Leaders of the Borders, Borders of the Leaders

Transcription

Journal of the Institute for Euroregional Studies
“Jean Monnet” European Centre of Excellence
University of Oradea
University of Debrecen
Volume 11
Edited by
Cristina-Maria DOGOT, Philippe PERCHOC & TÖKÉS Tibor
References by
Roberto FARNETI, Marianne LEFEVRE
Spring 2011
Eurolimes
Editors-in-chief: Ioan HORGA (Oradea) and Istvan SULI-ZAKAR (Debrecen)
Executive Editor: Sorin ŞIPOŞ (Oradea)
Spring 2011
Volume 11
Edited by Cristina-Maria DOGOT, Philippe PERCHOC & TÖKÉS Tibor
Honorary Members
Paul Alliès (Montpellier), Peter Antes (Hanover), Enrique Banús (Barcelona), Robert Bideleux (Swansea), Erhard Busek
(Wien), Jean Pierre Colin (Reims), George Contogeorgis (Athene), Gerard Delanty (Sussex), György Enyedi (Budapest), Sharif
Gemie (Glamorgan), Chris G. Quispel (Leiden), Moshe Idel (Jerulalem), Jarosław Kundera (Wroclaw), Ariane Landuyt
(Siena), Thomas Lundén (Stockholm), Kalypso Nicolaidis (Oxford), Adrian Miroiu, (Bucureşti), Frank Pfetsch (Heidelberg),
Andrei Marga, Ioan Aurel Pop, Vasile Puşcaş, Vasile Vesa (Cluj-Napoca), Mercedes Samaniego Boneau (Salamanca), Angelo
Santagostino (Brescia), Maria Manuela Tavares Ribeiro (Coimbra), Dusan Sidjanski (Geneve), Maurice Vaïsse (Paris)
Advisory Committee
Josef Abrhám (Prague), Iordan Bărbulescu, Simona Miculescu, Mihai Răzvan Ungureanu (Bucureşti), Teresa Pinheiro
(Chemnitz) Cristina Blanco Sio-Lopez (Luxembourg) Czimre Klára, Kozma Gábor, Teperics Károly (Debrecen), Rozália Biró,
Antonio Faur, Alexandru Ilieş, Rodica Petrea, Sorin Şipoş, Barbu Ştefănescu, Ion Zainea (Oradea), Ovidiu Ghitta, Adrian Ivan,
Nicoale Păun, Radu Preda (Cluj-Napoca), Margarita Chabanna (Kiev), Juan Manuel de Faramiňán Gilbert (Jaen), Didier
Francfort (Nancy), Tamara Gella (Orel), Ion Gumenâi, Octavian Ţîcu (Chişinău), Karoly Kocsis (Miskolc), Cătălina Iliescu
(Alicante), Savvas Katsikides (Nicosia), Anatoly Kruglashov (Chernivtsi), Renaud de La Brosse (Reims), Giuliana Laschi
(Bologna), Stephan Malovic (Zagreb), Maria Marczewska-Rytko, Bogumiła Mucha-Leszko (Lublin), Fabienne Maron
(Brussels), Ivan Nacev, (Sofia), Carlos Eduardo Pacheco do Amaral (Asores), Alexandru-Florin Platon (Iaşi), Mykola Palinchak,
Viktoriya Bokoch, Svitlana Mytryayeva (Uzhgorod), Stanislaw Sagan (Rzeszow), Grigore Silaşi (Timişoara), Lavinia Stan
(Halifax), George Tsurvakas (Tessalonik), Peter Terem (Banska Bystrica), Esther Gimeno Ugalde (Wien), Jan Wendt (Gdansk)
Editorial Committee
Ioana Albu, Ambrus Attila, Mircea Brie, Mariana Buda, Carmen Buran, Florentina Chirodea, Lia Derecichei, Cristina-Maria Dogot,
Dorin Dolghi, Diana Gal, (Oradea), Olha Yehorova (Uzhgorod) Natalia Cugleşan, Dacian Duna (Cluj-Napoca), Andreas
Blomquist (Stockholm), Nicolae Dandis (Cahul), Molnar Ernő, Penzes Janos, Radics Zsolt, Tőmőri Mihály (Debrecen), Bohdana
Dimitrovova (Belfast), Mariana Cojoc (Constanţa), Sinem Kokamaz (Izmir), George Angliţoiu, Oana Ion, George Lăzăroiu,
Florin Lupescu, Adrian Niculescu, Nicolae Toderaş (Bucureşti), Anca Oltean, Dana Pantea, Istvan Polgar, Irina Pop, Adrian
Popoviciu, Alina Stoica, Luminiţa Şoproni, Constantin Ţoca (Oradea), Laura Sicilione (Siena), Viktoryia Serzhanova (Rzeszow)
Assistant Editor (English): Daniela Blaga
Editorial Assistant: Elena Zierler
The full responsibility regarding the content of the papers belongs exclusively to the authors.
Address: University of Oradea
1st Universitatii Street
410087-Oradea/Romania
Tel/fax: +40.259.467.642
e-mail: [email protected]
www.iser.rdsor.ro
Engraving by Pierre Tardieu, in M. Lapie, Atlas universel de geographie ancienne et moderne, Paris, 1838, p. 15. „Lucian
Blaga” University Library, Cluj-Napoca, Stampe Collection.
Eurolimes is a half-yearly journal. Articles and book reviews may be sent to the above mentioned address. The journal may
be acquired by contacting the editors
Journal of the Institute for Euroregional Studies (IERS) is issued with the support of the Action Jean Monnet of the European
Commission and in the Co- Edition with Bruylant (Brussels)
Oradea University Press
ISSN-L: 1841-9259
ISSN 2247 / 8450
Cuprins ◊ Contents ◊ Sommaire ◊ Inhalt ◊ Tartalom
Cristina DOGOT (Oradea), Philippe PERCHOC (Paris), TÖKÉS Tibor (Debrecen) ◄►
Leaders, Borders and Changes - Introduction - ........................................................... 5
I. Political Leadership and the Borders of Europe during the Cold War ........................ 9
Florin ABRAHAM (Bucharest) ◄► Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej and Romania‟s Eastern
Neighbourhood ........................................................................................................ 11
Valentina GÎDEA (Cluj-Napoca), Lucian BOGDAN (Cluj-Napoca) ◄► From Consensus
to Mutual Distrust and Back: The Shifting Boundaries of Free Europe in the
Twentieth Century ................................................................................................... 30
Anca OLTEAN (Oradea) ◄► The Jews of Romania and their Immigration to Israel.
1948-1953 ............................................................................................................... 41
Ljiljana MANIC (Belgrade), Nada TORLAK (Belgrade), Natasa SIMEUNOVIC BAJIC
(Belgrade)◄► Tito, Yugoslavia, and the „Third Way”: Understanding Physical
and Symbolic Borders .............................................................................................. 55
II. United Europe, Europe of the leaders: European borders from 6 to (+)27............... 63
Radu CARP (Bucharest) ◄► Modernisation envers secularisme ? La transformation de la
Turquie ante portas .................................................................................................. 65
Helga ZICHNER (Leipzig), Bettina BRUNS (Leipzig) ◄► Within a “Ring of Secure
Third Countries”: Regional and Local Effects of the Extraterritorial Engagement of
the European Union in Belarus, Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova ..................... 78
Andreea Crina HOREA (Cluj-Napoca) ◄► Europe‟s Gordian Knot. Germany ................. 89
Licia BAGINI (Poitiers) ◄► Quelles frontières pour le Trentin-Haut Adige/Südtirol? .... 104
Denis ROLLAND (Strasbourg) ◄► Le Conseil de l‟Europe en 2010: une vieille
institution pour un projet moderne? Éléments de réflexion et d‟historiographie...... 118
III.
The Place of the Leaders after the end of the Cold War: the
Disappearance/Appearance of the Borders ........................................................... 127
REMÉNYI Péter (Pecs) ◄► An Emerging Border of an Emerging State? The Case of the
IEBL and the Republika Srpska of Bosnia-Herzegovina ......................................... 129
Monica OPROIU (Bucharest) ◄► Slobodan Milosevic and the Violent Transformation
of Borders in Former Yugoslavia ........................................................................... 142
Giulia PRELZ OLTRAMONTI (Brussels) ◄► Borders, Boundaries, Ceasefire Lines and
de Facto Borders: The Impact of Mobility Policies ................................................. 157
TÖMÖRI Mihály (Debrecen) ◄► The Role of the “DebOra” Cross-Border
Eurometropolis in the Hungarian-Romanian CBC Relations a Case Study of
Shopping Tourism in Debrecen and Oradea............................................................ 170
Adriana POPESCU (Oradea), Ludovic NICA (Oradea) ◄► Regionalism in a Europe
Without Borders Some Approaches on Bihor County ............................................. 179
IV. Focus ........................................................................................................................ 193
Erhard BUSEK (Wien) ◄► Moving Borders .................................................................. 194
Book reviews .................................................................................................................. 199
Mariana BUDA (Oradea) ◄► La lutte des orgueils politiques ou la conquête de l‟or
noir ?! .................................................................................................................... 200
4
Mariana BUDA (Oradea)◄► La géopolitique, un instrument sine qua non dans
l‟organisation mondiale.......................................................................................... 202
Cristina-Maria DOGOT (Oradea) ◄► Eastern European Frontier and Cross-Border
Cooperation ........................................................................................................... 206
Constantin Vasile ŢOCA (Oradea) ◄► Regional Development and Cross-Border
Cooperation: A Basis for the Multilevel Governance? ............................................ 210
About the Authors ......................................................................................................... 215
Leaders, Borders and Changes
- Introduction Cristina DOGOT1, Philippe PERCHOC2, TÖKÉS Tibor3
The issue of leadership or more precisely of political leadership has been increasingly
present in the public space, especially due to researchers within the field of Humanities. Historians,
sociologists, political analysts or economists have been trying to explain the different sociopolitical situations where the political leaders have a major influence, either visible or not, more or
less explicit, more or less important. This interest is entirely understandable in an era when political
leaders are closer to the society than ever, not because political leaders are physically closer to
people, but mainly because media makes them seem so. More than before, the decision-makers, the
political leaders can be observed in real time, when they are working, meeting with colleagues or
friends, when they are walking or even marrying. This deep interrelation of two parts which are
virtually present has accentuated both the common and the specialized interest for political leaders,
although this interest is far away from being a characteristic only of the highly technologized era.
This preoccupation for the leaders, for the head of a society has existed forever 4: what else was the
interest of Plato, Aristotle, Hobbes, Locke or Rouseau for authority, hierarchy or power? What else
was the interest of Thomas d‟Aquino for the different names given to authority? What else was the
interest of Machiavelli for the prince?
All these references offer us a very basic overview on the oldness and diversity of the
ideas concerning the political leadership. But, despite of the fact that classical approaches are still
current, the novelty of political leadership results from the actual magnitude of the interest for this
matter, an interest which is likely to be satisfied by technology. Howewer, despite the interest in the
topic, the authors of this Eurolimes issue have not proposed such an approach. Hence, almost no
matter the historical period researched within domains or sub-domains such as History, Political
History, Political Psychology, Political Analysis, International Relations, Polemology, Stasiology,
Irenology etc., approaching the matter of political leadership and its influences on the different
political events happened at national or international political level and often at the level of
different social spaces; this is really important for all these sub-domains. Behind every political
event there is a political decision, and behind every political decision there is a political leader,
frequently regarded as being the main or yet the single decision maker. It is difficult to accept,
especially for the democratic regimes, that only one leader might be able and could have the
authority, capability, the power or the potential to affect the evolution of a region, of a state or yet
of the world, to change, sometimes dramatically, the lives of individuals and societies (because,
and history has demonstrated this too often, the border changes were too often the source of drama,
especially for the common people). Nevertheless, although there are many constraints and factors
which influence the decision making process and the decision maker on his/her capacity to decide
and to lead, leaders and decisions are constantly the most obvious in this equation, with numerous
unknown variables for the common people. Therefore, as political decision produces more dramatic
effects in the life of different communities, this one is probably to be associated with the leader
who announced and implemented the respective political decision.
This Eurolimes Journal issue, i.e. Leaders of the Borders, Borders of the Leaders, brings
together the best articles presented at the conference with the same name, and focuses on two
1
University of Oradea, Faculty of History, Geography and International Relations.
Assistant académique au Collège d'Europe - Département d'Etudes Générales - à Bruges.
3
University of Debrecen/ Paris Sorbonne University (Paris IV).
4
“Leadership is as old as mankind. It is universal, and inescapable”. Jean Blondel, Political Leadership.
Toward a General Analysis, (London, Beverly Hills, Newburry Park, New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1987),
1.
2
6
important issues of the contemporary world: political leadership and the European frontiers. The
usual three sections of the journal were decided based on the necessity to achieve a more complex
diachronic approach of the numerous and different associations between political leaders and the
modifications of some European frontiers after the end of the Second World War until the present day.
The period covered by the proposed topic was considered necessary to take on, even with
the risk of assembling only some pieces of the entire puzzle. Howewer, the proposed chronology
tried to capture the main two historical periods, the Cold War and the post Cold War period,
together with a process which transcended the both, keeping parallel or intersecting the events, i.e.
the process of the European construction. The possibilities for a journal to achieve a holistic picture
of a given period of time are quite limited, because it depends on the matter of interest, on the
imagination, or on the inspiration of its contributors. We are aware that not all readers and not all
specialists will find answers to individual questions among the articles of this review; nevertheless,
some articles that deal with very narrow topics can provide a basis to create a new perspective on
an extended era. Hence, we considered an interdependent approach between both international
(Cold War, after Cold War period) and regional directions (Cold War, after Cold War and
European construction process, too), taking into account the standpoint regarding the influence of
political leaders on the borders changes that can be a feasible perspective even for a journal. The
main work in this case is to connect a quite difficult to define element, the political leadership,
considered generally as a “phenomenon of power”, with a very “material” event, the modification
of a border. This act implies both an anthropological approach and an international relations
viewpoint (and these possibilities are not limitative). For this reason, detailed presentations of some
fragments of a long and complicated history could be a usefull starting point for a synthesis or an
extended next research.
A simple overview of the three sections shows us the fact that Europe, during the same
period, and within its different regions, was aware of certain moments when the borders were
modified and when some political leaders have been or could have been considered as being the
key factors of these changes. Taking into account the different changes of the borders for the period
under consideration, these could be regarded both as positive (if we think of the European
unification process and the dissolution of EU internal borders) and negative (all the cases when
modifications were the result of an aggressive act). The period of the Cold War is very particular
because either of the two ways to change the borders was possible, although not reflecting the same
political actors. One the one hand, the beginning of the Cold War is linked by a clear delimitation
between the two blocks, both ideologically and physically. On the other hand, during the Cold War,
the Central-Eastern Europe experienced one of the darkest period of its history. Howewer, for the
different Central-Eastern European states and for the different stages of this period there are
particular characteristics that render difficult the generalisation of the role of political leadership at
the national, regional, European and international level. The level of obedience to political power in
Moscow was different for the several Central-Eastern European countries, and we dare state that
either borders or political leadership had any signification when “the big Eastern neighbour”,
Soviet Union, has particular interest beyond its external frontiers. Except for Gorbatchev, who
adopted a different political leadership style, any Soviet political leader, even the moderate
Khrushchev (note the 1956 events in Hungary did not hesitate to break any border and sovereignty
if the Soviet interests were considered as being affected (and the Praga 1968 events will be
extremely significant, too).
What is specific for this period is that the two blocks tried to diminish the role of the
internal borders, and to fortify their external border, both from ideological and economic points of
view (the political side was instrinsicly included). The difference consists in the used instruments:
the force for the communist block, and the free will of the member states for the communitarian
space. In the same time, the intrinsic causal links between decision-makers and the border changes,
either positive or negative, are more obvious in the period of the Cold War than after. During the
Cold War, the basis of the leaders‟ political power were easy to grasp, but the instruments used by
decision-makers and the results of their decisions were both easy and, at the same time, difficult to
forecast, to keep under survey, or to analyse. Therefore, it is more interesting how, and to what
extent the two processes, one peacefull from top to bottom, the namely the European construction,
7
and one completely opposite, namely the Cold War, determined certain modifications on something
which in reality is very difficult to change, the borders.
The period after the fall of the communism has been quite eventful. Concerning the
borders, this period will begin with a peaceful transformation of the internal German border (a “sad
border”, according to Michel Foucher), a result of the will of the most important political leaders of
the moment. Nevertheless, sometimes the events will demonstrate that changes are not always
peaceful. So, without much ado after the end of the Cold War the Europeans will experience both
the conflicts and the peacefull cooperation, both the war started to set out new frontiers (as in the
case of the former Yougoslavia) and the cross-border cooperation (perhaps a new approach of the
leadership?), sometimes between former opponents. This new reality is very closely confirmed by
the third section of this volume, where the authors give us a picture of a special part of Europe, that
of the East, where the events take a certain direction given a certain determinism and due to
political leadership of a certain period, too. Hence, particularly given to the ethnic and economic
ultranationalist approaches of some former Yougoslavia political leaders, the Balkan region will
experience a long and bloody conflict, the conflict that is very easily connected to the type of the
political leadership exercised at a time. The result was that after the reunification of Germany at the
end of the Cold War, Europe knew once again the negative disintegration of borders, triggered by
tension and conflict that proved difficult to manage.
It is more than obvious that the problem of political leadership becomes of special concern
to all the situations. Hence, despite the split of Germany after the Second World War, European
unification was an extremely positive process of disintegration of the national borders. European
common space, where the freedom of movement of persons, capitals, services or goods is a given
today, this would not have been done if some political leaders had not agreed on starting the
process of the European unity, and this could be considered as the most positive change of the
borders in the history of civilization. Specifically for the European integration process, even for the
process of the disintegration of the so-called internal borders, is the openness of the process, the
convergence of the member states wills, a convergence based on open negotiation and reciprocal
compromises, following common and general useful objectives.
The political leaders, indispensable in this process, were not the single decision-makers.
More that, sometimes they were the necessary tools for implementation of some ideas launched in
the public sphere (it is well-know the influence of Jean Monnet on Robert Schuman or the French,
German and Luxembourg ministers on the conception of the actual Schengen space). Given the
European integration process, an original experiment that has never existed in another part of the
world (with the exception, maybe, of the federalisation of America, but with taking into account the
specific historical period and conditions), Europe seems to be less rigid concerning the issue of the
borders, at least from the perspective of the economic borders‟ openness. Europe, world, different
peoples (even the residents of the former authoritarian states), all seem to be more and more in
motion and this situation is largely accepted as being the normality. A situation that was initially
considered only a political phenomenon tends to gain, today, an important cultural character.
Physychally the European internal borders have largely disappeared, but it is very important to
work on the cultural barriers and the mental borders. Two of the articles presented in the third
section of the magazine and one of the book reviews offer to the reader some necessary exemples
concerning the adaptation of some former communist states, where frontiers have had for a long
time the role of the barriers, to the new European dynamics and opportunities.
Capturing some moments of this recent European history was the aim of this issue of the
EUROLIMES journal, and we thanks to all the participants who contributed to the success of this
scientific result.
REFERENCES
Blondel, Jean (1987), Political Leadership. Toward a General Analysis. London, Beverly Hills,
Newburry Park, New Delhi: Sage Publications.
Foucher, Michel (1991), Fronts et frontières. Un tour du monde géopolitique. Paris: Fayard.
8
Wren, Thomas, Hicks, Douglas A. And Price, Terry L. (Eds.) (2004), Traditional Classics on
Leadership. Cheltenham, Northampton: Elgar Reference Collection.
I. Political Leadership and the Borders of Europe
during the Cold War
Florin ABRAHAM (Bucharest) ◄► Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej and
Romania‟s Eastern Neighbourhood
Valentina GÎDEA (Cluj-Napoca), Lucian BOGDAN (Cluj-Napoca)
◄► From Consensus to Mutual Distrust and Back. Shifts of the
Boundaries of Free Europe in the Twentieth Century
Anca OLTEAN (Oradea) ◄► The Jews of Romania and their
Immigration to Israel.1948-1953
Ljiljana MANIC (Belgrade), Nada TORLAK (Belgrade), Natasa
SIMEUNOVIC BAJIC (Belgrade) ◄► Tito, Yugoslavia,
„Third Way”: Understanding of the Physical and Symbolic
Borders
Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej and Romania’s Eastern Neighbourhood
Florin ABRAHAM1
Abstract. The study analyses the issue of Romania‟s eastern neighbourhood in the period
between 1945 and 1965 from the perspective of Gheorghiu-Dej‟s power interests. The research
follows three main directions: the way in which neighbourhood is conceived from the perspective
of the communist ideology; the geopolitical consequences of the neighbourhood relation between
Romania and the USSR; aspects of the diplomatic relations. From a methodological point of view
the research brings into discussion elements of psycho-history. The main conclusion of the
research is that Gheorghiu-Dej manifested a total obedience, often excessive, towards the Soviet
Union until the moment when he removed all his opponents from the communist party and Soviet
troops were withdrawn from Romania (1958). The Soviet Union‟s wish to increase its control and
integration degree over the communist bloc economies determined the emergence of divergences
between Bucharest and Moscow. That is the context of diplomatic disputes and the Romanian
communist leadership establishes its position within the so-called “April 1964 Declaration”.
Gheorghiu-Dej was an adept of realpolitik, of prudence, in order to avoid any situation that could
endanger his political position.
Keywords: Romania, Soviet Union, Eastern Europe, Bessarabia, communism, Cold War,
foreign relations, political leaders, COMECOM, Warsaw Treaty
Gheorghe Gheorghiu, who later became Gheorghiu-Dej, can be regarded as someone
whose destiny became exceptional because important moments of historical turmoil imprinted on
his life. Coming from a poor workers‟ family, Gheorghiu-Dej was brought into prominence as a
result of the huge global shift produced by the Second World War. During the interval 1945-1965
he played an increasingly important political role and his activity was one of the favourite subjects
for several historical studies. Having the advantage of a rich historical literature, as well as the
access to primary sources2, in the present study we set to grasp the way in which Gheorghiu-Dej
understood and then conceived Romania‟s eastern neighbourhood and, obviously, the relation with
the Soviet Union in the interval 23 August 1944 Ŕ March 1965 (until the end of his life). Our
scientific undertaking is neither repetitive nor a synthesis of the several edited or archive sources;
instead, we are using a new interpretation grid of some facts which are, for the most part, already
known. The method we propose does not aim at a simple narration of diplomatic history, but it
attempts to analyze Romania‟s foreign policy in the interval 1945-1965 from the perspective of
Gheorghiu-Dej‟s power interests. The main hypothesis of our research is that Gheorghiu-Dej
conceived Romania‟s relation with the Soviet Union not as a distinct political process, with
separate rules from the national political life, but as an instrument for increasing his personal
power. Thus, we break, of course, with the classical explanations of the realist school (dominated
by the idea of competition between impersonal forces), and bringing into discussion psychologicalhistorical elements, with their advantage of including the individual into the core of historical
explanation.
„This paper is suported by the Sectorial Operational Programme Human Resources Development (SOP
HRD), financed from the European Social Fund and by the Romanian Government under the contract
number SOP HRD/89/1.5/S/59758”
1
Scientific Director at „Ovidiu Sincai” Institute, Bucharest.
2
Within the National Archives of Romania there is the “Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej Collection (1901-1965)”,
gathering 24.30 linear meters, which includes important documents concerning his political and trade-union
activity. See http://www.arhivelenationale.ro/ (accessed on 1 st of March 2011)
12
The general rule under which we operate is the diachronic exposure of the study‟s subject,
along three subtopics: ideological definition of neighbourhood; geopolitical aspects of the relation
with the Soviet Union; diplomatic activity elements determined by Romania‟s neighbourhood with
the “big neighbour” from the East.
Psychological-political profile of a survivor
Testing the hypothesis of our research implies inevitable clarifications regarding
Gheorghiu-Dej‟s personality. The purpose of our study is not to achieve a psychological-biography
of one of the most important leaders of Romanian communism, an undertaking which is the more
necessary as a historical biography of Gheorghiu-Dej is still missing. The remarks concerning the
psychological- political profile of the Romanian communist leader are not touching upon a
psychoanalytic nature3, but are based on elements concerning the political career and social origins
of Gheorghiu-Dej, being justified by the fact that within totalitarian regimes, by the centralized and
non-transparent nature of the decision-making process, the role of personalities can often surmount
that of constraints endogenous and exogenous to the political system 4.
Gheorghiu-Dej has the classical biography of those marginal characters favoured by
revolutionary moments, in which subsequent social turmoil allows for the rise of elites from outside
the traditional selection basin. Gheorghe Gheorghiu, born in November 1901, is the son of worker
Tănase Gheorghiu from Bârlad town. According to the official biography5, published in 1948
Gheorghiu-Dej ended his childhood at an early age (11 years old), being sent to learn the craft of
shoe-making, after graduating the four-year elementary school. At the age of 14 he gets sick, being
forced to choose a less physically consuming craft he decides to become an electrician. His
education could not have been but rudimentary, the four-year elementary school being
supplemented only by three years in a crafts school; according to official information, he was a
self-learner seduced by communist ideas. The trade union activity, with an obvious political
connotation, within the railway workers‟ organization from Galati earns him a disciplinary
relocation to Dej (15 August 1931, hence his nickname), in Transylvania6. Then he arrives in
Bucharest at the Romanian Railways Workshop, being fired in May 1932. He becomes a member
of the communist Party in 1933. Following the strike of the railway workers in the interval 2-16
February 1933, which he helps organize, he is arrested and convicted to 12 years in prison, being
incarcerated in Aiud, Jilava, Văcăreşti, Craiova, Ocnele Mari, Caransebes, and Doftana. Ten days
before the moment of 23 August 1944, Gheorghiu-Dej is helped by Ion Gheorghe Maurer and
Mihail Roşianu to escape from the detention camp of Târgu Jiu, getting involved in the PCR
(Romanian Communist Party) political activity and becoming the essential element of the political
equation after the breakthrough of Soviet troops on the Romanian territory7.
3
The pretension of using psychodynamic or psychoanalytical theories applied to a person who cannot be
subjected to direct observation proves to be a methodological adventure. Therefore, in order to avoid a
speculative research setting we are using biographical information with a high degree of authenticity, as well
as psychological observations made by some collaborators of Gheorghiu-Dej. Of course, the biographical
method implies a “triangulation” between a variety of sources Ŕ observations of those who knew him,
opponents or admirers, the man himself and the concrete use of power. In the case of Gheorghiu-Dej,
sources contemporary with him have an obvious propagandistic character, and in the memorial literature
written after 1989, each “veteran” (Alexandru Bârlădeanu, Silviu Brucan, Corneliu Mănescu, Paul
Niculescu-Mizil a. o.) tries to attribute himself a most prominent role; assessments concerning the former
Secretary General of the Romanian Communist Party (Partidul Comunist Român, PCR) are made under the
spectrum of present evaluations.
4
Martha Cottam et al., A introduction to political psychology, (London: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates, 2004),
17-34.
5
Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej - Scurtă biografie, (Bucureşti: Editura Partidului Muncitoresc Român, 1948), 6-10.
6
Elis Neagoe-Pleşa, “<Camarila> lui Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej”, Annales Universitatis Apulensis, Series
Historica, 10/I (2006): 147-48.
7
Lavinia Betea, Maurer şi lumea de ieri. Mărturii despre stalinizarea României, (Arad: Fundaţia Ioan Slavici,
1995), 35-37.
13
At the level of personal life we can also notice a traumatic history: his wife Maria Alexe,
daughter of a sparkling water seller from Galati, left him after the disciplinary relocation to Dej,
although they had already had two daughters (Vasilica and Constantina); she remarried a gendarme in
1933. Even from these succinct biographical data, we can see how Gheorghiu-Dej became a survivor
since his very childhood. His joining the Communist Party while it was outlawed indicates a true loyalty
to the values of Marxism-Leninism, acknowledged by means of popularization brochures. His
involvement in a party bearing the stigma of the Soviet Union control, mainly bringing together
representatives of ethnic minorities, thus confronting the predominant ideas of the time, highlights the
accumulation of strong frustrations and resentments towards a society that did not offer him many
chances, but which the communist utopia undertook to change from its very foundations. The 11 years
spent in prison shaped his character, leading him to adopt the behaviour of a survivor, acquiring a set of
abilities necessary in communities dominated by the Darwinist logic: you ether win or disappear!
Ironically, the abilities developed during the prolonged detention (cynicism, selfishness, duplicity,
prudence, dissimulation capacity)8 were useful during his activity at the PCR top, a community with
fewer rules, except self-survival, then the interwar detention system.
After looking into this succinct biographical information, we can conclude upon the fact
that Gheorghiu-Dej did not have strong reasons to be attached to the “bourgeois society” and in
what concerns Comintern‟s theses regarding Romania‟s appraisal as “multinational imperialist
state” and “peoples‟ prison”, they could not be but accepted, as long as they represented the official
points of view of the PCR. The theses concerning Moldavianism and the “artificiality” of
Bessarabia‟s union with Romania were also parts of the PCR‟s patrimonial inventory, therefore the
eastern border of the Romanian state had to be established not on the Dniester River but on Prut,
within the limits of the Old Kingdom9.
Deference towards “Daddy Stalin” (1945-1953)
The removal from power of marshal Ion Antonescu on 23 August 1944, followed by
Romania‟s breaking up the alliance with Nazi Germany, as well as the breakthrough of Soviet
troops in Bucharest, with the behaviour of occupying and not liberating troops, were the first
elements indicating that PCR representatives were to play an important role in Romania‟s
leadership. The provisions of the Armistice Convention signed by Romania and the Allied Powers
showed that the Soviet Union was to have a more important role in Romania, although it was hard
to precisely indicate its extent in the autumn of 1944, in the context of Stalin‟s declarations
according to which the political regime types in the countries where the Red Army arrived will not
be affected10. Concerning borders, the Armistice Convention signed in Moscow on 12 September
1944, presented a single certitude, the permanent loss of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina11 and
8
Gheorghiu-Dej, called by his detention fellows “the Old Man”, was also nicknamed “Carpathian fox” and
“Macchiavelli of the Balkans”. A good connoisseur from inside of the communist elite, Vladimir
Tismăneanu, described Gheorghiu-Dej as follows: “He loved power, he voluptuously sniffed it, he chose
with feline ability his victim, he pretended to simulate kindness and even human tenderness, only to strike
then more surely and without hesitation when the other least expected” in Vladimir Tismăneanu, Fantoma
lui Gheorghiu-Dej, (Bucureşti: Editura Univers, 1995), 107.
9
Gheorghe E. Cojocaru, Cominternul şi originile „moldovenismului”, (Chişinau: Civitas, 2009), 13-82.
10
Volkov, Vladimir (1997). “The Soviet Leadership and Southeastern Europe”, in The Establishment of the
Communist Regimes in Eastern Europe, 1944-1949, ed. Norman Naimark, Leonid Ghibianskii (Boulder,
Colorado: Westview Press, 1997), 62.
11
“4. The state frontier between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and Rumania, established by the SovietRumanian Agreement of June 8 1940, is restored..”; “19. The Allied Governments regard the decision of the
Vienna award regarding Transylvania as null and void and are agreed that Transylvania (the greater part thereof)
should be returned to Rumania, subject to confirmation at the peace settlement, and the Soviet Government agrees
that Soviet forces shall take part for this purpose in joint military operations with Rumania against Germany and
Hungary.” in Convenţia din 12 septembrie 1944 - de armistiţiu între guvernul român, pe de o parte, şi guvernele
Uniunii Sovietice, Regatul Unit şi Statele Unite ale Americii, pe de altă parte, Monitorul Oficial 219 din 22
septembrie 1944. For English version see Armistice Agreement, 12 September 1944, accessed on
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/rumania.asp#art4, on 19 March 2011).
14
an ambiguous situation regarding Transylvania, while the Vienna Arbitration of 1940 was
considered null, but the situation had to be regulated through the peace treaty after the end of the
war. Romania was under the Soviet Union blackmail even after leaving the Axis powers: any claim
to discuss the situation of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina and, therefore, the consequences of
the Ribbentrop-Molotov Agreement of 23 August 1939, would have endangered the fate of
Transylvania. The situation was all the more difficult for Romania as long as the western powers
signing the Armistice Convention considered a fait accompli the incorporation of Bessarabia and
Northern Bukovina into the Soviet Union. As such, the issue of Romania‟s eastern border became a
taboo not only for communists, which considered Bessarabia as “Russian land”, anyway, but also
for King Michael or for the democratic parties (National Peasant Party Ŕ PNT, National Liberal
Party Ŕ PNL, Social Democratic Party Ŕ PSD). Renunciation to Bessarabia was the precondition of
recuperating Transylvania or most of it, being the first price to pay for Romania‟s joining the Axis
powers at the beginning of the war12.
Romania‟s entering into the Soviet sphere of influence represented for a marginal character (in
relation to the social hierarchy existing during the interwar period), such as Gheorghiu-Dej, the unhoped
for occasion to get his revenge upon the “bourgeois-landlord regime”. Gheorghiu-Dej was
acknowledged as one of the PCR leaders, by virtue of his participation in the organization of the strike
from the Griviţa railway workshops of 1933, but his statute depended on the one who had the real
decision-making power in the case of Romania: Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin. This truth was grasped by
Gheorghiu-Dej probably after the very first meeting with the Kremlin leader in January 1945, in a
delegation led by Ana Pauker, as Stalin established the use of the Tudor Vladimirescu Division (made
up of exiled PCR members) in order to take over power in Romania and also to instrument the issue of
Transylvania for establishing in Bucharest a “national democratic” government13. In fact, GheorghiuDej, as Minister of Communications in the Rădescu government, conveys in an indirect form Stalin‟s
message within the cabinet, after his return from Moscow14.
At the PCR conference of October 1944 Gheorghiu-Dej becomes a member of the new
collective party leadership, together with the so-called “Muscovites group” made up of Ana Pauker,
Vasile Luca and Teohari Georgescu. Only after a new visit in Moscow, in September 1945,
Gheorghiu-Dej gets Stalin‟s agreement to take over the PCR leadership as Secretary General, a
situation formalized after the National Conference of 1945. His position, though, was uncertain,
being endangered both by Lucreţiu Pătrăşcanu and by the group legitimized by its Comintern
activity, including the Spanish Civil War. It is less important if Stalin preferred Gheorghiu-Dej
because he liked him15 or because imposing a communist from the majority ethnic group, also
having the advantage of a proletarian origin (which lacked to the intellectual Pătrăşcanu), was part
of the strategic calculation of the Soviet leader concerning Romania. In the context of the present
analysis, it is significant that the PCR leader had to permanently offer fidelity proofs to “Daddy
Stalin”, so that goddess Fortuna does not abandon him. For that, Gheorghiu-Dej faithfully followed
the line of proletarian internationalism, getting in competition with the Cominternist group in order
to get the support of the Kremlin leader. The fresh Secretary General of PCR held a very important
formal position, but this had to be consolidated, both by imposing henchmen in the party leadership
and especially by convincing Moscow that he could best defend the latter‟s interests in Romania.
Ideologically, Gheorghiu-Dej uses from a very stage in which sovietization was neither
complete nor could it be considered irreversible, propaganda formulas meant to create the image of
a Soviet Union friendly towards Romania. The Report presented to the National Convention of
PCR in October 1945, the moment when he becomes, Secretary General of the party, is
12
Stefano Bottoni, Transilvania roşie. Comunismul român şi problema naţională 1944–1965, (Cluj-Napoca:
Ed. Institutului pentru Studierea Problemelor Minorităţilor Naţionale, Kriterion 2010), 49.
13
Georgi Dimitrov, The Diary of Georgi Dimitrov 1933–1949 Introduced and edited by Ivo Banac, (New
Haven & London: Yale University Press, 2003), 350-51.
14
Dorin-Liviu Bîftoi, Petru Groza, ultimul burghez. O biografie, (Bucureşti: Compania, 2004), 244.
15
Lavinia Betea, Alexandru Bârlădeanu despre Dej, Ceauşescu şi Iliescu. Convorbiri, (Bucureşti: Editura
Evenimentul Românesc, 1997), 45.
15
significant16. The first issue to be clarified was Romania‟s participation to the war together with
Germany, as the Antonescu regime was once more condemned for that decision. The Soviet Union
is not considered an aggressive power, but a “peace and freedom loving” country. Consequently,
argues Gheorghiu-Dej, “Romania‟s relations with the Soviet Union (…) have acquired the form of
affirmed friendship relations, warmly embraced by the broader popular masses. It is the sincere,
loyal and permanent friendship which our party has always had written on its flag”.
The ideological formulas publicly presented by Gheorghiu-Dej regarding the USSR were
meant to legitimize a geopolitical concept concerning Romanian-Soviet relations: Romania had to
be subordinated to the Soviet Union and the main result of satellization was the attainment of
complete power by the Communist Party. Along this strategic approach, of unconditional
acceptance of any demands from the USSR, we can also place the attitude of the Romanian
delegation to the Paris Peace Conference (29 July Ŕ 15 October 1946), of which Gheorghiu-Dej
was briefly a member, to consider that the border issue is taboo. The signing of the Paris Peace
Treaty on 10 February 1947 has the effect of ending USSR‟s blackmail over Romania by means of
the Romanian-Hungarian border theme, while PCR ensured its total control of the main political
institutions, as well as the confirmation of abandoning the territories occupied by the Soviet Union
following the ultimatum of 26 June 1940. One must also emphasize the fact that the fate of
Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina did not depend on the political actions of PCR, as the situation
of the two Romanian regions had already been decided during the negotiations between the Great
Powers, which accepted, both de facto and de iure, the consequences of the Ribbentrop-Molotov
Agreement. The responsibility of the communist leaders consists in the fact that they considered
Romania‟s border with the Soviet Union as fair, finding moreover ideological justifications for an
action based on the military force.
The ever increasing signals, occurring even from 1946, concerning the shift of the former
Allied Powers from the Second World War into a new stage of their relations, getting from
cooperation to the conflict called the “Cold War”, intensified during 1947, together with the
emergence of the “Truman Doctrine” and the launch of the “Marshall Plan”. The reaction of the
Soviet leadership was to abandon all appearance concerning the respect for the sovereignty of
states under Red Army occupation. The first measure was the enactment of the older plan (dating
from 1946) of creating the Information Bureau of the Communist Parties (Cominform), during the
marathon meeting of Szklarska Poreba in Poland (22-27 September 1947), which was attended by
seven East European and two Western European communist parties17. The purpose of Cominform
was politically codified by the Resolution of Szklarska Poreba, according to article II: “The
Information Bureau will be charged with organizing the experience exchange and, if necessary,
with the coordination of communist parties, on the basis of mutual assistance”18. During the
founding meeting of Cominform, the Soviet politician Andrei Zhdanov launched the theory of
camps confrontation: the “imperialist camp” vs. “the peace camp”, a collocation around which the
propaganda discourse of Gheorghiu-Dej will be organized.
The second measure of the Soviet Union, after that taken at the level of relations between
leading parties from the occupied states, concerned the inter-state relations level; a system of
bilateral treaties among those countries was imposed, which legally consecrated the de facto
satellization of the region going from the Baltic Sea until the Black Sea 19. On 4 February 1948 a
16
Gh. Gheorghiu-Dej, Articole şi cuvântări, ediţia a IV-a (Bucureşti: ESPLA, 1956), 5-84.
The meeting was attended by: the Communist Party of Yugoslavia, the Bulgarian Workers‟ Party, the
Romanian Communist Party, the Hungarian Communist Party, the Polish Workers‟ Party, the Communist Party
of the Soviet Union Ŕ Bolshevik, the Czechoslovakian Communist Party, the French Communist Party and the
Italian Communist Party. Mark Kramer, Stalin, soviet policy, and the consolidation of a Communist bloc in
Eastern Europe, 1944-1953, 2010, 24 in http://iis-db.stanford.edu/evnts/6186/Stalin_and_Eastern_Europe.pdf
(accessed on 5 March 2011).
18
Giuliano Procacci, The Cominform. Minutes of the three conferences 1947, 1948, 1949, (Milano: Feltrinelli,
1994), 3-453; Paul Niculescu-Mizil, De la Comintern la comunism naţional. Despre Consfătuirea partidelor
comuniste şi muncitoreşti, Moscova, 1969, (Bucureşti: Ed. Evenimentul Românesc 2001), 34-53.
19
For example, Romania signed the same type of treaties with other satellized states: Bulgaria (16 January 1948);
Hungary (24 January 1948); Czechoslovakia (21 July 1948); Poland (25 January 1949).
17
16
Romanian governmental delegation, also including Gheorghiu-Dej, signed the “Treaty of
friendship, collaboration and mutual assistance between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
and the Romanian Popular Republic” as well as the “Protocol regarding the determination of the
state border line between the Romanian Popular Republic and the Union of Soviet Socialist
Republics”. This protocol, prepared by the ministers of foreign affairs of Romania, Ana Pauker,
and of USSR, V.M. Molotov, and accepted by the Political Bureau of PCR, stipulated, among
others, that the “the Snake Island, situated in the Black Sea, east of the Danube mouth, becomes
part of the USSR”. Also, the islands of Tătarul Mic, Dalerul Mic, Dalerul Mare, Măican and Limba
are considered Soviet territory20. As a consequence, on 23 May 1948, on the territory of the Snake
Island a protocol of delivery concerning the island is signed, by Nikolai Pavlovich Sutov, first
secretary of the embassy, representing the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the USSR, and Eduard
Mezincescu, representing the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Romanian Popular Republic21.
Soviet control over Romania also had consequences over Danube‟s international status;
the latter was changed within the Belgrade Conference in the summer of 1948, attended by 11
riverain states. The establishment of the Danube Commission, with the headquarters in Galaţi,
marked the elimination of France and the United Kingdom from the decisional mechanisms
concerning the river use‟s regulation, as the Soviet Union acquired the position of dominant power
in the Danube basin22.
The creation of Cominform and the launching of the two camps (imperialist and socialist)
theory also brought with them transformations at the level of the official discourse concerning the
relations within the “peace camp”. The concept of “neighbourhood” is subsumed to the idea of
“brotherhood” among “peace and freedom loving peoples, led by the Soviet Union”. The treaties
signed by Romania with the USSR and the other satellized states are considered by Gheorghiu-Dej
to “closely respect the sovereignty and interests of each country” 23. Satellization is justified by the
idea of a “big brother”, the Soviet Union being considered a model and benchmark for all societal
transformations. Industry nationalization, collectivization, fight against “bourgeois elements” and
all the other decision to communize Romania are motivated by the Soviet experience. On the one
hand, all communization measures are publicly justified by the fact that they are inspired from the
Soviet Union (“Without the USSR help, without its experience, it would have been impossible to
build socialism in the popular democracies”) and, on the other hand, satellization (in the sense of
belonging to the “peace camp”) is considered a guarantee for the national independence and
sovereignty, threatened by the “western imperialism”. From an ideological point of view, we are
dealing with an authentic meltdown of borders, considered to be unnecessary between nations
animated by the ideals of proletarian internationalism. The very collocation of “camp” indicates the
“volatilization” of borders, the idea of state identity being subsumed to the one of “camp”.
Neighbourhood with the Soviet Union, defined as “bastion of peace all over the world”, is not
considered as problematic or threatening, on the contrary, by several rhetoric elements the idea of
an inclusive neighbourhood is built, as Romanian proletarians owe their “love and devotion to the
USSR”. But Gheorghiu-Dej is careful to argue that the “Stalinist policy of peace and friendship
among peoples” is not an asymmetric, vassal one, on the contrary, collaboration is achieved “on the
basis of equality of rights among great and small peoples”. The relations within the “peace camp”
are not static, passive, on the contrary, “the brotherly friendship and collaboration between popular
democracies and the Soviet Union” are strengthened and “impetuously increase”, that is why “the
20
Culegere de Tratate, convenţii, acorduri, înţelegeri şi protocoale încheiate între Republica Socialistă România
şi Uniunea Republicilor Sovietice Socialiste privind regimul frontierei de stat, (Bucureşti: Ministerul Apărării
Naţionale. Comandamentul Trupelor de Grăniceri, 1977), 11-13.
21
At the beginning of discussions concerning the border delimitation, Romania reconfirmed the acceptance of
the Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact‟s consequences: “The Romanian Government agrees with the Soviet
Government‟s statement that the Agreement (notes exchange) between the USSR and Romania of 28 June
1940, concerning the retrocession of Bessarabia and the northern part of Bukovina remains in force”, in
Cezar Stanciu, Devotaţi Kremlinului. Alinierea politicii externe româneşti la cea sovietică în anii 50,
(Târgovişte: Cetatea de Scaun, 2008), 72.
22
Ibidem, 46-49.
23
Gheorghiu-Dej, Articole…, 127.
17
imperialist triggers of a new world war are in a thundering rage and fury” 24. Summing up a broader
ideological construct, the satellization relation is justified by Gheorghiu-Dej through a) creation of
a new referential (proletariat instead of the “bourgeois nation”), so that state relations are
subordinated to the political ones, and through b) the Soviet Union superiority (morally,
economically, socially, technologically, militarily etc.), both towards popular democracies and
towards the “capitalist camp”.
Gheorghiu-Dej‟s visit to Moscow in February 1948 and his meeting with Stalin, on the
occasion of signing the bilateral treaty, did not remain without consequences upon the power
relations within PCR. After forcing King Michael to abdicate and establishing the Popular
Republic, Gheorghiu-Dej, together with the muscovite group, agreed to eliminate the man
associated on behalf of the communist movement with signing the Armistice Convention and the
negotiations with the historical parties, Lucreţiu Pătrăşcanu. During the formation congress of the
Romanian Workers Party (PMR) of February 1948, Pătrăşcanu loses his place in the Central
Committee, and then also his office of Justice Minister. On 28 April 1948, Pătrăşcanu is arrested
following an order of Gheorghiu-Dej, thus ending the transition stage towards the totalitarian
state25. The significance of eliminating Lucreţiu Pătrăşcanu in the context of the present study is
two-folded. First of all, from the very official accusations, of promoting “chauvinist and
revisionist” ideas (his declaration to the students of Cluj in 1946 became famous: “Before being a
communist, I am a Romanian”), results that Pătrăşcanu became incompatible with the proletarian
internationalism and with the project of completely subordinating Romania to the Soviet Union
(Ana Pauker even promoted the idea of turning Romania into a Soviet republic). Secondly,
removing Pătrăşcanu from the power circle, including his sentence to death and his execution in
1954, signifies the consolidation of Gheorghiu-Dej‟s power, and this was possible especially
because the communist leader followed without digressions the proletarian internationalism line.
In fact, the removal of Lucreţiu Pătrăşcanu was made on the background of a much
broader conflict between Stalin and Joseph Broz Tito‟s Yugoslavia. The essential stake of the
confrontation was Stalin‟s wish to get the control of Yugoslavia, a difficult objective while in the
state led by Tito there were no Soviet troops. The initiative of the Yugoslav leader to achieve
unification with Albania, as well as the project of a confederation with Bulgaria obviously raised
irritation at the Kremlin. Tito‟s refusal to sign a treaty similar to the one assumed by satellized state
by which a part of sovereignty to be given up to the Soviet Union had the effect of removing Soviet
advisors and instructors from Yugoslavia during the first part of 1948. The conflict becomes public
and, during the second Cominform conference (20-28 June 1948), taking place in Bucharest, the
Yugoslav Communist Party is excluded from the organization and the organization‟s headquarters
are moved to Bucharest. Gheorghiu-Dej played a very important role, as he is the one presenting
the report on the basis of which the resolution “The Yugoslav Communist party in the hands of
traitors and spies” was written. In the memorial writings dedicated to former communists leaders it
is accredited the idea that Gheorghiu-Dej did not have any other option and that the resolution of
condemning Tito and other Yugoslav communist leaders would have been achieved by the
Soviet26. The affirmation is not supported by documentary information, but the whole attitude of
Gheorghiu-Dej was to maximize anti-Titoist rhetoric. The propaganda against Yugoslavia
undertaken in Romania could not be found at a similar level of symbolic violence in the other
satellized states. Romania received, in recognition for its role in fighting the “Titoist heresy”, the
mission to host the periodic review “For Sustainable Peace, for Popular Democracy”, official
publication of the Cominform27. The acknowledgement of Gheorghiu-Dej‟s fidelity towards the
Soviet Union in the Yugoslav issue is also revealed by his next task to present a new report, during
24
Ibidem, 296, 353-56, 417-27, 428-35.
Vladimir Tismăneanu, Stalinism pentru eternitate. O istorie politică a comunismului românesc, (Iaşi:
Editura Polirom, 2005), 152; Lavinia Betea, Lucreţiu Pătrăşcanu. Moartea unui lider comunist. Studiu de
caz, (Bucureşti: Editura Humanitas, 2001), 8.
26
Niculescu-Mizil, 44.
27
Mioara Anton, Ieşirea din cerc. Politica externă a regimului Gheorghiu-Dej, (Bucureşti: Institutul Naţional
pentru Studiul Totalitarismului, 2007), 22-31.
25
18
the Cominform session of Budapest in November 1949, a document entitled “The Yugoslav
Communist party in the hands of assassins and spies”. Yugoslavia‟s policy was defined as “racially
national-chauvinist of a fascist type” and Tito was accused of being an agent of the “imperialist”
secret services. Under the leadership of Gheorghiu-Dej, Romania received emigrants from
Yugoslavia and denounced, on 1st October 1949, the Treaty of friendship, collaboration and mutual
assistance with the Popular Federative Republic of Yugoslavia, signed on 19 December 1947, as
the Soviet Union had done the same on 29 September 1949. without any doubt, the decision that
had the most serious consequences at human level was the deportation of 39,462 people in the
evening of 18 June 1951 from the settlements in the neighbourhood of the border with Yugoslavia,
at the extent of 25 km, to inhuman detention camps from Bărăgan plain (south east of the country).
The Soviet-Yugoslav crisis highlights the changes in Romania‟s foreign policy, as a result
of its satellization by the Soviet Union. Gheorghiu-Dej abandoned the Romanian strategy from the
interwar period, when Yugoslavia was included in an anti-revisionist front (The Little Entente in
1920-1921 and The Balkan Pact in 1934), the security objectives being subordinated by the
communist power to the Soviet Union. It is an important geopolitical shift, as a consequence both
of the Soviet military presence in Romania and the dependence of the communist party on the
latter, and also of the survival fights inside of the communist elites from Bucharest. The
competition between Gheorghiu-Dej and the “muscovite” group made up of Ana Pauker, Vasile
Luca and Teohari Georgescu had the stake of ensuring Stalin‟s support and not at all the defence of
the Romanian state‟s interests. The fragility of every group‟s power positions is also emphasized by
the political trials organized in the atmosphere dominated by suspicion and conspiracy psychosis:
László Rajk, former Minister of the Interior in Hungary, sentenced to death in 1949 under the
accusation of being a “Titoist spy”; the Bulgarian Traycho Kostov, initially remarked by the
Soviets for his anti-Titoist attitude, was indicted and sentenced to death in 1949 for spying; Koci
Xoce, Minister of the Interior in Albania was also sentenced to death. Also, Lucreţiu Pătrăşcanu
himself was accused of Titoism. In such a context, the role of anti-Titoism leader played by
Gheorghiu-Dej can also be interpreted as a personal survival strategy, which can also include
opportunism28 and over-bidding his faithfulness towards Stalin, as well as the complete
subordination of Romanian interests to the Soviet ones.
Such a conclusion is also strengthened by the creation in January 1949 of the Council for
Mutual Economic Assistance (COMECON)29, about which Gheorghiu-Dej says, during a session
of the Political Bureau of the central Committee of PMR on 10 January 1949, that he was a founder
of, together with Vasile Luca. The initiative of the PMR leaders was intended to be a “counterMarshall Plan”, being first conveyed to Moscow in the autumn of 1948 30. Gheorghiu-Dej even
proudly proposed that the initiative was called the “Stalin Plan”, which would have been beneficial
for Romania through increased investments in the heavy industry and which was to create
improved conditions of economic exchange with the rest of the satellite-states. The docility that
Gheorghiu-Dej showed to Stalin, often excessively as compared to other East European leaders,
created the premises of winning the trust of the “Daddy”. The latter was all the more convinced,
starting with 1951, of the existence of an imperialist-Zionist plot against him, not only within the
Soviet Union, but also among the satellite-states, a situation that had to be fought with specific
totalitarian instruments31. Gheorghiu-Dej “discovered” a “right-wing deviation” in the attitude of
Vasile Luca, following the latter‟s activity as head of the Ministry of Finance and of the National
Bank. Gheorghiu-Dej was received by Stalin in April 1952, and the latter approved the fight against
28
Prime Minister Petru Groza would have drawn the attention to Gheorghiu-Dej not to “spit so much on Tito,
as he would then have too much to kiss” in Biftoi, 466.
29
Institutionalized as a fully functional and structured organization in 1959.
30
Florin Constantiniu, “România, cofondatoare a CAER?”, in Clipa, (May 2009),
http://www.revistaclipa.com/1470/2009/05/repere-academice/romania-cofondatoare-a-caer (accessed on 9
March 2011).
31
E.A. Rees, The Nature of Stalin‟s Dictatorship. The Politburo, 1924–1953, (New York: Palgrave
Macmillan, 2004), 221-25.
19
“deviationists”, meaning the power group “Pauker-Luca-Georgescu”32. The PMR plenary of 26-27
May 1952 thus meant the enforcement of a new leadership formula, from which the muscovite
group lacked, but the key positions were occupied by the henchmen of Gheorghiu-Dej33. The
elimination of the so-called “right-wing deviation” had no consequences upon the relations
between Romania and the Soviet Union, nor did it mean a change in Gheorghiu-Dej‟s conception
concerning the eastern neighbourhood of the Romanian state, but only strengthened his political
position. The communist leader had skilfully managed to navigate through the whirling waters of
Stalinist politics, becoming in less than a decade the leader of the Romanian communist movement.
The incertitude period (1953-1958)
The death of Stalin in March 1953 brought with it the entrance into an era of another type of
incertitude. If, during Stalin‟s life, the main preoccupation of communist leaders from the satellized
states was not to anger the “Daddy”, due to the uneasiness caused by his unpredictable character, in the
post-Stalin era East European communists had to acknowledge the power fights in Moscow, in order to
adopt positions depending on them. In the first phase the leadership went to Lavrentiy Beria, whose
proposal to normalize relations with the United States, in the context of revolts from Eastern Berlin of
June 1953, has awakened the fears of the Soviet leadership. Thus, Nikita Khrushchev accused him on 26
June 1953 that he would have been a British agent and Beria was arrested. In September 1953,
Khrushchev becomes Prime Secretary of the Soviet Union Communist Party (KPSS), sharing power
with Prime Minister Georgy Malenkov. The latter wanted to settle a “new course” in the economic
policy, in the direction of increasing the level of investments in consumer goods and agriculture, at the
expense of those in heavy industry, for the purpose of raising living standards of the population. In
February 1955, Malenkov is forced to give up the Prime Minster office in favour of Nikolai Bulganin,
following accusations of involvement in atrocities (in fact for his relation with Beria). Nikita
Khrushchev‟s victory over his political competitors is confirmed during the 20th Congress of KPSS from
February 1956, when the Prime Secretary presents the famous “Secret Report” which reveals and
condemns part of the Stalinist crimes.
Without too much entering into other details concerning the Kremlin power competition of
1953-1956, in the context of our analysis it is significant the call to report of the PMR leadership in
July 1953. Much to the latter‟s surprise, reproaches regarded the Stalinist economic policy,
including the works at the Danube-Black Sea Canal34, investments in the military and heavy
industries. Molotov‟s accusation (“You have broken with the people!”) with the adagio “We need
that Romania becomes a sustainable basis of our front. Take improvement measures, without panic
or noise, but so that you are not an uncertain flank of our front” indicated a change of attitude
among Soviet leaders. They demanded to the Romanian communist leadership to become
legitimate, to get the population‟s support in order to be able to rule without the instruments of the
32
In Romanian archives there is no transcription of the Moscow discussions, but is well known a reinterpreted
tale concerning them, which was conveyed by Gheorghiu-Dej himself at the PMR Central Committee
Plenary of 30 November Ŕ 5 December 1961. Stalin would have asked Gheorghiu-Dej: “What kind of
proletarian are you?”, meaning that he should not tolerate the “factionist attitude” of the Pauker-LucaGeorgescu group. The desire to blame on Stalin for the elimination of the muscovite group is obvious, as in
1961 Gheorghiu-Dej says he would have answered: “I told him: comrade Stalin, we will examine the matter,
we have a commission”. But the Kremlin leader would have been ruthless: “What is to be examined? We
must know, we must examine well the things, what is their guilt”. It is certain that the elimination of the
Pauker-Luca-Georgescu group was achieved only with the approval of Stalin, but the exact details of the
Moscow discussions of April 1952 must be considered valid only after also finding a Soviet source and not
the justification offered by Gheorghiu-Dej.
33
Elis Neagoe-Pleşa and Liviu Pleşa, Dosarul Ana Pauker, vol. 1 Plenara Comitetului Central al Partidului
Muncitoresc Român din 30 noiembrie – 5 decembrie 1961, (Bucureşti: Editura Nemira, 2006), 8-25.
34
The achievement of the Danube-Black Sea Canal was imposed by Stalin. Concerning the latter‟s motives,
Gheorghiu-Dej seems to have reached the conclusion that the Soviet leader aimed at annexing the Danube‟s
mouth and delta to the USSR, after which Romania would have had another exit at the Black Sea under the
form of the Canal in Paul Sfetcu, 13 ani în anticamera lui Dej – ediţia a II-a revizuită, (Bucureşti: Curtea
Veche, 2008), 294.
20
totalitarian state. Molotov was even more eloquent: “You feel secure under the Soviet Union wing.
Without our support you couldn‟t last two weeks. If you will not be tied up with the people we
won‟t be able to help you anymore”. A significant fact is the psychological reaction of GheorghiuDej towards the new attitude of Soviet leaders: “We felt somehow embarrassed when the leaders of
the Soviet Union party and government discussed with us at the same tier”35. The confession of the
Romanian leader reveals his adapted behaviour towards the Soviet Union: he was used to be said
all he had to do and this would suffice to keep him in power. In the new political conditions from
the Soviet Union a threat seemed to appear for Gheorghiu-Dej‟s leader position, if he was not on
the side of the winning Soviet leader, as he was considered to be a product of the Stalinist era.
“Prudence” was the key word for the Romanian communist leader. Following Soviet demands, the
PMR Central Committee Plenary of 19-20 August 1953 decided to abide by Soviet advices in the
economic field, by the adoption of the principle of separating state offices from party positions. But
Gheorghiu-Dej did not hurried to give up his party office in favour of that of Prime Minister,
postponing this step till after the execution of Lucreţiu Pătrăşcanu (April 1954) and after he made
sure that the person appointed in his place in the PMR leadership, Gheorghe Apostol, would not try
to remove him from power, being completely loyal to him. In October 1955, taking advantage of
the fact that Khrushchev managed to remove Malenkov, so that the leading position in the party
regained its superiority compared to the state office, Gheorghiu-Dej returned as the leader of PMR
and Chivu Stoica became Prime Minister of Romania.
Gheorghiu-Dej also conceives the relation with the Soviet Union from the post-Stalin era
in the terms of a centre-periphery relation. Confronted with serious economic problems,
Gheorghiu-Dej demands during the Moscow visit of January 1954 a loan of 300-400 million
roubles but he only receives the promise for 200 million. During 1954, 12 of the 16 mixed
Romania-Soviet companies (Sovroms) are dismantled and in 1956 the other four remaining units
end their activity. The year 1955 witnessed the attempt of the West and the Soviet Union to
surmount the confrontation stage, by opening new bridges for communication. Austria was
considered by the American president Dwight Eisenhower the test-case for Khrushchev‟s détente
desire. The Soviet Union and the rest of the Allied Powers (the United States, the United Kingdom
and France) pulled back their troops from Austria and the latter became neutral36. The State Treaty
with Austria was signed on 15 May 1955, but a day before took place the establishment of the
Warsaw Treaty Organization37, by which a new legal framework was created to maintain Soviet
troops in the signatory states. The State Treaty with Austria is especially important for Romania, as
Soviet troops were maintained on the Romanian territory, according to the Peace Treaty of 1947, in
order to maintain communication lines with Austria. This was a changed that proved to be
significantly important in the context of Romanian-Soviet relations, as the presence of Soviet
troops on the Romanian territory was not anymore a matter of international interest, but strictly one
concerning the bilateral relation. Romania was no longer a transit country for a potential Soviet
military corridor towards Austria, but a country willingly accepting, at least formally, to host
foreign troops38. Therefore, even from 1955 Emil Bodnăraş, considered to be the most trustworthy
Soviet agent in Romania, receives from Gheorghiu-Dej the mission of testing the USSR‟s intention
of pulling back its troops from the territory of the Romanian state. It was though too early, as in
Moscow the battle for power was not yet decided and the relations with the West did not reach a
real degree of détente.
The signing on 14 May 1955 of the Warsaw Treaty by Gheorghiu-Dej, representing
Romania, legally completes the process of satellization of the Romanian state in relation to the
Soviet Union. In the secret Additional Protocol of the treaty the military obligations of each state
35
Gheorghe Buzatu, România şi marile puteri (1939-1947), (Bucureşti: Ed. Enciclopedică, 2003), 598-601.
Demilitarization of Austria and the establishment of its neutrality came in the context of the division of
Germany and of Federal Germany‟s accession to NATO (5 May 1955).
37
On the basis of the “Treaty of friendship, collaboration and mutual assistance” concluded in the Polish
capital, Soviet units from Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, Poland and the German Democratic Republic
(GDR) remained deployed in those countries, but from that date as “friendly troops”.
38
Anton, 66-68.
36
21
were provided for the creation of the United Armed Forces. A little time before the formalization of
the Warsaw Treaty Organization creation, on 13 March 1955 a mixed Romanian-Soviet committee
signed a protocol providing, among others, the deployment and stationing in Mangalia, starting
with 1956, of a Soviet brigade of submarines (with nine vessels) and a Soviet division of torpedoboats (made up of 12 vessels). If we add to this decision the plans of military endowment with
Soviet weaponry, in the context of complete secrecy even within the Political Bureau of the PMR
Central Committee (only Gheorghiu-Dej and Emil Bodnăras knew all the details of the military
cooperation with the USSR), we have the image of a state whose political leadership took decisions
by which the dependence relation towards the Soviet Union was strengthened, without real
consultations not even with the extended leadership of the communist leadership39. The USSR was
in the position of an occupant state, according to our historical interpretation, but formally (legally)
it contributed to the defence of Romania‟s borders against a potential attack of the “western
imperialism”.
Within Khrushchev‟s plan to re-evaluate the Stalinist inheritance was also the renunciation
to the conflict with Tito‟s Yugoslavia. Khrushchev‟s visit to Belgrade (27 May Ŕ 2nd June 1955)
means a strong signal given by the Soviets concerning their desire to reconcile with Tito. In such a
context, Gheorghiu-Dej, who championed anti-Titoism, quickly changed the strategy by giving up
the attacks against the neighbour state and by resuming diplomatic relations; eventually he also had
a meeting in Bucharest (24-26 June 1956) with the one he called just some years before “a bandit
and a spy” 40. The renewal of Romanian-Yugoslav relations and the development of bilateral
cooperation, including the launch of the project concerning the Iron Gates hydro-plant, did not
mean a geo-strategic reorientation of Romania, but was the consequence of an initiative coming
from the hegemonic centre.
A new challenge to Gheorghiu-Dej appeared on the occasion of the 20th KPSS Congress of
February 1956, an event in which Khrushchev presented the so-called “secret report” criticizing the
cult of personality from the Stalin era. The key concepts of the KPSS Congress were “collective
leadership” and “peaceful coexistence”, the latter codifying the idea of abandoning the aggressive
competition with the capitalist system. The war against the “imperialist camp” was not necessary
anymore, as socialist states had progressed in the economic field, so that they will prevail over
capitalism in this way, argued the soviet leader. Khrushchev had taken over the Titoist thesis of the
existing “specific paths” of development of communism, so that they should unfold “according to
the concrete historical and socio-economic conditions and peculiarities from every country” 41.
The consequences of the 20th KPSS Congress were not long in coming. In April 1956 the
Cominform was abolished, but this did not mean that the Soviet Union gave up the ideological
coordination of communist parties. Khrushchev was the supporter of a flexible satellization, which
would create the appearance of a “new course” not only in the relations with the West, but also
inside the communist bloc. Gheorghiu-Dej quickly complied with the new ideological tendencies,
so that invoking the argument of authority Ŕ “Stalin said so” Ŕ was replaced within the ideological
documents by the appeal to the Leninist theses. In an article published in Pravda on 1st of May
1956, entitled “Internationalism Ŕ the Ideology of Friendship among Peoples”, Gheorghiu-Dej
became the echo of the specific paths thesis of building socialism, being of the opinion that “the
relations of comradely collaboration combine the maximum care for the economic and cultural
development of each country for itself with the interests of the whole socialist world system” 42.
39
Petre Opriş, România şi Organizaţia Tratatului de la Varşovia (1955-1991), (Bucureşti: Editura Militară,
2008), 62-79.
40
Constantin Moraru, „Iunie 1956 Ŕ Tito la Bucureşti”, 186-200 în Putere şi societate. Blocul comunist sub
impactul destalinizării, 1956, ed. Dan Cătănuş, Vasile Buga, (Bucureşti: Institutul Naţional pentru Studiul
Totalitarismului, 2006), 186-200.
41
Congresul al XX-lea al Partidului Comunist al Uniunii Sovietice. Cuvântări, Rapoarte, Rezoluţii, Hotărâri,
(Bucureşti: Editura de Stat pentru Literatură Politică, 1956), 37-38.
42
Gh. Gheorghiu-Dej, Articole şi cuvântări: decembrie 1955-iulie 1959, (Bucureşti: Editura Politică, 1959),
159-67.
22
The message of de-Stalinization sent by Khrushchev re-launched the competition for power at
the top of PMR. Gheorghiu-Dej‟s authority was questioned concerning the abuses of the Securitate, the
cult of personality and party democracy. Miron Constantinescu and Iosif Chisenevschi, two old
Stalinists raised the issue of Gheorghiu-Dej‟ responsibility during a special Plenary (25 March 1956),
but the PMR leader, as in the case of Titoism, found responsible people in the past: those guilty of all the
excesses of Stalinism were Ana Pauker, Vasile Luca, Teohari Georgescu. The PMR leader, together
with his henchmen group immediately reacted against his challengers, in the sense of criticizing them,
but he did not go so far as to eliminate the, as long as the impact of de-Stalinization was hard to
anticipate and a measure of retaliation against some political leaders who demanded the application of
the “lessons of the 20th Congress” could prove to be risky43.
Gheorghiu-Dej was under the pressure of de-Stalinization, but the international events
offered him the possibility to survive. The strikes in Poznan (Poland) from 28-29 June 1956 had as
a first effect Khrushchev‟s abandonment of the de-Stalinization campaign, the objective of
preserving the stability of the empire being essential. In the autumn of 1956, Poland and Hungary
entered the swirl of de-Stalinization, the Polish and Hungarian communist elites wishing to
experiment their “own paths” of building socialism in their countries. In Poland, as a result of
Khrushchev‟s direct involvement a compromise was reached by imposing Wladyslaw Gomulka,
representing the so-called “national communism”. The new Polish leader gave insurances that
communism would not be abandoned and there was no question of changing the alliances system.
