur la côte corse, créant une pollution significative
par la fermentation du blé répandu sur le fond.
Nous avons vu le porte conteneurs "MELBRIDGE BILBAO" venu s'échouer sur les rochers
de l'Ile Molène comme ses frères "KINI KERSTEN" sur une plage du Cotentin ou du
"COASTAL BAY" à l'entrée de Liverpool parce que l'officier de quart s'était endormi.
Imaginons le porte conteneurs de 12000 boites que certains armateurs veulent construire se
brisant sur la côte, conteneurs chargés évidemment d'une énorme quantité de produits
dangereux ou polluants.
Imaginons à la place d'AMOCO CADIZ un LPG de 75.000 m3 chargé de propane? Que
serait devenue la population et toute la vie côtière? Le propane se vaporisant et restant
particulièrement froid aurait recouvert la côte asphyxiant tout, à moins de rencontrer
l'étincelle le faisant exploser?
Imaginons le transport de GNL de 125.000 m3 victime d'un abordage à proximité d'un port?
Le méthane à -164° se déversant à la mer, créant un iceberg qui en se désintégrant
progressivement bombarderait de glaçons les environs tout en créant des ondes de choc.
Imaginons le désastre qu'aurait pu présenter l'abordage du "VASCO da GAMA", éthylénier,
qui, abordé devant Terneuzen n'a pas eu de cuve touchée… certains spécialistes disaient
que si une cuve s'était déversée brutalement dans l'estuaire, l'explosion se serait fait sentir
jusqu'à Anvers où plus une vitre ne serait restée en place.
Mesure-t-on les conséquences d'une brèche dans une cuve d'un chimiquier transportant du
"VCM" ou de tout autre produit cancérigène à l'abord d'un port?
Les caboteurs peuvent devenir abordeurs et être à l'origine de catastrophes, et pourtant
certains règlements ne leur sont pas imposés.
Cette litanie apocalyptique, non pas pour vous empêcher de dormir ce soir, mais pour poser
les questions :
Les décideurs, nos protecteurs, les organismes de sauvetage et de protection sont-ils
prêt à affronter de tels désastres ? Chaque accident semble surprendre et oblige à innover.
Sauf peut être la lutte contre la pollution par hydrocarbures hélas assez courante qui a fait de
gros progrès.

Aura-t-on les moyens de limiter la course au gigantisme?
A-t-on fait le maximum pour éviter l'accident ? Surveillance de la qualité des navires et
des effluents, mais surtout qualité des marins, de leur formation, de la qualité de leur travail
et de leur condition de vie? Car ne l'oublions pas, ce sont souvent les premières victimes et
c'est de la qualité de leur travail que dépend la propreté des mers.

Technical and Operational Options for Safer Tankers
Options Techniques et Opérationnelles pour des Tankers plus Sûrs
Volker BERTRAM/ Ould M. El Moctar
Directeur H.S.V.A
Bramfelder Str 164
22305 HAMBURG
Tél : 49.40.69.20.32.39 – Fax : 49.40.69.20.33.45 – [email protected] - [email protected]
.
Abstract
Tanker accidents fuel the public discussion on maritime safety and corresponding legislation.
Technical and operational measures - already implemented and under discussion - are
reviewed. A focus is here also on available expert system technology which is hardly used. If
available and proposed measures would be implemented, tanker safety would be
significantly increased with a modest increase in gasoline and fuel oil prices. The problem is
that many tanker accidents are due to violations of existing legislation. The problem of
implementing safety is then addressed with proposals to increase liability and mandatory
insurance independent of where the ship is registered.
Les accidents causés par les tankers animent les polémiques portant sur la sécurité maritime
et sa législation. Des mesures techniques et opérationnelles - en application à l'heure
actuelle et en cours de discussion - sont passées en revue dans cet article. Si les mesures
proposées ou existantes avaient été mises en application, la sécurité des tankers aurait pu
être considérablement augmentée en contrepartie d'une modeste augmentation des coûts en
carburant et en fioul. Le problème réside dans le fait que la plupart des accidents sont dus
au non-respect de la législation en vigueur. Définir un e législation sur la sécurité concerne
d'une part des modèles visant à augmenter la sûreté et d'autre part la responsabilité
publique indépendamment du pays d'immatriculation du navire.
Introduction
On 12 December 1999, the Maltese-flagged tanker "Erika" broke in two off the coast of
Brittany, whilst carrying approximately 30,000 t of heavy fuel oil. An estimated 26,000 t were
spilled, but the crew of 26 was fortunately saved despite difficult weather conditions. Initially
the oil spill drifted parallel to the coast, but after several days the winds changed and the oil
spill was driven ashore. 400 km of coastline were polluted, causing huge damage to wildlife
and threatening the region's tourist industry. The "Erika" disaster fuels the discussions on
tanker safety until today. But before we will discuss technical and management approaches
to safer tankers, we will give some more background on tanker oil spills to understand the
problems better.
Size matters
Although tanker accidents account for only perhaps 5-10% of the total oil in the sea, it is the
spectacular major incidents which appear in the media and which are most likely to influence
future legislation, because of the greater visible impact to the environment.
According to the International Tanker Owners' Pollution Federation (ITOPF), most oil spills
from tankers result from routine operations such as loading, discharging and bunkering.
However, the vast majority of these oil spills involve small quantities. While small tanker spills
happen around the globe probably every day, the major spills make the news and result in
political activity.
Much has already been achieved in reducing oil pollution of the seas. The introduction of
industry practices such as "load on top" and crude oil washing for oil tankers, coupled with
segregated ballast requirements for tankers has contributed significantly towards reducing
operational pollution in the past two decades. The passing of MARPOL 73/78 can be
credited with a substantial positive impact in decreasing the amount of oil that enters the sea
from maritime transportation.
While the operational spills have been drastically reduced, problems with major accidental oil
spills persist, typically evidenced by the cases of the tanker "Braer" off the coast of Shetland
(1993), the tanker "Sea Empress" off Milford Haven (1996), or the tanker "Erika" off the coast
of Brittany (1999). Further disaster are likely to occur. The world's merchant fleet grows,
Table I, and unless ships become safer, this means that also the probability of accidents
grows.
Table I: World merchant fleet 1995-2000, source: Lloyd's Register, World Fleet Statistics
Tableau I: Flotte mondiale des navires de commerce 1995-2000
Year
1995
Number of ships
82890
Tonnage (million 490.6
gt)
1996
84264
507.6
1997
85494
522.2
1998
85828
531.9
1999
86817
543.6
2000
87546
559.1
The first ship to exclusively carry a cargo of petroleum appeared on the oceans in 1861,
carrying a mere 224 tdw (tons deadweight). Within a good century, the size of tankers had
exploded to ultra-large crude carriers (ULCC) carrying in excess of 500,000 tdw, and
1,000,000 tdw tankers were planned when the first oil crisis stopped the growth in size. The
reasons for the rapid development were demand for oil transport, economy of size and
technology progress making the largest ships in the history of mankind possible. The
economy of size was due to several factors. The surface of a tanker (and thus roughly its
steel weight, power requirement, fuel consumption, painting cost, etc) increases with the
square of its length if geometric proportions are kept. Its volume (tank carrying capacity and
thus roughly income) increases with the third power of its length. The crew is nearly
independent of the size. Thus a big tanker can transport oil much cheaper than a small
tanker.
The advent of modern computer simulations for ship strength (finite-element methods)
allowed ever bigger ships with ever lighter structures. A super-tanker may appear as
tremendous mass to an individual human. However, it has a relatively thin structure. A ULCC
has typically similar ratios of main dimensions as two shoe boxes put in line. If we would
scale down the ULCC to the length of two shoe boxes, the models typical side-wall thickness
would be a mere 0.1mm, or the thickness of usual sheet of paper! Corrosion reduces this
thickness with age. It is only because of the ingenious inner system of honeycomb-like
stiffeners that the tanker survives usual operation in seaways.
Nevertheless, no other cargo ship has such relatively thin structures. The very size of the
tanker makes it also so difficult to inspect. Cargo holds are 30 times higher than the size of a
human inspector who is often expected to pass his judgement while the ship is in port, i.e.
say within one or two days. Initial restrictions on tank size were adjusted in the course of
tanker development allowing also bigger and bigger tanks. In sum, the potential and actual
size of oil spills grew also in time. The power of tankers grew only moderately in respect to
size. This made tankers fuel efficient and environmentally friendly in terms of emissions. It
also made tankers the relatively lowest powered ships in our fleets. Table II gives relative
power in comparison to mass for various vehicles to give an impression of how little engine
power big tankers have. A car with same power/mass ratio as a supertanker would be
powered by a mere 100 W, i.e. a light bulb! Thus tankers accelerate and decelerate very
slowly. Stopping ways of several kilometers are not unusual for tankers. As an aggravating
circumstance, the rudder becomes largely ineffective during a crash-stop maneuver.
This means that the ship veers off its course uncontrollably. Often an avoidance maneuver is
the better strategy. However, the rudders of tankers are also relatively small for the size of
the ship. Current tankers react only with considerable delay and very sluggishly. They require
thus more forethought and forewarning times than other ships. Alternatively, one could say
that their manoeuvring equipment is undersized.
Table II: Ratio of installed power to mass of vehicle
Tableau II: Rapport puissance installée/tonnage
Porsche 911 GT2
Mercedes C180
Tug
Container ship (panmax)
ULCC
[kW/t]
227
63
4
0.5
0.07
So the very size of tankers, that makes them so economic, contributes at the same time to
their probability of having accidents. The safety record of tankers is not promising.
Supertankers and large bulk carriers have been aptly described as "supersinkers", Focus
(2000). In the past two decades, 180 bulk carrier sunk with 1465 lives lost at sea. For
comparison, the sinking of the "Titanic" involved a death toll of just 48 more deaths. In 1999,
154 ships (> 500 gross tons) sank. Yet the public did take little notice, because these ship
losses involved a few seamen at each time and did not cause major environmental
catastrophes in the western world. But that is just a lottery game. Sooner or later similar
catastrophes are bound to happen. The "Erika" will not be the only old tanker poorly
maintained, with structural flaws undetected by a classification society surveyor. But the
danger is that public and politician jump on one cause of tanker accidents and do not see the
larger picture. This often results in hasty legislation which reduces the risk of one cause for
failure drastically (naturally the one which caused the last disaster), but does not address
other failure modes and may indeed increase the risk of other failures. Structural failure (due
to poor maintenance and poor surveillance) was the cause of the "Erika" disaster. However,
statistics of tanker accidents show that grounding and collision were at least in the past the
most common causes of oil spills, Table III.
Table III: Cause of oil spills of more than 700 t 1979-1998, source: ITOPF 1999
Tableau III: Causes des marées noires de plus de 700 tonnes entre 1979 et 1998
Collision Grounding hull
failure
33%
32%
13%
Fire/explosion Loading/discharging others
7%
7%
8%
Current regulations governing damage stability and oil outflow for tankers are based on the
International Conference for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships, MARPOL'73,
implemented with the subsequent protocol of 1978. The MARPOL'73/78 regulations specified
requirements for limiting a "hypothetical outflow of oil" as well as limits for volumes and
dimensions of cargo tanks. Triggered by the grounding of the "Exxon Valdez" tanker, the
USA passed unilateral legislation, namely the US Oil Pollution Act, OPA'90, which became due to the importance of the USA in international trade - de facto world standard and has
strongly influenced over the past decade IMO discussions for new tanker regulations. IMO
regulations mandate double hull "equivalent environmental protection" for all new
constructions. However, single-hull tankers are allowed to operate until 2015 (!).
The discussion is focussed now on tankers and extensive legislation has been passed to
make tankers safer. But what is a tanker? Many IMO regulations apply for tankers above
5000t carrying capacity. The "Erika" disaster involved a 26,000t oil spill. Current post-panmax
containerships have already a typical fuel capacity of 10,000t. Jumbo container vessels
(JCV) with twice the capacity are widely expected to come, e.g. Bertram (1996).
These ships - while carrying more fuel than some tankers - operate outside IMO tanker
regulations. It may be an unsettling thought for some that we will have to wait for a major
disaster before legislation is passed addressing these "tankers in disguise". The danger for
JCVs may not be imminent. They will be new ships and operated by large, renowned ship
operators as they require considerable investment and existing integrated logistical chains.
But a generation from now on, these ships may well be in headlines again - this time not for
their technical progress.
Global safety approach considers engineering and operation aspects
But today, we are most concerned with tanker accidents which indeed pose the biggest
danger for oil spills. There are various ways to improve safety of tankers, some concern
engineering, some concern operation. We should take a system approach in safety rather
than focussing on one single aspect. We can e.g. compensate for relative structural
weakness or old designs (which are very expensive to change) by reducing the likelihood of
collisions and groundings by having better electronic equipment and better qualified and
supervised crews. Before entering into a discussion of how to achieve a better "global safety"
level, we will review nevertheless the most important individual aspects or components to
decrease environmental disasters due to tanker accidents.
We can prevent disasters at various instances of the typical sequential development of an oil
spill disaster :
•
•
•
•
Reduce the danger of the primary accident source (collision, grounding, fire)
Reduce the oil spill in case of a primary accident
Reduce the danger of the oil spill reaching the coast
Reduce the (biological) impact of the oil spill at the coast
Expert systems for collision/grounding avoidance hardly employed
The "Exxon Valdez" was built in accordance with the MARPOL convention and yet it caused
a major environmental disaster. The "Exxon Valdez" disaster highlights that we need to
address navigational errors and measures to reduce the risk from human errors (and
unprofessional conduct) in ship handling. Collision and grounding account for 2/3 of all
accidents, Table III.
Most references in the literature state that approximately 80% of all maritime accidents are
caused or aggravated by human error, e.g. Bea and Moore (1992). "Human errors" can be
manifold: poor standards, inadequate communication of standards, fatigue, alcohol or drug
abuse, poor equipment design, poor training, poor judgement, panic, etc. Statistics of the
Japanese Marine Association Inquiry Agency for 1993 gives poor watch-keeping as cause
for 54% of all collision accidents and dozing as cause for 48% of all grounding accidents in
Japanese waters, Murase (1995). Other sources mention that human errors at the origin of
accidents are often due to unnoticed or wrong interpretation of the displayed data by the
navigation or safety survey systems. Much could be avoided by installing "intelligent" bridge
systems.
Recent research in several high-tech shipbuilding nations has aimed at further reductions of
crew levels for both cargo and navy vessels while increasing levels of safety. The progress is
enabled by a combination of telecommunication, data acquisition, and branches of Artificial
Intelligence, especially expert systems. "Intelligent" expert systems model the human form of
problem solving and decision making, in the case of collision avoidance based on existing
rules (e.g. the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at Sea (1972), SOLAS
(1974), etc.) and human expert knowledge based e.g. on interviews or monitoring of
experienced ship masters. A ship can automatically detect dangers of collision and
grounding based on data input from radar, GPS, transponders etc. and knowledge of the
ship's manoeuvring characteristics and region (electronic sea chart). It can also automatically
derive suitable avoidance strategies. This is not science fiction! More than a decade ago, in
1989/1990 a real-ship trial with an automatic collision avoidance system was performed near
the Bay of Tokyo in an area of dense traffic, e.g. Kasai and Bertram (1996).
The ship steered safely in the congested sea traffic (up to 16 target ships) solving all collision
risk problems including one with a ship deliberately violating traffic rules and not giving right
of way. Further refinements resulted in the commercial "SuperBridge" system installed for the
first time in the 258,000 tdw tanker "Cosmo Delphinus", Kanamaru et al. (1994).
"SuperBridge" continuously monitors the dangers of grounding and collision on the basis of
the electronic chart (checking for shallows) and radar/ARPA (detecting surrounding ships).
The expert system determines secure avoidance route based on maritime traffic regulations
and good seamanship practice. For legal reasons, "SuperBridge" is an advisory system
requiring a confirmation of the system's decisions by the helmsman.
Over the past decade, the USA has developed and installed a number of comparably mature
"intelligent" navigational decision aids. The "Exxon Valdez" accident triggered the
development of the Shipboard Piloting Expert System (SPES) which was operated and
tested on Exxon tankers since 1992. Since 1995, the experience gained was used to develop
the Navigation and Piloting Expert System (NPES) for the San Francisco Bay as part of the
SmartBridge program. A SmartBridge prototype was installed on the "Chevron Washington",
a 70,000 tdw tanker, in 1997. The experience with the few installed systems shows that they
increase safety considerably relieving humans from tiring and ill-suited tasks like watchkeeping.
Human error happen also because the man-machine interface is poorly designed. Human
input should be minimized, but the remaining necessary interface should be the same in all
machines. We have yet to develop and implement standards for electronic charts, bridge
layout, fire-fighting equipment etc. Imagine the number of car accidents if the arrangement of
brake, gas and clutch pedals could be freely chosen by the designer. Unfortunately, this
describes largely the situation in designing the controls of a ship. The resulting accidents are
listed under "human error", implicitly often interpreted as crew's error. Official standards, e.g.
IMO regulations, take years before they come into effect. As long as the leading
manufacturers do not reach internal agreements, ship owners should consider only
integrated bridge systems to have at least within one ship a common user-interface, which
increases safety.
Integrated bridges with one common user-interface increase user-friendliness and thus
safety. In a quest for further improvement, the Japanese have added voice operation as the
latest development in ship handling. The ship master addresses the system by speaking
(e.g. ordering changes in speed or course, changing displays on screens, etc.) and the
system announces via loudspeaker relevant information (e.g. confirmations of accepted
orders, warnings and alarms, etc.). The voice-operated SuperBridge-X system has been
installed so far on two Japanese coastal tankers, Fukuto et al. (1998). The advantages of
voice-operated systems are obvious: The hands and eyes are free for other tasks, e.g.
watching the traffic and checking sea charts.
Transponders can enhance safety in many ways. They relieve the crew of standard
communication, can interact automatically with vessel traffic services (VTS) and on-board
expert systems for collision avoidance. The US Coast Guard has made transponders
mandatory for tankers above 20,000 tdw in Prince William sound in Alaska, National
Research Council (1994).
Several collision and grounding accidents are not due to errors in navigation, but due to
failure of the technical equipment, e.g. the rudder or rudder gear or the main engine. Various
technical option exist to supply emergency back-up systems, but all come at a price.
Redundant rudder systems are mandatory on ships carrying dangerous cargoes, but large
amounts of crude oil are not considered to be "dangerous" in the legal definition of IMO and
usual oil tankers are thus not subject to such a requirement.
If a tanker looses propulsive power (and thus also rudder effectiveness) or voluntarily stops
because its rudder is blocked, it soon drifts helplessly in the sea and may drift towards the
coast. In such events tugs can try to maneuver the tanker away from the coast. This is not
easy due to the size of the ships and the often adversary weather conditions.
Accidents have occurred because ship masters or ship owners have refused to accept tug
aid (to save money) until it was too late. Here legislation should be reformed that the
authorities can order tug deployment at the expense of the ship owner at a much earlier
stage.
The "Erika" was lost due to structural failure. The classification survey of the aging tanker
failed in preventing this disaster. As a reaction the international Condition Assessment
Scheme (CAS) has been revised introducing more stringent surveys for single-hull tankers.
These surveys are mandatory for all single-hull tankers intended to be in operation beyond
the year 2005.
New tanker designs reduce likelihood of oil spills
A lot of research and legislation has focussed on the problem of reducing the outflow of oil in
the event of collision or grounding. This is indeed important as tankers are too slow to avoid
collisions in some cases where the other ship violates traffic rules and rams the tanker. The
solutions are in principle very simple and appeal therefore also immediately to laymen
including politicians. We then target at creating a "bumper zone" on the outside of the tanker
quite similar to crash-zones in cars. The more energy the protecting bumper zone can
absorb, the less likely are internal tanks to be ruptured in the case of a collision.
Many design improvements for tankers have been proposed. The review of the National
Research Council, N.N. (1991), can still be considered as one of the best surveys of
concepts. The main "new" concepts for modern safer tankers are:
-
Double-hull tanker
The Americans favor the double-hull design: "For preventing oil outflow in low-energy
collisions or groundings, the double hull is, logically, the most effective design," N.N.
(1991). However, there is considerable dispute whether the double-hull design is really
the best engineering solution. Critics claim that the double-hull design may increase
problems with maintenance and inspection, as well as the risk of explosion and fire due
to hydrocarbon gases creeping into the double-bottom through cracks. So far, there have
been no reports of such accidents with double-hull tankers. Critics also claim that the
double-hull design does not remarkably decrease the average volume of oil outflow,
Hawa (2000), as the width of the protective layer is often not wide enough to prevent
penetration of the cargo holds. Wider wing tanks and more internal subdivision effectively
reduce the average volume of oil outflow, but also building cost.
-
Mid-deck tanker
As an alternative to double-hull tankers, Japanese shipbuilders proposed the "Mid-deck
Tanker" (MDT) with double sides, e.g. Isoda et al. (1992). After a comparative study, IMO
authorized the MDT as alternative to double-hull tankers, but the USA did not. The basic
idea is to divide the cargo tanks into a lower and an upper chamber. This reduces the
hydrostatic pressure (the weight of a vertical column of oil) acting on the tanker's bottom.
If the outer water pressure exceeds the hydrostatic oil pressure, in the event of bottom
damage the external water would (in theory) press the oil up and prevent it from flowing
out. In reality, some losses will occur due to hydrodynamic processes, but indeed the oil
outflow should be drastically reduced in case of bottom damage. Spaces in the doublesided hull are used for segregated ballast tanks or void spaces, providing greater
protection against collision than double hulls which have typically a much narrower
barrier. The construction costs are estimated to be similar as for a double-hull tanker.
-
Coulombi Egg
This design has been promoted as an alternative to double hulls,
http://heiwaco.tripod.com. The Coulombi Egg tanker is basically a single hull vessel with
two longitudinal bulkheads located at B/5. A horizontal bulkhead is situated at half depth.
The ship's cross section is thus divided into six compartments. The two upper wing tanks
are ballast tanks protecting the cargo in case of a side collision.
The lower tanks follow the mid-deck tanker principle avoiding larger spills due to
hydrostatic pressure. EC and IMO committees have included the single-hull Coulombi
Egg as a design offering equivalent or superior protection as a double-hull tanker. The
USA does not share this view and Coulombi Egg designs will not be allowed in US ports.
-
Vacuum method
The concept promoted by the Swedes in the early 1980s suggested that following an
accident, pressure valves on the damaged tanks should be shut down. Only a small
portion of the cargo would escape, and the reminder retained by the vacuum created in
the ullage space. The valves should then be operated automatically in case of a sudden
drop in the ullage. The concept was not adopted due to concerns that the vessel's
bulkheads might not withstand the vacuum conditions and the technical complexity of the
concept which would fail if the pressure valves were not maintained properly.
It is interesting to note that past tanker designs were safer in terms of compartment
subdivision than current tanker designs. Gleuel (1992) showed that subdivision of a typical
tanker of 1962 is more effective in reducing the average oil spill volume than modern doublehull and mid-tanker designs following current IMO regulations. This can be explained by a
tighter internal subdivision of the 1962 tanker.
The OPA and IMO regulations require a minimum distance of the cargo tanks from the outer
hull for double-hull tankers. This distance is a political and economical compromise. It does
not mean that a colliding ship will not rupture through all bulkheads and penetrate the inner
cargo tanks. The double-hull will prevent oil spills for "low-energy" impacts. The colliding ship
has a certain energy and will continue to move forward until this energy is used up. The main
part of the energy is absorbed in deformation of structures. If the energy is used up before
the cargo tanks are ruptured, the accident will not result in an oil spill. The energy absorbing
capacity of a structure depends on many factors, not just the void distance between outer
and inner hull. Material, plate thickness, welding, arrangement and type of structural
stiffeners, etc. play a big role in how much energy is absorbed before a colliding ship hits a
cargo tank. Research has been active in the past years on making tanker structural design
more resistant to damage (crash-proof). Extensive large-scale tests were performed in an
international cooperation between Germany, the Netherlands, and Japan to investigate the
mechanisms involved in collision and grounding, e.g. Kitamura and Kuroiwa (1996). The test
ships consisted of two inland waterway tankers. The test section was modelled as a tanker of
40,000 tdw scaled down 1:3. Crash tests against a (scaled down) bulbous bow and an
artificial rock were performed with a speed of 6 knots. The data collected served to validate
and improve finite-element computer simulations of such collisions. The validated simulation
tools can now be employed to evaluate alternative structural designs in terms of crash-proof
qualities.
Various alternative or supplementary solutions have been investigated to increase the
penetration resistance. This include internal deflecting hulls shaped similar as ice-breaking
bows, bow structures reinforced to absorb stresses over a larger area thus deforming but not
tearing, high-tensile steels for bottom structures, or even such exotic concepts as concrete
hull structures of ceramic-clad hull structures, N.N. (1991). High-tensile steels found wider
acceptance, but a problem with high-tensile steels is that they have the same fatigue
strength and corrode just as quickly as other steels, and thinner plates and cracks may then
become more critical as tankers age.
Proposals to prevent oil spills by internal liners of reinforced elastomeric resin fiber (in
essence giant plastic bags inside each tank) have been rejected due to complexity and
concerns that these may rip and make inspection, maintenance and cleaning of tanks
cumbersome.
Regulation 26 of Annex I of MARPOL requires that all ships carry on board a shipboard oil
emergency plan (SOPEP), intended for use following any accidental discharge. This is just
an extension of the conventional approach to damage control which relies on human
intervention under crisis conditions to integrate, evaluate and initiate actions.
The contingency plans and emergency procedures are often distributed into several manuals
like a "Damage Control Booklet", "Bridge Procedures", "Emergency Check List", and "Ship
Fire Fighting Manual". The "booklet" for damage control may comprise several hundred
pages covering a wide range of possible cases. Information retrieval from each of these
sources is time-consuming and error-prone under stress. Expert systems have been
developed to improve this situation. Such systems may incorporate early failure detection
and automatically react quickly. Advanced damage control decision systems have been
developed for navy combatants, e.g. Scott (1995), but are yet to be applied to tankers. These
systems could quite easily improve safety of existing older tankers.
First priority should lie with preventing spills
The first priority should lie on preventing accidents, the second priority on preventing or
minimizing oil spills in case of accidents. However, we have to prepare for oil spills
nevertheless. There is no 100% safety against accidental spills possible and there is also the
danger of deliberate (terrorist) spills. (The worst oil spill in history was the deliberate action of
Iraqi troops in the gulf war setting fire to oil wells and pumping oil from barges and tanks into
the sea, Table IV.)
But if after all an oil spill occurs, the task is to confine the spill and to prevent it from polluting
coastal areas. Several such methods are used in the event of an oil spill. None of the
methods in use today is 100% effective. The main alternatives are:
•
•
•
•
Mechanical (Booms restrain the oil spill, oil skimmers of various designs and pumps)
Not suitable for rough sea states and very sensitive to sea state. Good from
environmental point of view. Effort increases with size of oil spill. Much experience with
this technique.
Dispersants (chemical substances applied from planes, helicopters or ships with spray
booms)
Suitable for large oil spills, but must be applied within hours to be effective; potentially
large environmental damage
In-situ burning
Suitable for large oil spills; must be applied within hours of spill; risk of ship explosion; air
pollution
Bio-remedation/bio-degradation
Promising from environmental point of view; time-consuming; little experience outside
laboratory conditions; bio-remedation will also be a key technology to clean polluted
beaches
Schroh (1995) lists several arguments why chemical dispersants were largely replaced by
mechanical recovery in Germany's strategy for oil spill combat:
• Use of dispersants increases the threat of subsurface organisms by temporarily
increasing the toxic concentrations in the water
• Penetration of oil in the sea bottom will be increased by the dispersants thus potentially
endangering marine life at the sea bottom (shells, fish breeding grounds, etc)
• The toxic effect of the oil treated with dispersants can be much higher than that of
untreated oil
• Dispersants become ineffective for highly viscous oil like heavy fuel oil. Weathering and
aging increases the viscosity of oil. Rapid reaction is vital as many oil types loose their
dispersability within a few hours after initial sea surface contact.
• Oil slicks are uneven in thickness making suitable dosage of dispersants problematic.
Overdosing leads to increased toxicity and thus additional endangering of marine life.
Time is often of essence in oil spills. Remote satellite sensing is increasingly a technique to
detect oil spills early that are not communicated quickly by the ship's crew themselves.
Remote sensing can provide detailed information on the position and extent of the oil spill.
Such information should be incorporated in emergency plans which can be invoked quickly.
Decision support systems (expert systems) could again support in reacting quickly and
correctly.
Once the oil reaches the coastal lines, the main task is to quickly set up centers for collecting
and de-oiling seabirds. Again, we would profit from research for biodegrading oil, both in the
coastal waters and on the beaches.
Regulations for safety usually passed after a disaster
Most safety regulations for ships result unfortunately from political pressure after ship
disasters have happened. The examples speak for themselves:
•
•
•
•
The first SOLAS (safety of life at sea) conference was initiated after the "Titanic" disaster,
but recommendations were not passed due to World War I. (The fifth SOLAS conference
recommendations (SOLAS'74) are now in effect specifying limits for life saving equipment
and survivability in case of damaged hulls.)
The "Stockholm agreement" was passed after the "Estonia" disaster
The "Torrey Canyon" disaster happened in 1967. In 1968, the United Nations assembly
regulated a resolution that an effective international convention for the prevention of
marine pollution should be prepared. In response to the resolution, MARPOL'73 was
(International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships 1973) passed, but
went only in a somewhat watered down version as modified by the Protocol of 1978 in
1983 into force, 16 years after the accident of the "Torrey Canyon".
OPA'90 was passed 1 year after the "Exxon Valdez" disaster requiring double-hull
tankers in US waters with "grandfather" clause for tankers up to 2015. IMO regulations
followed allowing alternative designs widely perceived to offer superior safety against
environmental disasters.
In addition to these largely technically oriented regulations, IMO has recently added formal
frameworks for operation specifically aimed at reducing the likelihood of human error in
shipping:
•
•
International Safety Management (ISM)
IMO has adopted a series of resolutions dealing with guidelines on management
procedures to improve safety of shipping. These have resulted in the International Safety
Management Code (ISM Code) of 1993. The ISM code gives guidelines to systematic
ship operation management which is a good step to reduce errors. It focuses particularly
on the issue of poor management, but many other sources of human error remain. The
ISM code became mandatory for many classes of ships in July 1998 and will be extended
to further classes of ships in 2002. If properly implemented a safety management system
will reduce the likelihood of human error in case of an accident and increase the
likelihood of correct and swift action to minimize damages.
International Convention on Standards of Training, Certification and Watchkeeping for
Seafarers (STCW'95)
This convention should be fully implemented by 2002 contributing to the level of
seafarers' competence worldwide. The code specifies both the education and onboard
training plus it regulates the rest periods for watchkeepers. The STCW code also
specifies that the Port States shall control that the officers really fulfil what is specified in
the code and may detain the ship otherwise.
Most major operators are highly professional and some implement their own standards on
top of what is prescribed by international regulations. The Danish ship operator Maersk
(A.P.Møller) is reported to conduct random alcohol and drug tests on its crews terminating
immediately contracts in the event of finding a crew member guilty of abuse while at work.
The example may be recommended generally also tanker operation.
Then why do accidents happen again and again despite all these regulations? First of all,
there is no 100% safety! It has been said that a ship is only safe when it is scrapped. But we
can influence if we have 99% safety, or 99.9%, or 99.99999%. What is "safe enough"?
This is difficult to quantify, but we may generally state that "safe enough" is when the public
perceives an accident as "force majeure". "Risk can never be eliminated entirely, but it can
be reduced at some cost to a value acceptable to society. Society enjoys the benefits of oil
transportation but now demands a substantial risk reduction, for which it presumably is
prepared to pay reasonable costs", N.N. (1991). If a ship is lost in a particular violent storm,
due to terrorist attacks or a bizarre chain of coincidences, we will shrug off an environmental
disaster as inevitable. However, if the crew is careless or unprofessional (watching TV while
they should be on the bridge, being drunk, etc.), if inspectors of classification societies do not
properly inspect, if safety equipment is rusting away because it is not properly maintained,
the public (and thus for a while also the politicians) will not accept the common tune that this
was a regrettable single incident. The task is to make ships safe enough that accidents of
major impact occur only very rarely. We have not reached that level for tanker shipping.
Implementing safety should follow economic mechanisms
Regulations for maritime safety must be international due to the very nature of shipping and
pollution. Marine pollution off the coast of one country can easily spread to another country.
Also, legislation passed in one country could render ports or shipping less competitive than in
other countries. However, the US American Oil Pollution Act shows that regulations can be
enforced without having to have global consensus in the United Nations. The EC is
sufficiently strong as a maritime player that regulations enforced within the EC would become
de facto standard for shipbuilders worldwide.
The best regulations is useless if it is not enforced. IMO regulations are not enforced
everywhere with the same rigor. Tankers operate often under "flags of convenience" where
taxes are lower and supervision is lenient or the flag country is unable to implement its own
laws. Before we debate further regulations, we should ensure that current regulations are
indeed enforced. There is a clear need for some other "policing" tool in shipping to ensure
that regulations are followed. Many see port state control (PSC) as the most suitable such
tool. Under PSC, ships calling at a state's port can be inspected to ensure compliance with
international standards. Substandard ships can then be detained or otherwise fined. But PSC
has its short-comings. As PSC is carried during port calls, the ability to inspect cargo and
ballast tanks is limited and inspection of the underwater hull practically impossible. Thus PSC
will not be very effective in detecting structural problems. Competition between ports poses
the danger that surveyors are under pressure as ports will not want to loose trade due to
PSC harassment. Ideally, same PSC standards should be applied throughout the EC. A lot
would be achieved if PSC inspectors had access to databases listing the ship's history of
surveys. So far classification societies refuse to grant access to their records claiming special
client relationships, not unlike banks protect customer data. However, this could be
overcome given the political will. Both ship owners and classification societies could be
pressured into cooperation. The EC initiative for a database on safety and quality
performance of ships (www.EQUASIS.org) is an indication of future databases for PSC
inspectors. However, PSC has still several faults. The same general problems as with
classification societies occur. Individual surveyors will have to inspect ships of tremendous
size in short time and will not detect some flaws.
At best, PSC will enforce current legislation designed to enforce a minimum level of safety
and the regulations and processes are too rigid to follow technology or market development.
IMO regulations are very cumbersome and require several years or even more than a
decade before they come into force. They are unable to react quickly to new technological
developments or otherwise changed conditions. They should therefore rather act like a
constitutions giving general guidelines and we should have other mechanisms to react
quickly to perceived dangers or new technological possibilities. IMO regulations also specify
typically explicit lower thresholds for safety measures. Higher safety levels are de facto
punished as they are equivalent from the legal point of view and more expensive from the
financial point of view. The result is clear: we usually get ships just one notch above the legal
minimum level of safety. Existing technical and operational features to make shipping safer is
hardly employed, e.g. commercially available expert systems like SuperBridge, advanced
structural design meriting class notation COLL, better rudder equipment with back-up
features, etc. The E3 tanker (E3 = ecological, economical, European), developed by a
European consortium of shipyards a decade ago, incorporates many exemplary safety
features and was heralded as a model of a new generation of safe tankers, but it is never
built as its costs were 15%-20% higher than for other tankers.
Safety will only be actively pursued if there is some benefit seen in safety. If we want safer
ships we must make them more attractive to ship operators and seamen. The natural way is
to internalize external costs. As long as major environmental disasters are paid by the
community, there is no incentive for the ship operator to increase safety. The cost of
construction for a double-hull tanker (or a mid-deck tanker) were estimated to be 25%
greater than for single-hull tankers and the transport cost 11% higher, McKenzie (1990). As
transport cost are only a fraction of the total price of gasoline, the effect on the gasoline price
will be a few cents at most, but for a fiercely competitive transport market, the effect is that
aging single-hull capacity is used as long as possible, probably resulting in an increasingly
lower safety level of tankers until the year 2015. If safer ships had economic benefits (like
reduced insurance rates, access to more ports, lower port fees etc.), ship owners would
pursue actively better safety. A current measure under discussion is making compliance with
the ISM code condition of insurance coverage. This would be a step in the right direction, but
not enough.
Liability is a topic widely discussed in the context of oil spills. The American Petroleum
Institute advertises on its website: "Before entering U.S. waters, vessel owners must
demonstrate financial capability, up to their own limits of liability, to clean up spills and
respond to claims brought about as a result of a spill." A German representative of
Greenpeace contrasts this in an interview: A usual car insurance in Germany covers
damages up to 2.5 million Euro, while the liability of a ship owner for an oil tanker accident
may be limited to 1.7 million Euro for comparison! Indeed liability varies widely, both in the
laws of individual countries and in ship owners' practice. In addition, insurance usually covers
only damages which can be financially quantified and proven. In practice, individuals and
collectively "the taxpayer" cover the rest which can only be estimated. Oil companies like
Exxon have a strong interest in safe tankers. In the case of an accident, customers in Europe
and the US change towards competitors resulting in a financial loss not covered by any
insurance on top of the liability costs. The "Exxon Valdez" was by far not the biggest oil spill
in history, Table IV, but it was the so far most expensive one for the owner. Current tankers
of big oil companies are role models in terms of safety, both in terms of technical and
operational aspects. But oil companies have largely disposed of their tanker fleets! By
splitting their fleet into single-ship companies, owners have reduced their financial risk. Oil for
big oil companies is transported cheaply in anonymous tanker fleets with low standards,
removing liability claims and the threat of public opinion disasters for the oil companies.
Table IV: Major oil spills and causes; various sources
Tableau IV: Les plus importantes marées noires et leurs causes: sources diverses
Kuwait dock & wells
Nowruz oil field
IXTOC I
Aegean Captain /
Express
Castillo de Bellver
Amoco Cadiz
Torrey Canyon
...
Braer
...
Sea Empress
...
Exxon Valdez
...
Erika
1,300,000t
600,000t
600,000t
Atlantic 257,000t
spillage/fire
blowout
blowout
collision
19-jan-1991
Feb-1983
3-jun-1979
19-jun-1979
239,000t fire/explosion 6-aug-1983
221,000t grounding 16-mar-1978
121,000t grounding 18-mar-1967
85,000t
grounding
5-jan-1993
72,000t
grounding
15-feb-1996
36,000t
grounding
24-mar-1989
26,000t
structural
13-dec-1999
Perhaps we should have mandatory insurance coverage from ship owner and cargo owner
making sure that in the case of an accident an insurance company in Europe covers the
damage up to the actually occurring cost including the biological damage to the state or
community. This would remove current incentives to have one-ship companies with low
liability and subsequent low standards. Private insurance companies could reward improved
safety by reduced premiums and can react much faster to changing conditions. We could
strive for a global safety level where weaknesses in some aspects can be compensated by
other means, e.g. restriction to certain routes avoiding coastal areas as far as possible or
improved navigational means etc.
Formal safety assessment methods are still not widely adopted in the marine industries. For
certain aspects, classification societies have adopted suitable frameworks of systematic risk
effect analysis, e.g. Payer (1996). These frameworks consider failure probability of
components and the expected damage to humans, environment and ship in case of failure.
More critical components are then subject to more rigorous inspection cycles and
requirements. Application of similar frameworks to tanker safety could help in quantifying
risks and obtain in such manner a higher global safety level. The current policies focus
instead usually always on one element in a chain of potential risks, e.g. the passive collision
and grounding protection of the structure. Measure to improve one risk aspect alone may
well increase other risks and thus not achieve the desired global aim of reducing
environmental disasters to the desired extent.
Conclusion
Technical progress is much faster than international regulations. New risks appear and
current legislation is not capable of addressing these risks sufficiently. But neither is
stagnation in current technology an option, as much of the progress is both economically and
ecologically desirable. It seems as if we will have to be resigned to occasional disasters
happening due to technology changes, even though we can improve tanker safety at
acceptable cost. Technically many things are possible. If the political will is there to have
safer shipping, we will have safer shipping.
Acknowledgment
This work is dedicated to Prof. Walter Abicht who taught us much, not just about tankers.
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Appendix: Historical development of tankers (Sources: Prof. W. Abicht; Brennecke
(1980))
1861 first record of a ship carrying exclusively petroleum (224 tdw); initially ships transport
petroleum in barrels, later in canisters
1862 first petroleum clipper "Atlantic" with 8 cargo tanks (1 longitudinal bulkhead, 5
transversal bulkheads); carrying capacity 700 liters petroleum; cargo discharge with
on-board pumps in 24 hours
1869 Belgian sailing ship "Charles" converted to tanker: 59 block-shaped tanks with each
13 t oil capacity standing loosely side-by-side in the lower deck; burnt in 1872
1885 Conversion of tank sailing ship "Andromeda" from barrel to tank carrying ship with
total of 72 tanks with 2376 t capacity. The "Andromeda" was the first successful
transatlantic tanker; the journey from Germany to New York took typically 72 days.
1885 The wooden US tank sailing ship "Crusader" had 47 tanks. Although the era of steam
ships had begun, the tanker was built as sailing ship due to the danger of
fires/explosions in steam ships.
1885 The first steel tankers powered by steam appear in Germany ("Glückauf") and
Sweden ("Petrola") as single-hull ships. Germanischer Lloyd (GL) and Lloyd's register
(LR) refuse classification of the single-hull ships due to safety concerns, Bureau
Veritas (BV) grants classification; soon several steam ships were converted to steam
tankers in England, e.g. 1886 the "Chigwell".
1886 The first newly built tanker in steel "Glückauf" is built in England for a German ship
owner; 3,000 tdw (2,700 t oil); the "Glückauf" had already several typical tanker
features: engine aft due to safety reasons, coffer dam separating engine room and
cargo tanks, cargo space divided by 10 transverse bulkheads and one longitudinal
bulkhead, use of several tanks as ballast tanks when returning without cargo (a tanker
practice banned much later by the MARPOL'73/78 regulations)
First tankers had problems in finding crews and entering some ports due to safety
concerns, but the financial and operational success of the "Glückauf" initiated a tanker
boom.