Not the same happened though in Hungary, where the re-appearance on the main stage of the
reformer Imre Nagy had raised the Hungarians‟ expectations for the end of communism. Budapest
street protests were eventually brutally repressed (November 1956).
The instability from the Communist bloc, caused by its attempts to reform, was used by
Gheorghiu-Dej to secure his personal position. In the same way as during the crisis between the
USSR and Yugoslavia, on the occasion of the Hungarian Revolution, Gheorghiu-Dej oriented
Romania against its western neighbour, joining the backwater of the Kremlin. Gheorghiu-Dej
offered that Romania participates with troops in defeating the protests from Hungary. Khrushchev
declined the offer as he did not need this at military level, but Romania was nevertheless involved
by “hosting” the Imre Nagy group at Snagov in the interval 1956-1958.
Following the whole range of events of 1956, Gheorghiu-Dej consolidated his position,
both internally and externally. The PMR leader was considered by the Soviet as being still the most
useful, both in what concerns his involvement in solving internal crises from the communist bloc
and by the fact that Romania did not witness any revolutionary wave. Moscow‟s level of trust in
Romania is also emphasized by two symbolic Soviet gestures: the restitution of a part of Romania‟s
national thesaurus and the dismantlement of the last joint Romanian-Soviet company,
Sovromcuartit. Gheorghiu-Dej used the favourable situation for eliminating his main opponents,
Miron Constantinescu and Iosif Chişinevschi, during the PMR Central Committee Plenary of 28
June Ŕ 3 July 195744. The PMR leader had step by step eliminated his fellow party adversaries, had
won Moscow‟s trust, proving his loyalty towards defending the latter‟s interests, but his relation
with the Romanian society remained problematic. Gheorghiu-Dej understood from the conflicts in
Poland and Hungary that he needed popular support, as the preservation of his leadership only with
Soviet support became problematic if other political changes were to happen in Kremlin. The failed
plan of the Molotov-Kaganovich-Malenkov group to remove Khrushchev from power, whose result
was the very removal of the three during the KPSS Central Committee Presidium Session (18-22
June 1957), had as a direct consequence strengthening Gheorghiu-Dej‟s conviction that lowering
Romania‟s dependence on the Soviet Union had to become a strategic goal.
For the beginning, though, as a proof of trust in the “Romanian comrades”, on 14 January
1957, the KPSS Central Committee addressed a letter to the PMR, which presented the motivation
43
Dan Cătănuş, “Impactul raportului <secret> asupra conducerii P.M.R. Destalinizarea în România”, in Putere şi
societate. Blocul comunist sub impactul destalinizării, 1956, ed. Dan Cătănuş, Vasile Buga (Bucureşti,
Institutul Naţional pentru Studiul Totalitarismului, 2006), 109-151.
44
Alina Tudor and Dan Cătănuş, O destalinizare ratată. Culisele cazului Miron Constantinescu – Iosif
Chişinevschi, 1956-1961, (Bucureşti: Editura Elion, 2001), 248-55.
23
for calling back the Soviet advisors: “The permanent stay of the Soviet advisors and experts does
nor correspond anymore to the interests of our cause, and this form of collaboration is practically
obsolete”45. A stronger proof of Khrushchev‟s trust in Gheorghiu-Dej came in April 1958, when
the older demand to remove Soviet troops from Romania was approved46. Of course, the Soviet
decision was mainly based on considerations deriving from the relations with the West; the
removal of Soviet troops was meant to be a message, together with other decisions (unilateral
reduction of the Red Army troops with 300,000 men, out of which 41,000 station in GDR and
17,000 in Hungary; declaration regarding the unilateral stop to nuclear experiments) concerning a
comeback to the “Geneva spirit”47. In fact, Gheorghiu-Dej, in his speech at the reception offered on
the occasion of the Soviet troops leaving Romania (25 July 1958), explained the Soviet reasons:
“…The Soviet Union, as well as the other socialist countries, considers the issue of removing
foreign troops from the territory of all states as one of the important matters in the struggle for a
sustainable peace and détente in international relations (…). Imperialist powers are refusing,
though, to follow the example of the Soviet Union”48.
The removal of Soviet troops from Romania was an important step for communist elites,
including Gheorghiu-Dej, to reconcile with the Romanian society. Even if this step was achieved in
the context of a new wave of repression, launched precisely to send a message of control,
Gheorghiu-Dej built himself the image of a positive character, as he “broke us loose from the
Russians”, according to a popular say. At the level of Romanian-Soviet relations no abrupt change
occurred, but the removal of Soviet troops offered to the Romanian communist leadership a larger
array of options, without the risk of an immediate military intervention. As the Soviet Union was
burdened by the image of an aggressive state, following the intervention against the Budapest
revolution, Gheorghiu-Dej foresaw the fact that a new Soviet military intervention could take place
only in the case when Romania would intend to abandon the communist system or to leave the
Warsaw Treaty and COMECON, intentions which the PMR leader obviously did not have. The
concept of “eastern neighbourhood” could be recreated after 1958, by increasingly using the terms
of a “sovereign and independent state” and lesser and lesser according to the parameters of the
“Soviet camp”.
The winner takes it all (1958-1965)
According to the manner and personality of Gheorghiu-Dej49, the removal of Soviet troops
from Romania was not accompanied by sudden or substantial changes in the Romanian-Soviet
relations. Romania docilely followed the political lines imposed by Moscow, even if the
enthusiasm was mostly mimed. In 1959-1960, Gheorghiu-Dej considered the Soviet Union as the
most important provider of capital and technology for the country‟s industrialization 50. Romania‟s
relations with the USSR were considered to be very close and a major conflict was hard to
anticipate. In parallel with maintaining good relations with Moscow, Gheorghiu-Dej sends to the
West the first diplomatic missions for opening some economic contacts. Obtaining economic and,
consequently, political autonomy became Gheorghiu-Dej‟s main objective. Implicitly, the issue of
the eastern neighbourhood became subordinated to this purpose.
45
Vasile Buga, “Relaţiile româno-sovietice, 1953-1958 (II)”, Arhivele totalitarismului, 12/III-IV (2004): 61.
Ioan Scurtu, România. Retragerea trupelor sovietice – 1958, (Bucureşti: Editura Didactică şi Pedagogică
R.A., 1996), 233-35.
47
Sergiu Verona, Military Occupation and Diplomacy. Soviet Troops in Romania, 1944 - 1958, (Durham and
London: Duke University Press, 1992), 137-39.
48
Gheorghiu-Dej, Articole… (1959), 497-8.
49
A significant illustration for the prudence that Gheorghiu-Dej practiced is the testimony of his former head
of cabinet, Paul Sfetcu: “After the removal of the Russian troops from Romania, in 1958, then and few years
after that he did not want to comment the event neither with those who accompanied him during the final
diplomatic negotiations nor with his closest collaborators, so that the Soviet do not find that Gheorghiu-Dej
exults with joy for the success of his strategy” Sfetcu, 57-8.
50
Cezar Stanciu, „Relaţiile româno-sovietice între 1957 şi 1960: calmul dinaintea furtunii”, Revista Ştiinţe
Politice şi Relaţii Internaţionale, VI/3 (2009), 109-11.
46
24
The creation of the European Economic Community by the Rome Treaty (25 March 1957)
raised the problem of economic competition between the communist bloc and the capitalist system.
The idea of specialization within COMECON51, in order to avoid competition among member
states, was promoted not only by Moscow, but also by industrialized countries such as East
Germany and Czechoslovakia, who hoped to get very cheap food products in exchange for
industrial products. Even from 1959, the USSR proposed a modification of the COMECON statute
so that decisions were not taken by consensus, but by majority, a proposal opposed by Romania52.
The project of specialization within the bloc was not however abandoned, in spite of Romanian
opposition. At the conference of communist and workers‟ representatives from the European
socialist countries (Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, the German Democratic Republic, Hungary,
Poland, Romania and the USSR), taking place in Moscow on 2-3 February 1960, with the subject
of experience exchange in the field of agriculture, the issue of evaluating specialization within
COMECON was raised, so that some states to stimulate agricultural production itself and others
agricultural car and equipment manufacturing or chemical products destined to agriculture. The
political response of Gheorghiu-Dej came during the 3rd PMR Congress of 20-28 June 1960, in
which the policy of continuing Romania‟s industrialization was even more strongly supported.
The Soviet attempt to achieve an integrated economic planning within the whole socialist
bloc, by means of COMECON, was not abandoned, being re-stated at the Moscow session of the
organization on 3-5 August 196153. Gheorghiu-Dej thus ascertained that the project of
supranational economic coordination was an important preoccupation of Soviet leadership and, in
order to counteract this, a serious preparation had to be made. In October 1961 the 22nd KPSS
Congress took place, occasion on which the second wave of de-Stalinization was launched, but the
conflicts within the socialist camp became public. The Albanian Workers‟ Party was roughly
criticized (for “schismatic, factionists and subversive” activities), but the Communist Party of
China came to its help. Gheorghiu-Dej was again facing a political choice. Keeping the solidarity
line with Khrushchev was confirmed during the PMR Central Committee Plenary of 30 November
Ŕ 5 December 1961. This time, the de-Stalinization theses were well-received in Bucharest and the
excesses of the Stalinist era were entirely attributed to the Pauker-Luca-Georgescu and
Chişinevschi-Constantinescu groups. Albania and, consequently, also China, were criticized by
Romanian communists. The plenary at the end of 1961 is the moment when the theses of national
communism are strongly stated, criticizing “emigrants from the Soviet Union” which are “alien to
the country‟s realities”54.
Khrushchev never gave up his plan of transforming COMECON into a supra-state
organism of economic planning and coordination, the project being introduced on the agenda of the
Conference of communist and workers‟ parties‟ representatives from the COMECON countries in
Moscow on 6-7 June 1962. The Conference approved the document “Fundamental principles of the
international socialist division of labour” elaborated by the Soviet economist E.B. Valev, in which
the theses of specialization some countries along certain industries were determined. The
fundamental idea was to integrate the economic development plans within COMECON, including
the key role for the Soviet Union in this process. During the Moscow meeting, Gheorghiu-Dej
expressed his veto towards changing the decision making mechanism within COMECON, arguing
in favour of voluntary coordination (and not integration) of economic plans, as they represented an
attribute of national sovereignty. This was the first significant opposition attitude of Romania
towards the Soviet Union, a tense situation which Khrushchev wanted to defuse by making a visit
in Bucharest on 18-25 June 1962. The conflict was not defused, though, on the contrary: during the
session of the COMECON Executive Committee on 15-21 February 1963 in Moscow, the
51
Liviu Ţăranu, România în Consiliul de Ajutor Economic Reciproc. 1949-1965, (Bucureşti: Editura
Enciclopedică 2007), passim.
52
Mihai Retegan, Război politic în blocul comunist. Relaţii româno-sovietice în anii şaizeci. Documente,
(Bucureşti: Editura Rao, 2002), 11.
53
Elis Neagoe-Pleşa, “Rolul lui Gheorghe Gheorghiu-Dej în elaborarea politicii externe şi în direcţionarea
relaţiilor româno-sovietice (1960-1965)”, Annales Universitatis Apulensis, Series Historica, 9/I (2005): 231.
54
Tismăneanu, Stalinism…, 210-1.
25
Romanian representative, Alexandru Barladeanu, opposed the creation of a single planning organ,
arguing that it might affect national sovereignty55.
Tensions in the Romanian-Soviet relation increased, while Khrushchev suffered a defeat
in the case of Soviet missiles deployed in Cuba56, and China and Albania questioned Moscow‟s
supremacy within the socialist camp. Romania quickly got closer to China during 1963 in order to
counterbalance Soviet hegemony57, a context in which the Romanian ambassador in Tirana is sent
back to the Albanian capital, as a gesture of defiance towards Khrushchev58. On 24-25 June 1963 a
new visit of a Soviet delegation to Romania takes place and it is led by Khrushchev himself. The
issue of the Soviet advisors‟ presence within the Ministry of Home Affairs was raised and their
removal was requested59. On the same line of adopting an attitude of distancing from the Soviet
Union and renewal of the Romanian nation‟s cultural border, Gheorghiu-Dej initiated or approved
several symbolic measures: the “Maxim Gorki” Institute was turned into the Slavic Faculty within
the Foreign Languages Institute; the Institute of Romanian-Soviet Studies was dismantled; the
“Russian Book” publishing house became the Universal Literature Publishing House; compulsory
study of Russian language in Romanian schools was eliminated; the town named Stalin recovered
its former name, Brasov.
Confronted with China‟s increasing criticism, Khrushchev tries not to deepen dissensions
within the socialist camp by a challenge from Romania. Therefore, on 3-7 October 1963, he makes
a non-official visit to Romania (on the occasion of a hunt), but the Romanian-Soviet disagreement
was still open. Khrushchev‟s intention was to create a permanent multinational organism for
foreign policies issues, with the participation of competent ministers of the Warsaw Treaty member
states, is rejected by Gheorghiu-Dej in a letter sent to the Soviet leader on 14 February 196460.
In the spring of 1964 an adequate context was created, as a result of persisting divergences
between the USSR and China, for the assertion of Romania‟s own vision over the socialist bloc and
about the role Romania should play61. Thus, the “Declaration regarding the position of the
Romanian Workers Party on the matters of the communist and workers‟ international movement”
emerged, also known as the “April Declaration”62. The document synthesized Gheorghiu-Dej‟s
vision concerning collaboration within COMECON and the principles that had to underline this
collaboration: full equality of rights, respect of sovereignty and national interests, mutual advantage
55
Retegan, 50-189.
The USSR deployed launching bases of SS-4 Sandal rockets in Cuba and these were uncovered by the
United States. A major diplomatic crisis between the United States and the Soviet Union was unleashed,
with a potential risk of military conflict. Khrushchev announced, on 28 October 1962, his decision to
withdraw all offensive weapons from Cuba. The lack of consultation within the Warsaw Treaty
Organization concerning the deployment of Soviet missiles in Cuba became a reason for divergence between
Romania and the USSR.
57
Romania stopped its attacks against China‟s revisionism in 1963 and Prime Ion Gheorghe Maurer was sent
to China, in March 1964, to “mediate” a standstill in the Sino-Soviet conflict. In order to attack Soviet
Union, Mao Zedong recognized the fact that Bessarabia was unjustly taken from Romania in Liu Yong,
Sino-Romanian Relations‚ 1950‟s-1960‟s, (Bucureşti: Institutul Naţional pentru Studiul Totalitarismului,
2006),174-99.
58
Lavinia Betea, Convorbiri neterminate. Corneliu Mănescu în dialog cu Lavinia Betea, (Iaşi: Polirom, 2001),
128.
59
Dan Cătănuş, Între Beijing şi Moscova. România şi conflictul sovieto-chinez. Vol. I. 1957-1965, (Bucureşti:
Institutul National pentru Studiul Totalitarismului, 2004), 229-64.
60
Opriş, 109-10.
61
Florian Banu and Liviu Ţăranu, Aprilie 1964 – „Primăvara de la Bucureşti”. Cum s-a adoptat „Declaraţia
de independenţă” a României?, (Bucureşti: Editura Enciclopedică, 2004), passim.
62
Declaraţia cu privire la poziţia Partidului Muncitoresc Român în problemele mişcării comuniste şi
muncitoreşti internaţionale adoptată de Plenara lărgită a C.C. a PMR din aprilie 1964, (Bucureşti: Editura
Politică 1964), 7-61.
56
26
and comradely assistance. On the same path of asserting Romania‟s autonomy within the Soviet
camp, the Declaration denounced the interference in the internal affairs of other parties63.
The tough Soviet response did not come on the official channels, but by publishing the
study of professor E.B. Valev, “Issues of economic development concerning the Danube districts of
Romania, Bulgaria and the USSR”, in the Vestnik Moskovskogo Universiteta review, issue nr.
2/1964. Within the so-called “Valev Plan” it was proposed to achieve an inter-state economic
complex in the Lower Danube region with 11 million inhabitants that would include the Romanian
regions of Bucharest, Ploieşti, Argeş, Dobruja, Galaţi and Oltenia64.
Gheorghiu-Dej continued the strategy of eliminating the sovietization instruments,
immediately after the removal of Khrushchev from the KPSS leadership (14 October 1964), asking
the Soviet ambassador to withdraw the KGB advisors from Romania. The issue of borders between
Romania and the Soviet Union is publicly raised by invoking the “classics”: in December 1964 Karl
Marx‟s work “Writings about Romanians” is issued in Bucharest65, which confirms Romania‟s
entitlement to Bessarabia. In fact, at the level of the PMR Central Committee Political Bureau, the
issue of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina had been discussed since January 196466, and within the
Ministry of Home Affairs the issue was again raised in the context of explaining the Declaration of
April 196467. Until the end of his life in March 1965, Gheorghiu-Dej continued his actions for
Romania‟s autonomy within the socialist bloc, both by openings towards the West, mainly by
means of economic cooperation, and by maintaining an attitude close to political confrontation
towards the Soviet Union. In 1965 Gheorghiu-Dej had reached to the condition of a nationalcommunist whose “heresy” consisted in the fact that he wanted to rewrite the satellization relation
with a superpower, by using the terms of Marxism-Leninism: placing on an equal, principled foot
the relation between Romania and the Soviet Union.
Conclusions
Within this analysis comprising the problematic of two decades concerning the history of
the communist regime, for objective reasons, we had to operate simplifications of the factual
demonstration, by eliminating some details and by presenting a schematized version of some events
which are widely known (for example, the Soviet-Yugoslav conflict, the 20th KPSS Congress, the
Hungarian Revolution, the Sino-Soviet conflict etc.). Nevertheless, from the facts presented within
this study we can make some conclusive observations concerning the manner in which GheorghiuDej related to Romania‟s eastern neighbourhood.
The Romanian communist leader assumed Romania‟s satellization relation towards the
Soviet Union and his condition of faithful and docile “partner” was considered to be a source of
legitimacy for building a power basis within the communist movement. The adoption of Romania‟s
“own path” attitude within the socialist bloc, starting with year 1958 and culminating with the April
1964 Declaration, was achieved in the context of eliminating his PMR competitors and the
increasing divergences within the communist world, mainly between the USSR and China.
Romania‟s neighbourhood with the USSR was considered by Gheorghiu-Dej, until the
60s, a friendly and inclusive one, a source of welfare and societal model. Only as the Soviet Union
intended by the so-called “Valev Plan” to confer another role to Romania within the communist
bloc than the one assumed by the communist leadership by applying the Stalinist vision over
economy and society, a “derailment” takes place from the status of USSR‟s obedient satellite. The
timid questioning of Bessarabia‟s issue was undue and the main motivation aimed at getting the
63
The text of the Declaration was also published, in a summary, in Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, in:
Mihai Retegan and Alexandru Duţu, Război politic în blocul comunist. Relaţii româno-sovietice,
Documente, vol. II, (Bucureşti: Tritonic, 2004), 173.
64
Emanuel Copilaş, “Economical divergences and geopolitical opportunities. Romanian Foreign Policy in the
last period of Gheorghiu-Dej Regime”, in: Revista Română de Geografie Politică, 12/II (2010): 368-9.
65
Karl Marx, Însemnări despre români. Manuscrise inedite, (Bucureşti: Editura Academiei RPR, 1964).
66
Neagoe-Pleşa, Rolul...: 237.
67
Luminiţa Banu and Florian Banu, “Alexandru Drăghici la ora naţionalismului. Popularizarea <Declaraţiei
din aprilie 1964> în structurile M.A.I.”, Caietele CNSAS, II/1.3 (2009): 20.
27
political support of citizens using patriotic emotions, in an exercise which was afterward skilfully
repeated by Nicolae Ceauşescu. Gheorghiu-Dej was not the artisan of a “geopolitical revolution” in
Romania‟s relation with the Soviet Union, in the direction of leaving the socialist bloc, not even by
following the Yugoslav model of a non-aligned communist state. The limit of Gheorghiu-Dej‟s
“independence” project was Romania‟s autonomy within the Warsaw Treaty Organization and
within COMECON, not at all leaving them. From an ideological point of view, this was achieved
by using arguments from the Marxist-Leninist arsenal.
The analysis of the Romanian-Soviet relations dynamics in the interval 1945-1965
confirms the main hypothesis of our study: Gheorghiu-Dej was a faithful ally of Moscow as long as
his status at the top of PMR could be questioned, outrunning by his pro-sovietism the limits of state
interests, both during the Stalin-Tito conflict and by his attitude towards the Budapest Revolution.
Gheorghiu-Dej subordinated the policy towards western neighbours to the one towards the Soviet
Union. When Gheorghiu-Dej consolidated his power within PMR and Soviet plans for Romania in
the economic field could question the stability of the regime, he got into a series of small
diplomatic conflicts (with an implicit ideological connotation) with the Soviet Union, a situation
which generated a feeling of sympathy among the Romanian population, all the more as repressive
measures were relaxed. Gheorghiu-Dej proved to be an adept of realpolitik, his personal certainty
being the main criterion according to which the internal and international policies of Romania were
tailored. There is no doubt that Gheorghiu-Dej is not the only dictator who subordinated the foreign
policy to his political interests, but he is a historical character whose activity significantly
influenced for two decades Romania‟s fate, and the end-result was mostly negative.
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From Consensus to Mutual Distrust and Back: The Shifting Boundaries of
Free Europe in the Twentieth Century
Valentina GÎDEA1, Lucian BOGDAN2
Abstract. In this paper, we analyze the concept of a “Free Europe” as it has evolved
throughout the 20th century, with its ups and downs – ranging from the first realistic plans for
devising a continental edifice, continuing through the bleakest moments of Europe‟s history, when
liberty was under siege and had all but receded from the Easternmost part of the continent. We
begin with the ideas of Aristide Briand, the first major political figure to advance a concrete
concept of federal European integration. Although his initial approach only addressed economic
principles, Briand‟s design increasingly incorporated political considerations as well. The
economic and political woes of the period, however, caused its eventual failure. Finally, we focus
on the onslaught on liberty in postwar Eastern Europe, highlighting the ways in which the events
there were perceived by American diplomats who constantly warned of the security risks to
Western Europe and the U.S., once Eastern Europe succumbed entirely to totalitarian rule.
American diplomats also offered recommendations for what should be done once communism was
rolled back, as we have lately seen.
Keywords: European construction, federalism, liberty, anti-communism, integration,
democracy, diplomacy, projects, security, peace.
Preliminary Considerations
In this paper will be analysed the shifting concept of a “Free Europe”, including the rights
and values that formed its foundation, the evolving notions of European integration, and the
changes in its composition that were guided by geopolitical shifts. However, we will not only
describe the sequence of events, but also attempt also to highlight the actions taken to spur political
and economic freedom, and to facilitate international peace and cooperation on the European
mainland. European unity is not a new concept, but one that dates back centuries. The Briand
Project, however, was one of the first concrete federalist projects based on institutions for building
European unity. Aristide Briand noted with sadness that the League of Nations had not been
sufficient to ensure collective security. Initially, he focused on the political side of European
construction, but subsequently found it more effective to focus on strengthening the economy,
creating a common market, and raising the level of well being among Europeans.
As a point of departure, we begin with the Briand Plan of the interwar years. Then, we
discuss how those idea spread in Europe‟s easternmost boundaries. We attempt to show how Briand‟s
principles have stood the test of time; how European ideals and values triumphed over Communism,
and, as in the Nitzchean aphorism, emerged stronger. Still we trace the role of certain opposition
leaders who served as the last defenders of democracy in the Eastern most part of the continent. Those
leaders kept close contacts with the Western, free world, even as the Iron Curtain of communism was
preparing to isolate the freedom-loving people of Eastern Europe for years to come. Finally, we shall
discuss the role of European integration and the values and principles that stood behind it as a buffer
against the leftist threat. Those values served as a beacon of hope Ŕ and a model to follow Ŕ for the
easternmost nations of the continent, after their return to freedom. But for initiate, we will begin with
1
Faculty of European Studies at the Babeş-Bolyai University of Cluj-Napoca. The author wishes to thank for
the support provided from programs co-financed by the Sectorial Operational Programme Human
Ressources Development, Contract AMPOSDRU 6/1.5/S/3, scholarship, obtained trough the following
grant: Investeşte în oameni! Fondul Social European, Programul Operaţional Sectorial pentru Fondul Social
European, Programul Operaţional Sectorial pentru Dezvoltarea Resurselor Umane 2007-2013, proiectul
“Doctoral Studies, a Major Factor in the Development of Socio-Economic and Humanistic Studies”.
2
Faculty of European Studies at the Babeş-Bolyai University of Cluj-Napoca.
31
the commonly accepted proposition that societies function best in a free market system, operating
under the rule of law3. While promoters of collectivist societies claim they are able to instil order
and improve the population‟s quality of life, they fail to address the individual‟s own aspirations
and ideals, and potentially deny him/her the freedom to flourish4.
United States President Franklin D. Roosevelt once said: “They who seek to establish systems
of government based on the regimentation of all human beings by a handful of rulers… call this a new
order. It is not new and it is not order”. While the American President targeted his argument against the
rising scourge of Nazism and corporatism, it applies equally to the many forms of collectivism, which in
the aftermath of the Great Depression were threatening the Old World‟s return to freedom and normalcy.
While socialism and communism remained as marginal ideologies on the American political
stage, the situation in Europe was much different. The latter part of the interwar period was characterized
by a swift mounting of extremist factions, relying upon the discontent of those affected by the
depression. This trend would be understandable, if one assumes that the people - disillusioned by flaws
they perceived in the free market and in democratic governments - oriented themselves towards political
regimes that promised more immediate solutions. As scholars Murray Rothbard5 and Robert Higgs6,
have argued, however, a limited government re-invigorates the economy after a depression. If extensive
powers are imbued on an interventionist government, it will act only to strengthen its political base of
power, even to the potential detriment of the citizens. American statesmen, Thomas Jefferson and
Benjamin Franklin both warned that those who give up essential liberty for temporary safety deserve
neither and will lose both. Indeed, not only did the totalitarian regimes of the era, which were at first
cheered by the electorate, not solve the depression, but they actually led to the greatest catastrophe in
human history, World War II.
The totalitarian momentum did not stop there. The Soviets pushed their sphere of
influence Westward. According to some strategists, they threatened to engulf even the last bastions
of freedom in Europe. Socialist ideals were gaining ground, as a (supposed) alternative to the
problems of the past. Countries such as Italy, Greece and France even risked forfeiting democracy
in order to embrace an egalitarian utopia. The ideals admittedly looked good on paper and were
highly seductive. But as history has repeatedly shown, communism in practice diverges from
Marxist ideals and slides swiftly towards Stalinism Ŕ with a host of detrimental consequences to the
liberty and even physical security of people.
The Briand Project of the European Federal Union
Aristide Briand: Everything that is up to me will be done7
The most resounding European unity initiative belongs to the French Foreign Minister
Aristide Briand. Speaking to the Assembly of the League, he shared his vision for a federal bond:
„I think that among peoples who are geographically grouped, like the people of Europe, there must
be some sort of federal bond that will not touch the sovereignty of nations that could be part of such
an association”8. Hence, in this section, we analyse Aristide Briand‟s initiative for creating a
federal European union, including his shift, from an economy-based European federation to a
politically based federation. What are the arguments against an economic federal union? Why did
the project fail? Leo James Lentzen, the promoter of the federate Nations of the World, said of
Briand‟s proposal: “this plan should be the basis of a world Federation not merely of Europe. I
3
Victoria Curzon Price, Le libéralisme. Pourquoi ca marche (Paris: Favre, 2007), 27sqq.
We have borrowed the term from Douglas J. Rasmussen and Doug den Uyl, Norms of Liberty. A
Perfectionist Basis for Non-perfectionist Politics (Pennsylvania State University Press, 2005).
5
Murray N. Rothbard, America‟s Great Depression (Auburn, Ala: Ludwig von Mises Institute, 2000).
6
Robert Higgs, Crisis and Leviathan. Critical episodes in the growth of American government (Oxford
University Press, 1997).
7
AMAEF, Fonds Nominatifs PA-AP 19, Briand, SDN, Projet Briand des Etats Unis dÈurope. Entretien avec
un journaliste 1923, f. 5. AMAEF = Archives of the French Minister of Foreign Affairs.
8
Charles Zorgbibe, Histoire de lÙnion Européenne (Editions Albin Michel, 2005), 14.
4
32
shall be glad to give you any further suggestions in this matter.”9 Nevertheless, the Briand plan
when first introduced was derided and misunderstood because “whatever is great is despised since
it is beyond the mind of the masses. But your blessed hope is destined to fulfilment nevertheless.”10
The idea was raised of forming a constitutional “United States of Europe.” No one,
however, conceived of this as a genuine confederation of states with a common government and a
common parliament. To put such an idea into practice seemed daunting and impractical given the
vast differences among cultures, societies and political systems. Yet Briand believed the foundation
of a European community rested on more than a shared government. The centrepiece of the
federation concept became shared economic interests. The French reflected on this for several
years. The idea was that by working together, a confederation of European states would gain
economic power and serve as a counterweight to the American economy. European leaders
recognized that the continent was fragmented and if artificial barriers could be eliminated, the
confederation could be a powerful force for Europe‟s economic recovery. 11 Briand‟s ideas evolved
and matured over the years. After the war, Mr. Briand was one of the first French to emphasize the
importance of understanding and cooperation between all European nations. In 1927, shortly after
the first European conference when Briand assumed the Pan-European Union‟s chair of honour, he
surprised the delegation by saying that he still hoped to see the creation of the United States of
Europe. The most difficult but urgent matter was the economy. America‟s economic boom had a
great influence in Europe. Their economic interests, however, need not be antagonistic, since it is in
America‟s interest for the EU economy to remain healthy. 12
Coudenhove-Kalergi‟s plan for a European Pact suggested that plans for a Union should
primarily emphasize a political approach, with economic agreements being secondary. This system
has the serious disadvantage of being limited to Europe. The alternative would be to extend the
Covenant for an international union by making a pact such as the United States of European
Nations and not only states of United Europe. As its history shows, England most certainly would
have refuses to enter a European coalition conceived and supported by the system Coudenhove
proposed. France faced the risk of turning yesterday‟s ally into a real enemy, both because of
traditional hostility towards a multi-nation coalition and because of its hurt pride. Conversely,
Germany, considering itself already to be a great power, would not accept a purely European
confederation if it didn‟t have some advantages of its own.13
Creating an organization with rules similar to those of the United States of America would
obviously be out of the question. It is about a community of interests in Europe, a European
organization, a confederation of states. “We have to choose between a system of alliances and
alliance-cons, which existed for 15 years and led to war, or the creation of a political and economic
union, a cultural community, through the cooperation between all nations.” Or: “Briand‟s approach
is not a solution; it is a question, a question about Europe. The future of our continent depends on
the answer to this question”14.
9
AMAEF, Série Y Internationale 1928-1940, carton 85, doss. 1A, Société des Nations Fédération européenne
Documentation, Février 1929- Mai 1930, Lettre de Leo James Lentzen, the promoter of the federate Nations
of the World, Wisconsin, USA, Lettre à M. Briand, Premier of France sur la Ligue des Nations, Genève,
Suisse, f. 25.
10
Idem, carton 85, doss. 1A, Société des Nations Fédération européenne Documentation, Février 1929-Mai
1930, From Justine Flockton, American Woman`s Club, to Aristide Briand, 18 Sept. 1929, f.43.
11
Idem, carton 85, doss. 1 Lettre du 12 juillet 1929 au sujet de lìnformation télégraphique selon laquelle M.
Briand proposerait la constitution des Etats-Unis dÈurope, f. 3.
12
Idem, carton 85, doss. 1, Ambassade de France a Berne, Annexe à la dépêche du 16 janvier 1930, n.20 a la
Sous-direction dÈurope, Traduction Nouvelle Gazette de Zurich no. 56 du 11 janvier 1930, f. 9.
13
Idem, carton 85, doss. 1, Note pour le cabinet du Ministre, Paris, le 29 janvier 1930. Suggestions de M.
Heerfordt pour la création des Etats-Unis des Nations européennes.
14
Idem, carton 85, doss. 1, Légation de France à Vienne, Annexe no.1 de la dépêche 204 du 18 juillet 1929.
Initiative paneuropéenne de M. Briand. Pas dàrrière pensées ou dìntentions secondaires par R. R.
Coudenhove Kalergi, f. 31-33.
33
Edouard Herriot15 also had a concept for Europe, but it id not offer a formal solution.
Herriot considered protectionist customs laws to be the biggest obstacle to achieving the grand
idea. Unfortunately, each country tends to support such laws, which are ultimately against the
interest of those who would benefit from them. These laws would continue to make state borders
difficult to cross. Herriot argued that stringent protectionism must be supplanted by a direct stateto-state agreement. Customs laws provide some short-term benefits but even these are often
illusory. Rationalization will characterize all major industries in the United States of Europe, and
will bear similarly on Switzerland with watches and silk, on Germany`s chemical industry and on
England's textile industry. In Herriot`s opinion, removing agricultural tariffs would also benefits
farmers, who would be able to organize their production in a direct, rational and European way, in
the general interest. Each nation would benefit by having reduced costs and no longer having to
protect themselves against neighbours who produce and sell at higher prices.16
Aristide Briand was the first statesman to draft a formal proposal for European grouping.
He wanted to achieve peace, but he noticed with sadness that the League was not sufficient to
ensure collective security. To that end, he wanted to achieve a Franco-German reconciliation in an
organized Europe. On the 5th of September 1929, Briand presented his plan in Geneva, at the
meeting of the League of Nations: “I think there must be some sort of federal link between people
that are grouped geographically, as the peoples of Europe. These people must have the possibility
of contact at all times, to discuss their common interests, to take joint resolutions. In other words,
they must establish between them a bond of solidarity that enables them to cope, when needed,
with grave circumstances, should they arise. It is this link, gentlemen that I would try to create.
Obviously, the association will act mainly in the economic sphere: it is the most pressing need. In
this area, I think we can achieve success. But I am also confident that a political perspective or
social perspective, the federal link, without affecting the sovereignty of any nations that might be
part of such an association, may be beneficial.”17
Aristide Briand referred to the idea of federal bond, respect for sovereignty, and the notion
of association. Leon Blum, the Socialist leader, was sceptical about the Briand project and could
not envision an organization that combined two seemingly contradictory elements: the federal bond
and the maintenance of sovereignty. The Communists saw the draft as an anti-Soviet plot. The
French memorandum used imprecise and conflicting words, talking about a “federation”, a “union,
association or European community that would respect absolute sovereignty and complete political
independence of the European nations.”
In Germany, Briand‟s main partner, Foreign Minister Gustav Stresemann, reached an
agreement with him, adding that he must unify the currencies, create a European stamp, and most
importantly, establish equal rights for Germany. For Great Britain, it was obvious that it could not
commit to Europe in exchange for keeping close ties with the Commonwealth and the United
States. The Daily Express wrote that the British people intended to be part of Europe economically
and politically, and they were called to a future higher than this. Winston Churchill was very clear
about the united, federated Europe; he said Britain was a part of this Europe, but not actually in it,
because: “We are bound and not included”.
The 26 countries of the League of Nations gave Briand the opportunity to express his
ideas in a memorandum. Unfortunately, this memorandum was a very long, vague document, and
disappointed many proponents of a European federation. It was Alexis Leger who wrote a more
detailed memorandum for a European Federal Union, a project introduced before the League of
Nations on May 1, 1930. It emphasized the need for a pact to affirm the general principle of the
European Union, and to consecrate legally and solemnly the solidarity established among European
states. Following a liberal expression and indicating clearly the main objective of this association
(serving the collective work of peaceful organization of Europe), the Governments agreed to make
regular contact, in regular or special meetings to discuss common questions of interest for the
15
Member of Radical Party, Deputy between 1919-1940, 1945-1957.
AMAEF, Série Y Internationale 1928-1940, carton 85, doss. 1, Art. de Jn. Hennard, M. Edouard Herriot nous
parle des Etats-Unis dÈurope dans la Feuille dàvis de Lausanne (journal indépendant) du 9 janvier 1930, f. 3.
17
Extrait de son discours en Pierre Gerbet, La construction de l‟Europe (Paris, Imprimerie nationale, 1983), 38.
16
34
community of European people.18 There were discussions about establishing a permanent body,
which would be a living link of solidarity between European nations and would embody the
personality and morality of the European Union.
Through this memorandum, Briand wanted to establish a permanent regime of solidarity
between European countries, without prejudicing the League by competing with for jurisdiction. He
proposed three organizations: a European Conference that would be a representative body, in
conjunction with the League; a Political Committee that would be an executive agency that could serve
the needs of the League, and a permanent Secretariat. Unlike in his September 1929 speech, he stressed
that the effort must first be directed towards the economy, creating a common market and raising
Europeans‟ level of well being. The Committee (whose chair would be elected on a rotating basis, in
order to exclude any particular predominance) would concern itself with political, economic, social
and other European Communities that were important, but not yet addressed by the League.19
Briand‟s memorandum was clear about his desire to establish a federation based on the idea of
union, but also advocated flexibility to accommodate the independence and national sovereignty of
each state, while serving the interest of collective solidarity. He did not see the contradiction
reported by Leon Blum: “in this federal connection, there is a development of the system of
arbitration and security, an extension of the politics of Locarno until the integration of agreements
or individual agreements in a system of arbitration and security. Regarding Europe as an economic
organization, he wants a reconciliation of the European economies under the political responsibility
of governments together.”20
When the Eleventh Assembly of the League met at the beginning of September 1930, the
French government drafted its response to the concept of a European Federal Union. It argued that
a European Union would facilitate, but not compete with a League of Nations‟ central mission. In
September 1930, Briand considered the League to be above the task of arbitrating unresolved
differences between its member nations. It also answered the objections of England, Holland and
Portugal, which declared that “mak[ing] allowances and special considerations to ensure that
measures for tightening European cooperation cannot provoke any anxiety or dissatisfaction on
another continent”21, referring to the links that bound them to their colonial domains. Briand
reassured them by saying that the European organization contemplated in his memorandum does
not oppose any ethnic group within or outside of the League of Nations. However, it doesn‟t
explain how England, purely a European nation, can be bound both to an economic policy that
satisfies the nations of the European continent and its Dominions, which may have different
interests. These matters were reserved for subsequent conversations.
The government of Great Britain saw the need to better understand the interests of the people
of Europe, to turn their attention from the hostilities of the past. It declared that, at least in the economic
sphere, closer cooperation between the nations of Europe was urgent and desirable. The Italian
government was prepared to support a collaborative initiative, as they were eager to have the material
and moral help for Europe`s reconstruction. The Finnish Government considered that the project was
important for the future evolution of Europe. The German government contended that organizing
political and economic development on the continent would not disrupt the population‟s daily life and
routine. In its turn, the Romanian government focused on the urgency of the economic crisis in most
countries and the need for robust solutions. Without disputing the relative priorities of economics
and politics, Romania argued that economic cooperation did not seem likely to occur without a
prior political cooperative agreement. A political agreement might be sufficient, however, to
economic cooperation. The Romanian government was convinced that the federal union proposed
by the French Governments marked the beginning of a new era in international life. The gradual
realization of this project would establish a harmonious collaboration among peoples, and civilized
18
ELLOPOS. The European Prospect, “Le mémorandum d'Alexis Leger sur l'organisation d'un régime
d'Union fédérale européenne”, http://www.ellopos.net/politics/leger-memorandum.asp.
19
AMAEF, Fonds Nominatifs PA-AP 335 Briand, SDN, 19, Pierre Rai, Aristide Briand Lòrganisation de la
paix, f. 11.
20
Ibidem.
21
Ibidem.
35
nations would prepare for a future of brotherhood and happiness.22 Nevertheless, the government of
Great Britain, already an active member of the community of nations established on several
continents, noted that it had to ensure that the measures taken to strengthen the European
cooperation did not cause uneasiness or dissatisfaction on another continent. The issue of
federation raised different concerns among territories outside Europe, which act as colonies. The
Netherlands government considered that it might have to take its special interests in such territories
into consideration. The Portuguese government contended that a union contemplated in any matter
would weaken the ties that bind the colonies to their metropolis.23 The Hungarian Government
declared that the ideas of the sovereignty and equality of rights should be interpreted to include
„the elimination of all inequalities which, in their practical consequences for some states, are
barriers to the free exercise of their sovereignty”.24
Most European governments expected immediate progress in the path of collective
security because of the guarantees already provided by the Covenant of the League of Nations, the
Pact against war and Locarno Agreements. The governments of Denmark, Luxembourg and
Norway wished to ensure that this evolution would not take the form of an organization that
included military obligations.25 All participating nations agreed with the French Government and
affirmed their desire to actually put the envisaged union under the moral authority of the League of
Nations.26 All involved governments agreed not to do anything that could weaken the authority of
the League. The French government was quite pleased about the nations‟ willingness to cooperate
and recognize a collective authority in order to further the interest of peace. 27 Briand's prestige
peaked when the proposal was formally considered, but much work remained to be done before a
Union could be realized. Three days later, world news sources reported that 6 million German voters
sent 107 National Socialist deputies to the Reichstag, when two years earlier, Hitler had only been able
to get one million votes and 12 seats. This first major triumph for Nazism was not an answer for
Briand`s project.28 Curtis, who had succeeded Stresemann, welcomed France‟s suggestion to reduce the
tariff barriers, but he acknowledged that, considering the economic chaos in the world, Germany also
had reasons to defend its agriculture and industry.
During the summer of 1930, the economic crisis precipitated political events in the Reich,
postposing any hopes for legal reforms that would lead to real peace. Before dissolution, the
Convention of Geneva, considering the proposal of Romanian Permanent Representative to the
League of Nations, Nicolae Titulescu, invited the governments to revisit a proposal to create a
commission to study the European Union concept and elected Aristide Briand as president. “It was
a burial under a heap of flowers.”29 It would be only twenty years later that Foreign Minister
Robert Schuman would finally accomplish the unification of Europe.
Free Europe under siege and its last defenders
Under these nefarious circumstances, if the U.S. and its British allies wanted to keep the
entire European heartland from succumbing to red rule, they had to make a stand. Thus, began the
process of spurring European integration. This meant consolidating a space of freedom and
democracy, where the spontaneously crystallized market rules, and not the Gosplans dictated
arbitrarily by a despotic authority, would prevail. Strategically speaking, even though American
President Harry S. Truman and Secretary of State George C. Marshall expressed their willingness
22
AMAEF, Série Y Internationale 1928-1940, carton 85, doss. 1, Société des Nations, Union fédérale
européenne 2, 3 janvier 1930-11 aout 1930, f. 261.
23
Idem, carton 85, doss. 1, Société des Nations, union fédérale européenne 2, 3 janvier 1930-11 août 1930
concernant La position à l`égard des états extra européens ou non membres de la Société des Nations, f. 261.
24
Ibidem, f. 263.
25
Ibidem, 270.
26
Ibidem, 279-280.
27
AMAEF, Série Y Internationale 1928-1940, carton 85, doss. 1, Société des Nations, union fédérale
européenne Réponses des gouvernements au Mémorandum français relatif à lòrganisation dùne union
fédérale européenne, 31 juillet 1930, f. 206-208.
28
AMAEF, Fonds Nominatifs PA-AP 335 Briand, f. 12.
29
Ibidem, f. 13.
36
to assist any freedom-loving nation that wanted to stand up against communism, their goal was not
only to keep the people of Europe from falling subject to totalitarianism, but also to create a second
line of defence, situated overseas, for the U.S. mainland Ŕ where fears of a Soviet attack would
remain significant throughout the Cold War.
It is noteworthy, in this respect, to mention the considerations uttered by Andrew
Moravcsik when analysing the neofunctionalist explanations of European integration. The
Princeton professor argued that European integration is a process that, once set en route, will gain
its own momentum, either as a result of “Cold War geopolitics, or as a pragmatic response to
exogenous economic challenges”30, though none of these should take exclusive credit. In order to
sustain Western Europe on its ideological “axis”31, the U.S. would offer the Old World its
unconditional support, thus ensuring that the post-war international establishment would be
grounded in common standards for human and civil rights, a respect for democracy, and liberallyoriented values. International relations theorist Ernst Haas highlighted the way in which Western
Europe and the U.S. became - and remain to this day-close partners with the “weaving of an [everdenser] web of interdependencies” between the New and Old Worlds. The U.S. would attempt to
save Europe from its post-war miseries, while Europe would increasingly embrace the American
model (“domestic” Ŕ that is, intra-communitarian Ŕ policies included). A more proactive
international application of the U.S. model, according to Haas32, constituted the best long-term
approach to curtailing Communism, and for pursuing America‟s interests worldwide.
For all these policies to succeed, the U.S. and its European partners deemed a more
integrative and interdependent relationship between the powers on both shores of the Atlantic to be
advantageous. Western Europeans certainly stood to benefit from increased integration, even
without the political and collective security agreements their American counterparts were insisting
so much upon. This, in turn, Ŕ as the spill over theory would predict Ŕ would provide further
incentive for advancing on the path of integration.
During the same period, the situation in Eastern Europe was much grimmer: Communism
was gaining an ever-increasing foothold, and the Western Allies‟ leverage and influence were
waning. While the views of some analysts such as George F. Kennan on the process of
communization are well-known, we shall mention in the following section remarks made by
American diplomats in Eastern Europe, most notably in Romania, about communist takeover there
and its ensuing risks. In this respect, the fact-finding mission of reporter and Special Envoy Mark
Ethridge would prove instrumental in providing the Truman Administration with a far more
detailed Ŕ and more pessimistic Ŕ image of the developments of Romania33. Mark Ethridge (as
recounted by Burton Berry), describes the situation of American representation and its leverage in
Romania. Though his findings were no different than those in previous reports, the tone more
alarmist and is meant to capture policymakers‟ attention and impel them to act, while their actions
could still make a difference. Thus, argued, Special Envoy Ethridge,
“The position of western democracies is disintegrating fast, the Russian position
becoming stronger all the time and unless we can take firm and effective action in
Romania it will soon be too late. We are jeopardizing the confidence of the Rumanian
people in our intent and ability to carry out commitments we have made to the world”.
The latter part of Ethrdige‟s assessment bears great significance, as it highlights a key
element of American involvement in the international arena; namely, that a nation willing to stand
as a beacon for the democratic world and to build its foreign policy upon the rhetoric of its
30
Andrew Moravcsik, "The European Constitutional Compromise and the neofunctionalist legacy", in:
Journal of European Public Policy, 12:2 (Routledge, April, 2005): 351.
31
While the U.S.S.R. had imposed its ideological model on Eastern Europe by force, the U.S.A. preferred to do it by
relying upon the strength of example, by highlighting the advantages of living in a free (part of the) world.
32
Ernst Haas, The Web of Interdependence: The United States and International Organizations (New Jersey:
Prentice Hall, 1970), 10.
33
“Telegrama reprezentantului politic american în România, Burton Y. Berry, adresată secretarului de stat al
S.U.A., conţinând primele concluzii ale emisarului american Mark Ethridge asupra situaţiei politice din
România” (26 noiembrie 1945), in ANIC, colecţia Microfilme SUA, r. 667, cc. 689-697.
37
exceptionalism34 could not allow itself to sit idly and allow other regional actors to undermine its
position. This, he suggested, was particularly true because soft power was the primary source of
America‟s advantage. That advantage could swiftly erode if that power seemed passive or
ineffective when communists were cracking down on those chanting for their sovereign and the
principles of constitutional monarchy.
Concerning the “seizure of power” undertaken by the communists, remarked Ethridge, “[b]oth
sides profess to be anxious to solve it [be it understood, each in its own favor], but in the meantime the
governmental situation is approaching the chaotic”. Ethridge also argued for imminent parliamentary
elections, as a way to settle the issue of government representation. He described the Romanian
government‟s attitude towards the Groza Government in the following way:
“My own conviction is that the Government will not go to the people yet because it
is not willing to risk itself in a free election and wants more time to consolidate its
power. I am entirely convinced that the Groza Government is in no sense representative
under the Yalta formula because the two political groups which have the support of the
vast majority of the Rumanian people […] are being harassed by the Government, […]
their newspapers entirely suppressed and all public meetings of the opposition barred”.
Further on, Ethridge characterized the Communist Party of Romania as “almost wholly a
Russian creation […] pursuing a policy which has no basis in Rumanian traditions”; moreover, he
remarked the Plowmens Front was used as a communist proxy “to win adherents among peasant
and artisan classes”.
Concerning the economic situation, the American envoy remarked on its continuous
deterioration and the risks to foreign investment posed by the process of communization: “Outside
companies, including those Americans have an interest in, are being squeezed to the point where
they will have to get out of the country”, warned Ethridge, as Romania was being delivered in the
hands of “a dictatorship […] worse by universal agreement than the German occupation”. The
American envoy‟s predictions and analyses would prove highly accurate not only for the domestic
situation of Romania, but also with regard to recommended policies for the U.S., were it to succeed
in reversing the trend and bringing the Eastern European country back in the family of democratic
nations: “much could be done if we would insist that the Allied Control Commission become a
truly tripartite body rather than a Soviet authority as at present”; however, Ethridge acknowledged
that his country‟s role in the region confined itself to “one of constantly futile protest”.
All this led to the people “becoming more and more disillusioned, their morale sinking all
the time”, which constituted, in the Special Envoy‟s view, a “failure on our part”, as the U.S. could
and should have been communism‟s main opponent in the region. However, even though we see
that Ethridge‟s views were favourable to the Romanians and supported salvaging the country from
communist dictatorship, he had been sent solely on a fact-finding mission, and was in no position
to advocate any further course of action by the Department of State, or by the U.S. government,
which would conduct its foreign policy in accordance with its grander strategic views. And even
though the U.S. and U.K. would insist on broadening of the representative character of the post-war
governments in Eastern Europe, one by one, from Romania and Bulgaria and up to Czechoslovakia,
they would be washed away by the red tide. The Westerners remained as little more than observers
in an area where, theoretically, they should have retained near-equal influence.
This reaffirmed U.S. Secretary of State James Byrnes‟ assessment of Romania‟s future
prospects and what America might accomplish there using purely political means. He was determined
to maintain its current course, if nothing more resolute could be achieved:
“We must realize that international conferences are not intended to give individual
statesmen the opportunity to achieve diplomatic successes. They are intended to be
useful in the adjustment of delicate social and human relations between states with
many common interests and many divergent interests.”
In international affairs, as in national affairs, conflicting interests can often be reconciled
only though mutual understanding and frank discussion. The meeting in Moscow did serve to bring
about better understanding. Secretary Byrnes declared at the 1945 Moscow Meeting: “We must not
34
For details, vid. H. Kissinger, 38.
38
slacken in our efforts. With patience, good will, and tolerance we must strive to build and maintain
a just and enduring peace.”35 During negotiations that preceded the Paris Peace Conference of
1947, certain Eastern European statesmen promoted the idea of European integration, seeing it as a
preferable alternative to a total loss of national sovereignty and complete absorption into the Soviet
system. Of these, it is noteworthy to mention the proposals of Hungarian Minister to Washington,
Paul Auer, uttered in his discussions36 with Frederick T. Merrill, the U.S. State Department‟s
delegate at the Peace Conference. The Hungarian Minister warned his American interlocutor that
the Soviets were issuing proposals for a Danubian Zollverein. The anticipated first step in this
direction would be a Russian-Hungarian customs union, which Auer anticipated would be used by
the U.S.S.R. to totally dominate the Hungarian economy. Consequently, the Hungarian Minister
issued a counter-proposal, which caught Merrill‟s attention:
“Auer stated that he will attempt to head off any plans for customs unions with
Yugoslavia and Rumania by counter proposals for a European Customs Union. He said
he had already interested certain French officials in this”.
Thus, the idea of a European single market37 was kept alive and attempts to promote it
were made even in a region that was succumbing to dictatorship and centralism. Moreover, Paul
Auer correctly anticipated the developments in Eastern Europe; the Soviet-dominated Council for
Mutual Economic Assistance would be established in 1949 and Eastern Europeans simultaneously
advanced proposals for a continent-wide organization, as a way to curtail communism. This
approach to resisting communist expansion would soon become the political instrument of choice
for a series of West-German chancellors, starting with Konrad Adenauer. Auer, however, as the
American representative chose not to commit to the Hungarian Minister, but simply to
acknowledge his proposal. The absence of support from the most powerful member of the Paris
Peace Conference was certainly detrimental to the Eastern European countries, who became
increasingly isolated from the Western family of democracies, from the process of European
integration, and from the free world.
While it is understandable that domestic political considerations Ŕ mainly a reticence to
demand greater sacrifice to support a proactive foreign policy after so many years of hardships Ŕ
caused the U.S. to take a step back. What is more worrying from reports of those days, is that
certain key policymakers were missing the big picture, and ignoring evidence from envoys such as
Ethridge and George Kennan, had actually convinced themselves that danger came from the East.
Thus, as part of negotiations for the Paris Peace Treaty38, the Department of State issued a report on
reintegrating former Eastern European partners of the Axis into the family of democratic, peaceloving states, which contained some lofty considerations: it argues that the newly-enacted peace
treaties “will bring to an end armistice regimes giving to the occupying power almost unlimited
control over the national life of this countries and they will, in some cases, mean the complete
withdrawal of, and in others, major reduction in the occupying forces which, since the end of the
war, have imposed such heavy burdens on their national economies”.
In retrospect, these considerations seem unrealistic, considering predictions of the Soviet
sphere of influence were either long delayed, or carried out only when other force of control were in
place. (As history shows, in the case of Romania, this would happen only after the Dej regime
demonstrated loyalty to the Soviets during the Hungary‟s 1956 uprising). However, at least, the Report
acknowledges the treaties‟ flaws and shortcomings. Secretary Byrnes, in his comments on the draft
forms, argued they were “not the best which human wit could devise” 39, but highlighted the fact that
35
Report by Secretary Byrnes, December 30, 1945, on the Moscow Meeting, in A Decade of American
Foreign Policy, 1941-1949 (New Haven, CT: Yale Law School), 2008.
36
Memorandum of Conversation, by Frederick T. Merril of the United States Delegation (August 2, 1946), in
Foreign Relations of the U.S. Series - Paris Peace Conference: proceedings (1946), Volume 3 (Washington
DC: Government Printing Office), 81-84.
37
Which, let us remember, had been conveyed in Central and Eastern Europe during the declining years of the
Austrian-Hungarian Empire as well, from Franz Ferdinand to Coudenhove Kalergi.
38
Third Meeting of the Council of Foreign Ministers, New York City, November 4 to December 12, 1946 Ŕ
report by the Department of State, in A Decade of American Foreign Policy, 1941-1949, loc. cit.
39
James Byrnes, quoted in ibid.
39
they constituted “the best which could be reached by unanimous agreement among the members of the
Council of Foreign Ministers”. The Department of State concludes its Report on an optimistic note,
arguing that the treaties it had supported “will permit Italy, Rumania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Finland to
reassume their responsibilities as sovereign states in international affairs and will afford them an
opportunity to qualify for membership in the organization of the United Nations”40. Unfortunately, this
lofty speech, not backed by actions, or even by a resolute position on the defence of freedom at the
Peace Conference and succeeding meetings, meant little of any practical value could be achieved and
that, freedom in Europe would remain, fundamentally, in retreat.
It is interesting to note that, in spite of this, former Liberal foreman, and by the late 40‟s,
head of only a faction of the Party, Constantin I.C. Brătianu, would make one last attempt. He
petitioned Communist Premier Petru Groza, as early as July 14 th, 1947, to demand that Romania
adhere to the Marshall Plan, arguing that in the liberal view, national sovereignty and economic
integration are not mutually exclusive, and citing American assurances that the Marshall Plan did
not “follow any interference in the domestic affairs of other countries”41. Despite these final efforts
to promote, or more precisely, to cling to the last remnants of liberty, communism would be the
dominant reality of Eastern Europe for decades to come, while European integration was
miraculously transforming the Westernmost part of the continent.
Concluding remarks. A return to normalcy, after decades of craving
Communism and restrictions on even the most basic liberties would be the norm in
Eastern Europe for as long as four decades. When the Iron Curtain Ŕ and its more material symbol,
the Berlin Wall Ŕ finally came down, it would take the people quite a while to understand and
accommodate to their re-found liberties42. What is certain, however, is that the return to a normal
political life, even if not entirely democratic, has helped human development and, probably even
more importantly, the advancement of freedoms as cherished by the family of nations comprising
the European Union. Triumphal as it may sound, it is undeniable that Eastern Europe‟s return to
freedom, which united the continent under a twelve-flagged banner, is a success to be celebrated
throughout Europe and the world. It has advanced economic liberty and growth, improved
standards of living, and promoted individual freedoms.
Perhaps the most profound effect arising from Free Europe‟s expanded boundaries is the
awareness of freedom: with an ever-increasing number of citizens realizing they are free, and
enjoying the benefits of their freedom, the rule of law and market economy become ever harder to
dislodge. In this way, democracy becomes a practical reality, not just an aspirational ideal, admired
form afar. Hoping that our demarche has illuminated the emergence and evolution of a Free Europe,
we rest our case, expressing our hope the European integration process continues to develop and to
operate as a guardian of freedoms.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Curzon Price (2007), Victoria. Le liberalisme. Pourquoi ca marche. Paris: Favre.
40
Though, in fact, it would be precisely the United States that would try locking Romania‟s accession to the
United Nations on some occasions, as means of retaliation against mischievous conduct of the communist
government and that it would profit from the location of the New York headquarters of the U.N. on its soil
to chicane Romanian diplomats when trying to attend its meetings, thus delaying Romania‟s accession by
some nine years.
41
“Scrisoarea lui Constantin I.C. Brătianu, preşedintele Partidului Naţional-Liberal, adresată primului
ministru, dr. Petru Groza, privind participarea României la Conferinţa Statelor Europene (14 iulie 1947)”, in
România. Viaţa politică în documente (1947), Bucureşti: Arhivele Statului din România, pp. 187 sq.
42
Besides, this was the very danger against which American Charge d‟Affaires to Bucharest, C. Montagu
Pigott, had warned as early as 1949: “opposition [to communism] gives way to resignation and resignation,
eventually to acceptance [of totalitarian rule]” - The Charge in Romania (Pigott) to the Secretary of State
(Telegram 711.00/3-2649 of March 26, 1949), in FRUS, Eastern Europe; the Soviet Union, vol. V (1949),
pp. 535 sqq.
40
Haas, Ernst (1970), The Web of Interdependence: The United States and International
Organizations. New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
Higgs, Robert (1997), Crisis and Leviathan. Critical episodes in the growth of American
government. Oxford University Press.
Moravcsik, Andrew (2005), “The European Constitutional Compromise and the neofunctionalist
legacy”. Journal of European Public Policy, 12:2 (Routledge, April, 2005), 349-386.
Rasmussen, Douglas J. and Doug den Uyl (2005), Norms of Liberty. A Perfectionist Basis for Nonperfectionist Politics, Pennsylvania State University Press.
Rothbard, Murray N (2000), America‟s Great Depression. Auburn, Ala: Ludwig von Mises
Institute.
Zorgbibe, Charles (2005), Histoire de lÙnion Européenne. Paris: Editions Albin Michel.
Documents and Collections of Documents:
A Decade of American Foreign Policy, 1941-1949. New Haven, CT: Yale Law School, 2008.
ANIC, colecţia Microfilme SUA, r. 667.
Foreign Relations of the U.S. Series - Paris Peace Conference: proceedings (1946). Volume 3.
Washington DC: Government Printing Office.
România. Viaţa politică în documente (1947), Bucureşti: Arhivele Statului din România.
AMAEF, Fonds Nominatifs PA-AP 19, Briand, SDN, Projet Briand des Etats Unis dÈurope.
Entretien avec un journaliste 1923, f. 5.
AMAEF, Série Y Internationale 1928-1940, carton 85, dossier 1A, Société des Nations Fédération
européenne Documentation, Février 1929-Mai 1930, Lettre de Leo James Lentzen, the
promoter of the federate Nations of the World, Wisconsin, USA, Lettre à M. Briand,
Premier of France sur la Ligue des Nations, Genève, Suisse, f. 25.
Idem, carton 85, dossier 1A, Société des Nations Fédération européenne Documentation, Février
1929- Mai 1930, From Justine Flockton, American Woman`s Club, to Aristide Briand, 18
Sept.1929, f. 43.
Idem, carton 85, dossier 1 Lettre du 12 juillet 1929 au sujet de lìnformation télégraphique selon
laquelle M. Briand proposerait la constitution des Etats-Unis dÈurope, f. 3.
Idem, carton 85, dossier 1, Ambassade de France a Berne, Annexe à la dépêche du 16 janvier 1930,
n.20 a la Sous-direction dÈurope, Traduction Nouvelle Gazette de Zurich no.56 du 11
janvier 1930, f. 9.
Idem, carton 85, dossier 1, Note pour le cabinet du Ministre, Paris, le 29 janvier 1930. Suggestions
de M. Heerfordt pour la création des Etats-Unis des Nations européennes.
Idem, carton 85, dossier 1, Légation de France à Vienne, Annexe no.1 de la dépêche 204 du 18
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AMAEF, Fonds Nominatifs PA-AP 335 Briand, f. 12.
The Jews of Romania and their Immigration to Israel. 1948-1953.
Anca OLTEAN1
Abstract. The Jews of Romania had to bear difficult times within the communist Romania.
The Romanian communist state tried to assimilate the minorities and to erase all differences.
Emigration was possible after the Second World War, but the Jews who immigrated to Israel lost
their jobs when they decided to leave Romania, together with their properties. The diplomatic
relations between Romania and Israel were influenced by the emigration problem of the Romanian
Jews. The persecutions of Zionist leaders in Romania together with the periods when emigration
was prevented constituted moments of tension in the Romanian – Israeli relations. Often, the Israeli
diplomats reminded their Romanian counterpart that the process of emigration had to continue.
The process of emigration of Romanian Jews depended closely on the development of Romanian –
Israeli economic relations. Almost all Romanian Jews emigrated from Romania during the
communist years.
Keywords: Jews, Romania, emigration, immigration, communism, Israel, economic
relations, Zionism, diplomacy, Embassy, postwar
Not much has been written in Romania on the immigration of Jews from Romania to Israel
during the years 1945-1953. Valuable are the contributions of Liviu Rotman and Radu Ioanid,
Cristina Păiuşan Nuică2. Also a collection of documents was published by Daniela Bleoancă,
Nicolae Ŕ Alexandru Nicolescu, Cristina Păiuşan, România – Israel. Diplomatic documents 19481989, coordonated by Victor Boștinaru (București: Editura Sylvi), 2000.
At the end of the WW II Jewish population was living in conditions of poverty, fear,
misery. They did not have enough food and shelter. There were a very small number of Jewish
children after the war. The International organization Joint Distribution Committee provided to the
Jews from communist states food and medicines. Thus were helped Jews from countries such as
Romania, Hungary, Poland, Austria3. The context when this emigration happend was extremely
tensioned. After the agreement from Yalta and Teheran, Romania fell under the Soviet zone of
influence. The frontiers were closed and emigration was prohibited. During the whole communist
period, the Romanian Jews succeeded to emigrate but, as Liviu Rotman and Radu Ioanid shows,
this happened under very difficult circumstances. Moreover, the Jews who emigrated lost all their
properties together with their and jobs when they decided and subsequently applied for emigration.
Starting with 1949, the Zionist leaders who tried to convince the Jewish population to emigrate
were imprisoned4. The community life of the Jews was also affected. Communist Security tried to
supervise the remaining Jewish communities. Still, the commmunities continued to exist although
their numbers were decreasing5.
1
Institute for Euroregional Studies within the University of Oradea.
Cristina Păiuşan-Nuică, Relaţiile româno-israeliene 1948-1978, (Bucureşti: Editura universitară, 2008).
3
Bernard Wasserstein, Vanishing Diaspora. The Jews in Europe since 1945, (Great Britain:Hamish Hamilton
Ltd, 1996), 36.
4
Teodor Wexler, „Procesele sioniştilor” în Romulus Rusan (ed.), Anii 1954-1960. Fluxurile şi refluxurile
stalinismului, Fundaţia Academia Civică, 2000, 380.
5
Valuable information concerning the situation of Jewish community during communist period was provided
by Moses Rosen in the work Primejdii, încercări, miracole. Povestea şef-rabinului Dr. Moses Rosen
(Bucureşti: Hasefer, 1991).
2
42
The immigration of the Jews from communist states to Israel
At the end of XIX century anti-Semite feelings and attitudes were frequent. The pogroms
from Russia or the Dreyfus Affair are examples of anti-Semite manifestations. In Romania, only
after the Constitution from 1923 Jews became Romanian citizens, being granted full rights, just like
any Romanian citizen. In the other parts of the Eastern Europe the Jewish situation was far from
good. This was the background that gave way to political Zionism, a Jewish movement which
militated for the creation of a Jewish homeland in Israel. Zionism was disapproved by some
religious Jewish groups because according to the Jewish religion the return of the Jews to Israel
must take place during the messianic era. Such religious groups did not see that it was the right
time for the Jews to return to Israel. Herzl warned on the dramatic consequences of anti-Semitism.
In his book “Der Judenstaat”, published in 1896, he expressed his premonitions: “Herzl seems to
have a presentiment of the destiny that the Jews will have forty years later. His work releases a
warning that something must be done” 6[transl.]
The refusal of European leaders to take into consideration the proposal of the Jews
determined the Jews to consider also other territories where to create their own state, like it was the
case of Uganda, Sinai, El Arish, Cyprus or Argentina. In the aftermath of the First World War, in
the time of their Palestine mandate the English enacted the Balfour Declaration, which encouraged
the creation of a Jewish homeland in Palestine. The following proposals went from encouraging the
Jews to live only in a part of Palestine, to setting up a proportion between Jewish and Arabic
populations, and to the limitation of the Jewish immigration to Palestine7. Only the disaster of
Holocaust made obvious that it was necessary to build a Jewish state in 1948. But after Israel made
its pro-western orientation known, the Soviet Union delimited itself from the new state and started
supporting the Arabic side within the area.
The table below shows the numerical evolution of the Jewish population in the world (1780
Ŕ 1967). So we see that the Jews settled early in Hungary and in a high percentage, 0.9 %, i.e. 81,000
in 1780. In the same period, 2.4% settled in Romania, i.e. 80,000. In that time, they were living in
great number in Russia, Poland, Galicia and Moravia. Their number increased not only in Hungary,
but also in Romania. On the eve of the Second World War, their number decreased probably because
emigration initially and later on, deportation. The Jews from the NorthŔWestern Transylvania and
from Hungary were deported to German concentration camps. A part of the Jews from the Old
Kingdom of Romania were deported to Transnistria. A number of the Jews from these countries
succeeded to save their lives by relocating to other more safe areas. After the war, because of the
death caused by deportation and emigration, their number was much smaller now. In Hungary, only
174,000 remained alive, namely 1.9% from the total of the population, while in Romania, according
to the table, only 110,000 remained, i.e. 0.6%. This figure seems too small. According to Liviu
Rotman, the number of the Jews remained in Romania in 1945 was much greater: “According to
statistics, in Romania in the year 1945, the Jewish population was 375,000 people, so that in 1946
their number increased to 420,000, because of a flux of former deported Jews from different countries
that returned to Romanian territory”8. (Rotman, 2004: 27) [transl.]