1890 41 steam tankers serve the transatlantic trade; Germany and UK at that time world
leaders in tanker construction
1903 The "Narragansett" sets new record as biggest and fastest tanker with 12,500 tdw
and 13 knots
1907 The Suez canal lifts the ban for tankers to cross
1908 New system of longitudinal stiffeners ("Isherwood" system) introduced to increase
longitudinal strength of tankers
1909 MS "Vulcanus" as first ocean-going motorship tanker with 1194 tdw and 7 kn speed
1913 Steamship tanker "San Fraterno" with 15700 tdw largest tanker of the world
1928 First diesel-electric driven tanker "Brunswick"
1930 Introduction of the tanker freeboard in International Load Line Convention (ILCC);
Welding enters increasingly ship production technology
1939/45 The war favors series of tankers; the USA build 481 units of the type T2 (16,000
tdw)
1950 "Large" tankers with 24,000 to 27,000 tdw capacity enter the arena
1953 The German built "Tina Onassis" sets a new record with 45,242 tdw; the enormous
demand for oil leads to 50% of all newly built ships being oil tankers at this time
1956 The Japanese built "Universe Leader" sets a new record at 85,000 tdw
1959 The Japanese built "Universe Apollo" sets a new record with 106,000 tdw
1962 Japan becomes technology leader in tanker construction; "Nissho Maru" with 132,000
tdw new record
1963 Classification societies allow larger distances between transverse bulkheads; first
segregated ballast tanks appear
1964 Bulbous bows are introduced on tankers to decrease resistance
1966 First VLCC (Very Large Crude Carrier = tanker with more than 150,000 tdw) in Japan
built; the "Tokyo Maru" sets new record with 153,000 tdw; 290m long, 16m draft;
cargo discharge in 20 hours
1966 The International Load Line Convention (ILCC) allows a lower freeboard for tankers,
thus increasing economies considerably
1967 The "Idemitsu Maru" sets new record at 213,360 tdw; 326 m long, 17.70 m draft
1967 The "Torrey Canyon" disaster off the southern coast of England; begin of a worldwide
discussion on tanker safety with respect to oil spills
1968 First ULCC (ultra large crude carrier = tanker with more than 300,000 tdw); the
"Universe Ireland" sets new record with 316,000 tdw; 330 m long, 24.80 m draft
1969 First VLCC with double bottom; concept not successful
1970 Several tanker losses due to explosions of VLCCs (due to electrostatics charges
created during tank cleaning)
1971 First IMCO (predecessor of IMO) recommendations for maximum cargo hold size
1973 The Japan built "Globtik Tokyo" sets new record at 477,000 tdw; 360 m long, 28.20 m
draft
1973 First oil crisis; drastic reduction of demand for tankers
1976 The "Batillus" sets new record at 553,662 tdw; 402 m long, 28.6 m draft
1978 "Amoco Cadiz" disaster in Brittany
1978 Additional protocols to MARPOL and SOLAS passed by IMO
1980 The "Seawise Giant" is converted to 564,763 tdw setting a new record
1983 MARPOL'73/78 enters worldwide in force
1989 The "Exxon Valdez" disaster sets a new record in damages paid by a ship operating
company and sparks worldwide protests
1990 The US congress passes the Oil Pollution Act (OPA'90) requiring double-hull
construction for tankers in US waters; a "grandfather" clause permits single-hull
tankers to operate until 2015
1993 IMO largely follows OPA in the Regulation 13F to Annex I of MARPOL 73/78 passing
recommendation for double-hull tankers, mid-deck tankers, or design alternatives
offering equivalent or superior protection. The USA does not accept Regulation 13F
insisting on double-hull designs.
1999 Tanker accident "Erika" off the coast of Brittany sparks new discussion on tanker
safety
The contribution of shipbuilders to safer seas
Newbuildings and technology
Rafael GUTIERREZ
Association of European shipbuilders and Ship Repairers
Chairman of the Working Group on Substandard Ships
rd
Rue Marie de Bourgogne 52-54 3 Floor
B 1000 BRUXELLES
Tél : +34.913.87.81.09 – Fax : +34.91.387.81.15 – [email protected]
It is not a contradiction to say that our seas are today safer than ever while maintaining that
safety levels are still inadequate and must be improved.
The losses of ships have been greatly reduced over time. From 1950 to 1980 ships were lost
every year at the rate of about 0,6% of the vessel number and 0,3-0,4% of the gross tonnage
of the world’s fleet. Those were years of complacency and little regard for environmental
issues.
That careless period ended in the late seventies and early eighties, after several serious
casualties and environmental disasters. The consequence was the coming into force of the
SOLAS 74 Convention and the 1978 Protocols to the SOLAS and MARPOL Conventions.
Since then, there has been a continuous improvement in the world’s marine casualty rates,
that in recent years are around 0,10-0,2% of both number of ships and gross tonnage.
It is the social pressures that have brought this marked improvement. Pressures arising
mostly from environmental concerns and, sadly to a lesser extent, a concern over human life
losses. These pressures have become stronger over time, and it is a safe bet that they will
continue this trend for the foreseeable future.
In fact, in some aspects like large pollution incidents or the lives of passengers in developed
countries, the social tolerance is getting close to zero. A similar movement is extending to
other areas of the world in the wake of economic development. Therefore the marine
industries must prepare themselves to operate in a zero-tolerance environment, not very
different from those of the airlines or the nuclear industry.
Fortunately, it is quite possible to improve marine safety levels. We have the knowledge of
causes and the technology to do the job. It is only a matter of decision and, indeed, of putting
the necessary means to work.
It is often heard that 80% of marine casualties are due to human errors. This may be true in a
very loose way, in the sense that every accident that does not result from an ‘act of god’ is
due to a human error somewhere along the chain. But this generalisation, unfortunately
deviates our attention from the fact that a very large number of marine casualties are due to
failures not in the human element, but in the ships and their equipment.
It is a proven fact that old ships suffer many more casualties than new ones. According to
data of the Institute of London Underwriters reporting ship total losses in the 10-year period
from 1989 to 1998, the casualty rate grows exponentially with the ship’s age.
For instance, a new ship has an average total loss probability of 0,03%, but a 20-to-24 year
old vessel has more than 20 times higher risk.
These huge differences are surely not due to human error. The human element is similar on
new or old ships, and the perils of the sea are the same for all. Therefore, the difference is in
the hardware, the ships and their equipment.
New ships are much, much, safer than old ones, and this for two main reasons: ships ageing
and ships becoming obsolete.
First, ageing. New ships are better because they are new. And being new means being free
from certain problems related to ageing, such as fatigue, corrosion, wear and tear.
Fatigue in particular is an insidious enemy because you cannot see it. Metals age irreversibly
each time it is subject to a load cycle, and ships work always under cyclic loads. Therefore,
ships, even in the absence of corrosion, have limited lives. Until recently, the structural
fatigue of ships was not a well understood phenomenon and ships were designed and built
without regard of fatigue. Recent calculations, only possible now thanks to modern
computers and software, show that many ships in service have fatigue lives as short as five
years. Few reach the 25-year that is the typical demolition age of merchant ships.
The same effects of fatigue, corrosion, wear and tear, apply to the ship’s machinery and
equipment. In consequence, the ship’s structure and systems become less and less reliable
and efficient with time. All there effects contribute to make old ships unsafe. Therefore, after
certain age, ships in service need substantial maintenance to remedy the effect of fatigue,
even if the structure and machinery look like new to the eye. They are old inside.
Unfortunately, in some cases maintenance is insufficient to balance the negative effects of
fatigue, corrosion, wear and tear, and the result are catastrophic failures and ship losses.
These are the Erika’s the Braer’s the Castor’s the Leader L’s, etc.
The second reason why new ships are safer than old ones is because they are better. Yes,
better.
Old romantics tend to remember old ships with love and to believe they were stronger and
safer. The opposite is true. Old ships are obsolete and unable to meet today’s safety
standards. They become in fact substandard even when they receive proper maintenance,
much more if they don’t, as is often the case.
Ships were never designed and built with such a deep know-how and superb tools as today.
In general terms, never shipbuilding materials and systems achieved the quality and
reliability of today’s equivalents.
Everything is better in modern ships; knowledge of structural loads, structural design tools,
environmental design tools, steel plates and profiles, welding materials and machines,
surface preparation, coatings, engines, machines and mechanical systems, and last but not
least, electric and electronic systems.
Structural fractures are far less common on modern ships than in those built only 10 years
ago. Time between overhauls of machinery and electronic systems is today several times
longer than 20 years ago, due to better design and higher reliability of components.
Furthermore, regulations have never been tighter nor better adapted to the actual perils of
the sea.
The result is that, in every aspect related to safety, modern ships are technologically superior
to their older companions. This, plus insufficient maintenance, plus the effect of fatigue,
corrosion, wear and tear, is what makers old ships 20 times more likely to become a total
loss than new ones.
The periodic renewal of the fleet is consequently a necessity in order to improve marine
safety. Old ships, like old cars, belong in museums.
In order to keep up with technology and social demands, regulations must be regularly
updated and ships given certain time to adapt. Permanent ‘grandfathering’ as is called the
custom of granting existing ships permanent exemption from new regulations, is contrary to
the goal of improving marine safety and environmental protection. Not only allows obsolete
ships to keep trading, but is a source of unfair competition against newer ships that are
designed and built to more exacting standards. Therefore, in the future, ‘grandfathering’
should be limited in time, and ships pretending to extend their operating lives beyond, say
ten or fifteen years, should adapt to exactly the same regulations as new ships.
We have all seen these last 12 years the uphill road for the implementation of double hull
requirements for tankers. Thanks to ‘grandfathering’ we will still see single hull tankers in our
seas for another 15 years. And this is after the recent IMO amendments to MARPOL,
because otherwise they would have stayed in service until the year 2026.
What are the improvements that modern ships could bring in the future in terms of safety and
environmental protection? Here are some samples:
• Tankers could be built with duplicated and redundant propulsion and steering machinery,
with stronger hulls, with smaller cargo tanks, with a cargo vapour recovery system, etc.
• Bulkers could and should be built with stronger hulls, increased freeboard, a raised
forecastle and probably with double hulls as well.
• Containerships should be built with higher freeboard and fewer container on the exposed
decks. Given the enormous power of the larger container ships, they should also
maximise the measures to reduce gaseous emissions; NOx, SOx, CO2, etc.
• LNG carriers are getting more and more numerous and may eventually become a
significant safety threat. They should definitely be built with duplicated and redundant
propulsion and steering, as well as with fuel-efficient engines or cargo vapours
reliquefaction plants.
And you may ask, who will pay for all this? Well, of course, the market will do it, provided
there is a level paying field in which all competitors are bound by similar obligations. This
means it cannot be achieved by the market forces alone. Regulators should ensure that
standards adequate to the current social demands are adopted, and that they are applied
fairly and uniformly to all.
Port State Control - Developments within the Paris MOU
Michael VOOGEL
Deputy Secretary
Paris Memorandum of Understanding on Port state Control
Jan v. Nassanstr.125
2509 LA HAGUE
Tél : +31.70.351.15.09 – Fax : +31.70.351.15.99 – [email protected]
Introduction
Port State Control is seen by many as the ultimate solution to “sub-standard shipping”.
At the same time the maritime sector seems to agree that those responsible for the safe
operation of ships are the owner or operator and the flag State.
On the one hand port State control is expected to play a more prominent role in safe
shipping, while on the other hand the owner and flag remain responsible.
Should port State control be seen as a safety net only or will the deterrent factor play a more
important role in the future?
The importance of port States, and in particular regional agreements, is growing, not in the
last place because the maritime Conventions give greater policing powers to the port State.
In recent years the traditional role of port State control officers verifying certificates and
checking hardware has been extended to control on operational requirements, the
competence of the officers and crew and the proper implementation of a management
system on board.
Why was port State control given the role to police these new requirements? In order to
answer that question, one has to look back to the reasons why port State control was
introduced in the first place.
The Paris MOU on Port State Control.
The grounding of the "Amoco Cadiz" in March 1978 caused a strong political and public
demand in Europe, especially in France, for much more stringent regulations with regard to
the safety of shipping.
At the ministerial conference in Paris, in January 1982, the Memorandum of Understanding
on Port State Control was adopted and signed by the maritime authorities of fourteen States.
The Paris Memorandum came into operation on 1 July 1982i.
Since then Poland, Canada, the Russian Federation, Croatia and Iceland have also joined,
and co-operating status has been granted to the United States Coast Guard, Slovenia and
Estonia.
i
As of 1 July 2000 the membership consists of 19 Maritime Authorities: Belgium, Canada, Croatia, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Russian
Federation, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
During the past 19 years much has been accomplished by the harmonized approach of port
State control under the Paris MOU. A central computer information system, the so-called
“SIReNaC system”, provides a transparent history of port State control inspections within the
region.
Significant steps have been taken to more effective targeting of potentially sub-standard
ships, thereby reducing the burden on ships with a good safety record and increasing
efficient use of inspection time. For each ship calling at one of the ports in the region, an
individual targeting factor is displayed in the information system, identifying priority for
inspection.
In the 1993 Annual Report a list was published for the first time of the flag States exceeding
the average detention percentage. Ships registered under these flags would be inspected on
a priority basis.
Exposing ships with a poor safety record was the next step, which was taken in 1994. A list
of ships with a record of multiple detentions over a 24 month period was made available to
the press, international organizations and other interested parties. Since October 1998, the
list is published on a monthly basis, including all detentions of that month.
After having agreed on a harmonized policy for detention criteria and criteria for the
rectification of deficiencies, the detention rates multiplied within four years to an all time high
of 11,21% (1995) of the inspections.
The 1996 figures showed the first evidence that the measures taken by the Paris MOU have
been effective, and the detention percentage1 was slightly reduced to 10.7%. This downward
trend has continued into 1998, with a detention percentage of 9.06%. However, the 1999
results indicated a slight increase to 9.15%, which continues in the 2000 results towards
9.50%.
This might indicate that the strong measures from the Committee regarding targeting is
starting to achieve its aims. Across the Paris MOU there was a swing of 9% towards the
inspection of higher target factor ships, resulting that every ship flying a black listed flag
which entered the region during 2000 was subject to at least one inspection.
To reward the quality owner and to use the inspection time more efficient at the same time a
task force was installed to introduce in the near future a Paris MOU Quality reward system,
also to reflect the system as recently introduced by the USCG.
1
Until 1998 the detention percentage was expressed in the number of detentions related to the number of
individual ships. Since 1999 this percentage is related to inspections.
Individual ships
Inspections
Deficiencies
Detentions
Detention %
1991
10.101
14.379
25.930
525
3.65
1992
10.455
14.783
27.136
588
3.98
1993
11.252
17.294
43.071
926
6.39
1994
10.694
16.964
53.210
1597
9.41
1995
10.563
16.381
54.451
1837
11.21
1996
10.256
16.070
53.967
1719
10.70
1997
10.719
16.813
53.311
1624
9.66
1998
11.168
17.643
57.831
1.598
9.06
1999
11.248
18.399
60.670
1.684
9.15
2000
11.358
18.559
67.735
1.764
9.50
Until 1991 port State control inspections under the umbrella of the Paris MOU were limited to
checking the “hardware” of the ship. Although the members realized that the safe operation
of a ship is a combination of shore management, a sufficient number of competent crew
members and a well maintained and equipped ship, the international conventions only
provided for checking the certificates and equipment on board. Restricted by the international
conventions the performance of the crew on board, also referred to as the human element or
the “software”, could not be assessed, even in the case of serious doubts.
Following three serious casualties (“Herald of Free Enterprise”, Scandinavian Star” and
“Exxon Valdez”) in which human error caused considerable loss of lives and damage to the
marine environment, the European Ministers responsible for maritime safety decided to meet
on 14 March 1991 in Paris.
One of the decisions taken at the Ministerial Conference was to ensure compliance with
operational requirements regarding marine safety and pollution prevention. As a result
“guidelines for control on operational requirements” were adopted by the Port State Control
Committee later that year.
Careful first steps were taken to instruct Port State Control Officers in this new area of
inspections, which in particular focused on ro-ro/passenger ferries.
At the initiative of several MOU members the “guidelines for control on operational
requirements” were submitted to the IMO and were eventually adopted as Assembly
resolution A.681(17) in November 1991ii.
Now, nine years later, Port State Control Officers in the Paris MOU region have gained
considerable experience in operational inspections, in particular on large ro-ro ferries which
often carry close to 3.000 passengers.
In co-operation or after consultation with the flag State such operational inspections have
already included a complete assessment of the emergency management on board.
ii
This Resolution was revised as Res. A.742(18), “Procedures for the Control of Operational Requirements
related to the Safety of Ships and Pollution Prevention and has now been included and superseded by IMO
Resolution A.787(19), “Procedures for Port State Control”, as amended by Resolution A.882(21).
With only key staff members aware of the extent of the assessment, teams of PSCO’s
witness a chosen scenario of emergency operations. These may include simultaneous or
phased operations in the engine room, firefighting drills on one or more locations, evacuation
drills, medical response, navigational simulations and radio emergency communications, as
well as the overall control management of the situation in the emergency control centre.
Operational control has also been a regular topic on seminars for PSCO’s and a Task Force
has been instructed to establish harmonized scenarios for operational control on ferries and
passenger ships.
As a next step, operational inspections were extended to MARPOL requirements, including
garbage managementiii.
As a result of the possibility to assess both the “hardware” and “software” on board foreign
ships, the number of operational deficiencies has also increased steadily over the past few
years.
Operational deficiencies 1992
1993 1994 1995
1996
1997 1998
1999
2000
MARPOL
10
130
268
201
232
262
546
558
618
SOLAS
265
512
643
521
561
723
831
975
1132
Total
275
642
911
722
793
985
1377
1533
1750
Although the Paris MOU has no official status within the International Maritime Organization,
the achievements of this regional agreement on port State control have certainly had its
impact on international rule-making in the IMO.
Not only has the alarming statistical information on sub-standard ships been an incentive to
finally discuss the implementation of international regulations by flag States in a special SubCommitteeiv, the success of the Paris MOU has also promoted the establishment of other
regional agreements on port State controlv.
Furthermore, many provisions of the Paris MOU and the model for the PSC inspection report
have been included in the new IMO Resolution A.787(19) “Procedures for Port State
Control”.
iii
MARPOL 73/78, Annex V
Sub-Committee on Flag State Implementation
v
Acuerdo de Viña del Mar, Tokyo MOU on Port State Control and Caribbean MOU on Port State Control
iv
Improved Targeting
In order to provide the Paris MOU port States with a mechanism to target ships for
inspections, several year ago a computerised targeting formula was introduced in the
database.
This formula, resulting in a target factor (TF) for each individual ship, should assist in
establishing a priority for inspection. This resulted that ships, which may be in a potential
sub-standard condition, receive a higher priority. By using the target factor port States can
make more effective use of their recourses and at the same time relieve the burden on ships
with a good safety record.
The targeting system is composed of two modules:
1. The generic factor, and
2. The history factor
The generic factor for an individual ship is calculated by adding together several elements
forming a generic profile of the ship:
• Flag State Record: flags with a 3-year record of detentions above the allowable limits,
using a fixed yardstick of 7%. Based on the detention record ships flying a certain flag
may be labelled between “medium risk” and “very high risk”. TF values range from 4 to 20
points.
• Certain ship types are targeted with a higher priority and receive 5 TF points. These
include bulk carriers, oil and chemical tankers, gas carriers and passenger ships, which
are liable for an expanded inspection.
• Non EU recognized classification societies also receive 5 TF points.
• Ships of a certain age will receive additional target factor points, ranging from 1 point for
ships between 13 and 20 years to 3 point for ships older than 25 years.
• When the flag State has not ratified all conventions in force 1 TF point is added.
• In case the deficiency ratio of the classification society is above average 1 TF point is
also added.
The generic factor is updated when the particulars of the ship change or the status of its
existing flag or class change.
The history factor is applied to the generic factor to reflect the actual condition of the ship
found during port State control inspections. The following elements are applied to each PSC
inspection of the ship carried out in the previous 12 months:
• When no PSC inspection has been recorded of a particular ship in the last 12 months,
the ship will receive 20 TF points.
• No inspection recorded in the last 6 months will raise the total with 10 TF points.
• A ship which has been detained will receive 15 TF points
• When deficiencies are found during an inspection the ship will receive between 0 and 15
additional TF points. When no deficiencies are found the TF will be reduced with 15
points.
• For each outstanding deficiency after an inspection the TF will be raised with 1 point.
The overall TF is calculated by adding the Generic and History Factor but cannot be lower
than the Generic Factor.
All target factors are recalculated on a daily basis.
Concentrated Inspection Campaigns.
Since 1995, the Paris MOU has introduced the so-called “Concentrated Inspection
Campaigns”. These campaigns normally last a period of 3 months and focus on a specific
area of the ship. The following CIC’s have been held:
• 1995 Pilot ladders
• 1996 Oil Record Books
• 1997 Working and Living Conditions
• 1998 ISM implementation
• 1999 Structural Safety of Bulk Carriers
• 2000 Safety of Oil Tankers
• 2001 Securing of Cargo
The 2000 campaign on Oil Tanker safety, included the structural safety. The campaign
started on 1 September 2000 and lasted for a period of 3 months. Tankers of over 15 years
and larger than 3000 GT were subject to this CIC, which was an strong political signal to the
tragic accident of the tanker ERIKA off the coast of France. A total of 23 ships were detained,
of which 5 detentions (21%) involved items for which class was responsible.
In 2001 the Paris MOU focused its attention on the securing of cargo. All ships which are
normally targeted for a PSC inspection were assessed for compliance with cargo securing
requirements. A total of 1072 inspections were carried out, resulting in 16 detentions. The
campaign indicated that in 31% of the inspections the ships involved used poor quality of
lashing material and 10% indicated that the lashing was not carried out according the lashing
plan or Cargo Securing Manual. The Paris MOU will continue to target ships carrying cargo
requiring securing that visit the region, and will inspect the quality of the lashing material in
use.
On 1 February 2002 the new STCW amendments will come into force, after this date the
PSC Officers in the Paris MOU region will enforce these new regulations, according uniform
guidelines. This inspection campaign, is mend as a message to the Industry.
After the successful campaign on the implementation of the ISM Code on 1 July 1998, a new
CIC has been announced to take place starting 1 July 2002. On this date all ship types have
to comply with the Code, involving the large group of general cargo vessels.
The campaign, however, will not be limited to verifying compliance of the new ship types but
will also concentrate on those ships which have been compliant since 1998.
The campaign will be executed in conjunction with the TokyoMOU and USCG and in close
co-operation with the TokyoMOU on PSC.
The CIC for the year 2003 will be dedicated to Operational Inspections on board of
Passenger ships due for an enhanced inspection, starting in May, thus aiming at the start of
the cruise season. Passenger ferries and high speed Passenger ships in regular services,
will be excluded because it is felt these ships are covered under the EC directive.
For 2004 the planned Concentrated Inspection Campaign is dedicated to the Working and
Living conditions on board. This regarding the new ILO Resolution which will be becoming in
force at that time.
Responsibility of Classification Societies.
Many flag States have delegated their authority to survey and issue ships with the required
convention certificates to Classification Societies. The major societies have been united in
the International Association of Classification Societies. By delegating their powers to class,
it is reasonable to assume that these organizations also take responsibility in the work they
do on behalf of the flag State.
Port State control inspections revealed, however, that the surveys carried out by the class
were not always up to standard with convention requirements, although the ship was issued
with valid long term certificates.
In order to monitor the performance of classification criteria have been developed by the
Paris MOU to give guidance to the Port State Control Officer. These criteria, which have
been provisional until May 2000, have been applied for over one year and the results have
been entered into the SIReNaC database. For the first time statistics have been generated
by the Paris MOU to indicate the performance of the class over 1999.
The 1999 figures revealed that in 24% of the detentions one or more deficiencies could be
attributed to the responsibility of the classification society that had issued the statutory
certificates for the ship. The 2000 figures revealed that in 22.11% of the detentions, one or
more deficiencies could be attributed to the responsibility of the classification society, that
had issued the statutory certificates for the ship.
The criteria, which to a large extent correspond with those used by the US Coast Guard,
have been re-evaluated by the Paris MOU Committee and are no longer provisional since
May 2000.
Transparency of PSC information.
For a number of years flag States and the industry have called for greater transparency with
regard to PSC information. As mentioned in the introduction, specific information on
inspections was not revealed in the 1980’s and the Paris MOU only provided flag States with
information of their ships when so requested.
The demand for more transparency resulted in the publication of a list of flag States with a
consistent poor safety record. These flags were informed that they would be subject to
priority inspections.
In its 1999 Annual Report the Paris MOU published 3 lists of flag States:
− The “white list” indicating the quality flags;
− The “grey list” for flags with an average PSC record; and
− The “black list” for flags with a consistent poor safety record.
In 1997 the Paris MOU has opened a homepage in the Internetvi. On this homepage the
Secretariat of the Paris MOU has made all its public information available on the World Wide
Webvii). The web site will provide useful information to many parties in the maritime industry.
vi
vii
Paris MOU homepage may be found at: http://www.parismou.org
The Paris MOU web site contains the following information:
- General information on the operation of the Paris MOU
- Text of the Memorandum of Understanding, including guidelines on port State control inspections
- Annual Report
- Monthly list of detained ships and a searchable database
- “Rustbucket of the Month”
- Addresses of Paris MOU port State control authorities
- Press releases and news items
- Links to other port State control related sites
Ship owners throughout the world will now be aware of new port State control initiatives
carried out under the umbrella of the Paris MOU.
In particular information from the Annual Report on certain flag State administrations which
have a persistent poor port State control record and a database of detained ships has
generated a substantial source of information.
This database will be expanded this year to include the results of all port State control
inspections. Various queries can be made to enable the user to retrieve specific information
of interest.
In 1999 the Paris MOU started to publish the so-called “Rustbucket of the Month” in the
internet. This publication is aimed to generate a greater understanding with the maritime
industry and the general public of the substandard conditions found on board some of the
ships inspected in the region.
The Paris MOU has also decided to provide other sources with inspection information. A
major step forward in this area is the development of the EQUASIS database, which is also
aimed at providing greater transparency on the condition of ships.
Closing remarks.
It must be realized, however, that the battle against sub-standard shipping is a long and
persistent one which can only lead to success through unflagging determination and cooperation on the part of port States in their endeavour to enhance:
−
−
−
−
the safety of shipping;
the protection of the marine environment;
maintenance of acceptable living and working conditions; and
adequate operational standards of the officers and crew.
These four elements have a strong mutual correlation.
Port State control - and this must be stressed once again - is not the remedy against all evil,
as is often assumed, and can never be a substitute for the efforts that should be made by the
flag State in respect of enforcement of compliance with adequate standards.
Last but not least, all parties with a genuine interest in the safety of shipping and the welfare
of seamen, no matter whether they are flag States, ship owners, classification societies,
underwriters, trade unions, maritime lawyers, charterers or port States, should co-operate
with the ultimate aim to stop the operation of sub-standard ships.
Sub-standard shipping is a sheer disgrace to the whole of the maritime industry and has
done the industry more than enough harm. Not only in terms of dollars and cents, but also in
terms of reputation and prestige.
“L’état des choses après 20 ans”
~ Changements dans les relations entre
l’Etat du pavillon et l’Etat du port~
Michael Voogel
Secrétaire
11 March 2002
1
Navigation sous-standard paie
• Armateur sous-standard
peut réduire ses frais
operationnels par 15%
• Armateurs sous-standard
ont peu d’intérêt pour:
9 La sécurité
9 La pollution maritime
9 Les conditions de travail
et de vie
11 March 2002
2
Responsabilité
•
•
•
•
Armateur / Entrepreneur
Etat du pavillon
Société de classe
Contrôle des navires par
l’état du port (PSC)
• Autres:
9
9
9
9
11 March 2002
Assurance
Banques
affréteurs
propriétaires cargaison
3
Conventions et accords
• Contrôle des navires par l’état du port est basé
sur les conventions internationelles maritimes
• Accord régional est fixé par le “Paris MOU on
Port State Control”
• Fixé par droit pour membres de l’UE par EC
Directive pour le contrôle des navires par l’état
du port. (PSC).
11 March 2002
4
Portée régionale
11 March 2002
5
Accords sur Paris MOU
•
•
•
•
Respecter les conventions OMI et OIT
Nombre d’inspections de 25% minimum
Inspections inopinées
En principe pas d’inspections plus d’une fois
tout les 6 mois
• Eviter des retards inutiles
• Echange d’informations
11 March 2002
6
Structure de l’organisation
Paris MOU on port State control
Autoritées
Autoritées
Maritimes
Maritimes
Service
Servicedes
des
l’inspections
l’inspections
nationales
nationales
des
desnavires
navires
des
des
Paris
ParisMOU
MOU
Armateurs,
Armateurs,
états
étatsdu
du
pavillon
pavillonetet
societees
societeesde
de
classe
classe
11 March 2002
Comité
Comité
Port
PortState
StateControl
Control
Commission
Commission
Europienne
Europienne
Autoritées
Autoritées
Cooperatives
Cooperatives
Maritimes
Maritimes
Observateurs:
Observateurs:
OTI,
OTI,OMI,
OMI,
l’autre
l’autreMOU’s
MOU’s
SIRENAC
SIRENAC
Système
Systèmed’d’
Information
Information
Secrétariat
SecrétariatParis
ParisMOU
MOU
(La
Haye,
Pays
Bas.)
(La Haye, Pays Bas.)
MOU
MOUForum
Forumd’Avis
d’Avis
Groupes
Groupes
d’evaluation
d’evaluation
technique
technique
7
Inspections prioritaires
• Déclarées par les pilotes ou les autorités
portuaires
• Transportant des matières dangereuses ou
polluantes non déclarées
• Sur demande d’un autre autorité maritime
• Suite à une plainte émanant de quelqu’un ayant un
intérêt légitime
• Abordage, échouement ou navigation dangereuse
• Dont la classe a été suspendue pour des raisons de
sécurité au cours des 6 mois précédents
11 March 2002
8
Coefficient de ciblage
• Etat du pavillon sur la liste “noire”
• Navires-citernes pour gaz et des produits
chimiques, pétroliers, vraquiers âgés
• Socièté de classifcation non reconnu par l’UE
• L’âge du navire
• Première escale dans la région ou apres12 mois
• Non inspecté pendant 6 mois
• Histoire immobilisation/ déficiences
• Déficiences à rectifier
11 March 2002
9
Facteur de ciblage général
ELEMENT
3 yr detention record above the allowable limit
Flag of medium risk
Flag of medium to high risk
Flag of high risk
Flag of very high risk
Targeted ship type (i.e. subject to expanded
inspection)
Non-EU recognized class society
TARGET FACTOR VALUE
+4
+8
+14
+20
+5
+5
Age of ship:
> 25 years
21-24 years
13-20 years
Not all conventions ratified
+3
+2
+1
+1
Class deficiency ratio above average
+1
11 March 2002
10
Facteur de ciblage historique
ELEMENT
Entering a region port for the first time in the last
12 months
Due for inspection
(not inspected in the last 6 months)
Detained
Number of deficiencies:
0
1 to 5
6 to 10
11 to 20
> 20
11 March 2002
TARGET FACTOR VALUE
+20
+10
+15
-15
0
+5
+10
+15
11
11 March 2002
12
11 March 2002
13
Publication de l’information PSC
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
1993 liste d’états du pavillon
1994 liste d’immobilisations tout les 3 mois
1997 internet site (www.parismou.org)
1998 liste d’immobilisations mensuelle
1999 “rustbucket” à l’internet
2000 liste blanche-grise-noire
2000 PSC information à EQUASIS
2000 data base de toutes les inspections sur internet
2001 statististiques mensuelles
11 March 2002
14
11 March 2002
20
00
99
98
97
16
1
0
16
.3
8
.0
7
16
16
3
17
.8
1
18
20.000
9
9
.5
5
.6
43
18
.3
9
4
4
.2
9
.9
6
17
19.000
19
19
19
96
95
3
17.000
19
19
94
.7
8
18.000
19
14
15.000
93
92
16.000
19
19
Nombre d’inspections
14.000
13.000
12.000
15
11 March 2002
20
19
19
19
00
99
98
97
96
95
43
67
.7
3
5
0
1
.6
7
.8
3
60
57
1
7
1
.9
6
.3
1
53
0
.4
5
.2
1
54
53
1
53
.0
7
70.000
19
19
6
50.000
94
.1
3
60.000
19
27
30.000
93
92
40.000
19
19
Nombre de déficiences
20.000
10.000
0
16
11 March 2002
20
00
19
99
19
98
19
97
6
7
4
8
4
9
7
4
1.
76
1.
68
1.
59
1.
62
1.
71
1.
83
1.
59
1.750
19
96
92
2.000
19
95
8
1.250
19
94
58
750
19
93
19
92
Nombre d’immobilisations
1.500
1.000
500
250
0
17
11 March 2002
20
00
99
98
97
96
95
94
3,
98
%
5,
35
%
%
%
9,
50
9,
15
%
9,
66
%
%
%
,2
1
,7
0
11
%
10
9,
41
9,
06
10%
19
19
19
19
19
19
93
92
5%
19
19
Immobilisations en % d’inspections
15%
0%
18
60%
Resultats: inspections des membres
50%
target (25%)
Inspection efforts of members compared to target
inspection effort 2000 (%-IN)
40%
inspection effort 1999 (%-IN)
30%
20%
10%
m em be rs
Kin g d o m
Sw e d e n
Sp ain
Fed eration
Portu g a l
Po la nd
N o rw ay
e th e rla n d s
Italy
Ire la n d
Ice la n d
Gree ce
Germ a ny
Fran ce
Fin la n d
D en m ark
C roa tia
11 March 2002
Canada
Belgiu m
0%
19
Responsabilité des états du pavillon
•
•
•
•
•
•
Implanter les instruments d’OMI et d’OTI
Réquisition et certification statutaire
Equipage
Performance des organisations reconnues
Conditions de travail et de vie
Exécuter les interventions du PSC
11 March 2002
20
Performance des états du pavillon 2000
Liste Blanche
1. Finland (4)
2. United Kingdom (9)
3. Sweden (6)
4. Germany (2)
5. Ireland (3)
6. France (12)
7. Netherlands (5)
11 March 2002
Liste Noire
1. Bolivia (-)
2. Albania (1)
3. Sao Tome & Principe (-)
4. Honduras (2)
5. Lebanon (4)
6. Syrian Arab Rep. (5)
7. Cambodia (7)
21
Conséquences pour les pavillons de la
“Liste Noire”
• Nouvelles réglementations de l’UE vont être
incorporées au Paris MOU
• Date effective: [ 22 July 2003 ]
• Navires avec immobilisations multiples vont être
bannis
• Navire d’état du pavillon figurant sur la liste noire sera
banni en cas de:
9 3 immobilisations;
9 Durant les derniers 24 mois
11 March 2002
22
Conséquences pour pavillons “liste Noire”
• Navire du pavillon sur la liste noire consideré comme
“risque très élevè ” ou “risque élevè” sera banni en cas
de :
9 2 immobilsations;
9 Durant les 36 derniers mois.
• Refus d’accès applicable immédiatement après avoir
quitté le port.
• Applicable seulement aux navires citernes de gaz et
produits chimiques, petroliers, vraquiers, et navires à
passagers.
11 March 2002
23
Dialogue avec les états de pavillon
•
•
•
•
•
Soumettre le rapport annuel a l’OMI
Réunions pour échanger des idées
Fournir de l’information
Examiner les plaintes
Possibilité de revoir des immobilisations à
partir suite à une enquête
11 March 2002
24
Forum de révision
• Considérer la demande de révision d’immobilisation
selon
9 Etat de pavillon
9 Socíété de Classification
• Seulement quand on n’a pas fait appel au état du port
• Une dispute ne peut pas être résolue entre les états du
port et les états du pavillon
• Est composé du Sécretariat et 3 membres de MOU
• Conclusions soumises au pavillon/classe Etat du port
11 March 2002
25
Questions?
• Secretariat Paris MOU
on Port State Control
• P.O.Box 90653
2509 LR The Hague
The Netherlands
• Internet:
www.parismou.org
11 March 2002
26
Standards for inspections, surveys, maintenance & newbuildings
Nikos E. MIKELIS
Chairman INTERTANKO Safety Technical & Environmental Committee (ISTEC)
and
Director, Lyras Shipping Limited,
Transworld House,
100 City Road, London EC1Y 2BP
tel: +44 20 7324 5800
fax: +44 20 7324 5801
email: [email protected]
The shipping industry has demonstrated a long period of continuous improvement in safety,
as can be testified from published loss ratio statistical analyses going back to WW2. There
has also been an equally impressive improvement in the reduction to marine pollution
caused by ships when analysing records starting from the 1980s. These improvements have
been the result of both regulatory and industry efforts. IMO has consolidated a lot of
important legislation in its internationally adopted conventions, Classification Societies have
applied new technologies to the many facets of engineering associated with shipbuilding and
shipping, and shipowners have responded by contributing their operational expertise towards
the formulation of new regulations and by adopting and complying with the ever increasing
mandatory and voluntary requirements. Any objective analyst can realise for himself that
serious progress has been made. Perfection however is not attainable, and the occasional
accidents continue to happen and will continue to happen. It is an unwise society the one
that does not recognise this reality.
But, aside of the “unintentional accidents”, and whereas the safety initiatives of the last 30-40
years have borne fruit, there still remains a thorn with the unresolved problem of the
substandard ship and of its substandard operator. In recent years this problem has received
much attention from the maritime press, has been extensively discussed in conferences, and
is now receiving the attention of politicians. Various initiatives have already been launched by
local, regional and by the international regulators. Some of these initiatives have wisely
focused at the fundamentals and although it may be too early to evaluate their effectiveness,
it would appear that they will be successful in making more difficult the operation of
substandard ships. In this category of positive initiatives I would list EQUASIS as one
example.
Other initiatives have failed to understand and take into account the basic structures of the
industry, and as such their effectiveness is disproportionately low compared to the amount of
upheaval and costs they have brought to the industry. One example of such an initiative is
the accelerated phase-out regulation hurriedly instigated after the Erika casualty. In my mind
there is no doubt that Erika pointed to the need of structural regulatory changes. However,
the issue surrounding the Erika event was not one of single versus double hull. And as none
of us would be well served by a doctor who prescribes expensive and painful treatment for
our health without taking the trouble to examine us and diagnose the root problem, similarly
as an industry practitioner I am not impressed when the regulators do the same to my
company’s ships.
One very important fact that is often not understood by people in authority to regulate
shipping, is that the vast majority of shipowners and all of the industry associations are
already on their side in wanting to eradicate the substandard ship. This is an important
message worth expanding here: Most shipowners do not take short cuts on safety and
pollution prevention matters. The rest of the industry considers the few substandard owners
that do take short cuts a menace, because: (a) they compete unfairly for the same business
in view of their lower cost structure; (b) they drag the image of the whole industry towards the
least common substandard denominator; and (c) they cause a disproportionate number of
casualties and they are the root cause for the introduction of many new regulations which
burden the whole industry. If legislators were to accept the above statement as a fact, they
would rely on the experience of the industry and of its associations much more in seeking
and devising viable solutions to the problem of the continuing existence of the substandard
ship.
From my vantage point, I perceive many of the recent initiatives aimed to eradicate
substandard ships as shots in the dark by regulators who might appear not too concerned as
to how well aimed their efforts are. Accumulating more regulations and requirements has not
eradicated substandard ships so far, and I would hazard the guess that they will not
eradicate them in the future. Instead, creating a regulatory burden makes operating ships
unnecessarily difficult and costly to the (vast) majority of the owners who still try to comply to
the plethora of the requirements, while the substandard owner can still choose to selectively
ignore them.
Instead of arming local policemen with heavy weaponry and armoured vehicles in order only
to catch the common thief, I respectfully suggest that we need to think again what is that we
are trying to achieve here. IMO has already issued three Resolutions, each time calling for
better implementation of existing regulations, as opposed the introduction of new regulations.
I therefore propose that we simply need to question with an open mind whether existing
compliance structures are inadequate. The Port State Control needs to ensure that the
envisaged mechanisms will produce the required result. That means that whereas
substandard ships should be heavily penalised with detentions and with banning, on the
other hand all ships must be given the ability to a speedy appeal, so that the system remains
just and fair. Similarly, detentions must be graded according to the severity of the problem,
so that records of PSC inspections eventually become a sharp tool for targeting the
substandard operator.
For many years, surveys by Classification Societies have been the main tool for ensuring
compliance with adequate structural and mechanical standards for existing ships, and also
for compliance with newbuilding standards for new ships. These duties and responsibilities of
the Classification Societies have recently been under the spot light and under questioning by
many industry participants, and it looks that some serious thought and action is needed to
address these concerns. Recent accidents have raised further questions on survey
procedures with special regard to the traceability of the survey process itself.
These kinds of issues are not intractable and practical solutions could be devised to solve
the problem of the continuing existence of the substandard ship. What stands in the way of
such a solution is that it is very hard to get the due attention of the relevant stakeholders, it is
hard to maintain common sense and a clear vision, and it is hard to avoid the usual
arguments as to “whose fault it has been”. This is why each issue and each casualty tends to
be treated in a piecemeal manner, adding in this way layers of regulation without looking at
the underlying structural issues.
Drawing a parallel, it is understandable that shooting in the dark is much easier than having
to take a good aim. The problem with this however is that if you are the innocent injured party
you end up with no respect for those who shoot.
Securite Maritime et Formation des gens de mer
Daniel RETUREAU
Conseiller économique et social européen
263, rue de Paris
93516 MONTREUIL
Tél : 01.48.18.84.78 – 01.48.18.84.94 – [email protected]
1. Les hommes d'équipage, les sous officiers et le capitaine sont-ils les principaux
coupables ?
Selon diverses approches statistiques, "l'élément humain" constituerait le facteur principal et
la cause fondamentale de 80 % des catastrophes maritimes.
Si cela était vrai, il faudrait en tirer d'extrême urgence des conséquences appropriées en ce
qui concerne la qualification et la formation des gens de mer, et en particulier dans le
domaine de la sécurité.
Toutefois, l'analyse des catastrophes montre que les catastrophes résultent d'un
enchaînement de circonstances, que ce soit à bord ou à terre, où divers éléments entrent en
jeu ; les conditions climatiques, et le fait que si la compagnie l'ordonne ou si le capitaine est
sous la pression de délais il sort du port en dépit de mauvaises conditions, et nul ne peut à
l'heure actuelle s'y opposer - il faudrait donner ce pouvoir à l'autorité portuaire- ; l'état général
du navire, qui n'a pas été toujours bien inspecté ou bien certifié, et l'état des équipements de
sécurité, les exercices qui auraient dû être faits, mais ne l'ont pas été, le chargement du
vraquier qui a été mal fait une fois de trop et une superstructure a lâché. Le refus de certains
ports de servir de ports de refuge et le nombre très insuffisant de zones ou de ports de
refuges. ETC.
Des hommes, il est vrai, prennent des décisions, font des choix économiques, techniques,
des intervenants à différents niveaux sont insuffisamment entraînés ou qualifiés, la gestion
d'une crise peut connaître des failles, toutes les inspections ne peuvent être faîtes en dépit
du coefficient de ciblage du navire, faute d'inspecteurs en nombre suffisant ; et il peut
résulter de l'accumulation de ces choix et de ces faits, sous certaines conditions et dans
certaines circonstances, une sorte de cumul de faits et d'actions ou d'inactions, dont parfois
aucun pris individuellement n'aurait suffit à lui seul à causer le désastre, mais qui combinés,
à un moment donné peuvent conduire à la catastrophe.
Mais on ne peut accepter que ce soit le capitaine qu'on mette à tout hasard en prison avant
toute autre analyse des circonstances, où que l'on conclue trop vite que le capitaine et
l'équipage sont seuls responsables. Il y a toujours des responsables, mais les moins
responsables sont souvent ceux qui sont embarqués, et dont la vie est en jeu.
Cependant, la sécurité commence aussi et en premier lieu à bord, et il est nécessaire de
replacer l'équipage au cœur de la sécurité, si on est conscient de l'importance du facteur
humain, en lui reconnaissant des droits et en lui donnant les compétences pour les exercer
pleinement, de même qu'à toutes celles et ceux qui ont un rôle à jouer en matière de
sécurité.
Il convient de souligner que la baisse continue des effectifs à bord, et le recours à des
technologies de plus en plus complexes, instaurent une pression de plus en plus forte sur les
officiers et les marins, dont les responsabilités individuelles et le stress sont en hausse, et
dont les formations ne suivent pas toujours les perfectionnements technologiques.
La fortune de mer ne peut être invoquée que si par ailleurs les diverses normes et leur
sanction fonctionnent correctement. La sanction est le point faible. La prévention est en outre
socialement moins coûteuse que l'accident, et la fatalité a parfois bon dos.