The numerical evolution of Jewish population in the world (1780 -1967)9
Country
Austria
Belgium
Bulgaria
Czechoslovakia
Boemia
6
1780
1820
1860
1900
180
20 (0.3)
90
93
2 (0.1)
39
60
1939
191(2.8)
70 (0.9)
50 (0.7)
357 (2.4)
76 (1.2)
Table 1.
1948
31 (0.4)
45 (0.6)
45 (0.6)
42 (0.3)
1967
13 (0.1)
40 (0.6)
6 (0.4)
15 (0.1)
Claude Klein, Israel. Statul evreilor, (Timişoara: BIC ALL, 2003), 10.
Klein, 15.
8
Liviu Rotman, Evreii din România în perioada comunistă: 1944-1965 (Ia;i: Polirom, 2004), 27.
9
The tabel was detailed in Victor Karady, The Jews of Europe in the Modern Era. A Socio-historical outline,
(Budapest, New York: Central European University Press, 2004), 44-45; adaptation after Encyclopedia
Judaica. The figures from the table must be multiplied by 1,000.
7
43
Country
1780
1820
1860
1900
1939
1948
1967
Moravia
28
43
44
41 (1.2)
Slovakia
137 (4.1)
Ruthenia
103(14.1)
Estonia
5 (0.5)
France
40 (0.2) 50 (0.2)
70 (0.2)
80
260 (0.5) 235 (0.6) 540 (1.0)
Galicia
151
240
450 (9.7) 811(11.1)
Germany
223(0.9)
450(1.0)
587(1.0)
240(0.3)
153(0.4) 30(0.05)
Great Britain
20(0.1)
60(0.2)
200 (0.5)
340 (0.7)
345(0.7) 450(0.8)
Greece
10
73(1.2)
9(0.1)
7(0.1)
Hungary
81(0.9) 150(1.5)
450(3.3)
850(5.0)
445(5.0)
174(1.9) 80(0.8)
Italy
25
25(0.1)
35(0.1)
48(0.1)
53(0.1)
35(0.1)
Latvia
32
78 (5.5)
95(4.9)
50(2.0)
Lithuania
155(7.6)
25(0.1)
Netherlands
45(1.8)
104(2.0)
112(1.4)
28(0.3)
30(0.3)
Poland
3,250(10.0)
88
21
Romania
80(2.4)
267(4.5) 850 (4.7)
380 (2.3) 110 (0.6)
Russia
1,600(3.5) 5,190(4.9) 2,825(2.1) 2,600(1.1) 2,600(1.1)
Sweden
2
7(0.1)
15(0.2)
13(0.2)
Switzerland
2(0.1)
13(0.4)
18(0.5)
35(0.8)
25(0.4)
Turkey
50(4.0)
80(0.4)
40(3.3)
Yugoslavia
68(0.5)
10(0.08) 7(0.05)
Serbia
2
6
Croatia
9
18
20
Bosnia
1,5
8
14
1,3
Europe
2,730
8, 690
9,870
4,360
4,070
North America
5
8(0.15) 1,016(1.3) 5,115(3.6) 5,180(3.5) 6,150(2.8)
South America
5
34(0.09)
331(0.5)
567(0.5) 781(0.3)
Asia
420
1,047
1,030
2,544
Palestine
45
78(12.0)
475(32.4)
750(75)
2,436(8
(Israel)
6)
North Africa
298(1.1)
452(1.1)
563(1.5) 63(0.1)
W. and S.
40(3.9)
91(0.9)
154(0.7) 132(0.3)
Afrika
Oceania
1
17(0.3)
32(0.3)
41(0.4)
75(0.4)
Total
3,280
10,600
16,940
11, 900
13,840
If we analyze the table below, we notice that the segment that interest us most, the period
1948-1951, is marked by a dynamic immigration to Israel. In these years, from Romania, 117,950
Jews immigrated to Israel and this is the most dynamic period of emigration from the entire
interval. In Hungary it is the same situation, the most dynamic segment of emigration dates also
from these years. 14,324 of Hungarian Jews immigrated to Israel during the years 1948-1951. Also,
in other countries from the communist space, Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Poland, the highest
number of emigrants is recorded to these years. Also, the next period, 1952-1966, shows an
increased mobility in the case of Romania and Hungary. We must take into account that the number
of Hungarian Jews after the Holocaust was much smaller than that of Romanian Jews. The great
number of the Jews who immigrated to Israel in the years 1948-1951 reflects the enthusiasm of the
Jews from this country towards the creation of an Israeli state and the approval of communist
regimes for whom the Israel had not yet become an enemy.
44
The immigration to Israel from Europe, 1948-94. The period of emigration and the country of birth10
Table 2
Austria
Belgium
Great Britain
Bulgaria
Czechoslovakia
France
Germany
Greece
Hungary
Italy
Netherlands
Nordic
Countries
Poland
Romania
Spain
Switzerland
Turkey
USSR/CIS
Yugoslavia
Other states
Total
Percentage
from total
immigration to
Israel
1948-1951
2,632
291
1,907
37,260
18,788
3,050
8,210
2,131
14,324
1,305
1,077
85
1952-1966
1,011
747
3,233
2,336
2,317
3,386
2,579
916
11,447
714
1,139
349
1967-1979
1,215
1,606
10,847
256
2,108
11,725
4,062
600
2,073
1,353
2,147
1,571
1980-1989
356
788
7,098
180
462
7,538
1,759
147
1,005
510
1,239
1,178
1990-1994
168
408
2,547
2,489
268
4,298
1,068
65
1,180
279
510
638
TOTAL
5,382
3,840
25, 632
42,521
23,943
29,997
17,678
3,859
30,029
4,161
6,112
3,821
106, 414
117,950
80
131
34,547
8,163
7,661
1,343
367,349
53,4
46, 531
108,478
427
536
13,281
22,283
481
340
232,531
38,8
14, 011
28,586
475
1,237
10,801
157,970
287
415
253,345
60,4
2,807
14,607
321
706
2,088
29,754
140
303
72,986
47,4
1,708
3,904
109
443
524
530,767
1,447
461
553,281
90,8
171,471
273, 525
1,412
3,053
61,241
748,937
10,016
2,862
1,469,492
60,1
The map bellow shows the situation of immigrants of Jewish origin from Oriental Europe
who reached Israel in the years 1948-1950. Right after the creation of the state of Israel, Romanian
communists established diplomatic relations with the Israeli state. The period that followed is
considered one of the most important period of Jewish emigration from Romania. We see in the
map bellow that a good part of Jewish migrants from Oriental Europe came from Romania, namely
85,000 in the years 1948-1950. In spite of the official propaganda against Zionism and life
conditions in Israel, Romanian Jews continued to emigrate. Even the rabbis were advised to preach
against immigration to Israel, but the Jewish population continued to emigrate. After WW II, until
the Romanian Revolution of 1989, around 400,000 of Romanian Jews immigrated to Israel.
10
The table was detailed in Bernard Wasserstein, Vanishing Diaspora. The Jews in Europe since 1945,
(Hamish Hamilton: London, 1996), 92, table ellaborated by Israel Central Bureau of Statistics.
45
Source:
http://www.google.ro/imgres?imgurl=http://www.ushmm.org/lcmedia/map/lc/image/isr78020.gif&imgrefurl=http://
www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/media_nm.php%3FModuleId%3D10005139%26MediaId%3D392&usg=__D4h-AbqW5O1a8FR9dXUuYPiaoI=&h=420&w=640&sz=54&hl=ro
&start=0&zoom=1&tbnid=GeNxFjk5vYftSM:&tbnh=102&tbnw=155&ei=VVGDTYbNB4TqOdi_0NAI&prev=/i
mages%3Fq%3DIsrael%2Bemigration%2Bmap%2B1950%26um%3D1%26hl%3Dro%26sa%3DG%26biw%3D1
024%26bih%3D574%26tbs%3Disch:1&um=1&itbs=1&iact=rc&dur=1379&oei=VVGDTYbNB4TqOdi_0NAI&p
age=1&ndsp=20&ved=1t:429,r:2,s:0&tx=55&ty=72
Aspects of the Romanian – Israeli diplomatic relations during 1945-1953
In this part of the article we will present the evolution of Romanian Ŕ Israeli reports, as it
results from the documents published in the collection titled Romania –Israel. Diplomatic
documents 1948-198911. As a consequence of a telegram dated 9 June 1948, the Israeli Minister of
External Affairs required the Romanian state to recognize the legitimacy of the state of Israel.
Since the very beginning, the state of Israel shows openness to the immigrating Romanian Jews.
So, through this telegram decisions of the National Jewish Council are announced the: “Conseil a
declare que Etat israélien sera ouvert [á l] immigration tous les juifs, se consacrera [au]
développement du pays au profit de tous ses habitants, sera base sur les principles [de] liberté, justice
et paix, maintendra égalité sociale et politique, tous citoyens sans distinction de race, religion ou sexe,
garantiera entire liberté de conscience, education, langue sauvegardera saintété et inviolabilité de
sanctuaries et lieux saints toutes religions, se dovouera [aux] principles Charte Nations Unies” 12.
After a telegram adressed by Ana Pauker, the Minister of External Relations of Romania to Moshe
Sharett, Minister of External Affairs of provisional government of the state of Israel, the Romanian
government agrees with the establishement of an Israeli legation to Bucharest. In a similar way, the
11
Daniela Bleoancă, Nicolae-Alexandru Nicolescu, Cristina Păiuşan, România-Israel. Diplomatic documents
1948-1989, coordonated by Victor Boştinaru (Bucureşti: Editura Sylvi), 2000.
12
Bleoancă, 4. See the information in Telegram addressed by Ana Pauker, minister of Foreign Affaires of
Popular Republic of Romania, to Moshe Sharett, minister of External Affairs of provisional government of
the state of Israel, by which it is recognized the state of Israel by the Romanian government.
46
Romanian legation to Israel is established13. Reuven Rubin is appointed Extraordinary Minister of
Israel to Bucharest.
The problem of emigration of Romanian Jews appears as a constant theme of negociation
between the Romanian diplomats and the Israelian ones. So, in a telegram from March 11, 1949, it is
shown that the Israeli government is especially concerned with the emigration of the Jews from Oriental
Europe. The Israelis show their gratitude that the Romanian government authorised the departure to
Israel of several thousands of Romanian Jews14 . The state of Israel motivates its need of emigrants also
because of the military situation (it is surrounded by hostile neighbours), but also because of the need for
employees for its economic development. This task also requires an increase of the population of Israel,
but also a certain quality of the population. The same telegram shows that also in the past, the first
ellements in Israel came to a great extent from Oriental Europe. In several occasions, the representatives
of Israel require guarantees from the Romanian government that emigration will continue. The aggresive
attitude of the Romanian state towards the Zionist movements and the anti-Zionist campaigns from the
Romanian press trigerred worry from Israel for whom the Zionist were working. It was required the
emigration in Palestine of the 5,000 of members of Halutz movement for whom the emigration was the
most important purpose in their life.15 In the same time, the Romanian legation established to Tel Aviv
reports back to the Minister of External Affairs, Ana Pauker. The reports show dayly facts, such as the
fact that they did not have money with them, that they did not receive money from Israelis, that there
were discontented with the hotel which the Israelis had chosen for them. In the dialogues with the Israeli
representatives, the Romanian diplomats referred to Romanian Jews more in terms of cohabiting
nationalities, than of ethnical minorities16. So, the Romanian diplomats were one of the first legations
established in Israel after the Soviet legation and American, English and French Embassies.
The Zionists were not persecuted only by the Romanian communists, but also in the other
states from Eastern Europe. In a discussion between Romanian and Russian diplomats, both groups
had the opinion that the Zionists are bourgeois nationalists17. In the same time, the documents show
fragments from the life of the Romanian legation in Tel Aviv. So, the members of legation
encountered difficulties at Tel Aviv because they spoke neither English nor Hebrew and hired a
teacher of English and a young man who translated from Hebrew18. They did not have any typist;
they did not have a car and suffered from the absence of their families. Another problem which
Romanian diplomacy in Israel had at the beginning was the lack of experience in diplomatic work.
In the same time, the documents from the collection Romania-Israel. Diplomatic Documents
describe different situations of the Romanian Ŕ Israeli relations. Ana Pauker enjoyed a special
prestige in Israel. The Israeli Minister of Foreign Affairs, Moshe Sharett named her “an exceptional
woman”. She was constantly informed with the evolution of Romanian Ŕ Israeli external relations
during the period when she was Minister of External Affairs. The Ad-interim President Sprintzak
acknowledged in front of Romanian diplomats the contribution that Romanian Jews brought to the
construction of Israel. The documents describe aspects from the activity of the Romanian legation
to Tel Aviv. The legation had relations with the authorities, political life, representatives of
economic life and also tried to involve the cultural life. 19 The representatives of the legation shared
13
Bleoancă, 4-5. See the information in the Telegram addressed by Ana Pauker, minister of Foreign Affairs of
Popular Republic of Romania, to Moshe Sharett, minister of External Affairs of provisional government of
the state of Israel, regarding the establishment of diplomatic legations in the two countries.
14
Bleoancă, 6-10. See the information in Letter of Moshe Sharett, Minister of External Affairs of the state of
Israel addressed to Ana Pauker, Minister of External Affairs of Popular Republic of Romania, concerning
the emigration of Jewish Population.
15
Bleoancă.
16
Bleoancă, 13. See the information in Report of Romanian Legation at Tel Aviv addressed to Ana Pauker,
vice prime-minister and Minister of External Affairs of Popular Republic of Romania, concerning the
installation of Romanian mission and its first contacts with Israelian autorities.
17
Bleoancă, 14.
18
Bleoancă, 17-19.
19
Bleoancă, 24. See the information in Report of Nicolae Cioroiu, extraordinary representative and
plenipotentiary minister at Tel Aviv, adressed to Ana Pauker, vice-prime-minister and minister of External
Affaires of Popular Republic of Romania concerning the organisation of theactivity of the mission.
47
their daily responsibilities. Thus, they were involved in consular problems, dayly payments, economic
and cultural tasks, relations with the press. They received ideological materials from the Ministry of
External Affairs from Romania which they had to read. Controversial aspects of the Romanian-Israeli
relations appeared and they were focused on the problem of emigration of Romanian Jews. Thus, in a
discussion with Romanian representatives, in 1949, the minister Ben Gurion asserts: “I am worried
for of the destiny of the Jews who wish to come to Israel and who do not have the permission of
Romanian government. Israel cannot strenghten and develops only with the Jews from here and needs
the Jews from outside the borders. The development of the relations between the two countries
depends on the economic reports of the two countries, but also on the emigration of the Jews who
would like to leave Romania. Please convey this message to the Romanian government”20. (transl.)
The Romanian ambassador promised in consequence that the Romanian state willissue visas to Israeli
citizens. In another discussion, from October 19, 1949, the Minister of External Affaires of Israel
draws the attention to the problem of emigration, as the Popular Republic of Romania stopped the
emigrations that started in 1948, continuing to issue vizas for 100-200 people21. The Jewish citizens
of Romania couldn‟t take the ship “Eylath” which was in the port and for which they had tickets. The
Romanian authorities forced them to take the ship “Transilvania” instead, although it was damaged.
The discussions continued around this problem. In the same time, it was prohibited to Romanian Jews
to emigrate in groups. In the same time, as a consequence of repeated requests of Israeli officials to
accelerate the emigration of Romanian Jews, the representative of the direction of the Minister of
External Affaires of Romania formulated the next conclusion: “I underlined to be clear for them that
the problem of Jewish Romanian citizens who wanted to go to Israel is a problem that concerns
exclusively the authorities from the Popular Republic of Romania and nobody can get involved.”22
(transl.) Moreover, protests of Israeli representatives had taken place against the arrests of the leaders
of Zionist movement initiated by the Romanian state. The Minister Sharett said that it diplomatic
relations between Romania and Israel could not exist if a consensus is not reached with regard of
emigration of Romanian Jews23. In this sense, as a sign of protest, Israel calls back his diplomatic
representatives of Romania, Rubin and Agami, writes the Minister at Tel Aviv, Nicolae Cioroiu, at
November 21, 1949. The relations between Israel and Romania depended of the attitude of Soviet
Union: “Sharett will have to use the presence of the United Nations for claryfying the problem with
the Minister of External Affaires of the Soviet Union in the problem of the relations with the Eastern
block”24 (transl.).
Moreover, the Romanian legation to Tel Aviv had also a propagandist role, disemmining
to the personalities and Israeli institutions the press of Romania, newspapers such as “Scânteia”,
“Romanie Nouvelle” and the newspaper “Unirea”. The Romanian legation to Tel Aviv had
connections with the Communist Israeli Party, supplying materials written in Romanian about the
situation from the Popular Republic of Romania. Another aspect was that Romanian patriotic
movies were broadcast under the auspices of the Embassy. The legation from Tel Aviv sent
20
Bleoancă, 26. See the quotation in the Telegram of Nicolae Cioroiu, extraordinary representative and
plenipotentiary minister to Tel Aviv, to the Minister of External Affairs of Popular Republic of Romania
concerning the granting of the emigration visa for Israel to Jewish citizens from Romania.
21
Bleoancă, 27. See the information in Note of discussion of Nicolae Cioroiu, extraordinary representative
and plenipotentiary minister of Popular Republic of Romania at Tel Aviv, with Moshe Sharett, minister of
External Affairs of the state of Israel in the problem of emigration.
22
Bleoancă, 31. See the quotation in Telegram of the direction of the cabinet of the minister of External of
Popular Republic of Romania to Romanian legation at Tel Aviv concerning some aspects of the bilateral
relations.
23
Bleoancă, 32. See the quotation from the Telegram of Nicolae Cioroiu, extraordinary representative and
plenipotentiary minister at Tel Aviv to the Minister of External Affairs of Israel concerning the audience at
the Israelian minister of External Affairs regarding bilateral relations.
24
Bleoancă, 33. See the quotation in Telegram of Nicolae Cioroiu, extraordinary representative and
plenipotentiary minister at Tel Aviv to the Minister of External Affairs of Popular Republic of Romania
concerning the tension existent in bilateral relations.
48
newspapers from Israel to Romania25. Jewish emigration from Romania was a problem of
particular importance for the state of Israel, because the Popular Republic of Romania had the
greatest number of Jews from the countries of Oriental Europe, an aspect acknowledged by the
Israeli Minister of External Affairs, Sharett26. Sharett describes the hostile attitude of the Romanian
press towards the state of Israel as an impediment in Romanian-Israeli relations.
After the call-off of the Minister Ŕ Diplomat Rubin to Tel Aviv by the Israeli state, the
newspapers wrote that if the government of the Soviet Union does not change his hostile attitude
towards Zionism and Israel, the place of Rubin will remain unoccupied27. Moreover, the Romanian
diplomats note the hostile attitude of Israeli press towards Romania. Only the press of Communist
Israeli Party is not hostile to Romania. It is represented by the newspapers “Kol-Haam”, “Al
Itiahad”, “Glasul Poporului”, “Kol Hapoel”, “Kol Hanovar” and never took attitude against the
emigration from Romania, it did not put forward the problem of Zionism, and received to
publication material of Romanian legation to Tel Aviv 28. The activities of the Romanian legation
accomodated the organization of an exhibition with Romanian paintings, books, reviews and
Romanian newspapers. They presented Romanian movies such as the Congress of Intellectuals,
The Cup of Youth, The city that doesn‟t sleep and August 23rd 29.
The Israeli press protested against the prohibition of emigration of the Jews from Oriental
Europe to Israel. So, the newspaper Haţofe published two articles about the emigration in which it
condamned the politics of Soviet Union, Popular Republic of Romania and of Hungary: “What it
escaped from furnaces is annihilated by assimilation. The emigration of Eastern Europe is a
problem of life for us and must stay at day agenda. If Israel will not succeed to obtain the
emigration, we are in front of a national catastrophe”30. [transl.]
In a telegram of Romanian legation from Tel Aviv towards the Minister of External
Affairs of the Popular Republic of Romania from January 18, 1950, it is shown that Israel decided
the nomination of a new Minister to Bucharest, but it has not yet been decided who it would be31.
Another document made a description of the representatives of the Legation of United States, being
shown the extent of “infiltration” of United States in Israel 32. The Plenipotentiary Minister to
Bucharest who was appointed by the state of Israel was Ehud Avriel, Plenipotentiary Minister to
Prague and Budapest.
25
Bleoancă, 35. See the information in the Report of Nicolae Cioroiu, extraordinary representative and
plenipotentiary minister at Tel Aviv, addressed to Ana Pauker, vice president of the Council of Ministers
and minister of External Affairs of Popular Republic of Romania concerning the activity of the legation.
26
Bleoancă, 36-39. Report of Nicolae Cioroiu, extraordinary representative and plenipotentiary minister at Tel
Aviv addresed to Ana Pauker, minister of External Affairs of Popular Republic of Romania, concerning the
discussion with Moshe Sharett, minister of External Affairs of the state of Israel, in the problem of
imigration and its repercursions in bilateral relations.
27
Bleoancă, 49. See the information in Telegram of Nicolae Cioroiu, extraordinary representative and
plenipotentiary minister at Tel Aviv, to the Minister of External Affairs of Popular Republic of Romania
regarding the call off of the minister Rubin.
28
Bleoancă, 50. See the information in Report of Romanian legation from Tel Aviv addressed to Ana Pauker,
vicepresident of the Council of Ministers and minister of External Affairs of Popular Romanian Republic
concerning the anniversation of the day of Republic in Israel.
29
Bleoancă, 51. See the Report of the Romanian legation from Tel Aviv addressed to Ana Pauker,
vicepresident of the Council of Ministers and Minister of External Affairs of Popular Republic of Romania
concerning the aniversary of the day of Republic in Israel.
30
Bleoancă, 53. See the quotation in the Telegram of Nicolae Cioroiu, extraordinary representative and
plenipotentiary minister at Tel Aviv, to the Minister of External Affairs of Popular Romanian Republic
concerning the position of Israelian press in the problem of emigration.
31
Bleoancă, 54. Telegram of the Romanian legation at Tel Aviv to the Minister of External Affairs of Popular
Republic of Romania concerning the echo and the consequences of the call off of the Romanian diplomatic
representative from Israel.
32
Bleoancă, 55. Report of the Romanian legation at Tel Aviv addressed to Ana Pauker, vicepresident of the
Council of Ministers and Minister of External Affairs of Popular Republic of Romania, concerning the
diplomatic life from Israel.
49
Incidents arose that endangered the Romanian Ŕ Israeli relations. Thus, on February 23
1950, it is announced that the Headquarters of the Romanian legation in Israel was broken and
goods were stolen from the legation33. It was required to relocate the personnel to a new place.
Other aspects of tension were frequent. So, the newspaper New York Times published a
tendentious article Ŕ in the opinion of the Romanian legation to Tel Aviv - concerning the situation
of Popular Republic of Romania and the situation of the diplomats from Israel in Romania34.
During an interview, Ben Gurion talked about persecutions of cohabiting nationalities in Romania.
On April 28, 1950, a telegram of the Romanian legation to Tel Aviv towards the Minister of
External Relations of Popular Republic of Romania asserts that the press printed a communicate of
Popular Republic of Romania according to which, since May 3, the formalities of immigration to Israel
were easened up35. The documents show that the entire Israeli press wrote about the nominaton of Avriel
as a Minister of Israel to the Popular Republic of Romania. Instead of Avriel, for Budapest and Prague
dr. Eliasiv was proposed for the job; he was the director of the section “Eastern Europe” from the
Ministry of External Affairs. In the place of Eliasiv, an Israeli counselor will be appointed to Moscow36.
The documents show reflections of economic crises from Israel and the country is
considered more and more dependant on American politics 37. Descriptions were made of the
situation in Israel. The Zionists were against the Israeli Communist Party, the workers from Israel
requested the increase of their salaries, the Israelis suffered from hunger. Ben Gurion requested a
loan of 35 million dollars from Americans and asked, in the same time, for the support of the
American Jewry. He organized a conference to Jerusalem where he invited 45 American wealthy
men38. So, the described picture is a complex one: “In this difficult economic situation, each new
emigrant who arrives is a new burden on the situation. Over 100,000 people from camps have no
place to sleep, they don‟t have a job, and they live without a perspective. But their number
increases always”39 (transl.) The Jews from Israel often bring critiques to the Romanian
government: “But the main attacks against us were carried out on two directions: the propaganda
from the country against the departures in Israel and the arrests of Zionist leaders. I announced the
attacks against us”40. [transl.] It is explained that the hostile attitude of the Popular Republic of
Romania is caused by the profound bounds which the state of Israel has with Americans. In the
camps of emigrants where there are kept at the beginning Romanian Jews, there are organized
conferences, courses in Hebrew language41.
Moments of tensions in the Romanian-Israeli relations continued to exist. So, the Israeli
newspaper “Iedioth Ahronot” (The lastest news) and “Heruth” wrote that the Israeli legation to
United Nations would vote for the proposal of Western powers to blame Romania for the
unfulfillment of the conditions of armistice and the annihilation of individual rights in this state.
The newspaper asserts that the Israeli government will accuse Romania for the anti-Zionist
repressions, the prohibition of emigration to Israel and the arrests of the leaders of Sionist
33
Bleoancă, 60. See the information in telegram of the Minister of External Affairs of Popular Republic of Romania
to Romanian legation at Tel Aviv regarding the handing in of a diplomatic protest of Israelian autorities.
34
Bleoancă, 62. See the information in the Telegram of the Minister of External Affairs of Popular Republic
of Romania to Romanian legation at Tel Aviv concerning the position of the government from Bucharet
concerning the assertions of the Israelian prime minister regarding the situation of cohabiting nationalities in
Romania.
35
Bleoancă, 63. See the information in the Telegram of Romanian legation at Tel Aviv to the Minister of
External Affairs of Popular Republic of Romania concerning aspects of the situation from Israel.
36
Bleoancă, 68. See the information in Report of Romanian legation at Tel Aviv addressed to Ana Pauker,
minister of External Affaires of Popular Republic of Romania concerning the diplomatic life in Israel.
37
Bleoancă, 70. See the information in Report of Romanian legation at Tel Aviv addressed to Ana Pauker,
minister of External Affaires of Popular Republic of Romania, concerning the emigration of the Jews from
Romania.
38
Bleoancă, 71.
39
Bleoancă.
40
Bleoancă, 72.
41
Bleoancă, 73.
50
movements, it is asserted in a telegram of Romanian legation to Tel Aviv to the Minister of
External Affairs of Popular Republic of Romania in September 21, 195042.
A constant theme of interest for Israeli parties is the problem of Jewish emigration from
Occidental Europe. Thus, the Zionist parties made from the emigration of the Jews in Israel the
basis of their program. Paul Davidovici, one of the representatives of Romanian Legation to Tel
Aviv, asserts that there are also individuals in these parties that considered that immigration to
Israel must be stopped or limited43.
The arrests of the Romanian Zionists are a theme of conflict with Israel. In several
diplomatic documents published in the collection of Boştinaru protests of the Israeli representatives
are formulated with regard to these arrests which infridged human rights. The attacks of Israel against
the Romanian state are considered by the Romanian diplomats as manifestations of American
imperialism44. It is asserted that, according to the law of repatriation ellaborated by the Government of
Ben Gurion, any Jew can immigrate to Israel.
There appear reflections of some economic issues between Romania and Israel. Thus Mrs.
Weizmann, the Israeli President‟s wife, asked the Romanian diplomats if the Popular Romanian
Republic could sell oil to Israel45. It is reflected in the documents of the Romanian-Israeli relations,
that on February 11, 1953, the Soviet government broke the diplomatic relations with Israel, as a
consequence of the fact that on February 9 a bomb exploded in the Headquarters of the Legation of
Soviet Union to Tel Aviv, in spite of the fact that the President of Israel condemned this terrorist
act and apologized in front of the authorities from Kremlin. The Russian-Israeli relations were
resumed on June 20, 195346.
It is shown that, the departures at Israel of Jews from capitalist countries surpass the
mounthly rate of 1,200 of people. In a propagandistic style, the letters of the Romanian legation to
Tel Aviv shows that thousands of emigrants from Romania regretted their immigration to Israel and
requeasted to return home. On December 7, 1953, Moshe Sharett came-next-after Ben Gurion as
Prime Minister. The diplomate Virgil Huţanu, one of the representatives of Romanian Legation
from Tel Aviv, shows that Ben Gurion‟s resignation was due to his bad leadership: “In the period
that preceded the confirmation of the tendecy of Ben Gurion to resign and until its presentation, the
bourgeois press wanted to present Ben Gurion to the population as a clean man, as a real leader of
the people who did not have anything in common with the internal and external situations in which
Israel was. In articles on long pages the newspapers tried to show that the population regrets
profoundly that Ben Gurion leaves from the leadership the state and this would be a great loss for
the Israeli people”.
From party press, but also from the discussions with local friends, it appeared that the real
motiv of its resignation was not the fatigue, but the bad consequences of his governance, both on
political plan and internal plan, and on political external plan, too.”47 [transl.]
As a conclusion of the analysis of this collection of documents Romania-Israel, the
diplomatic relations between the two countries appeared to be full of difficulties, especially
42
Bleoancă, 75. See the Telegram of Romanian legation at Tel Aviv to the Minister of External Affairs of
Popular Republic of Romania concerning some stances towards Romania of the Israelian government.
43
Bleoancă, 77. See the Note of Paul Davidovici, representative with affairs a.i. of Romanian legation at Tel
Aviv, addressed to Ana Pauker, minister of External Affairs of Popular Republic of Romania, concerning
the position of the israelian parties towards the problem of imigration.
44
Bleoancă, 82. See the report of Romanian legation at Tel Aviv, addressed to Ana Pauker, minister of External
Affairs of Popular Republic of Romania, concerning the politics of emigration of the state of Israel.
45
Bleoancă, 90. See the Telegram of Romanian legation at Tel Aviv to the Minister of External Affairs of
Popular Republic of Romania concerning certain problems of the bilateral relations and the breakfast offered
by the wife of president of the state of Israel.
46
Bleoancă, 91. See the information in the Telegram of Romanian legation at Tel Aviv to the Minister of External
Affairs of Popular Romanian Republic concerning the reluation of Soviet-Israelian diplomatic relations.
47
Bleoancă, 95. See the information in Report of Virgil Huţanu, representative with affairs a.i. of Romanian
legation at Tel Aviv addressed to the Minister of External Affairs of Popular Republic of Romania
concerning the recent political evolutions from Israel.
51
regarding the emigration of Romanian Jews, but also tensioned because of the persecution by the
Romanian state of Zionist leaders which followed after 1949.
Reflections of aliya from communist Romania in the writings of Liviu Rotman and
Radu Ioanid
Aliya (Jewish emigration to Israel) started in Romania before the creation of the Israeli
state, in 1948. Thus, Liviu Rotman emphasizes that a few Jews from Moineşti şi Bârlad immigrated
to Israel in 188248. Jewish immigration to Palestina coming from Romania continued in communist
time. The author tries to analyze the Jewish immigration to Israel, both from the perspective of
Jewish population and of Communist party49. In 1945, at Tecuci the Jewish population militates for
emigration. The Jewish migrants encountered difficulties in their attempt to emigrate, during the
years 1945-1948, when the British policy was against emigration of Jews from Oriental Europe to
Israel. But these immigrations also happened illegaly. So, as Rotman shows, in 1945 the ship
“Transilvania” transported Jews to Palestine from Hungary, Poland and Romania50.
But not all Jewish attempts to emigrate were successfull. Thus, 53,000 Jews from Central
and Eastern Europe out of which 23,000 originated from Romania were stopped in Cyprus when
they tried to get to Palestine.51 In the opinion of Liviu Rotman, the communist power did not
encourage emigration, but it did not take measures to stop it either. Thus, emigration was possible.
After the creation of Israel, the Jews immigrated in a large number to Israel and their wish to
emigrate increased. In the same time, Israel starts to press Romanian authorities to accelerate
emigration. It was an interesting strategy of the Romanian state to allow emigration, but to start a
campaign against it. Thus, many roumours of that time reffered to the difficult conditions of life
from Israel. In the opinion of Rotman, the process of emigration of the Romanian Jews was
subordinated to economic and political interests. This process was coordinated exclusively by
Romanian authorities who tried to elliminate the influence of the Israeli Embassy52. An
organization dominated and created by communists, the Jewish Democratic Committee militated
against Jewish emigration to Israel.
Rotman underlines that the bureaurocracy aggregated in this process was working slowly
and had no sensitivity towards the Jewish problems. Because of this massive emigration, the
Romanian authorities had to admit their failure to integrate the Jews in communist Romania53.
There were entire communities wanting to emigrate, such as Ocna Mureş (350 Jews), Adjud (249
Jews), Târnăveni (403 Jews), underlines the author.54 Rotman emphasizes the manifestation that
took place in Iaşi on March 13, 1953 where 600-700 protesters demonstrated against the
communist Jewish Democratic Committee55. Rotman quotes a synthesis of political reports that
referred to the most important causes of the process of emigration. These were: the insuficiency of
the salary, the danger of antisemitism, the fact that girls could easily get married in Israel, the idea
that all the Jews were leaving, the necessity to be close to the relatives 56.
In the problem of Jewish emigration to Israel, the Communist Party had an ambiguous
attitude. Thus, Rotman quotes Vasile Luca and Gheoghiu Dej who were against emigration. So, in
1945 Vasile Luca said “you can not bring together [the Jews Ŕ L.R.] from all the countries to make
an artificial state, on the expense of other people. Don‟t you see what is happening now in
Palestine?” and concluded “The only way for the Jewish population is [that] in each country to
integrate them in the aspiration of that people, in economic life, social policy of the respective
people with whom they life together”57. [transl.] The propaganda against Israel was also reflected in
48
Rotman, 89.
Rotman, 89.
50
Rotman, 90.
51
Rotman, 92.
52
Rotman, 95.
53
Rotman, 96.
54
Rotman, 97.
55
Rotman, 98.
56
Rotman, 98.
57
Rotman, 100.
49
52
Scânteia, a central communist Romanian newspaper, which will start a campaign describing the
difficult conditions from Israel, but such campaign will not have the expected success.
Rotman considers that Jewish emigration from Romania was possible because it, also, existed
material reasons which determined Romanian autorities to allow the Jewish immigration to Israel.
Emigrating, the Jews were letting aside jobs and apartments which could be used by Romanian
population.58 The unity of families was endangered with these departures. Sometimes the wife left for
Israel and the husband remained at home, other times parents left and the kids remained behind, but
finally they all emigrated. So, Rotman shows that at least 1 194 of cases of parents separated from their
children existed in Romania.59
The emigration represented a continuous proces, until 1952, when the tendancy of the
communist party was to stop Jewish emigration, shows the author: “If during 1950-1951 the rate of
departures was high, around 30,000 of Jews/yearly-and in consequence we could talk of aliya of
masses, in 1952 the rate will decrease to 3,800 and in 1953 because of the general froze, the
emigrants will decrease to 360, rate that will maintain until 1958”60. [transl.] Also, Rotman offers an
interesting approach of the problem of emigration in the relations between the two states of Romania
and Israel. The approach is similar to the conclusions that one could notice from the documents from
the collection of Boştinaru.
So, in 1948 Romania was one of the first states which recognized the legitimacy of the
state of Israel. The external politics of Romania was dependant on the politics of the Soviet Union,
and Romania acted in consequence. The state of Israel allways raised the problem of emigration in
its relations with the Romanian representatives. The process of emigration is subordinated to
economic reasons, the state of Israel promising to Romanian representatives that accelerated
emigration will develop the economic relations between Romania and Israel. Rotman underlines
the importance of the nomination of the painter Reuven Rubin as Plenipotentiary Minister of Israel
in Romania. He was originary from Botoşani and he was speaking Romanian. So, Liviu Rotman
summarizes the evolution of Romanian Ŕ Israeli relations in the problem of emigration: “If the
position of Israel was to remind with any occasion of the problem of Jewish emigration, the
Romanian part will permanently deny that „emigration” exists in Romania”61. [transl.] The
Romanian politicians perceived Jewish population as belonging to the Romanian nation, as
enjoying all the rights and liberties in Romania, as being equal with the citizens of the country, and
found it hard to acknoledge the failure of communist politics in the Jewish issue62.
The issue of Jewish emmigration was also approached by Radu Ioanid in his book
Răscumpărarea evreilor. Istoria acordurilor secrete dintre România si Israel63. Radu Ioanid shows
that, during 1947 and 14 mai 1948, no Romanian Jew immigrated to Palestine. At June 11, 1948,
Romania acknowledged the new state. In a few months, Reuven Rubin was named Plenipotentiary
Minister of Israel to Romania. After the creation of the consulates of the United States, the Soviet
Union, France and Great Britain, Romania opened its own consulate in Tel Aviv. The problem of
emigration, shows Ioanid, was the result of several controversies between the Romanian diplomats
and their counterparts. In its dialogue with Ana Pauker, Moshe Sharett protested against the fact
that the Romanian authorities stopped the emigration and asked for the liberation of seven Israelis,
arrested by the Romanian state for Zionist propaganda. Ioanid shows that the Romanian External
policy towards the state of Israel depended on Soviet Union politics, which encouraged the actions
against Great Britain, but also had, in the same time, an anti-Zionist policy. In 1948, shows the
author, Stalin supplied the ammunition that Israel needed to win the war against the Arab League.
But soon Stalin will start an anti-Jewish campaign. Thus, shows the author, he dissolved
the Jewish Antifascist Committee, and reflections of his antisemite campaign appeared in the
58
Rotman, 102.
Rotman, 103.
60
Rotman, 104.
61
Rotman, 109.
62
Rotman, 109-110.
63
Radu Ioanid, Răscumpărarea evreilor. Istoria acordurilor secrete dintre România și Israel (Bucureşti:
Polirom, 2005).
59
53
Soviet press. Thus several Romanian intellectuals were arrested and the newspapers published in
Ydish were prohibited. In Czechoslovakia, Slanski Trial takes place. In 1952, in the Soviet Union a
plot takes place against some Jewish doctors accused of contributing to the death of some Soviet
leaders, an acusation that had no real base. The satellite states of the Soviet Union were at the
beginning encouraged to allow the emigration and to encourage the Jewish communists from Israel,
shows Ioanid. In Romania, the American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee was destroyed and
the Jewish schools and hospitals were closed. The communists tried to destroy the Jewish
organizations, such as the Jewish Union from Romania. Thus, the Jewish Antifascist Committee
was created and tried to subordinate the Jewish community from Romania to the communist party.
When Israel opened a diplomatic institution in Bucharest manifestations were held in the
favour of Israel. In 1948, shows Radu Ioanid, the Romanian Communist Party voted a resolution
that condemned Zionism. The author shows that it was a false idea to consider that the Jews
brought the communism in Romania. So, in the next table, he shows the representation of Jewish
population in the Secret Service Structures. We can notice that the number of the Jews was not
particularly high.
The number of members aggregated in Secret Service grouped on ethnicity64
Ethnicity
Romanians
Jews
Hungarians
Russians
Yugoslavians
Others
Total
Number of members aggregated in
the Secret Service
3 334
338
247
24
13
17
3973
Table 3
Procentage in the Secret
Service
83,9%
8,5%
6,2%
0,6%
0,3%
0,4%
In 1949, a brutal campaign against Zionists began in Romania. Approximatively 250 of
Jewish Zionist leaders were arrested. Radu
Ioanid shows the ambivalence of the politics
The number of Jews that emigrated in 1950
of Romania towards Israel: “In August 1949,
Table 4
the Secretary of the Romanian Communist
Month
Number of emigrated Jews
Party reached a consensus concerning the
January
1500
emigration of the Jews. The party will allow
the emigration, and, in the same time, will
February
2000
intensify the propaganda against it,
March
3000
publishing letters from Palestine that
April
3000
described the miserable conditions from
May
4000
there”65. Radu Ioanid shows that a report of
June
5000
the Jewish Democratic Committee from 1950
July
7000
mentioned the next figures concerning the
August
7000
emigration of the Jews.
September
7000
So, we see thus the main directions
October
4000
of action of the Romanian communist state
December
3000
towards the Romanian Jews and also its
relations with Israel in the first years after the
war. Romanian diplomats had a lot to gain from their experience in Israel. The diplomatic relations
between the two states were often tensioned because the persecutions of Zionist leaders in Romania
and, because of the fact, that there were periods when emigration was forbidden. The Israeli
diplomats were concerned with the issue of emigration of Romanian Jews, a process that, in their
64
65
This table was supplied by Radu Ioanid, 76.
Ioanid, 83.
54
opinion, should continue. Indeed, in communist years, almost all Jews of Romania emigrated but
they had to bear a lot of inconveniences. Thus they lost all their property and lost their jobs when
they decided to emigrate.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bleoancă, Daniela and Nicolescu Nicolae-Alexandru, Păiuşan Cristina (2000), România – Israel.
Diplomatic documents 1948-1989, coordonated by Victor Boștinaru (București: Editura
Sylvi).
Ioanid, Radu (2005), Răscumpărarea evreilor. Istoria acordurilor secrete dintre România şi Israel
(Jewish redemption. History of secret agreements between Romania and Israel.). Iaşi:
Polirom.
Karady Victor (2004), The Jews of Europe in the Modern Era. A Socio-historical outline.
Budapest, New York: Central European University Press.
Klein, Claude (2003), Israel. Statul evreilor (Israel, the Jewish State). Timişoara:BIC ALL.
Moses Rosen in the work (1991), Primejdii, încercări, miracole. Povestea şef-rabinului Dr. Moses
Rosen (Dangers, Trials, Miracles. The Story of Chief Rabbi Dr. Moses Rosen), Bucureşti:
Hasefer.
Rotman, Liviu (2004), Evreii din România în perioada comunistă: 1944-1965 (Jews in Romania
during the communist period: 1944-1965). Iaşi: Polirom.
Wasserstein Bernard (1996), Vanishing Diaspora. The Jews in Europe since 1945, Great Britain:
Hamish Hamilton Ltd.
Wexler Teodor (2000), „Procesele sioniştilor” (“Zionists processes”). In Anii 1954-1960. Fluxurile
şi refluxurile stalinismului (Years 1954-1960. Rising and Falling of Stalinism), edited by
Romulus Rusan, Fundaţia Academia Civică.
Tito, Yugoslavia, and the „Third Way”: Understanding
Physical and Symbolic Borders
Ljiljana MANIC1, Nada TORLAK2, Natasa SIMEUNOVIC BAJIC3
Abstract. Viewed with an understanding of Josip Broz Tito‟s personality and leadership,
Yugoslavia‟s position during the Cold War is not difficult to comprehend, The political separation
from Stalin in 1948, determined a course for Yugoslav development that was different from that of
other socialist countries. This separation also caused Yugoslavia to seek allies outside of Europe.
That is how the Non-Aligned Movement was founded, as a unity of nations designed to ease the
tension between the Eastern and the Western blocs. Tito‟s image as a liberator, statesman and a
party leader was the reason the Yugoslav people saw him as the stalwart of the Republic. It is also
what led him to be named president for life in 1974. The best Yugoslavian factories, schools,
military facilities and main streets of all the cities, were named after him. Even now, thirty years
after his death, Josip Broz Tito‟s personality and leadership are still often discussed. Many of his
followers continue to glorify his successes, but there are also a growing number of young people
who are infected by “titostalgia”. They gather on various Internet web-sites or in lines waiting to
get in the Museum of Yugoslav History (formerly called “Museum 25 May”, after his birth date).
This paper will explore Yugoslavia‟s political, economic, and cultural position during the Cold
War. The relationship between youth, born after Tito‟s death, and his personality will be
specifically explained.
Keywords: Josip Broz Tito, Yugoslavia, Balkans, Cold War, Non-Aligned Movement
Introduction
“The Balkan region has a tendency to produce
more history than it can consume” (Winston Churchill)
The Balkan region, during its long and rich history, has hosted a number of different
civilizations, ideologies, religions and cultures. It has been repeatedly re-shaped by influences
within and beyond its borders. It is fair to say that Balkan history tells a tale of unstable states that
failed to establish any extended period of peaceful development and independence from foreign
forces. In addition, all the countries of the Balkan Peninsula have been economically far less
developed than Western European countries, while religiously, they face the challenge of having
significant Christian (Orthodox and Roman Catholic) and Muslim populations. For the second half
of the twentieth century, the Balkans was a battleground between two military-political and
economic blocs. It operated as socialist republic from 1943 to 1991, under the official name SFRY
(also colloquially called Second Yugoslavia or Tito‟s Yugoslavia), when the region included
Croatia, Slovenia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Serbia and its two autonomous provinces, Vojvodina
and Kosovo and Metohija, Montenegro, and Macedonia. The end of Cold War ushered in a new
political reality: new, small states, impoverished by wars. In particular, Yugoslavia‟s dissolution
spawned smaller Balkan countries. The transition from socialism to capitalism in the Balkans was
followed, unfortunately for its peoples, by a series of wars in former Yugoslavia. The process also led
to other geopolitical changes, including the duplication and fragmentation of national borders because
of the emergence of new states, while other multi-national entities transformed into nation states. No
doubt, the attendant wars left remnants of destruction throughout the Balkan states. Armed conflicts
1
Megatrend University, Belgrade.
3
2
56
also affected the trust between nations and disrupted the equilibrium of their position and status within
international institutions. The term „Southeast Europe” was introduced to characterize the region
instead of „The Balkans,” since „Balkanization” had taken on such a negative connotation, suggesting
inequality, conflict, backwardness. Also, the term „Southeast Europe” indicated the West‟s political
engagement with former socialist countries. It implied that the political systems and development
efforts of these societies were approximating the model of Western democracy, which promotes
political freedom, rule of law and a market-based economy.
Attempts to Create Regional Alliances
The Balkans‟ geographic divisions did not change significantly after World War II, but the
countries of this region distinguished themselves along the lines of power between the Eastern and
Western military- ideological blocs. Even before the end of World War II (after joining Romania
and Bulgaria on the Allied side during the war), Josip Broz Tito and Georgi Dimitrov, began
discussions about creating a Balkan federation. Yugoslavia and Bulgaria were supposed to be the
bases of that federation (Georgi Dimitrov 1948, discussed in one interview on that subject). In
1948, the Bulgarian president publicly mentioned the possibility of forming a Balkan Federation,
which, in addition to Yugoslavia and Bulgaria, would include Romania, Hungary, Czechoslovakia,
Albania, Poland and Greece. That idea, however, caused some consternation to Stalin, who at the
time served as the supreme authority for all European Communists. After the Soviets reacted
harshly and severely criticized Bulgaria and Yugoslavia, such ideas were abandoned. Moreover,
Bulgaria had fully ceded to Stalin and became one of the most loyal members of the Soviet block.
Yugoslavia, however, had opposed Stalin's demands, did not accept his authority, set out to build it
own form of socialism. „The breakup of Yugoslavia and Eastern Block would later have a huge
importance for the position of Yugoslavia during the Cold War, in relations between the blocs and
the re-composition of the entire Balkan region after the Cold War”.4
In 1948, Stalin called for Yugoslav communists to disavow their leader because he was
displeased by Tito's attempts to break from the Soviet bloc. This isolated the newly communist
Yugoslavia from both United States and from the Soviet Union. Yugoslavia had previously been
economically and politically dependent on Moscow, as it needed the Soviet Union‟s support to
repair and rebuild its war-torn country. Rebuffed by the Stalin, Josip Broz Tito enacted a plan to
develop and apply a new brand of socialism, which would be named „Titoism”. Tito‟s break with
Stalin caused a foreign policy crisis in Yugoslavia, and raised concerns about the USSR‟s threat to
its security, since half the country‟s borders abutted countries under USSR control. The period of
tension between Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union (1948-155) was known as the Time of the
Informbiro. According to some theorists of that period, the onset of the Korean War was what
rescued Yugoslavia from Stalin's military intervention. Being mindful of the danger posed by the
Soviets, and aware of the US-led Western power capabilities, Tito sought support from and alliance with
Greece and Turkey. „It indicated possibility of the division of the Balkans to pro-Soviet north and east
and pro-Western West and South, especially if the plan of Western countries for subversion in Albania
succeeds”.5 However, none of that happened. On the contrary, the West embraced Yugoslavia‟s
departure from the Soviet bloc.
Yugoslavia - „Third Way „ - Between the East and the West
The Balkan Pact, signed in Ankara on 28th February 1953, represented a major step in
reversing Yugoslavia‟s international isolation, and mitigating conflict with the Soviet Union and
other countries of the „socialist bloc”. This regional pact, written in accordance with the Charter of
the United Nations, established an “Agreement of Friendship and Cooperation” between
Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey. After that, the Balkan Pact was signed at Bled on 9 th August 1954.
Then, on 2nd March 1955, a treaty was signed to establish the Balkan Advisory Committee, which
was supposed to comprise representatives from the parliamentary assemblies of three states,
4
5
Krempton Ricard, Balkan posle drugog svetskog rata, (Beograd: Clio 2003), 52.
Krempton, 158.
57
working to establish mutual coordination and cooperation. The assembly was never established, so
the Balkan pact did not last.
After the Informbiro, Yugoslavia had an ambivalent relationship with the European
community. The West had been supporting Yugoslavia‟s ostensible neutrality, giving it special
status, financial assistance, and open borders even though the state had continued to build its own
brand of socialism. But Yugoslavia‟s concept of socialism was different Ŕ more liberal Ŕ than the
Soviet brans of communism. Tito‟s split with Stalin put Yugoslavia on different path than other
socialist countries, causing it to seek allies outside Europe and ultimately to develop political and
economic relationships with the West. In the midst of global tensions between the world‟s great
powers, Tito began a movement to assemble the countries that had opposed the political
partitioning of nations. This was the beginning of The Non-Aligned Movement, community of
nations that aspired to reduce tensions between Eastern and Western blocs. At the time of the
bipolar balance and the Cold War, the Socialist Federal Republic (SFR) of Yugoslavia followed the
path of “non-alignment” in its foreign policy, which had some characteristics of neutralism.
Simultaneously maintaining ideological sympathies with the socialist bloc, and positive relations
with the West, especially the U.S., helped Yugoslavia to survive after breaking with the Eastern
bloc. Yugoslavia initiated and led the alliance of countries from The Non-Aligned Movement. This
movement had mostly attracted undeveloped countries of the so-called Third World in Africa and
Asia. Non-alignment, as a specific form of neutrality distinguished Yugoslavia as the only country
of its kind in Europe, which gave it special status.
Countries of The Non-Aligned Movement initially believed that avoiding bloc
confrontations and preventing nuclear disaster were the sole principles of peaceful co-existence.
The bases of all international relations, hoever, should be the right of people to self-determination,
independence and free determination of economic, social and cultural development. The NonAligned Movement ultimately comprised 55% of the world‟s population, garnering more than 100
member countries, nearly two-thirds of whom were also members of the United Nations. The
movement‟s mission, as written in the Havana Declaration of 1979, was to ensure „national
independence, sovereignty, territorial integrity and security of non-aligned countries in their
struggle against imperialism, colonialism, neocolonialism, apartheid, racism, including Zionism
and all forms of foreign aggression, occupation, domination, interference or hegemony as well as
great power and bloc policy.” The Havana Declaration of 1979 turned out to be the last NonAligned conference in which president Tito would participate. The great powers were inclined to
treat the Non-Aligned Movement as an artificial phenomenon. Accordingly, they encouraged
conflict between Non-Aligned states. For U.S. “non-alignment” was a „Trojan horse” of
communism and a foil for the USSR „reserve track” of socialist forces. The movement was
evaluated de facto depending on the position occupied by the antagonistic blocs. When the „Iron
Curtain” began to fall, it became clear that The Non-Aligned Movement would not have provided
sufficient protection for Yugoslavia‟s foreign or domestic policy.
Yugoslavia‟s Economic Position during the Cold War
The Cold War was a period of rapid economic development for Yugoslavia. The fastest
growth of social output occurred between 1957 and 1960 resulting in 11.3% average annual
growth. Although in growth rate declined in the years that followed (from 1965 until 1979 the gross
of domestic product grew at an average rate of 5.6%), its success was never touted nor even
reported. Remarkably, in a relatively short period, Yugoslavia had been able to overcome the
vestiges of economic underdevelopment and improve the living conditions of its citizens.
Yugoslavia‟s economic growth permitted it to close the gap with other European countries in its
comparative the standard of living, education, life expectancy, infant mortality rate and other
indicators. In the mid 1980s, Yugoslavia was the first country in Europe to have 20 students per
10,000 inhabitants, with an especially noteworthy increase in female student enrolments.6
6
Latific Ibrahim, Jugoslavija 1945-1990 - razvoj privrede i društvenih delatnosti (Beograd: Drustvo za istinu o
antifasistickoj narodno oslobodilackoj borbi u Jugoslaviji 1941-1945, 1997), 18.
58
Political cooperation with Member States of the Non-Aligned Movement expanded to
include economic and cultural co-operation as well. In 1963, Yugoslavia, as one of the most
developed member countries, began to finance and invest in Non-Aligned states. The country
financed loans for the purchase of equipment, machinery and transport vehicles in Yugoslavia,
while simultaneously accepting foreign loans, mainly from the U.S. and Western European
countries. Foreign trade with these countries increased throughout the Cold War. In the decade
between 1971 and 1981, foreign trade increased tenfold, reaching $ 4.5 billion. Yugoslavia
exported to Non-Aligned countries industrial products (45% of export), machinery and equipment
(37%), foodstuffs (9%) and raw materials (9%). They mainly imported products and raw materials
(petroleum, coffee, cotton, copper, iron, bauxite and tropical fruits).
Scientific cooperation also became an important part of Yugoslavia‟s economic cooperation.7 The country was educating students from Non-Aligned countries in her territory, mostly
in the fields of energy, building, agriculture, trade and industry. Yugoslav experts supported
economic development in Libya, Colombia, Iraq, Zimbabwe, Egypt and many other Non-Aligned
countries. Yugoslavia‟s status as one of the most developed countries, gave it special influence
within the Movement. According to data from 1981, Yugoslavia‟s per capita income had risen to
$2,430. The only countries in the region with a higher average were oil-exporting countries such as
Bahrain ($5,460) and Qatar ($ 16,590). At the same time, Yugoslavia was setting an example for
successful social transformation as well. The state efforts were led by Josip Broz Tito a statesman
of the highest reputation, not only among the leaders of the Non-Aligned countries, but among
widest population in the world. In his book „The Global Cold War”, a Norwegian professor Arne
Vestad states that the biggest surprise for him was discovering Tito`s closeness with many leaders
from Third World countries. They talked to him about things they had not even told to theirs
closest associates. To Indira, for example, Tito was almost like a father. Indira Gandhi often
communicated with him about personal things, asking for advice on international issues. Tito and
Nasser`s 1967 conference about the war in the Middle East, was very significant. In fact, Nasser's
actions could be explained Ŕ in part Ŕ by his conversations with Tito. „If you want to study the
causes of war in the Middle East in 1967, which had been in many ways created by the modern
Middle East, there was no better way than to review Tito's conversations with Arab leaders, who
were taken almost daily”.8 Another big surprise for Vestad was Yugoslavia‟s vital role of in
supporting the liberation movements of the Third World.
Tito's „Third Way” and Cultural Policy
Tito's „Third Way” is perhaps best exemplified in his cultural policies. Cultural policy can
be viewed on a continuum from authoritarian to democratic, pointing to a greater or lesser degree
of openness in the society.9 Democratic ideals in cultural policy are rooted in the philosophical
ideas of John Milton and John Stuart Mill. They presuppose that an open society, ideological
pluralism, deregulation, and self-regulation should charactertize highly developed democratic
societies. The democratic model does not apply direct censorship impose strict sanctions against
the creators of culture. It encourages free development of creativity without interference from the
state. The free market is very important, and it is where cultural assets acquire their value. The
authoritarian end of the cultural policy spectrum is completely different. An authoritarian ethos
implies a closed society, ideological monism and centralized political power. State and public
authorities are the most important subjects of cultural politics. Direct censorship is common and
sanctions are often imposed upon those whose cultural creations are “unsuitable.” There is a
selective attitude towards cultural heritage values, which are used heavily in state-sponsored
propaganda.
7
Dretar Milivoj, „Polozaj Jugoslavije u pokretu nesvrstanih“, Hrvatski povijesni portal (2010): 1. accessed
February 20, 2010,
http://povijest.net/sadrzaj/lenta/20-st/sfrj/951-polozaj-jugoslavije-u-pokretunesvrstanih.html
8
Djordjevic B, ”Srpski arhivi svetsko blago”, Vecernje novosti, April 29, 2009, accessed February 20, 2010,
http://www.novosti.rs/vesti/kultura.71.html:238696-Srpski-arhivi-svetsko-blago
9
Miller Toby and George Yúdice, Cultural Policy (London: Sage Publications, 2002), 142.
59
Tito's cultural policy in Yugoslavia tended toward an authoritarian posture, but his „third
way” approach distinguished his style of governance from classical authoritarianism. Tito`s break
with Stalin was a defining moment for Yugoslavia and opened new avenue for relations with the
West, from whom it received great financial support. Tito also introduced many liberal elements
into the culture that facilitated its development, including the openness of the country, a free regime
for obtaining passports, rapid industrialization and urbanization, and raising social standards. A
large number of schools, colleges, libraries, museums, cinemas and theaters were opened, leading
many analysts to conclude that Yugoslavia had made great progress in education and culture.10 For
example, the educational system, which had been set up in socialist Yugoslavia, was transformed.
The rate of illiteracy fell from 44.6% in 1931 to 9.5% in 1981. Also, the number of educated people
increased at all levels, from primary to higher education. In that same 50 year period, number of
people completing elementary school was 1.7 times greater; the number of high school graduates
was 6 times greater; and the number of citizens with a university diploma was 10 times greater.11
The education system was very versatile; schools and colleges were well spaced geographically and
for the first time people without financial means could receive free education. This reversed the
pre-Socialist trend that permitted only the wealthy to be educated.
Tito also demonstrated his more democratic inclinations in handling relations with Walt
Disney Productions. Even today, people relate the story of how in 1952 Disney characters came to
occupy the pages of the national paper, “Politikin Zabavnik.” When Tito was asked about this and
about a visit from a Disney corporate representative, he replied: „Well, why not? And I like Donald
Duck.” Just few years later, Decje Novine signed a contract with Disney and launched a new
journal called „Mickey.” The journal‟s inaugural issue included a welcome letter with a signed
photograph of Walt Disney himself. They expanded to include the sale of licensed products (toys
and school supplies) with images of Disney characters. This certainly was not characteristic of
countries operating under an authoritarian model of cultural policy.
Yugoslavia‟s film industry flourished, and the state allocated substantial funding for
filmmaking technology, film studies, and professional filmmaking training. In period from 1945 to
1991 the country produced about 800 domestic feature films, and co-produced another 129 films
between 1945 and 1991. Portions of several foreign television series were filmed in Yugoslavia.12
Although partisan war movies drew large numbers, by percentage, they did not take the largest part
of all screened Yugoslav movies.
The most expensive film made in Yugoslavia was the “Battle of Neretva”. That movie cost
4.5 million dollars to make, which is equivalent in contemporary costs, with some of Hollywood‟s
most expensive creations, such as James Cameron`s “Avatar”. The “Battle of Neretva” took 16
months to film and was sponsored by 58 companies. Pablo Picasso made the poster for the film‟s
American release, and Oscar-winner Bernard Hermann scored the music, which was performed by
The London Philharmonic Orchestra.13 The film starred many of the era‟s great actors from Orson
Welles, to Yul Brynner, Curd Jürgens, Hardy Krüger, Sergej Bondarcuk and Franco Nero. The film
was released in 16 versions, translated into different languages and was nominated for an Academy
Award. The movie was sold in 80 countries and earned more than any other film made in
Yugoslavia. Actors Sophia Loren and Omar Sharif sat next to Tito at the movie‟s premiere in
Sarajevo.14 Today, of course, the neither the former Yugoslav republics or nor any other country in
the region in the region could afford such a spectacle. This was a testament to Tito`s ability to open
its borders to all countries in the field of cultural development.
10
Ugresic, Dubravka, Kultura lazi, (Zagreb: Bastard/Arkzin, 1996), 122.
Latific, 100.
12
Kosanovic Dejan, “Jugoslavija: raskrsnica pokretnih slika“, Zbornik radova Fakulteta dramskih umetnosti 4
(2000): 162.
13
IMDB, “Battle of Neretva”, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0064091/ (accessed February 3, 2011)
14
Popboks, “40 godina Bitke na Neretvi (1)“, http://www.popboks.com/tekst.php?ID=7764 (accessed
February 3, 2011)
11
60
The Figure of Josip Broz Tito as a Symbol of the Socialist Epoch: An Empirical Inqury
Tito has often been mentioned as the subject of a “cult of personality.” In theory, the
personality cult is a public and uncritical fronting and worshiping of one person as an infallible
leader. Various forms of personality cults have occurred within dictatorships but they may also
exist in democratic systems. The phenomenon was noted, for example, in the Mussolini's fascist
Italy, Hitler's National Socialism in Germany and Real socialist dictatorships as they existed in
Romania, the Soviet Union or Yugoslavia. Nikita Khrushchev first used the term „personality cult”
in 1956 at a closed session of the 20th Congress of the League of Communists of the Soviet Union,
to describe the public‟s reaction to Stalin and his apology.
Sample
We surveyed students of the Faculty of Culture and Media to explore how much young
people know about the figure and work of Josip Broz Tito. Eighty seven students completed the
anonymous questionnaires. There were more female (68%) than male respondents (32%), but the
ratio approximates that of the University‟s student population (72% vs 28%). All respondents were
born 10 or more years after Tito's death.
Results
All participants reported knowing of Josip Broz Tito. As shown in Figure 1, most (81%)
believed that he had been a long-time president of Yugoslavia, while 12% saw him as a leader of
the Communist Party, and 7% as the Supreme Commander of the Partisans in World War II.
President of
Yugoslavia
Commander of the
Partisans
Leader of the
Communist Party
Figure 1: The largest number of students first recognizes Tito as the president
Students acquired their knowledge of Tito primarily from parents, relatives and friends
(55%), or based on information from the media (29%). A smaller proportion learned about Tito‟s
life primarily from textbooks and during their formal education (16%). As reflected in Figure 2,
participants were split in their views of Josip Broz Tito‟s overall policies, with 56% rating them
positively (positive or very positive) and 44% rating them negatively (negative or very negative).
Very positive
Positive
Negative
Very negative
Figure 2: Evaluation of Tito's overall policy during the Cold War
Interestingly, evaluations differed according to participant‟s primary source of
information. Students who learned about Tito‟s life from primarily the media gave the most
negative ratings, while a substantial majority (76%) of those who learned from the experiences of
61
their older relatives and friends, rated Tito's policies positively. This difference might be
attributable (in part) to the fact that our students‟ parents and older siblings had often been born in
the 1950s and 1960s, so their memories were based on Yugoslavia‟s period of greatest prosperity.
The early years of Tito‟s rule, however, were marred by illegality, autocracy and brutality.
Between 1945 and 1946 60,000 people (150,000 in the whole of Yugoslavia), were executed for
being war criminals, collaborators, enemies during the civil war, or political opponents. 15 The
actual number of victims in Goli Otok (the camp for those who sided with the USSR at the time of
Informbiro) has never been determined, with estimates ranging from several hundred to 12,000.
Conversely, Tito is often portrayed negatively in the media. Decades of „official history” in which
Tito had been shown only in a positive light, was followed by trend toward negative coverage, with
signs, journal feuilletons, and publications often emphasizing the most bizarre details of his life.
Most survey respondents (58%) believed that Yugoslavia‟s greatest advances during the Cold War
occurred in the area economic development. About one in four (23%) thought the country‟s
greatest Cold War successes were in the sphere of international relations, another 14% saw it in
culture, and 5% in the field of human rights.
Economic
development
Culture
Human rights
Figure 2: Areas in which Tito's Yugoslavia has achieved the greatest successes during the Cold War
International
The biggest failure of Tito's policies, according to most relations
respondents, was in the field of
human rights and freedoms. A substantial minority located the greatest failure in the field of
international relations, with the remaining few seeing economic development as his downfall (see
Figure 3).
International
relations
Economic
development
Human rights
Figure 3: The biggest failures of Tito's policy during the Cold War
The participants held diverse views on whether Tito's rule prompted a personality cult, but
they were nearly unanimous (90%) in their belief that while Tito was in power, that the position of
students and study conditions were more favourable than they are today.
A 2010 study of 1813 Serbian citizens, conducted by the Centre for the Study of Social
Democracy examined opinions on the transition from socialism to capitalism. They found that 81% of
respondents believed the country‟s best times occurred under socialism. Six percent thought Serbia‟s
best times occurred in the 1990s under Slobodan Milosevic, while 10% found “today” to be the
country‟s best time. (Journal ``Danas`` 10.2010. entitled „Citizens of Serbia still give highest rates to
Tito”). The examinees rated living standard at the time of socialism with four and during the Milosevic`s
era and today's standard Ŕwith two.
15
Cvetkovic Srdjan, Izmedju srpa i cekica - represija u Srbiji 1944-1953 (Beograd: Institut za savremenu
istoriju, 2006), 114.
62
Conclusion
According to Serbian historian and politician Latinka Perovic, Tito undoubtedly had
charisma, and his post-war personality cult was a factor for cohesion and balance. It is difficult,
however, to create a cult that will outlive the personality himself. Khrushchev after the 20th
Congress said: „There is no cult of personality, and no personality.” This is not true for Tito. There
is no cult today, but the vestiges remain of a figure who intrigues, polarizes and requires research.
The fact is that the Non-Aligned world recognized Tito as its leader, and they knew he was
respected in the West. But what was most intriguing for Latinka Perovic was the fact that Tito had
been respected in the East, even in Russia itself, at the time of the Informbrio, when fierce
propaganda and ideological war had been being directed against him. The fact is that Tito was a
figure of balance in a country located between two opposing blocs, characterized by economic and
social contradictions, national heterogeneity, and religious diversity. And he was an instinctual
leader. All of that was condensed in his personality.
Tito is an intriguing figure for researchers, not only in the former Yugoslavia but also
throughout the world. The period of the Second (i.e.Tito's) Yugoslavia was the longest period of
peace in the Balkans - half a century without war. It was also the period of the country‟s most
dynamic economic development and modernization.
Tito has been the subject of more than a thousand books and several dozen documentaries.
Interest in his leadership and personality continues today. It is useful now, with the benefit of
history, to revisit some of these fundamental questions about Josip Broz Tito. We hope this paper
can provide a foundation for future research on Yugoslavia, Tito and the Balkans.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Cvetkovic, Srdjan (2006), Izmedju srpa i cekica- represija u Srbiji 1944-1953. Beograd: Institut za
savremenu istoriju.
Djordjevic, B (2009), “Srpski arhivi svetsko blago”, Vecernje novosti, April 29, 2009, accessed
February 20, 2010, http://www.novosti.rs/vesti/kultura.71.html:238696-Srpski-arhivisvetsko-blago
Dretar, Milivoj (2010), „Polozaj Jugoslavije u pokretu nesvrstanih“, Hrvatski povijesni portal
(2010): 1. accessed February
20,
2010,
http://povijest.net/sadrzaj/lenta/20st/sfrj/951-polozaj-jugoslavije-u-pokretu-nesvrstanih.html
Kosanovic, Dejan (2000), “Jugoslavija: raskrsnica pokretnih slika“, Zbornik radova Fakulteta
dramskih umetnosti 4 (2000): 158-164.