2. Gens de mer, des métiers dégradés et de moins en moins attractifs.
Peu de temps après la sortie des projets de législation techniques (paquets Erika I et II), une
Communication récente de la Commission européenne sur la formation des gens de mer
attire l'attention sur la baisse continue du nombre de candidats aux études et aux carrières
de sous officiers et d'officiers originaires de l'Union Européenne. Elle fait suite au projet de
directive concernant la condition des équipages de 1998, qui est toujours dans les limbes et
rencontre une forte opposition de l'ECSA (employeurs).
Le Comité économique et social européen a rendu récemment un avis critique sur cette
communication, et demandé des décisions politiques et financières appropriées. Il a invité
les partenaires sociaux à prendre leurs responsabilités et à engager des négociations en ce
qui concerne le traitement communautaire des marins communautaires opérant dans les
transports maritimes intra communautaires de passagers et de marchandises ; il s'agit
clairement de dispositions de marché intérieur et non d'une remise en cause du droit de l'état
du pavillon de fixer les normes sociales à bord des navires battant son pavillon, bien que les
dispositions communautaires doivent tenir compte du droit international en vigueur.
Cependant, le caractère international de l'industrie et le droit maritime international ne
peuvent être utilisés pour faire obstacle à la prise de mesures régionales appropriées,
pertinentes et indispensables, ceci dans l'intérêt général. Ces mesures ne s'imposent
souvent que devant l'insuffisance ou les violations permanentes du droit international
maritime.
On espère que rapidement le projet de directive et des mesures concrètes pour inverser
l'inquiétant constat relatif aux défections dans les études et à la baisse continue des effectifs
communautaires.
Pourquoi la carrière est-elle devenue si peu attractive ? Quel projet pour y remédier, en
offrant une carrière qui permette d'occuper différentes responsabilités au cours de la vie
active, à bord et ensuite aussi à terre, par exemple comme inspecteur, puisqu'on en manque
au point, en France, de ne réaliser que 10% des inspections dans les ports, alors que le
Mémorandum d'Entente (mémorandum de Paris) prévoit d'inspecter 25 % des navires, et de
les inspecter le plus à fond possible ?
La création de registres internationaux ou de registres spéciaux par la plupart des pays
membres de l'EEE permet aux pavillons européens de recourir massivement à des marins
non communautaires payés bien au-dessous des minima fixés dans les pays membres et de
s'exonérer substantiellement des cotisations et des responsabilités sociales
correspondantes. Il y a une tour de Babel de nationalités, chacune traitée différemment à
bord d'un même navire, et qui a souvent, du fait de la diversité des langues et des accents,
des difficultés de communication d'un groupe à l'autre et avec les officiers. Cette
discrimination entre marins à bord d'un même navire a été dénoncée par l'OIT dans divers
cas, notamment celui du pavillon des TAAF (Kerguelen).
Les brevets de marins, les certificats de santé peuvent être des faux, ou être achetés dans
certains pays. Pour les équipages engagés par contrats précaires, sur des navires sous
normes, il n'y a pas de formation permanente ni d'entraînement à la sécurité. Qu'en serait-il
de l'avenir de ceux qui refuseraient d'embarquer en dénonçant un navire peu sûr ?
La situation des hommes est le reflet de la situation des navires et de l'industrie tout entière.
3. Une industrie profondément transformée par les critères de rentabilité immédiate et
la réduction drastique des coûts par la mise en concurrence des surcapacités (en
matière pétrolière, notamment).
En ce qui concerne la marine marchande, les grandes flottes de pétroliers appartenant aux
compagnies pétrolières, les grands armateurs sous pavillon d'un pays membre, ont été
remplacés par des compagnies aux origines parfois intraçables, enregistrées dans des pays
où le droit des sociétés permet toutes les combinaisons et peu de taxes. Souvent, une
société écran est déclarée propriétaire d'un seul navire, et les propriétaires réels de flottes
marchandes sont indéfinissables.
La pression à la réduction du coût des transports maritimes est liée à la globalisation
économique ; 90% des marchandises du commerce international et du pétrole transitent par
mer. La compétitivité se fait trop souvent au détriment de la qualité des navires et de la
condition des équipages, et donc globalement au détriment de la sécurité. La compétitivité
doit se faire dans un environnement régulé et sûr, non selon les lois de la jungle.
4. Le droit international ne dispose pas des moyens de contrôle des normes.
Les conventions OMI et OIT sont des conventions soumises aux règles du droit international
public. Les états n'ont aucune obligation de ratification. Les mécanismes de contrôle sont à
construire dans l'OMI, et ceux de l'OIT s'appliquent aux pays ayant ratifié les conventions,
mais consistent en des rapports et constats, sur base de l'examen périodique de la
législation et de la pratique des états parties, ou de mécanismes de contrôle actionnés par
une plainte, généralement formulée par une fédération syndicale. Ces conclusions et
recommandations de l'OIT ont une influence purement morale. En d'autres mots, les
conventions même ratifiées, ne constituent des normes obligatoires que pour les pays
décidés à les respecter, ce qui n'est en général pas le cas des pays aux pavillons sous
normes.
5. Comment disposer de normes efficaces ?
Les états constituant de grandes puissances économiques peuvent imposer des règles.
C'est le cas des normes imposées aux pétroliers par les autorités des Etats Unis, et de celles
que se propose de mettre en oeuvre la Communauté, avec la certification des sociétés de
classification ou la double coque pour les pétroliers, un fond complémentaire
d'indemnisation, une Agence maritime européenne, une base de données à jour EQUASYS
et une liste noire, etc. Ces mesures ont reçu l'appui du CES européen, qui en a souligné tant
les avantages que les limites. Beaucoup dépend de la mise en oeuvre effective du droit
international et communautaire par les états du pavillon et du port.
Les défaillances de l'état du pavillon sont compensées, dans une mesure insuffisante, par
les contrôles de l'état du port, dans un certain nombre de pays. C'est le but du mémorandum
d'entente de Paris, dont la révision est sur le point de s'engager. Néanmoins, les objectifs
d'inspection fixés ne sont pas réalisés partout, et de beaucoup, parfois.
L'inspection sociale des conditions des équipages est encore moins bien réalisée que
l'inspection technique, dans la plupart des cas.
Il serait nécessaire de disposer d'un nombre bien supérieur d'inspecteurs ayant les
compétences techniques nécessaires, difficile à recruter, surtout si les rémunérations
offertes sont parfois trop insuffisantes, et de créer un corps spécialisé pour l'inspection
sociale, une véritable inspection du travail maritime.
Les normes européennes proposées et jusqu'ici acceptées dans une large mesure par les
états membres sont des normes techniques et administratives.
Elles devraient être complétées par de véritables normes sociales, sur le modèle des
conventions de l'OIT. Les conventions maritimes de l'OIT devraient être ratifiées d'urgence et
en tout état de cause mises en oeuvre en pratique par tous les états membres de l'Union.
Mais ces normes techniques et sociales minimales devraient être d'application universelle
sur le territoire communautaire. Les navires sous normes qui ne procèdent pas aux
réparations nécessaires ou ne respectent pas les règles minimales devraient être exclus des
eaux communautaires, et si ces navires transportent des marchandises dangereuses ou
polluantes, ils devraient être exclus de la zone économique exclusive des 200 miles définie
par la Convention sur le droit de la mer, entrée récemment en vigueur.
Sans mesures effectives, les effets de la compétition entre les armements et entre les ports
auront des conséquences négatives sur la sécurité maritime et sur la condition des
équipages. Le coût du transport doit intégrer la sécurité, sinon les investissements
nécessaires, dans les hommes et les matériels, ne pourront être réalisés.
Si l'industrie ne peut se réguler, ou n'est pas disposée à négocier sur les normes sociales, il
convient de la réguler ; les gouvernements en portent la responsabilité politique, et ont
l'obligation de mettre en oeuvre les conventions internationales de bonne foi. Le niveau
communautaire, qui va s'élargir à de nouveaux pays maritimes, offre un cadre adéquat de
régulation, car le droit européen est susceptible de sanctions effectives, à la différence du
droit international.
Un marché compétitif sain demande des règles communes, respectées par tous les acteurs ;
sans ces régulations, on tombe dans la concurrence sauvage et le dumping social, qui ont
démontré leur nocivité, du point de vue de la dignité des équipages comme du point de vue
de la sécurité.
Mitigating Risk in the 21st Century Marine Transportation System
Martha GRABOWSKI
Director, Information Systems Program
Le Moyne College
Syracuse, New York
Phone : 315.655.81.93 - Fax 315.655.81.93 - email: [email protected]
Introduction
Fundamental changes are underway in the 21st century marine transportation
system. These changes will have dramatic impacts on the way in which shippers,
ports and waterways managers, regulators, brokers, financiers and insurers, ship’s
pilots and officers, and scientists will work in and around the marine transportation
system. Each of these parties is interested in safer ships, ports and marine
transportation, and technology is often prescribed as an answer to the call for
increased safety. The examples of the Erika, the Braer, the Royal Majesty, and the
Exxon Valdez provide ample opportunities for the world maritime community to
consider how best to mitigate risk in the 21st century marine transportation system,
and what role technology can play in mitigating risk.
This paper addresses the challenges of mitigating risk in the marine transportation
system of the 21st century, and proposes that a broader-than-technology perspective
is required, one that addresses each of the roots of risk propensity—tasks,
technology, people, organizations, and culture—in order to mitigate risk. This paper
discusses the benefits and pitfalls of technology, and suggests that high reliability
organizational goals, and a shared culture of reliability and safety, are important
objectives for the marine transportation system of the 21st century, seeking to
mitigate risk.
Risk in Marine Transportation
Risk propensity in large-scale systems has its roots in a number of factors. One
cause of risk is that the activities performed in the system are inherently risky (e.g.
mining, manufacturing, airline transportation); another is that the technology is
inherently risky, or exacerbates risks in the system (e.g. heavy equipment,
locomotives, and cables). Yet a third cause is that the individuals and organizations
executing tasks, using technology, or coordinating both can propagate human and
organizational errors. In addition, organizational structures may unintentionally
encourage risky practices (e.g. lack of formal safety reporting systems or safety
departments in organizations, or organizational standards that are impossible to meet
without some amount of risk taking). Finally, organizational cultures may support risk
taking, or fail to sufficiently encourage risk aversion (Grabowski & Roberts, 1996;
1997; 1999) (Figure 1).
Tasks
Technology
Organizational
Structures
Human &
Organizational
Error
Organizational
Culture
Figure 1
Risk Propensity in Large Scale Systems
These factors are certainly present in marine transportation. Tasks in the system—
navigation, vessel loading, cargo transfer, arrivals and departures--are distributed
across a large geographical area, are time-critical, and contain elements of
embedded risk (vessel navigation in congested waters, in reduced visibility, perhaps
carrying passengers or hazardous cargo on time-critical schedules). The technology
used in the system—vessels, equipment, lines, etc.—is also inherently risky. Human
and organizational error is present in the system, and organizational structures which
result in limited physical oversight and contact can make risk mitigation difficult.
Finally, the system’s organizational culture can send confusing or contradictory
messages about risk tolerance in the system (e.g., safety bulletins that celebrate the
number of accident free days while crew schedules and rotations require operators to
work long hours).
Mitigating risk in marine transportation, however, presents some challenges. First,
because the system is a distributed system, risk in the system can migrate, making
risk identification and mitigation difficult. Second, because marine transportation is a
large scale system with complex interactions between its members, incidents and
accidents in the system may have long incubation periods, making risk analysis and
identification of leading error chains difficult. Third, because the system is comprised
of members with their own individual goals, policies, and cultures--ashore, aboard
ship, or in the shipyard--developing a shared culture of reliability can be difficult.
These attributes make risk mitigation in marine transportation challenging, but they
can also provide important clues about effective risk mitigation in marine
transportation.
New technology is often prescribed as an antidote to risk in large-scale systems. In
marine transportation, these technologies can include advanced sensors; navigation,
communication and control system technology; next generation propulsion and cargo
control equipment; high performance computing, communication and information
infrastructures; maintenance and monitoring technologies; and radical redesigns and
upgrades of shore-based facilities. Technology introduction in many fleets, however,
occurs in a piecemeal fashion, and new technologies are introduced into aging fleets,
resulting in a mix of new and old vessels, new and old technology, new and old
operational dynamics, varying degrees of automation, and little understanding of
what pathological conditions such technology mixes might introduce into the system.
We have seen that technology mixes and lack of planning produce both intended and
unintended consequences in other large scale systems: aerospace and
communications systems, medicine, manufacturing, nuclear power, and
telecommunications (Perrow, 1984; Sagan, 1993; Bogner, 1994; Tenner, 1996;
Vaughan, 1996). Thoughtful design and introduction of appropriate technology can
certainly advance and enhance the performance of the marine transportation system
of the 21st century. However, pressures to introduce new technology into marine
transportation must be balanced with requirements to manage and measure levels of
risk in the system overall, and must be accompanied by discourse, planning, and on
going assessment.
The Pitfalls of Technology and Automation
The design and implementation of technology in general has followed what
has been described as a technology-centered approach. Typically, a particular
accident or incident identifies circumstances in which human error was seen to be a
major contributing factor. Technology is designed in an attempt to remove the source
of error and improve system performance, often by automating functions carried out
by the human operator. Technology design questions thus revolve around the
hardware and software capabilities required to achieve machine control of the
function. There is not much concern for how the human operator will subsequently
use the technology in the new system, or how the human operator’s tasks will be
changed by the technology—only the assumption that technology will simplify the
operator’s job and reduce errors and costs (Wickens, Mavor and McGee, 1997, p.
265).
The available evidence suggests that this assumption is often supported:
technology shrinks costs and reduces or even eliminates certain types of human
error. However, the limitation of a purely technology-centered approach to technology
design and implementation is that some entirely new human error forms can surface
(Wiener, 1988), and “automation surprises” can puzzle the operator (Sarter & Woods,
1995a). This can reduce system efficiency or compromise safety, negating the other
benefits that technology provides. These costs and benefits have been noted
especially in the case of cockpit automation (Wiener, 1988), but they also occur in
other transportation domains.
One of the ironies of technology is that automation designed to reduce
operator workload sometimes increases it (Bainbridge, 1983; Rochlin, 1997). In
addition, the introduction of technology can lead to manual skill deterioration,
alteration of workload patterns, poor monitoring, inappropriate responses to alarms,
and reductions in job satisfaction (Wiener & Curry, 1980). However, two things
should be kept in mind when discussing problems associated with automation.
First, some of the problems can be attributed not to the automation per se but
to the way the technology is implemented in practice. Problems of false alarms from
automated alerting systems, automated systems that provide inadequate feedback to
the human operator (Norman, 1990), and automation that fails “silently” without
salient indications, fall into this category. Many of this class of problems can be
alleviated to some extent by more effective training of users of the automated
system.
Secondly, problems can arise from unanticipated interactions between the
technology, the human operator, and other systems in the environment. These are
not problems inherent to the technology, but to its behavior in the larger, more
complex, distributed human-machine system into which the device is introduced
(Tenner, 1996). This can be seen in ship’s bridge environments, in which the
introduction of high levels of automation has produced a situation in which system
performance is determined by the interaction of multiple technologies (Grabowski &
Roberts, 1996).
The benefits of advanced technology introduction in marine transportation
include cost savings, more precise navigation and vessel control, fuel efficiency, allweather operations, elimination of some error types, and reduced operator workload
during certain phases of the voyage. The benefits of vessel traffic control automation,
which has been more modest to date in comparison to bridge automation, include
improved awareness of hazardous conditions, conflict alerts, elimination of some
routine actions that allow the vessel traffic controller to concentrate on other tasks,
and a reduction in unnecessary verbal communications on congested voice traffic
frequencies.
However, the benefits of automation and technology introduction in marine
transportation are not guaranteed. In many cases, the economic arguments that
initially stimulate investment in automation are clearly reinforced by the financial
return on that investment. On the other hand, though, some technology benefits are
mitigated or eliminated by the costs. For example, although automation has reduced
operator workload during some voyage phases, the overall benefit of automation on
workload has been countered by some costs. Sometimes technology decreases
workload only during a short work phase, but not otherwise. At other times,
technology increases workload because of increased demands on monitoring or
because of the extensive reprogramming that is required. In either case, the
anticipated workload reduction benefit of technology is not realized.
Given that by now it is almost axiomatic that automation does not always
work as planned by designers, a better understanding of the effects of automation on
human performance is vital for designing new technology systems that are safe and
efficient. Table 1 lists the kinds of human performance problems that have been
associated with automation (Wickens, Mavor & McGee, 1997, p. 268). The list is not
comprehensive and is not meant to indicate that automation in inevitably associated
with these problems. Rather, the table gives an indication of the kinds of problems
that can potentially arise with automated systems. These effects are now quite well
documented in the literature, and there is empirical support for each of the effects
noted in the table, although the quality, quantity and generalizability of the empirical
evidence varies from effect to effect. The effects that have been most well studied
are briefly discussed in the following sections.
Human Performance Problems
New error forms
Increased mental workload
Decreased task communication, group
participation
Increased monitoring demands
Unbalanced trust, including mistrust
of systems/technology
Overtrust
Reference
Sarter & Woods (1995b), Wiener
(1988)
Wiener (1988)
Grabowski & Sanborn (2001)
Parasuraman, et al. (1993)
Lee & Moray (1992); Parasuraman et
al. (1996)
Parasuraman et al. (1996); Riley
(1994)
Mosier & Skitka (1996)
Decision biases
Hopkin (1994); Wiener (1988)
Skill degradation
Sarter & Woods (1992, 1994)
Reduced situation awareness
Kirlik (1993)
Cognitive overload
Hopkin (1991, 1994)
Masking of incompetence
Foushee & Helmreich (1988); Parsons
Loss of team cooperation
(1985)
Table 1
Human Performance Problems Associated with Automation
(Wickens, Mavor & McGee, 1997, p. 268)
New Error Forms
One of the great ironies of automation is that although automation can reduce
or eliminate certain kinds of human error, it can also produce new error forms
(Wiener & Curry, 1980). Such cases do not necessarily represent a failure of the
automation per se. On the contrary, the automation may work precisely as designed.
However, if incorrect inputs are provided, and the automation proceeds to act on
these inputs in a manner that is not monitored by a human operator, or if the
automation behavior is unexpected, errors can result. Early examples of this kind of
error include numerous aircraft incidents involving the inertial navigation system that
were attributed to incorrect loading of way point data (Wiener, 1988). More recent
examples include mariner difficulties with non-standard radar and ARPA displays,
early difficulties with data inputs to collision avoidance systems, and current
challenges with automated vessel management, steering, and AIS systems (National
Research Council, 1994).
Highly automated systems that represent a considerable increase in
complexity over previous systems are one source of new error forms. Examples of
such systems include new bridge automation systems, vessel management systems,
autopilots, vessel propulsion and control systems, and steering systems. These
systems can present higher levels of complexity to operators, which can increase the
number of intervening subsystems between the ship’s officer, pilot or master. This
can have the effect of decreasing the direct control functions of the shipboard
operator and increasing their “peripherilzation” (Norman, et al., 1988; Satchell, 1993).
Advanced bridge systems can also have several modes of operating, which
can introduce another set of errors—mode errors. Modes can be selected for
navigation, maneuvering, trackkeeping, headings, propulsion changes, for instance,
and users may have difficulty differentiating between a bridge automation system that
is in training, rather than operational, mode.
Several studies have shown that even experienced operators may not have a
complete understanding of all bridge automation modes or their interactions with
each other, particularly in unusual circumstances (Grabowski & Wallace, 1983; Fee,
Lascelle & Nieri, 1980). In aviation, studies have shown, for example, that pilots of
the Boeing 737-300 had some gaps in their knowledge of cockpit automation modes
and mode behavior in unusual situations, such as an aborted takeoff (Sarter &
Woods, 1995b). These difficulties were attributed to the pilots having an imperfect
mental model of the various functions of the cockpit automation systems (Sarter &
Woods, 1992). Moreover, some pilots were not aware of the gaps in their knowledge
(Sarter & Woods, 1994). This led to automation surprises, or automation behavior
that was unexpected. Thus, technology introduction can clearly have intended and
unintended consequences, with attendant impacts of safety (Sagan, 1993; Tenner,
1996; Rochlin, 1997).
Workload
The impact of workload on technology is similar to the impacts on new error
forms: although technology can reduce workload, it does not inevitably do so. For
example, a ship’s automated vessel management system is meant to reduce ship
officer and pilot workload, and generally does so. However, when the system must
be reprogrammed (e.g., because of a destination change), officer workload can be
increased, particularly if the reprogramming occurs during a time-critical phase, such
as immediately prior to arrival.
Workload impacts can also differ significantly by role and task. For instance, in a
study evaluating the impact of an intelligent ship’s navigation system on ship
masters, mates and pilots during two years of transits in Prince William Sound,
Alaska, it was shown that different watch team members experienced different levels
of workload using the technology: pilot and master cognitive workload decreased with
use of the intelligent navigation system, while mates’ workload increased (Grabowski
& Sanborn, 2001). Masters were found to have lower workloads than mates when
using the intelligent navigation system, and pilots experienced greater workload than
masters, which is consistent with masters’ and pilots’ cognitive demands, and pilots’
anecdotal complaints about having to climb to the top of the bridge and down, hang
onto a rope ladder in order to board and debark vessels, and then pilot the ship.
Masters using the intelligent navigation system required less effort than mates, and
pilots using the system required greater effort than masters, a finding that is
consistent with masters being more familiar with the intelligent navigation system
than were the pilots or mates (Grabowski & Sanborn, 2001). These findings highlight
the importance of considering users’ task and role responsibilities, and their
attendant workload, when introducing technology in safety-critical settings.
Communication and Group Decision-Making
Team and individual communication is critical to effective performance in
safety-critical environments such as marine transportation. However, technology
introduction, as well as workload, stress and fatigue, can significantly impact
communication and participation in group or team decision-making.
For instance, in early studies of one person bridges and intelligent navigation
aids, varying levels of stress had a significant impact on watch team communications
and participation in group decision-making activities (Schuffel, Boer & van Breda,
1989; Grabowski & Wallace, 1993). In a later study, in low stress conditions, mates
using an intelligent navigation system participated more in group decision-making
activities, and increased the frequency and number of their communications.
However, in high stress situations, mate participation in group decision-making
significantly decreased, while pilot participation increased. These findings again
suggest that role and task requirements, as well as technology introduction, can
impact individual and group decision-making and communication (Grabowski &
Sanborn, 2001).
Lu and Levis (1991) argue that communication changes can reflect a change in
group member roles under stress. The data in the Grabowski & Sanborn (2001)
study suggest that under high stress, the intelligent technology may have
encouraged pilots to increase their verbal communications about voyage planning,
and masters to increase their voyage plan-related interactions. Masters and pilots
both noted that the system prompted them to “talk about piloting in a way that we
normally don’t,” suggesting that the intelligent system could have catalyzed masters
and pilots to communicate their closely held "mental maps" of the piloting domain
held by the pilots and masters (Rouse, Cannon-Bowers, & Salas, 1992). If true, this
is a contribution towards reducing an important log jam in ship pilot-watch team
communications patterns, which could encourage participative decision-making
patterns on the bridge (i.e., bridge resource management) (National Research
Council, 1994). At the same time, however, mates became less communicative,
which could have been due to the hierarchical bridge watch team organization
reasserting itself in high stress conditions. Thus, the technology introduction had
differing impacts on the different watch team members: enhancing communication
between pilots and masters, and decreasing mate communication. In fact, the result
of the technology introduction may have been an increase in mate psychological
tension (Nemeth, 1982) since mates were encouraged to expand their participation
by the technology, and were simultaneously driven by increased stress to focus on
their role in the navigation task (National Research Council, 1994). Mates expressed
frustration with the participation that the system encouraged, as well as with the new
monitoring tasks it occasioned. These findings have important implications for
organizations and individuals contemplating new technology introduction.
Trust
Trust is an important factor in the use of technology by human operators. Sheridan
(1988) discussed a number of meanings of the term trust, examining how trust
affects an operator’s use or non-use of automation features. For example, an
automated tool that is reliable, accurate, and useful may nevertheless not be used if
the operator believes that it is untrustworthy. Initially, users trust technology, and they
expect a system to be accurate (Muir, 1988). However, trust is dynamic, and will
change depending on the users’ experience with the system (Lee & Moray, 1992).
Users will weigh each experience with the technology differently, depending on the
“risk” involved. The result is that trust will affect whether users choose manual or
automated control, or in the case of decision aids, compliance with the system’s
advice (Lee and Moray, 1994). Studies also show that trust can be rebuilt after it is
broken, but rebuilding is a difficult process (Lee & Moray, 1992).
Trust itself is likely to be multiply determined and to vary over time. Clearly, one
factor influencing trust is automation reliability. Automation that is unreliable is
unlikely to be trusted by an operator and therefore it will not be used, if an option is
available. In addition, users’ confidence in their own skills and ability can determine
trust in technology. Lee and Moray (1994) found that users chose manual control if
their confidence in their ability exceeded their trust of the automation, and they chose
automation otherwise.
Several studies have shown that operators choose to use automation when it works
reliably and is accurate. Interestingly, occasional failures of automation seem not to
be a deterrent to future use of the automation. Riley (1994) found that both college
students and airline pilots did not delay turning on automation after a failure and, in
fact, continued to rely on failed automation. In a study examining monitoring of
automation failures, Parasuraman, et al. (1993) found that, even after the simulated
catastrophic failure of an automated engine monitoring system, subjects continued to
rely on the automation for a period of time, although to a lesser extent than when the
automation was more reliable. These findings are surprising, in view of other studies
suggesting that operator trust in automation is slow to recover following a failure of
the automation (Lee & Moray, 1992; Muir, 1988). One mitigating factor may be the
overall level of automation reliability. When this is relatively high, then operators may
come to rely on the automation, so that its occasional failures do not substantially
reduce trust or reliance on it unless they are sustained for a period of time. Other
contributing factors may be the ease with which automation behaviors can be
detected and the automation enabled and disabled, and overall task complexity
(Wickens, Mavor & McGee, 1997).
Mistrust
Human operators of systems tend to be conservative in their work habits. New
technology, when first introduced, tends to be looked at suspiciously and perhaps
mistrusted. As experience is gained with the new system, however, and given that it
works reliably and accurately, most operators will tend to like and come to trust the
new device. Unfortunately, mistrust of alerting and alarm systems is widespread in
many settings because of the false alarm problem.
Two important factors that influence the false alarm rate, and thus the operator’s trust
in an automated alerting system, are the threshold value that activates the alarm, and
the base rate of the hazardous condition (Wickens, Mavor & McGee, 1997).
Human operators may also express leeriness of automated systems that they do not
understand well. As discussed earlier, airline pilots have been found to have
incomplete knowledge of the various modes and behaviors of their Flight
Management Systems (Sarter & Woods, 1994). Ship’s pilots and captains were
found to have less confidence and satisfaction in using their intelligent navigation
system, compared to the ship’s mates, who used the system most frequently, and
who expressed high levels of confidence and satisfaction in using the system
(Grabowski & Sanborn, 2001).
Time criticality and stress levels may also be related to an operator’s tendency to use
an automated system. In the intelligent ship’s navigation system example, bridge
watch teams had a tendency to use the system as a threat monitoring aid under
conditions of low stress, a supposition supported by masters’ reports of increased
confidence and satisfaction with the intelligent navigation system in low stress
conditions.
One master noted, for instance, that the system was helpful “when he had time to
absorb all of its information,” but less helpful when he needed to absorb critical
information quickly. Thus, despite a designer’s intent to produce a useful product, an
incomplete or underspecified mental model of the automation on the part of the
operator can undermine the benefit of the automation because of operator mistrust.
As automated systems become more complex and their behaviors less predictable,
efforts must be made to make automation more transparent, so as not to generate
mistrust.
Overtrust (Complacency)
If some automated alerting systems are ignored because of operator mistrust, then
others may be "overtrusted," in the sense that operators may come to rely uncritically
on the automation without recognizing its limitations or may fail to monitor the inputs
to the automation. High trust in automation could lead operators not to carry out
vigilant monitoring of their displays and instruments. In numerous aviation incidents
over the past two decades, problems of monitoring of automated systems have been
involved as one, if not the major cause of the incident. An early example is the crash
of Eastern Flight 401 in the Florida Everglades in which the crew, preoccupied with
diagnosing a possible problem with the landing gear, did not notice the
disengagement of the autopilot and did not monitor their altitude, even though the
descent was apparent from the instruments and despite a query (although
ambiguous) from a controller who noticed the loss of altitude (National Transportation
Safety Board, 1973).
The grounding of the cruise ship Royal Majesty provides another example of the
dangers of complacency induced by overreliance or overtrust in technology. In this
example, crew members failed to monitor ship’s position routinely using means
independent of the electronic GPS system. The result was the grounding of the
vessel and lessons learned about the importance of a “trust but verify” attitude with
respect to technology (National Transportation Safety Board, 1997).
Conclusion: More than Technology Alone
With all of these examples of the difficulties associated with human use of
technology, we might wonder how or why technology is prescribed as a means of
mitigating risk in marine transportation. Clearly, simply introducing technology into
marine transportation is unlikely, in and of itself, to mitigate levels of risk in the
system. However, technology can be an effective risk reduction intervention, as
noted earlier, allowing humans to perform more cognitive tasks, fewer routine tasks,
and providing decision support that enhances human performance and increases
levels of safety in marine transportation. How best, then, to mitigate risk in marine
transportation?
Reviewing Figure 1 may provide some clues. In Figure 1, technology is but one of
several factors influencing risk in large-scale systems. Moreover, Figure 1 also
suggests that risk propensity may have as much to do with interactions between risk
factors—between tasks, technology, and human and organizational error, for
instance—than it does with any one risk factor. The literature just reviewed supports
this thesis and also suggests that understanding the interactions between humans,
organizations and technology is critical to mitigating risk in safety-critical systems.
Figure 1 also suggests that understanding the interplay between humans,
organizational structures, and organizational cultures is also important in mitigating
risk. The body of research associated with High Reliability Organizations (HRO’s)
may provide important lessons in this regard. HRO’s are organizations where failure
in a core, or even a peripheral process, can have devastating consequences for the
organization or for society at large. HRO’s are perceived to have unique
characteristics in that they are built around a highly complex technological core; their
processes can interact in non-linear ways; and their failure can lead to unacceptable
loss of life and property (Perrow, 1984; Roberts, 1993). Such organizations prioritize
safety and reliability as essential goals and rely on redundant technological systems
and personnel in order to deal with unexpected situations (Grabowski & Roberts,
1999). HRO’s anticipate and respond to threats with flexibility and with a collective
state of mindfulness that enhances the organizational ability to discover and contain
unexpected errors before they reach catastrophic levels (Weick & Sutcliffe, 2001).
High reliability organizations are inherently devised to mitigate risk. Risk is at the
cornerstone of what the systems are about, and it is at the cornerstone of what such
systems must address on a daily basis. Thus, in order to capitalize on HRO findings
and apply them to the goal of mitigating risk in marine transportation, we can focus
on three identifiable characteristics of HRO’s as goals for the marine transportation
system of the 21st century:
• the articulation of safety and reliability as goals throughout the system,
• a shared culture of reliablility, and
• a high degree of interpersonal trust.
Technology can serve as an adjunct to these goals, but in order to truly mitigate risk
in marine transportation, we must go beyond purely technological solutions, and
embrace each of the elements of Figure 1, and their interactions. Moreover, we must
develop a high degree of interpersonal trust among members of the marine
transportation system.
What would a high reliability culture look like in marine transportation? The answer
looks strangely like the three goals just articulated. Generally, high reliability
organizations are characterized by prioritized safety and reliability goals, as such
practices enhance a milieu of safe operations. HRO’s clearly define what they mean
by safety goals and define tasks and safety standards against which they assess
themselves. Operationalizing safety and reliability goals in HRO’s often takes the
form of redundancy in personnel and technology, as well as in developing a high
reliability culture that is decentralized and constantly reinforced, often by continuing
practice and through training. Finally, HRO’s continually attend the development of
interpersonal trust, which is fostered and developed by training, drills, and
encouraging people to get to know each other. Thus, mitigating risk in the 21st
century marine transportation system requires a broader-than-technological
perspective, embracing the needs of tasks, technology, people, organizations and
culture in the system.
In marine transportation, both humans and technology are jointly responsible for
executing tasks, and for system safety; thus, understanding technology and tasks,
and human and organizational error, and organizational structures, and
organizational cultures is important for mitigating risk in the system. The result of this
understanding could be the development of an organizational culture that fosters the
development of a shared sense of system reliability and safety.
Several initiatives are observable around the world that enhance system safety and
are responsive to requirements induced by changes in marine transportation, i.e., the
International Safety Management (ISM) certification process. However, fundamental
organizational and system change will be required before we can fully describe the
marine transportation system of the 21st century as a high reliability organization.
This goal will provide an important benchmark for marine transportation as we
continue through the new millennium.I
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Wickens, C. D., Mavor, A.S., & McGee, J.P. (editors). Flight to the Future: Human Factors in
Air Traffic Control. Washington, D.C.: National Academy Press, 1997.
Wiener, E. L. Cockpit Automation. In Human Factors in Aviation, E.L. Wiener & D.C. Nagel
(editors). San Diego: Academic Press, 1988.
Wiener, E.L. & Curry, R.E. Flight Deck Automation: Promises and Problems. Ergonomics. 23,
1980, 995-1011.
Woods, D.D. The Price of Flexibility in Intelligent Interfaces. Knowledge-based Systems 6,
19983, 1-8.
Navigational Aids and the
Human Element:
The Intelligent Bridge
Martha Grabowski
LeMoyne College
Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute
Email: [email protected]
http://web.lemoyne.edu/~grabowsk
March 12, 2002
• Navigation
• Vessel Loading
• Cargo Transfer
• Propulsion
Operations
• Arrivals/departures
Tasks
Technology
Organizations
People
• Human Error
• Bounded rationality
• Information overload
• Cognitive errors
• Poor d-making
• Vessels
• Equipment
• Lines
• Control systems
• Sensor Systems
• Information Technology
Culture
• Organizational Errors
• Limited physical oversight
• Imperfect safety systems
• Reporting structures
• Impossible standards
• Latent conditions
• Environmental factors
• Confusing, contradictory
messages
•Fatigue, stress, crew rotations, crew composition
•Risk Taking Cultures
Technology Promises and Pitfalls
• Cost savings
• Increased costs
• Error reduction
• New error forms
• Precision operations
• Manual skill deterioration, poor
monitoring
• Efficiency (fuel,
propulsion, control…)
• Inappropriate responses
• All weather operations
• Unintended consequences
• Reduced workload
• Increased workload, reduced
satisfaction
Exxon Benicia Navigation
System
ExxBridge display
Navigation displays
Radar display
Radar
display
Ship’s wheel
Demonstration System Architecture
Overhead
Monitor
EO Camera System
Daylight TV/
Infrared Camera
RS-422
Laser Rangefinder
Video
SmartBridge
Console PC
Radar
Ethernet
RDP
Demo
Monitor
Gyrocompass
Backup GPS
LORAN
Fathometer
Speed Log
Pitch &
Roll
SmartBridge PC
Ship Sensors
Ship-to-Shore Data
RS-232
RS-232
NMEA-0183
Coherent
Recv/Xmit
RF
PORTS
dGPS
GPS
UPS
Nowcast Data
Water level, Current,
Wind data
Notice-to-Mariners
SmartBridge Display
348
000
046
090
090
346
Intelligent Bridge Evaluation
Subject
Performance
Watch
eams
Uniform
Masters
Improved
Pilots
No impact
Mates
Improved
Communica
tion
Participa
tion
Info
Accessed
Workl
oad
Confiden ce
Number of
Alternatives
Considered
Recommenda
tions,
Reasoning
Less
social,
More task
Less
social,
More task
In low
Stress
In low
Stress
In high
Stress
In high
stress
Recommenda
tions,
Reasoning
Tracklines,
Waypoints
No
impact
No
impact
• Navigation
• Vessel Loading
• Cargo Transfer
• Propulsion
Operations
• Arrivals/departures
Tasks
Technology
Organizations
People
• Human Error
• Bounded rationality
• Information overload
• Cognitive errors
• Poor d-making
• Vessels
• Equipment
• Lines
• Control systems
• Sensor Systems
• Information Technology
Culture
• Organizational Errors
• Limited physical oversight
• Imperfect safety systems
• Reporting structures
• Impossible standards
• Latent conditions
• Environmental factors
• Confusing, contradictory
messages
•Fatigue, stress, crew rotations, crew composition
•Risk Taking Cultures
High Reliability Organizations (HRO’s)
• Organizations that either can’t or don’t
make mistakes
• Attention to...
–
–
–
–
–
Communications
Organizational structures
Organizational culture
Redundant technology, personnel
Trust
Navigational aids and the human factor"
Rodger MAC DONALD
Secretary General
IFSMA – International Federation of ShipMaster Associations
202 Lambeth Road
SE1 754 LONDON
Tél : +44.207.261.0450 – Fax : + 44.207.928.90.30 – [email protected]
Relating the key human factor of fatigue, are the needs of Seafarers being
adequately considered in the development of new maritime technology? AIS is
one such example of technology forging ahead with little or no consideration
of the human factor.
One of the key human factors affecting today’s maritime industry is fatigue. Although
this is acknowledged, industry and Flag States are not addressing the issue.
Consider, for example, how the rapid development of the Automatic Identification
System (AIS) which is perceived to be a valuable aid to navigation may even place
more stress on the officer of the watch by causing him to absorb information that is
confusing and unnecessary.
Between July 2002 and June 2008 ships will be required to be fitted with AIS. This
technology is very impressive and will certainly be of benefit to the shore maritime
traffic controllers. However, no thought has really been given to the watch-keepers at
sea who both have to set the information for transmission as well as interpret the
numerous pieces of information that will be appearing on their screens. Indeed it is
not decided yet whether this information will be displayed on a totally separate
screen or incorporated for example on the radar display.
To add to the confusion, not all ships will be required to have this facility, and
therefore the officer of the watch will only be receiving partial information from this
source. This is not to say the AIS is wrong, but demonstrates once again how
technology can drive ahead concepts without any input from the end users.
What is perhaps even more alarming is that no formal training for the use and
interpretation of information gained from the AIS has been offered at this time. It is to
be hoped that this will be rectified before the first AIS assisted collision takes place. It
is not the technology that will bring about safer seas, but the competence of the
seafarers that use it.
AIS is just one current issue. It is the matter of training seafarers that needs to be
reviewed. The 1995 amendments of the STCW Convention 1978 introduced the
principle of competency based training, assessment and certification. In this context
the best place to train and assess competence is in the workplace itself.
This is not a new practice at sea and in the past senior officers have looked after
cadet training needs. Surgeons do this and are required to train and supervise
medical students through their working life that high-level skills are maintained and
improved upon by every student.
However, this concept has now been weakened due to the lack of time caused by
reduced manning, shorter port calls etc. and it is felt that not only does this concept
have to be revived, but also that the concept of trainer / trainee should be applied at
every level. In order to be able to provide meaningful training on board it is necessary
to give those providing training the necessary training skills. One way to do this
would be to include a provision in the syllabus at management levels for deck and
engine certification.
In spite of clear prescription with respect to minimum sea time, minimum age and its
rationalization, one finds many different approaches some Countries have taken.
This makes comparing the each national certification of competence difficult.
Approved Shipboard structured training requirement will make comparison easy and
useful and would eliminate the tight scheduling of placements to meet the college
time structure.
What is also important to consider is the changing technology that is being provided
on modern ships may not be reflected by what is being taught in the classrooms
ashore. The technology that is provided changes from ship to ship and therefore
there is an essential need for time to be given to ion board familiarisation training as
each officer takes up a new appointment.
On board training will benefit the ship-owners because it should considerable reduce
the time required to study in colleges ashore. The savings this generates could be
place training officers on board ships equipped to carry a group of trainees. This is
additional competent officer on board would help the master or chief engineer with a
further officer that could be available to support the watch keepers at times when
conditions that create fatigue occur.
Safer Seas Conference
Brest
March 11th-16th 2002
Are the needs of Seafarers being
adequately considered in the
development of Marine Technology?
Captain Rodger MacDonald FNI
Secretary General - IFSMA
Introduction
• I would like to use the example of AIS being
introduced to ships to explain how the seafarer
believes that the problem of fatigue at sea is
being ignored by the powers that be.
• I would then like to suggest that training is
essential for new technology, and thus a new
approach to training may offer a way to ease the
burden of responsibility placed on today’s
shipmasters
Fatigue
• There is no doubt that Fatigue is a prime
contributor to maritime casualties.
• Adding more and more incoming
information to the Master and Watchkeeper adds to fatigue
• Especially if much of this information is
unwanted and unnecessary
Fatigue
Our message to Flag States
• Today there are fewer competent officers
available to assist the master on the bridge of
most ships than a generation ago.
• Keep the information that is available to the
Shipmaster and watch-keepers relevant accurate
and timely.
• What may be a technological miracle in the
laboratory is not necessarily what the seafarer
(the end user) needs or desires.
Let us Consider A.I.S.
• The new requirement for Automatic
Identification System (AIS) to be fitted to
ships is one example where technology is
being forced on the Shipmaster without
adequate research.
• AIS is being considered by many to be an
alternative to radar. This is dangerous
thinking
The Shipmasters’
Point of View
• The Key Facts are:
– That Radar remains (and will
remain) the primary electronic
system for Collision Avoidance,
• and
– Radar is a very important tool for
Navigation
Why is Radar such a valuable tool?
• The Master and watch-keepers have
Confidence in the information Radar
provides because:
– It’s operation is ship based
– It is not reliant on third party sources
– The users are skilled in its use
– It has a proven track record
In Short
• In its uncluttered display, it offers the
watch-keeper the basic reality of all targets
relative to the ship.
• It therefore aids the watch-keepers vision
and helps in decision making for both
Navigation and Collision Avoidance
AIS on the Other Hand
• Relies on external sources of data collection (GPS
•
•
•
and VHF)
Will not show every vessel as it only applies to
certain tonnage and the Master is at liberty to
turn it off
Will certainly not show uncharted dangers such as
ice
Gives out too much unnecessary information and
may distract the watch-keeper from keeping a
proper look out.
But AIS is on the Way
• Between July 2002 to June 2008 ships will
be required to be fitted with AIS
• The USA are seeking through IMO to
reduce this period by four years for
national security reasons
• AIS has a real purpose to enable coastal
stations to monitor shipping movements
A Technology Driven Concept
• So in 3 short months AIS will start to be a
requirement on all new ships above 300GT
• Most Seafarers cannot as yet see any
benefit from AIS
• So far we have not heard of any AIS type
approval!
• Therefore no training can or has been
considered for its use!
AIS Training
• From the seafarers point of view, to be burdened
with new equipment without adequate training in
its use, IS ASKING FOR TROUBLE
• Have we not learned from the early radar assisted
collisions?
• We fear that identifying the names of other ships
may encourage VHF Communication. Using the
VHF to circumvent the Collision Regulations is a
dangerous procedure.
Training for new Technology
• The electronic aids that are provided changes from
ship to ship and therefore there is an essential
need for time to be given to on-board
familiarisation training as each officer takes up a
new appointment.
• Most Seafarers now believe refresher training
(especially for ARPA) should be mandatory
• Above all Standardisation of electronic aid such as
radar controls and displays would form an
important part of providing effective training
Do Colleges keep up with Changing
Technology?
• It is also important to consider that the
changing technology being provided on
modern ships may not be reflected by
what is being taught in the classrooms
ashore.