Krempton, Ricard (2003), Balkan posle drugog svetskog rata. Beograd: Clio.
Latific, Ibrahim (1997), Jugoslavija 1945-1990- razvoj privrede i društvenih delatnosti. Beograd:
Drustvo za istinu o antifasističkoj NOB u Jugoslaviji 1945-1991.
Miller Toby and Yúdice George (2002), Cultural Policy. London: Sage Publications.
Ugresic, Dubravka (1996), Kultura lazi. Zagreb: Bastard/Arkzin.
Vestad Arne (2009), Globalni hladni rat. Beograd: Arhipelag.
IMDB, “Battle of Neretva”, http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0064091/ (accessed February 3, 2011)
Popboks, “40 godina Bitke na Neretvi (1) “, http://www.popboks.com/tekst.php?ID=7764
(accessed February 3, 2011)
II. United Europe, Europe of the Leaders: European
Borders from 6 to (+)27
Radu CARP (Bucharest) ◄► Modernisation Envers Sécularisme ?
La Transformation de la Turquie ante portas
Helga ZICHNER (Leipzig), Bettina BRUNS (Leipzig) ◄► Within a
“Ring of Secure Third Countries”: Regional and Local Effects of
the Extraterritorial Engagement of the European Union in
Belarus, Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova
Andreea Crina HOREA (Cluj-Napoca) ◄► Europe‟s Gordian
Knot. Germany
Licia BAGINI (Poitiers) ◄► Quelles Frontières pour le TrentinHaut Adige/Südtirol ?
Denis ROLLAND (Strasbourg) ◄► Le Conseil de l‟Europe en
2010 : une vieille institution pour un projet moderne ? Éléments
de réflexion et d‟historiographie
Modernisation envers secularisme ?
La transformation de la Turquie ante portas
Radu CARP1
Abstract. Turkey adopted from its very beginning an original project of modernity seen
an alternative both to Westernization and Islam. It seems that this “third way” does not help
enough in order to achieve the democratic standards of a European country. This paper analyses
not all Turkey modernity aspects, but only secularism, mainly because this was considered for a
long time the most successful one. In order to see what is right now the meaning of secularism in
Turkey, this paper address the historical background of political parties in Turkey, starting with
Refah Party and ending with the latest developments of AK Party of the current Prime Minister
Erdoğan. This paper discuss also many issues related to the role of religion in society, either Islam
(“the muslim veil” interpreted by ECHR in Leyla Şahin v. Turkey – 2005, the Alevi community,
Imam Hatip schools), or Christian (the new 2008 legal framework on associations acknowledging
the right of property of the religious associations, mainly Christian, the ECHR decision on
Ecumenical Patriarchate v. Turkey – 2008, the status of the Theological School of the Ecumenical
Patriarchate from the island of Halki). The question of Turkey belonging to the European Union is
addressed in this paper also from the perspective of different types of Europe borders –
geographical, institutional, cultural and transactional (formal). No matter the type of border
considered, Turkey is still a problematic case. Turkey‟ European aspirations accelerated the
debate on what is and what should be the European Union: a construction based on Western
civilization and Christianity or a polity based on democratic values without reference to history or
even geography. The paper conclusion is that is in the very interest of the European Union to
accept Turkey and it has to act in such a way that at a certain moment Turkey will transform itself
into a country with a similar approach to religious freedom as all other existing Member States.
Keywords: borders, European Union, modernity, religious freedom, secularism, Turkey
L‟une des erreurs les plus fréquentes que l‟on commet alors qu‟on tente de proposer une
interprétation de la relation entre la Turquie, le sécularisme, la modernité et l‟Europe est de penser
que ce ce pays est passé par un processus linéaire par lequel, à partir de la négation du système
ottoman, a été adoptée une version occidentale de la modernisation par l‟imitation inconditionnelle
des évolutions de l‟Europe du XXe siècle. En fait, dès l‟apparition de l‟État turc, son élite politique
et culturelle a adopté un projet de modernisation original, en prenant une distance critique tant par
rapport à l‟Islam qu‟à l‟occidentalisation, les deux étant vues comme des extrêmes qui risquer de
mettre en danger la stabilité de la jeune démocratie. Cet écart par rapport aux deux attitudes
susmentionnées est parfois si faible qu‟il est presque invisible tant pour l‟observateur de Bruxelles
que, de l‟autre côté, pour celui de Kabul.
La justification de cette véritable « troisième voie » a été la crainte qu‟une
occidentalisation accélérée aurait pu mener à la perte de l‟identité nationale et donc à l‟échec de
l‟unité étatique obtenue avec tant de peine ; d‟autre part, on a considère que la poursuite du projet
islamique entre les limites fixées par l‟ancien régime risquait de maintenir la Turquie dans l‟état de
pays musulman indistinct des autres. C‟est pour cela qu‟on a pu parler, à juste raison, d‟une
« modernisation hybride à la Turca » 2. A un moment donné, l‟expérimente turc semblait avoir réussi
et le sécularisme était vu comme la valeur la plus enracinée dans la conscience communautaire, sans
que les transformations évoquées soient pourtant le résultat d‟un consensus au sein de la société ou
1
2
Faculty of Political Science, University of Bucharest.
Alev Çinar, Modernity, Islam, and Secularism in Turkey. Bodies, Places and Time (Minneapolis/London:
University of Minnesota Press, Public Worlds, 2005), 15.
66
d‟une démocratisation de bas en haut. En ce moment-là, l‟option européenne a été pour la Turquie le
bout d‟un processus de création de sa propre identité, alors que l‟attraction pour l‟Islam mettait en
danger les fondements-mêmes de la Turquie moderne. Afin que le projet de modernisation à la turque
réussisse, a été nécessaire une intervention persistante de l‟État tant dans la sphère publique que Ŕ et
surtout Ŕ dans la sphère privée. L‟État avait de l‟autorité jusque dans les aspects les plus intimes de la
vie privée, du style des vêtements aux manières de passer son temps libre. L‟effort de fixer un
comportement public des personnes privées en prenant pour repère les pratiques occidentales est
donc, pour cette raison, un rappel de la période où l‟État turc se trouvait encore en quête de légitimité.
Parmi les différents aspects de la modernisation au style turc, ce n‟est que le sécularisme
qui fait l‟objet de notre analyse, puisque Ŕ fait apparemment paradoxal Ŕ c‟est précisément cet
élément, vu comme la grande réussite du projet de modernisation, qui est devenu l‟un des plus
contestés. La mise en contraste de ce type de modernité avec l‟Europe d‟une part, la religion, le
sécularisme et l‟Islam d‟autre part nous apparaît comme la seule voie d‟apprendre dans quelle
mesure le projet turc de modernisation, avec ses particularités, demeure une solution viable après le
moment de l‟adhésion de ce pays à l‟Union Européenne. La relation le plus souvent sinueuse que
l‟on peut établir entre ces termes dans le cas de la Turquie illustre le fait que le rapport entre la
religion et la modernité n‟est pas marqué seulement par la sécularisation et par son accélération
avec le passage du temps, mais peut se traduire aussi par le contraire de la sécularisation3. Dans une
société marquée pendant six siècles par les principes de l‟Islam, il aurait été impossible que la
religion disparaisse tout simplement à la fois de la sphère publique et de celle privée. En se rendant
compte des limites d‟une ingénierie sociale risquée, les fondateurs de la Turquie moderne n‟ont pas
banni complètement l‟Islam : ils l‟ont intégré progressivement dans le projet politique moderne.
Grâce à ce fait-ci, s‟y est développée dans le temps une compréhension tout particulière des notions
de modernité et sécularisme. L‟ « apprivoisement » de l‟Islam s‟est fait par son intégration
progressive dans l‟État. Au lieu de séparer la religion de l‟État suivant le modèle américain du
« mur de séparation », la Turquie a choisi une solution tout à fait originale : tous les pratiques et
toutes les activités religieuses ont été mises sous le contrôle d‟une Direction des Affaires
Religieuses (le Diyanet), subordonné directement au Premier-Ministre, le président et le conseil
d‟administration de cette institution étant nommé par le Président de la République. En même
temps, toutes les autorités traditionnelles de l‟Islam ont été déclarées illégales, l‟autorité du calife
étant annulée. Les ordres religieux islamiques autonomes (tekké et zaviyé) et l‟ordre soufi (tarikat)
ont été interdits. Tout de suite après la création de cette Direction, a été mis en place un nouveau
Code civil, très semblable à celui de la Suisse, dans le but de remplacer l‟ancienne législation
fondée sur le droit islamique (sharia). Ainsi la polygamie a-t-elle été interdite ; les mariages
religieux n‟étaient plus autorisés ; les hommes et les femmes ont reçu des droits égaux en ce qui
concerne le droit d‟hériter, le mariage et le divorce ; le système des instances juridiques religieuses
a été dissous, ainsi que les institutions d‟éducation religieuse. Le nouveau Code pénal adopté à la
même époque stipulait que l‟utilisation de la religion dans des buts politiques était une infraction.
L‟alphabet arabe a été remplacé par l‟alphabet roman.
Suite à ces mesures, toutes les autorités religieuses islamiques ont été dissoutes et la
Direction des Affaires Religieuses a été autorisée à vérifier la connaissance de la religion et des
pratiques islamiques, attribution qui s‟est traduite par la mise en place d‟une surveillance des
mosquées et de toutes les manifestations de leur intérieur, y compris par la nomination des imams,
en parvenant ainsi au monopole de l‟État sur la production et la diffusion de l‟Islam. A présent,
l‟enseignement de la religion à l‟école est obligatoire, mais l‟unique enseigné est l‟Islam sunnite ; il
s‟ensuit qu‟y compris les élèves d‟autres confessions comme les chrétiens ou les Juifs sont obligés
d‟étudier l‟Islam sunnite4. L‟État intervient jusque dans la formulation des traditionnels appels des
muezzins à la prière, en autorisant seulement l‟utilisation dans ce but de la langue turque, à
3
4
Concernant les théories de la sécularisation, voir Radu Carp, Dumnezeu la Bruxelles. Religia în spaţiul
public European (Cluj-Napoca: Eikon, 2009), 45-67.
Niyazi Öktem, „Religion in Turkey”, in The Status of Religious Confessions of the States Applying for
Membership to the European Union, (sous la direction de) Francis MESSNER (Milano: Giuffrè Ed., 2002),
262.
67
l‟exclusion explicite de l‟arabe. Puisque ces appels à la prière sont faits cinq fois par jour dans
toutes les localités, l‟État voulait contribuer par cette mesure à la formation d‟une conscience
linguistique turque commune, distincte de celle arabe. Toutes ces mesures sont l‟équivalent d‟une
véritable nationalisation de l‟Islam. La formation de l‟État national turc est ainsi étroitement liée à
la création d‟une sphère publique séculaire où la religion et les pratiques religieuses se sont acquis
une place, mais uniquement sous l‟oeil attentif de l‟État. Ce projet, sans équivalent ni dans le
monde islamique ni dans le monde occidental est demeuré inchangé pendant sept décennies, se
trouvant toujours sous la pression de projets de modernisation concurrents, qu‟il s‟agisse du modèle
islamique, kurde ou marxiste. Parmi eux, le rival le plus puissant est sans doute le projet islamique
qui resurgit aujourd‟hui alors que le pays tente de se créer une identité européenne.
La principale expression du projet de modernisation islamique, opposé à celui
officiellement promu par l‟État séculier turc appartient au parti Refah. Celui-ci apparaît sur la scène
politique dès les années 1960 ; jusqu‟aux années 1990 pourtant il se définissait plutôt comme un
mouvement conservateur de droite plutôt que de se déclarer islamique. Ce n‟est qu‟après la chute
des régimes communistes d‟Europe de l‟Est que le parti Refah a assumé une identité islamique
explicite. La disparition du projet marxiste alternatif, vu comme une menace pour le type de
modernisation pratiqué en Turquie a fait que le projet islamique devienne en réalité l‟unique rival
du sécularisme. Aux élections locales de 1994, Refah reporte sa première victoire importante,
Recep Tayip Erdoğan devenant le premier maire islamiste d‟Istanbul depuis l‟instauration de la
république par Atatürk. Un an plus tard, Refah occupe la première place parmi les partis politiques
du Parlement et son chef, Necmettin Erbakan devient en 1996 le premier-ministre d‟un
gouvernement de coalition. Cette ascension brusque était plus que le sécularisme turc ne pouvait
admettre en ce moment et c‟est pour cette raison que la présence du parti Refah au gouvernement
n‟a pas pu durer plus d‟un an. En février 1997, le Conseil pour la Sécurité Nationale a demandé au
Gouvernement de prendre des mesures fermes contre l‟islamisme, ce qui a entraîné la démission du
gouvernement de coalition. Par la suite, le Refah a été mis hors la loi pour renaître en février 1998
sous le nom du parti Fazilet. Aux élections parlementaires de 1999, le Fazilet gagne 15% des voix
de l‟électorat, en devenant peu à peu marginal dans la vie politique turque ; il finit par être interdit
par la Cour Constitutionnelle en juin 2001.
L‟héritage byzantin est sans doute l‟identité que le sécularisme turc refuse au plus haut
degré. Un point commun entre les adeptes de ce type de sécularisme et ceux qui le renient au nom
des valeurs islamiques est précisément le refus de tout projet ancré dans cette identité ; les
représentants des deux courants de pensée s‟accordent sur le fait que le sentiment d‟appartenance à
la nation turque est né de l‟opposition à cette tradition. En 1996, alors que le premier-minstre actuel
de la Turquie, Erdoğan était maire d‟Istanbul, a été organisée une célébration d‟un faste sans
précédent des 550 ans depuis la conquête ottomane de Constantinople5. La cérémonie avait pour
but de suggérer l‟idée d‟une « deuxième conquête » de la cité avec l‟obtention par le représentant
du parti Refah de la mairie d‟Istanbul, mais aussi celle de la naissance de l‟identité turque au
moment de la conquête de la cité, longtemps avant la création de l‟État turc moderne. Or, pour se
faire reconnaître l‟identité européenne à laquelle elle aspire, la Turquie ne devrait pas mettre entre
parenthèses l‟héritage byzantin, mais, bien au contraire, de s‟auto-identifier comme une forme
viable de syncrétisme byzantino-islamique. En fin de comptes, la proximité géographique de la
Turquie à l‟Europe plus qu‟à l‟Orient est due à la position de Byzance et à son rôle de médiateur
entre les deux continents6.
La victoire du parti Refah aux elections locales de 1994 a généré une vague de
mouvements pro-sécularistes, de manière que l‟identification entre le sécularisme et la modernité Ŕ
l‟idéal auquel aspiraient les fondateurs de la République Ŕ est devenue une réalité. Ce n‟est point
par hasard que les mouvements séculiers les plus actifs parus à cette époque portaient les noms de
la Ligue des Femmes Modernes ou de l‟Association des Écrivains Modernes. Vu l‟ascension du
5
6
Çinar, 152 et seq.
Radu Preda, „De la apologie la lobby. Politici europene şi viziuni ecleziale”, in Un suflet pentru Europa.
Dimensiunea religioasă a unui proiect politic, edited by Radu Carp (Bucureşti : Ed. Fundaţiei Anastasia,
2005), 349.
68
parti Refah et sa contestation ultérieure, il était devenu évident que le sécularisme ne pouvait plus
retenir le monopole de la sphère publique.
En 2001, la faction modérée des partis Refah/Fazilet se transforme dans le parti AK
(Adalet ve Kalkinma Ŕ Justice et Développement), sous la direction du même Recep Tayip
Erdoğan. Le parti AK ne continuait point l‟un des deux partis d‟origine, en mettant l‟accent sur la
libéralisation économique et le rapprochement de l‟Union Européenne, se déclarant d‟accord avec
le sécularisme turc et adoptant des positions islamistes modérées. Le principal organe de presse
affilié (mais pas officiel) au parti AK, Yeni Şefak, offre une perspective à la fois islamiste et
libérale : on essaie d‟y proposer la vision d‟un libéralisme économique doublé d‟un
conservatorisme politique où l‟Islam joue le rôle de valeur définitoire. Toute l‟évolution de la scène
politique et culturelle de la Turquie après l‟avènement au pouvoir du parti AK en 2002 suggère un
effort de diffuser l‟idée que l‟Islam peut produire des effets tout aussi modernisateurs que le
sécularisme, le résultat final envisagé étant ce que l‟on espère être le modernisme islamique. AK a
été souvent décrit et se définit lui-même comme un parti de nature conservatrice-démocratique, et
Erdoğan le décrit volontiers comme un parti fondé sur les mêmes principes que les partis chrétiensdémocrates d‟Europe. Fait particulièrement significatif, l‟AK est membre associé du Parti
Populaire Européen7 et va devenir membre de plein droit du PPE après l‟adhésion de la Turquie à
l‟Union Européenne.
Le parti AK a opté pour cette affiliation également pour des raisons pragmatiques, puisque
la plus grande opposition à l‟idée de l‟adhésion de la Turquie à l‟Union Européenne provident de
partis membres du PPE. Le Président de la France, Nicolas Sarkozy, dont le parti retient une
position importante au sein du PPE a souvent affirmé que la Turquie ne saurait prendre part au
projet d‟intégration européenne. Pourtant, au sein du PPE existent aussi des opinions favorables à
l‟adhésion de la Turquie à l‟Union Européenne, en provenance des chrétiens-démocrates des pays
scandinaves notamment8. La rhétorique antiséculariste des dirigeants du Refah s‟est transformée,
chez le parti AK, dans un appui au sécularisme. AK considère que l‟État turc est anti-séculier par le
fait qu‟il intervient dans des questions religieuses et n‟offre qu‟une protection limitée à la liberté de
conscience. Le parti ne met pas au premier plan les préceptes du Coran ou la religion islamique ; il
milite pour une plus grande liberté de pratique de la religion non seulement pour l‟Islam, mais pour
toutes les confessions, y compris chrétiennes9. La victoire du parti AK aux élections de 2002,
seulement un an après la séparation du groupement d‟Erdoğan du parti Fazilet a marqué le début
d‟une nouvelle ère non seulement dans l‟histoire de la Turquie, mais surtout en ce qui concerne le
statut de l‟Islam dans le cadre des régimes politiques modernes. Fait significatif, à ces élections, le
parti Saadet, dirige par Erbakan n‟a obtenu que 2,5% des voix. L‟AK a gagné 34% des voix, ce qui lui
a permis de former une majorité parlementaire et gouvernementale sans avoir besoin de s‟associer
d‟autres forces politiques. Pour la première fois dans l‟histoire moderne de la Turquie, un parti à
origines islamistes est arrivé au pouvoir sans avoir besoin d‟une intervention militaire, ayant y
compris la majorité nécessaire pour changer la Constitution. Il est ainsi devenu possible que le parti
AK élimine de la Constitution les stipulations consacrant le caractère séculier de l‟État turc Ŕ ce qui
ne s‟est pas encore passé. Le principal défi pour le parti AK est de montrer surtout aux adeptes du
sécularisme de la Turquie qu‟un parti à origines islamistes peut être plus efficace que tout parti
séculier et qu‟il peut résoudre les problèmes sociaux, économiques et politiques de la Turquie.
Mais même si le parti AK s‟est dissocié de l‟Islam, celui-ci demeure à la base de son
idéologie. Les femmes des parlementaires AK et des membres du gouvernement portent, dans leur
grande majorité, le voile islamique Ŕ y compris la femme et les filles du premier-ministre Erdoğan.
Les disputes pour et contre cette attitude ont abouti en 2003, lors de la réception offerte en honneur
de la fête nationale par le Président de la République de cette époque, Ahmet Necdet Sezer: celui-ci
n‟a pas envoyé d‟invitation aux femmes des membres importants du parti AK qui avaient déclaré
leur intention de porter à cette occasion le voile islamique. L‟incident a été dépassé, les leaders de
7
Cf. la page Internet du Parti Populaire Européen, http://www.epp.eu, consulté 20.04.2011.
Joost Lagendijk and Jan Martinus Wiersma, Travels among Europe‟s Muslim Neighbours. The Quest for
Democracy, (Brussels: Centre for European Policy Studies, 2008).
9
Çinar, 174.
8
69
l‟AK s‟y présentant sans leurs épouses. Cet épisode illustre d‟une manière convaincante l‟attitude
ambivalente du parti AK par rapport à l‟Islam, ains que les défis auxquels Erdoğan se confronte
dans la politique intérieure. L‟AK est parvenu jusqu‟à présent à faire passer le message que sa
nouvelle idéologie politique peut naître et s‟affirmer entre les limites du sécularisme officiel ; reste
à voir si ces limites ne vont pas se modifier avec la modernisation et l‟européanisation de la
Turquie. La question si on peut combiner de manière durable la pratique et l‟idéologie islamiste
d‟une part et la modernité et la sécularisation d‟autre part Ŕ arrangement qui permette l‟apparition
d‟un modernisme islamique Ŕ demeure ouverte.
En règle générale, on considère que le fait que les principes promus par le parti AK ont un
plus haut degré d‟acceptabilité est en fait le résultat de toute une série de mutations sociales et
économiques commencées aux années 1980 et générées par Turgut Özal, premier-ministre, puis
Président de la Turquie à cette époque. L‟influence de l‟État dans l‟économie s‟est réduite et les
monopoles économiques associés à l‟État et à son idéologie séculière sont disparus
progressivement. Les mass-médias contrôlées par l‟État, le véhicule principal du kémalisme ont
commencé à subir la compétition de journaux et telévisions privés et les entreprises d‟Anatolie,
dirigées par des musulmans conservateurs sont entrées en compétition avec celles appartenant à
l‟État ou aux entreprises privées administrées par l‟élite séculière concentrée surtout à Istanbul. Le
succès du parti AK s‟expliquerait ainsi par une mutation profonde dans la société et dans
l‟économie turque ; de même, Erdoğan a su se positionner de manière à venir à la rencontre de
toutes les factions dominantes. Le fait que le parti AK met en œuvre en Turquie un expériment
unique, à travers lequel il vise l‟adaptation des valeurs islamiques traditionnelles à la modernisation
n‟est pas resté sans écho dans les pays du monde arabe, surtout au Maroc et en Égypte 10. C‟est pour
cette raison qu‟Abdulah Gül, durant son mandat de ministre des Affaires Extérieures, a mis en
place une politique de rapprochement de la Turquie du monde islamique. A l‟époque où il a été
Secrétaire Général de l‟Organisation de la Conférence Islamique, Gül a essayé d‟agir comme
médiateur dans le conflit arabo-israélien, y compris en invitant les dirigeants du Hamas à Ankara.
C‟est ainsi que la parti AK entend montrer au monde arabe que son orientation pro-européenne ne
se fait pas au détriment de l‟implication de la Turquie dans les problèmes du monde islamique.
Le parti AK est resté au pouvoir après les élections parlementaires de 2007, avec des
résultats meilleurs qu‟aux élections précédentes : 47% des voix exprimées. La même année, une
controverse s‟est ouverte à l‟égard des fondements séculiers de l‟État turc alors qu‟Abdulah Gül,
ministre des Affaires Extérieures dans le gouvernement Erdoğan (et dont la femme porte le voile
islamique) a annoncé son intention de se porter candidat pour la charge de Président de la
République. En avril 2007, l‟Armée turque a annonce officiellement qu‟elle s‟opposera à toute
élection d‟un président qui remettrait en cause le caractère séculier de l‟État, ce qui a provoqué de
grandes manifestations publiques à Istanbul, Ankara et Izmir. Les opposants les plus puissants de la
candidature de Gül ont été Sezer, le président de l‟epoque et le commandant de l‟Armée,
Büyükanit. Le conflit a été finalement apaisé. En mars 2008, le procureur en chef de la République
a saisi la Cour Constitutionnelle en demandant la dissolution du parti AK et en réclamant que 71
personnes qui détenaient ou qui avaient eu des fonctions publiques Ŕ dont le Président de la
République et le Premier-Ministre soient sanctionnés d‟une interdiction d‟être membres d‟un parti
politique pour une période de cinq ans. La principale raison invoquée contre le parti AK été liée à
certaines de ses activités, considérées anti-séculières. En juillet 2008, la Cour Constitutionnelle a
rejeté la demande du procureur, avec une majorité très faible, mais elle a décidé que le parti AK
avait effectivement agi à l‟encontre des principes séculiers fondateurs de la Turquie, ce qui a
entraîné des pressions supplémentaires sur les directions d‟action de ce parti.
Dès la prise du pouvoir, le parti AK avait désigné une commission formée de professeurs
universitaires dans le but de proposer une révision à la Constitution de 1982. Jusqu‟à présent, un
calendrier pour le fonctionnement de cette Commission n‟a pas été établi et aucun projet de
modification de l‟actuelle Constitution n‟a été proposé. Malgré cela, le Parlement, dominé par AK,
a modifié en février 2008 deux articles de la Constitution (10 et 42) afin d‟autoriser le port du voile
islamique dans le cadre des universités, ce qui a généré une forte opposition de la part des recteurs.
10
Joost Lagendijk and Jan Martinus Wiersma.
70
Cette position du parti AK concernant le voile islamique a été déterminée par une décision de la Cour
Européenne des Droits de l‟Homme de novembre 2005, Leyla Şahin vs. la Turquie11. La CEDH a
considéré que le fait d‟interdire à la réclamante l‟accès aux cours et aux examens dans le cadre de la
Faculté de Médecine de l‟Université d‟Istanbul en 1998 parce qu‟elle portait le voile islamique
n‟entre pas en contradiction avec les droits garantis par la Convention Européenne des Droits de
l‟Homme. La décision de la CEDH n‟a pas tranché la question du voile islamique ; elle s‟est
contentée d‟affirmer que son interdiction était compatible avec les principes du sécularisme assumés
par l‟État turc. Ainsi peut-on affirmer que cette décision n‟a pas marqué la fin des controverses
entourant le voile islamique ; on peut dire plutôt qu‟elle a relancé cette discussion dans d‟autres
termes12. Finalement, le problème sera résolu en Turquie et non à Strasbourg. Ce qui est intéressant à
remarquer dans le cas Şahin vs. la Turquie c‟est que le gouvernement turc, par sa position, soutenait la
position de la réclamante. Le premier-ministre Erdoğan a difficilement accepté cette décision, surtout
que ses filles, qui font leurs études aux États-Unis, avaient la possibilité de porter le voile islamique. Il
aura fallu attendre trois ans pour que le Gouvernement se décide d‟adopter une position officielle à cet
égard par la modification de la Constitution. Cette position du gouvernement Erdoğan peut être
interprétée aussi comme une expression de la déception ressentie en Turquie à l‟époque, puisque
l‟opinion publique s‟attendait à ce que la CEDH donne une réponse plus tranchante dans quelque
direction que ce soit. En ce moment, il n‟est pas clair si la levée de l‟interdiction sur le port du voile
islamique dans les universités représente un but en soi pour le parti AK ou s‟il ne représente qu‟un pas
vers des buts que le parti n‟assume pas publiquement.
Pour voir quelle est la position du gouvernement Erdoğan et du parti AK concernant la
liberté religieuse de la population musulmane, il faut évoquer, outre sa position à l‟égard du voile
islamique, le cas des écoles Imam Hatip et celui de la communauté Alévi, ce dernier étant analysé
plus tard en fonction de la position de la Commission Européenne et de la CEDH. Les écoles Imam
Hatip sont des institutions d‟éducation secondaire dont la fonction est celle de former des imams.
Dans ces écoles, outre le programme d‟étude obligatoire pour toutes les institutions d‟enseignement
du même niveau, huit heures par semaine sont attribuées à l‟étude du Coran et de la théologie
islamique. Aux années 1990, le nombre des personnes désireuses de suivre une telle éducation s‟est
accru. Erdoğan lui-même a suivi les cours d‟une telle école et il a voulu accorder à ces institutions
une meilleure situation. Vu le fait que l‟AK était le parti majoritaire dans le Parlement, un projet de
Loi en faveur des écoles Imam Hatip a été adopté sans problèmes en mai 2004 ; mais le Conseil de
l‟Enseignement Supérieur a contesté Ŕ avec succès Ŕ cette loi devant les instances judiciaires.
Après les élections de 2007, le parti AK a fait changer la composition de ce Conseil en y nommant
des personnes favorables à sa propre orientation politique. Pourtant, le gouvernement Erdoğan
hésite toujours d‟inscrire sur son agenda politique un projet de loi similaire à celui de 2004.
La Turquie a adopté une nouvelle Loi des associations en février 2008. Cette Loi avait été
adoptée par le Parlement dès novembre 2006, mais le président Sezer s‟était opposé à son entrée en
vigueur; elle a fini par être adoptée suite aux pressions de l‟Union Européenne. Cette loi est plus
libérale que ne l‟était le cadre normatif précédent, surtout en ce qui concerne la sélection des
organismes directeurs des associations, l‟acquisition de biens en propriété, l‟obtention de fonds de
l‟étranger et la coopération avec les associations hors les frontières. La norme qui stipulait que les
citoyens étrangers ne pouvaient pas créer des associations en Turquie a été remplacée par le
principe de réciprocité. La loi stipule la création d‟un Conseil des Associations, organisme
gouvernemental à pouvoir décisionnel dans ce domaine et au sein duquel les associations existentes
sont représentées. Malgré ces améliorations, les associations doivent toujours notifier les autorités
gouvernementales avant de recevoir de l‟appui financier de l‟étranger et elles ont toujours
11
Cour Européenne des Droits de l‟Homme, Leyla Şahin c. Turquie, Requête no. 44774/98, Arrêt de la
Grande Chambre, Strasbourg, 10 novembre 2005.
12
Dans un commentaire critique à l‟égard de cette décision de la CEDH on a affirmé que cette instance n‟a
pas jugé en réalité la réclamation de Leyla Şahin, en adressant à un niveau plus général la provocation
islamiste visant le sécularisme et que, ce faisant, l‟instance avait „substitué l‟Université d‟Istanbul à la
Turquie et à l‟Islam, un voile” (Kerem Altiparmak and Onur Karahanogullari, „After Şahin: The Debate on
Headscarves Is Not Over”, European Constitutional Law Review, 2 (2006): 268-292.
71
l‟obligation de fournir à l‟État tout document concernant ce type de soutien, ce qui représente une
contrainte importante pour les associatios religieuses actives en Turquie et dont le centre d‟autorité
se trouve en dehors des frontières de ce pays. Autant qu‟en Turquie on continue de questionner la
constitutionnalité d‟autres formes d‟association, tels les partis politiques Ŕ y compris du parti au
gouvernement Ŕ, on ne pourra parler d‟une garantie de la liberté d‟association, y compris en ce qui
concerne les associations religieuses. En ce qui concerne le droit de propriété des associations
religieuses, cette Loi marque un changement radical: celles-ci pourront inscrire sur leurs propres
noms les propriétés inscrites après 1936 sous des noms fictifs ou qui leur ont été données après
cette date mais qui, en raison des restrictions en matière de propriété imposées aux associations, ont
dû être inscrites au le nom du donateur ou de la Direction Générale pour les Associations
subordonnée au Gouvernement. Selon la loi, les propriétés des associations ou des cultes religieux
peuvent être transférées à d‟autres associations ou cultes religieux. Suite à cette loi, la Direction
Générale pour les Associations a émis une circulaire concernant la restitution des propriétés des
associations religieuses non-musulmanes enregistrées sous des noms fictifs. En matière de
propriété, la loi est pourtant critiquée par la Commission Européenne dans le Rapport concernant
les progrès de la Turquie en vue de l‟adhésion à l‟Union Européenne13, parce qu‟elle ne prend pas
en compte les propriétés des associations Ŕ y compris des associations non-religieuses Ŕ qui ont été
confisquées et/ou vendues à des tiers.
Afin de mieux comprendre les problèmes du droit d‟association et surtout ceux auxquels
se confrontent les cultes et les associations religieuses, ainsi que de leurs droits de propriété, il faut
préciser qu‟au temps de l‟Empire Ottoman, le statut des propriétés des organisations religieuses
était défini seulement par des décrets du sultan. Le droit islamique ne réglementait pas la
personnalité juridique des entités privées. Il s‟ensuivait que la propriété n‟était pas enregistrée au
nom des cultes ou des associations religieuses, mais de personnes privées. Ce n‟est qu‟en 1912 qu‟a
été reconnue aux personnes morales privées la possibilité de détenir des propriétés en leur nom
propre. Par la Loi no. 2762 de 1936, le statut de wakf a été attribué aux associations appartenant à
l‟Église Orthodoxe et celles-ci sont passées sous l‟autorité de la Direction Générale de l‟Evkaf (de
manière abusive, puisque cet organisme, créé en 1826, mettait sous l‟autorité de l‟État seulement
les organisations charitables structurées suivant les règles de la religion musulmane), ce qui
signifiait que toutes les propriétés de ces associations allaient être confisquées par l‟État. Après
1960, l‟obtention de nouvelles propriétés par les cultes a été interdite et en 1974 la Cour Suprême a
interdit toute transaction de propriétés entre ces entités14. La Loi des associations, entrée en vigueur
en 2008 apporte une résolution à l‟esprit européen d‟un autre problème auquel se confrontaient les
associations religieuses et surtout celles orthodoxes : depuis 1991, celles-ci n‟avaient plus le droit
d‟organiser des élections pour la désignation de leurs organismes directeurs. Dans l‟absence de
telles élections, au moment où la personne ou les personnes qui administraient une telle association
décédaient, la propriété de l‟association respective passait sous l‟administration de la Direction
Générale de l‟Evkaf, ce qui signifiait une nationalisation de facto des biens appartenant aux
associations religieuses orthodoxes. La nouvelle loi, entrée en vigueur en 2008 élimine cette
pratique pour l‟avenir, mais les propriétés confisquées depuis 1991 jusqu‟en 2008 restent dans la
propriété de l‟État.
En juillet 2008, la Cour Européenne des Droits de l‟Homme a émis une décision dans un
cas dirigé contre la Turquie où le réclamant était la Patriarchie Œcuménique15. Celle-ci avait été
privée par l‟État turc des propriétés obtenues en 1902 et dédiées à l‟usage spécifique de
l‟Orphelinat Grec pour Garçons de l‟île de Büyükada, près d‟Istanbul en 1903. La Direction
Générale pour les Associations a considéré cet orphelinat comme une institution dont l‟activité
13
Commission of the European Communities, Turkey 2008 Progress Report, SEC (2008) 2699, Brussels,
5.11.2008.
14
Pour plus de details, voir Charalambos Papastathis, “Turkey, Europe and the Ecumenical Patriarchate in
Istanbul”, in Turkey in the European Union? Opinions of the European Consortium members, European
Consortium for Church and State Research Newsletter, 5 (April 2005): 14-15.
15
Cour Européenne des Droits de l‟Homme, Affaire Fener Rum Patrikliği (Patriarcat Œcuménique) c.
Turquie, Requête no. 14340/05, Arrêt (fond), Strasbourg, 8 juillet 2008.
72
avait cessé en 1995 et il a pris la charge de son administration, action que la Patriarchie
Œcuménique a contestée devant la CEDH. La Cour a considéré que les autorités gouvernementales
turques n‟avaient pas eu de justification légale pour priver la Patriarchie Œcuménique de sa
propriété sans lui accorder de compensations financières et a décidé que dans ce cas avait été
commise une violation de la Convention Européenne des Droits de l‟Homme. Le rapport de la
Commission Européenne offre cet exemple sans s‟exprimer sur le contenu de la décision de la
Cour, mais, en mettant cette référence en relation avec d‟autres parties du même Rapport ; on peut
conclure que, dans la vision de la Commission, cette décision de la CEDH est un pas en avant vers
la garantie de la liberté religieuse en Turquie.
La Commission Européenne a constaté dans le même Rapport que les cultes religieux nonmusulmans ont toujours des problèmes liés à leur manque de personnalité juridique et au régime
restrictif concernant l‟éducation du personnel clérical. La législation turque en vigueur n‟autorise
pas les formes d‟éducation religieuse privée pour ces cultes et la possibilité que ce personnel
reçoive une instruction spécialisée dans le système public d‟enseignement n‟existe pas. Nonobstant,
dans le cadre de la Faculté de Théologie de l‟Université d‟Istanbul fonctionne depuis 1999 un
département de théologie chrétienne, mais qui n‟est pas autorisé à préparer le personnel de culte. La
Commission Européenne a également critiqué le fait que l‟École Théologique de la Patriarchie
Œcuménique de l‟île de Halki (Heybeliada) reste fermée, situation qui date depuis 1971. Un autre
problème que la Commission Européenne considère que la Turquie devrait résoudre est liée au fait
que le Patriarche Œcuménique ne peut pas faire usage de son titre en public en toute occasion,
même si le premier-ministre Erdoğan déclarait, en mars 2008, que la Turquie ne devrait plus
continuer à réglementer la question de l‟usage de la titulature d‟ « œcuménique ». La Patriarchie
n‟a pas pu restaurer ses propres immeubles et lieux de culte depuis plus de 30 ans, en obtenant ce
droit seulement après l‟élection de Turgut Özal comme président de la République16.
Dans ce contexte, il faut préciser que le statut des minorités non-musulmanes, y compris
religieuses est réglementé par un acte de droit international auquel la Turquie est partie, le Traité de
Lausanne de 1923 qui reconnaît à toutes ces minorités des droits égaux à ceux de la majorité
musulmane en ce qui concerne la liberté religieuse et surtout l‟éducation religieuse. Mais les
autorités turques n‟ont pas toujours appliqué de manière intégrale les stipulations du traité. Fait
significatif, alors que la minorité chrétienne comptait 100.000 membres à Istanbul seulement en
1927, de nos jours elle ne dépasse pas les 2000 personnes. En ce qui concerne l‟École Théologique
de la Patriarchie Œcuménique dont la situation est signalée y compris dans le rapport de la
Commission Européenne, quelques précisions supplémentaires s‟imposent. Celle-ci a été créé en
1844 et elle a continué à fonctionner jusqu‟en 1971, en assurant l‟éducation théologique du
personnel clérical de plusieurs pays qui se trouvent sous la juridiction canonique de la Patriarchie
Œcuménique. Sa fermeture a été justifiée par l‟État turc par l‟apparition d‟une nouvelle loi de
l‟éducation privée, no. 625/195, selon laquelle l‟éducation religieuse ne pouvait être assurée que
par les institutions de l‟enseignement public. Ultérieurement, la Constitution de la Turquie a précisé
à l‟art. 24 que l‟éducation religieuse et militaire revenait dans la charge exclusive de l‟État17. Une
réouverture de l‟École Théologique de la Patriarchie Œcuménique ne nécessiterait pas une
modification de la Constitution de la Turquie : l‟article susmentionné contrevient aux stipulations
du Traité de Lausanne, et la Constitution de la Turquie reconnaît elle-même la priorité du droit
international sur le droit interne.
La Commission Européenne considère que la situation de la communauté Alévi est un cas
important où la Turquie a des problèmes liés à la garantie de la liberté religieuse. Les Alévi sont un
groupement religieux musulman distinct de la majorité sunnite existante en Turquie, ainsi que de la
tradition shiite avec laquelle elle n‟a de commun que le culte d‟Ali. 25% des Turcs appartiennent à
la minorité Alévi qui n‟a pas de très bonnes relations avec le parti AK, vu comme une expression
de la majorité sunnite. En raison de la marginalisation des Alévi, le sécularisme turc a été considéré
autoritaire, puisqu‟il ne reconnaît et ne coopte à l‟exercice du pouvoir que l‟Islam de type sunnite,
en abandonnant la neutralité religieuse pour créer un monopole de l‟interprétation de la foi
16
17
Öktem, 254.
Papastathis, 13.
73
islamique18. Il faut mentionner que les Alévi ne sont pas en Turquie l‟unique groupe dissident par
rapport à l‟Islam sunnite officiellement protégé par l‟État : il existe plusieurs fraternités
musulmanes19 dont les membres n‟ont, eux aussi, qu‟une liberté religieuse limitée. Au cours des
années 1990, plusieurs conflits violents se sont produit entre les sunnites et les Alévi, des
événements qui persistent encore dans la mémoire collective. Les protestations des Alévi sont
principalement dirigées vers la Direction pour les Affaires Religieuses, accusée de n‟autoriser que
la dissémination publique de la version sunnite de l‟Islam. Le parti AK a, à cet égard, deux
options : soit il décide que cette Direction devrait avoir une approche plus libérale, de manière a
assurer à toutes les religions et confessions un traitement égal, soit il encourage le maintien de
l‟actuelle politique religieuse promue par cet organisme, mais en lui retirant plusieurs de ses
attributions de contrôle. Le parti AK n‟a pas fait son choix entre les deux, même si le premierministre Erdoğan a fait Ŕ en 2008 notamment Ŕ des gestes symboliques dans la direction d‟une
réconciliation des différentes versions de l‟Islam pratiquées en Turquie. Toute modification du
statut de la Direction pour les Affaires religieuses remettrait en question les bases-mêmes du
sécularisme sur lequel l‟État turc est fondé et déclencherait des mouvements de protestation et c‟est
pourquoi les hésitations du parti AK sont justifiées ; mais ce problème devra être résolu, au moins
pour la simple raison qu‟Erdoğan a créé de grandes attentes tant aux rangs de la minorité Alévi que
de la majorité sunnite. Malgré une plus grande ouverture du gouvernement Erdoğan pour la
résolution de cette affaire, la Commission Européenne considère que les problèmes liés à
l‟éducation religieuse et aux lieux de culte de cette communauté persistent. En octobre 2007, suite à
une demande en provenance des membres d‟une famille appartenant à la communauté Alévi, la
CEDH a décidé que l‟éducation religieuse doit inclure des références à tous les courants religieux
musulmans20. Puisque cette décision de la CEDH n‟a pas été appliquée, en août 2008 la Fédération
Alévi a demandé au Conseil des Ministres du Conseil de l‟Europe d‟intervenir dans ce sens, en
montrant par la suite que les matériels employés dans le cadre de l‟éducation religieuse à l‟école
n‟incluent que des informations superficielles concernant les Alévi. L‟État turc n‟a pas résolu cette
situation dans le sens de la décision de la CEDH ; en échange, depuis mars 2008, les élèves
appartenant à la communauté Alévi peuvent être excepté des cours d‟éducation religieuse. Un autre
problème de la communauté Alévi signalé par la Commission Européeenne est la nonreconnaissance par l‟État turc des lieux de culte de ces communautés (cemevi) qui ne peuvent pas,
par conséquent, recevoir de financement du budget d‟État pour en construire de nouveaux ou pour
l‟entretien de ceux qui existent déjà.
Le fait de mettre en évidence les problèmes qu‟a la Turquie, de la perspective de a
Commission Européenne, concernant la garantie de la liberté religieuse ne signifie pas que la
religion per se doit être considérée comme un élément qui fait obstacle à l‟adhésion de la Turquie à
l‟Union Européenne. Les critères d‟adhésion sont d‟une autre nature et ils ne mettent pas au
premier plan l‟exclusion des pays dont la religion majoritaire n‟est pas le christianisme. En ce
moment, le problème qui se pose n‟est pas si un pays à majorité musulmane peut faire partie de
l‟Union Européenne, mais combien les institutions de l‟Union peuvent s‟impliquer dans la
résolution des problèmes qui relèvent de la liberté religieuse dans l‟absence d‟un modèle commun
des relations État-Église valable pour tous les États membres. La Commission Européenne se rend
compte des limites de sa démarche en cette matière : beaucoup de ses observations concernant la
garantie de la liberté religieuse en Turquie se fondent, à ce que nous avons vu, non pas sur l‟acquis
communautaire, mais sur la mise en application des décisions de la CEDH, mécanisme distinct et
par rapport auquel les institutions de l‟Union Européenne n‟ont pas la compétence d‟intervenir.
Loin de considérer que la religion est un handicap pour l‟adhésion de la Turquie, on considère que
l‟appartenance de ce pays à l‟Union Européenne aurait des conséquences positives du point de vue
18
Cemal Kararkas, „Turkey, Islam and Laicism: Between the Interests of State, Politics and Society”, PRIF
(Peace Research Institute Frankfurt) Reports 78 (2007), http://www.hsfk.de/downloads/prif78.pdf, consulté
20.04.2011.
19
Pour leur présentation, voir Öktem, 264-269.
20
Cour Européenne des Droits de l‟Homme, Hasan et Eylem Zengin c. Turquie, Requête no. 1448/04, Arrêt
(fond), Strasbourg, 9 octobre 2007.
74
religieux : une exclusion éventuelle de la Turquie générerait des problèmes dans la relation avec
des pays à majorité chrétienne comme la Géorgie ou l‟Arménie21, pays inclus dans la Politique
Européenne de Voisinage et qui verraient un tel geste comme un signal de la part de l‟Union
Européenne suggérant que la région dans son ensemble ne présente pas d‟intérêt en ce qui concerne
l‟extension du processus d‟européanisation et entraînerait toute une rhétorique anti-européenne
dans une partie du monde où l‟Union Européenne à des intérêts stratégiques et géopolitiques
évidents. Même si l‟Union Européenne mettait sur le premier plan de ses relations avec la Turquie
son identité et son héritage chrétiens, ceci ne serait pas un argument pour refuser à ce pays la
perspective de futur membre de l‟Union Européenne ; un statut particulier accordé à la Turquie
pour des raisons religieuses, avant et après l‟adhésion, n‟aurait pas pour effet la création d‟un état
d‟infériorité pour les pays à majorité non-chrétienne, mais il pourrait contribuer à la mise en
évidence de la diversité22, valeur assumée du projet européen, tout comme l‟intensité des
sentiments d‟appartenance à l‟identité britannique ne dépend pas du statut privilégié accordé à
l‟Église Anglicane par rapport à d‟autres cultes23.
L‟adhésion de la Turquie à l‟Union Européenne aura pour effet non seulement un
agrandissement du territoire et de la population de l‟Union, mais modifierait aussi Ŕ et surtout Ŕ la
manière dont l‟intégration européenne est perçue : un projet des pays occidentaux riches et de
tradition chrétienne24. Quelle que soit la position qu‟ils adoptent, tant ceux qui soutiennent
l‟adhésion de la Turquie que ceux qui s‟y opposent se mettent d‟accord sur le fait qu‟une telle
adhésion aurait des effets bénéfiques tant sur la Turquie que sur l‟Union Européenne25. La question
fondamentale qui se pose à présent est si l‟Union Européenne peut continuer son processus
d‟intégration économique, s‟acquérir une identité politique collective et parvenir à ses objectifs tout
en acceptant la Turquie en tant qu‟État-membre. Une autre question, liée à la première est si
l‟impact des dimensions de a Turquie (du territoire, de la population, des problèmes sociaux et
politiques) sur le processus d‟intégration européenne sera tolérable ou si, bien au contraire,
l‟adhésion de cet État remettrait en question les bases-mêmes du projet politique européen.26
Pour répondre à ces questions, il est important de voir comment l‟Europe perçoit ses propres
frontières et limites. En ce moment, l‟Union Européenne n‟a pas de territoire sur lequel il puisse exercer
son autorité, délimité par des frontières géographiques qui séparent les membres des non-membres, ni
des frontières politiques ou culturelles, parce que certains États non-membres se trouvent dans une
relation spéciale avec l‟Union Européenne, soit qu‟ils appliquent des parties de l‟acquis communautaire
ou qu‟ils appartiennent à une culture commune. L‟européanisation n‟est pas un processus à des résultats
prévus, cas où le problème des frontières géographiques se serait posé d‟une manière plus précise. Les
frontières de l‟Union Européenne ne sont pas territoriales, mais fonctionnelles : la ligne de démarcation
entre l‟espace européen et celui non-européen est définie par la présence ou l‟absence de l‟acquis
communautaire et/ou de la culture européenne. Selon Michael Smith, l‟Union Européenne possède ni
plus ni moins de quatre types de frontières : géographiques, institutionnelles, culturelles et
transactionnelles (formelles)27.
Un État qui n‟est pas membre de l‟Union Européenne peut bien se trouver en dehors de
ses frontières culturelles et appartenir à celle-ci par le partage de règles communes, alors qu‟un État
21
Richard Potz, The European Union and Turkey, in Turkey in the European Union? Opinions of the
European Consortium members, European Consortium for Church and State Research Newsletter, 5 (April
2005), 4.
22
Matthias Mahlmann, „Constitutional Identity and The Politics of Homogeneity”, German Law Journal,
Special Issue Ŕ Confronting Memories, 6, 2 (2005), 310.
23
J. H. H. Weiler, Un‟Europa Cristiana, (Milano: Biblioteca Universale Rizzoli), 2003.
24
Cristopher Hill, „The Geo-political Implications of Enlargement”, in Europe Unbound: Enlarging and
Reshaping the Boundaries of the European Union, ed. Jan Zielonka (London: Routledge, 2002), 95-117.
25
Barry Buzan, Thomas Diez, „The European Union and Turkey”, Survival, 41, 1 (1999), 41.
26
Sanem Baikal, „Unity in Diversity? The Challenge of Diversity for the European Political Identity,
Legitimacy and Democratic Governance: Turkey‟s EU Membership as the Ultimate Test Case”, Jean
Monnet Working Paper 09/05, 10.
27
Michael Smith, „The European Union and a Changing Europe: Establishing the Boundaries of Order”,
Journal of Common Market Studies, 34, 1 (1996), 5-28.
75
membre qui se trouve à l‟intérieur des frontières géographiques et culturelles de l‟Union peut tout
aussi bien se retrouver à l‟extérieur de ses frontières institutionnelles par son refus d‟appliquer
l‟ensemble de l‟acquis communautaire. De ce point de vue, le cas de la Turquie est problématique :
quel que soit le type de frontière que l‟on prend en compte à son égard, son appartenance à l‟Union
reste une question ouverte. Le fait que les frontières de l‟Europe ne sont pas principalement
géographiques, mais aussi culturelles et que ce fait est bien perçu comme tel à l‟intérieur de
l‟Union Européenne est révélé aussi par le fait que les aspirations européennes de la Turquie ont
accéléré le débat sur ce qu‟est et ce que devrait être l‟Union Européenne Ŕ si c‟est une construction
fondée sur le christianisme et la civilisation occidentale ou une communauté fondée sur les valeurs
démocratiques, sans rapport à l‟héritage historique ou à l‟espace géographique28. Le débat
entourant la question de l‟identité européenne de la Turquie représente une très bonne occasion
pour réfléchir à ce qu‟est l‟Europe du point de vue culturel et politique. La meilleure voie pour
donner une réponse à la question « Qu‟est-ce que l‟Europe ? » serait de préciser ce qu‟elle n‟est
pas, c‟est-à-dire « un espace de l‟amnésie et de l‟éternel début »29. Autrement dit, l‟identité
européenne de la Turquie ne peut pas être séparée du passé et du présent de l‟identité européenne
de tous les pays avec lesquels elle veut partager un avenir commun.
Plus les quatre types de frontières se superposent, mieux on peut assurer la cohérence
d‟une gouvernance démocratique de l‟Union Européenne, car les règles de la démocratie peuvent
être appliquées uniquement sur un territoire et à une population bien définis. Dans le cas contraire,
l‟UE risquerait de devenir une espèce d‟« empire néo-médiéval » 30, structuré en cercles
concentriques et à géométrie variable qui aggraverait les problèmes liés à la loyauté de ses citoyens
par rapport au projet politique européen. L‟adhésion de la Turquie à l‟Union Européenne pose le
problème de l‟élargissement dans d‟autres termes et pourrait avoir pour effet l‟un des risques
observés par J. H. H. Weiler : l‟éloignement des institutions européennes des citoyens qu‟elles
déclarent représenter31.
Vu son niveau de développement économique Ŕ au moins comparable aux pays qui ont
adhéré à l‟Union en 2004 et 2007 Ŕ, la Turquie n‟aura pas de problème, au cours des négociations
d‟adhésion, concernant l‟adaptation de l‟acquis communautaire à la législation interne, surtout dans
les domaines techniques. Mais il y a trois grandes catégories de problèmes, partiellement ou pas du
tout couverts par l‟acquis communautaire : la liberté d‟expression Ŕ à laquelle sont apparentées tant
la liberté religieuse que celle d‟association ; la solution du problème kurde et la définition du rôle
de l‟Armée dans la société. A présent, en Turquie il y a une intense dispute entre ceux qui
considèrent qu‟un changement dans ces trois domaines est nécessaire et que ceci constituerait un
prix raisonnable à payer en échange des avantages à tirer du statut de membre de l‟Union
Europeenne et ceux qui considèrent que toute modification dans ces domaines minerait les basesmêmes de l‟État turc moderne. D‟autre part, l‟Union Européenne elle-même n‟a pas précisé
clairement comment elle voudrait que ce changement se produise afin que la Turquie en devienne
membre (vu aussi les limites de ses compétences, beaucoup plus réduites en cette matière que dans
la sphère économique) et n‟a pas établi de calendrier précis pour l‟adhésion. L‟Union Européenne
peut jouer un rôle décisif dans la démocratisation et surtout dans l‟européanisation de la Turquie,
mais uniquement si son approche à l‟égard de ce pays sera moins équivoque. D‟autre part, l‟Union
ne peut pas modifier sa position à l‟égard de la Turquie autant que l‟opinion publique et les
dirigeants politiques de ses États membres ont des attitudes différentes et changeantes par rapport à
la Turquie, ce qui fait qu‟une position commune à cet égard soit difficile à établir. L‟Union
28
Nilüfer Göle, „Islam, European Public Space and Civility”, in Religion in the New Europe, ed. Krzystof
Michalski, (Budapest: Central European University Press, 2006), 123.
29
Radu Preda, „Christianity and the Limits of Europe. A Social-Theological Approach”, Eurolimes. Journal
of the Institute for Euroregional Studies, vol. 5 (Religious Frontiers of Europe), 124.
30
Jan Zielonka, „Enlargement and the Finality of European Integration”, in What Kind of Constitution for
What Kind of Polity? Responses to Joschka Fischer, (eds.) Christian JOERGES, and Yves MENY, and J. H.
H. WEILER, (San Domenico di Fiesole: European University Institute, 2000), 152.
31
J. H. H. Weiler, „Does Europe Need a Constitution? Demos, Telos and the German Maastricht Decision”,
European Law Journal, 1, 3 (1995), 232.
76
Européenne n‟a pas la capacité d‟intervenir directement pour modifier l‟actuel statu quo des
relations entre les adeptes du sécularisme dans sa forme kémaliste et les anciens islamistes
convertis à la démocratie de type occidental, même si, d‟une manière quelque peu paradoxale, ce
sont les aspirations des deux camps à l‟intégration européenne de leur pays qui ont généré l‟actuelle
situation. La raison pour laquelle l‟Union Européenne ne peut intervenir dans ce domaine est qu‟il
n‟existe pas de modèle unique, agréé dans tous les États membres, d‟un État séculier qui soit
complètement neutre par rapport à la religion. La diversité des modèles de relations entre État et
Église dans les États membres rend impossible la définition d‟un tel modèle : une Église d‟État
dirigée, même formellement, par un chef d‟État, telle qu‟elle existe en Grande Bretagne serait
inconcevable en France. Comme l‟affirmait dans une étude le Conseil Scientifique des Pays Bas
pour les Politiques Gouvernementales, « il n‟y a pas de standard européen commun auquel la
situation de la Turquie puisse être comparé et il n‟y a point de raison a priori qui détermine la
Turquie de suivre ou non un ou plusieurs modèles d‟européanisation existants »32. Il est pourtant
certain que l‟Union Européenne a l‟intérêt de procéder de manière à ce que, à un moment donné, la
Turquie, au bout de transformations dont la nature ne peut souvent pas être définie Ŕ et encore
moins anticipée Ŕ devienne l‟un de ses États membres.
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Not Over”, European Constitutional Law Review, 2: 268-292.
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(Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2004), 38.
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Dimensiunea religioasă a unui proiect politic (A soul for Europe. Religious dimension of a
political project), ed. Radu Carp (Bucureşti: Editura Fundaţiei Anastasia).
Preda, Radu (2008), „Christianity and the Limits of Europe. A Social Ŕ Theological Approach”,
Eurolimes. Journal of the Institute for Euroregional Studies, vol. 5: 120-150.
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Joerges, Yves Meny, and J. H. H. Weiler. San Domenico di Fiesole: European University
Institute.
Within a “Ring of Secure Third Countries”: Regional and Local Effects
of the Extraterritorial Engagement of the European Union in
Belarus, Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova
Helga ZICHNER1, Bettina BRUNS2
Abstract. The EU acts more and more extraterritorially, claiming to promote prosperity,
stability and security not only within the EU but within its direct neighbourhood as well. We argue
that the production of internal security (with the EU) and the production of secure milieus outside
its own territory (within third countries) are closely interconnected and pursued in heterogeneous
policy fields e.g. migration policy, education policy and the policy of welfare promotion. In much of
the contemporary research, the extraterritorial engagement is treated as a question of the innerEU dynamics. In a complementary and as we think fresh approach, we want to research the effects
the extraterritorial measures of the EU unfold in the concerned third countries. As a preparatory
step to future field work in third countries we take a look a central EU documents in order to find
out about the connection between internal and external security in the mentioned policy fields.
Keywords: EU, third countries, security, securitization, extraterritorial engagement,
migration.
In search of the common logic of the extraterritorial engagement of the EU: is it all
about security?
For quite a while already we can observe that the external dimension of the EU is gaining
in importance and that the EU acts increasingly with the ambition to promote prosperity, stability
and security in third countries, especially those in its direct neighbourhood. At the same time,
discourses and practices of securitization have multiplied, this phenomenon being registered and
analyzed critically by a number of researchers (see for example Huysmans 2000 and Andreas
2003). One example for the increasing importance of security is the restriction of the border
regime, which we will refer to as a good starting point in order to demonstrate what we are
interested in our forthcoming research project: in order to analyse the EU border regime one may
not restrict the research to the procedures at the border crossing point, but the analysis has to
include complementary procedures of this border regime that happen both outside the EU territory
(e.g. the whole visa-issuing procedure) and others which happen inside the EU territory (like
internal controls by customs, by national or border police forces). This means that places of bordercontrol have multiplied. Some of these places, e.g. consulates are situated outside the EU (and these
places are not new), the concrete sites of embassies and consulates yet representing EU territory
located outside the EU. At the same time, other parts of border control are being internalized3 as
controls may continue even if one has passed the actual border crossing points. The multiplication
of places of control and the fact that one finds many of these places in a spatial distance of the
actual (of course imagined) line of the border is the reason why one speaks also of the
delocaliziation or the de-linking of the border from its classical locus4. So, the mentioned forms of
1
Leibniz-Institute for Regional Geography.
Leibniz-Institute for Regional Geography.
3
This is why some even speak of „new borders behind old ones“, see: Kees Groenendijk, “New borders
behind old ones: post-Schengen controls behind the internal borders and inside the Netherlands and
Germany”, in In search of Europe‟s borders, ed. Kees Groenendijk, Elspeth Guild and Paul Minderhoud
(The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2003), 131-146.
4
Elspeth Guild, “The border abroad Ŕ visas and border controls”, in In search of Europe‟s borders, ed. Kees
Groenendijk, Elspeth Guild and Paul Minderhoud (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2003), 103. Similarly:
Didier Bigo and Elspeth Guild, “Policing at a distance: Schengen visa policies”, in Controlling frontiers: free
movement into and within Europe, ed. Didier Bigo and Elspeth Guild (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005), 234 and Mark
2
79
border control mentioned up to here all take place though on EU territory, even if this territory is
delocalized in some cases (e.g. embassies).
The phenomena of delocalization represent an important research matter of its own, and
we are interested in the implications of the processes of delocalization because the matter is
pointing to the blurring of the border between inside (EU) and outside (non-EU neighbour
countries). We argue that this border is even stronger blurred by other activities of the EU which
may be summed up as the extraterritorial engagement of the EU. By this term we understand
activities, programs or political measures carried out by the EU outside the sovereign territory of
the EU member states, e.g. some of the actions undertaken by the EU agency Frontex in
international waters or the pursuing of a capacity building policy in different political and societal
domains in third states. All these actions outside the EU territory are legitimated internally by the
reference to security of the EU and its citizens. In the framework of many of the measures and
actions the EU tries to bind the third states closer to the EU, by offering a certain degree of
integration to these countries. For that reason one can say also that the EU promotes inclusion and
exclusion of the surrounding third countries at the same time5.
Within the framework of our project, we plan to do ethnographic fieldwork in three
neighbouring countries, namely Belarus, Ukraine and the Republic of Moldova. We decided on
these countries because they are treated by the EU as a distinctive space of its own. This spatial unit
is called: Western newly independent states. Furthermore, these countries are interesting for us
from another point of view: as their economic and political situations are very different, it will be
interesting to see whether and in what respects the perception of the EU engagement may differ.
Fieldwork in the different countries will comprise media analysis, expert interviews, group
discussions and participant observation, depending on the concrete research issue. Besides the
country-based comparison, our project will contain another comparative dimension, because we
want to analyse the engagement of the EU and its local effects in three different policy fields,
which are education, migration and the promotion of prosperity. The intensity of the engagement
differs depending on each field, and so will do, we presume, the perception of the engagement. To
sum up one of our basic ideas, we chose firstly very different countries (which the EU despite
considerable differences in their political and social situation puts into one group) in order to see
the possibly heterogeneous effects the external engagement may produce. At the same time, we
chose different policy fields supposing that the degree of acceptance of the EU-engagement will be
different depending on the policy field. Another pragmatic reason to decide on these fields was that
they are operationalized in different EU programs so that there should be sufficient empirical
starting points for our empirical studies. The overall aim is to find out about the unintended,
respectively actual effects of the extraterritorial engagement of the EU in the different fields. Here,
we will pay attention to how it is perceived by the local population and different actor groups.
In relation to the different policy fields (migration, education, prosperity), our first aim is to
reconstruct their common logic, as they are all embedded into or being parts of the external
engagement of the EU. This initial task we will try to tackle in the rest of the article by addressing
four questions: (1) How is the external dimension linked to the matter of security? (2) How are
internal and external security linked? (3) What have migration-policy, education-policy and the
promotion of prosperity have to do with the matter of security? (4) Which is the role ascribed to the
third states the external EU policy aims at?
As a first step of our research and in order to get ready to do our empirical fieldwork, we
need to get familiar with the external engagement of the EU, especially with those dimensions of
the EU foreign policy that address the third countries we want to research. Therefore we will firstly
take at look at several central EU documents which provide the framework for developing further
5
B. Salter, “Passports, mobility, and security: how smart can the border be?” International Studies Perspectives,
5(2004), 80.
As expressed in our project title, we are interested especially in the local and regional effects the
extraterritorial engagement unfolds in the third countries. However, since our project will start only by
summer 2011, we cannot refer here to any empirical findings, so that we have to restrict ourselves in this
place to the presentation of our theoretical framework.
80
cooperation programs or other measures and instruments in relation to third countries. These
documents are the European Security Strategy (ESS in the following), entitled „A secure Europe in
a better world”6, the European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy paper7 (ENP in the following)
which was invented in order to support the ESWS, and finally the Strategy on the external
dimension of the area of freedom, security and justice8 (SED in the following). In each of the
documents the overall aim of these strategies becomes clear very quickly: it is the safeguarding of
the security within the EU, but also in the countries in its direct neighbourhood. Let us quote from
one of them:
“The purpose of this Communication is to demonstrate how the external dimension of
justice and home affairs contributes to the establishment of the internal area of freedom,
security and justice and at the same time supports the political objectives of the European
Union’s external relations, including sharing and promoting the values of freedom, security and
justice in third countries.”9 (italics in the original)
Moreover, the central role of the matter of security is reflected also in the title of the
responsible person in the European Commission, currently Catherine Ashton, who holds the
position of the “High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy”. The
policy domain at stake is called “Common Foreign and Security Policy”, so the priority given to the
matter of security is evident.
How does the EU link its external dimension to the matter of security?
Approaching the external action and thus the external dimension of the EU by the official
homepage of “European External Action Service” 10, you are offered a heterogenous list of topics
these policies aim at. Some of the topics refer to a political field without specifying a certain
geographical reference, like e.g. “Civilian Crisis Management”, “Development”, “Environment Ŕ
Green Diplomacy”, “Terrorism” or “Migration”. Others are oriented towards economy, e.g. “Trade
Ŕ bilateral relations” or the “European Economic Area (EEA)”, yet still others address to a certain
region, e.g. “Arctic Region”, “Black Sea Synergy”. Among those latter ones we also find the
“Eastern Partnership”, which is legitimated basically as follows: “What happens in the countries in
Eastern Europe and the Southern Caucasus affects the European Union. Successive EU
enlargements have brought these countries closer to the EU and their security, stability and
prosperity increasingly impact on the EU’s. The potential these countries offer for diversifying
the EU‟s energy supplies is one example”11 (our emphasis).
The matter of security is put to the fore and this is valid not only with reference to the
relation the EU evolves with third countries in the East, but seems to be characteristic for the EU‟s
external dimension in general: “The projection of the values underpinning the area of freedom,
security and justice is essential in order to safeguard the internal security of the EU. Menaces such
as terrorism, organised crime and drug trafficking also originate outside of the EU. It is thus crucial
that the EU develop a strategy to engage with third countries worldwide” 12. The orientation towards
the matter of security results thus from the perception of a whole scenario of dangers residing
outside the EU, potentially threatening or challenging the internal security of the EU. This idea of
producing a “secure Europe” is not exactly new but has gained increased importance since the
events of 9/11 in 2001, the challenge of facing potential terrorist attacks being mentioned
6
A secure Europe in a better World. European Security Strategy. Brussels, 12th December 2003.
http://www.consilium.europa.eu/uedocs/cmsUpload/78367.pdf, ESS in the following.
7
Communication from the Commission: European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper, Brussels, 12.5.2004,
COM(2004) 373 final. http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/strategy/strategy_paper_en.pdf, ENP in the following.
8
Communication from the Commission: A strategy on the external dimension of the area of freedom, security
and justice, Brussels, 12.10.2005, COM(2005) 491 final. (CELEX 52005DC0491), SED in the following.
9
SED, 4, italics in the original.
10
Homepage of the European External Action Service: http://eeas.europa.eu/policies/index_en.htm (accessed
May 11, 2011)
11
Cited from the internet http://eeas.europa.eu/eastern/index_en.htm (accessed May 11, 2011).
12
SED, 3.
81
afterwards in the first place13. Very roughly one can say, that it is in the context of these events, that
also the European border regime has been redesigned and restricted throughout the last decade, or at
least that the efforts to do so were reinforced after 9/1114. Besides that, the term leaves open on first
sight whether it refers only to the security within the EU or also to the surrounding third countries.
Generally, one can state that the increasing role and communication about security matters, and thus
the increasing discourses of securitization is a phenomenon that has been critically noticed for quite a
while already. By „securitization” we mean that certain issues are transformed into matters of
security, whereas before they have been discussed under different prefixes. A good example is the
matter of migration, which may be discussed under the aspects of the right for asylum or certain forms
of welcomed (qualified) work migration, but is now considered almost exclusively in terms of
potential risks: “…the Schengen process has led to the portrayal of migration as a security issue
(rather than primarily a social, economic or ethical issue)”15.