Consider Maritime Training in
General
• The 1995 amendments of the STCW
Convention 1978 introduced the principle of
competency based training, assessment
and certification.
• In this context the best place to train and
assess competence is in the workplace
itself.
Training at Sea
• This is not a new practice at sea and in the
past senior officers have looked after cadet
training needs.
• Surgeons do this and are required to train
and supervise medical students through
their working life that high-level skills are
maintained and improved upon by every
student.
Reduced Manning
• However, this concept has now been
weakened due to the lack of time caused
by reduced manning, shorter port calls etc.
and it is felt that not only does this
concept have to be revived, but also that
the concept of trainer / trainee should be
applied at every level.
Financial Benefits
• On board training will benefit the ship-
owners because it should considerable
reduce the time required to study in
colleges ashore. The savings this generates
could place training officers on board ships
equipped to carry a group of trainees.
Approved Shipboard Structure
• Approved Shipboard structured training
requirement will make comparison easy
and useful and would eliminate the tight
scheduling of placements to meet the
college time structure
Help to reduce Fatigue
• This additional competent officer on board
would help the master or chief engineer
with
a further officer that could be
available to support the watch keepers at
times when conditions that create fatigue
occur.
Train the Trainers
• In order to be able to provide meaningful
training on board it is necessary to give
those providing training the necessary
training skills.
• One way to do this would be to include a
provision in the syllabus at management
levels for deck and engine certification
Different standards
• One final point
• In spite of clear prescription with respect
to minimum sea time, minimum age and
its rationalization, one finds many different
approaches some Countries have taken.
• This makes comparing the each national
certification of competence difficult.
Conclusion
• Considerable research is still necessary on how
electronic aids display information so that
unnecessary data does not add to distraction and,
ultimately, fatigue.
• Training and refresher training is essential for all
new technology
• On board training should be cost effective and it
could help reduce the fatigue problems
Regulation & The global labour market for seafarers
Tony LANE
Director
The Seafarers’ International Research Centre
University of Wales
PO Box 907
CF 10 3 YP CARDIFF
Tél : +44.029.20.87.46.20 – Fax : +44.029.20.87.46.19 – [email protected]
As a matter of policy, the Seafarers’ International Research Centre does not have
collective views. The arguments presented in this paper are, therefore, solely those
of the author.
1. Introduction
1.1 It is argued in this paper that many and perhaps even most of the problems
relating to the world’s seafaring labour force have their origins in the twin process of
flagging out and deregulation which began in the later 1970s, gathered momentum
in the 1980s and, continued through into the 1990s, albeit at a diminishing pace.
After a discussion of regulatory systems in general and maritime regulation in
particular, the causes and consequences of deregulation are then explored in some
detail and with a focus on the development of a global labour market for seafarers
and its implications for training, education, certification and employment conditions.
On these issues there is some emphasis on the need to develop optimally efficient
crews.
1.2 In a concluding section it is said that the labour market is in crisis because
although the industry has become global, it has yet to institute a system
commensurately capable of training and certificating seafarers to a uniformly high
standard and providing socio-economic conditions necessary to attract and retain a
committed workforce. If this highly necessary objective is to be achieved, it is argued
that either a new ILO or IMO convention is needed to specify the best practice
required of flag states on labour questions.
2. Regulation and Deregulation
2.1 The term ‘regulation’ as used here is borrowed from political science and has a
particular meaning. It refers to networks of institutions and organisations which,
through a common interest in some particular area of human activity, seek to
negotiate in appropriate forums and in voluntary association with the state, a
consensual system of law, rule, convention and customary practice. ‘Regulation’ in
this sense presupposes an administratively competent state whose machinery is
supervised by professional and impartial agencies and maintains permanent and ad
hoc consultative processes providing for the participation of representatives of all
interest groups.
2.2 ‘Regulation’ therefore means the application of law, rule, convention and custom
as negotiated by the interested parties and as operated by organisations and
agencies commonly accepted as legitimate. This definition of regulation does of
course come close to specifying the essential conditions for a democratic society.
Without a legitimate rule of law and the possibility of negotiated settlements among
organised interested groups, there can be little prospect of functioning democracy
and every likelihood of disorder and dislocation with unpredictable outcomes.
2.3 Provided we can use these words without evoking extreme images of turmoil
and disarray, ‘disorder, dislocation and unpredictability’ are actually quite useful
words when talking about the contemporary labour market for seafarers. Perhaps
the point can best be made by examining the essential characteristics of the
seafarers’ labour markets of the world until the mid-1970s. Principally in Europe and
Japan but similarly in those developing countries establishing new shipping
industries, the national labour markets were in all major aspects consensually
regulated by employers organisations, trade unions, government agencies and
voluntary organisations. The pattern of regulation in the command economies of
Eastern Europe and China was of course driven by the state in its various guises
although the practical outcomes in terms of the management of labour supply and
standards of training and education were not substantially different from those found
in the ‘West’.
2.4 By the 1970s the structures, institutions and organisations concerned with the
various dimensions of the labour market looked remarkably similar in virtually all
nations with a shipping industry . Legal frameworks specified and supervised
seafarers’ registries, standards of technical competence, shipboard safety, work
discipline, minimum accommodation and victualling levels, crew engagement and
discharge. Training and education was provided by state or state-supported
institutions with governing bodies representative of interested parties. At the very
least, employment conditions and the engagement and discharge of crews were
supervised by agencies guided by law and rules and procedures agreed by joint
bodies of shipowners and seafarers. These various organisational practices though
different in detail and emphasis, nevertheless formed a coherent and informally
unified regulatory system. Shipowners’ and seafarers’ representatives, examiners
and surveyors, senior civil servants, nautical college principals and welfare workers
routinely interacted and routinely found ways of making consensual decisions. This
'regulatory system' was so similar and applied to such a large proportion of the
world's internationally trading ships that it effectively set international standards. The
great strength of the system was its ability to continuously develop best practice in
one part of the system and then export it to all other parts. Regulation, far from being
a dead hand, was actually a source of great dynamism.
2.5 It was not by chance that the high point of regulatory systems in the late 1960s
coincided with a moment when a great deal of collective energy was being devoted
to progressive reforms in training and education, labour-saving technology,
recreational welfare and in the terms and conditions of employment. Considerable
advances were made in the 1960s as the commitment to enhancing technical skills,
educational regimes and conditions of employment servicing the shipping industry
became steadily more sophisticated. Standards which had hitherto been effectively
set by shipowners' views of what was minimally needed, were by the 1960s
increasingly being modified by an informal alliance of progressive shipowners,
maritime sector educationalists and trade unions.
This ‘alliance’ was formed and driven by shared concerns at the level of labour
turnover and the need for durable and constructive counter measures to build and
retain a well-trained, technically proficient workforce at least comparable to other
modern industries.
2.6 This forward-looking approach to training and education was barely launched
when it was undermined and eventually discarded by the fallout from the 1970s
crises and the ensuing search for cheap offshore solutions to seafaring labour. The
oil crises of the 1970s, the slump in world trade, a glut of ships and the availability of
offshore flags offering the symbols but none of the substance of developed modern
states, saw waves of ships moving into the unregulated space of offshore. These
one-off survival strategies provided short-term economic relief. But the price was
the dislocation of a regulatory system which had provided the world with a labour
force of steadily improving quality. The progressive reach toward higher standards
was to all intents and purposes, abandoned. The fracturing of the link of common
citizenship or country of domicile between employers, seafarers and educationalists,
meant that it was no longer practically feasible for them to be directly involved or
influential in the training and education of the great bulk of the labour force. The
significance of the breach in this especially important area of regulation was
subsequently, if tacitly, recognised by the development of aid programmes from
some shipowning nations (e.g. Japan and Norway) to labour supply nations (e.g. the
Philippines and India), and financial assistance from some shipowners,
shipmanagers and trade unions to individual and mainly private colleges.
2.7
Regulation of the kind outlined above was, workable, dynamic and
transnationally influential for three main reasons:
1
the great majority of seafarers and shipowners were citizens of the same
political entities (states or coalitions of states),
2
these entities were at comparable levels of technical, political and
administrative development,
3
there were well-established routes for the transnational transfer of technical,
operational and socio-economic knowledge.
2.8 Now, in 2002, the transnational availability of relevant shipping industry
knowledge has become immensely more complete. The concentration of ownership
in the shipbuilding and ships’ equipment industries; the growth of ship management
companies with transnational portfolios of owners; a specialist press with global
coverage and a seamless round of commercially organised international conferences
and seminars; the development of a global labour market; the networking of Port
State Control agencies; the increasingly prominent central roles of the IMO and the
ILO and the rise to significance of international associations such as IACS,
Intertanko, Intercargo, ITF, ISF. These factors in combination make the industry
interactively knowable to its population to an unprecedented extent. On the other
hand, conditions 1 & 2 no longer apply extensively. As we have seen, the
widespread resort to flags of convenience and second registers severed the links of
common citizenship between shipowners and seafarers and between training and
certification and flag state. It also signalled the diminution of comparable levels of
competence and remit across all flag state administrative agencies.
2.9 Under the new regime in world shipping the largest flag states, currently
Panama, Liberia, Bahamas, Cyprus, Malta, neither have nor aim to provide the allround regulatory competencies characteristic of the embedded maritime nations
(large and small alike) which, in concert, shaped world shipping until the mid-1970s.
What had made regulation both possible and dynamic in these embedded maritime
nations were, to repeat and summarise, the enabling agencies and legal frameworks
of states with domiciled owning companies and a seafaring labour force which, given
the epochal political balances of power within these states, required the development
of customary practices of consultation and formal and informal negotiation. But as
soon as shipowners adopted flags of foreign micro nations lacking any substantive
political infrastructure and serious semblance of regulatory capacity, they unilaterally
opted out of regulation.
2.10 The embedded ‘western’ maritime nations (sometimes misleadingly described
as the ‘traditional maritime nations’), whether large like Japan, the UK and Norway or
smaller such as Belgium, Spain and Italy, were all left with considerable residues of
skills and experience in seafaring and the politics and procedures of regulation, but
with greatly diminished fleets and skeletal regulatory structures. In the event the
accumulated skills and experience were displaced but not entirely lost. Large
shipping companies, ship management firms, maritime regulatory agencies, trade
unions, international organisations and associations etc., remain dependent to
some degree or other on people trained in and with experience of advanced
regulatory systems. There is, therefore, both a collective memory of what good
regulatory practice entails and, even though rapidly shrinking, a residual ‘corps’ of
professional regulatory regime practitioners.
2.11 The contemporary and continuing drift to offshore registries may no longer be
primarily driven by a desire to reduce labour costs but the original impetus to
flagging out by the shipowners of the then-embedded maritime nations was
unquestionably for that reason. It is, however, important at this point to emphasise
that shipowners’ were only concerned with the problems of the moment and the
certain knowledge that employment costs were the only ones that could immediately
be reduced.
The world’s shipping industry may have lost a viable and reasonably effective
system for training and employing a proficient labour force, but this was utterly
unintended.. Similarly unintended was the creation of a global labour market.
3. The Global Labour Market
3.1 The global labour market is now a reality for most of the world's seafarers except
for those working in the coastal and near-sea trades of the world's least economically
developed regions. There are, of course, still a large number of internationally
trading, nationally-flagged ships crewed by nationals. But it is surely a sign of the
epoch that the PRC, now the only nation with a sizeable fleet of merchant ships
crewed by nationals who have been trained and certificated in a well-regulated
national system of state-funded colleges and universities, also licenses manning
agents to provide seafarers for foreign-flagged ships. Elsewhere in the world, the
national flag flown by a ship only corresponds with the nationality of a significant
proportion of the crew where employment costs are considerably lower than those
aboard internationally crewed ships..
It is taken for granted and therefore passes unremarked that in the worlds larger
flag fleets - Panama, Bahamas, Liberia, Cyprus and Malta - nationals of these flag
states do not feature in any known collections of manpower statistics. Furthermore,
the second register fleets and increasingly the first register fleets in most OECD
countries as well as ships flagged in Hong Kong and Singapore, all have ships
where dwindling numbers of crew members are nationals.
3.2 What apparently characterises the global labour market is simultaneously its
global inclusiveness and its global organisation of recruitment. That is to say, that
while among crew managers there is a hierarchy of preferred nationalities, all
available nationalities are regarded as potentially employable and recruitment to
ships (as distinct from recruitment into the industry), is organised by a dynamic
system of globally trading manning companies. The eventual shipboard outcome of
this activity is a rich pattern of mixed nationality crews.
3.3 Mixed nationality crews are hardly a new phenomenon but what makes the
modern mixed nationality crew distinctive is the extent to which it is consciously
composed by crew managers’ evaluations of the level of competencies and the
probity of certification procedures on a country by country basis. The global labour
market is stratified to an extent which was unknown in the national labour markets of
the once-established maritime nations in Europe and Japan. In the modern industry
there are widely shared views among shipowners and ship managers as to which
nationalities are best fitted for which ranks. Where a relatively small range of
nationalities are held to be fitted for senior officer ranks, a somewhat larger range
are reckoned to be suited to junior officer positions and a very large range are
thought suitable as ratings. Where officers are concerned, these judgements are
not primarily made on the grounds of nationality as such, but on the basis of
evaluations of the training institutions and certification agencies of the officers’
countries of origin. The training and certification of ratings, by contrast, is taken much
less seriously and ratings are accordingly recruited from a much wider range of
countries.
3.4 Some advantage of the global labour market‘s opportunities can in principal be
taken by anyone with a good general knowledge of the industry and with funds to
invest in a maritime directory, a telephone and fax machine and a computer with an
internet connection. But the most effective advantage is taken by firms with large
crewing requirements and able to afford personnel departments with a global reach.
No doubt this is why growing numbers of shipowners with relatively small fleets hire
ship management companies to organise their crewing for them. The scale of the
crewing requirements of the larger shipmanagent companies and the range of
owners' crew preferences these companies have to satisfy, inevitably leads
shipmanagers into linkages into local manning agencies, local training institutions
and local trade unions. Furthermore, since shipmanagement companies commonly
have to hedge against the future they actually form a vanguard searching for
potential new sources of seafaring labour and ‘experimenting’ with nationalities they
have not previously employed. This process of search and experimentation
‘advertises’ the availability of new sources and thus helps shape a labour market
which always carries within itself the seeds of instability. While the larger crew
managers have the resources to explore, sample and test new labour supply sources
and do so, at any one moment their immediate needs are such that they are
inevitably drawn into at least semi-permanent organisational arrangements in very
small numbers of labour supplying nations. Crew managers with large labour
requirements are at least in the short term a significant force for labour market
stability. They each aim to have a portfolio of perhaps three or four large national
sources with domiciled subsidiary companies as manning agencies However,
should a prolonged and all-sector slump in freight rates develop these same crew
managers will look to new and significantly cheaper labour sources for their ratings if
the price of their existing labour proves inelastic.
3.5 The calculation as to which nationalities to select involves a trade off between
price and efficiency. Given the existence of a market which is statified in each sector
by the price of hire and the various competencies and conditions represented in that
price, it follows that other things being equal, as price goes down so does the
efficiency of labour. When crew managers speak of cost effective crews, they are
simply referring to the fact that there are more and less efficient crews and that
although sometimes ‘bargains’ are to be had (i.e. buyers get more than they paid for),
buyers normally get what they have paid for.
3.6 The efficiency of labour has two basic dimensions: technical competency
acquired through training, education and experience, and effort commitment which is
primarily determined by the social and economic conditions of employment. In short,
the efficiency of labour is determined by, a) prior investment in training, education
and productive experience and b) current investment in conditions of employment.
These various aspects of labour efficiency were exactly the issues that regulatory
systems evolved to address because it was recognised that markets left to
themselves were unable to satisfactorily deliver the required efficiencies. Fortunately
for the future development of the shipping industry’s seafaring labour market there
are some indications that regulation is back on the agenda, but before we examine
these developments and discuss how they might be further advanced, it might be
useful to summarise the global labour market’s principal contemporary
characteristics:
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•
•
•
•
•
•
seafarers of any nationality are potential employees
efficient transnational linkages exist between crew managers, manning agents
and national labour markets
no formal barriers to entry beyond certification compliance
widespread multinational crewing
stability depends upon the extent and timing of fluctuations in world trade
low and diminishing correspondence between flag of ship and crew nationality
absence of system-wide regulation
3.7 Taken in themselves none of these characteristics are problematic except for the
last two. The low level of correspondence between flag and crew nationality is a
serious obstacle to maintaining high levels of training and education and credible
certification. But the absence of system-wide regulation is the more serious because
if this were in place it would be possible to carry through most of what is necessary
to develop an optimally efficient labour force and this would include consistently high
levels of training and certification credibility.
3.8 ‘Optimally efficient labour’ is not actually a term heard outside gatherings of
human resource managers working for large companies even though it could be
taken as at least approximating to the implicit objectives of the most advanced of the
embedded maritime nations.
Similar objectives may also be inferred from those quality assurance protocols which
on personnel matters speak of aiming for excellence and developing and maximising
skills and potentialities. With these considerations in mind and taking a holistic view,
an optimally efficient labour force can be sensibly defined as one where technical
competency is universally consistent with best practice and current knowledge and
where socio-economic conditions elicit maximum effort commitment.
3.9 Some weight has been deliberately placed upon system-wide regulation. This is
because market forces in the current global labour market do not go entirely
unchecked. On matters of training, certification and employment conditions there is a
great deal of activity. Behind the IMO’s STCW95 and the ILO’s conventions and
minimum wage guidelines, behind Port State Control practices, the oil majors’ SIRE
programme, the ITF’s Fair Practices Committee, the ISF’s Training and Manning
committee, the ICMA affiliates’ reporting and referral procedures, there are conferring
and interested parties concerned with setting rules and standards and devising
procedures of recognition, adherence and enforcement.
3.10 Where technical competence are concerned there is wide agreement in the
global industry that overall standards are not consistent with best practice. The same
level of agreement does not exist regarding the socio-economic conditions necessary
to achieve good levels of effort achievement. Indeed it is safe to say that apart from
the ITF, welfare organisations and small numbers of progressive shipowners and
ship managers, this dimension of seafaring life and labour has not been the subject
of serious consideration since the shelved UK Sealife Programme of the early 1970s.
It is true that Port State Control agencies, SIRE inspectors and some P&I clubs have
become readier to see compliance with ILO conventions as an indicator of proper
operating standards but there is simply no doubt that questions of seafarers’ wellbeing are not formally ackjnowledged as fundamental to efficiency.
4. Global Regulation
4.1 Despite its initial economic attractiveness to shipowners, the resort to flags of
convenience and second registers as a means of avoiding labour market regulation
has not delivered any long term gains. Flagging out may have provided shipowners
with the opportunity to make short-term labour cost savings but these savings could
only be made once. Concurrent with the flagging out process were substantial
reductions in manning levels but here, too, there is no longer any scope for further
savings. The longer term consequence for the shipping industry of flagging out and
reduced manning levels has been a manpower crisis.
4.2 The manpower crisis has several dimensions and cannot be simply reduced to a
question of shortages of key officer personnel. There may be a consensus in the
industry about an imminent shortage of people suitably trained and experienced for
senior officer ranks but it is also becoming apparent that many ratings are poorly
trained and that fraudulent certification, especially at junior officer and ratings levels,
is widespread.
4.3 These particular manpower problems concern technical competence. There are
also important issues concerning effort motivation. Varying lengths of tours of duty
by rank and nationality among members of the same crew are not conducive to
teamworking even though the subjects of this inequity often tolerate it resignedly.
Lengthier tours, especially where served aboard ships with small crews and in
trades with rapid turnarounds, social isolation has become a matter needing urgent
inquiry. More generally, shore-leave opportunities for the great majority of seafarers
are negligible in most trades. This makes it difficult for seafarers to periodically
‘escape’ and even harder to sustain and renew family connections.
4.4 Considering in total and in the round the current problems of technical
competence and effort motivation it is plain that the global shipping industry is not
facing the prospect of a manpower crisis but is already in such a crisis. Good
training, education and certification is still available for all ranks - but not
everywhere and insufficiently in some countries. Relatively good socio-economic
conditions can also be found but are for the most part restricted to senior ranks and
even there are not sufficient to attract and then hold new entrants to the industry.
The eventual solution to the manpower crisis will come with the recognition that it has
as much to do with socio-economic conditions as with training and education. And
the solution itself will have to be the product of a global regulatory system..
4.5 The problems briefly summarised above point to a series of remedies. And the
first remedy must involve adjustments to the regulatory framework of institutions and
practices. On this question we might recall that those regulatory systems based in
flag states with substantial modern maritime experience were concerned with
creating and sustaining continuing opportunities of linking interested parties through
formal organisations. It followed from the practice of regulatory systems that
decision-makers at national, regional and local levels either knew everyone who was
relevant or could easily locate and secure an introduction to a relevant person. In this
way, information and understanding of issues and trends could pass rapidly and
efficiently through the system. Continuous and reliable each-way feedback between
employers and employees is of course fundamental to operational best practice in all
industries but provides special problems in an industry obliged to employ a distant
and detached labour force. The effects of distance and detachment are inevitably
magnified now that the shipping industry has a global labour market where crews or
crew segments, ‘owners or managers and ships, are in each case attached to
different sovereign states. These problems are compounded by turnaround times
which, except in the general cargo and long-haul bulk trades, are typically of less
than 24 hours duration and therefore allow few possibilities for interaction between
seafarers, employers, trade unions and welfare organisations. In these
circumstances the need to construct a workably effective international regulatory
system and a set of effective instruments is urgent because there is simply no other
way of ensuring that the shipping industry has a highly motivated and professional
labour force.
4.6 The first priority must be to ensure the existence of an effective framework of
compliance so that there can be confidence in regulatory instruments and practices.
This means that ratifications of ILO and other relevant conventions must be real in
the sense of being real in their consequences. In principle, the ratification of ILO and
IMO Conventions must surely mean that the ratifying state has the intention of
requiring compliance with the provisions of the ratified convention. In turn this must
also mean that the ratifying state has the administrative capacity to monitor the
extent of compliance and to require full compliance in cases where it is deficient. In
respect of the maritime conventions this meaning of ratification can only be taken for
granted in the cases of those embedded maritime states having both effective
administrative agencies and a legal code designed to regulate employment practices
and protect persons employed aboard ships. Those states currently lacking such
agencies and legal codes must therefore be expected to devise means of ensuring
that their ratification entails the intent and the administrative capacity to require
compliance and conforms with best practice. This logically suggests an ILO-IMO
accord on a suitable convention and effective means of enforcement but possibly
IMO) specifying at least a minimum of flag state administrative capacity in respect of
seagoing labour. These capacities should entail:
•
•
•
•
•
•
•
Seafarer death and serious accident records and investigation procedures
Retrievable archive of articles of agreement and official logs of all registered
ships
Health screening records
Supervision of vocational training institutions
Supervision of compliance with ratified conventions
Specification of rights and obligations of non-citizen seafarers
Seafarer right of meaningful access to consular services, employers, trade
unions, welfare agencies and medical care
4.7 Such a convention could usefully have a code of practice indicating in detail what
should be expected of each provision and require or encourage the establishment of
one or several tripartite advisory committees to help flag states manage their
administrative systems in an efficient and sensitive manner.
4.8 The introduction of the sort of convention described in outline above and
especially the attachment of tripartite advisory committees, would go a long way
toward the creation of a global regulatory system by the simple device of enabling the
emergence of uniform transnational codes and practices . Stability in the labour
market is an essential precondition for developing global standards and practices and
ensuring that the commodities of world trade are carried aboard excellent ships with
optimally efficient crews.
The Human Element In Maritime Transport
Frederik VAN WIJNEN
General Sercretary
Conferderation of European Shipmasters’ Asssociations
Delftsestraat 9-C
3013 AB ROTTERDAM
.Management on board, in the past and at present, changes in management culture
and the impact on the human factor”
As you can derive from this introduction, I intend to try to clarify the human factor from the
position of the shipmaster, who is still the only person responsible for what is happening on
board a ship. Many laws have been changed but the position of the shipmaster has so far not
been affected for the simple reason that he is the only person to act whenever necesssary in
conditions where the shore based management is out of reach. Through improved means of
communication, the position of the shipmaster is somewhat influenced in the field of the
“everyday” management of his vessel. Modern shipping companies, in the container trade for
example, have accurate details on the vessel’s position, course, speed and even fuel
consumption. Maintenance schedules can be checked by the technical department and
surveys can be organised from a distance. This is about the reach of “Big Brother” and then
only during working days, for during long weekends the vessel is mostly on her own again.
All other navigational, metereological and other accidental occurrences are still very much of
concern to the ship’s staff. Reason to believe that this situation will cease to exist in the
distant future, is not to be expected due to the fact that in the event of an accident, the
scapegoat is to be found on board the ship and not in the office. Criminalization of the
shipmaster has even become a hot item, even within IMO circles, because realisation has
come at last to responsible persons in the maritime industry that this system is unlogical and
inhuman. Moreover no normal civilised human being will choose a career at sea knowing that
he can be found guilty of a crime to such an extent that he will be thrown into prison before
even found guilty of a mistake in his judgement of certain conditions in circumstances which
are sometimes completely beyond human comprehension. These human judgements or
decisions are very much in the news lately after studies have shown that approximately 80
percent of all shipping accidents are due to the human element. With the experience and
knowledge of seafarers on board ships plying our EU waters evidently declining, the
influence of the human element in marine accidents will undoubtedly increase. All
conventions and good will shown by the IMO to control the quality of seafarers have so far
not shown any effect due to the simple truth that the so called white list has not had the
desired effect. Fraudulent certificates are still easy to obtain and controlling these criminal
procedures has been found very difficult to realise. Recent tests have proved this to be more
than a true fact.
Many maritime accidents have demonstrated that the human factor is playing an important
role. A not very recent but striking example is the grounding of the “Torrey Canyon” in 1967.
Already then, the world was made aware of the dramatic impact of the enormous dangers of
maritime transport of oil products. As the consequence of an unperceived wrong position of
the selector switch on the automatic steering device, the vessel turned out to be temporarily
out of control and grounded, still at full speed, onto Pollard Rock. The accident was a clear
case of human factor or human error. As already mentioned, estimates indicate that
approximately 80 percent of all maritime accidents are due to a similar cause. Despite this
knowledge, such incidents are still happening and they will continue to do so. It goes without
saying that shipmasters are not, least of all, excluded from this phenomenon. They are even
held responsible for the failing of others, as is recently proved after the “Erika” disaster.
Moreover, the human factor continues to profile itself as an utterly complicated matter.
Technical developments are aiming at influencing the effect of the human element on marine
accidents by alarm systems and even decision making to prevent the responsible person on
the bridge of making a mistake. The Automatic Identification System (A.I.S.) has been
developed to give a better image of the actual surrounding shipping traffic and avoid
misinterpretation during the so called VHF Collregs which is rapidly becoming popular and is
threatening to replace the internationally accepted “Rules of the Road”.
The founding of IMCO (later IMO) was intended to worldwide promote safety of ship and
crew. Consequent conventions such as SOLAS and MARPOL have contributed to this goal,
the latter as a protection for the marine environment. The activities primarily concerned the
“hardware” or shipconstruction and equipment. The “software” or “humanware”, the division
which had to bring the ship from A to B and to whom the greater part of the accidents were
attributed, obtained some attention in a later stage. The STCW Convention and the ISM
Code were amongst others responsible for this new phenomenon in the shipping industry.
Maintaining a safety culture on board ships had sofar been a concern of the ship’s staff. The
ISM Code however shows that the human factor hardly permits the safety culture to be
merely a matter of ship’s personnel.
There is, however, still an important part reserved for, notably, the shipmaster, who should
be in a position to take an active part, despite interferences from many authorities and
parties in the transport sector. Specialisation could have a positive impact in this respect.
Manning agencies who often employ “Jacks of all trades”, scarcely contribute to an
acceptable safety culture on board. The fundamental issue however continues to be a
“commitment from the top”.
The many parties which are rightly involved in the implementation of a safety system, such
as shipowners, port state control, classification societies etc. are also responsible for the
increasing workload of the shipmaster. Every authority has actually its own standards for
observing . In many cases, these obligations have to be fulfilled during periods that
operational circumstances are most intensive.
With the recent, sometimes, skeleton crews and the fact that the shipmaster is at times even
incorporated in the duty schedule, his availability diminishes, which has a negative effect on
the safety aspect. This situation is even worsened by the presence on board of cheaper,
often less experienced and sometimes substandard officers and crew.
In an effort to improve standards, a number of IMO conventions have been adjusted and
new editions created. The number of publications and manuals has been doubled during the
past few years. The variety of checklists, that have to be completed, has grown
spectacularly, for each occasion there is one available. We wonder whether all this reporting
is in fact so important and whether a centralised system of data is a possibility to prevent
duplications. The ultimate danger in overflowing people with regulations, directions, manuals
and information is, that it results in a total “black out”. The capacity of the human mental
endurance has its limits.
This condition can lead, directly or indirectly, to accidents with serious effects, such as loss of
human life or pollution of the environment.
Spreading all relevant information is facilitated by modern communication equipment. Apart
from some negative effects, as described above, this improved means of communication
enables us, as shipmaster associations, to improve contacts with our active seagoing
members. We attach great value to the opinion of this group of colleagues. They are
positioned in the centre of the impact of the human factor on safe maritime transport. It is
remarkable that, although working conditions are sometimes substantially different, opinions
are rather unanimous. It is obvious that safety consciousness has not spread everywhere.
Yet a number of shipmasters have considered the ISM Code as an instrument to improve
safety management on board, although filling in the checklists is still considered a timeconsuming activity, which has to completed in a short span of time.
Some directions or regulations are even contradictory. Inspections have to be performed in a
safe manner, circumstances permitting. A signature under a form which has been completed
under time pressure, does not guarantee safety at all.
Increased traffic intensity, one man bridge control, operator unfriendly equipment (lack of
proper standardisation) and multi-national crews do not contribute to easily maintain a
satisfying safety culture on board our ships. Training institutions are trying to get their hands
into these changed circumstances. Tutoring EU trainees during their practical period
becomes an ever greater problem as the shipmaster is one of the few or the only EU citizen
board. Problems in communication, caused by a faulty command of the English language,
play a role in this context
CESMA has tried to express proper concern of its active seagoing members. Experienced
shipmasters should be in a position and capable to bring forward sensible suggestions. We
are convinced that the introduction of the STCW95 Convention and the ISM Code are a
sincere effort to weed out the weak spots and improve safety standards. The shipmaster
however should be in a position to properly follow the intended procedures. It could not have
been the intention that the ISM Code would only increase the administrative bother! The
intention has been to compensate the influence of the human factor on the safety culture. It
will only succeed when there will be an improvement in the time consuming, not to say time
spilling, procedures in maintaining the Code. If not, the contrary will take place which will be
difficult for the shipmaster to compensate.Which influence will that have in ship-management
and the human factor of the master himself, remains a question which is still not answered.
The STCW95 Convention and the ISM Code have also been initiated in the framework of
the globalisation of the shipping industry. Inquiries by the Nautical Institute have shown that
appreciation for ISM Code is far more positive in developing countries than in traditional
seafaring nations. This shows that the ISM Code is seen as a back up for gaining experience
in obtaining a proper safety culture. Seafarers from traditional seafaring nations feel that they
do not need the ISM Code. They already had a similar safety culture, initiated by their own
renowned shipping companies and in fact estimate the ISM Code to be redundant and
unnecessary. Most of these seafarers were and still are properly educated, trained and
motivated, estimating the ISM Code not much more than a paper burden, in fact not invented
for them. Frequent audits by all kind of inspection officers often cause irritation and deviate
attention from the real job. It has therefore in many cases the opposite effect.
Another cause for discontent is the level of knowledge of some inspection officers, causing
misunderstanding and friction. CESMA firmly believes that safety at sea can only be
guaranteed by capable, well educated and trained and motivated seafarers from whatever
part of the world or culture.
Motivation is the key word in this respect. Everybody who has spent many years at sea,
knows that you cannot properly run a ship without a motivated crew. Recent reports from our
members show that this motivation leaves much to be desired nowadays. Many crews
consist of a great number of nationalities of which a great part come from crewing agencies
which employ people by the voyage without properly checking their ability and experience.
Even certificates in many colours do not prove proper capability. Many ships in our European
waters sail under the supervision of a few experts or even a single expert from a reservoir
which is still motivated but quickly becoming extinct. Reports tell us about the lack of interest
in the profession of the so called crews of convenience whose only goal is to finish their term
on board in due time without getting too tired. This causes a direct safety concern, as this
attitude also effects attentiveness, one of the basic conditions for properly navigating a ship.
This negligence can hardly be compensated by instruments or electronic devices. Many of
these appliances, however clever invented by the ever energetic electronic industry, only
cause distraction. The engineroom control, transferred to the bridge for economic reasons, is
a main cause for disturbing the concentration of the duty officer on the bridge. Many alarms
occur at moments when the responsible person on the bridge is overburdened by other,
mostly navigational, duties. On most bridges computers are placed to enable the duty officer
to complete administration duties before arriving at the next port of call. During a recent
collision off the Portuguese coast, the entire staff on the one vessel, including the captain,
were fully absorbed in repairing the boardcomputer, forgetting to keep a proper lookout. Of
the many instruments on the bridge, only a few are essential.The increasing new inventions
do not contribute a lot. They only distract the officer on watch from his normal and essential
duties. The Automatic Identification System (A.I.S.) is the latest game of the electronic
industry which promotes its invention as a true contribution to maritime safety. Another study
involves a so-called “decision-maker” which assists the duty officer to choose from several
options during complicated navigational situations. The project which is carried out by
MARCONSULT from Genoa. Italy, which has asked CESMA to co-operate in investigating
the effectiveness of the new system. This shows that a shipmaster of today should not deny
new developments in navigational equipment. However, great attention should be given to
the crucial fact that instruments may assist the human element to improve maritime safety
but also that they can never replace the real capability and motivation of the “essential
seafarer”.
Comment garantir le respect du droit international du travail
dans le secteur maritime?
Dani APPAVE
Spécialiste Principal en Questions Maritimes,
Bureau International du Travail
4, Route des Morillons
22 GENEVE
La Convention des Nations Unies sur le Droit de la Mer prévoit dans l’Article 94 que, “ Tout
Etat exerce effectivement sa juridiction et son contrôle dans les domaines administratif,
technique et social sur les navires battant son pavillon” et “ En particulier tout Etat :
exerce sa juridiction conformément à son droit interne sur tout navire battant son pavillon,
ainsi que sur le capitaine, les officiers et l'équipage pour les questions d'ordre administratif,
technique et social concernant le navire”. De plus “ Tout Etat prend à l'égard des navires
battant son pavillon les mesures nécessaires pour assurer la sécurité en mer, notamment en
ce
qui concerne : la composition, les conditions de travail et la formation des équipages, en
tenant compte des instruments internationaux applicables;”
La responsabilité des Etats à prendre les mesures nécessaires est claire mais la ratification
des Conventions internationales n’est pas obligatoire. Les mesures nécessaires
comprennent l’adoption de la réglementation appropriée, de la vérification de l’application y
compris par des inspections et des sanctions pénales en cas de non respect de la
réglementation.
L’OIT a adopté des Conventions et des Recommandations relatives à divers aspects des
conditions du travail dans la marine marchande, entre autres, les heures de travail, le
logement des équipages, la santé, la sécurité a bord, l’inspection du travail, et la sécurité
sociale. L’OIT est la seule institution spécialisée des Nations Unies à avoir un
fonctionnement tripartite. Les organisations d’employeurs et de travailleurs y ont une grande
influence. Les questions maritimes y sont discutées par la Commission Paritaire Maritime et
les Sessions Maritimes de la Conférence Internationale du Travail. La Commission Paritaire
est composée d’armateurs et de syndicalistes maritimes et ceux-ci détiennent ensemble 50
pour cent des voix en cas de vote à la Conférence. Par conséquent, les instruments adoptés
par l’OIT sont l’expression des Etats et de toute l’industrie maritime.
Le principal instrument en la matière est la Convention No.147 sur la marine marchande
(normes minima), 1976. C'est, dans le cadre de l’OIT, un instrument très particulier. Elle
oblige les Etats qui l’ont ratifiée à appliquer des mesures qui sont équivalentes dans
l’ensemble à un certain nombre d’autres Conventions de l’OIT qui sont énumérées dans
l’Annexe à la Convention. Elle permet aussi l’inspection des navires étrangers visitant les
ports des pays qui ont ratifié la Convention. De ce fait, elle contraint indirectement des
navires immatriculés dans des Etats n’ayant pas ratifié la Convention à appliquer un certain
nombre de dispositions de Conventions de l’OIT énumérés dans l’Annexe. La Convention
No. 147, en formalisant la possibilité d’une vérification par les Etats portuaires a été un
élément catalyseur du développement des Mémoranda régionaux en la matière.
Un Protocole adopté en 1996 a élargi les domaines couverts par la Convention No.147 avec
une nouvelle liste de Conventions en Annexe. Le Protocole a atteint le nombre de
ratifications nécessaires et entrera en vigueur le 10 Janvier 2003.
La Convention No.147 est ratifiée par 43 Etats Membres de L’OIT , représentant 55 pour
cent de la flotte mondiale. Cette Convention est l’une des mieux ratifiées des Conventions
maritimes de l’OIT. La mieux ratifiée des Conventions maritimes de l’OIT est la Convention
No.108 concernant les pièces d’identité des gens de mer, 1958 qui est ratifiée par 61 Etats
représentant 61 pour cent de la flotte mondiale. Toutefois aucune de ces Conventions
n’atteint le niveau d’acceptation quasi-universelle atteint par les Conventions SOLAS ou
STCW.
Un autre instrument qui contribue a l’application des normes internationales est la
Convention (No. 178) sur l’inspection des conditions de travail (gens de mer), 1996. Cette
Convention oblige les Etats à avoir un système d’inspection et à procéder à des inspections
des navires immatriculés sur son territoire pour vérifier l’application de la législation en
vigueur en ce qu’il s’agit des conditions de travail et de vie a bord. Les inspecteurs devront
être indépendants de toute influence extérieure. Je reviendrai sur le besoin d’étendre le
devoir d’inspection pour assurer l’application du droit international sur les navires.
Dans la mesure où les instruments sont l’expression de l’industrie maritime et des Etats, plus
particulièrement ceux qui ont une vocation maritime, on s’attendrait à ce qu’elles soient très
largement ratifiées. Mais en fait, le niveau de ratification relativement faible des
Conventions de l’OIT s’explique facilement: aucun Etat ne veut mettre sa flotte dans
une position de désavantage commercial par rapport aux navires immatriculés dans
d’autres pays. Toute Convention de l’OIT n’est ainsi ratifiées que si un pays juge soit que la
Convention concernée présente plus d’avantages que de coûts pour ses navires ou si le
pays s’attend à ce que la Convention sera ratifiée par un grand nombre de pays représentant
une grande partie de la flotte mondiale. En d’autres mots, que l’application de la Convention
ne sera pas un désavantage commercial pour sa flotte. La Convention No.108, par exemple,
présente l’avantage de faciliter la mobilité des gens de mer. Elle a peu de désavantages et
elle est donc ratifiée plus largement que d’autres. La Convention No.147, quant à elle, est
devenue presque d’application obligatoire dans certaines parties du monde en raison de
l’inspection par les Etats du port. Certains pays ont ainsi décidé de la ratifier pour donner une
certaine respectabilité à leur immatriculation et ainsi bénéficier de plus sympathie de la part
des services d’inspections dans les ports étrangers, en d’autres termes, les avantages
sembleraient commencer à compenser les inconvénients.
De plus, la ratification d’une Convention de l’OIT, soumet le pays concerné à la supervision
de la Commission d’Experts sur l’application des Normes. En conformité avec la Constitution
de l’OIT, chaque Etat Membre doit rendre compte de l’application de toute norme qu’elle a
ratifiée. Des plaintes peuvent aussi être déposées contre un pays pour non application
d’une norme. Donc, éviter une ratification peut signifier éviter de rendre compte. Pour
certains, le meilleur moyen d’offrir le maximum d’avantages à des armateurs soucieux de
leur situation commerciale face à une concurrence de plus en plus dure, est de ne rien
ratifier dans la mesure du possible, pour offrir le plus possible de liberté a l’armateur.
La non-ratification à cause des coûts est évidente, les armateurs choisissant
l’immatriculation pour limiter les coûts d’exploitation. Plusieurs auteurs ont souligné que c’est
sous le chapitre coûts de main d’œuvre que le choix d’immatriculation offre des possibilités
d’économie (voir par exemple An analysis of the decision to flag out, Bergantino et Marlow,
1976 et Substandard ships and crews, Chartered Institute of Transport, 1976). L’OCDE a
même estimé les économies faites par les exploitants qui évitent leurs obligations et opèrent
“sous normes”.
Il faudrait qu’à l’avenir ce soit impossible de ne pas appliquer les normes minima en ce qui
concerne le droit du travail maritime. L’OIT travaille en ce moment vers une consolidation de
toutes les normes du travail maritime de l’Organisation dans une Convention unique. Ce
processus fait l’objet d’une série de réunions et de Conférences qui culmineront dans
l’adoption d’une nouvelle Convention en 2005. Cela aura pour conséquence de faire plus de
clarté dans les normes du travail maritime, une Convention unique remplacera plus de 30
Conventions. Les Etats devront ratifier un seul instrument et n’auront pas le loisir de choisir
d’ignorer certaines dispositions contraignantes du point de vue commercial. Mais, puisque la
ratification est un acte volontaire, il faudra que la ratification apporte, quand même, plus
d’avantages que d’inconvénients. Pour cela, il faudra que la Convention contienne un
certain nombre de points importants: le renforcement de l’obligation pour l’Etat du
pavillon d’imposer l’application des normes minima en ce qu’il s’agit du travail
maritime; et pour cela, il faudra que le contrôle par l’Etat du port deviennent plus
systématique en incluant le maximum de thèmes couverts par la Convention;
l’obligation pour l’Etat du pavillon de prouver qu’il supervise régulièrement
l’application de la Convention et cela de manière vérifiable par l’Etat du port.
Dans le but d’améliorer l’application du droit international en matière de conditions de travail
et de vie à bord, il est urgent de rendre les inspections de navires étrangers par l’Etat du port
plus systématique dans le monde entier. La Convention No.147 permet à l’Etat de port de
prendre les mesures nécessaires pour redresser toute situation à bord qui constitue
clairement un danger pour la sécurité ou la santé. Il faudrait qu’à l’avenir qu’il y ait obligation
d’intervenir dans ce cas, sinon on perpétuerait la possibilité de situations de “non-assistance
à personne en danger”. Par ailleurs, il faudrait que dans la nouvelle Convention, l’Etat du
port puisse intervenir pour obliger le redressement de toute situation qui serait contraire aux
dispositions de la Convention et non pas seulement en cas de danger pour la sécurité ou la
santé.
Les têtes pensantes de l’industrie maritime réfléchissent en ce moment même à la manière
d’imposer une norme universellement acceptée en matière de travail maritime. Il ne faudrait
pas que cette norme soit acceptée par certains seulement parce qu’elle est vide
d’obligations. Tout au contraire, il faudrait que cette norme soit capable de relever le niveau
de la plus grande partie de la flotte mondiale qui en ce moment même tente, pour cause de
concurrence, d’éviter le droit maritime international. Il est de bon ton de combattre fraude,
blanchiment d’argent et autres maux. Il faudrait aussi que disparaissent les violations des
droits des travailleurs de l’industrie maritime, aujourd’hui monnaie courante grâce à la non
application du droit international.

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