The argumentative chain employed by the EU can be summed up as follows: the alert
events of 9/11 put not only the EU into, was intensified in the course of the following enlargement
rounds because the integration of East European countries into the EU moved the EU
geographically closer to those regions of the world (potential) risks are (potentially) originating
from. Moving the external borders eastward in the framework of the last rounds of EUenlargements meant not only a geographical relocation but also altered their meaning and function.
Thus, former “bilateral” borders between two states became external borders of the EU or even the
Schengen-space, influencing not only the life-world of local people in affected border-zones but the
interstate, bilateral relations of the concerned countries. Securing the external border implicates
measures both inside the EU and outside, if we think of visa procedures, the training of third states‟
customs officers16 or the continuation of controls inside the EU-territory. Inside and outside begin
to overlap and we argue that this is happening also to the matters of internal and external security,
respectively, that these processes are closely interconnected.
How are internal and external security linked?
The interesting point for us and others in discourses about security is that the matters of
internal and external security as they are discussed by European politics, become increasingly
intermingled, respectively, that the border between them becomes blurred. The catchphrase-like
core assumption of the EU reads as follows: „internal and external security are inseparable”17.
Why is this so? The EU supposes that the security within the EU can only be safeguarded
if the security in the close neighbourhood can be guaranteed, too. As we will see, the EU is
inventing a lot of instruments in order to produce this external security, thereby blurring the line
between internal an external, like on a Möbius ribbon, as Didier Bigo observed: “The
transnationalization of security opposes national (and societal) security. It creates like in a Möbius
ribbon, a situation where one never knows whether one is inside or outside”18. But how exactly is
this border getting blurred (and is it really getting so blurred that you never know whether you are
inside or outside?)? Let us see in a first step, how the EU describes the relationship between
internal and external beyond the above mentioned “catchphrase” before we elaborate sketchily on
some.
13
Ibidem.
Peter Andreas, “Redrawing the line: borders and security in the twenty-first century”, International Security
28 (Fall 2003): 78-111 and Salter.
15
Salter, 82.
16
See for example a “The 4th meeting of the Eastern Partnership Integrated Border Management Panel (Vilnius, 31
March 2011)“, aiming at the exchange of best practices on integrated border management,
http://eeas.europa.eu/eastern/docs/2011_03_ibm_panel_en.pdf.
17
Vermerk des Vorsitzes für den Rat (Allgemeine Angelegenheiten)/Europäischen Rat 17024/09. Betr.: Das
Stockholmer Programm Ŕ Ein offenes und sicheres Europa im Dienste und zum Schutz der Bürger.
http://register.consilium.europa.eu/pdf/de/09/st17/st17024.de09.pdf
18
Didier Bigo “When two become one. Internal and external securitisations in Europe”, in International
relations theory and the politics of European integration: power, security and community, ed. Morten
Kelstrup and Michael C. Williams (London: Routledge, 2000), 171.
14
82
Basically, the EU delivers two arguments in order to legitimate its increasingly external
engagement. On the one hand, it is the increasing geographical proximity to third states resulting from
the enlargement process: “The integration of acceding states increases our security but also brings the
EU closer to troubled areas”19. In this perspective, the EU keeps its character as a secure area in contrast
to the environment, perceived as troubled and thus insecure. This also means that the EU upholds a clear
distinction between inside (EU) and outside (Non-EU), yet the buffer between the EU and “troubled”
areas threatens to shrink if one does not succeed in building “a ring of well governed countries”20 Ŕ in
other words “secure” third states Ŕ around the EU. According to the second argument, it is nevertheless
exactly this border between inside and outside, respectively secure and insecure, which is increasingly
under pressure because of the process of globalisation: “The post cold war environment is one of
increasingly open borders in which the internal and external aspects of security are indissolubly
linked”21. Furthermore: “In an era of globalisation, distant threats may be as much a concern as those
that are near at hand”22. These quotations make clear that even without the increasing geographical
proximity the problem would be perceived quite similarly because according to this point of view the
impermeable character of borders changed23 so that potential dangers are getting closer in the sense of
being more easily able to penetrate into secure territories. At this point we should take a look at what
dangers, respectively threats or put more mildly “challenges” are at stake: as we mentioned in the
beginning, much of the security discourses have been coined in the aftermath of the events of 9/11 and
also the European Security Strategy was developed in that period. The potential dangers, localized
outside the EU comprise terrorism (in the first place), proliferation of weapons of mass destruction,
regional conflicts, state failure and organized crime24. As the EU observes, these threats differ in
character to threats in previous times, like e.g. the scenario of a large-scale aggression against any
member state25. Therefore also the concept of self-defence was changed, with some relevance to the role
of the border between inside and outside: “Our traditional concept of self-defence Ŕ up to and including
the cold war Ŕ was based on the threat of invasion. With the new threats, the first line of defence will
often be abroad. […] Conflict prevention cannot start too early”26 (our italics). So, it is not the border
itself which gets blurred - because the rhetoric of “invasion”, “self-defence” and “abroad” imply very
clearly both an inside and an outside Ŕ but the matters of internal and external security begin to overlap.
This is so because the EU considers that in order to maintain (or secure) the border and the security
within its borders it has become necessary to act more and more outside its borders, namely “abroad”.
Therefore, the Möbius ribbon metaphor catches very well the extremely close tie between internal and
external security which the EU stresses herself.
But what does this mean in practice? What political instruments has the EU invented in
order to realize its aim of a ring of well governed countries?
What do migration and education policy and the promotion of prosperity have to do with
the matter of security?
It is our hypothesis that it is in the name of “internal security or of a „secure Europe” that the
EU tries to shape the living conditions in third countries in many dimensions and by many different
instruments and measures, some of them addressing the matters of education, migration and the
promotion of prosperity. Towards this aim, the EU engages more and more extraterritorially and
legitimates this internally by pointing to the well being of the EU citizens but also by the well-being of
19
ESS, 8.
Ibidem.
21
ESS, 2.
22
ESS, 6.
23
We assume that it is too general to state that borders are becoming increasingly open. This is valid only for
certain entries, e.g. qualified work migration or tourism or in terms of the frontier free area within which
people (EU-citizens), goods or services may move freely. Therefore, we together with others (Andreas,
Salter) think the term “smart border” being more appropriate to characterize the EU-borders: allowing for
desired entries, yet impermeable to undesired ones.
24
ESS, 2-5.
25
ESS, 3.
26
ESS, 7.
20
83
non-EU people respectively countries. The fundamental motivation is contained e.g. also in the
European Security Strategy: “The best protection for our security is a world of well-governed
democratic states. Spreading good governance, supporting social and political reform […] are the best
means of strengthening the international order.”27 We mention the ESS at this point once more, because
as we will see, some strategies within the framework of the external dimension of the EU are derived
directly from the ESS, or created in order to support the initial ESS.
This is especially the case with the European Neighbourhood Policy Strategy Paper (ENP),
where the reader is presented the same scenario as in the ESS: “We have acquired new neighbours and
have come closer to old ones. These circumstances have created both opportunities and challenges. The
European Neighbourhood Policy is a response to this new situation. It will also support to realise the
objectives of the European Security Strategy”28. The coherence with respect to the estimation of the
current political situation is of course not very surprising, which implies that the matter of security is of
great importance for the ENP, too. In comparison to the ESS however, the rhetoric of the ENP builds far
more on the question of commitment to same values. Concerning the priorities for action in the
framework of the ENP, we read: “Action plans will cover two broad areas: first, commitments to
specific actions which confirm or reinforce adherence to shared values and to certain objectives in the
area of foreign and security policy; secondly, commitments to actions will bring partner countries closer
to the EU in a number of priority fields”29. The relation between values like e.g. pluralism, tolerance,
justice, solidarity freedom etc. and the matter of security is not specified in detail here. If we bear in
mind, however, passages from other papers30, we can draw the conclusion that security itself
represents one of the central values from the point of view of European foreign policy. In that way,
the matter of security becomes charged with values and the accomplishment of other objectives is
measured according to its contribution to produce security (internally and externally).
Finally turning to the three policy areas (promotion of prosperity, education and
migration), we can say in relation to the promotion that this policy area enters the ENP in a twofold manner: On the one hand, it is regarded rather an intended side-effect of the measures
undertaken in order to strengthen third countries economically: “The approach proposed by the
ENP has important economic implications, as it envisages enhanced preferential trade relations and
increased financial and technical assistance. […] The ENP has a potential to improve economic and
social conditions in the EU neighbourhood” 31. As the beneficial side effects are considered
potentially difficult to deliver, it is suggested on the other hand to promote prosperity (respectively
welfare) also directly: “The extent to which the ENP is perceived as beneficial depends on its
effects on living standards. Participation in the ENP project should be accompanied by active
policies to address poverty and inequality” 32. In order to highlight the relation between welfare
issues respectively poverty issues and the matter of security, we need to go back to the ESS, in
which poverty is mentioned as the first global challenge giving “rise to pressing security
concerns”33, since it often coincides with conflict and insecurity according to the ESS34. So
basically we can say that the engagement in order to promote welfare in third countries is
considered as necessary if the ENP as a whole shall be successful.
With reference to the matter of education we can see a similar argumentation. Education is
strongly connected to the matter of stability, like in the following quotation: “The reform and
modernisation of learning systems is a sine qua non condition for the economic competitiveness
27
ESS, 10.
ENP, 2.
29
ENP, 9.
30
“Security is a precondition to development” (ESS, 9) and “The purpose of the Communication is to
demonstrate how the external dimension of justice and home affairs contributes to the internal area of
freedom, security and justice […] including sharing and promoting the values of freedom, security and
justice in third countries” (SED, 4).
31
ENP, 14.
32
Ibidem.
33
ESS, 2.
34
ESS, 2.
28
84
and the social and political stability of partner countries”35. As the matter of stability is closely
connected to that of security, the link seems to be easily retraceable. Yet, there is another aspect
about education which can be related to the two main priorities for action of the ENP which we
mentioned above. This aspect becomes clearer, if we take into consideration what is said about the
EU-education program “Tempus”36, addressed especially to the “partner countries”, among them
the ones from Eastern Europe. The aim of the Tempus-program is “to enhance their quality and
relevance, and to increase convergence with EU developments”37. The geographical approximation
since the last enlargements (the “new” situation presented in the introductions both to the ESS and
to the ENP) shall be accompanied by a kind of value-based approximation to the EU-standards,
considered as a way to produce stability and thus contributing to security.
In order to analyse the link between migration and security we have to return once more to the
“Strategy on the external dimension of the area of freedom, security and justice” from 2005 (SED),
mentioned in the beginning of our article, because migration does not figure among the problems
addressed explicitly within ENP strategy paper. Again, the basic argumentative chain suggesting already
migration issues can be found on page four of the SED, where it is argued that the freedom, security and
justice issues are central in order to achieve stability and security both within and outside the EU.
Furthermore, the promotion of free movement together with more open borders has to go hand in hand
with an efficient border management, the safekeeping of independent and efficient judiciaries, rule of
law and the establishment of a fully functioning asylum system. Finally and more explicitly, the
“security umbrella” is spanned by pointing to the crucial role, which external policies have in promoting
security and stability38, before “cross-border challenges such as migration, border-management and
organized crime”39. The tasks for third countries would be to “improve [their, HZ & BB] capacity for
migration management and refugee protection in accordance with international law; support their
operational border management capacity; enhance document security; prevent illegal migration […]”40.
Ultimately, this aims at securing the capacity of preventing undesired entries into the EU.
Potentially illegal migrants are to stay or to be resettled in the third countries41 and thus
externalizing the problem and consequences of unwelcomed forms of migration. As others have
observed this creates a “liberal paradox”42 for the EU resulting from the collision between the
liberal wish for ever more open borders for economic transactions and the wish for an effective
control about who enters the state territory. It has been critically observed by current research 43 that
EU states try to delegate the control of access to their territories to third states, in other words to
externalize this control. According to Mau et al.44 this can be interpreted as the trial to find a spatial
solution to the liberal paradox and to gain control over migration processes without having to take
over the responsibility to grant them the rights they may claim. With respect to our research
project, this critical observation has to be evaluated against the background of a further analysis of
35
ENP, 20.
The European Commission on Education and Training: “Tempus: modernising higher education in EU
neighbours”,
http://ec.europa.eu/education/external-relation-programmes/doc70_en.htm (accessed May 11, 2011).
37
Ibidem.
38
SED, 5.
39
Ibidem.
40
SED, 6.
41
See in this respect also the Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on
regional protection programmes, Brussels, 1.9.2005, COM(2005) 388 final.
42
James Hollifeld, „Offene Wirtschaft und nationales Bürgerrecht: das liberale Paradox“, in Migration im
Spannungsfeld von Globalisierung und Nationalstaat, ed. Dietrich Thränhardt and Uwe Hunger,
(Wiesbaden: Westdeutscher Verlag, 2003), 35-57 and Steffen Mau et al., “Grenzen in der globalisierten
Welt. Selektivität, Internationalisierung, Exterritorialisierung“, Leviathan 36(2008): 123-148.
43
See Lena Laube, Die räumliche Dimension der Migrationskontrolle: über die Verhinderung unerwünschter
Grenzüberschreitungen im Kontext liberaler Nationalstaaten. Diploma Thesis, University of Bremen, 2007.
44
Mau et al., 143.
36
85
legislative materials and the empirical reality, nevertheless other authors are pointing to a similar
direction45.
To sum this chapter up, we may say that basically all three policy fields are placed under
the umbrella of security. Security represents the context and priority of the external dimension of
the EU as a whole, while other aims are derived from it. As such it can be considered the
precondition for the realization of any other goal or implementation of other value systems but at
the same time, the formulation of objectives in other fields is made under the premise that these in
turn shall contribute to the production of security.
Creating, including and excluding (secure) third states – what role ascriptions for
neighbouring countries?
Considering exemplarily the action plan, the EU has worked out within the framework of
the ENP for the Rep. of Moldova, we can see, that the EU tries to influence the countries in many
ways. The set “priorities for action” comprise political, juridical, social measures to be taken by the
Rep. of Moldova, measures that shall affect the social and political sphere, as well as the civil
society and economy. It would transgress the scope of the article to describe the range of the far
reaching reforms required by the EU in detail, therefore we would just like to stress the basic idea
that shines through even if we take a look only at the used vocabulary: “Adopt”, “align”,
“converge”, “implement” or “streamline” are found on almost every page of the plan and represent
expressions that aim at changing something in a certain way according to a pre-stabilized standard,
in this case the standards as they are set by the EU. Here is an example that demonstrates this
aspect, taken from the chapter 2.1 of the action plan called “Political dialogue and reform”: “Put in
place and implement appropriate legal framework guaranteeing the freedom of expression and of
the media, in line with European standards and on the basis of the recommendations of the Council
of Europe”46. Even if at the risk over over-interpreting the wording of the quotation, we would like
to draw the attention to the expression “put in place”: the aim of the ENP, meant to support the ESS
as part of the external dimension, is to transfer the current rules of the game of the EU to countries
outside the EU. This “game” is about producing a secure place or sphere, respectively a ring of
well-governed countries surrounding the EU. To put it differently we could say that the EU tries to
expand the validity of certain rules which make the EU a safe place, which in consequence would
lead to the transformation of the environment into a safe place. On this basis and in perspective
then, certain tasks could be extraterritorialized or delegated to these newly secure third states,
especially in migration issues. To realize this, it is e.g. necessary to “improve cooperation regarding
the efficient management of migration flows and on readmission of own nationals, persons without
nationality and third country nationals” or to “start developing a comprehensive education and
training strategy on state border management, including improved understanding of Schengen rules
and standards”47.
Altogether, the different measures of streamlining shall have the effect to approximate the
countries in question to EU standards48. They shall become alike and thus close to European standards,
which at the same time means becoming less strange or dangerous. We argue that the EU tries to bind
these third countries to the space of the EU. This “binding” happens in two different dimensions: one is
the aspect of binding the countries by the means of extraterritorializing certain political tasks for which
basically the EU holds responsible. This kind of binding presupposes the above mentioned
approximation to EU standards because otherwise the delegated tasks cannot be accomplished in the
intended way. Another way of binding, in way representing the reward for the third countries doing an
45
Virginie Guiraudon, “De-nationalizing control: analyzing state responses to constraints on migration
control”, in Controlling a new migration world, ed. Virginie Guiraudon and Christian Joppke (London:
Routledge, 2001), 31-64 and Virginie Guiraudon and Christian Joppke, „Controlling a new migration
world”, in Controlling a new migration world, ed. Virginie Guiraudon and Christian Joppke (London:
Routledge, 2001), 1-27.
46
EU/Moldova Action Plan, http://ec.europa.eu/world/enp/pdf/action_plans/moldova_enp_ap_final_en.pdf (9).
47
EU/Moldova Action Plan, (47) and (49).
48
EU/Moldova Action Plan, introduction, 2.
86
effort to approximate to the EU standards, is to offer them not only the role of partners (taking over some
tasks) but to offer them the perspective of an inclusion into the space of the EU: “The European
Neighbourhood Policy opens new partnership perspectives: the perspective of moving beyond
cooperation to a significant degree of integration, including through a stake in the EU‟s Internal Market,
and the possibility for Moldova to participate progressively in key aspects of EU policies and
programmes”49. So it is not only by the externalization of certain tasks that the border between inside
and outside or between internal and external security gets blurred but also by integrating the countries
partially in the sense of according them a certain degree of participation in the EU‟s institutions. Again,
examples may be given from very different policy areas, like e.g. better access to the European Research
Area, deepened trade relations, but above all the access to financial support in order to realize the
requested reforms, here one has to mention especially the European Neighbourhood Policy Instrument.
On the other hand, however, it is clear that no matter how well the approximation
succeeds, these countries will not become full EU-members and as non-members, they will remain
on the outside of an increasingly fortified border, nevertheless (paradoxically even) being involved
in the processes of making this border a secure one. They are expected to sign (reciprocal)
readmission agreements (Ukraine and Moldova have signed already such agreements) by which
persons from third countries residing in the EU without a valid residence permit/visa may be sent
back to the respective third country50. Many of the citizens of these countries have problems of
successfully applying for a Schengen-visa, as our previous research showed 51. So despite other
forms of participation or gradual inclusion, in many respects, the outsider status remains very clear.
Look-out
The synchrony of inclusion and exclusion and the creation of a ring a secure third
countries as a spatial unit of its own can be summed up altogether by the word “buffer zone”: “an
area designed to separate”52. In order to fulfil the task of buffering, respectively protecting the EU
from certain risks, the aimed at buffer zone has to be prepared for the tasks of protection, because
not long ago the countries in the respective geographical area were considered being part of the
insecure area.
We expect that the processes of producing a secure “buffer zone” produce ambivalent
effects in the affected countries. Whether these effects unfold inclusionary or exclusionary effects
and especially who is being affected in how far by these effects will depend on the actor group, or
even on the assumed role of a single actor: think of a person being member of the Moldovan border
police staff. In his/her official function as representative of the border police, he/she may be
included into the EU border policy, contributing in this way to promote integrative processes in
other policy areas (trade for example). At the same time, the very same person may be confronted
with the exclusionary effects of exactly the same border if applying unsuccessfully for a visa.
In place of conclusions, we would like to stress the central research goals of our
forthcoming project: First of all, it is our aim to complement research approaches which
concentrate largely on the EU by focussing on the local effects in third countries. According to this,
we want to lay emphasis on the perspective of these countries, thereby looking at the involved
actors/actor groups in the third countries not only as receivers or addressees of EU measures, but to
analyse, how they perceive and handle these effects. This shall include also an analysis of their
motivations to accept and to participate (in) the EU-engagement or the implemented measures.
49
EU/Moldova Action Plan, 2.
“Readmission agreements with Eastern European countries, with the exception of Russia”,
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/justice_freedom_security/free_movement_of_persons_asylum_immigr
ation/l14163_en.htm.
51
Bettina Bruns et al., „Grenzüberschreitende ökonomische Praktiken an den östlichen EU-Außengrenzen Ŕ
der Umgang von Kleinhändlern und Kleinhändlerinnen sowie Unternehmern und Unternehmerinnen mit
Grenzregimen“, in Alltag im Grenzland. Schmuggel als ökonomische Strategie im Osten Europas, ed.
Mathias Wagner and Wojciech Lukowski, (Wiesbaden: VS Verlag, 2010), 129-146.
52
http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/buffer%20zone.
50
87
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s_asylum_immigration/l14163_en.htm
Europe’s Gordian Knot. Germany
Andreea Crina HOREA1
Abstract. The present paper proposes an analysis of the European enlargement process,
from the point of view of one of its major actors, a founding member state, Germany, and its
involvement in shaping the policies of the European Communities, regarding economy, security,
unique market and Eastern enlargement. Germany represents a special case, a state with an
outstanding character and a surprising historical evolution, worth being studied. The following
pages shall reveal the binomial Germany – Europe in its evolution post reunification period,
stressing the farther involvements of the German unity, the attitude of its neighbors, determined by
interests and the geographic position, a mixture of sympathy, neutrality or hostility towards the
German state.
Keywords: European integration, borders, enlargement, key member, partnership
The last decade has witnessed unprecedented events in Europe, the fall of communist regimes
lead to a radical restructuring of the Eastern and Western Europe. On the one hand, the European
Communities turned into the European Union, a complex structure both in terms of political and
economic as well: in 1992, the Treaty of Maastricht (Treaty on European Union) aims at completing the
single market, establishes an Economic Monetary Union, whose main purpose is the adoption of the
single currency, the euro by the Member States and defines the political component of the European
Union, cooperation in Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), Justice and Home Affairs; the
Treaty of Amsterdam continues this process by introducing the Schengen Agreement and the Protocol
on social policy within the Treaty on European Policy. On the other hand, the changes in the countries of
Eastern and Central Europe determined the EU Member States launch the process of reunification of the
European space by signing the European Agreements and accepting the new European democracies to
join the European Union. The historic imperative of the EU enlargement faces the current
developments of the European institutions and policies, requiring thus the premises for a good
report between the thoughts on the future of the EU and the need to put into practice these points of
view, resolving therefore the historic debate between supernationalits (national states fighting for
supranational state formation, which involves the territorial redistribution of political power) and
intergovernmentalists (national states remain key players in the European political space, sovereign
and with constitutional mandate, in contrast with the limited powers of the EU).
The EU has emerged as a complex system of rights and obligations stated itself as a major
player on the international political and economic scene, as well as a forum for dialogue and
negotiation of local, regional, national and transnational interests. Created initially as a solution to
European security and stability issues, the EU has come to represent the most ambitious integration
project in the history of the continent. Furthermore it is the time for an analysis of the future of the
European Union and the directions it shall follow, starting from Germany‟s key part and its
national leaders in the transformations of internal European borders in the process of enlarging
Europe from the Europe of 6 to Europe of 27.
The present paper proposes, in this way, the analysis of the European enlargement
process, from the point of view of one of its major actors, a founding member state, Germany, and
its involvement in shaping the policies of the European Communities, regarding economy, security,
unique market and Eastern enlargement. Germany represents a special case, a state with an
outstanding character and a surprising historical evolution, worth being studied. The objective is to
follow the binomial Germany Ŕ Europe in its evolution post reunification period, revealing the
farther involvements of the German unity, the attitude of its neighbors, determined by interests and
1
Babeş-Bolyai University, Cluj Napoca.
90
the geographic position, a mixture of sympathy, neutrality or hostility towards the German state.
The article starts from the hypothesis that Germany has played a key role in the foundation, the
construction and farther shaping and enlarging of the European Communities‟ borders.
There are two important questions that this article will give an answer to: is Germany a
model, an example for Europe and does the European integration process bear the mark of
Germany? And the second significant question of this research is whether Germany is a promoter
of the European enlargement?
The methodology used will go through a historical approach, based on the analysis of the
European construction‟s phases and how has Germany been involved, its main part and
achievements from historical point of view, supported by a qualitative analysis, of the official
documents and papers related to the EU and Germany‟s part in the construction process, as well as
of the official speeches belonging to German authorities, stressing Germany‟s motivation for its
involvement within the European integration process. Furthermore, there will also be taken into
consideration the EU‟s enlargement strategies and their principles related to Germany‟s influence
and part in their development and implementation: the European Neighborhood Policy (ENP), the
ENP+, Central Asia Strategy and the Strategic Partnership with Russia. The research design will
follow three parameters: where (the main focus goes Ŕ on Germany and the European integration
process, from the Europe of the 6 to the 27), what (at what level can the German influence be
observed Ŕ economical, political and geostrategical level) and how (through which means will be
made the validation of these hypothesis Ŕ document analysis, official strategies and process
interpretation). It will consist of four chapters. First of them focuses on Germany and the beginning
of the European Communities, revealing how the European integration process has been
economically marked by Germany, through the creation of the European Monetary System (EMS)
and the adhering to the European Community of some important countries (such as Great Britain,
Denmark), thus influencing the farther European integration process. The other two following
chapters, Germany‟s part in shaping Europe and Germany versus Europe, are meant to prove how
Germany has put its distinctive mark at both political and geostrategical level of the integration
process and moreover of the enlargement of the EU: countries that were below the European
Communities‟ level, but with great strategically importance in terms of the European Communities‟
borders‟ security and stability. As regarding the conclusions, these will present the answers to the
two questions of this research and highlight the key central part that Germany has played all
throughout the European integration process and plays in the enlargement process, especially
regarding the Eastern enlargement of the EU, towards Ukraine, Republic Moldova and Belarus.
Therefore, such an analysis and analogy worth being studied: the Gordian knot represents
the difficult, the intractable and often the insolvable problem. Constructing the new Europe was a
war. Victory came through struggle. It required cunning and guile and superior strategy. And this is
what Germany has brought to Europe: “Turn him to any cause of policy/ The Gordian Knot of it he
will unloose/ Familiar as his garter…” (Shakespeare, Henry V, Act 1, Scene 1, 45-47).
Germany and the beginning of the European Communities
On May 9, 1950, in the Clock Room of the Quai d'Orsay, the Foreign Minister Robert
Schuman made public France‟s offer to Germany to pool the coal and steel production, wanting to
create a policy of heavy industry in Western Europe. The Schuman Plan was innovative in its
essence, combining a technical solution and a complex political project 2: “France and Germany‟s
secular opposition was to be eliminated”, given the fact that, in his conception, „Europe shall be
created through real achievements: a common heavy industry that will be the core of a large and
deep community.”3 The institutions were already drafted, so that on the 18th of April 1951 the
Treaty creating ECSC (European Coal and Steal Community) has been adopted, a treaty that
asserted Germany not only as a member of ECSC, but also as a founding member of the European
Community, revealing therefore the one opportunity the German economy needed and expected in
2
Adrian Liviu Ivan, Sub zodia Statelor Unite ale Europei. De la ideea şi planurile de unitate Europeană la
Europa supranaţională, (Cluj Napoca: Ecumenica, 2006), 113.
3
Charles Zorgbibe, Construcţia europeană: trecut, prezent, viitor, (Bucureşti: Trei, 1998), ch. 3.
91
order to bloom. A specific invitation of the German Government, although the community was
open also for other countries in Europe: thus Germany‟s endorsement was won, along with those of
Italy and Benelux, the UK remained hostile to the idea of giving away part of sovereignty.
On June 20, 1950 takes place the Conference in Paris, bringing together the six countries
and which will result in the elaboration of a Convention draft and the adoption of the Treaty
establishing the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) on April 18, 1951. Thus, the
common market was created, the customs duties and quantitative restrictions on free movement of
goods have been abolished, and the discriminating measures are prohibited as well as the subsidies
or help from the state. The principle of free competition was established, although the Community
controlled the regular supply and fixed the price at the lowest level. The ratification of the treaty
would know most delays from France, where the government was facing a double opposition, on
the one hand the French Communist Party and the People's Assembly and on the other hand,
General de Gaulle‟s. However, the Treaty will enter into force on 25 July 1952 and the Common
Market was opened on February 10, 1953 for coal, iron ore and for steel on 1 of May 1953.
Subsequently, the French will launch the idea of transposition the Schuman Plan in the military
field, by creating a European Defense Community, based on a common European army and that
shall be attached to Europe‟s political institutions. An idea that will lead to even more contradictory
discussions, because for some CECA was seen as a way to get German rearmament, while others,
especially the U.S. tried to delay the rearmament of the German state. Confusion that dominated
and divided the internal political German life state: peace movement opposed rearmament, socialdemocratic opposition demanded for RFG equal rights and a strong defense along the Elbe, while
the Bonn government remained reluctant, what was important for him was the guarantee that the
system that will be applied will not be too discriminatory. Thus, Germany became in 1950 not only
a member of the ECSC, but also a founding member of the European Community, whose purpose
was to create a single common market, in order to ensure the free movement of goods, persons,
capital and services between Member States, opening the opportunity that the German economy
needed to explode. From the very first beginning and founding of the European Community,
Germany played its key part in shaping the evolution of the European integration process and
drawing the lines of its enlargement.
The 1957 Treaty of Rome4, establishing the European Economic Community marked the
beginning of the story of the European integration, with main focus on developing the economies
of Western Europe by strengthening cooperation and giving greater depth to cooperation and on
promoting trade among the founder nations. The treaty logically entailed the creation of a common
market with no trade barriers, a decision with great impact on the pace of European unification.
The goals behind the notion of a “common market” required an authority that created a specific
order, the European Commission as an administrative body that was above the interests of
individual states. The treaty brought the dismantling of internal borders and thus the freedom of
goods, services, capital and labor, resulting in the single European market in 1992. The institutional
consequences of these economic changes stimulated the various reform stages that led to
integration Ŕ from the expansion of the Commission, the direct election of the European Parliament
and the extension of common areas of responsibility to major reforms in the form of the Treaties of
Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice.
Once unified and asserted among wealthy democratic states, influential on the
international scene, Germany has not adopted a restrained attitude towards Europe. For the French,
the inclusion of Germany in the European cooperative economic structures was a step forward,
positive, because the German state had so many more interests in common with his neighbors than
reason to start war against them. While for the German policy this was the perfect opportunity to
ensure their peaceful prosperity through economic cooperation, as chancellor Schroeder described
4
Josef Janning, Germany in Europe, Facts about Germany: Germany in Europe, accessed March 3rd, 2009,
http://www. Tatsachen-ueber-deutschland.de/en/foreign-policy/main-content-05
92
it, in one of his speeches in 2005: „Due to the political and economic development of Germany, we
have a particular responsibility in Europe, but we never had pretensions to leadership”. 5
Instead, Germany has started tying the knot around it: has intensified its cooperation with
European neighbors and EU partners, especially with France, the Franco-German tandem being the
engine of European cooperation, „EU integrator axis”6, the major difference between them is only
referring to the vision upon the EU institutional architecture:
 Germany claimed a supranational solution, strongly supporting the European Parliament;
 France claimed intergovernmentalism.
Affirming Germany within the European Community had from the very first beginning
some internal obstacles, the typical federalism in which the Länder governments, responsible for
certain policy areas and sectors have come to a competition and constant friction with the federal
government and the Bundesrat. Germany has become the leading state especially in the area of
monetary integration and exchange rate mechanism and the Common Agricultural Policy.
Germany's European policy has been driven by interests related to the scope of competition and a
number of government agencies, framed within the „frames” and subject to individual ministries
German bureaucratic procedures.
In 70‟s, Chancellor Helmut Schmidt wanted to continue promoting the process of
European integration and monetary cooperation by launching a series of internal negotiations on
achieving a European Monetary System. Therefore, although the EMS was Schmidt's work and
moreover the first major act of the German leadership in the history of the Community, the German
financial system has strenuously opposed the adoption of EMS. But Germany has benefited from
domestic trade during the 1980s, increasing its exports within the EU with a rate of approximately
28%; it became a major beneficiary of trade liberalization and looked more interested in the
maintenance of a system whose main winner was: the country that pays the most has also the right
to most concessions.7 However, the acceptance of a monetary frame, even though rigid, and the
results brought by the year 1980, revealed the superiority of the German mark in the EMS, but they
came also as a result of the coalition of governments in neighboring countries, and of the influence
that Germany was beginning to assert. The German Federal Bank has dominated the EMS from its
beginning, placing the German mark in a central, hegemonic role. The European Monetary Project
bears the mark of the German model, which has been implemented at European level through the
existence of an independent Central Bank (after the model of the Bundesbank), that was meant to
guarantee the monetary stability, based on a social consensus and a rigorous budgetary policy. The
German strictness in the monetary field is explained by the state‟s history. 8
The policy of the German Central Bank has played a decisive role in the evolution of the
EMS, supporting an independent monetary policy, for as long as it serves correctly its objective,
that is to control the inflation in Germany and guarantee the credibility of the German mark, it also
serves the interests of its European partners. The EMS has become an important instrument in the
fight against inflation, and its creation meant the acceptance of the German policy‟s priorities. 9
Still, the EMS has been a success, its member states managing to give more freedom to the
mobility of capital, by removing any restrictions. The most important result has been the
enhancement of the preoccupations for the integration process, which led in 1986 to the European
Single Act, in order to create the common market, and in 1989 to the Report over the Economic
and Monetary Union.
5
John Bendix, “Germany,” in European Politics, ed. Collin Hay et al., (Oxford: Oxford University Press,
2007), 1.
6
Luciana Alexandra Ghica, Enciclopedia Uniunii Europene, (Bucureşti: Meronia, 2007), 168.
7
Paulette Kurzer, “The new Germany in Europe: an emerging hegemon?” Research Group International
Relations (Forschungsgruppe Internationale Beziehungen), Publication Series of the International Research
Group, Reichpietschufer, 50, FIB Papers: 2.
8
Mircea Coşea, Economia Integrării Europene, (Bucureşti: Pro Universitaria, 2007), 182.
9
Maria Bârsan, Integrare Economică Europeană, vol I, Introducere în teorie şi practică, (Cluj: Carpatica,
1995), 125.
93
The single currency was an extension of the EMS, inside which the German mark played
the key part of main reference, fact stipulated also by the Maastricht Treaty, and the additional
clause, the Monetary Stability pact, approved in Dublin, in 1996. Germany has become the largest
net contributor to EU budget, with a substantial contribution to the financial support of the new
Member States. Although cooperation between the two countries has been somewhat difficult,
Germany has learned to cooperate with its traditional rival, a true exercise in preparation for taking
over his new geopolitical role as the „Land der Mitte” between the West and the new 10 eastern
European members, which have joined the EU in 2004.
Germany‟s part in shaping Europe
Despite the supranational dimensions and the features of multilevel governance that the EU
proved from its very first beginning, the interests and the preferences of national governments still
mattered and matter, and in particular those of the largest and most powerful member states. Therefore
the EU Ostpolitik and the issue of enlargement were to be translated through he interests and preferences
of Germany. Fact due to Germany‟s size and power and its geographical location on the eastern edge of
the EU, which made it both vulnerable to the instability typical to the Eastern Europe, but also the
country most likely to benefit from the stability and prosperity in post communist Europe.10
Germany‟s role has been particularly influential in steering the direction of integration
among the large founding members, it has been constantly supportive of both widening and
deepening.11 Thus, no more statements are required to say that in 1973 it supported the
enlargement, the tow stage Mediterranean enlargement and the Free Trade Association (EFTA) enlargement of 1995. Its geographical position, as well as its security and economic interest in
Eastern Europe made it very clear that the EU‟s eastern enlargement would be a “German-lead
enlargement.”12 Geographical proximity and rapid regeneration of economic interactions in the post
Cold War, asserted Germany as one of the most influential actors of the EU and thus Europe's center of
gravity shifted to the north eastern Germany, confirming Germany‟s freedom to maneuver in European
politics. According to the German view, the enlargement and the shaping of the European borders could
have been reached through some dimensions, such as: the ENP, ENP+, the Strategy for Central Asia.
Thus, the „new born” European Neighborhood Policy, dating back 2003, is an expression of the efforts
of the European process to expand firstly, towards East and afterwards to the Caucasus and Central Asia,
becoming the foundation of the European Union's relations with neighboring states.13
The Neighborhood Policy, as an alternative to enlargement, a form of compromise, “a
different way within the EU than membership”, has stated its commitment to strengthening
stability, security and welfare in neighboring states and everywhere in the EU, stressing the part of
one of the leading European players, Germany. Germany seems ready to assert itself as a major
player in the European policy towards the East, the Caucasus and Central Asia, seeking through
various strategies and partnerships to shape the European Neighborhood Policy: developing new
relationships and partnerships with Central Asia, Strategic Partnership with Russia and finally trade
agreements with Ukraine. Another initiative is the „ENP +”, a term used by the German presidency
of the denominated principle of differentiation between European and non European countries14 a
policy based on the integration of the eastern states, but also a compromise within the EU. Problem
was needless to say the same: the eastern states, the Southern Caucasus want become more than
partners, they want to become members, or this policy is addressed to countries such as Ukraine,
Moldova, George, Armenia and Azerbaijan, and could mean:
10
Michael Baun, Germany and EU Enlargement into Eastern Europe (paper presented at the 5th Biennial
ECSA Conference Seattle, Washington, May 29-June 1, 1997).
11
Simon Bulmer, Charlie Jeffery, William Patterson, Germany‟s European Diplomacy. Shaping the regional
milieu, (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2000), 10.
12
George Kolankiewicz, “Consensus and Competition in the Eastern Enlargement of the European Union”,
International Affairs 70, 3 (July 1994): 490.
13
Wider Europe Ŕ Neighborhood: A new Framework for relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbors,
Brussels, 11.03.2002, COM (2003) 104 final.
14
Antonio Missiroli, The ENP in Future Perspective, UACES, Global Europe Papers, (December 2008): 8.
94
• plus an advanced association model for partner states;
• further strengthening of regional-multilateral schemes;
• plus renewal of the standard instruments used;
• plus the offer of an ENP model that facilitates the access of the states in difficult situations
or entities not recognized.”15
The strategic goal of the new ENP+ will be to implement attractive and realistic policies,
encouraging security and stability in neighboring EU states. As already mentioned in the lines
above Central Asia is one of the major interests of Germany, as is one of the most dynamic regions
of the world, situated at the crossroads of two continents. Thus, the first steps in this direction were
made by adopting, at the European Council Summit on 22 nd of June 2007, the Central Asia
Strategy, which sets guidelines for EU policy towards Central Asia. In Central Asia, there are not
only economic interests related to energy security, but the German Chancellor Merkel said: “there
are strategic interests that should be taken into account ... a bridge between Russia, China and the
EU ... from here we can influence the situation in Iran and Afghanistan.” One of the central topics
of the future ENP in the region will be building the Nabucco pipeline.” Moreover, both Germany
and France want a strengthening of the dialogue with the Mediterranean region, which Chancellor
Merkel said that “was a central element of EU external policy”, “the two countries making progress
in developing a dialogue for strengthening the Defense and Security Policy”.
Another priority on the EU‟s list, are also the perspectives and relations with Turkey, as
Europe needs a partner. „The prospect of a European Turkey and reform-oriented must be
sustained.” Turkey is considered an important economic and geostrategic region, despite its human
rights issues, freedom of expression or opinion, to guarantee women's rights. We also need to make
progress in religious matters, if we think about religious freedom, which is very limited for the
Greek Orthodox Church. Thus, cooperation with Turkey should be strengthened and placed on the
foundations of a special partnership with an intensification of relations in key areas:
• To strengthen trade relations through a tariff union, especially for industrial and
agricultural products;
• strengthening partnership projects and financial aid, environment, health, infrastructure,
technical cooperation;
• Criminal and police cooperation.
However, negotiations with Turkey remain problematic; the Union opening two more
chapters in the negotiation process, but obstacles still remain. Yet Turkey wants to be a model of
integration for Ukraine, the EU has initiated negotiations to conclude a trade agreement, which will
reduce the EU import costs for the Ukrainian consumers and provides for this former Soviet
republic better access to EU internal market and brings it closer to the West. Germany has also a
direct interest in Ukrainian partnership, as Ukraine has declared its support for Berlin‟s proposal to
reform the ENP, but on the other side is aware of the benefits that might derive from agreements
with the EU, and could require the inclusion of an item that would ensure Ukraine's future
membership. In April 2006, the European Parliament adopted a resolution to conclude an
Association agreement with Ukraine, which was immediately seen by the Ukrainian Press
Association as a means and not as a way to become a full member.
Through the ENP, the EU has created an extensive new framework for its relations with
its Eastern and Southern neighbors. This was a task for Germany, for the first half of 2007, to carry
on the European priorities and continue the process for which Germany, invoking a variety of
reasons, had a „vital interest”: behind the moral engagement for the enlargement, originated in
Germany‟s co responsibility for the Cold War and for dividing Europe, the economic benefits that
German industry has achieved and continues to obtain from the Eastern markets have become
extremely important, as evidence we have the agreements signed, during the German presidency,
with Ukraine and Moldova (Moldova's trade with Germany reached 40% more than in trade with
other central European countries) in order to facilitate their access to the internal European market,
as these are countries with great potential for cooperation and economic growth, buoyant markets
and investment areas.
15
Michael Emerson, Noutcheva Gergana, Nicu Popescu, Neighbourhood policy: ENP Plus, CEPS, (2007).
95
Diagram 1: PEV and the economic benefits
(Source: http://fritz.breuss.wifo.ac.at//Breuss.pdf, 2007)
Germany has major interests in Eastern Europe and the Caucasus, especially energetic
interests in the Caucasus and Caspian Sea region, a geostrategical area, crossed by the BakuTbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline, while Eastern Europe has become a vital area in terms of geopolitical
and geostrategical interests, an instrument in fighting the expansion of Russia: the Eastern States,
former Soviet republics, must become “an agent” of democracy, stability and prosperity without the
influence of Russia, a shield against its expansion and an instrument of control of the revival of the
„Russian Empire”. So, Central Asia is becoming increasingly important for the energy security of
Germany: Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan have important reserves of oil and gas, the Caspian and
Central Asia possesses approximately 4% of the global energy supplies. Germany‟s Federal
Minister, Steinmeier stressed the great interest of its country regarding energy, describing it as an
important dimension of the security strategy developed by the EU. Moreover, Germany has
strategic interests in this area and, as stated by the German Chancellor, A. Merkel: “We must take
into consideration the geographical position: a bridge between Russia, China and the EU and
therefore is in EU's strategic interest to accept this area as a partner.”16
In conclusion, the primary interest was to consider the ENP as a tool for stabilizing the
Eastern European and the German interests, as a guarantor of Germany‟s security. The imperative
of security has led and still guides Germany to pursue the integration into Western structures of the
eastern neighbors, transforming the German state „into their lawyer and their deck towards the
EU.”17 Yet, there seems to be a problem: Germany looks more to the east while some of its
neighbors to the South. This explains why Germany did not want to focus on a division east / south,
but rather preferred a „singled out” ENP based on country-specific bilateral initiatives.
The most important question about the Neighborhood Policy is the fact that Europe‟s
neighbors expect to receive something that Europe is not yet prepared to offer - the prospect of EU
accession and membership, for which the authorities in Berlin have created the concept of „ENP +”.
ENP seems to belong to everyone and no one, all states have interests in this policy, but none got
involved directly. So it arises the question what can the ENP offer to these states, as long as there is
no possibility for them to adhere to the Union? The answer is this „European Neighborhood Policy
Plus”: whether it will determine the opening of markets or imports of services or it will be an increase
in free trade zones, the new ENP + will bear an associated cost. So, it will be Germany and France's
16
Bernd Riegert, “Deutsche EU-Ratpraesidentschaft: Fortschritte in Zentralasien”, Fokus Ost Sudost (2007),
DW Radio.
17
Bulmer, Jeffery and Patterson, Germany‟s European Diplomacy, 105.
96
mission to develop plausible and dynamic strategies for both eastern and southern European states,
without forgetting the essential role that they will have to play, if the accession negotiations with
Turkey and Croatia are to be concluded successfully, as well as for the prospect of joining of the
Western Balkan states. Europe can not cope with an ambiguous status quo, confused and tense, but
rather must remain flexible and prepared to meet the challenges of XXIst century. Europe can not
develop and become really Europe without its neighbors, so the future ENP states became part of the
strategic interests of Europe.
EU‟s enlargement in Eastern Europe has become a top priority on the Council agenda
during the German presidency, presenting three complementary aspects: strengthening the ENP, the
relations between the EU and Russia and adopt new strategies for Central Asia. Moreover three
approaches have been developed: the extension (with respect to Croatia, Turkey and western
Balkan states), ENP (including Ukraine, Moldova and Belarus, the Southern Caucasus) and the
relationship with Russia.18 Now it has been developed the „Intermediate Progress Report, regarding
the objectives of the ENP and approved by foreign ministers of member states on 18/19 June 2007
and stating as purpose the association of the ENP partners from Eastern Europe, Caucasus, North
Africa to the internal European market and opened for them the possibility to participate in the
Community‟s programs.19 The document provides the frames for the development and
harmonization of the eastern and south-eastern Mediterranean dimension of the ENP. Another
novelty of this report was the „Black Sea Synergy” initiative, which was intended to promote
cooperation in the Black Sea region on a variety of topics (energy, environment, transportation,
democracy, the right of law, human rights), including new joiners, Romania and Bulgaria, but also
Turkey, Russia and the bordering states already partners of the ENP, Germany accounting for the
role of a mediator-moderator. On the other hand, however, the black ball under the German
chairmanship of the ENP was the inability to conclude a commercial agreement with Ukraine. ENP
was „placed” on three basic principles that assure the character of a European policy of security
and prosperity for local citizens:
1. Agreement between member states on the fact that the ENP represents a priority of the EU
external actions, and that the political and practical commitments of the EU to its partners must be
accomplished;
2. Consensus on the fact that the ENP is a single policy framework, coherent and inclusive,
offering enhanced cooperation relations and provides all partners the same tools;
3. Distinct from the EU membership: it does not offer the prospect of joining the Union, but
opens the possibility of intensified relations, closer with the EU. 20
Strengthening the ENP involved measures meant to improve cooperation in regard of some
problems and areas of major interest:
The agreement with Ukraine was supposed to be a defining project for the future of the
ENP, a model for other partners and a sign of credibility and commitment, support offered by the
Union;
It has started the work for an „advanced status” for Morocco, as well as the elaboration of
action plans for Lebanon, Egypt, Armenia and Azerbaijan, Georgia, became important parts of the
reform agenda, along with a Non-Paper of the European Commission for Belarus, to ensure its
democratic and state involvement in the ENP;
In the energy field the dialogue with partner states has intensified: the implementation of
“Energy Memoranda of understanding” with Ukraine and Azerbaijan has progressed, and Algeria
has been given a strategic energy partnership; the enlargement of the Trans European Transport
Network towards its Eastern and Southern neighbors;
18
Martin Koopman, Pacemaker instead of European Savior: Germany‟s EU Presidency, Real Instituto
Eleano, 6 (2007): 5
19
Marco Overhaus,”Balance Sheet of Germany‟s EU Council Presidency 2007”, http://www.Deutsche
Aussenpolitik.de
20
Strengthening the European Neighborhood Policy. Presidency Progress Report, General Affairs and
Extended Relations Council (GAERC), 18/19 (June 2007): 2.
97
The problem of illegal migration is intended to be solved through dialogue and closer
cooperation between partner states, bringing into discussion, followed by negotiations on Visa
facilitation for Ukraine and Moldova, but also for certain groups in the eastern partner countries;
Economic Integration of partners through increased access to the European internal
market, increased trade with the EU and between partners. Thus, concluding trade agreements with
and between the ENP countries, whose accession negotiations will be preceded by the accession of
partner countries to the WTO: the Agreement with Ukraine should serve as a model, will continue
negotiations on trade in services, agricultural and fishery products with Mediterranean ENP
partners;
Creating a financial instrument to increase funding partners, but also to establish a
Neighborhood Investment Fund;
Integration and sectored cooperation, as important elements of strengthening mutual
confidence, regional cooperation on border management and migration, but also on the energy
problem;
marital and educational dimension, as manifested by strengthening civil society, an
intensified dialogue with citizens and their involvement in EU projects, training and education
activities increased with the ENP countries, through scholarships awarded to students from these
countries within the Erasmus/MUNDUS framework.
Thus, the ENP has become a successful expression of the German presidency, although
officially launched in 2004 as a way to provide eastern and south-eastern states without accession
prospects, strengthened economic and political relations.
Germany versus Europe
With its central location at the heart of today‟s European Union, Germany enjoys a special
benefit from living in peace and harmony with its neighbors. As the EU member state with the
largest population, a strong economy and central geographical position, united Germany has an
overriding interest in being included in the development and advancement of the European
integration and its future expansion. There are three main factors that must be taken into consideration
when asserting such an idea: first of all, the past, when the integration process has proved to be a suitable
basis for ensuring peace, prosperity and security. Secondly, the EU‟s structures have made it possible to
voice and successfully represent German interests in Europe and thirdly, in terms of common policy,
Germany has forged strong ties to partners who are its neighbors.
In Europe, Germany has ironically turned from a factor of instability and insecurity into a
guarantor of Europe‟s wealth and security, a mediator between the American, the Russian interest
towards Europe. Reunified Germany is a country of 356,959 km 2, in 1914 it had a surface area of
549,000 km2 and of 470.622 km2 in 1937, and thus the German territory lost in the twentieth
century nearly 200,000 km2. The disappearance of the Berlin Wall in autumn 1990, announced
Germany‟s return to its traditional geopolitics-reunification within NATO, and proximity to
Germany being the solution for overcoming the stalemate on the European continent. The united
Germany found itself back at the center of activities on the world political stage “almost
overnight”21, alignment that was successful thanks to the fundamentals of German foreign policy as
had been developed and given firmer form ever since the foundation of the Federal Republic of
Germany. Fact that has been possible and founds itself as a distinct German mark over the
European integration process, due to one of its main feature of the political culture: the
maintenance of a broad consensus on foreign policy issues and of continuity in other areas.
Germany‟s first federal Chancellor, Konrad Adenauer has referred to the transatlantic
partnership and European integration, the wish for good neighborly relations and the difficult
process of reconciliation with Israel. The foundation of German foreign policy has been the
country‟s comprehensive integration into the structures of multilateral cooperation, idea fostered
after the experience of two world wars by the country‟s neighbors‟ desire to include and control it,
21
Gregor Schoellgen, “Germany- a partner worldwide”, Facts about Germany: Germany Ŕ a partner
worldwide, http://www. Tatsachen-ueber-deutschland.de/en/foreign-policy/main-content-05
98
as well as by its need for peace, security, prosperity and democracy. There is no wonder that the
Germans are the ones that turned to those international organizations which had given the Federal
Republic support and future prospects, the EU, NATO, the UN and the CSCE (Conference on
Security and Cooperation in Europe).
Creating the European Union in the context of the new bipolarity brought to light the
question of a new German geopolitics: reverted after 1996, the first client and first provider for all
countries of Central and Eastern Europe, Germany has managed to rebuild its economic power also
in the East. Moreover, she supports his allies in the Visegrad group in their accession to the EU,
acting therefore in the way of a geographical enlargement and strengthening of the structures of the
Union. Germany gradually asserted itself as a central power, as well as a power-model in Europe Ŕ
federalism Ŕ in Europe.22
Along with the process of European integration, Germany has close ties with the U.S. and
leads a special policy towards Russia, all of which indicated that Germany's geopolitical intentions
in Europe are not gone for good. Germany has no territorial claim, asserting itself as a power in the
service of peace and balance on the European continent, but its active role in the recreation of the
former-Yugoslavian space Ŕ its support for Croatia, the participation in NATO military action
against Serbia in 1999 - its will to reform the UN and to ensure representation in the Security
Council in accordance with the geopolitical reality of the world, all of these are pointing to a return
of Germany to geopolitical ambitions in Europe and the world. Its central location in the heart of
Europe has created and maintained the hegemonic aspirations and the desire of continental
supremacy, always bringing it into conflict with neighboring countries and creating a fame of a
warrior nation. Germany has always considered itself a „Land der Mitte”, a country in the center
and of the center, both geographically and politically as well. Located between Poland (east),
France (West), Switzerland (South) and Denmark (the North), each direction represents a type of
political system tried by Germany: socialist-party-based management (East Germany),
representative democracy multiparty based on federalism (West Germany) and the monarchy
(Wilhelm‟s era). The new Germany, having moved the Bundestag to Berlin in 1999, although it
narrowed its borders, has found its influence between the shores of Europe from the Baltic to the
Adriatic Sea. Thus, Germany continues to affirm itself according to Bismarck's words, to the east as
well as towards the west. Germany‟s fast reunification, result of a long cultural history and coherent
Ostpolitik strategies led by Bonn, represents a point of reference for the period 1989-1990: a state that is
taking back its people. This miracle of the European continental diplomacy is proved by the historical
dates that follow each another very fast: November the 9th,1989 the collapse of the Berlin Wall, 1 July
1990, economic and monetary unification, on 3rd of October 1990, the political unification, 2nd
December 1990, the first legislative election in the reunified Germany. Within one year everything has
been said.23
A new actor worth being taking into account has appeared on the European and
international stage, with a miraculous journey, which from a mixture of disunited and divided states
has turned into the main economic power of Europe and one of its pillars and the third economic
power in the world, in 2005, after Japan and the U.S. At this point, the Germans produce 5.6% of
the world GDP with only 1.2% of the population. A Germany reborn from the ashes, in the heart of
Europe, which developed and assumed the role of key stakeholders of stability, peace and security
of states, not just of those members of the EU, but of the whole continent. An economic giant, the
German state affirmed itself also as a political force capable of making their own rules and lead the
game, to assert and maintain their own interests on the continent. Interests that are mainly
translated in terms of energy security, as well as European security, part of the national interest,
stability and prosperity.
Germany became a guarantor of European security and an important pawn in the security
scheme of great actors regarding the European continent therefore the close relations with the U.S.
22
Aymeric Chauprade and François Thual, Dicţionar de geopolitică. State, concepte, autori, (Bucureşti:
Corint, 2003), 138.
23
Daniel Vernet, La renaissance allemande, (Paris: Flammarion, 1992), apud. Catherine Durandin, Statele
Unite, mare putere europeană, (Chişinău: Cartier Istoric, 2007), 94.
99
and Russia and the brake of their ambitions on the continent. Relations with a historical
background and a solid foundation: U.S.‟s participation in war in Europe leads to a long history,
with memories of solidarity in Western Europe, contrasting memories when it comes to Germany,
destroyed and rebuilt. Year 1917 and President Wilson's decision to participate in the war alongside
the Allies scored a tipping point for European history of the twentieth century: the ideological and
political presence of Wilson at the Peace congress, the economic and financial presence of U.S.
within the reconstruction of Germany' or the economic rehabilitation of France and Britain after the
war. It seemed to create a triangular joint between the debts that France and Great Britain owed to
the U.S., while Germany had to pay for repairs to Paris and London.
Germany and Russia, pragmatic states when it comes to policy, were able to pass easily
over the huge wounds created by the wars between them and manage historic collaboration to great
effect. After First World War, despite the adversity of war and the Bolshevik regime installed in
Russia, Germany signed with Russia the Treaty of Rapallo and, later on, the one known as the
Ribbentropp-Molotov. The same situation was encountered after World War II and the Cold War,
when the German-Russian relations have gone from extreme tension, to mutual interested
cooperation and total relaxation. Over 30 million Germans and Russians who died in World War II
and the total destruction of Germany and European Russia, different political systems, could not
break the bound of the German Russian interests.
Between 1990 and 1993, Germany has invested in Russia 50 billion dollars, while Germany's
economy depends for more than 30% of Russian economy. Considering the importance that Russia has
for the EU and its policies and its ever-growing part on the international stage, the strategic partnership
will Russia shall be consolidated, as a part of the ENP, and this will also be Germany‟s responsibility.
The focus remains mainly on economic issues, trade, environmental and military cooperation, ENP
promising access to the Common Market and the political process, but denies the participation within the
political institutions. And this dilemma of the ENP and Member States will persist, given the fact that
these states perceive themselves as part of Europe and not only as its neighbors. In conclusion, there are
two possible scenarios: a positive, optimistic one, which forecasts a favorable systemic transformation
and structural reform, which results in a change for a better cooperation between the EU and Russia, and
also between Russia and Germany.
On the other hand, it should be taken into account the negative, pessimistic scenario,
which leads to an “international marginalization of Russia, based on internal amid situation that
could generate a security risk”24 both at economic and political levels. But, according to the three
researchers from Bundesinstituts Ostwissenschaftliche und für Internationale Studien, the most
likely and realistic scenario would be the middle way: a stabilization at an average level with
alternate successes or failures, which means that without a clear political profile of the international
community, Russia will continue to move forward „haphazardly” and the Community will have to
adapt. In other words, „doing business” with Russia requires a willingness to take risks, talent for
improvisation, continuous monitoring and observation of socio-economic environment, but as well as
predictable, reliable partners. Therefore, for Germany the future of the EEC will claim more
involvement and effort from its art in order to strengthen cooperation in Eastern Europe and South
Caucasus states, considering the fact that Germany has become in the eyes of these countries “their
deck to the West and the EU”. During his visit to Moscow on the occasion of greeting the new
Russian president, Medvedev, German Foreign Minister, Steinmeier said, „for Germany, the EU is
our response to globalization and its inherent dangers. This brings us to a great challenge that we
must face: the unity and harmony must not be restricted to the economic and monetary policy, but
to extend the integration and European foreign and security policy.” Moreover, Germany will
strengthen its support for Turkey, an important country not only for the authorities in Berlin, but
also for Europe's future, „a bridge between European and of Islamic culture”, as Steinmeier said.
The relations with Russia will continue, at which point the German foreign policy on the
ENP will once again demonstrate its ambiguity: on the one hand, Steinmeier wants to strengthen its
24
Hans Hermann Hohmann, Christian Meier, Heinz Timmermann, “Russia and Germany in Europe. Recent
Trends of Political and Economical Relations”, in Berichte des Bundesintituts für ostwissenschftliche und
internationale Studium 38, (1997), 36.
100
partnership with Russia given the fact that „we need Russia to share responsibility for global stability.
Not even the conflict in the Balkans or the nuclear weapons dispute with Iran can be solved without
Russia or avoiding Russia”25, while Merkel was not so adept of a close relationship with Russia in
areas of interest of German politics: Eastern Europe and Caucasus South. The main differentiation
shall be made between the European and non European neighbors, while also the others can become
useful. So, we can expect an increase in Germany's relations with Ukraine and Moldova, two
important markets and investment areas, although their accession to the European Union will not
happen soon, given that Berlin does not consider them as potential States. However, Ukraine,
Moldova, Belarus should be considered from a different perspective than that of the Southern
Caucasus, in the conditions of the Black Sea region and the frames of the „newborn” GUAM
(Georgia, Ukraine, Armenia, Moldova), which brings them in an even closer connection.
Moreover, these countries are also members of the European Council and of the commitment to
common values and principles, which may thus contribute to strengthening the ENP. In essence,
the message is a clear one: considering the deepening / expansion of the European Union, the ENP
will stand out and will evolve independently of the EU enlargement policy, focusing increasingly
on the interests of neighboring states, in some areas and the effective promotion of economic and
political transformation of the ENP countries.
As a result of the mutations brought by the Treaty of Malta, during the decade that
followed, a powerless and lame Europe was born, in terms of military and political decisions
worldwide. The EU has a single market, a single currency, a single border, but they can make
neither war nor peace. Europe has no single decision or unique ministers. Although aware of the
political limitations imposed by its hegemonic aspirations in the past and sensitivities of its
European neighbors, Germany is fully and irreversibly integrated into European and world
economy, no longer holding back. Germany as “hegemonic power of success” 26 has come to
influence the lives of other countries by other means than force, coercion or blackmail, being able
to use their wealth to ensure a superior model of economic management and societal relationships,
and an attraction for neighboring states, a state worthy of respect for the entire West. Germany will
be an element of power, self-contained and developed in economic and political field: the
unification was made under the West, in the form of GDR'as integration in Germany and not as a
compromise between West and East, its unification would become the engine of Europe‟s unity,
and its integration in the West the essential foundation for the capacity of the German state.
Conclusions: Germany today
After the admission of Romania and Bulgaria in 2007, the European Union expanded to 27
states, has a population of 480 million people and produces about a quarter of global GDP. However,
this economic weight and the number of inhabitants does not guarantee a significant influence of the
Union on the international scene, but in order to project its global authority, the EU will have to improve
several internal issues, to consolidate and simplify the CFSP process and decision-making mechanisms.
Imperatives that have also been identified by the German Foreign Minister Frank Walter Steinmeier in
his speech on the Future of Europe, on the 12th of June 2007, in Brussels, whom, quoting Winston
Churchill „Let Europe arise!” states that „the achievement of a united Europe is more than an abstract
idea is a practical political necessity that has the following essential elements:
• European foreign policy;
• Developing the European Security and Defense Policy;
• Formation of a European public opinion;
• European value of solidarity;
• European Social Dimension of Globalization.
In these circumstances, the eastward expansion to include the countries in Eastern and
Central Europe and brought a change in the character, concerns and objectives of the Community,
provided that for them, the EU membership is essential for political stability, for the maintenance
25
Speech by Frank Walter Steinemeier, Federal Minister for Foreign affairs, on Current German Foreign
Policy Issues at the German Council on Foreign Relations, Berlin, 11 September 2007.
26
Kurzer, “Germany in Europe“, 2.
101
of peaceful relations, and relieved cooperation with neighbors, but especially for economic
prosperity. Just as the Southern Caucasus and Central Asia states also the East - Central Europe
differs in historical experience, political perceptions and national aspirations, but they are all more
common features, such as: their membership to Western structures, with a major influence on
CFSP acquis and preferential expression of the dilemma of loyalty to the EU and Russia.
Regarding the relations with Russia, Europe has declared its intention to develop a
strategic partnership based on common values, calling for the change and adjustment from both
players‟ side:
1. Russia - should prove that it can be a reliable partner in the relations and projects it has
with the EU, a commitment that has major implications for the Russian public opinion and
governance, and try to modernize their own visions of national interest, a first step in this direction
is the new Russian security doctrine, the Ivanov doctrine;
2. Europe - would have to make changes on three fronts: on the one hand, the EU must
assess the security problems both in terms of geography, stretching to the Western Balkans,
through the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Middle East, as well as in conceptual way, from the
problems of corrupt governments and crime issues in ethnic conflicts, from local terrorism within
the EU to global terrorist movements, on the other hand, the cooperation with Russia on security
matters must be taken into account as a possible part of a triangular cooperation, even an alliance
including the U.S., and thirdly, considering the political principles and political ideology, the EURussia relationship should be reconsidered, it's just a matter of interest and attention.
After the great expansion in 2004, the context for the ENP has become more grim: the east
needs to strengthen the democratic transition in Eastern ENP partner states, while towards north, the
EU needs to convince Russia that its national interest lies in working along with their common
neighborhood, and in the south part, the EU needs to reinforce the fight against Islamic terrorism and
support democratization, democratic non Ŕviolent parties. But, with the Lisbon Treaty, approved in
October 2007, which aims to amend existing treaties, it is unlikely that some of the provisions have
a significant impact on the ENP, but rather is expected to be placed under the supervision of a EU
High Representative for Foreign and Security Policy, although it will remain under the
responsibility of a Commissioner, thus leading to a „contamination” of the Neighborhood Policy. A
contamination that could have positive effects, leading to a more coherent and strengthened
common policy of the Union towards its neighbors that will include not only community, but also
the individual Member States.
Germany played a central role throughout the entire integration process in Europe, from
its launching with the Schuman Plan and the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community.
The “Monnet Method” of supranational integration shaped Germany‟s behavior in a multilateralist
way, making the transition from a national identity to an Europeanist one. The German unification
came as a reaction to the rejection of the great powers‟ traditions, in order to shape its borders and
to exclude any revisionism. After the radical changes from Eastern Europe, Germany has affirmed
itself as a winner and moreover with something to say on the international stage. It still was deep
anchored in the euro-Atlantic structures, using its influence in the process of enlargement towards
East. Its influence is due not to its military power, but to the economic power, to technological
innovation, internal stability and to its dynamism.
An important step which has led to a pattern of multi-level governance, applied to the
domestic relationship between the federal and Länder levels and moreover to a shaping
interdependence between the Federal Republic‟s institutions and the European Communities.
Nowadays, the basic principles of the German EU policy are characterized by all Ŕ party consensus.
Germany‟s desire is for a Europe capable of acting, while remaining both democratic and
transparent. They reject the idea of a European super-state, pleading for a clearer delimitation of
areas of responsibility. In 2005, in Germany, the treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe was
ratified by both the Bundestag and the Bundesrat by a large majority and the country remains
interested in the advancement of Europe as envisaged in the constitution.
Regarding the economic and political situation, they both have been profitable for
Germany, in terms of Common Market, the euro and the EU‟s enlargement, its central position in
the world‟s largest single market explaining Germany‟s progress in the export league tables. With
102
the neighbors in Eastern Central Europe, Germany‟s economic relations are aligned to the rules of
integration, in each of these markets Germany being the largest foreign trading partner and the
German industry is the most important investor. Germany also carries a large part of the
infrastructural burden of the new open borders because the major European transportation axes run
through the country. The full implementation of EMU, the further deepening through institutional
reform and the eastern enlargement are striking proofs that Germany has been shaping the
European milieu, along with the projection of a Europeanized identity centered on multilateral
cooperation. In this process of reform and promotion of the ENP will return to Germany an
important role. Europeanized identity design, based on multilateral cooperation partners and require
Franco-German partnership remains crucial. Germany and France‟s level of coordination with
respect to the European policy initiatives is unprecedented in the EU, having the character of a
„special decompression chambers, bringing the elite French politics in conjunction with Germany's
growing political power.
As Simon Bulmer, Charlie Jeffery and William Patterson said, Germany‟s European
diplomacy is a combination between an influential vision, great institutional models to be exported
to the EU, a solid political consensus and an important set of bilateral relationships. The German
diplomacy regarding the eastward enlargement is one of a „Yes, but ...” kind, with a „but” more
pronounced in areas where concerns may influence the European process: EU budget, free
movement of labor force and control of its borders. Moreover, the continuous commitment of the
German policy towards Europe and the cooperative, consensus-oriented style, typical for the
German domestic political process will continue to put its mark at European institutional level,
shaping its goals, borders and therefore milieu. In this respect, the affirmation of a European
Gordian Knot embodied by Germany is a valid metaphor, given the fact that a Europeanized
Germany continues to exert a distinct influence on the institutional character and over the Union
and European integration process. We can conclude that Germany bears the consequences of the
European Union in a particular way. Just as Alexander the Great cut the Gordian knot with a
decisive blow, the so called cutting the Gordian Knot, Germany solved the complicated problems
of the European integration process through bold and decisive action, but tying now a new Gordian
knot, around it and Europe.
It is to be seen who will be able to cut this Gordian knot.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Bulmer, Simon, Jeffery, Charlie and Patterson, William (2000), Germany‟s European Diplomacy.
Shaping the regional milieu. Manchester: Manchester University Press.
Chauprade, Aymeric and Thual, François (2003), Dictionar de geopolitică. State, concepte, autori
(Dictionary of Geopolitics. State, concepts, authors). Bucureşti: Corint.
Coşea, Mircea (2007), Economia Integrării Europene (Economy of European Integration).
Bucureşti: Pro Universitaria.
Ghica, Luciana Alexandra (2007), Enciclopedia Uniunii Europene (European Union
Encyclopedia). Bucureşti: Meronia.
Ivan, Adrian Liviu (2006), Sub zodia Statelor Unite ale Europei. De la ideea şi planurile de unitate
Europeană la Europa supranaţională (Under the sign of United States of Europe. From the
idea and plans for European unity to the supranational Europe). Cluj Napoca: Ecumenica.
Zorgbibe, Charles (1998), Construcţia europeană: trecut, prezent, viitor (European construction:
past, present, future). Bucureşti: Trei.
Articles
Baun, Michael (1997), “Germany and EU Enlargement into Eastern Europe”, Paper presented at
the 5th Biennial ECSA Conference Seattle, Washington, May 29-June 1.
Bendix, John (2007), “Germany”, in European Politics, edited by Collin Hay and Anand Manon,
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Durandin, Catherine (2007), Statele Unite, mare putere europeană, (Chişinău : Cartier Istoric).
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Hohmann, Hans Hermann, Meier, Christian, Timmermann, Heinz (1997), “Russia and Germany in
Europe. Recent Trends of Political and Economical Relations”, in Berichte des Bundesintituts
für ostwissenschftliche und internationale Studium 38, (July), 1-38.
Janning, Josef, “Germany in Europe, in Facts about Germany: Germany in Europe”, http://www.
Tatsachen-ueber-deutschland.de/en/foreign-policy/main-content-05, (accessed March 20th
2009).
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European Union, in International Affairs 70, 3 (July), 477-495.
Koopman, Martin, Pacemaker instead of European Savior: Germany‟s EU Presidency, Real
Instituto Eleano.
Kurzer, Paulette, “The new Germany in Europe: an emerging hegemon?” in Research Group
International Relations (Forschungsgruppe Internationale Beziehungen), Publication Series of
the International Research Group, Reichpietschufer, 50, FIB Papers.
Overhaus, Marco, Balance Sheet of Germany‟s EU Council Presidency 2007, http://www.Deutsche
Aussenpolitik.de, (accessed July 26th, 2007).
Riegert, Bernd, Deutsche EU-Ratpraesidentschaft: Fortschritte in Zentralasien, in Fokus Ost
Sudost, 28.06.2007, DW Radio.
Schoellgen, Gregor, Germany- a partner worldwide, in Facts about Germany: Germany Ŕ a partner
worldwide, http://www.Tatsachen-ueber-deutschland.de/en/foreign-policy/main-content-05
(accessed March 20, 2009.
Strengthening the ENP. Presidency Progress Report, General Affairs and Extended Relations
Council (GAERC), 18/19 (June 2007).
Quelles frontières pour le Trentin-Haut Adige/Südtirol?
Licia BAGINI1
Abstract. Federalism is highly developed in Italy and the High-Adige/South Tyrol region
provides an example of wide independence provided for by devolution. This independence was
obtained through a long process of negotiation which took place between the Italian government,
local independence parties and the Austrian government, from the end of the Second World War to
the beginning of the 21st century. The High-Adige/South Tyrol thus provides an interesting
illustration of the links between “territory and identity” among various linguistic communities, the
largest of which are the German speaking and Ladino populations. How then does the notion of
borders apply to the High-Adige/ South Tyrol? Are these borders internal or external;
geographical, cultural or economic? In this context should we then leave aside the notion of the
borders of the Nation State and approach the High-Adige/South Tyrol rather from a
“Euroregions” perspective?
Keywords: identity, independence, bilingualism, cross-border cooperation, Euroregions.
Le nom de la région
Le nom de la région italienne Trentino-Alto Adige/Südtirol soulève souvent des questions
auprès des non-Italiens qui le trouvent « long » et en deux langues. La réponse est étroitement liée à
la question des frontières qui délimitent aujourd‟hui cette région dont le nom Südtirol a été
introduit dans la constitution italienne seulement en 2001. Mais de quelles frontières faut-il parler
pour cette région ?2 L‟Italie est divisée en vingt régions dont cinq autonomes à statut spécial. Parmi
celles-ci, il y a le Trentin-Haut Adige/Südtirol, au nord-est, zone montagneuse frontalière de
l‟Autriche et de la Suisse, avec une superficie de 13 607 Km2 et 1 032 483 habitants3. Dans cette
région, cohabitent trois communautés : les italophones, les germanophones et les Ladins. Le nom
de cette région vient de ses deux provinces : le Trentin, au sud, dont le chef-lieu est Trente (524
826 hab.) et l‟autre, au nord, dont le chef-lieu est Bolzano/Bozen/Bulsan4 (507 657 hab.). Les
italophones et les Italiens des autres régions appellent la province du Nord « Haut-Adige » parce
que le fleuve Adige le traverse (Bolzano se trouvant dans la partie nord Ŕ « haute » Ŕ du parcours
de ce fleuve). La dénomination Haut-Adige a été introduite par Napoléon : en effet, le Tyrol
méridional sera intégré au Royaume d‟Italie Ŕ créé par l‟empereur Ŕ comme « département du Haut
Adige », à la suite du traité du Hâvre du 20 mai 1810. Cela correspond à la mise en place de
l‟organisation en départements issue de la Révolution française et s‟inspire de la toponymie
hydrographique utilisée à l‟époque dans les études géographiques relatives à la répartition
géométrique des espaces5.
1
Université de Poitiers, France.
Cet article tient compte des informations données par les sites de la région Trentin Haut-Adige/Südtirol et de
la province autonome de Bolzano et de mes articles : Licia Bagini, « Le cas du Haut-Adige/Tyrol du Sud »,
in Cahiers du Mimmoc, n° 3, 2007 (cahiersdumimmoc.edel.univ-poitiers.fr/index.php?id=232) et Licia
Bagini, «Haut-Adige/Tyrol du Sud. Avers et revers du plurilinguisme» dans Grande Europe, Paris, La
Documentation française, n° 28, janvier 2011, dossier «Territoires, identités en conflits», 66-75.
3
Cf. données ISTAT, 01/12/2010.
4
Nom du chef-lieu en italien, allemand et ladin.
5
Cf.
SALSA,
Annibale,
Ecco
perché
possiamo
dirci
trentini,
2/12/2010,
http://www.giovanipatt.eu/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=79:ecco-perche-possiamodirci-trentini&catid=45:documenti&Itemid=150
2
105
Carte n°1. Italie. Les régions (1999)6
Les germanophones et les Ladins l‟appellent Südtirol. Dans ce cas, l‟optique change
complètement car elle ne se rapporte pas à l‟Italie mais au Tyrol du Nord qui appartient à
l‟Autriche. Bolzano se trouve donc dans le Tyrol méridional de langue allemande (Welschtirol).
Avant la Première Guerre Mondiale, la province de Trente aussi faisait partie du Tyrol, lequel
appartenait au grand empire austro-hongrois, tout en jouissant d‟une certaine autonomie locale.
Aujourd‟hui, Trente et Bolzano sont les deux seules « provinces autonomes » en Italie, c‟est-à-dire
qu‟elles bénéficient d‟une autonomie plus importante que les provinces des autres régions
autonomes, ce qui s‟explique par des raisons historiques et politiques. La quasi-totalité des
compétences régionales a été tranférée à ces deux provinces, Trente est le chef-lieu de la région,
mais Bolzano est le siège du Conseil Régional. La province de Bolzano constitue un cas unique en
Italie. En effet, ici, les italophones et les germanophones Ŕ ces derniers y sont majoritaires Ŕ se
trouvent en même temps dans une double situation de minorité ou majorité, selon qu‟ils se
rapportent au territoire local, régional ou national. Les Ladins Ŕ à l‟exception de quelques
communes Ŕ sont toujours une minorité. Dans la province de Trente, où les italophones sont
largement majoritaires, vivent également des minorités linguistiques : les Ladins (7553 habitants en
2001), les Cimbres (882 hab. en 2001) et les Mochènes (2276 hab. en 2001). Ces deux derniers
parlent des dialectes germaniques austro-bavarois.
6
Source :
Les
Études
de
la
Documentation
http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/cartotheque/regions-1999.shtml
française
n°
5096.
106
Superficie 7 399, 97 km²
Population 507 657 habitants
Superficie 6 206,90 km²
Population 524 826 habitants
Carte n°2. Les deux provinces du Trentin-Haut-Adige/Südtirol 20107
Région du Trentin-Haut-Adige / Sud-Tyrol :
- italophones 65 %
- germanophones 32 %
- ladinophones 3 %
Province de Bolzano 2001 :
- germanophones 69,15 %
- italophones 26,48 %
- ladinophones 4,37 %
Les italophones
Les italophones sont minoritaires dans la
province de Bolzano (26,4%), mais majoritaires
dans la province du Trentin (98 %).
Carte n°38
Rappels d’ordre historique
La région du Haut Adige/Tyrol du Sud a fait partie de l‟empire romain durant cinq siècles,
mais à sa chute, elle est entrée progressivement dans une aire linguistique et culturelle essentiellement
germanique. Avec l‟arrivée de différents peuples barbares, les populations autochtones parlant le ladin se
sont retirées au fur et à mesure dans des vallées montagneuses d‟accès difficile où nous les retrouvons
encore aujourd‟hui. Selon plusieurs linguistes la langue ladine serait née de la fusion de la langue parlée
par les Rhètes avec le latin. L‟influence germanique d‟un point de vue numérique, linguistique et
culturel dans le Tyrol méridional va donc se prolonger jusqu‟à la fin de la Première Guerre mondiale. A
la fin de la guerre, le Tyrol du Sud, comme la province de Trente, devient italien. Cela s‟est fait dans le
non-respect du principe d‟autodétermination des peuples alors que le Südtirol germanophone et les
Ladins demandaient l‟annexion à l‟Autriche ou la création d‟un État autonome. Sous le fascisme, le
Haut Adige subit une politique d‟italianisation dans un but d‟assimilation des germanophones qui
constituaient à l‟époque 90% de toute la population et d‟Italiens arrivant d‟autres régions pour
renforcer la présence italienne. Les germanophones subissent une véritable discrimination qui voit,
entre autre, l‟interdiction de l‟appellation Tyrol et de l‟utilisation de l‟allemand à l‟école, dans la
vie publique, et dans les toponymes. En 1939, Hitler et Mussolini signent un pacte aux termes
duquel les germanophones de cette province se voient offerte la possibilité de choisir la citoyenneté
allemande s‟ils quittent le sol italien pour s‟installer dans les territoires occupés par les Allemands,
où on leur promet logement et emploi : 85 % des Tyroliens du Sud se déclarent volontaires, mais le
mouvement est interrompu par le déclenchement de la guerre. Les Ladins, considérés alors
allophones, doivent eux-aussi choisir entre deux nationnalités dans lesquelles ils ne se
reconnaissaient pas totalement : si cette minorité parlait une langue proche de l‟italien, en revanche,
elle avait vécu durant des siècles dans un contexte germanique. Seule une petite partie de
7
8
Source : Trentin Haut Adige, http://www.tlfq.ulaval.ca/axl/europe/italietrentin.htm
Source : Trentin Haut Adige, http://www.tlfq.ulaval.ca/axl/europe/italietrentin.htm
107
germanophones et Ladins aura le temps de quitter l‟Italie où, d‟ailleurs, certains retourneront à la
fin du conflit.
Nous assistons à un revirement de la situation à partir de l‟armistice du 8 septembre 1943,
signé par le maréchal Badoglio et les forces alliées, lorsque l‟armée allemande procède à une rapide
occupation de l‟Italie en descendant par le Brenner. La langue allemande est restaurée et, à leur
tour, les italophones subissent une discrimination. Au lendemain de la fin de la guerre, naît le
Südtiroler Volkspartei (SVP), parti qui demande le droit à l‟autodétermination, l‟annexion à
l‟Autriche ou éventuellement la création d‟un État autonome : le Tyrol. En même temps, une
grande partie des Ladins adhèrent à la Zent Ladina Dolomites Ŕ mouvement politique proche du
SVP Ŕ qui demandait la reconnaissance de leur groupe et de leur langue, l‟union des Ladins dans
une seule province du Trentin Haut-Adige. Comme à la fin de la Première Guerre, la population n‟a
pas été consultée directement. Vingt ans de fascisme et vingt mois d‟occupation nazie ont donc
généré une sorte de distorsion de la vision du passé dans les deux communautés allemande et
italienne aboutissant à des accusations réciproques. Désormais il ne s‟agit plus seulement de
problèmes de frontières historiques, mais de frontières linguistiques et ethniques qui touchent plus
particulièrement les relations entre Rome et cette région, les rapports entre Italie et
Autriche. Toutefois, nous ne pouvons pas oublier que les différentes mesures prises pour résoudre
ces problèmes sont influencées par le contexte international d‟avant et d‟après la guerre froide.
1. Le Tyrol dans l‟empire austro-hongrois avant 1918
2. Le Tyrol rattaché à l‟Italie après 1918
Leaders et frontières : Alcide De Gasperi et Karl Gruber
Face à une situation très tendue, les Alliés, dans le Traité de Paris (05/09/1946) incitent
l‟Italie et l‟Autriche à élaborer une politique pour la protection des germanophones dans le Haut
Adige. Ceci se concrétise dans l‟accord italo-autrichien De Gasperi-Gruber – les deux ministres des
Affaires Étrangères Ŕ entré en vigueur en 1948. Cet accord, qui donne lieu au Premier Statut
d‟Autonomie pour cette région, reconnaît, entre autres, le droit à l‟emploi de la langue allemande à
l‟école, l‟utilisation paritaire de l‟allemand et de l‟italien dans l‟administration publique et dans les
toponymes ; il envisage la répartition adéquate des postes publics entre groupes linguistiques ainsi
que la facilitation de la circulation de personnes et de marchandises dans les deux Tyrols 9. Cette
9
Avec cet accord le gouvernement italien s‟engageait à trouver des solutions pour les Tyroliens du Sud qui en
1939 avaient renoncé à la nationalité italienne en choisissant de prendre la nationalité autrichienne
(l‟Autriche était occupée par les Allemands). Ceci concernait 86% des Tyroliens du Sud, aussi bien ceux qui
avaient pu quitter l‟Italie que ceux qui n‟avaient pas pu le faire à cause du début de la guerre en 1940. Les
premiers retours légaux en Italie des Tyroliens qui avaient quitté ce pays ne commenceront qu‟en 1949. Cf.
http://www.regione.taa.it/codice/accordo.aspx
108
politique de protection des minorités linguistiques trouve une confirmation dans la nouvelle
constitution italienne entrée en vigueur le 1er janvier 1948.
Malgré cet accord qui visait à la réconciliation des populations locales et à établir des relations
pacifiques entre deux États-Nations confinants, un mécontentement se répand dans la région. Pourtant,
De Gasperi (1881-1954) connaissait très bien la situation du Trentin-Haut Adige, car il était né dans la
province de Trente en 1881. Italophone, il avait fait ses études à Vienne, en 1911 il avait été élu député
de la Chambre Autrichienne où il défendait l‟italianité de sa province. Quand le Trentin devient italien,
De Gasperi devient député en 1921 dans le Parti Populaire Italien et est attaqué par les fascistes en tant
qu‟« Autrichien » ayant servi l‟Empire Austro-hongrois. Antifasciste, fondateur en 1942 et leader de la
Démocratie Chrétienne Ŕ parti italien de la majorité durant 50 ans Ŕ, il représente l‟Italie en 1945 à la
conférence de Londres et sera parmi les pères fondateurs de la CECA.
Pourquoi donc ce mécontentement ? Les mesures de protection initialement prévues pour
la seule province de Bolzano, ont été étendues à celle de Trente. L‟essentiel des prérogatives
revenait à la région et non aux deux provinces, au contraire d‟aujourd‟hui. La communauté
germanophone, majoritaire dans la province de Bolzano, se trouvait minoritaire dans la région,
avec, par conséquent, moins de poids. Les Ladins étaient ignorés dans ces accords, alors que la
nouvelle constitution assurait une protection à toutes les minorités. Ils avaient vécu eux aussi
jusqu‟en 1919 dans le Tyrol autrichien, et, à partir de 1923, ils s‟étaient retrouvés divisés sur trois
provinces Ŕ Bolzano, Trente et Belluno, cette dernière étant dans la région Vénétie. Au lendemain
de la fin de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, les Ladins étaient considérés comme Italiens Ŕ comme de
Gasperi affirme au Conseil National du 21 janvier 1946 Ŕ ou alors comme « philo-Autrichiens »10.
Une partie d‟entre eux, tels les germanophones, souhaitaient un rattachement à l‟Autriche. D‟autres
Ladins rêvaient, à l‟époque, d‟une province indépendante : la Ladinia. Aujourd‟hui encore une
grande partie des Ladins rêvent d‟une seule province ladine. La demande de nombreux Ladins de la
province de Belluno de quitter la région Vénétie pour rejoindre la région Trentin-Haut
Adige/Südtirol est toujours d‟actualité. Cet éventuel changement permettrait aux Ladins de la
province de Belluno de jouir d‟une majeure protection comme minorité linguistique et des
avantages économiques d‟une région autonome.
Carte n°4: Ladinia11
Ouvrons une petite parenthèse pour rappeler la situation internationale dans laquelle
l‟Italie était insérée qui explique le climat tendu de la rencontre De Gasperi et Gruber. Preuve en
est le fait que la photographie des deux ministres se serrant la main diffusée souvent à ce sujet ne
correspond pas au moment de la signature de l‟accord (ambassade d‟Italie à Paris, le 5 septembre
10
11
Cf. ARMILLOTTA, Giovanni, I ladini e la geopolitica, Limes, 17/11/2008, http://www.limeonline.com.
Source : “I Ladini”, http://www.provincia.bz.it/pariservertrag/accordo/ladini.asp
109
1946), mais à une rencontre relative à un accord culturel entre l‟Italie et l‟Autriche qui aura lieu
cinq ans plus tard. Plusieurs rencontres entre De Gasperi et Gruber auront lieu par la suite et parfois
dans des lieux « secrets », loin d‟éventuels risques, comme en 1952 à Sachsenburg, en Carinthie 12.
En 1946 les Alliés ne voyaient pas d‟un bon œil un changement de frontières au nord-est de l‟Italie
en faveur de l‟Autriche qui ne faisait pas partie des pays vainqueurs. D‟autre part, il était évident
que les Sudtiroliens n‟auraient jamais abandonnée l‟idée de réintégrer l‟Autriche qui devait devenir
un État neutre et tampon entre les deux blocs Est-Ouest de l‟Europe. Rome n‟aurait jamais accepté
de donner un statut d‟autonomie seulement à la province de Bolzano et de dialoguer avec une seule
province à majorité germanophone pro-autrichienne. De plus, l‟Italie, qui allait entrer dans l‟OTAN
(1949), dans la même période, avait à résoudre d‟autres problèmes de frontière avec la Yougoslavie
de Tito. En effet, de 1947 à 1954, la zone de Trieste constituera le T.L.T (Territoire Libre de
Trieste) divisé en deux parties : la zone A, administrée par l‟Allied Military Government (forces
américaines et britanniques), et la zone B, sous le contrôle de l‟armée yougolave. La question sera
définitivement résolue seulement en 1975 avec le Traité d‟Osimo (10 novembre 1975) qui entérine
la division entre ces deux pays et fixe ainsi la frontière, qui était effective depuis le protocole
d‟accord de 1954. Les solutions adoptées dans le traité d‟Osimo entrent officiellement en vigueur le
11 octobre 1977. Il faut donc étudier les accords De Gasperi-Gruber dans ce contexte international
délicat qui peut être bien résumé dans l‟affimation de Winston Churchill, lors de son discours de
Fulton le 5 mars 1946 : « De Stettin sur la Baltique à Trieste sur l‟Adriatique, un rideau de fer est
descendu à travers le continent européen 13 », annonçant le début de la Guerre Froide.
Silvius Magnago: vers le Nouveau Statut d‟Autonomie de 1972
L‟application des mesures prévues dans le Premier Statut d‟Autonomie pour le TrentinHaut Adige se fait attendre, alimentant un climat de tension qui aboutira même à des actes
terroristes durant une trentaine d‟années (1950-1980). Deux nouveaux leaders entrent alors en
scène : Silvius Magnago (1914-2010), responsable du parti Südtiroler Volkspartei depuis 1957,
président du conseil de la province de Bolzano de 1960 à 1989, qui se battait pour le transfert des
compétences autonomistes de Trente à Bolzano (Loss von Trient) et Bruno Kreisky (1911-1990),
responsable du Sozialistische Partei Österreichs (SPÖ14), ministre autrichien des affaires étrangères
en 1959 et chancelier fédéral de 1970 à 1983. Ce dernier, est le porte-parole de l‟Autriche qui, se
considérant la puissance protectrice des germanophones du Tyrol du Sud, saisit en 1960 les Nations
Unies pour obtenir le dialogue avec Rome et accélérer l‟application des mesures d‟autonomie.
L‟ONU incite l‟Italie et l‟Autriche à négocier. Après de nombreuses négociations entre le
gouvernement italien et le Südtiroler Volkspartei, on parvient à l‟élaboration du Nouveau Statut
d‟Autonomie de 1972 Ŕ connu sous le nom de « Paquet » Ŕ, où deux nouveaux principes sont
affirmés : le bilinguisme obligatoire dans l‟administration publique (trilinguisme dans les vallées
ladines) et le système proportionnel dans l‟organisation de la société et de l‟économie. L‟Autriche
informe l‟ONU que la controverse avec l‟Italie a trouvé une solution mutuellement satisfaisante
seulement en 1992-1993. Par la suite, ce statut verra quelques modifications visant à un
élargissement de l‟autonomie.
Le bilinguisme
Le bilinguisme est très largement pratiqué : l‟allemand et l‟italien sont, par exemple,
utilisés dans la toponymie, au sein du Conseil provincial, de l‟administration et des services
judiciaires. L‟utilisation du ladin est plus réduite et concentrée dans quelques vallées 15. Des
12
En effet, il n‟y a aucune photographie de l‟Accord signé à Paris par De Gasperi et Gruber. Cf. Magagnotti
Paolo (sous la direction de), L‟Accordo di Parigi, numéro spécial de la revue Regione Trentino-Alto
Adige/Regione Trentino/Südtirol pour le 30e Anniversaire de la signature de l‟Accord de Paris, Trente,
Décembre 1976.
13
Cf. “Discours de Winston Churchill (Fulton, 5 mars 1946)”, http://www.ena.lu/discours_winston_
churchill_fulton_mars_1946-010000103.html
14
Parti socialiste jusqu‟en 1991, le SPÖ a adopté depuis le nom Sozialdemokratische Partei Österreichs.
15
« Le ladin en Italie », http://www.uoc.edu/euromosaic/web/document/ladi/fr/i1/i1.html.
110
diplômes (Patentino) certifiant la connaissance de la deuxième langue sont exigés, depuis 1994,
pour les recrutements dans le secteur public. Les Ladins ont la possibilité de passer un examen
spécifique pour tester leur trilinguisme. Du primaire au supérieur, l‟allemand est obligatoirement
enseigné en tant que deuxième langue vivante dans les écoles italiennes, et vice-versa, ce qui
permet une ouverture entre les différentes communautés. Toutefois, les institutions scolaires sont
séparées en fonction de la première langue adoptée. Cela incite les élèves à continuer de fréquenter
en dehors du milieu scolaire des jeunes du même groupe linguistique, à l‟exception des plus
importants centres urbains, où le recours à une autre langue est plus fréquent : 25% des jeunes gens
n‟hésitent pas à utiliser la langue de « l‟Autre » entre amis. Ce phénomène se prolonge dans la vie
sociale des « adultes » où trois-quarts de la population ont des amis dans le même groupe
linguistique, ce qui ne favorise pas l‟utilisation d‟une autre langue et renforce les clivages. Dans le
but d‟améliorer le niveau de la deuxième langue pour en permettre une utilisation plus fréquente et
aisée, plusieurs enseignants pensent qu‟il faudrait réaliser une sorte d‟« immersion linguistique » à
l‟école: certaines matières seraient enseignées dans la deuxième langue, ce qui existe déjà dans les
écoles ladines où les élèves ont carrément un enseignement général trilingue16.
Le système proportionnel
Le système proportionnel ethnique vise à une répartition équilibrée des emplois dans le
secteur public, des avantages sociaux (c‟est le cas, par exemple, pour l‟attribution de logements
sociaux) et des sièges dans les différentes assemblées. La représentativité ethnique est établie à
partir du recensement de la population Ŕ qui a lieu tous les 10 ans Ŕ et de la déclaration
d‟appartenance à un groupe linguistique17. Selon le recensement de 2001, 69,15 % de la population
du Tyrol du Sud appartiennent au groupe de langue allemande (présent surtout dans les campagnes
et dans les vallées), 26,48 % au groupe de langue italienne (présent en majorité dans les centres
urbains) et 4,37 % au groupe de langue ladine (concentré principalement dans le val Badia et le val
Gardena). En comparant ce recensement à celui de 1991, nous pouvons constater que le groupe
linguistique italien tend à diminuer alors que le groupe germanophone enregistre une réelle
croissance. Il ne s‟agit pas seulement d‟une croissance démographique différente concernant les
deux groupes. D‟autres éléments entrent en jeu, comme, par exemple, l‟entrée de l‟Autriche dans
l‟UE et son adhésion au traité de Schengen, qui a entraîné le transfert de nombreux militaires
italiens et de leurs familles de la frontière italo-autrichienne vers d‟autres régions.
S‟il est vrai que ce système introduit une plus grande justice dans la distribution des postes
de travail et des avantages sociaux, condition nécessaire à une coexistence pacifique, il soulève
différentes questions. Par exemple, le choix d‟un groupe ethnique n‟est pas évident pour les
couples « mixtes » ni pour leurs enfants. Le choix est encore plus difficile pour les émigrés ayant
obtenu la nationalité italienne, émigrés qui depuis 2005 dépassent les Ladins en nombre. Les
émigrés étrangers, qui constituent environ 8% de la population, optent généralement pour le groupe
majoritaire, pensant que cela facilitera leur recherche d‟un emploi et d‟un logement social. En
réalité, tout en assurant un principe d‟équité entre les trois communautés, le système proportionnel
contribue à garder des frontières entre les trois groupes, renfermés dans « des cages ethniques »18,
et conduit cette société vers un certain immobilisme. De plus en plus de personnes critiquent ce
système et demandent sa revision. En 1981, les résidants de cette province qui n‟avaient pas
présentés la déclaration d‟appartenance à un groupe linguistique se trouvaient, dans un certain sens,
dans les conditions d‟un apatride, sans droits civils. Par exemple, Alexander Langer, qui en 1981
16
Toutefois, ces propositions ne font pas l‟unanimité. Cf : http://altoadige.gelocal.it/cronaca/
2011/02/22/news/scuola-ladina-bufera-su-durnwalder-3512969.
17
Cf. facsimile : http://www.provincia.bz.it/astat/downloads/Gruppi%20linguistici.pdf
Les salariés des services de l‟administration publique ou des services qui ont été privatisés comme la Poste ou
les Chemins de fer, de même que les membres des associations sportives et culturelles qui demandent des
aides financières doivent se soumettre à cette déclaration. Le tribunal de Bolzano reçoit les déclarations et
délivre les certificats d‟appartenance à un groupe linguistique, la déclaration pouvant être modifiée à tout
moment.
18
Expression introduite par Alexander Langer. Cf. : http://www.alexanderlanger.org/it/162/661
111
s‟était refusé à apporter cette déclaration au bureau de l‟état civil, a été exclu de l‟enseignement
public ; ce sera seulement grâce à un jugement du Conseil d‟État qu‟il retrouvera son poste
d‟enseignant. La coexistence des trois groupes linguistiques se fait ainsi sur des bases plus
séparatrices qu‟unificatrices, ce qui contribue à renforcer une identité ethnique se heurtant parfois
aux sentiments des Italiens des autres régions. En effet, de temps en temps, de « vieilles questions »
resurgissent plaçant au centre des débats cette région dont on parle rarement dans les médias et
dont beaucoup d‟Italiens connaissent mal le fonctionnement et l‟histoire.
Luis Durnwalder et Giorgio Napolitano: question d‟identité
Le dernier événement qui a suscité des polémiques a été la position du président du
Conseil de la province de Bolzano, M. Durnwalder, vis-à-vis des célébrations du 150e anniversaire
de l‟Unité d‟Italie, fêté officiellement le 17 mars dernier19. Rappelons que le Royaume d‟Italie est
créé en 1861 dans un Pays qui durant plusieurs siècles avait été séparé en différents États. Le
territoire de ce nouveau royaume n‟était pas celui que nous connaissons aujourd‟hui : en effet, la
Vénétie deviendra italienne en 1866, Rome en 1870 et le Trentin-Haut Adige/Südtirol en 1919. La
polémique est née quand M. Durnwalder a déclaré publiquement, le 7 février, que sa province ne
participerait pas aux célébrations. Le président italien, M. Napolitano, n‟a pas tardé à répondre par
écrit (10 février) à M. Durnwalder en se disant surpris et attristé par ces paroles, tout en rappelant
que le président de la province de Bolzano ne peut pas s‟exprimer au nom « di una pretesa
„minoranza austiaca” dimenticando di rappresentare anche le popolazioni di lingua italiana e
ladina, e soprattutto che la stessa popolazione di lingua tedesca è italiana e tale si sente nella sua
larga maggioranza»20. Le lendemain (11 février), M. Durnwalder répondait :
« […] Siamo una minoranza austriaca e non abbiamo scelto di far parte dello
Stato italiano. Non volevamo nel 1919 ; non volevamo nel 1945. Poi abbiamo accettato il
compromesso dell‟autonomia amministrativa e normativa all‟interno di questo Stato.
Festeggiare ? Non mi sembra il caso. Potrebbe essere interpretato male da qualcuno.
Non è una questione etnica e non vogliamo offendere nessuno. Ma non credo che come
giunta prenderemo parte alle celebrazioni ufficiali. Però non faremo nemmeno nulla
contro i festeggiamenti. Quindi, se gli italiani vorranno prendervi parte, lo facciano
pure. Di certo non ci opporremo.21 »
La tension entre Rome et Bolzano s‟est à la fin estompée sur la base d‟un respect commun
de la constitution italienne. D‟une part, M. Durnwalder soulignait que « tous les Sudtyroliens se
reconnaissent dans la Constitution italienne » ; d‟autre part, M. Napolitano exprimait sa confiance
dans le fait que toute la population de la province de Bolzano puisse se reconnaître dans les
19
En 1861, naissait le Royaume d‟Italie dans un Pays qui avait connu depuis des siècles différentes
occupations étrangères et la séparation en plusieurs États. Le territoire de l‟Italie de 1861 n‟était pas celui
que nous connaissons aujourd‟hui : en effet, la Vénétie deviendra italienne en 1866, Rome en 1870 et le
Trentin Haut-Adige/Südtirol en 1919.
20
« d‟une prétendue "minorité autrichienne", en oubliant de représenter aussi les populations italienne et
ladine, et, surtout, que la population même de langue allemande est italienne et se considère comme telle
dans sa grande majorité » (ma traduction). Cf. http://www.lettera43.it/politica/8407/napolitano-bacchettadurnwalder.htm
21
« […] Nous sommes une minorité autrichienne et n‟avons pas choisi de faire partie de l‟État italien. Nous ne
le voulions pas en 1919 ; nous ne le voulions pas en 1945. Puis nous avons accepté le compromis de
l‟autonomie administrative et normative à l‟intérieur de ce pays. Fêter ? Je ne vois pas l‟intérêt. Cela
pourrait être mal interprété par quelqu'un. Il ne s‟agit pas d‟une question ethnique et nous ne voulons
offenser personne. Mais je ne crois pas que comme Conseil nous participerons aux célébrations officielles.
Cependant nous ne ferons rien contre les célébrations. Donc, si les Italiens veulent y participer, qu‟ils le
fassent. Nous ne nous opposerons certainement pas » (ma traduction). Cf. PASQUALI, Davide, Festa per
l‟Unità d‟Italia. Il leader della Svp Durnwalder « Non ci sarò, la giunta altoatesina nn partecipa », Alto
Adige, 07/02/2011, http://altoadige.gelocal.it/cronaca/2011/02/07/news/festa-per-l-unita-d-italia-il-leaderdella-svp-durnwalder-non-ci-saro-la-giunta-altoatesina-non-partecipa-3372380;
Voir
aussi :
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aVeS8Y_BWc4;
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Pm6voju0xs&feature=related; http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FeNnDph8-3g&feature=related.
112
célébrations de la naissance de l‟État italien dans l‟esprit des articles 5, 6 et 1122 de sa Constitution
républicaine » qui déclarent que « la République, une et indivisible, reconnaît et favorise les
autonomies locales, elle protège les minorités linguistiques ». La question Durnwalder-Napolitano,
a donné lieu à de nombreuses réactions des médias et à une multitude de commentaires sur internet
(dans les blogs, twitter), en faveur ou contre les deux autorités politiques. Les Ladins ont exprimé
une position plus modérée que M. Durnwalder et ont participé, bien qu‟avec des critiques à l‟égard
du processus d‟unification de l‟Italie, aux célébrations. Les Italiens des autres régions ont souvent
l‟impression que Rome doit toujours réaffirmer son autorité et ils tendent plutôt à critiquer
l‟attitude du Südtirol Ŕ une des régions les plus riches du Pays Ŕ dont ils envient certains avantages.
Le plus dangereux dans ces occasions, c‟est que des formes accentuées de nationalisme Ŕ
aussi bien italien que philo-autrichien (allemand) Ŕ remontent à la surface comme dans le passé.
Certains Italiens ont proposé même de boycotter les produits du Trentin-Haut Adige/Südtirol et
d‟éviter d‟y passer leurs vacances, sachant que le tourisme est essentiel pour l‟économie de cette
région. Périodiquement, des groupes germanophones relancent la question de l‟autodétermination.
A ce sujet, en janvier dernier, le Süd-Tiroler Freiheit a organisé un sondage auprès de la population
de la province de Bolzano et demandé une double nationnalité italienne et autrichienne. Or, depuis
quelque temps, de grands efforts sont faits pour dépasser la problématique des frontières
territoriales et ethniques.
Dépasser les frontières: Le « Pont » d‟Alexander Langer
Nous avons vu que Alcide De Gasperi a été à l‟origine du statut spécial pour la région du
Trentin-Haut Adige/Südtirol et que Silvius Magnago s‟était battu pour l‟élargissement de
l‟autonomie à la province de Bolzano. Arrêtons-nous maintenant sur une autre figure phare de la
question sudtyrolienne : Alexander Langer (1946-1995).
M. Langer était originaire du Sud-Tyrol, de mère italophone et père germanophone, avec
un cursus scolaire mixte italien-allemand, journaliste, traducteur, enseignant, militant pour la paix.
Il a participé à la vie politique de sa région Ŕ en tant que membre du Conseil provincial et régional
Ŕ, de l‟Italie et de l‟Europe Ŕ élu membre des Verts/ALE de 1989 à 1995 au Parlement européen. Il
a toujours travaillé pour créer une société inter-ethnique qui développe « l‟Art de la vie en
commun ». En simplifiant, pour M. Langer le concept de frontière dans une société pluriethnique
correspond à une fiction et invention, car un même territoire est habité par de différentes
communautés en même temps. Sa théorie de l‟Art de la vie en commun se base sur trois principes
fondamentaux23 :
Ŕ la nécessité d‟un autogouvernement, d‟une autonomie qui implique le fait que le territoire
soit conçu comme une maison commune dont il faut s‟occuper tous ensemble ;
Ŕ la participation de ceux qu‟il appelle « traîtres » : des personnes qui dévoilent les pièges de
l‟ethnicité et renoncent à alimenter les tensions entre les groupes ;
Ŕ le développement de groupes mixtes qui oeuvrent à devenir des « explorateurs de
frontière ». Chacun doit expliquer à l‟autre, en même temps, les défauts et les qualités de son
propre groupe tout en parcourant ensemble la « frontière ». Cette ligne étroite s‟élargira alors, en
faisant apparaître un nouveau « no man‟s land », ou terre pour tous, où l‟on peut vivre dans une
nouvelle perspective.
22
Art. 5 : « La République, une et indivisible, reconnaît et promeut les autonomies locales; elle développe
dans les services qui dépendent de l'État la plus ample déconcentration administrative; elle adapte les
principes et les méthodes de sa législation aux exigences de l'autonomie et de la décentralisation. » ; Art. 6 :
« La République protège avec des normes adaptées les minorités linguistiques » ; art. 11 : « L'Italie répudie
la guerre comme instrument d'offense à la liberté des autres peuples et comme moyen de résolution des
controverses internationales ; elle consent, en condition de parité avec les autres États, aux limitations de
souveraineté nécessaires aux règles qui assurent la paix et la justice entre les Nations ; elle promeut et
soutient les organisations internationales tendant vers ce but ».
23
Cf. BAUR, Siegfried et DELLO SBARBA, Riccardo, Aufsâtze zu Südtirol 1978-1995 Scritti su Sudtirolo,
Merano : Edizione AlphaBeta Verlag, 1996.
113
L‟image du « pont »24 deviendra emblématique de sa pensée: le pont qui permet de dépasser
les obstacles, de mettre en contact deux réalités, de favoriser les rencontres et les échanges entre
individus, de passer d‟un groupe à l‟autre sans la crainte de perdre sa propre identité en trahissant son
groupe ethnique, pour construire un « Autre Tyrol », nom repris pour le mouvement alternatif et vert
qu‟il fondera dans les premières années de 1980. Ces idées ont séduit progressivement une partie des
Sudtyroliens en se concrétisant dans différents projets. Tout récemment, par exemple, (2010-2011)
a paru un manuel d‟histoire pour les lycées préparé par des enseignants et des historiens de langues
allemande, italienne et ladine. Ce manuel expose le point de vue des trois communautés
linguistiques sur l‟histoire de la province de Bolzano, point de vue qui est concordant 25. Toujours
dans le sens de changer les mentalités des nouvelles générations, les enseignants organisent de plus
en plus des rencontres et des échanges entre des classes de différentes écoles allemandes, italiennes
et ladines.
Aujourd‟hui, une grande partie des institutions locales met l‟accent sur une identité plutôt
historique et territoriale qu‟ethnique : un seul peuple multilangue vivant d‟une économie liée au
même territoire alpin, qui a élaboré une identité culturelle spécifique, caractérisée par une autoresponsabilisation administrative de la gestion du territoire durant des siècles, comme le rappelle
Annibale Salsa :
« […] La gestione del territorio era basata sull‟auto-responsabilizzazione
amministrativa da cui deriva il concetto di autonomia. L‟autonomia, nelle Alpi, non era un
privilegio fine a se stesso, ma l‟unico mezzo per fare restare la gente in montagna, nei
territori fragili. Ciò ha generato forte senso di appartenenza al proprio territorio da parte
delle popolazioni. […] Le popolazioni alpine, a differenza di quelle appenniniche, per
secoli hanno costruito, assimilato e metabolizzato l‟idea di autogoverno »26 .
On peut alors franchir les frontières ethniques, linguistiques et politiques entre Étatsnations, en joignant l‟optique de l‟Arge Alp, des Eurégions et des GECT auxquelles le Trentin
Haut-Adige/Südtirol adhère.
Euregio, GECT et Arge Alp
On privilégie alors la perspective d‟une identité territoire-local, en redéfinissant
indirectement de nouvelles frontières entre zones de montagne et zones de plaine, comme l‟a
souligné, lors du discours d‟ouverture de la dernière réunion du Dreier Landtag Ŕ l‟assemblée
conjointe des trois conseils des provinces de Trente, Bolzano et Innsbruck Ŕ de 2009 à
Mezzocorona (province du Trentin), le Président du Conseil provincial, M. Kessler:
« […] Abbiamo una comune cultura, una comune identità, che uniscono le comunità
del Tirolo, del Sud Tirolo e del Trentino. Un destino comune che si è formato dall‟abitare
questa terra di montagna, questo spazio alpino delle Alpi Centrali, questo vero e proprio
« cuore d‟Europa »[…]Solo l‟avvento degli Stati nazionali e la ferita del Trattato di SaintGermain del 1919 hanno spezzato la contiguità territoriale tra i versanti opposti delle
Alpi.[...]. Le discontinuità nelle Alpi non si trovano, infatti, fra gli opposti versanti, ma tra la
pianura e la montagna. Nella tradizione delle popolazioni alpine trentino-tirolesi, la voglia
24
Langer parle déjà de cette vie en commun, dans le respect réciproque, comme alternative aux tensions et
attentats dans la deuxième moitié des années 1960. Ces idées seront les principes de fond du groupe et de la
revue « Die Brucke/Il ponte » qu‟il fondera avec d‟autres étudiants en 1967.
25
Cf. Pädagogisches Institut, http://www.schule.suedtirol.it/pi/faecher/geschichte_land.htm, page consultée le
24/03/2011.
26
Annibale Salsa: […] La gestion du territoire était basée sur l‟auto-responsabilisation administrative d‟où
découle le concept d‟autonomie. L‟autonomie, dans les Alpes, n‟était pas un privilège en soi, mais c‟était le
seul moyen pour faire rester les gens à la montagne, dans les territoires fragiles. Ceci a généré un fort sens
d‟appartenance au territoire de la part de ces populations.[…] Les populations alpines, à la différence de
celles qui habitaient les Apennins, ont construit et assimilé durant des siècles l‟idée d‟autogouvernement »
(ma traduction).
114
di comunità, fortemente incarnata e radicata su di un territorio è inscritta nel DNA culturale
degli uomini di questa terra ».27
Dans cette optique, le TrentinHaut Adige/Südtirol adhère depuis 1972
à l‟ARGE ALP, communauté de travail
des régions alpines comprenant 10 länder
de 4 pays différents : Lombardie,
Trentin, Südtirol en Italie ; Bavière en
Allemagne ; Grisons, Saint Gall, Tessin
en Suisse et Tirol, Vorarlber, Salzboug
en Autriche. L‟Arge Alp propose une
collaboration transfrontalière en matière
de développement durable, aménagement
territoriale, agriculture et culture du
milieu alpin; elle promeut les contacts
entre les habitants des régions alpines qui
y adhèrent dans le but de renforcer la
position de ces régions tout en
contribuant à l‟intégration dans l‟UE28.
L‟ARGE ALP, née comme lieu
Carte n°5: 1972: ARGE ALP. Communauté de
d‟échange d‟informations et de projets
travail des régions alpines
communs, a permis de créer de réseaux
Italie: Lombardie, Trentin, Südtirol ; Allemagne:
entre ses adhérents, mais n‟a pas de
Bavière; Suisse: Grisons, Saint-Gall, Tessin;
personnalité juridique. Par la suite,
Autriche: Tyrol, Salzbourg, Vorarlberg
d‟autres communautés de travail ont vu
le jour, comme l‟Alpe Adria pour les
Alpes orientales et la COTRAO pour les Alpes Occidentales. Ces deux communautés collaborent
avec l‟Arge Alp sur le projet d‟un Fédéralisme Alpin, caractérisé par la tradition de l‟autonomie
locale et le pluriculturalisme. Pour avancer dans la coopération, en 1995 a été mis en place
l‟Euregio Tirol29, un projet commun de collaboration économique, politique et culturelle entre les
régions qui constituaient le Tyrol historique : environ 1 670 000 habitants dont 62% de
germanophones, 37% d‟italophones et 1% de ladinophones. L‟Eurégion Tyrol est représentée au
sein de l‟Union Européenne, à Bruxelles depuis 1995 et a obtenu des résultats non négligeables,
comme, par exemple, l‟élaboration du Manifeste des Alpes de 2001, dont l‟art. 1 déclare:
« Con questa dichiarazione, la Provincia autonoma di Bolzano, la Provincia
autonoma di Trento e il Land Tirolo fissano gli obiettivi concreti ed i provvedimenti da
adottare nei settori dell‟agricoltura e delle foreste, della tutela della natura, del turismo,
dell‟insediamento delle imprese, dei trasporti, dell‟istruzione, della formazione e ricerca
e della cultura, formulando allo stesso tempo i principi per una loro attuazione.
27
Cf. http://www.consiglio.provincia.tn.it/banche_dati/articoli/art_documento_campi.it.asp?pagetype=camp&app=art&cari
ca_var_session=1&suffix=_campi&type=testo&blank=Y&ar_id=111910&ZID=1906855
« […] Nous avons une culture commune, une identité commune, qui unissent les communautés du Tyrol, du
Tyrol du Sud et du Trentin. Un destin commun qui s‟est formé du fait d‟habiter cette terre de montagne, cet
espace alpin des Alpes Centrales, ce "véritable cœur de l‟Europe" […] Seule l‟arrivée des Etats-nation et la
blessure du Traité de Saint-Germain de 1919 ont brisé la contiguïté territoriale entre les versants opposés des
Alpes. […] En effet, dans les Alpes les discontinuités ne se trouvent pas entre les versants opposés, mais
plutôt entre la plaine et la montagne. Dans la tradition des populations alpines du Trentin et du Tyrol, le
désir de communauté, fortement incarné et enraciné dans un territoire, est inscrit dans l‟ADN culturel des
hommes de cette terre » (ma traduction).
28
Cf. les articles n° 1 et 2 du Statut de l‟ARGE ALP de 1972. En consultant le site de l‟Arge Alp
(www.argealp.org) nous trouvons des initiatives communes telles le développement de sources d‟énergie
renouvelables, l‟interdiction de circulation d‟EuroCombi Ŕ poids lourds géants Ŕ, des festivals de cinéma
alpin, des projets de coopération pédagogique pour sensibiliser les jeunes à l‟espace alpin.
29
Cf. http://it.alpeuregio.info
115
L‟intervento a tutela degli interessi delle regioni alpine e della loro popolazione è
l‟espressione di un‟azione basata sul principio di sussidiarietà che mira ad affidare agli
abitanti del territorio alpino, e quindi non a soggetti esterni, la gestione del loro spazio
vitale. Con i principi enunciati in questa dichiarazione, volti a raggiungere una
situazione di equilibrio fra le politiche di sviluppo e di tutela del territorio alpino, la
Provincia autonoma di Bolzano, la Provincia autonoma di Trento e il Land Tirolo
muovono un ulteriore e importante passo verso una più stretta collaborazione
nell‟ambito di un‟Euroregione »30.
Si cette Eurégion permet d‟en finir avec la question de la frontière imposée en 1919 et de
rapprocher la province de Trente à Bolzano et à Innsbruck, elle permet également de sortir d‟une
optique région-État en s‟insérant dans une perspective européenne. Ceci correspond mieux à la
situation actuelle où, avec les accords de Maastrich de 1992 et de Schengen de 1995, l‟adhésion la
même année, de l‟Autriche à l‟UE, les frontières entre les États membres de l‟UE sont désormais
ouvertes. Les Eurorégions ont des caractéristiques communes, comme des mécanismes
décisionnels et des ressources administratives et financières propres, tout comme une identité
généralement séparée de celle de leur pays, membres de l‟UE. La mise en place des Eurorégions a
été vivement soutenue par le Conseil de l‟Europe. Rappelons trois moments forts de ce soutien:
Ŕ le Traité International de Madrid (21/5/1980), signé par 20 Pays, premier cadre de référence
qui donne une base juridique internationale pour la formation d‟organismes de coopération
transfrontalière ;
Ŕ l‟Interreg (1990) : programme lancé par la Commission UE qui finance des initiatives visant
à favoriser la diffusion d‟Eurorégions ;
Ŕ le protocole additionnel de Strasbourg (1995) qui ajoute que les organismes transfrontaliers
peuvent avoir une personnalité juridique et être sujets de droit public et privé.
Le succès de cette politique est confirmé par l‟important développement des Eurorégions:
en 1988 elles étaient vingt-six et aujourd‟hui elles sont environ quatre-vingts. Actuellement,
d‟autres Eurégions comprennent des régions italiennes, comme, par exemple, l‟Eurorégion AlpesMéditerranée, qui réunit pour l‟Italie le Piémont, la Vallée d‟Aoste, la Ligurie, et pour la France
laProvence, Alpes-Côte d‟Azur et Rhône-Alpes. En 2006, naissent les GECT31 (Groupes
Européens Coopération Territoriale), qui visent aussi à renforcer la coopération économique et
sociale transfrontalière, transnationale et interrégionale, en facilitant les démarches et rendant plus
rapide l‟accès aux fonds européens pour les projets communs des Eurégions, car tout est géré par
un seul sujet juridique32. En effet, contrairement aux organismes et structures que nous avons vus,
le GECT a une personnalité et capacité juridiques.
Les GECT, ratifiés en 2009 en Italie33, définissent plus clairement les pratiques liées aux
coopérations territoriales. Peuvent faire partie d‟un GECT les États-membres, les autorités
régionales ou locales, les associations et n‟importe quel organisme de droit public. La dernière
30
« Avec cette déclaration, la Province autonome de Bolzano, la Province autonome de Trente et le land Tyrol
fixent les objectifs concrets et les mesures à adopter dans les secteurs de l‟agriculture et des forêts, de la
protection de la nature, du tourisme, de l‟installation des entreprises, des transports, de l‟instruction, de la
formation et de la recherche, et de la culture, en formulant en même temps les principes pour leur réalisation.
L‟intervention en tutelle des intérêts des régions alpines et de leur population est l‟expression d‟une action
basée sur le principe de subsidiarité qui vise à confier aux habitants du territoire alpin, et donc non à des
sujets exterieurs, la gestion de leur espace vital. Avec les principes énoncés dans cette déclaration, dont le
but est d‟arriver à une situation d‟équilibre entre les politiques de développement et de protection du
territoire alpin, la Province autonome de Bolzano, la Province autonome de Trente et le land Tyrol font un
autre pas important vers une collaboration plus étroite dans le cadre d‟une Eurégion» (ma traduction).
31
Cf. Réglement CE 1082/2006.
32
En 1985 est né le GEIE (Groupement Européen d'Intérêt Économique), une entité juridique fondée sur le
droit européen. Le GEIE est, en faible mesure, le précurseur du GECT. Son objectif était de faciliter la
coopération transnationale entre entreprises qui souhaitaient mettre en commun des moyens tout en
conservant leur personnalité juridique propre. Cette institution a été dépassée par le GECT, doté de plus de
pouvoir.
33
En 2009 naît le CEGT ArchiMed qui compred les îles et les archipels de la Méditerranée.
116
réunion du Dreier Landtag de Mezzocorona a approuvé la constitution d‟un GECT Tyrol qui
représenterait une sorte de « valeur ajoutée » à l‟Eurorégion déjà existante. Toutefois, l‟Euregio
Tyrol révèle des limites dépendant d‟une politique parfois hésitante entre européanisme et
ethnocentrisme, limites qui devront trouver des solutions dans le futur.
Tous ces projets s‟insèrent dans le processus de l‟Europe de Régions. La tendance à
coopérer des collectivités transfrontalières, dans des régions un peu « à l‟écart » comme le sont les
Alpes dans la grande UE, est perçue par les populations comme un moyen de se faire entendre
auprès des grandes instances européennes.
Des rencontres entre Eurorégions qui partagent des réalités similaires Ŕ comme le
bilinguisme, par exemple Ŕ se mettent en place et semblent intéresser davantage les communautés
territoriales. La collaboration transfrontalière et les échanges entre Eurorégions favorisent ainsi le
processus d‟intégration dans l‟UE par « le bas » et apparaissent une réponse à une forme de
désaffection vis-à-vis de l‟UE et de ses institutions, car elles se concrétisent dans des projets
visibles à l‟échelle locale.
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Le Conseil de l’Europe en 2010: une vieille institution pour un projet
moderne? Éléments de réflexion et d’historiographie
Denis ROLLAND1
Abstract. The Council of Europe, the first European common institution, although it
failed in its first goal, to unify the continent after the experience of the Second World War, is again
one of more active institution in Europe. Its history was not a simply one, and the dabates on its
role arising frequently, and although its decisions are used in different field of the European and
international life, the Council of Europe is less studied as one of the firstEuropean institutions.
Nevertheless, despite the fact that the Council of Europe is neglected both by political actor and by
researchers of the European and international space, and despite its low visibility, the Council of
Europe is the institution which, although it is not part of the communitarian angrenage, could play
the role of a European political institution.
Keywords: Council of Europe, political union, european institution, european
integration, democracy
Le Conseil : confusion, questions, carence
En ce début du XXIe siècle, victime de ses difficultés initiales et du rapide
compagnonnage de ce qui est devenu l‟Union, le Conseil de l‟Europe paraît habillé d‟une
ambiguïté politique, institutionnelle et même terminologique non surmontée. Qu‟on réalise la
perplexité du visiteur : aujourd‟hui, le Conseil se présente, au pied des marches de son grand
escalier d‟honneur, comme le « Palais de l‟Europe »2 ; puis, sur toute la largeur de ses portes
d‟entrée, est proclamée et répétée une autre appellation, « Maison de la démocratie ». Mais où est
donc le « Conseil de l‟Europe » ? Quelles qu‟en soient les bonnes raisons, historiques,
architecturales ou de communication, l‟identité présentée, ainsi déclinée en trois désignations,
certes complémentaires, est incertaine, avant même que ne s‟ajoutent de nombreuses confusions
possibles - sur lesquelles nous reviendrons. C‟est ennuyeux car l‟institution n‟est, de fait, pas très
médiatique ou visible. Quand on aborde ainsi avec un public non spécialisé une question liée à cette
institution méconnue qu‟est le Conseil de l‟Europe, l‟on se heurte souvent d‟abord à une
confusion ; vient ensuite une interrogation ; avant qu‟un constat de carence ne soit fait (le
cheminement inverse étant d‟ailleurs possible).
La confusion d‟abord. Lorsqu‟elle en connaît l‟existence, l‟opinion courante pense que le
Conseil de l‟Europe est un organisme de l‟Union européenne. Or il n‟en est rien 3. Il y a confusion
aussi parce que les emblèmes du Conseil, drapeau (1955) et hymne (1971) sont devenus aussi ceux
de la Communauté : en deux étapes pour le drapeau étoilé, 1983 puis 1986 ; en 1985 pour le thème
principal du quatrième mouvement de la Neuvième symphonie de Beethoven ou « Ode à la joie »4.
1
Université Robert Schuman, Strasbourg.
Lieu du siège du Conseil.
3
La confusion est ancienne, liée aux suites concrètes du Traité de Rome et au développement rapide de l‟intégration
économique. Dans l‟introduction d‟un rapport de 1984 intitulé Pour une relance durable du Conseil de l‟Europe,
l‟auteur note, dès l‟introduction, comme première condition : « Il est indispensable que les responsables, les
journalistes, les citoyens puissent aisément distinguer l‟une de l‟autre les deux institutions principales dites
« européennes », soit, d‟une part, l‟« Europe des Dix » - et bientôt des Douze Ŕ c‟est-à-dire la « Communauté
européenne » et, d‟autre part, « l‟Europe des vingt-et-un », c‟est-à-dire le « Conseil de l‟Europe ». Pour une
relance durable du Conseil de l‟Europe, Rapport de mission de M. Michel Dreyfus-Schmidt à M. le Premier
Ministre, 5 mars 1985, multigraphié, p.1. L‟importance prise depuis par l‟Union n‟a fait qu‟aggraver cette
confusion.
4
Le poème de Schiller, mis en musique par Beethoven (avec quelques ajouts et arrangements de l‟original), appelle
à la fraternité, à l‟égalité et à l‟harmonie entre les hommes de toutes les nations. L‟hymne européen n‟est
2
119
Cette intelligente communauté délibérée de symboles entre Conseil de l‟Europe et Union
européenne encourage toutefois depuis le malentendu. Et cette ambiguïté visible et audible n‟est
pas que du ressort de l‟image extérieure ; les inévitables incertitudes frontalières entre les deux
institutions sont légion, compliquent assez souvent le travail du Conseil5.
L‟interrogation qui vient ensuite tient au rôle du Conseil: « Mais à quoi sert donc le
Conseil de l‟Europe ? ». Pour ceux qui connaissent un peu son existence propre, telle est l‟une des
questions les plus fréquentes. Le rôle Ŕ essentiel Ŕ du Conseil lié à la promotion et à la diffusion de
la démocratie et des droits de l‟homme est une activité complexe qui tend volontiers à contourner
officiellement toute tentative de définition des concepts. Car le Conseil de l‟Europe est une
fabrique de droit, de normes, et un lieu de contact, de discussion et de facilitation, un instillateur de
la culture du dialogue politique. Sans entrer dans une énumération fastidieuse que l‟on trouvera
dans les quelques manuels existants, rappelons que l‟organisation a élaboré plus de 200
conventions dans un nombre très important de domaines (ouvertes à la signature d‟Etats non
membres) ; que la Convention européenne des droits de l‟homme qui vient de fêter ses 60 ans en
présence du Secrétaire général de l‟ONU est un texte obligatoire pour ses membres... On dénombre
parmi ses nombreuses autres activités ou instances, souvent peu connues, le Congrès des pouvoirs
locaux et régionaux, la Cour européenne des Droits de l‟Homme, le Commissaire aux droits de
l‟homme, la Conférence des Organisations non gouvernementales (OING), le Fonds européen pour
la jeunesse, la Pharmacopée européenne, l‟Accord partiel sur la Banque de développement, ou le
Groupe de coopération en matière de lutte contre l‟abus et le trafic illicite des stupéfiants (Groupe
Pompidou)… Et cet inventaire « à la Prévert » est loin d‟être exhaustif.
Il n‟empêche, le Conseil de l‟Europe souffre toujours d‟un grand déficit de visibilité. Et
l‟on peut s‟interroger sur les conséquences d‟une pause, voire d‟un arrêt prévisible de
l‟élargissement sur la fonctionnalité politique du Conseil rapidement examinée plus haut et qui a
conféré à l‟institution une légitimité technique certaine en cette transition des XX e et XXIe siècles.
Cette question sur le « rôle » du Conseil est d‟autant plus vive qu‟aujourd‟hui encore, même les
Etats au cœur de l‟Union, signataires des institutions du Conseil de l‟Europe, dont la Convention
européenne des droits de l‟homme, ne respectent pas les textes signés: en 2010, pour ne donner que
deux exemples, l‟Italie, sur la gestion des réfugiés, ou la France, sur la politique à l‟égard des
Roms, ont été dument rappelées à l‟ordre par le Conseil, mais sans capacité de contrainte6.
A priori discret et méticuleux vigile international sur la scène européenne, le Conseil évite
en règle générale de rompre des lances avec qui que ce soit (et, selon les points de vue manque
cependant qu‟instrumental. Cf. Esteban Buch, La Neuvième de Beethoven. Une histoire politique, Paris, Gallimard,
1999.
5
Le rapport déjà cité conseillait donc de dissocier les symboles. Pour le citoyen de l‟Union européenne, un seul
registre de référents symboliques (dont la diffusion doit être améliorée) semble pourtant être indispensable.
6
« Préoccupations suscitées par plusieurs expulsions italiennes. Le Secrétaire Général, Thorbjørn Jagland, a fait part
de sa vive préoccupation au sujet de l‟expulsion de M. Mannai vers la Tunisie, à laquelle les autorités italiennes ont
procédé le 1er mai, en dépit d‟une demande de la Cour européenne des droits de l‟homme de ne pas procéder à
cette expulsion. « Il est indispensable que les mesures prises par la Cour, dont l‟ensemble des parties à la
Convention européenne des droits de l‟homme reconnaissent le caractère juridiquement contraignant, soient
respectées par tous les États membres. Toute atteinte à cet égard risque de compromettre le système des droits de
l‟homme qui est fondamental pour la protection de tous les citoyens européens », a-t-il précisé dans sa déclaration
du 19 mai ». Communiqué du Conseil de l‟Europe, 19-05-2010. « Le Président de l‟Assemblée préoccupé par la
situation des Roms en Europe : Les événements qui se sont produits récemment dans plusieurs pays européens, et
tout dernièrement les évacuations de camps roms en France et les expulsions de Roms de France et d‟Allemagne,
ne sont assurément pas de nature à améliorer la situation de cette minorité vulnérable. Bien au contraire, elles
risquent fort d‟attiser les sentiments racistes et xénophobes en Europe », a déclaré le 20 août Mevlüt Çavusoglu,
Président de l‟Assemblée parlementaire du Conseil de l‟Europe (APCE). « Certains groupes et gouvernements
profitent de la crise financière pour capitaliser sur les peurs engendrées par l‟assimilation des Roms à des
criminels, en choisissant un bouc émissaire qui représente une cible facile, les Roms étant l‟un des groupes les plus
vulnérables. La Cour européenne des droits de l‟homme condamne régulièrement des Etats où les Roms souffrent
de maltraitance ou de discrimination », a fait observer le Président, rappelant également que le Protocole n° 4 à la
Convention européenne des droits de l‟homme interdit les expulsions collectives d‟étrangers »
(http://www.coe.int/defaultfr.asp).
120
d‟efficacité). Il est plus facilitateur que censeur patenté, le Conseil apparaît a priori insuffisamment
soucieux ou en mesure de porter la voix distinctement, d‟imprimer publiquement au débat politique
européen sa singularité, d‟instiller au discours sur le rapprochement en Europe une dose visible ou
audible de modernité, voire d‟engagement militant.
Lorsqu‟enfin on cherche à en savoir plus sur le Conseil de l‟Europe, c‟est un constat de
quasi carence bibliographique qui doit être fait. Et c‟est l‟une des remarques par lesquels nous
souhaitons ouvrir ce volume : vivant, de fait, dans l‟ombre de l‟Union européenne, parfois regardé
à Bruxelles ou Luxembourg avec équanimité, indifférence ou condescendance, cet organisme dont
peu savent la fonction est doté d‟une bibliographie à ce jour assez déficiente ou indigente7. Certes,
ceci explique en partie cela : on conçoit bien comment cet organisme politique, le Conseil de
l‟Europe que l‟on assujettit, dans le meilleur des cas, par erreur aux institutions d‟abord
économiques de l‟axe Bruxelles-Luxembourg-Strasbourg voisine, dans les représentations
communes, avec une double inexistence, fonctionnelle et bibliographique8.
Le Conseil de l‟Europe : « Black power » politique ?
Né du traumatisme de la Seconde Guerre mondiale, porté sur les fonts baptismaux par dix
Etats ouest-européens, le Conseil de l‟Europe est, en 1949, la première « tentative d‟Europe
„européenne‟ », c‟est-à-dire, si l‟on reprend les mots d‟un de ses plus classiques biographes, « faite
par les Européens et pour les Européens »9. Même si le contexte de Guerre froide suffit à établir un
lien implicite, l‟OCDE ou l‟OTAN n‟ont pas eu de rôle direct dans la création de ce nouveau « club
des démocraties » occidentales. Le Conseil, « fruit tardif de l‟aspiration des Européens à
l‟identification mutuelle »10 est, dans sa forme première, le résultat de deux compromis liés entre
eux : pour schématiser à l‟excès, entre partisans de l‟Europe supranationale et simples avocats de la
coopération ; entre Français et Britanniques aussi. De là, la signature, à Londres et par dix ministres
des Affaires étrangères11, du « Traité portant statut du Conseil de l‟Europe » le 5 mai 1949. Le
responsable travailliste du Foreign Office britannique, Lord Ernest Bevin déclare alors : « Nous
assistons pour la première fois sur notre vieux continent à la naissance d‟une institution
démocratique commune »12. Mais la géométrie du projet politique imaginé par ses promoteurs
initiaux a singulièrement été restreinte.
Les statuts définissent les objectifs du Conseil : « Tout membre du Conseil de l‟Europe
reconnaît le principe de la prééminence du droit et le principe, en vertu duquel toute personne
placée sous la juridiction doit jouir des Droits de l‟Homme et des Libertés fondamentales » (article
3). Konrad Adenauer, qui a accédé à la Chancellerie l‟année de la création du Conseil (qui est aussi
celle de la naissance de la RFA), précise peu après qu‟« il est de la plus grande importance d‟avoir
[…] un centre où se réunisse presque toute l‟Europe ». « Il est, ajoute-t-il, d‟une grande importance
pour le développement de l‟Europe d‟avoir créé, avec les institutions du Conseil de l‟Europe, une
plate-forme sur laquelle les représentants de notre continent se rencontrent réguličrement pour
exposer leurs soucis essentiels, leurs désirs et leurs espoirs, et essayer de mettre au point des
critčres communs permettant d‟évaluer leurs besoins et de coopérer dans un esprit de franchise et
de bon voisinage. En d‟autres termes, nous trouvons ici une expression de la conscience
européenne. Il est de la plus grande importance, également, d‟avoir ici un centre oů se réunit
7
À titre d‟exemple, dans un petit ouvrage récent sur l‟Union européenne, pas un mot du Conseil : cela peut sembler
logique, sauf que l‟index mentionne l‟OTAN, l‟OMC et bien d‟autres organismes internationaux. José Echkenazi,
Guide de l‟Union européenne, (Paris: Nathan, 2007).
8
L‟ouvrage de Jean Peteaux, L‟Europe de la démocratie et des droits de l‟Homme, (Strasbourg: Conseil de
l‟Europe, 2009) commence à meubler cet espace presque vide que la synthèse de Birte Wassenberg sur l‟histoire
du Conseil viendra aussi compléter.
9
Jean-Louis Burban, Le Conseil de l‟Europe, (Paris: PUF, 1985 (3e éd. 1996)), 3.
10
Expression d‟un des premiers analystes du Conseil, Pierre Duclos, Le Conseil de l‟Europe, (Paris: PUF,
1960), 5.
11
Belgique, Danemark, France, Irlande, Italie, Luxembourg, Norvège, Pays-Bas, Royaume-Uni et Suède.
12
5-05-1949.
Conseil
de
l‟Europe,
„Pères
fondateurs”,
http://www.coe.int/aboutCoe/index.asp?page=peresfondateurs&l=fr
121
presque toute l‟Europe, quelles que puissent ętre les différentes nuances de conception dans nos
efforts, pour réaliser une organisation plus étroite de notre communauté »13.
Le Conseil est ainsi la première institution communautaire. Il existe avant que ne
s‟esquisse la Communauté européenne du charbon et de l‟acier (CECA, proposée en mai 1950,
créée en 1951), puis la Communauté économique européenne (1957), laquelle a perdu l‟adjectif
« économique » en 1992, enfin, en l‟Union européenne. Mais, si le Conseil a été créé avec des
ambitions politiques, elles ont fait long feu.
Sur le site de l‟Union européenne, on lit de même aujourd‟hui que « les nations de
l‟Europe occidentale fondent le Conseil de l‟Europe en 1949 » ; sauf que la phrase suivante en
réduit la portée à une sorte d‟incubateur : « Il s‟agit du premier pas vers une coopération, que six
pays souhaitent approfondir »14. Alors, exit le Conseil, peau de chagrin des premières expériences
inachevées et des temps pionniers ? C‟est un peu plus complexe évidemment. Certes, Robert
Schuman déclare déjà en 1951 que « le Conseil de l‟Europe, en effet, est le laboratoire où se
prépare et s‟expérimente la coopération européenne ». Mais il ajoute que c‟est « en attendant qu‟il se
transforme lui-même en une institution organique de l‟unité européenne ». Il conclut toutefois : « Nous
en sommes encore au stade des déboires initiaux et des échecs apparents, qui n‟autorisent jamais le
découragement, mais justifient parfois une impatience salutaire »15.Dès que l‟Europe des Six commence
à fonctionner, le Conseil voit son rôle réduit, en cette période de Guerre froide qui gèle la géographie de
l‟Europe libérale.
Et le Conseil de l‟Europe n‟est pas devenu une « institution organique de l‟unité européenne ».
Le Conseil a-t-il échoué ? L‟intégration politique de l‟Europe n‟a pas suivi. Le moteur de l‟intégration
s‟est déplacé du côté des institutions créées dans le sillage du Traité de Rome, sans que le Conseil y soit,
d‟une manière ou d‟une autre, inséré. La tentative de promouvoir une intégration politique en Europe a
échoué. Cette image colle à la peau du Conseil jusqu‟aujourd‟hui. On se souvient du jugement cinglant
de De Gaulle en 1962 sur cette « belle qui sommeille sur les bords du Rhin », « cette assemblée
parlementaire du Conseil de l‟Europe, qui, me dit-on, se meurt aux bords où elle fut laissée »16… Le
résultat, au milieu des années 1980, pour reprendre la métaphore éclairante mais discutable d‟un
élu français, serait que la CEE formerait le « noyau dur » de l‟intégration européenne, tandis que le
Conseil (qui fut pourtant la première institution communautaire) en serait l‟enveloppe, la chrysalide
abandonnée, desséchée, la coque. Trop simple, la question alors posée a néanmoins le mérite de
planter les représentations respectives communes des années 1980 : « Tout en durcissant encore, le
noyau dur doit-il chercher à s‟étendre dans les limites de l‟enveloppe plus large et même, pourquoi
pas, au-delà, ou, au contraire, s‟en séparer comme la coque de noix se sépare du brou »17…
La chute du mur (1989) et la fin de l‟URSS (1991) donnent cependant un nouveau et
grand souffle au Conseil. L‟aire géographique de son regard, de son activité ou de son intervention
est désormais très largement ouverte, des Balkans au Caucase : l‟Europe politique tend à rejoindre
d‟incertaines frontières culturelles et géographiques. A la suite de cette radicale mutation, le
Conseil devient le principal lieu d‟attente et de préparation politique à l‟entrée dans l‟Union : car le
Conseil a des structures adéquates disponibles ; surtout, il propose une forme de critères de
convergence politique que l‟Union a tardé à mettre en œuvre officiellement (et partiellement ?) :
pour adhérer au Conseil, un Etat doit notamment être une démocratie pluraliste avec des élections
libres ; il doit faire respecter les droits fondamentaux ; et ses institutions doivent respecter l‟état de
droit et la séparation des pouvoirs. Etre membre du Conseil de l‟Europe ne veut pas dire que l‟Etat
concerné est une démocratie établie définitivement ou complètement. Quand un Etat devient
membre, des processus de monitoring, de respect des droits de l‟homme, de respect de la séparation
des pouvoirs sont mis en place. Le Conseil n‟est toutefois pas là pour juger ou critiquer mais pour
aider les Etats membres. L‟Union européenne a pour but l‟intégration (économique et sociale,
13
10-12-1951 ;
archive
sonore :
Conseil
de
l‟Europe,
„Pères
fondateurs”,
http://www.coe.int/aboutCoe/index.asp?page=peresfondateurs&l=fr
14
« L‟Europe en bref/L‟histoire de l‟Union » http://europa.eu/abc/history/1945-1959/index_fr.htm
15
Conseil de l‟Europe, „Pères fondateurs”, http://www.coe.int/aboutCoe/index.asp? page=peresfondateurs&l=fr
16
Cité par Jean-Louis Burban, 3.
17
Pour une relance durable du Conseil de l‟Europe. Jean-Louis Burban, p. 2.
122
régionalisation, transports…) des Etats membres : pour cette raison, les institutions nationales lui
ont transféré quelques compétences. Le Conseil de l‟Europe n‟a pas de délégation de pouvoir des
Etats : il est censé agir par le dialogue, par la discussion pour promouvoir des valeurs (démocratie,
droits de l‟homme) et c‟est pour cela que, parmi d‟autres exemples possibles, la Russie a pu
devenir membre du Conseil de l‟Europe et le demeurer depuis.
Bien sûr, l‟entreprise de la construction économique européenne était aussi politique dans
l‟esprit de ses fondateurs : Paul-Henri Spaak admettait que le Traité de Rome n‟était pour ses
signataires « que l‟accessoire ou du moins la première étape d‟une révolution politique plus
importante encore ». Mais cette dimension a tardé à poindre dans l‟agenda de la Communauté.
Certes, il exista, de fait, des critères politiques à l‟entrée dans la Communauté : sinon la Grèce des
colonels, le Portugal de Salazar ou l‟Espagne de Franco auraient pu la rejoindre (ces deux derniers
rentrèrent respectivement au Conseil en 1976 et 1977 et dans la Communauté en 1986).
Néanmoins, en ce domaine, en pratique, la Communauté « s‟en est remise au Conseil de l‟Europe.
À partir du moment où les pays candidats remplissaient les conditions d‟adhésion au Conseil de
l‟Europe (qui définit le fonds commun social, politique, culturel de nos sociétés), plus aucune
question n‟était posée », constatait en 1999 le Belge Philippe de Schoutheete18 ; et il répondait
logiquement « non » à la question « existe-t-il des critères politiques d‟entrée dans l‟Union
analogues à ceux de Maastricht pour le domaine monétaire ? ».
Depuis la « chute du mur », tandis que l‟Union a défini par les « Critères de Copenhague »
(1993)19 des critères politiques minimalistes d‟adhésion, le Conseil de l‟Europe a paru chargé, de
facto, de préparer le terrain à cette intégration dans l‟Union. Se serait-il finalement converti en
antichambre de l‟Union ? La « chronologie comparée des élargissements » donnée en fin d‟article
répond partiellement à cette interrogation.
Les années 1990 ont donc été celles d‟une grande vitalité fonctionnelle20 d‟un Conseil qui
a, entre-temps, reprécisé ses objectifs : « Le but premier du Conseil de l‟Europe, lit-on aujourd‟hui
sur le site du Conseil, est de créer sur tout le continent européen un espace démocratique et
juridique commun, en veillant au respect de valeurs fondamentales : les droits de l‟homme, la
démocratie et la prééminence du droit »21. Aujourd‟hui, beaucoup de nouveaux membres du
Conseil sont devenus ou ont encore vocation, pour certains, à devenir membres de l‟Union
européenne : parmi d‟autres activités, le rôle du Conseil est d‟accompagner ces pays dans le
processus de rapprochement. Toutefois, l‟équation ainsi posée est par trop simplifiée. D‟une part, la
géographie politique de l‟Europe a changé au-delà de la capacité ou volonté d‟absorption de
l‟Union : la perspective d‟intégration n‟apparaît guère applicable à court ou moyen terme à
plusieurs pays, dont l‟Ukraine, la Russie, les pays du Caucase, sans même parler du Bélarus Ŕ
encore faudrait-il qu‟ils le souhaitent... D‟autre part, des pays démocratiques membres du Conseil
de l‟Europe, Suisse et Norvège par exemple ont aussi choisi de ne pas rejoindre l‟Union
européenne22.
Le Conseil et l‟Union sont bien deux systèmes différents, mais à de nombreux points de vue
complémentaires. Les organisations à l‟origine de l‟Union avaient pour but l‟intégration économique Ŕ
18
Philippe de Schoutheete, « Identité européenne et volonté politique », in Les Frontières de l‟Europe, éds. Elie
Barnavi, Paul Goossens, (Bruxelles: Musée de l‟Europe, De Boeck, 2001), 185.
19
Tout pays présentant sa candidature à l‟adhésion à l‟Union européenne doit respecter les conditions posées par
l‟article 49 et les principes de l‟article 6 § 1 du traité sur l‟UE. Des critères ont été posés lors du Conseil européen
de Copenhague en 1993, renforcés en 1995 à Madrid. Pour adhérer à l‟UE, outre les critères économiques et celui
dit de « l‟acquis communautaire », un État doit remplir aussi un critère politique : la présence d‟« institutions
stables garantissant l‟état de droit, la démocratie, les droits de l‟homme, le respect des minorités et leur
protection ». Le traité modificatif de Lisbonne de 2007 reprend ces « Critères d‟éligibilité et procédure d‟adhésion
à l‟Union » dans une phrase insérée dans l‟article 49 : « Les critères d‟éligibilité ayant fait l‟objet d‟un accord du
Conseil européen sont pris en compte ».
20
Bien décrite par Denis Huber, Une décennie pour l‟Histoire. Le conseil de l‟Europe, 1989-1999, (Strasbourg:
Editions du Conseil de l‟Europe, 1999).
21
Conseil de l‟Europe, „Nos objectifs”, http://www.coe.int/aboutCoe/index.asp? page=nosObjectifs&l=fr
22
Cf. l‟entretien avec François Friederich dans le livre, Denis Rolland, Pour une gouvernance démocratique
européenne, Les écoles d‟études politiques du Conseil de l‟Europe, (Paris: L‟Harmattan, 2010).
123
et cela lui a été suffisamment reproché. En revanche, la vocation fondamentale du Conseil était
d‟emblée et demeure la coopération politique, même avec des objectifs reconsidérés. Le Conseil n‟a pas
la force contraignante de l‟Union : il intervient dans d‟autres domaines, dont la nature est différente. « Le
Conseil ne peut pas imposer à un État la façon dont il doit se comporter en matière de droit des
minorités, de droits de l‟homme »… Les organisations sont différentes et complémentaires. Il n‟y a, à ce
jour, ni niveau d‟appartenance, ni passerelles automatiques entre les deux institutions : un État peut être
membre du Conseil mais pas de l‟Union européenne. Par contre, un État qui veut faire partie de l‟Union
doit remplir des conditions politiques proposées pour l‟adhésion au Conseil ; il doit disposer d‟un
système politique démocratique formel où les droits fondamentaux sont a priori respectés : en d‟autres
termes, pour faire partie de l‟Union, un État doit « marier » les principes du Conseil de l‟Europe23.
On le comprend, le Conseil constitue une membrane sensible entre les réalités de la
périphérie de l‟Europe et l‟Union européenne; et c‟est déjà un aspect important des fonctions du
Conseil. Mais, s‟il y a de l‟intelligence dans cette création de fluidité, ce n‟est néanmoins qu‟un
volet de l‟activité d‟une organisation animée par une vision de croissance et dont beaucoup des
animateurs s‟inscrivent contre des perspectives court-termistes. Nous ne ferons néanmoins pas en
conclusion de ce bref article une réhabilitation ou encore moins une apologie du Conseil de
l‟Europe. D‟abord, l‟institution ne nous paraît pas en avoir besoin : elle a su trouver ses marques et
sa spécificité comme lieu de dialogue pour bâtir ou renforcer, avec un sentiment d‟appartenance
commun, le socle institutionnel et les cultures démocratiques. Ensuite, entrer dans un tel plaidoyer
serait un manquement sérieux à l‟éthique de notre métier d‟historien. Ce serait ensuite adopter une
vision trop large qui n‟est pas dans notre ambition. Ce serait également contourner nombre
d‟interrogations essentielles : comment l‟organisation a-t-elle géré ses échecs avant les années
1990 ? Pourquoi l‟institution a-t-elle décidé d‟inclure la Russie, aux modalités de respect des droits
de l‟homme parfois éloignées des idéaux ou patrons occidentaux ou des États-principautés à la
démocratie discutable comme le Liechtenstein24 ? À l‟inverse, comment le Conseil gère-t-il (ou a-til géré, avant le Secrétaire général actuel, mieux disposé au dialogue interinstitutionnel que son
prédécesseur) sa relation à l‟Union ? Et sa relation à la Russie, depuis qu‟elle a intégré
l‟organisation ?
CHRONOLOGIE COMPAREE DES ELARGISSEMENTS
ENLARGEMENTS COMPARATIVE CHRONOLOGY
Conseil de l’Europe
année n°
pays
1949 10 Belgique, Danemark, France,
Irlande, Italie, Luxembourg,
Norvège, Pays-Bas, RoyaumeUni, Suède
12
Grèce, Turquie
1950 14
Islande, RFA
1956 15
Autriche
1957
1960
1961 16
1963 17
23
24
n°
-
6
CEE puis UE
Pays
-
n°
Belgique, France Italie,
Luxembourg, Pays-Bas RFA
7
Chypre
Suisse
AELE
Pays
Danemark, Autriche,
Norvège, Portugal,
Suède, Suisse, RoyaumeUni
Finlande (ass)
Rolland.
Cet Etat, monarchie réelle et néanmoins constitutionnelle ne donne, par exemple, aux femmes depuis 1994 qu‟un
droit de vote limité. Ce gouvernement soutient financièrement certaines Ecoles politiques dans les Balkans.
124
1965 18
1970
1972
Conseil de l’Europe
Malte
CEE puis UE
8
9
6 Retrait (adhésion CEE)
Danemark et RoyaumeUni
1976 19
1977 20
1978 21
1981
1986
Portugal
Espagne
Liechtenstein
10
12
Saint-Marin
Finlande
Hongrie
Pologne
Bulgarie, Estonie, Lituanie,
Slovaquie, Rép.tchèque
1993 32
Roumanie, Slovénie
1994 33
Andorre
1995 38 Lettonie, Albanie, Moldova, Ex- 15
Rép. Youg. de Macédoine,
Ukraine
1996
1999
2001
2002
2004
+ Islande
Danemark, Irlande,
Royaume-Uni
1973
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
AELE
Grèce
Espagne, Portugal
22
23
24
25
30
40
41
43
44
45
2007 46
Russie, Croatie
Géorgie
Arménie, Azerbaïdjan,
Bosnie-Herzégovine
Monaco
Montenegro
Autriche, Finlande, Suède
6
+ Finlande, retrait
Portugal
(adhésion CEE)
7
+ Liechtenstein
4
Reste Islande
Liechtenstein Norvège,
Suède
Retrait Autriche
(adhésion UE) Finlande,
Suède
25 Pologne, Rép.tchèque, Hongrie,
Slovaquie, Slovénie, Lituanie,
Lettonie, Estonie, Chypre,
Malte
27
Bulgarie, Roumanie
BIBLIOGRAPHIE
Burban, Jean-Louis (1996), Le Conseil de l‟Europe. Paris: PUF, 1985 (3e éd.).
Duclos, Pierre (1960), Le Conseil de l‟Europe. Paris: PUF.
Echkenazi. José (2007), Guide de l‟Union européenne. Paris: Nathan.
Huber, Denis (1999), Une décennie pour l‟Histoire. Le conseil de l‟Europe, 1989-1999. Strasbourg:
Editions du Conseil de l‟Europe.
Peteaux, Jean (2009), L‟Europe de la démocratie et des droits de l‟Homme. Strasbourg: Editions du
Conseil de l‟Europe.
Rolland, Denis (2010), Pour une gouvernance démocratique européenne. Les écoles d‟études politiques
du Conseil de l‟Europe. Paris: L‟Harmattan.
125
Schoutheete, Philippe de (2001), « Identité européenne et volonté politique », in Les Frontières de
l‟Europe. Edité par élie Barnavi, Paul Goossens, 185-189,. Bruxelles: Musée de l‟Europe, De
Boeck.
Pages officielles
Conseil de l‟Europe, „Pères fondateurs”,
http://www.coe.int/aboutCoe/index.asp?page=peresfondateurs&l=fr (consulté, 04-2010)
Conseil de l‟Europe, „Nos objectifs”,
http://www.coe.int/aboutCoe/index.asp?page=nosObjectifs&l=fr (23-08-2010).
« L‟Europe en bref/L‟histoire de l‟Union » http://europa.eu/abc/history/1945-1959/index_fr.htm (consulté,
04-2010).
III. The Place of the Leaders after the End of the Cold
War: the Disappearance/Appearance of the
Borders
REMÉNYI Péter (Pecs) ◄► An Emerging Border of an Emerging
State? The Case of the IEBL and the Republika Srpska of BosniaHerzegovina
Monica OPROIU (Bucharest) ◄► Slobodan Milosevic and the
Violent Transformation of Borders in Former Yugoslavia
Giulia PRELZ OLTRAMONTI (Brussels) ◄► Borders,
Boundaries, Ceasefire Lines and de facto Borders: The Impact of
Mobility Policies
TÖMÖRI Mihály (Debrecen) ◄► The Role of the “DebOra” CrossBorder Eurometropolis in the Hungarian - Romanian CBC
Relations - A Case Study of Shopping Tourism in Debrecen and
Oradea
Adriana POPESCU (Oradea), Ludovic NICA (Oradea) ◄►
Regionalism in a Europe without Borders. Some Approaches on
Bihor County
An Emerging Border of an Emerging State?
The Case of the IEBL and the Republika Srpska of Bosnia-Herzegovina
REMÉNYI Péter1
Abstract. This article examines the geopolitical changes in the Balkan region that led to
the emergence and evolution of Republika Srpska (RS), which now operates as a semi-autonomous
state. During the Bosnian war, the corridors linking the historical Serb-inhabited areas, where the
target of ethnic cleansing that fundamentally changed the area‟s ethnic composition. In the Dayton
Peace Accords (DPA), those very corridors became the boundaries of the newly recognized
Republika Srpska. Throughout postwar Bosnia, ethnicity affects nearly all aspects of daily life.
Serbs are highly disadvantaged and Bosniaks are moving toward a majority. In the 15 years since
DPA, Republika Srpska has sought to administratively control these ethnic divisions by enforcing
DPA and Inter-Entity Boundary Line (IEBL) provisions and obstructing attempt to reduce
decentralization. The IEBL, an informal border separating two ethnic communities, is one of the
most contested divisions in the Western Balkans. Because of its roots in ethnic cleansing, the
boundary line is a symbol of violent secessionism. In recent years, the IEBL has obstructed ethnic
“re-mixing” as local RS authorities try to prevent internally displaced persons (IDPs) from
relocating there.
Keywords: Bosnia-Herzegovina, Western Balkans, ethnocratic regime,
homogenization, Inter-Entity Boundary Line, settlement system, Dayton Peace Accords.
ethnic
Introduction
Yugoslavia‟s national disintegration was a milestone event in post-bipolar Europe. The
aftermath was marred by civil war, the emergence of short-lived statelets, rapid and turbulent
border changes, mass migration, and large scale devastation. Ultimately, seven successor states had
emerged by 2010. Bosnia-Herzegovina has been the hub of the transition in the Western Balkans.
Extreme decentralization and the creation of two „almost-states‟ (so-called entities) was the price of
the peace. Provisions of the Dayton Peace Accords (DPA) Ŕ even 15 years after their drafting Ŕ still
prevail, but in many ways, that agreement obscures progress in development. Because Bosnian
Serbs rely on the DPA as a guarantee of their rights under changing demographic circumstances,
consensus on change is hard to achieve. A major provision of the DPA is the Inter Entity Boundary
Line (IEBL), which divides the two parts of the country. Although the IEBL is a controlled border,
the tensions between the entities it separates are so high, that the line creates an important divsion.
In this paper we argue that ethnic divisions still dominate the social-political economy of
Bosnia-Herzegovina. Though the country outwardly portrays itself as a multicultural state, this
belies a much more deeply divided reality. Ethnicity and ethnically based social structures affect
nearly all aspects of daily life. As a result, ethnic communities are creating their own subnational
structures. Even if the state itself can be considered a multicultural, the entities and cantons (the
subnational territorial organizations) are highly exclusionary and ethnocratic2. These multiple
ethnocratic regimes often have competing interests and hinder any unified plans „state-building‟. In
our analysis we use demographic data, territorial planning documents, and prior research to support
our arguments. We draw upon Yiftachel and Ghanem‟s work on “ehtnocracies” and apply it to the
case of Bosnia-Herzegovina, where the phenomenon is seen at a subnational level. Many of the
mechanism, however, are quite similar. We use Republika Srpska (RS) of Bosnia-Herzegovina as
an example of how ethnocracy does not only operate on the state level but anywhere an ethnic
1
2
Institute of Geography, Faculty of Sciences, University of Pécs.
On this see: Oren Yiftachel and As‟ad Ghanem. ”Understanding „ethnocratic‟ regimes: the politics of seizing
contested territories”, Political Geography, 23 (2004): 647-676.
130
community has exclusive rights over a given piece of land. In the case of the RS, those rights were
provided by the DPA.
Theoretical considerations.
Measuring ethnic homogenization
One of the most significant geopolitical effects from Yugoslavia‟s dissolution is the
impact on ethnic composition. Previous mosaic structures have ceased to exist and many ethnic
spaces and cities have become homogenized. This process has influenced how new regimes
develop and has made ethnicity a prominent factor in the region‟s governance structures. Ethnic
composition differs markedly by region. The migratory patterns cannot be readily discerned simply
by comparing state-level percentages cross-sectionally at two points in time. A more nuanced and
sensitive form of measurement is needed. Simpson‟s Ethnic Diversity Index (EDI) has been
proposed as a promising measure of changes in ethnic composition. Though the EDI originated in
the field of biology as a measure of biodiversity within an ecosystem, Péter Bajmócy adapted it for
geographical analysis. He applied the EDI in Hungary to estimate the likelihood that a member of
one ethnic group would meet someone from the same or different ethnic groups3. Applying the
following mathematical formula, the EDI produces a value between 0 and 1, where 0 indicates a
completely homogenous population while 1 indicates that each person is of different ethnicity.
n
L ( L 1) / 2
EDI
ei (ei 1) / 2
i 1
L ( L 1) / 2
, where
L: a population of municipality (or other spatial unit)
e1, e2,….en: number of persons belonging to the ethnic groups
EDI: ethnic diversity index
Comparing homogeneous ethnic populations using census data is problematic. The 1991
and 2002 census tools each used a different number of possible ethnic categories from which to
choose. The state-level data, however, were comparable. So it is possible to compare the diversity
indices and the extent of changes at that level, and also at the settlement level. To understand
trends, it is necessary not only to compare the diversity index (EDI) itself but but also its changes
over time (ΔEDI). The changes are a critical part of understanding the region‟s ethnic
homogenization.
Investigating ethnocratic regimes
Yiftachel and Ghanem introduced the term “ethnocracy” and described the defining
characteristics of ethnocratic regimes. In their view, the central feature was a condition in which
ethnicity “rules” and governs nearly all aspects (political, social, and economic) of citizens‟ daily
lives. Ethnicity Ŕ more so than class or wealth Ŕ becomes the primary factor in distinguishing
among members of the population. Yiftachel and Ghanem also suggest that ethnocratic regimes
usually use economic development, plans and land tenure as means to maintain and regulate to
their ethnic control over a territory4. Bosnia-Herzegovina, though not included in Yiftachel and
Ghanem‟s original studies, would meet their definition of an ethnocracy. Bosnia, writ large, would
not be considered a “typical” ethnocratic regime, since its official political and social structure is
based on a balance among the three major ethnic groups. In practice, however, its two component
entities do maintain ethnically based structures, and they are granted authority to do so by the
Dayton Peace Accords. This ethnocratic orientation is evident each community‟s structures and
institutions, including ethnically based political parties, ethnically based school curricula, and
ethnically based universities. It is also apparent from the ethno-demographic changes
3
Bajmócy, Péter. „A nemzetiségi és vallási szerkezet változása Magyarországon a XX. században”, in: II.
Magyar Földrajzi Konferencia, (Szeged: SZTE Természeti Földrajzi és Geoinformatikai, 2004), 16p.
4
Yiftachel and Ghanem: 650.
131
(homogenization) that has occurred in recent decades, and from scholarly fieldwork as well 5. As we
will show, the Inter Entity Border Line (IEBL), which emerged from the DPA, mirrors the former
frontline, reinforcing ethnic divisions and facilitating the ethnocratic governance at subnational
level. Moreover, ethnically based school curricula6 hinder attempts at pluralism or coexistence, and
support ethnocratic controls.
The DPA, we argue, provided a legitimizing foundation for the region‟s ethnically based
governance and segregation of institutional, political and economic systems7. According to DPA
provisions, the IEBL itself lacks any strong dividing power. It has no border control, no regulation of
inter-entity traffic, and no internal customs or tariffs. Instead, the boundary functions as a symbolic
division between two antagonistic, ethnically based entities8. Applying Yiftachel and Ghanem‟s
concept of ethnocracy to Republika Srpska, we document the evolution and characteristics of its
ethnically based structures. We also emphasize that, in this instance, ethnocracy does not operate as
state-level program for ethnic supremacy, but rather as a subnational trend to strengthen separatism.
We consider how a Serbian „counter-ethnocracy‟ may have emerged to check the growing power of
the Bosniak population, and how this impedes unified state-building efforts.
The demographic impact of Yugoslavia‟s breakup
Changes within population
We consider the changes of population in numbers the most important demographical
alteration of the breakup of Yugoslavia, which affected Bosnia-Herzegovina seriously. The Wars of
Yugoslav Succession created the largest population of displaced Europeans since WWII. The
overall population declined in war-affected regions (which were predominantly Bosnian), but
increased in the less conflict-ridden areas, due in part to the influx of refugees. Proportionally, the
population of Croatian Krajinas declined most significantly because the expelled Serbian
population was only partially replaced by Croatian settlers. In Bosnia-Herzegovina the regions
experiencing significant population declines were as follow: settlements in Central Bosnia, the
Bosnian Krajinas, settlements along the Drina and the area known as the Posavina corridor. The
Serbian, Bosniak and Croatian ethnic regions adjoin the Central Bosnian settlements, suggesting
that maximum ethnic diversity presents not only two- but three-sided struggles. The areas in
Bosnia-Herzegovina insulated from armed conflict did not suffer from a significant population
decline, and also accepted large numbers of refugees from less fortunate areas. Banja Luka and
Bijeljina, the western part of the Posavina Flatland, became the most desirable refuge for Serbians,
while the Posavina corridor‟s southern rim became a shelter for the Muslim population.
Herzegovina‟s eastern settlements grew in number due to Serbian migration and the western ones
due to Croatian settlers. The area was not severely impacted by war; and even before the war the
area was less ethnically diverse, so relatively few people fled or were displaced.
Ethnic homogenization
The primary objectives of the war that accompanied Yugoslavia‟s breakup were: to secure
political independence in the occupied areas; to satisfy nationalist territorial needs; and to
homogenize the possessed and the occupied territories. Ethnic homogenization and cleansing,
therefore, was not a side-effect of the war like in many other cases, but the aim itself. Before 1991,
the region‟s ethnic composition was more diverse than that of any other European country. We are
not arguing that Yugoslavia‟s dissolution was a direct consequence of ethnic tensions, nor do we
think that ancient ethnic hatreds caused the conflict, but once it broke out, ethnically based
5
Juhász, Adrienn Lilla. „A boszniai gócpont: a folytonosság és átmenet keresztútján”, Külügyi Szemle, (spring
2008): 47-71.
6
Juhász 52, and Michelle Alfaro. Returnee Monitoring Study: Minority returnees to the Republika Srpska Ŕ
Bosnia and Herzegovina, no place: UNHCR, 2000. iv.
7
Recently on this see e.g.: Patrice C. McMahon and Jon Western. „The Death of Dayton. How to stop Bosnia
from falling apart.”, Foreign Affairs, 88, 5 (September/October 2009): 69-83.
8
On othering see e.g.: Henk Van Houtum and Ton Van Naerssen. „Bordering, ordering and othering”,
Tijdschrift voor Economische en Sociale Geografie, 93/2 (2002): 125-136.
132
territorial power was its main driving force. Conversely, the main obstacle to peaceful separation
was the mismatch between ethnic and administrative borders and in Bosnia-Herzegovina the lack
of ethnically homogenous territories, which could have been a base for territorial political
formations. Indeed, the armed conflicts resulted in ethnic-based conflicts, ethnic cleansing and
homogenization. The fear and the conflict itself forced millions to leave their homes. This forced
migration was ethnically based and generally, though not in all affected regions, led to ethnic
homogenization of the area. As a result, the multicultural region of the Western Balkans has
disappeared, just as have the ethnic mosaic structures of several areas.
The statistically provable homogenization is not as discernible within larger territorial
units such as the Western Balkans or the federal republics, but is quite evident at territorial and
settlement meso-levels (such as entities, counties, municipalities) level. The ethnic homogeneity of
the former state, writ large, has barely changed. The succession states of former Yugoslavia Slovenia excluded - show only a 0.3% increase in their homogenization index. The data suggest
that the war did not change the ethnic proportions and ethnic diversity of the entire region. In fact,
the degree of ethnic homogenization of the former Yugoslavia is rather insignificant. Within the
individual succession states and the territorial units, however, the changes have been substantial.
The change of ethnic diversity index of Yugoslav succession states and other sub
national territorial formations between 1991 and 2004.
Table 1
Republic / entity / autonomous area
ΔEDI (pp)
BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA
-5
Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina
-22
Bosnian Serb Republic
-26
CROATIA
-18
MACEDONIA
2
MONTENEGRO
11
SERBIA PRIOR 2008 (Serbia Proper + Vojvodina + Kosovo)
1
SERBIA AFTER 2008 (Serbia Proper + Vojvodina)
-5
SERBIA PROPER
-4
KOSOVO
-13
VOJVODINA
-9
ex-YUGOSLAVIA (EXCLUDING SLOVENIA)
-0,3
Source: statistical institutions
Using the ethnic diversity index, the Yugoslav successor states can be grouped into two
categories, according to the degree of change: minor, suggesting the change easily explainable by
natural processes such as assimilation or the cessation of “Yugoslav” as a category, or
considerable, reflecting the result of significant homogenization. In Croatia and Kosovo ethnic
homogenization occurred mainly because the majority drove out the minorities by force. Serbs
were expelled en masse from both regions and from Kosovo, and the population of Albans
naturally grew more quickly.
Serbia‟s population has homogenized slightly, probably as a result of several converging
trends, including changes in the number of people choosing “Yugoslav” as their ethnic category in
the 2002 census, the relocation of Serbians driven out of Croatia, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo,
and the natural process of assimilation of such minorities as Hungarians, Slovaks and other
minority groups. As several studies have shown9, a large proportion of the Serbian-bound refugees
from former Yugoslavian successor states settled in Vojvodina. This trend, along with an increase in
Hungarians leaving the territory, probably explains the 9% drop in Vojvodina‟s diversity index. The
9
Kicošev, Saša and Kocsis, Károly. „A menekültügy társadalmi-demográfiai aspektusai a Vajdaságban.”
Regio, 9, 3. (1998): 63-74.
133
absolute value of this rate may seem small, but Vojvodina shows more homogenization than other
war-hit entities in the former Yugoslav region.
Ethnic diversity in Macedonia and Montenegro have also increased, but for different
reasons. One quarter of Macedonia‟s population are Albans, and as a result of their higher
reproductive rate and opposition to assimilation, the country shows a pattern of growing ethnic
diversity. In Montenegro, the pursuit of independence divided the society because the choice of
ethnic identity, had political implications and vice versa. Despite the fact that no official data exist
on ethnic representation in Bosnia-Herzegovina, it is reasonable to assume that diversity at the state
level has changed little, and that the 5% rate approximates that of Serbia. Though, at the state level,
ethnic structures changed very little, they were much more apparent at subnational levels. DPA
ushered in an extreme and legitimized version of separation in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Serbs enjoy a
majority in Republika Srpska, while the Federation‟s other two major ethnic groups enjoy an
absolute majority in their respective jurisdictions. Further homogenization is evident in the cantons,
reflecting pervasive ethnic segregation throughout the country.
Fig. 1. Ethnic homogenization of successor states of former Yugoslavia (based on alterations of
ethnic diversity index) between 1991 and early 2000.
Source: own calculations from data and estimates of statistic institutions. Cartography: Á Németh
Analysing ethnic homogenization at the municipal level, reveals several other types of
areas. Municipalities that were hardest hit by armed conflict (e.g. Slavonia, Kosovo, several parts
of Croatian and Bosnian Karjinas, Central Bosnia, and he majority of the Bosnian Serb Republic)
show the greatest degree of homogenization. In these areas, homogenization was caused primarily
by minorities leaving the regions. In Dalmatia, Istria and Novi Sad the absolute value of the
minorities has not declined; there has, however, been a growth in the majority group. These are
relatively peaceful destination areas for a large number of refugees. In contrast, in areas where the
local majority was not the state majority, the change in ethnic diversity increased. Examples
include the core territories of the Croatian and Bosnian Krajinas, where Serbs comprised 90% of
the population before and during the war. The majority of Serbs did not flee and there was influx of
Croatian refugees.
134
In the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina‟s homogenization, the major ethnic groups were
spatially segregated either at entity levels (Serbs Ŕ non-Serbs); at cantonal levels (Croats Ŕ
Bosniaks within the Federation); or at municipal levels (Serbs Ŕ Croats Ŕ Bosniaks within the
multiethnic cantons of the Federation). This ethnic pattern has changed only slightly after
repatriation, when approximately half a million refugees and internally displaced persons returned
to areas not controlled by their own ethnic group. In many instances, however, repatriation is only
„theoretical‟, since in the pre-war territories many fundamental rights (social, economic, security,
dignity etc.) are missing.10 The entity level homogenization was a foundation for ethnic separatism
in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Unfortunately, the DPA created boundaries permitting ethnic groups to
maintain control over certain areas, which facilitates territorial separatism.
The IEBL and its impact on spatial structures
The IEBL affects many facets of daily life among Bosnian citizens. As we noted, it is an
international agreement that contributes to territorial separatism. It runs more than 1000 km across
the country, cutting across several municipalities. Although IEBL is not guarded and does not
regulate traffic across its boundaries, in many ways, it functions as a barrier between the
ethnocratically controlled entities on either side. The units are parsed into four main groupings,
which are concentrated around Brčko-Doboj, Sarajevo-Foča, Mostar-Trebinje, and Jajce-KupresGlamoč-Petrovac. Three of these concentrations mirror the corridors created by ethnic cleansing:
the first is the Posavina and North Drina corridor, the second is in South Drina, while the other is
connected to a corridor not included in our survey, and located outside the territory of the RS. This
latter corridor links the Bosniak core area to the exclave of Bihać.
Fig. 2. Municipalities cut by the IEBL (cartography: Andor Végh)
Beyond the ethnic structures already discussed are those created by the settlement networks.
Those networks determine how the ethnic spatial structures are populated. To understand the
10
Huma Haider, “The Politicisation of Humanitarian Assistance: Refugee and IDP Policy in Bosnia and
Herzegovina”, The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance, 2000. http://jha.ac/2010/04/26/thepoliticisation-of-humanitarian-assistance-refugee-and-idp-policy-in-bosnia-and-herzegovina/
135
demographic shifts in the region, simply knowing where and in what proportions the respective ethnic
groups live is insufficient. Settlement structures determines the spatiality, spatial organisation, and
spatial processes of a given state or entity. Adding this knowledge of settlement structures to data on
other ethnic structures allows a clearer forecast of emerging spatial processes in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
Network data also illuminate the internal spatial organisation processes of the respective entities.
The DPA produced a complex state structure that fundamentally transformed the urban
network and the spatial division of labour. IEBL boundaries - with few exceptions, such as the
Posavina and Goražde corridors) Ŕ were based on the area‟s ethnic composition in 199511. This
implies that the international community, at least indirectly, accepted ethnic
homogenization/cleansing as a way of gaining control over a territory. This assertion is consistent
with the the International Court of Justice‟s decision on the Srebrenica massacre, stating that the act
was a genocide, but that Serbia could not be held responsible for it.12 Negative effects of ethnic
transformation were also visible in the settlement network. Communication across the IEBL came
to a standstill. The hinterland areas especially suffered. DPA divided each of the hinterlands macroregions (Figure 5.). Towns and cities were destroyed, leaving areas with no real centre.
Fig. 3. Map from the regional development plan of Republika Srpska. Prostorni plan Republike
Srpske do 2015.
DPA consolidation was a slow process, affected both by domestic (elections, economic
processes) and international events. All three nations had to reconsider the territorial issues and the
problems these posed for the settlement network. The Croat community approached the spatial
processes mindful of the expanding autonomy of the cantons they inhabited. In contrast, the Bosniak
11
Midhat Aganović and Želimir Jovanović, “Bosnia and Herzegovina spatial structures and regional
policies”. Vision Planet Project Interreg II.C International Adriatic Conference, 1999 Trieste.
http://www2.units.it/vplanet/atti/Aganovic.htm
12
Juhász, 56.
136
community tried to ignore the de facto divisions, to treat the IEBL as a virtual border and to
implement spatial policy without considering IEBL. To them, regionalisation is a tool for maintaining
the integrity of the country (Figure 4). The Serb party, however, insisted on claiming the rights and
areas allocated to them in the DPA. They were motivated to keep the communities segregated and
to maintain only the most tenuous possible relations between the entities. The designs of both the
Serb and the Bosniak parties are evident in their planning documents. In RS spatial development
maps, the FBiH is not even visible (fig 3.), while in the regional development maps made in the
FBiH, the IEBL is so pale that it is virtually undetectable (fig 4.). The content of the plans also
differed. The FBiH regularly regards the state as a single unit (e.g.: borders of the macro-regions),
while in the plans of the RS the IEBL is treated almost as a state border, standing in the way of
spatial structures.
Fig. 4. Economic regions of BiH, Izvor Federalni zavod za programiranje razvoja, 2004.
The impact of the Inter Entity Boundary Line on the settlement network
Banja Luka, the centre of the RS and possible capital of a potentially sovereign state, has
made more progress in the settlement hierarchy than any other city (municipality) in the past decade.
Though the general Bosnian population declined, the population of Banja Luka did not. Instead,
because it avoided direct war actions and received many Serb refugees, the city‟s occupancy rose
from 195,000 in 1991 to 225,000 in 2004). Banja Luka as the centre of the RS is the country‟s
“quasi capital city”. For nearly half (49%) of the Bosnian territory, the de facto capital city now is
not Sarajevo but Banja Luka. Sarajevo is not a state capital, but it is the seat of the Federation of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, which covers 51% of the territory. This effect of the DPA has further
decentralized decision making in the country, so that it is divided Banja Luka and Sarajevo.
In an RS move toward sovereignty, there are few options for a capital city that would serve
that goal better than Banja Luka. It has a sizable population base (almost 15% of the inhabitants of
137
the RS live in Banja Luka) is home to many of the state‟s institutions and functions. Its location,
however, poses some physical geographical challenges that could make it more difficult to govern
eastern and the southern areas. Banja Luka could be a perfect capital city for a West Bosnian Serb
Republic (Bosanska Krajina), which would end somewhere near Brčko, but it might be much more
difficult to impose its influence on the Drina River area. Morever, there is the obstacle posed by
tensions between the Banja Luka and the Pale lobbies, which fall along party lines and can affect
relationships with the West and Serbia.
Fig. 5. Bosnia and Herzegovina these days
(Source: Federalni Zavod za Programiranje Razvoja, ed.: Reményi P.)
The other Bosnian macro-regional centres (Tuzla, Mostar, Zenica) were in the reverse
situation, having lost a significant part of their hinterlands, and becoming much more peripheral. The
revival of their spatial relations was more than uncertain. During DPA negotiations, all these centers
were included the FBiH and their mutilated hinterlands were left without real centres. Banja Luka also
lost a large part of its former region, but it “inherited” territories allocated to the Bosnian Serb
Republic, which previously belonged to the Tuzla region. Before the war, the detached regions were
only loosely connected to Banja Luka13, but this provided them with two sub-regional centres to
nurture (Prijedor and Bihać). The situation was much more favourable, however, for the settlements
annexed to the other side of the border. These settlements assumed many of the functions of the regional
centres. Specifically, these include small and medium-sized towns of the Bosnian Serb Republic. Doboj,
Bijeljina, or Trebinje were not previously centre regions, but had become functional centres in the Serb
part of the hinterlands of Tuzla and Mostar. They gained spatial organising power, also facilitated by the
RS regional development programmes. Pale‟s situation was less decisive. It is a regional sub-centre
13
Veljko Rogić, „The Changing Urban Pattern in Yugoslavia”, in: An Historical Geography of the Balkans, ed.
Frances W. Carter, (London: Academic Press, 1977.), 429.
138
and may have shown the largest growth in population (from 6,000 to 20,000), primarily because it
welcomed Serb refugees from Sarajevo. Pale, however, still carried the burden of being known the
seat of the Bosnian Serb war government. In the end, the Banja Luka lobby prevailed, and the
institutions of the central part of the country moved to Banja Luka.
Among the former centres that lost their hinterlands, the Drina River area was the most
disadvantaged. It sits on a narrow strip of between a state border and an administrative-ethnic
boundary, without real centres or adequate transportion infrastructure. Before the war, because the
area lacked major centres, functions were held in Sarajevo and Tuzla. Now Bijeljina, Zvornik and
Pale are attempting to take over these roles. The city of Brčko, positioned at the confluence of the
Drina and the Sava Rivers, could assume centre or sub-centre role, but it is blocked by its special
legal status. Like the Drina River area, Eastern Herzegovina remained without a centre. Its natural
centre, Mostar, one of the main scenes of the Bosniak-Croat opposition, is now outside the territory
of the federation. The other potential centres with a viable location (Dubrovnik, Nikšić) have
become cities in a different state. Without any developed centre, the small town Trebinje tries to
satisfy the demands of the region for central functions.
Different group dynamics in Bosnia-Herzegovina
A number of factors affect the spatial composition of ethnic groups in Bosnia-Herzegovina.
In 2009, the Federation of Bosnia Herzegovina‟s population grew by 1‰, while the population of
Republika Srpska declined 2.2‰14. Croats and Serbs both have adjacent and accessible „home‟
countries, but Bosniaks do not. Croats and Serbs, can, therefore, more easily move abroad. Moreover,
the economic situation in BiH is much less favourable than in neighboring countries.
Demographic trend data suggest that Bosniaks are moving toward a majority, which will
affect not only demographic statistics, but will also lead to increased demand for resources, power
and space. DPA, which delineates entities on ethnic basis, will serve as a check on Bosniak
expansion. Republika Srpska also maintains an ethnocratic regime, where serious decisions (and
even ones on municipal level) are usually made to favor ethnic (Serb) interests. So it is crucial for
Serbs to support the force of DPA, to retain their control over 49% of the country‟s territory.
Bosniaks, on the other hand, are motivated to reform or even terminate the DPA, to centralize the
state and to break ethnocratic governance in the Republika Srpska. Those changes would allow
Bosniaks to gain territorial control, to increase their resources, and enhance their power. In essence,
Bosniaks have an offensive strategy, while the Serbs are left on the defensive. Again, DPA
contributes to this tension. The treaty, de facto, legalizes territorial ownership gained during the
armed conflict, at least implicitly legitimizes ethnic cleansing and homogenization, and endorses
Republika Srpska‟s war gains. Serbs control 49% of the territory. Croats have no designated entity
(although they were also belligerents). As a result, Bosniaks were forced to further decentralize
their 51% of the country and “share” it together with the Croats15.
The Croat situation is somewhat distinctive. They possess no designated entity of their
own, and there are few of them than there Bosniaks or Serbs. As a matter of law, the Federation
belongs jointly to Croats and Bosniaks, but as a practical matter, Bosniaks dominate the area
because their population is larger and growing more quickly. Croats tried to create their own entity
in 2001, but with no success. The international community rebuffed their effort. This left the Croats
to create their ethnoterritorial structures within the cantons, and to await outcome of the BosniakSerb competition.
Spatial planning as a tool for ethnoterritorial control
The situation described above suggests that currently RS is not sufficiently prepared to
provide spatial distribution or adequate services for the population Ŕ and, therefore, to become a
sovereign state. RS is making progress, however, especially in strengthening its urban network. The
Republic‟s regionalisation and urban development plans are generally designed to strengthen this
urban network, and to create an infrastructure that organizes the various settlements into a functioning
14
15
From the Statisstical offices of FBiH and RS 2011 at: http://www.fzs.ba/ and http://www.rzs.rs.ba/
Juhász, 48.
139
network. The RS development plan for creating separate entities lacks any spatial rationality. For
example, a number of planned territorial centres are less than 50 kilometres away from the “real”
centres on the other side of the IEBL. Without a rational basis, the document is an empty effort to
demonstrate its preparation for sovereignty.
Communication and transportation systems are essential to a well-functioning urban
network. Cities serve as hubs within territories, but they can only serve that role effectively if
supported by an adequate infrastructure. The shape of the RS is geopolitically unfavourable, and
much of the pre-war infrastructure Ŕ which was not even designed for the shape of the RS - was
interrupted by the IEBL. In fact, there are several “hotspots” where the narrowing of
communication corridors could potentiate future conflicts. As the foundation for a functional,
sovereign state, however, communication infrastructure is essential. RS spatial development plans
purport to address this problem. Transportation poses another challenge. Currently, several RS areas
are inaccessible by major transport routes (such bottlenecks include the Posavina and South Drina
corridors as well as Doboj and Mrkonjić Grad districts). The RS development plan contains largescale plans for eliminating these bottlenecks and for connecting to Serbia without disrupting any
other entity. Several transport development zones (such as the Posavina motorway, Eastern
Herzegovinan railway, Serbia-Sarajevo railway) coincide with conflict the “hotspots” and with the
“genocide-corridors” mentioned earlier. These are critical areas for the RS Ŕ their control allows the
entity to operate, and their loss could lead to territorial fragmentation.
Compounding the problems of its awkward shape, RS orography also impedes large-scale
infrastructure development. Making progress along the Drina River and in Eastern Herzegovina
requires substantial funding and professional skill. For this reason, mega-investments along the
Northern and Southern reaches of the Drina River are no longer on the agenda,. Currently, the plan
is to strengthen east-west relations, which are connected in the territory of Serbia by existing northsouth tracks.
Fig. 6. Road development plan of Republika Srpska. Prostorni plan Republike Srpske do 2015.
140
Top-down vs. bottom-up state building
Multiple state-building efforts are occurring simultaneously in Bosnia-Herzegovina. The
„main‟ effort is that initiated by the international community after the 1995 peace treaty. It is calls
for by peace implementation followed by peacekeeping, institution and capacity building and
infrastructure reconstruction. All efforts are designed to facilitate a functioning state, with attendant
reforms and centralization. The effort is funded by international donors, institutions and aid from
other countries. This initiative focuses on strengthening a centralized state through minority
returns, currency reforms, political reforms and creating an army, and tax and security system. But
there remains much to do before it can be transformed into an effective state. A second line of
state-building efforts in the Republika Srpska Ŕ though more limited Ŕ are being undertaken by the
Croat community. The interests and motivations of governance in the Serb controlled half of the
country are much different than those in the Federation. Croat plans took form in the mid-1980s,
but extended beyond typical post-conflict reconstructions efforts. Instead, the efforts were designed
to create an ethnically homogenous entity under Croat control. This process was interrupted by
international forces, which enforced peace upon the warring parties. After 1995, they began a new
wave of state-building, which clings to DPA and IEBL provisions that actually help them to
maintain control of territory they gained during the war. In essence, just as ethnocratic regimes do
in order to gain control over territory, they create an environment in which ethnicity becomes the
dominant social/political factor in all realms of daily life. Classic ethnocratic regimes already
possess control and recognized authority over demarcated territories. The RS initiatives are trying
to create an ethnically based independent or semi-independent entity, which may weaken and
further fragment and already fragile state.
Conclusions
In this paper we focused on Bosnia-Herzegovina - one of Europe‟s most troubled and fractious
countries. Recent trends, however, suggest that it may not be moving toward unified state reforms, but
instead that it may be becoming even more divided. Plagued by longstanding armed conflict, a highly
decentralized and ethnically based system of governance was introduced as a measure to stop the in
Bosnia-Herzegovina. Those measures accomplished their short-term objective; they stopped the
hostilities. But the vestiges of that system are now impeding state development and reinforcing ethnic
segregation.The bifurcating inter entity border line was drawn without consideration of historical or
economic considerations, transportation routes, settlement structures, or divisions of labor.
Although the IEBL is not Ŕ and did not intend to be - a state border, the subnational ethnic
governances and inter-ethnic tensions make it a strong dividing line. Ethic segregation caused by
the civil war was irreversible. Fifteen years after the conflict, fewer than a half million of the
minorities displaced by the conflict returned, and many of those did not remain. Demographic trend
projects suggest that Bosniaks are moving steadily toward a majority. That will expand Bosniak
influences on politics and economics, and multiply their demand on the resources (especially land).
To mitigate the growing Bosniak influence, Serbs maintain a subnational ethnocratic regime to
exercise control over their 49% of the country and exclude non-Serb citizens from accessing public
goods. Regional planning and the vision of the common state are tools used by the elite of
Republika Srpska to maintain their exclusive control over the entity and to create spatial structures
position them to seek wider autonomy or independence. It is clear that multiple Ŕ sometimes
competing Ŕ state-building efforts are occurring simultaneously in Bosnia-Herzegovina. One aims
to create, with external help, a unified, centralized and effective Bosnia-Herzegovina, while the
other aims to create and preserve, mainly relying on internal resources, a (semi-)independent
Serbian state.
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Kicošev, Saša and Kocsis, Károly (1998), „A menekültügy társadalmi-demográfiai aspektusai a
Vajdaságban.” Regio, 9, 3: 63-74.
McMahon, Patrice C. and Western, Jon (2009), „The Death of Dayton. How to stop Bosnia from
falling apart.” Foreign Affairs, 88, 5 (September/October): 69-83.
Reményi, Péter (2006), „Átalakuló városhálózat Bosznia-Hercegovinában”. in A Balatontól az
Adriáig, edited by Pap, Norbert, 231-240. Pécs: Lomart Kiadó.
Rogić, Veljko (1977), „The Changing Urban Pattern in Yugoslavia”. In: An Historical Geography
of the Balkans, edited by Frances W. Carter, 409Ŕ436. London: Academic Press.
Urbanistički zavod Republike Srpske 2008: Prostorni plan Republike Srpske do 2015. godine,
Banja Luka.
Yiftachel, Oren and Ghanem As‟ad. „Understanding „ethnocratic‟ regimes: the politics of seizing
contested territories.” Political Geography, 23 (2004): 647-676.
Federalni Zavod za Programiranje Razvoja 2004: Prilog 1. Karte regija BiH
http://www.fzzpr.gov.ba/Bos/Bosanski.htm downloaded: 18 June 2010.
Slobodan Milosevic and the Violent Transformation
of Borders in Former Yugoslavia
Monica OPROIU1
Abstract. The dissolution of former Yugoslavia was seen “not just as a misfortune for the
Balkans, but as a disaster for Europe as a whole” because it triggered a fierce bloodshed just as
the old continent was trying to adapt to the new realities of post-Cold War politics. The label of
“ethnic wars” was soon attached to the violence occurring in several former entities of Yugoslavia,
raising speculations about the reigniting of ancestral hatreds and the powerful return of
nationalism in Europe. Slobodan Milosevic‟s firm grip of power in Serbia coincided with the
transformation of borders in the former Yugoslavia by means of war and this paper is aimed at
assessing his role in the process and the quality of his leadership. From the 1987 speech in Kosovo
which gave him the aura of a charismatic leader to the subsequent label of “the Beast of the
Balkans”, Milosevic led the Serbs on a path of violence and ethnic strife, capitalizing on their
uncertainties and fears in order to gain and maintain power. By selectively drawing on history in
order to portray conflict within Yugoslavia as inevitable and by breaking the taboo of ethnic
nationalism, Milosevic attempted to transform borders as to accommodate a “Greater Serbia”, a
political agenda which attested a toxic component of his leadership and opened Pandora‟s box for
the future sufferings of the peoples in the region.
Keywords: Yugoslavia, ethnic conflict, ethnic extremism, ethnic cleansing, war,
communism, charismatic leadership, Slobodan Milosevic, nationalism, borders.
Introduction
Fifteen years have passed since the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement, which ended
a fierce bloodshed that shocked Europe. The international community was caught completely offguard when violence broke out in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia at the borders of the
European Community, a long-time sanctuary of peace and prosperity towards which the eyes of all
the states newly emerged from communism in South-Eastern Europe were turned.
The dissolution of the Federal Socialist Republic of Yugoslavia was perceived “not just as
a misfortune for the Balkans, but as a disaster for Europe as a whole” 2, the more so because it
occurred at a time when the United States were envisaging their retreat from European affairs, the
European Communities were just preparing to launch an ambitious project of political union,
including a common foreign and security policy, while Russia was being absorbed by its own
transition to a post-Soviet status and difficult economic challenges. Although one European leader
hazardously proclaimed it to be “the hour of the Europeans,” implying that there would not be any
need for help from the Americans to deal with the violence in the European Community‟s
“backyard,” the armed conflicts in former Yugoslavia proved to be too hard to handle by the
nascent common foreign and security policy and became an extremely divisive issue within the EC.
The label of “ethnic wars” was soon attached to the on-going violence in several entities of former
Yugoslavia, raising speculations about the reigniting of ancestral hatreds and the powerful return of
nationalism in Europe.
This article aims at analyzing the role played by the Serbian leader Slobodan Milosevic in the
process of border transformation in former Yugoslavia by means of war, whilst assessing the possibility
of him being a charismatic and toxic leader at the same time.
1
2
National School of Political Studies and Public Administration, Bucharest.
Tom Gallagher, The Balkans after the Cold War-From Tyranny to Tragedy, (London: Routledge, 2003), 2.
143
The Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia – from Tito to Milosevic
At the moment of its dissolution, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia comprised six
republics, two autonomous provinces and twenty national minorities, thus representing a modern Babel
tower, the construction of which was the illustration of Josip Broz Tito‟s grand scheme for an exemplary
multiethnic communist state. Created in the aftermath of the Second World War by the communist
regime on the remains of the first independent Yugoslavia, this entity was viewed by its critics as a
“conceptual madness” and praised by its apologists as “the perfect model of an ethnically diverse and
integrated society”3.
Yugoslavia at the end of the Second World War
At the end of the Second World War, the communist Partisans in Yugoslavia were among
the few in Europe who could boast about liberating their country on their own, with little Ŕ if any Ŕ
help from the Allies. Nevertheless, the resistance against the Nazi occupiers during the war had been
orchestrated at a great cost, the more so because the Partisans were not the only ones claiming power
over the Yugoslav people during those turbulent times. When the Nazi German army occupied
Yugoslavia in 1941, it established a puppet Croat government composed of members of the fascist
Ustashi movement, which took this opportunity to declare the independence of Croatia and
unilaterally enlarge its territory by including some Serb-inhabited lands. Consequently, a civil war
broke out against the background of foreign occupation, with the Nazi-backed Croatian Ustashi, the
Serb monarchist Chetnicks and the communist Partisans fighting for both power and territory. All
sides committed extreme acts of violence against each other, the Ustashi reportedly killing the most
people and establishing Nazi-style death camps such as Jasenovac4. During this conflict, one third of
Bosnia‟s population perished, while the Serbs vowed Ŕ like the Jews later on Ŕ “never again”, that is
never allow the Serbian people to succumb to Croatian violence and atrocities again.
Beginning in 1945, a second Yugoslavia was organized as a communist state under the
rule of Marshal Tito Ŕ the former Partisan leader Ŕ comprising the lands of Serbia, Croatia,
Montenegro, Slovenia and Bosnia Ŕ now elevated to the status of republics, to which Macedonia,
once part of Serbia, but granted republic status by Tito was added and two autonomous republics Ŕ
Kosovo in Southern Serbia and Voivodina in Northern Serbia. Among the republics, only BosniaHerzegovina was not clearly dominated by one ethnic group Ŕ being home to Serbs, Croats and
Muslims (called Bosniaks), while Kosovo was populated mostly by Albanian Muslims and
Voivodina had a large population of Hungarians5. It is argued that not only this diversity of peoples
and cultures contributed to the dissolution of Yugoslavia after the Cold War, but also the specific
conditions in which the first Yugoslav state was created back in 1918. On the ruins of two
neighbouring empires Ŕ the Ottoman and the Austro-Hungarian ones Ŕ it confronted two projects
for organizing the future of the Balkan Peninsula, newly liberated from foreign rule by the Great
War: a federalist project promoted by the Croat intellectuals aiming at bringing together and on
equal terms all the Southern Slavs and a centralizing and hegemonic project inspired by the Serbs
envisaging the inclusion of all Serbs in one state, with other nations joining to be considered
“tolerated”6. The hasty creation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in 1918 (renamed
Yugoslavia in 1921) under the Great Powers‟ pressures did not allow a compromise between the
two views, thus planting the seeds of division and mutual suspicion among the peoples of the new
state, which was destabilized by extremists (the Communists, the Ustashi) all throughout the InterWar period, culminating in the assassination of King Alexander in Marsilia in 1934. The atrocities
committed against each other during the Second World War provoked an unprecedented rift among
the peoples of Yugoslavia Ŕ especially between the Serbs and Croats and Serbs and Muslims in
Bosnia and Kosovo respectively Ŕ thus posing a serious challenge to any initiative of reorganizing
the state in the aftermath of the bloody confrontations. But Tito, emerging as the new leader at the
3
Vidosav Stevanovic, Milosevic: The People‟s Tyrant, (London: I.B Tauris, 2004), 5.
Vamik Volkan, Bloodlines. From Ethnic Pride to Ethnic Terrorism, (Boulder: Westview Press, 1998), 52.
5
Volkan, 52.
6
Jean-François Soulet, Istoria Europei de Est de la al doilea război mondial până în prezent, (Iaşi: Polirom,
2008), 167.
4
144
end of the Second World War, had the ambition of finally turning the page of history by uniting all
Southern Slavs around the idea of communism and the cult of his personality7.
Yugoslavia under Tito‟s rule
Tito was convinced that the source of all past evil lay in the bitter rivalry that opposed the
two most powerful nations Ŕ the Serbs and the Croats Ŕ so he decided to support other peoples as
well in order to counterbalance them. Consequently, the 1946 Constitution of the new state
recognized the existence of six nations corresponding to the six constituent republics Ŕ Serbia,
Slovenia, Croatia, Macedonia, Montenegro and Bosnia-Herzegovina Ŕ unlike the Inter-War
Yugoslavia, which formally included only three nations Ŕ the Serbs, the Croats and the Slovenes. In
1969, the Muslim Slavs in Bosnia-Herzegovina were granted the status of a nation too, whilst the
Albanians in Kosovo and the Hungarians in Voivodina Ŕ the two autonomous provinces of Serbia Ŕ
were considered “nationalities”, thus not being entitled to equal rights as the recognized nations. It
is in such a manner that Tito understood to resolve the nationality problem and to avert the revival
of past conflicts Ŕ by legally creating new nations so that the Serbs and Croats, although the most
prominent peoples, would not also be the only recognized ones Ŕ and by a gradual political
decentralization both at party and state level. The communist regime under Tito actively pursued
the enhancement of the autonomy of the six republics plus two provinces, enabling all peoples to
practise their specific cultures and speak their own languages. Moreover, the Communist League Ŕ
the name for the Yugoslav Communist Party Ŕ functioned as a federation of the Communist parties
in the six republics, which favoured the transfer of power from the centre to the periphery, as
discontinuous as it may have been during Tito‟s rule8.
The success of Tito‟s ingenious strategy of pluriethnicity very much depended on the
existence of both a supranational authority and a common project for the many nations in
Yugoslavia. So he relied on his aura as war-time leader and opponent of Stalinism on the one hand,
and on the elaboration of an original and viable version of communism on the other hand, in order
to rally all Southern Slav peoples around him so they could leave behind a past of bloodshed and
deep mutual mistrust9. Basically, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia remained “a Babellike compound of languages, cultures, customs and histories” held together less by a federal
government, Constitution and legal system and more by the cult of Tito‟s personality and what was
perceived as a specifically Yugoslav form of socialism10. The development of the cult of
personality ran parallel to the growth of the working class Ŕ an essential element of the new
ideology Ŕ but rather absent from the rural-dominated Yugoslavia inherited from the Inter-War
period. More and more people left the villages for the developing urban environment, enabling the
regime to create a new class system that would replace the old ethnic differentiations among the
Yugoslav peoples and instil the sense of a unique new order. In addition to this, Tito developed the
model of self-management of enterprises, giving the workers the chance to take part in the
decision-making process affecting their work. Last, but not least, Tito‟s push for schooling and
social development together with all the above measures made possible a consistent improvement
in the standard of living in Yugoslavia, especially when compared to neighbouring Albania or some
of the Soviet satellites in South-Eastern Europe11.
The solving of the nationality problem by granting generally equal rights to the peoples of
Yugoslavia allowed for the development of a sense of common purpose, fuelled by the memories
of a (partially) common anti-fascist fight in the past and the joint resistance against Stalin after the
war. Nevertheless, Yugoslavia remained a fragile edifice within which regional nationalism was
considered a sin, being contrary to the Marxist notions of class Ŕ not national Ŕ identity. Tito
controlled it through a complicated system of privileges granted to the communist nomenclature in
each republic and the yearly changes of local, regional and national leadership. The gradual
7
Soulet, 167.
Soulet, 168.
9
Soulet, 168.
10
Stevanovic, 6.
11
Soulet, 168.
8
145
decentralization operated during the ‟60s and the „70s, which allowed for both a greater autonomy
of the republics and some deviant tendencies to occur, together with the bad management of some
crises by the Tito regime during the same period, eroded considerably the political fabric of the
SFRY, to which soon Tito‟s death gave a powerful blow.
The Communist leader‟s strong negative reaction to the Croat crisis of 1971 - which began
as an economic one when Zagreb asked to keep part of its revenues from tourism and the
decentralization of the banking system in Yugoslavia and soon transformed into an identity one
when the Croat Republic claimed the elevation of status for the Croat language and the revision of
historical accounts of the Second World War Ŕ humiliated profoundly the Croatian leadership (and
people), who were accused of nationalistic counter-revolution and were submitted to radical purges
of the Communist Party. Three years later, the Serbian leadership (and people) deeply resented the
proclaiming of Kosovo and Voivodina as “autonomous provinces” in the new Constitution, feeling
that Tito contemplated the weakening of the Serb authority and control over its own territory12.
Tito‟s death on the 4th of May 1980 provoked a highly emotional reaction among the
population which determined a rare display of unity on the occasion of his funeral, but tensions
were already lurking at the surface, waiting for the ripe moment to erupt and reveal the extent of
the damage done by misfortunate policies in the previous years. Only ten months after Tito‟s death,
in March 1981, what started as students‟ protests against the leadership of the University in Pristina
turned into revolts all over the province; the protesters denounced the very difficult economic
conditions in Kosovo Ŕ where the national income per capita was five times lower than in Slovenia,
the most advanced republic in Yugoslavia Ŕ and formulated claims regarding the granting of
federal republic status, instead of autonomous republic, status gained in the 1974 Constitution. In
addition to this, a part of the protesters envisaged indeed the creation of a Greater Albania by
uniting Kosovo with the neighbouring communist state ruled by Enver Hodja, but what really
inflamed the spirits were the initial clashes with the local police forces, which left 11 people dead13.
After that, the federal authorities‟ reaction was extremely firm and police and army units were sent
to Kosovo in order to contain the protests; Pristina was put under military rule, not before hundreds
of people got killed or wounded, while other thousands were arrested under the accusation of being
“counterrevolutionary” or “irredentist” forces aiming at joining Albania. Although the Serbian
authorities blamed the hostile regime in Tirana for the outbreak of the revolts, local elites in
Kosovo were accused of mismanaging the crisis and consequently the leader of the Communist
party in the province Ŕ Mahmut Bakalli - together with some other high-rank officials were forced
to resign14. The violent repression of the revolts in Kosovo had multiple consequences: on the one
hand, it enabled the emergence of a new Albanian political generation, more prone to confrontation
with the federal authorities of Yugoslavia while promoting a vocal nationalism and on the other
hand it emboldened the local minority Serb population Ŕ already enraged by the Albanian
majority‟s perceived hostility Ŕ which began to organize themselves and condemn the reduction of
the Serbian influence in the province. Four years later, two thousand Serb protesters in Kosovo
denounced the “genocide” committed against them by the Albanian majority.
All these social movements Ŕ with a strong ethnic component Ŕ occurred against the
background of an ailing economy suffering from huge inflation, public debt and unemployment,
most affecting the already disadvantaged regions like Macedonia, Montenegro and Kosovo. It was
this setting that witnessed the emergence of a set of ambitious politicians with their own agendas
and a talent for mobilizing crowds with a nationalistic rhetoric. Among them, Slobodan Milosevic
soon proved to be the most prominent character, entering the stage at the ripe moment.
Slobodan Milosevic and the beginning of the end
Slobodan Milosevic‟s name is unquestionably related to the emergence of Serbia within
Yugoslavia as the main driver for nationalistic outbursts, drawing on a long history of victimization
of the Serbian people which went back to the 14th century, thus providing “ancient fuel for a
12
Soulet, 168.
Stefano Bianchini, The Yugoslav Issue, (Bucureşti: All, 2003), 138.
14
Bianchini, 138.
13
146
modern inferno”15. Relatively unknown to history until 1986, when he was elected president of the
Communist Party in Serbia, Slobodan Milosevic soon became credited for fuelling Serbian
nationalism in the „80s Ŕ through a set of initiatives and interventions with a highly symbolical
significance Ŕ which served not only to mobilize the Serbs, but also to strengthen the other
nationalisms in Yugoslavia, paving the way for the brutal wars in the „90s.
This paper focuses on Milosevic‟s initiatives and their consequences for the state of
Yugoslavia and the people living within it in the decade after 1989, aiming at highlighting the
profile, agenda, objectives and means employed by the Serbian leader in order to assess the quality
of his leadership.
From anonymity to becoming a national hero
Slobodan Milosevic was born in 1941 in Pozarevac in Serbia to a family from Montenegro
Ŕ his father was a theologian turned teacher and his mother taught as well, in addition to being a
school headmistress and an ardent communist (Rogel 2004, 122). After his parents separated, he
stayed with his mother and during secondary school met his future wife Mirjana Markovic, who
was his schoolmate. He became a member of the Communist League as early as 1959 and went to
Belgrade for his undergraduate studies together with Mirjana. Milosevic completed a law degree at
the Belgrade University, while his wife earned a degree in Sociology. Nevertheless, after
completing his law studies, Milosevic pursued a career in business and banking Ŕ he was director of
Technogas in 1970-1978, and the director of Beobanka in 1978-1982. In 1982 he accepted a fulltime position with the League of Communists and in 1984 he became the head of its Belgrade
branch, succeeding his friend Ivan Stambolic. On the 8th of May 1986 he became head of the
Serbian League of Communists, which put him in the very powerful position of controlling the
republic‟s party and its membership16. One year later he was elected president of the presidency of
the Serbian League of Communists, 1987 also marking his first real encounter with history.
Milosevic‟s rise to power coincided with a nationalistic trend emerging in Yugoslavia
among the Serbs and the Slovenes as a result of an intellectual movement claiming more political
rights on the basis of a revival of national values. Two opposing yet similar initiatives shook the
political scene in Yugoslavia between September 1986 and January 1987: a Memorandum
elaborated by some members of the Arts and Sciences Academy in Serbia and a collection of
sixteen essays grouped under the heading “Contributions to a national Slovene program” published
by the Slovene magazine “Nova Revija”. These documents proved that the intellectuals in the
constituent republics were in search of alternative projects Ŕ with either a national, economic or
political focus Ŕ to the Communist League, which seemed entrenched in bureaucracy and unable to
solve the crisis undergone by the Yugoslav society17.
The Serb Memorandum denounced Tito‟s past policies of favouring the Croats and the
Slovenes at the expense of the Serbian people, who were already living dispersed within different
republics and were confronted with general hostility; the authors of the Memorandum asked for the
correction of this unfair treatment Ŕ further illustrated by the extended political autonomy granted
to the provinces of Kosovo and Voivodina by the Constitution of 1974 Ŕ and claimed that they had
the right to self-determination for the Serb minorities in the other republics together with a strong
re-centralization at the federal level18. This initiative provoked a strong reaction within both the
society and the state apparatus, being denounced by Ivan Stambolic as “a requiem for Yugoslavia”,
whereas its authors were officially stigmatized. Slobodan Milosevic, who at that time had not
replaced Stambolic yet at the helm of the Communist League of Serbia, did not provide an official
response to it, but he “rode the nationalistic wave it produced”19.
15
See the title of Chapter 4 in Volkan 1998, ”Ancient Fuel for a Modern Inferno: Time Collapse in BosniaHerzegovina”
16
Carole Rogel, The Break-up of Yugoslavia and its Aftermath, Revised edition (Westport: Greenwood Press,
2004), 122.
17
Bianchini, 147.
18
Soulet, 171.
19
Rogel, 122.
147
Enter Milosevic
There were three main endeavours that put Milosevic on the path to huge popularity in the
‟80, preparing the scene for his military adventures in the following decade: his participation to a
Serbian rally in Kosovo in April 1987, the launching of the so-called “anti-bureaucratic revolution”
and his spectacular out-of-the-sky appearance at the six hundredth anniversary of the Battle of
Kosovo celebrated on the 28th of June 1989. Together - the first as a spontaneous reaction (by all
accounts) to the Kosovo Serbs‟ complaints about the treatment they were subjected to by the
Albanian majority and the latter two as carefully orchestrated mini-dramas illustrating the growing
support for the national cause in Serbia Ŕ all these had a great impact on the Yugoslav society at the
dawn of an era which helped it become aware of the shortcomings of Tito‟s rule.
Slobodan Milosevic marked his entry in history with the famous words “Kosovo is Serbia
and will always be Serbia. No one has the right to hit you. No one will ever hit this people again”20
proclaimed in April 1987 in front of a Serb angry mob in Kosovo which was complaining of their
mistreatment by the local Albanian majority and the weak reaction of the federal authorities. This
improvised speech by a relatively unknown Serb apparatchik had an extraordinary impact not only
on the crowd Ŕ who miraculously became calm and then spent the night surrounding the building
where their new idol resided Ŕ but also on the larger Serbian society mobilized by the continuous
broadcasting of the speech that signalled a new approach. Milosevic was acclaimed as the defender
of the Serbian people‟s rights and his newfound popularity allowed him to eliminate all political
adversaries within the party, including Ivan Stambolic (the president of Serbia at that time), thus
gaining effective and complete control of the Communist Party and public life in Serbia 21.
Meanwhile, as Yugoslavia witnessed the development of two political directions aimed at
providing a solution to the crisis which threatened to engulf the society Ŕ one proposed by Milan
Kucan in Slovenia and the other one by Slobodan Milosevic in Serbia Ŕ the aggravating economic
conditions triggered an ever deeper national polarization. While the leadership in Slovenia feared
being exposed to underdevelopment because of the federal government‟s incapacity of resuscitating
the economy of the constituent republics among which Slovenia was the most industrialised and
thus competitive, in Serbia, where the absence of small and medium enterprises could not
compensate Ŕ as in Croatia Ŕ the plunge of the production of the heavy industry, the rise of
unemployment fomented social unrest. Slobodan Milosevic chose to mobilize this social tension in
Serbia and direct it against the federal government through mass rallies and protests denouncing its
inefficiency. The so-called “anti-bureaucratic revolution” had a strong nationalistic element as well,
which would soon become Milosevic‟s hallmark in politics. Building on his previous success in
Kosovo, Milosevic hardened the anti-Albanian policy in this province and its grip of power within
the party, established a firm control on the media and entered a direct political confrontation with
the Slovene leadership which condemned his nationalistic policies and claimed more rights within
the federation (freedom of expression, of assembly, of using the Slovene language in the army and
the central administration)22. In addition to this, Milosevic used the opportunity created by mass
protests which toppled the leaderships in Voivodina and Kosovo and issued in March 1989 a new
Serb Constitution revoking the autonomy granted to these provinces by the federal Constitution of
1974. The ensuing protests of the Albanians in Kosovo were violently repressed at Milosevic‟s
orders and their leader Ŕ Azem Vllasi Ŕ arrested.
The final piece in this puzzle was added by the lavishing commemoration of the six
hundredth anniversary of the battle of Kosovo Polje (the Field of Blackbirds) where the Serbian
Czar Lazar‟s army was defeated by the Ottoman Turks, marking the beginning of a centuries-long
Ottoman rule under which the Serbs became “perennial mourners”23. Slobodan Milosevic was
brought to the ceremony by a helicopter, descending from the sky in the middle of a electrified
crowd to which he delivered a simple yet penetrating message: “never again” (would Islam
20
Florence Hartman, Milosevic: La diagonale du fou, (Paris: Denoël Impacts, 1999), 24.
Soulet, 171.
22
Soulet, 171.
23
Volkan, 64.
21
148
subjugate the Serbs)24. Whether his intensions were to spark inter-ethnic tensions remains unclear,
but if he considered increasing the cohesion of Serb group identity and Serb national pride in order
to secure his own political position, he definitely succeeded 25. Milosevic‟s words of that day did no
less than bring back into memory a long history of victimization of the Serbian people, who vowed
not to allow for a similar defeat to occur again, this time by the hand of the “new Turks” Ŕ the
Muslims in Kosovo and Bosnia26.
Yugoslavia on the road to perdition
In the meantime, in Slovenia and Croatia the trend toward autonomy was consolidating, as
various non-communist initiatives reflected a growing discontent with the federal government‟s struggle
with economic difficulties and with Serbia‟s nationalistic power-hungry regime. In Croatia two noncommunist parties emerged Ŕ the HSLS (Hrvatska Socijalno-Liberalna Stranka) and the HDZ (Hrvatska
Democratska Zajednica) Ŕ the latter being led by former Yugoslav general Franjo Tudjman who enjoyed
the support of the ultranationalist Croatian dispora27. In Slovenia, the Parliament voted for the preeminence of republican laws over the federal ones, while the local Communist League accepted the
multi-party principle28. The turning point thus became the 14th extraordinary Congress of the League of
Communists held in January 1990, when Slovenia and Croatia asked for multi-party elections and Serbia
staunchly opposed the idea. The abyss between the Northern republics and Serbia became clear.
Nevertheless, as the federal government of Ante Markovic was struggling to reform the economy of
Yugoslavia Ŕ with quite some success Ŕ Croatia and Slovenia held in April and May their first free
elections which brought to power non-communist forces: the HDZ in the former and “Demos”, a
coalition of various parties, in the latter. The other republics held elections in November and December:
nationalist forces won in Bosnia-Herzegovina (the Muslim Alia Izetbegovic became president) and
Serbia (where Milosevic created the Socialist party), while in Macedonia and Montenegro the
incumbents kept their grip of power29.
The post-communist transition thus revealed the deep political, identity, cultural and moral
crisis Yugoslavia had been struggling with over the last ten years Ŕ the triumph of the ethnic parties
in the first free elections was a consequence of the failure of the Communist League in promoting a
higher common good, paving the way for more narrower causes of representing the national
interests of the constituent republics. Nevertheless, even within those republics, the national cause
remained specific for a local majority, leaving various minorities outside the national project. This
approach prevented the forming of alliances against hardliners such as Serbia, which aimed at
maintaining the federation. The sterile debates during the first months of 1991 around the
federal/con-federal future of Yugoslavia could not prevent the dissolution of the state. Yugoslavia
was on the brink of war.
The violent transformation of borders in Yugoslavia (1991-1995)
The transformation of borders in the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia was made
generally by means of war, whose result engendered five new states almost territorially equivalent to the
former constituent republics. For some, the insistence that the internal borders of the constituent
republics had to be maintained as the external borders of the new national states was the biggest mistake,
which added to the failure to address on an equal basis the claims to self-determination of all the peoples
in Yugoslavia30.
In only one instance the separation was peaceful Ŕ Macedonia, while in the case of
Slovenia the armed conflict was moderate if the number of casualties and its duration are taken into
consideration. But as far as Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina are concerned, the wars fought for
24
Volkan, 69.
Volkan, 67.
26
Volkan, 68-69.
27
Soulet, 172.
28
Soulet, 172.
29
Bianchini, 156-157.
30
Louis Sell, Slobodan Milosevic and the Destruction of Yugoslavia, (Durham: Duke University Press, 2002), 6.
25
149
gaining their independence were not only longer and bloodier, but they also horrified Europe and
the international community as a whole because of the atrocities committed by the warring parties.
Slobodan Milosevic‟s ever firmer grip of power in Serbia coincided with this violent
transformation of borders in the former Yugoslavia, whilst his role in it earned him the label “the
Beast of the Balkans”. He actually led the Serbs on a path of violence and ethnic strife, capitalizing
on their uncertainties and fears in order to maintain power. By selectively drawing on history in
order to portray conflict within Yugoslavia as inevitable and by breaking the taboo of ethnic
nationalism, Milosevic attempted to transform borders so as to accommodate a “Greater Serbia”, a
political agenda which attested a toxic component of his leadership and opened Pandora‟s Box for
new sufferings of the peoples in the region.
The facts of war
In June 1991, after the failure of the discussions regarding Yugoslavia‟s future, Slovenia
and Croatia proclaimed their independence. The federal army (JNA) was sent to Slovenia on the
27th of June, starting the so-called ten-day war, in which it confronted the highly motivated Slovene
militias. Basically, there were three warring parties: the Slovene population which supported the
democratization of Yugoslavia and denounced the Serbs‟ oppressive policies in Kosovo, the federal
authorities led by prime-minister Ante Markovic, who tried to prevent the dissolution of
Yugoslavia with the Army‟s help, and last but not least, Slobodan Milosevic, who was using this
opportunity to win the Federal Army on his side in view of his plans for a Greater Serbia 31. The
intervention was a failure and soon Slovenia won recognition of its independence by the
international community.
The second war took place in Croatia beginning in July 1991, after the Federal Army‟s
failure in Slovenia; Zagreb colluded with Ljubljana in the first place, but then did not raise any
finger to help it while it was invaded by the JNA, only to become itself soon the victim of an armed
invasion by the federal forces. The difference was that this time Ŕ after mass desertions of the nonSerbs Ŕ the JNA had become basically Serb-dominated and this enabled Milosevic to pose as its
real leader instead of the federal authorities. Moreover, the army was just the tip of the iceberg as
Milosevic used a variety of actors in the war against Croatia: paramilitary units such as Arkan‟s
Tigers or Mirko Jovic‟s White Vultures, and the Serbian militias organized in the Serb-inhabited
regions of Croatia like Krajina and armed by the Serbian police32. The Croat army was
outnumbered, but the JNA failed again because the fighting took place on several fronts
simultaneously Ŕ especially around the big cities like Dubrovnik and Vukovar. Nevertheless, the
atrocities inflicted on each other by the warring parties and the immense destruction of the cultural
patrimony determined the United Nations to deploy an international mission Ŕ FORPRONU Ŕ in
the Serb-inhabited lands of Croatia in order to stop the fighting.
The war in Bosnia-Herzegovina was the longest and involved the greatest number of
participants, best illustrating Milosevic‟s quest for creating a Greater Serbia. The November 1990
elections in Bosnia had left no doubt as to the massive polarization on ethnic grounds in the country
(the population of which was made up of 17,3 % Croats, 31,3 % Serbs and 43,7 % Muslims) 33 so
the government had to include all winning parties representing the three nationalities: the Muslim
SDA, the Croatian HDZ-BH and the Serbian SDS. As early as May 1991, Radovan Karadzic‟s
SDS proclaimed a Serbian autonomous region near the Bosnian town of Banja Luka, very close to
the Croatian border with Knin, a town which was the centre of another self-proclaimed Serb
autonomous region in Croatia. By the end of the summer, there were six such Serb autonomous
regions in Bosnia which rejected Sarajevo‟s rule and planned to integrate within a Greater Serbia
together with the Serb-inhabited regions in Croatia. The SDS proclaimed a separate Parliament of
the Serbs in Bosnia and began building an army with the help of the Yugoslav federal forces. The
first clashes between the Bosnian Serbs and the Muslims took place in December 1991, but the war
generalized in April the next year, when the former began the siege of Sarajevo. As soon as
31
Soulet, 173.
Soulet, 173.
33
Soulet, 174.
32
150
November 1992, the Serb army led by Ratko Mladic gained control of over 70% of Bosnian
territory34, while the Croats set up their own state in Western Bosnia with the capital at Mostar.
Consequently, fighting erupted between the Muslims and the Croats as well, and it lasted until the
spring of 1994, when the USA brokered a deal managing to persuade them to form a federation.
Meanwhile, the Bosnian Serbs were performing a thorough ethnic cleansing of the areas they
controlled, sending shock waves among an international community deeply revolted by their
actions, but unwilling to commit troops on the ground in order to stop them. When the international
community finally mobilized and sent the UN troops of Black Helmets, the Serbian forces
humiliated them by committing the massacre of Srebrenica in July 1995. Only after NATO
launched the operation Deliberate Force against the Serbian forces did the warring parties agree to
negotiate a peace settlement. It was signed in November at an air-base near Dayton, Ohio and put
an end to the fighting by consecrating Bosnia-Herzegovina as a confederation including a CroatBosnian Federation (on 51 % of the territory) and Rebublika Srpska (on 49% of the territory). An
international peacekeeping force was established Ŕ the IFOR (Implementation Force) Ŕ together
with the setting up of an International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (in the Hague)
in order to bring to justice those responsible for war crimes and crimes against humanity committed
during the war.
Ethnic conflict, ethnic extremism and ethnic cleansing in Yugoslavia
The literature on ethnic conflicts advances three types of explanations regarding their
origin:
- Conflict behaviour in the name of ethnic nationalism is a response to external threats to the
state or the ethnic group;
- The violence is actually the burst to the surface of ancient ethnic hatred;
- Large-scale violence is the result of purposeful and strategic policies rather than irrational
acts of the masses, with specific political actors creating violent conflict by selectively drawing on
history in order to portray it as inevitable35.
In the case of the former Yugoslavia, it has been argued that the second type of
explanation is inadequate due to the fact that it had never witnessed the kind of religious wars
waged in Western Europe and that intermarriage rates were high in most ethnically-mixed regions
before the war. Tolerance was a fact proven by sociological polling as late as 1989-1990 in those
same regions that would see the worst of violence outbreaks during the wars in the „90s36.
Consequently, the wars that accompanied the dissolution of Yugoslavia could be explained by a
resurrection of ethnic differences which favoured the proliferation of threat perceptions and
ethnically-biased assessments of the others‟ intentions. As ethnic differences per se do not set a
society inexorably on a path to war, it becomes clear that a secondary explanation must account for
the unprecedented violence which erupted in the Balkans in the aftermath of the Cold War; here the
role of the political elites can be taken into consideration as they capitalized on the uncertainties,
fears and threat perceptions of their constituencies, distorting both the past and the present in order
to gain and maintain power. It then becomes clear that episodes such as the six hundredth
anniversary of the battle of Kosovo Polje in 1989 Ŕ which promoted Slobodan Milosevic to the
forefront Ŕ had a tremendous impact on the Serbian people who, by recollecting their fall under
Ottoman-Turk rule, became extremely suspicious of the Muslims in Bosnia and Kosovo whom they
began seeing as the new Turks. Following the collapse of Yugoslavia, fear and a shared feeling of
entitlement to retaliation helped sanction the official propaganda among the Serbs and even the
atrocities committed by Karadzic and Mladic‟s paramilitary troops against the perceived enemies 37.
Generally, ethnic wars, as opposed to ideological civil wars, are characterized by rigid
individual loyalties, each side‟s mobilization base being limited to members of its own group in a
34
Soulet, 175.
V.P Gagnon, “Ethnic Nationalism and International Conflict: The Case of Serbia”, International Security,
19, (Winter 1994-95), 130-166, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2539081
36
Gagnon, 133-134.
37
Volkan, 79.
35
151
friendly controlled territory; that is why ethnic conflicts are usually military struggles whose
victory is equivalent to physical control over the disputed territory38.
Despite their diversity, the wars in the Balkans shared many characteristics that allowed
scholars to highlight a pattern of ethnic conflict in the region:
- Large, territorially concentrated minority groups;
- A history of ethnic division that compounded political and economic problems that led to
intensified competition among groups for scarce resources;
- Governments with little or no institutional capacity to manage conflict among diverse
groups, except through coercion and intimidation;
- An absence of civic cultures conducive to the pursuit of peaceful policies for the reduction
and management of ethnic conflict and divisions;
- Highly divided political loyalties;
- Political elites who had a vested interest in advancing particular agendas for maintaining and
augmenting their power base;
- A tendency among the political elites in ethnically divided societies to use history and mythmaking as a way of establishing symbols around which ethnic groups coalesce;
- A tendency towards contagion and diffusion of ethnic conflicts through processes of vertical
(within) and horizontal (across) state boundaries39.
But ethnic conflict does not necessarily transform into an armed conflict unless it is fuelled by
ethnic extremism. The basic dimension of ethnic extremism is the readiness of a political actor to resort
to the use of violence to achieve proclaimed objectives, even if there are legal avenues available for
pursuing these goals; a second dimension is cultural and political exclusiveness, materialized in the
reluctance of some ethnic minorities to seek political support from other ethnic groups or to admit
willing recruits from such groups to their ranks; a third one is separatism, as a movement having as
primary goal the achievement of independence and sovereignty including secession40. There are many
factors that contribute to the strengthening of separatist tendencies among ethnic groups, to the
promotion of ethnic exclusiveness and to the appeal to violence by ethnic groups, respectively.
Separatism is basically fuelled by the widespread diffusion of the doctrine of national selfdetermination and the deterioration in the balance of advantages of belonging to a large multiethnic state41 - these factors are universal in their application to any given society and can serve as a
fundamental explanation for what happened in Yugoslavia during the „90s. Other theories of ethnic
nationalism favour an economic interpretation of the grievances that generate separatism,
advancing such concepts as “internal colonialism” or “cultural division of labour” and
acknowledging various scenarios in which either a more developed region starts reflecting on
separatism as a means to stop backing less developed ones, or the lack of geographic congruence
between the political leadership function and that of economic development, or a “differentiated
modernization” prompted by state intervention in some regions that trigger economic competition,
immigration flows that raise the fear of cultural submergence or a lowering in status/role of the
local elites42. The first type of explanation could help understand Slovenia‟s firm decision of
separating itself from Yugoslavia as the federal government proved to be incapable of surmounting
the economic crisis or connect the economy to the European trend of revival after the collapse of
the communist regimes in the South-Eastern part of the continent.
Ethnic exclusiveness is a reaction to the group‟s (perceived) demographic weakness,
cultural, social and linguistic isolation, to the differentiated modernization process orchestrated by
38
Chaim Kaufmann, “Possible and Impossible Solutions to Ethnic Civil Wars”, International Security, 20,
(Spring 1996), 140, http://www.jstor.org/stable/2539045
39
Frank P. Harvey, “Primordialism, Evolutionary Theory and Ethnic Violence in the Balkans: Opportunities
and Constraints for Theory and Policy”, Canadian Journal of Political Science / Revue canadienne de
science politique, 33, (March 2000), 45-46, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3232617
40
Raphael Zariski, “Ethnic Extremism among Ethnoterritorial Minorities in Western Europe: Dimensions,
Causes, and Institutional Responses”, Comparative Politics, 21, (April 1989), 253-254,
http://www.jstor.org/stable/422292
41
Zariski, 256.
42
Zariski, 256-261.
152
the central authorities and also to the intrusion of groups of immigrants. This was hardly the case in
former Yugoslavia. Last but not least, the appeal to violence by ethnic extremist groups is triggered
generally by the same factors as in the case of ethnic exclusiveness, but there are also some specific
elements that pertain especially to the state‟s reaction to this phenomenon. A very significant role
in fuelling ethnic extremism is attributed to a legacy of violence and repression in the past, raising
the stakes of reconciliation as a necessary guarantee that the conflict has been not only managed or
contained, but resolved, in the sense of eliminating its root causes.
In his highly regarded “Hypotheses on Nationalism and War,” Stephen van Evera draws
attention to the importance of the past conduct of nationalities or states in relation to their
neighbours Ŕ whether crimes or abuses have been committed, whether they are still alive in the
collective memory, whether the victimized groups can blame the atrocities on another group that is
still present, whether the latter has acknowledged responsibility for its crimes, or has adopted
another kind of behaviour in the aftermath43. It is in this type of argument that one can find the
explanation for the apparent irrationality with which the Serbs and Croats massacred each other and
the Serbs attempted to “cleanse” the territories they controlled in Bosnia of Muslims. In the first
case, the memories of Ustashi atrocities committed during the Second World War enhanced the
violent reaction of the Serbs when the Croats apparently adopted the Ustashi flag as Croatia was
gaining its independence; for the Serbs, this signalled a possible return to those turbulent times
when they had fallen victims to Croat violence so they reacted immediately to their leadership‟s
calls for a Greater Serbia that would reunite all Serbs, thus preventing history from repeating itself.
While some scholars went to great lengths in order to explain that the adoption of the Ustashi flag
by the new Croat authorities was just a carefully cultivated myth since the flag in the ‟90s differed
sensibly from the Ustashi one44, it is nevertheless true that genuine reconciliation had not taken
place between the Croats and the Serbs, the more so because the former took a revisionist approach
to history. During the crisis of 1971, the Croats had asked for a revision of official history of
Yugoslavia that depicted the Ustashi crimes during the Second World War; as with all their claims
back then, this one ended as well being rejected by Tito, who condemned the Croats for trying to
impose a national counterrevolution. In the second case, the Muslims in Bosnia became in the eyes
of the Serbs the incarnation of the Turks that had subjugated them for centuries after the defeat at
Kosovo Polje. Fearing that the new leadership in Bosnia Ŕ the Muslim Alia Izetbegovic Ŕ would try
to create an Islamic fundamentalist state and raise a new “janissary army” against them, the Serbian
army inflamed by Milosevic‟s propaganda took to violent acts of mass rape of Muslim women or
massacres of Muslim men (like in Srebrenica in July 1995)45.
Another important element is that of the present conduct towards ethnic minorities, which
has a direct influence over a nation‟s desire to incorporate its diaspora in a neighbouring state.
Resuming the listing of factors that can trigger the resort to violence of extremist groups, there is
never enough emphasis on the crucial importance of the state‟s/ central authorities‟ conduct
towards ethnic minorities. The refusal to negotiate with and the repression of ethnic minorities,
together with untimely concessions can lead to escalating claims and violence46. Finally, the
external support provided by various extremist groups from the outside should never be overlooked
as it may bolster an extremist movement‟s activities and help it arm, radicalize or mobilize larger
constituencies for its cause. To a certain extent, this was the case with the Serbs in Croatia and
Bosnia-Herzegovina, who did not wait to see what the new national authorities in these states
would do about them and decided to disobey their rule by proclaiming autonomy in the lands they
inhabited, soon to be armed and strongly supported by Milosevic‟s army and police, all in the name
of a Greater Serbia that would bring them all in their own state, where they would be secure.
43
Stephen van Evera, Hypotheses on Nationalism and War”, International Security, 18, (Spring 1994), 23-25,
44
Sabrina Ramet, “Politics in Croatia since 1990”. In Central and South-East European Politics since 1989,
ed. Sabrina Ramet, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 261.
45
Volkan, 76-78.
46
Zariski, 264.
153
As far at ethnic cleansing is concerned, it became a household expression during the war
in Bosnia when the so-called “CNN effect” proved its worth Ŕ the public opinion in Europe and the
United States was appalled by the atrocities committed there, slowly building support for a
UN/NATO intervention. Ethnic cleansing is usually performed by a nation-state trying to
homogenize its population rather through coercion and imposition of a certain culture and language
than of a citizenship and through the expulsion of the “alien” groups. The state justifies its actions
with arguments that are either strategic (those groups are rebel ones and they pose a danger by
obeying a foreign power or seeking secession), demographical (the aliens are too prolific or
outright invaders) or historical (they have subjected the local population to massacres or have
arrived at a later stage), aimed at consolidating its power 47. In the case of Bosnia, it was the Serbs
and Croats who secretly colluded to divide the lands inhabited by their kin and then performed
ethnic cleansing as to eliminate the Muslim presence on the territories they conquered or envisaged
conquering in order to enlarge their own national states.
Milosevic‟s role in the dissolution of Yugoslavia – charisma versus toxicity of leadership
Taking into consideration all the theoretical highlights and specific explanations listed
above, it is necessary to sum up the role Slobodan Milosevic played in Yugoslavia‟s dissolution.
First of all, the Yugoslavia he helped destroy was by the end of the „80s a fragile political construct
by definition and further undermined by faulty decentralization, a bitter economic crisis, the deep
polarization of the people on ethnic grounds, which enhanced the use of national identity as a
means for propaganda and mass mobilization48. Slobodan Milosevic thus had the opportunity to
pose as the potential leader of a new Yugoslavia Ŕ a more centralized one, with Serbia as its core Ŕ
which all others were able to join if they admitted the Serb dominance. After the 1990 elections,
when it became clear that the other republics preferred a multi-party system and a loose federation
to a communist centralized one or even envisaged independence, Milosevic gave up the plan of recentralizing Yugoslavia and keeping it united. It was then that the grand scheme of a “Greater
Serbia” took the forefront, as Milosevic had the new opportunity to emerge as a saviour for the
Serbian people whose self-perception was dominated by victimization and discontent because of its
decline among the other republics and an uncertain future.
Secondly and paradoxically, Milosevic‟s rise to power was favoured by a national crisis
which he was credited for having the capacity to resolve, but at the same time it was this very sense
of crisis that he had to cultivate among the Serbs so as to maintain and consolidate his power. It is
argued that several characteristics of the Serbian political culture favoured this people‟s quest for a
charismatic authority which was soon embodied by Milosevic: the persistence of old-fashioned
patriotic values, as well as a teleological obsession with the nation‟s „historical uniqueness‟; an
exaggerated emphasis on sanguinity, territoriality and ancestral myths, reinforced by an emotive
rhetoric of belonging to the same community; a deep sense of victimization combined with a belief
in near-future redemption and ultimate national regeneration; and a sense of superiority vis-à-vis
other ethnic groups that leads to collective self-centeredness, fear of the Other and, ultimately,
contempt for pluralism49. Although this kind of arguments can explain only to a very limited extent
the rise of “charismatic leaders”, it cannot be ignored that Milosevic really succeeded in creating
for himself an aura of redemptory leader of the Serbs, which would not have had the same appeal to
a community which lacked at least a historical sense of victimization and a deep suspicion of its
neighbours.
Thirdly, his instruments appeared to have been the most adequate in order to secure
allegiance: from the electrifying speeches at mass rallies to a constant manipulation of the state-run
media, Milosevic dared to eliminate the taboo of nationalism enacted by Tito‟s regime and built
47
Georgios Prevelakis, The Balkans – culture and geopolitics, (Bucureşti: Corint, 2001), 172.
Takis S. Pappas, “Shared Culture, Individual Strategy and Collective Action: Explaining Slobodan
Milosevic‟s Charismatic Rise to Power”, Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 5 (May 2005), 197,
http://web.ebscohost.com
49
Pappas, 195.
48
154
heavily on ethnic mobilization50. He publicly endorsed a Serbian nationalist agenda Ŕ the creation
of a Greater Serbia if Yugoslavia could no longer be maintained, strategically manipulated cultural
symbols Ŕ such as Lazar‟s defeat in front of the Turks and Kosovo as the cradle of Serbian
civilization and politicized ethnic identities51, playing on the classical in-group/out-group
dichotomy. Charismatic leaders seeking to transform group-identity can be, by some accounts,
either reparative or destructive52. A reparative leader helps the group identity evolve in a positive
way by enhancing the previously injured self-esteem of his people, whereas destructive leaders
similarly have the goal of bolstering their group, but they do so by hurting and destroying another
group, so that only in comparison do their followers seem better off 53. According to this distinction,
Milosevic may have initially emerged as a reparative leader seeking to restore to the Serbs their
self-esteem (“Nobody will hit this people again”, 1987), but he transformed into a destructive one
when he began implementing his Greater Serbia agenda through territorial conquest and ethnic
cleansing, not to mention the official propaganda depicting others as enemies of a permanently
victimized Serbian people. So, by transforming what was essentially a political conflict Ŕ over the
future of the federation and over borders Ŕ into ethnic conflict, Slobodan Milosevic opened
Pandora‟s box in the Balkans.
Last but not least, the Weber-inspired theories of charismatic leadership highlight more
the magnetization of the followers and less the magnetism of the leader54, which could explain
Milosevic‟s first success in Kosovo in 1987, when he managed to mobilize an entire crowd with a
simple, improvised speech, soon to become his hallmark. After that, it was the television and less
his speeches that maintained his aura as a charismatic leader55. While Milosevic‟s own nationalism
can be questioned, he knew how to exploit, according to his needs, various nationalist frustrations
of the Serbs56. The Greater Serbia he advocated became a magic formula which enabled him to
reconstruct a communist state under Belgrade‟s rule as soon as the demise of the federal state
became imminent, maintaining power for himself and his party, while catering to the needs of the
Serbs, who feared being transformed into minorities in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina emerging
on the ruins of Yugoslavia. Consequently, he transformed what was basically a political conflict
into an ethnic one and finally into a brutal war fueled by a maximal agenda of territorial conquest
and ethnic cleansing and by the reminiscences of a violent or humiliating past that the Serbs had
not allowed themselves to forget (the Ottoman rule and the Ustashi crimes during the Second
World War).
This is why it has been argued that the conflict in Yugoslavia was marked by a double
dose of irrationality Ŕ one pertaining to a conquest of territories that was not justified from an
economic perspective and the other related to irrational leaders who promoted violence both within
and without their constituencies as a means of achieving their political goals57.
Conclusion
It has been argued that the wars in the „90s did not have to be the immediate consequence
of the long disintegration process of Yugoslavia since their causes could be identified in the
creation of new national states, whose leaders pushed them to the (armed) conflict over the division
of former Yugoslav territories58. In other words, in order to create the new national states, their
leaders pursued a war for border changes between the republics and the expulsion of other ethnic
50
Pappas, 197.
Pappas, 197.
52
Volkan, 154.
53
Volkan, 154.
54
Roger Eatwell, “The Concept and Theory of Charismatic Leadership”, Totalitarian Movements and
Political Religions, 7, (June 2006), 142, http://people.bath.ac.uk/mlsre/TMPR2006Ch1.pdf
55
Hartman, 58.
56
Hartman, 88.
57
Vojin Dimitrijevic, “The International Community and the Yugoslav Crisis”. In The Road to War in SerbiaTrauma and Catharsis, ed. Nebojša Popov, Budapest: CEU Press, 2000), 653.
58
Vesna Pešič, “The War for Ethnic States”. In The Road to War in Serbia- Trauma and Catharsis, ed.
Nebojša Popov, Budapest: CEU Press, 2000), 9.
51
155
groups. This was the case especially for Serbia and Croatia, whose leaderships believed Ŕ and acted
upon this belief Ŕ that the creation of new national states was only possible by means of war.
Slobodan Milosevic remains a classical, yet ever fascinating example of a pseudocharismatic leader turned saviour and warrior on behalf of his people, to whom he aimed
restoring the self-esteem denied to them for centuries under foreign occupation and then
undermined by Tito‟s modern Babel-like construction of second Yugoslavia. The dull
bureaucrat, promoted leader of the party and then leader of the state and army, employed a
variety of means in order to continuously consolidate his power and group the Serbs around him.
While his charisma was carefully supported by national propaganda and control of the media, the
toxic component of his leadership emerged as he played on the fears of a confused, yet very
proud people whose state was slowly disintegrating. Although his nationalistic rhetoric was not
necessarily impregnated by hatred, the toxicity of his leadership was manifested through the
constant manipulation of the Serb forces during the wars which capitalized on their sense of
insecurity, but of entitlement to vengeance as well, leading to the numerous crimes that appalled
the international community.
It has been argued that the regular armies seldom commit crimes and atrocities, but in
times of insecurity old forms of non-regular organization resurface59. This was the case of Arkan‟s
Tigers or Jovic‟s White Vultures, armed and generally supported by the JNA and Milosevic, for
whom they were doing the “dirty work”. That same sense of insecurity among the people enables
the regime to pursue a type of adventurism in foreign policy that brings to the forefront the
territorial issues, the necessity to protect their national minorities on foreign territories or the threat
represented by various minorities on their own soil 60. Consequently, the political discourse
privileges this type of issues instead of the internal ones pertaining to economy or political rights.
From this perspective, Milosevic unscrupulously used the manipulation of the Serbs in order to
gain support for his war adventures and Greater Serbia agenda, leading the process of violent
border transformations in former Yugoslavia.
What had constituted a Pandora‟s box for decades after the creation of the second
Yugoslavia Ŕ unstable borders, opposing territorial claims, a tradition of fratricide violence,
psychological traumas from the past, states and institutions that lacked solidity61 Ŕ was opened by
Milosevic (and others like him) after the Cold War, plunging the Balkans into chaos and destruction.
And although the world was tempted to blame once again the “powder keg” of Europe for the
outburst of violence, there were some voices that claimed a revision of this perspective. What if the
Balkans were not so much the powder keg of Europe but its thermometer, indicating the continent‟s
shortcomings in terms of identity, solidarity, coherence and adaptation to the new realities after the
end of the Cold War?62. The violent transformation of borders in Yugoslavia thus served as a wake-up
call for a Europe emerging from the shadows of the Cold War motivated to build a new post-national
political project that would some day include this turbulent periphery as well.
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Borders, Boundaries, Ceasefire Lines and de facto Borders:
The Impact of Mobility Policies
Giulia PRELZ OLTRAMONTI1
Abstract. This paper is concerned with the de facto borders of, and within, Abkhazia and
South Ossetia, and their evolution between the onset of the ceasefire agreements (1992 in the case
of South Ossetia, 1994 in the case of Abkhazia) and the resumption of conflict in August 2008. After
reviewing the nature of boundaries, borders and ceasefire lines, it examines the complex dynamism
of the de facto borders. It then argues that „mobility policies‟ are one of the main mechanisms
various actors have used to harden or soften the de facto borders. Mobility policies include formal
and informal policies aimed at allowing or limiting the movement of people and goods across
dividing lines. Through the prism of mobility, this paper analyses how various actors have
influenced the dividing lines. These actors include the regional powers, namely Georgia and the
Russian Federation, local stakeholders, including de facto authorities and borderlands‟
populations and entrepreneurs, and external actors.
Keywords: borders, boundaries, mobility, Georgia, de facto states
Introduction
The two separatist conflicts that took place in the early 1990s between Georgia on one
side, and South Ossetia and Abkhazia on the other, resulted in dividing lines that lasted until
August 2008, when the conflict between Georgia and South Ossetia changed those boundaries and
the way in which they were managed. This is not to say, however, that the permeability of the
boundaries between the separatist entities and the motherland had remained unaltered throughout
the stalemate that characterised most of the 1990s and 2000s. On the contrary, the boundaries were
subject to processes of hardening and softening, influenced by state and non-state actors.
This paper examines the influences of regional and local actors on the evolution of
boundaries, borders and de facto borders of, and within, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The analysis
also includes Georgia and the Russian Federation. It argues that mobility policies, in particular,
have significantly affected the weakening or strengthening of dividing lines. Acknowledging,
ultimately, that many variables contribute to border transformations, this paper focuses specifically
on the effect of policies aimed at enhancing or reducing the movement of goods and people. These
are referred to throughout the paper as “mobility policies.” The paper initially clarifies the
distinction between borders, boundaries, ceasefire lines and de facto borders, to contextualize the
dividing lines that separate the de facto states from Georgia. It then examines the state-of-the art on
mobility policies in conflict situations, which mostly focuses on trade sanctions and trade
incentives. It argues that mobility policies and concepts need to expand to include both formal and
informal policies promoted by state and non-state actors. A broader definition of mobility policies
is therefore proposed before approaching the case studies under consideration. Each case is then
analysed by examining first, the policies of the regional actors, namely Georgia and the Russian
Federation, and then those of local actors.
Borders and boundaries, ceasefire lines and de facto borders
The issue of borders and boundaries in conflict areas has been recently undergoing
renewed scrutiny. While not abandoned, the institutional perspective is now one among many
frameworks through which borders and boundaries are considered. Social, economic and
anthropologic perspectives have enriched our understanding of how dividing lines evolve and how
they affect and are affected by violent conflict.
1
Université Libre de Bruxelles, CEVIPOL.
158
As borders and boundaries are terms currently used in everyday language (as well as their
synonyms e.g., frontier), here, they shall be briefly defined for clarity. State borders typically refer
to dividing lines around “fixed, legal, geopolitical entities” 2. During conflict, however, the
permanence, legality and geopolitics of those lines may be tested by the course of the events, by
changes in international law or its interpretation, by differences in the parties‟ interpretations of the
lines, or by geopolitical factors. Additionally, the permanence and the legality of the borders may
not be coterminous. Boundaries, on the other hand, do not carry the weight of permanence, legality
and geopolitics Ŕ though they do not exclude them either. Boundaries are the dividing lines at
which something - rules of behaviour - changes.3 The characteristic that most distinguishes
boundaries (from borders) is their greater potential to change and evolve. In cases of conflict, in
fact, boundaries can be hardened or softened to suit various interests, a process referred to as
“boundary activation”.4 Different entities Ŕ including states and non-state actors - can be involved
in hardening or softening boundaries.
As defined above, these two terms fail to entirely describe the status of the dividing lines
of the two cases considered in this paper. While the dividing lines between the Russian Federation
on one side, and Abkhazia and South Ossetia on the other, have remained undisputed borders in the
timeframe considered here, dividing lines between the de facto states and Georgia are less inviolate
and more ambiguous. The ceasefire lines of Abkhazia and South Ossetia remained fixed entities,
patrolled respectively by a Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) peacekeeping force
stationed under the observation of a small United Nations Military Observer Mission, and a
peacekeeping force composed jointly of Ossetians, Russians and Georgians, monitored by the
Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe‟s (OSCE) mission.
The term “ceasefire line” does not adequately convey the complexities that shape the
relations between two neighbours, beyond simply implying that armed hostilities have halted.
Ceasefire agreements usually lead to peace accords or resumption of conflict. In some cases,
however, ceasefire agreements can regulate a situation for prolonged periods of time. Ceasefire
lines can evolve into demilitarised and highly securitised zones, as occurred with Korea and
Nagarno-Karabakh, or into semi-permeable boundaries with low levels of violence, as it happened
in Transdniestria. During prolonged stalemates, ceasefire lines tend to assume the character of
borders, except that they lack the imprimatur of international law. In several cases, ceasefire
agreements have led to the creation of de facto states, such as Somaliland and Northern Cyprus.
These entities might be regarded as states under the 1933 Montevideo Convention. If, however, one
considers the domain of “relations with other states”, however, to include not just diplomatic but
also commercial exchanges, a more restrictive definition might apply, as it specifies: “The state as a
person of international law should possess the following qualifications: a permanent population; a
defined territory; government; and capacity to enter into relations with the other states”5. The
concept of statehood, moreover, has been customarily linked to recognition by the international
community; accordingly, such entities are regarded as de facto states. Their borders shall therefore
be called de facto borders.
Mobility policies
In the context of conflicts, mobility policies have traditionally been analysed in terms of
formal arrangements that regulate the flow of goods; namely trade sanctions (embargoes) and,
increasingly, trade incentives. The two most common options are sanctions and incentives of
2
Goodhand, Jonathan, „War, peace and the places in between: Why borderlands are central.‟ in Whose peace?
Critical perspectives on the political economy of peacebuilding, (Basingstoke [England] and New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2008)
3
Migdal, Joel S. Boundaries and belonging: states and societies in the struggle to shape identities and local
practices, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).
4
Tilly, Charles, The Politics of Collective Violence, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).
5
The Avalon Project, “Convention on Rights and Duties of States (inter-American); December 26, 1933”,
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/intam03.asp
159
various kinds;6 a combination of the two can also be devised, and has been hailed as the most
effective method.7 Since the early 1990s, support for all-encompassing economic sanctions
weakened because they were generally deemed ineffective in bringing about major changes in
policy. 8 Targeted sanctions, on the other hand, are intended to damage elites‟ interests, while
avoiding negative impacts on vulnerable populations. The difficulty of such approach rests in the
interconnectedness of actors and economic networks. The appropriateness of using embargoes was
questioned because of their potential impact on civilian livelihoods and concerns that they might
fostering criminal behaviour.9 In some cases, all-encompassing sanctions not only proved
ineffective, but also counterproductive, generating a “rally „round the flag” effect. 10 In the Abkhaz
case, they reinforced a siege mentality; 11 the impact of trade restrictions on South Ossetia in 2004,
discussed later, also illustrates the point. On the other hand, sometimes sanctions can facilitate
internal oppositions, as has happened in the case of Transdniestria in 2006. These varying reactions
to commercial restrictions depend on the varying nature, implementation and framework of
changes in customs regulation.
While it is extremely difficult to quantify the results of sanctions, their degree of success
depends “on what goals they are measured against”.12 Sanctions are more amenable to certain kinds
of goals or desired outcomes than others; the fit is essential. Goals have been classified in three
main categories, namely behaviour change, containment and regime change.13 Targeted sanctions
have not been equally effective across all three categories. Nevertheless, policy makers often assess
the effectiveness of sanctions simply by gauging the degree of economic pain they inflicted. A
preference for incentives over negative sanctions has emerged in the last decade.14 As with
sanctions, however, the effectiveness of inducement strategies depends on sender‟s objectives,
nature of recipient regime, political dynamics between sender and recipient and, crucially, the
presence or absence of exogenous incentives.15 Two additional factors nearly always shape the
effectiveness of both sanctions and incentives. The first is the fit Ŕ or lack of fit Ŕ between
intentions and perceptions. Receivers may perceive economic pressure differently from the way in
which the sender intended it. The second is implementation. Whether sanctions and incentives
work depend Ŕ in part Ŕ on whether states are able to effectively monitor financial and commercial
flows. This partly depends on their own state capacity, but the impact of neighbouring countries
and of regional powers should not be underestimated. Sanctions that are poorly implemented are
6
For an analysis of power relations in sanctions see David Baldwin, „The Power of Positive Sanctions‟, World
Politics, Vol. 24, No.1 (1971).
7
Gitty Amini, A Larger Role for Positive Sanctions in Cases of Compellence?, Working Paper No. 12, (Los
Angeles: Center for International Relations, University of California, 1997).
8
Cary Hufbauer, Jeffrey Scott and Kimberly Ann Elliott, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and
Current Policy, (Washington DC: Institute for International Economics, 1990), 94.
9
Karen Ballentine, „Beyond Greed and Grievance: Reconsidering the Economic Dynamics of Armed
Conflict‟, in The Political Economy of Armed Conflict, Beyond Greed and Grievance, ed. Karen Ballentine
and Jake Sherman, (London: Lynne Rienner, 2003), 279.
10
David Cortright, „The Economic Tools of Peacemaking‟, in Peacemaking in International Conflict, Methods
and Techniques, ed. I. William Zartman, Revised Edition, (Washington DC: U.S. Institute of Peace Press,
2007), 392.
11
Anna Matveeva, „Georgia: Peace Remains Elusive in Ethnic Patchwork‟, in Searching for Peace in Europe
and Eurasia, eds. Paul van Tongeren, Hans van de Veen and Juliette Verhoeven, (London: Lynne Rienner,
2002), 419.
12
Alan Dowty, „Sanctionning Iraq: The Limits of the New World Order‟, The Washington Quarterly, No.17,
Issue 3 (1994), 192.
13
Meghan O‟Sullivan, Shrewed Sanctions: Statecraft and State Sponsors of Terrorism, (Washington DC:
Brookings Institution Press, 2003).
14
Randall Newham, „More Flies with Honey: Positive Economic Linkages in German Ostpolitik from
Bismark to Kohl‟, International Studies Quarterly, No.44, Issue 1 (2000), 8.
15
David Cortright, The Price of Peace: Incentives and International Conflict Prevention, (Lanham MD:
Rowman and Littlefield, 1997), 272-290; Rock, Stephen, Appeasement in International Politics, (Lexington:
University of Kentucky Press, 2000).
160
likely to be less effective and may, in fact, undermine the legitimacy of the sender. 16 The
sanctions/incentives approach, however, reflects the actions of a very limited pool of actors,
namely governments and international bodies, and fails to consider boundary dynamics. Sanctions
and incentives may indirectly impact borders and boundaries, as their main target is not the
dividing line itself, but the economic entity on the other side.
A broader view of mobility policies is needed to reflect the variety of actors, whether
formal or informal, and methods affecting the de facto borders considered here. In the framework
of this paper, mobility policies include: formal policies aimed at allowing or limiting the movement
of people and goods; planning of infrastructure to facilitate or hamper the movement of people and
goods; and commercial policies between de facto states and other regional actors. The framework
also includes unofficial policies, such as: facilitating or impeding unsanctioned trade; influencing
peacekeeping operations; and promoting or reining in non-state violence in the borderlands. The
need to examine mobility policies as a factor driving border and boundary changes is borne from
the recognition that neither borders nor boundaries are ever static17. States and non-state actors can
Ŕ and do - use a variety of methods to harden or soften borders and boundaries to further their
particular interests.
Mobility policies emerge prominently in nearly any analysis of borderland political
economies during conflict. The counterintuitive argument has convincingly been made that even in
conflict settings borders not only separate entities, but also create opportunities.18 For the residents of
the borderlands, commerce through dividing lines often represents one of the few ways to make a
living. For the private sector, borders tend to function dually as (logistic and economic) barriers, and
as conduits to enhanced revenue (from additional services). For administrations and law enforcement
agencies, borders are the lines along which taxation can be applied, whether officially or unofficially
(i.e. bribes). Understanding mobility policies Ŕ rules aimed at facilitating or limiting the movement
of people and goods - is essential for understanding boundaries and borders. An analysis of
mobility policies shows clearly which actors attempted to harden and which actors attempted to
soften which borders and boundaries, why and how. The approach described here expands the
concept of mobility policies, from its traditional focus on sanctions and incentives to a broader
array of factors and processes that harden and soften borders.
Regional powers: the two neighbours
Georgia and the Russian Federation had a decisive impact on the borders of the de facto states.
They are the only two countries that share a border, whether de jure or de facto, with Abkhazia and
South Ossetia. While the former has an extensive coastline along the Black Sea, but no other territorial
neighbour, the latter is landlocked by its two larger neighbours. Georgia and the Russian Federation
have markedly different views on the nature and operation of the de facto state borders. This
difference originates in the fact that, for Georgia, Abkhazia and South Ossetia are matters of
domestic concern, while Russian Federation considers them matters of foreign policy. After the
1991-1992 conflict with South Ossetia and the 1992-1994 conflict with Abkhazia, Georgia lost
control over most of the territory of the two separatist regions. Although ceasefire agreements
generally held, with some resumption of violence, until 2008, no peace agreements were achieved.
Georgia never recognised the independence of the de facto states. Following the principles of
territorial integrity and national sovereignty, Georgia remained explicitly committed to
reintegrating the two regions within the Georgian state. The Georgian authorities decisively
rejected the status quo, and crafted their strategy accordingly.
Russia, however, designed and implemented its mobility policies pertaining to Abkhazia
and South Ossetia as part of its neighbourhood policy and, to a greater extent, its foreign policy.
While there is no straightforward interpretation of Russia‟s policy towards its near-neighbourhood
16
Michael Pugh and Neil Cooper, War Economies in a Regional Context, Challenges of Transformation,
(London: Lynne Rienner, 2004), 227.
17
David Newman and Anssi Paasi, „Fences and Neighbours in the Post Modern World: Boundary Narratives
in Political Geography‟, Progress in Human Geography, Vol. 22, No. 2 (1998).
18
Goodhand, 235.
161
and the South Caucasus, the key factors that dictated its policy were the attempt to maintain a
strong influence over its own backyard and a drive to securitize its own borderlands. 19
In the case of Abkhazia, the CIS-imposed embargo banned CIS members from official
contact with the territory, restricted economic co-operation and prohibited trade of most goodsexcept food and medical supplies-without licences from the Georgian central government.20
Notwithstanding the embargo, Georgia and Russia remained Abkhazia‟s two main trading partners.
With the added barriers and burdensome bureaucratic procedures for moving goods, the embargo
contributed to a new grey economy. 21 Although the embargo was officially upheld by all parties,
from the 1990s onward, it was gradually disregarded. Embargo barriers were circumvented by
trading illegally through the Inguri and Psou Rivers, through Abkhaz seaports, and by bribing lowwaged state officials at checkpoints on the ceasefire line.22
Commercial dynamics along the Psou River largely reflected political shifts in the
relationship between Russia and Georgia, and followed trends of Russian investments. In 1999, the
Russian President, Vladimir Putin, abrogated by decree the Russian commitment to uphold the
embargo, cancelling most restrictions on crossing the Psou River.23 While repeatedly claiming to
uphold the blockade, Putin expressed in 2004 the belief that this commitment did not include
curtailing commercial activities and private investments. By contrast, on the Abkhaz-Georgian
ceasefire line the embargo was always officially upheld, and repeated efforts were made to curtail
smuggling.24 Under Eduard Shevardnadze‟s presidency, however, the ceasefire line was extremely
permeable to smuggling, thanks to pervasive corruption at all levels of security forces and state
institutions. Smuggling along the Inguri became so substantial in the early 2000s that the ceasefire
line was described as “a competitive market for various Abkhaz and Georgian forces vying for the
spoils of trans-border trade”.25 Commodities smuggled through the ceasefire line included
petroleum products, scrap metal, stolen cars and timber, which entered the Georgian market or
were re-exported through the ports of Batumi and Poti.26 In 2004, the Georgian government
attempted to reduce the flow and subdue the various actors trading across the ceasefire line. These
new policies designed to fortify the Georgian budget, and inhibit Abkhazia‟s revenue so that it
might be forced to negotiate. Georgian president Mikhail Saakashvili insisted on implementing
trade sanctions with other regional governments, suppressing paramilitary groups, corruption and
19
For an analysis of Russia‟s foreign policy and Russia‟s policies in the Caucasus, see Dov Lynch, What
Russia Sees, Chaillot Paper, No.74, (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 2005); Paul Baev, Russia‟s Policies
in the Caucasus, (London: Royal Institute of International Affairs, 1997).
20
Soviet Bezopasnosti SNG, '‟Reshenie Soveta Glav Gosudarstv SNG o Merax po Uregulirovaniyu Konflikta
v Abxazii, Gruziya‟, Dokument No. 258, January 31, A/51/62 Ŕ S/1996/74, in Konfliktyi v Abxazii i
Yuzhno‟I Osetii, Dokumentyi 1989-2006, ed. Volxonski‟i, M.A., B.A. Zaxarov and N.Yu. Cilaev (Moscow:
MGIMO, 1996), 377-9.
21
Stacy Renee Closson, State Weakness in Perspective: Trans-territorial Energy Networks in Georgia, 19932003, Unpublished thesis submitted for doctoral degree in International Relations, London School of
Economics (2007), 168; David Chkhartishvili, Roman Gotsiridze and Bessarion Kitsmarishvili, „Georgia:
Conflict Regions and Economies‟, in From War Economies to Peace Economies in the South Caucasus, eds.
Phil Champlain, Diana Klein and Natalia Mirimanova, (International Alert: London, 2004), 134.
22
Closson, 168.
23
Tamaz Diasamidze, „The Collection of Political-Legal Acts, Regional Conflict in Georgia Ŕ the
Autonomous Oblast of South Ossetia, the Autonomous Republic of Abkhazia (1989-2002)‟, in Smuggling
Through Abkhazia and Tskinvali Region of Georgia, eds. Alexandre Kukhianidze, Alexandre Kupatadze and
Roman Gosiridze, (Tbilisi: Transnational Crime and Corruption Centre, 2003).
24
Alexandre Kukhianidze, Alexandre Kupatadze and Roman Gosiridze, Smuggling through Abkhazia and
Tskhinvali Region in Georgia, (Tbilisi: Transnational Crime and Corruption Centre, 2004), 55.
25
Closson, 170.
26
Alexandre Kukhianidze, Alexandre Kupatadze and Roman Gosiridze, „Smuggling in Abkhazia and the
Tskhinvali region in 2003-2004‟, in Organised crime and corruption in Georgia, eds. Louise Shelley, Erik
R. Scott and Anthony Latta, (London: Routledge, 2007), 77; Alexandre Kukhianidze, Alexandre Kupatadze
and Roman Gosiridze, Smuggling through Abkhazia and Tskhinvali Region in Georgia, 15.
162
smuggling, and limiting trade by sea. 27 Nevertheless, smuggling increased slightly, as a result of
shifting trade routes after the Ergneti market was closed in South Ossetia.28 In 2008, Tbilisi
attempted to start a dialogue about economic cooperation, including free customs zones and
investments, but the efforts were thwarted by the conflict in August.29
Until late 2003, the movement of people and goods along the South Ossetian front was
virtually unrestricted. Accompanying Shevardnadze‟s presidency, were civil relations and an open
posture toward the South Ossetian-Georgian ceasefire line. In December 2003, however, the newly
elected leadership started anti-smuggling operations along the ceasefire line and subsequently
closed the Ergneti market in May-June 2004. Indeed, the anti-smuggling operation mobilized so
many Georgian security forces, that some worried it was an act of aggression.30 A de facto
economic blockade was imposed, as forces of the interior ministry controlled access roads and
villages in the southern part of the region, and some roads used for contraband were blown up. 31 It
was hoped that Ŕ if deprived of its revenues- the de facto regime would collapse.32 The Georgian
government publically declared that it would differentiate between the regime and the civilian
population, offering a range of incentives. 33 However, armed conflict resumed in August 2004,
when the Georgian military and police retreated sustaining seventeen casualties.
Tbilisi‟s policy backfired as it antagonized both the South Ossetian elite and large segments
of the South Ossetian population. As expected, the regime denounced Tbilisi‟s humanitarian
initiatives as “a destabilization attempt” and suspended relations with Tbilisi.34 The civilian
population did not respond positively, as had happened in Adjara, and the effort did not contribute to
unsettling the regime of the de facto president, Eduard Kokoity. As South Ossetian separatism was
not merely a criminal phenomenon, the blockade had a boomerang effect, strengthening Kokoity‟s
popularity.35 The effort significantly reduced the possibility of employment in trade and the
accessibility of Tbilisi‟s markets for small producers.36 Incentives were misaligned with needs.
Resting the railway to Tsinkhvali and supporting farmers by providing fertilizers might have had
long-term benefits. More immediate actions, however, such as a medical mission to distribute
medicines in Tskhinvali, had little reach among the South Ossetian population.37 The provision of aid
was not coordinated with Tskhinvali, ultimately causing the effort was viewed with suspicion, so the
local police barred intended recipients from accepting it. Trading did not stop completely, but it was
considerably curtailed by the closure of the Ergneti market and the enforcement of trade regulations
at roadblocks. It was difficult to estimate the post-2004 trade volume. Small-traders claimed highranking officials were able to use their advantaged positions to operate even after the market was
27
Giorgi Sepashvili, „CIS Summit Reveals Rift in Russian/Georgian Relations‟, Civil Georgia Report, (17
September 2004); Dov Lynch, Why Georgia Matters, Chaillot Paper, No.86, (Paris: Institute for Security
Studies, 2006), 41.
28
Alexander Kupatadze, „The Impact of the Rose Revolution on Smuggling through Abkhazia and South
Ossetia‟, Insight Turkey, Vol.7, Issue 4 (2005), 70.
29
Interview with Gia Jandieri, a founder and the vice-president of the New Economic School of Georgia.
30
ICG, Georgia: Avoiding War in South Ossetia, Europe Report, No.159, (Tbilisi and Brussels: International
Crisis Group, 2004), 11-2.
31
Civil Georgia, „Governor Blows up By-Roads to Prevent Smuggling‟, Civil Georgia, 23 December 2003,
available from: http://civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=5904&search=
32
Nino Khutsidze, Ajara Boosts Government‟s Financial Hopes, Civil Georgia Report, 8 May 2004, available
from: http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=7489&search=
33
Giorgi Sepashvili, „Experts Suggest to Focus on Economic Projects in Conflict Resolution‟, Civil Georgia
Report, (13 January 2004); Giorgi Sepashvili, „Saakashvili Sends Reconciliatory Signs to South Ossetia‟,
Civil Georgia Report, (1 June 2004);.Dov Lynch, Why Georgia Matters, 42.
34
Civil Georgia, „Tskhinvali Cuts Links with Tbilisi, Demands Compensation‟, Civil Georgia, 12 June 2004 ,
available from: http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=7122&search=
35
ICG, 13.
36
Theresa Freese, „With All Roads to Tsinkhvali Closed, Zone of Conflict Residents Pray for Saakashvili and
for Peace‟, Central Asia-Caucasus Institute Analyst, 30 June 2004, available from:
http://www.cacianalyst.org/?q=node/2235
37
Civil Georgia, „Georgian Healthcare Minister Visits Tskhinvali, Delivers Aid‟, Civil Georgia, 8 June 2004,
available from: http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=7091&search=
163
closed.38 In fact, some argued that although Saakashvili effectively clamped down on corruption in
law enforcement agencies, upper levels of government safeguarded their interests and their
connections with South Ossetian businesses and officials.39 Others, on the contrary, pointed out that
small-scale smuggling, conducted between villages, was the only activity that survived the
clampdown, as it was harder to detect and prevent.40 All in all, it is agreed that trade on the
TransCaucasian Highway (TransCam) was reduced to a trickle when compared with pre-2004
volumes.
Trade was diverted initially to the Zemo Larsi checkpoint - the only legal border crossing
between Russia and Georgia,.41 This new route bypassed South Ossetia, depriving its inhabitants of
trade revenues. Moreover, some commodity trading was abandoned entirely, as it was no longer
profitable with the addition of custom taxes. In 2006, the Zemo Larsi route was also suppressed, as
Russia closed the checkpoint for indefinite maintenance.42 This not only paralyzed traffic between
the two states, most severely affecting Armenia and North Ossetia, but also the entire region. 43 In
retaliation, Georgia closed the Ergneti checkpoint, which had allowed the transit of people between
2004 and 2006.44
Local stakeholders
From within Abkhazia and South Ossetia, the strengthening and weakening of internal and
external borders and boundaries was closely linked to each entity‟s aspirations for state building.
But it was also linked to opportunities for profit that the leaders of the de facto states and of the
neighbouring regions could craft out of boundary activation. Therefore, Abkhazia and South
Ossetia each approached the dividing lines very differently, not only because of their history,
demographics, geographical situation and economic viability, but also because of their divergent
interests. In the case of Abkhazia, the destruction caused by the war and the 1996 CIS-imposed
blockade led to a dramatic decline in socio-economic conditions45. The area‟s damaged and looted
infrastructureŔincluding both public assets and private housing- did not receive the necessary
investments for rehabilitation.46 Both agriculture and tourism, the two main pillars of the pre-war
Abkhaz economy, suffered from war-related destruction, isolation, and underinvestment.47
Railways, which had been the primary vehicle for heavy-cargo transportation, fell into despair
during the conflict. Only electric passenger trains and light-cargo trains operated haphazardly
between Ochamchira, Sukhumi and onwards to Sochi. The state-run Russian Railway Company
would need to assume a major role in rehabilitating the railway in 2004; for many, however, their
involvement was provocative. 48 The Abkhaz leadership wanted, and need, to restore the
38
Natalia Mirimanova, Corruption and Conflict in the South Caucasus, (London: International Alert, 2006),
22.
39
Ibidem, 27.
40
Kupatadze, Alexander, „The Impact of the Rose Revolution on Smuggling through Abkhazia and South
Ossetia‟, 69.
41
Theresa Freese, „With All Roads to Tsinkhvali Closed, Zone of Conflict Residents Pray for Saakashvili and
for Peace‟
42
Civil Georgia, „Russia Closes Border Checkpoint with Georgia‟, Civil Georgia, 8 July 2006, available from:
http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=12991&search=
43
Civil Georgia, „Armenia for Reopening of Russo-Georgian Border Checkpoint‟, Civil Georgia, 11 July 2006 ,
available from: http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=13011&search=; ICG, 25; Ramilya Alieva, Georgia:
Smuggling Crackdown Hurts Azeris, 17 February 2005, Institute for War and Peace Reporting, available at:
http://www.iwpr.net/index.php?apc_state=hen&s=o&o=p=crs&l=EN&s=f&o=239869
44
Civil Georgia, „Tbilisi Denies Entry to Passengers Coming via Roki Tunnel‟, Civil Georgia, 10 July 2006,
available from: http://www.civil.ge/eng/article.php?id=13000
45
Closson, 165.
46
UNDP, United Nations Needs Assessment Mission to Abkhazia, United Nations (1998), available from:
http://www.unpo.org/content/view/712/236/
47
Gotsiridze, Roman, „The Economic Situation in Blockaded Abkhazia‟, Central Asia and the Caucasus, No.
6, 18 (2002)
48
Dov Lynch, Why Georgia Matters, 49; Giorgi Sepashvili, „CIS Summit Reveals Rift in Russian/Georgian
Relations‟
164
infrastructure between Abkhazia and the Russian Federation, which linked the de facto state‟s
hopes for economic viability to its northern neighbour.
Restoring the infrastructure between Abkhazia and the Russian Federation generally- and the
railway, specifically - raised national security concerns.49 The Abkhaz authorities neither sealed the de
facto border, nor facilitated transit. While Russian peacekeeping forces patrolled the ceasefire line,
Abkhaz authorities left the adjacent borderland, traditionally inhabited by ethnic Georgians, to the
control of militia. Instead, Abkhaz militia turned the Gali region borderland into an opportunity zone,
activating the security/insecurity boundary, for economic gain. In the second half of the 1990s and
early 2000s, the militia periodically swept the Gali region, contributing to the movement of internally
displaced persons (IDPs) back and forth across the Inguri River.50 Abkhaz militias and official,
however, were not the only ones to benefit from this boundary activation.
Along the security zone straddling the Inguri River, stakeholders in widespread smuggling
networks included security services (Russian, Abkhaz and Georgian), militias (Abkhaz and
Georgian), officials (Abkhaz and Georgian), peacekeeping forces, suppliers and distributors of
various nationalities.51 In addition, residents of adjacent areas, often returnees to the Gali region or
IDPs from the Gali region living in Sagramelo, carried out small-scale smuggling.52 With the Gali
region in economic despair and landmines still littering the fields previously used for agriculture,
the smuggling trade allowed Abkhazians to make a living and to access to consumer goods in spite
of the embargo.53 Along the ceasefire line, until 2004, the involvement of Georgian security forces
and bureaucracy was crucial to the smuggling networks. Low-waged Georgian officials, earning as
little as 7 USD per month, demanded bribes to supplement their income.54 Local departments of
law enforcement agencies and influential actors in Sagramelo controlled large-scale smuggling,
especially of petroleum products. 55 The Abkhaz Government in Exile, the Georgian Tax
Department and MPs from Sagramelo owning petrol stations were singled out as providing support
to groups involved in smuggling.56 Officials within the Ministry of Interior had ties to drug and
weapons smuggling, as well as kidnapping and extortion.57 Senior officers of anti-drug departments
were even known to be involved in trafficking narcotics. 58
South Ossetia approached the security/insecurity boundary activation quite differently.
Until 2004, the South Ossetian authorities guaranteed secure passage of goods crossing the de facto
state and maintained a policy of permeable de facto borders from within South Ossetia. They were
no mechanisms for legal trading along the Transcaucasian highway. 59 Goods usually bypassed
Russian customs fees and bureaucratic procedures through routine bribes. Nor were the goods
subjected to Georgian customs, as Tbilisi was unable to establish border posts at the Roki tunnel.
The Georgian central government refrained from setting up customs posts along the ceasefire line
between Georgia and South Ossetia, being adamant that the ceasefire line should be treated as an
49
Paul Rimple, „Abkhazia and Georgia: Ready to Ride on the Peace Train?‟, Eurasianet, 4 August 2005, available
from: http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/insight/articles/eav080505.shtml
50
Dodge Billingsley, „Security Deteriorates Along the Abkhazia-Georgia Ceasefire Line‟, Jane‟s Intelligence
Review, (6 September 2001)
51
Closson, 170.
52
Alexandre Kukhianidze, Alexandre Kupatadze and Roman Gosiridze, Smuggling through Abkhazia and
Tskhinvali Region in Georgia, 6.
53
Alexandre Kukhianidze, Alexandre Kupatadze and Roman Gosiridze, „Smuggling in Abkhazia and the
Tskhinvali region in 2003-2004‟, 84.
54
Svetlana Korsaia, Mamuka Kuparadze and Mikheil Mirziashvili, Hoping for Peace, Georgia: Conciliation
Resources, 2002.
55
Closson, 168,172-3.
56
Closson,173-4.
57
Interview with Giorgi Baramidze, Saakashvili‟s new Minister of the Interior, reported in Ken Stier, „Behind
a Desk, Georgian Official Promises War on Corruption‟, Eurasianet, 19 December 2003, available from:
http://www.eurasianet.org/departments/qanda/articles/eav121903.shtml
58
Cornell, Svante E., „A Growing Threat to Transnational Organised Crime‟, in Dov Lynch, ed., The South
Caucasus: A Challenge for the EU, Chaillot Papers, No. 65, (Paris: Institute for Security Studies, 2003), 33.
59
ICG, 25.
165
internal administrative boundary.60 Therefore, although unsanctioned, goods continued to flow
freely between Tskhinvali, Ergneti and Tbilisi with the assistance of corrupt Georgian officials. The
Ergneti market itself was partly controlled by Lokha Chibirov, the son of the first de facto
president, and even market access became a profitable enterprise, as protection was provided at a
price.61 Georgian paramilitary groups operated under the umbrella of the Georgian State
Chancellery. 62
Only when crossing the territory of South Ossetia, did trade assume the official protection
of the authorities Ŕ albeit the de facto ones. Businessmen generally followed South Ossetian norms,
paying an official fee administered by the de facto power ministries. Law enforcement agencies, in
return, prevented other agencies or paramilitary groups from extracting further bribes, and
guaranteed a safe passage from the Roki tunnel to the ceasefire line.63 In the early 2000s, the
European Commission proposed that a joint customs regime be established. As an act of
compensation, it would have contributed to the overhaul of the TransCam itself. The South
Ossetian government rejected the proposal, on the grounds that it would have curtailed its
sovereignty. More realistically, such an agreement would have curtailed the scope of smuggling
and future profits.64 In fact, the stakeholders‟ analysis of the South Ossetian stalemate revolves
around the TransCam trade and the evolution of trade regimes. A trans-territorial network
composed of Russians, South Ossetians and Georgians orchestrated the trade. Members of the elite,
bureaucracy, business groups and consumers were its stakeholders.65 IDPs, refugees and residents
of the conflict areas mainly conducted small-scale trade. Although control of the TransCam
smuggling was gradually concentrated in the hands of a few well-connected businessmen and
members of the elite, the trade continued to provide a living to residents of South Ossetia and
adjacent areas in Georgia. It created jobs and lowered the costs for basic goods, as they were
virtually duty-free. 66
Conclusion and future research
The hardening and softening of boundaries in the interwar period had economic, social
and political consequences on the borderlands and throughout the region. As demonstrated by the
resurgence of full-scale violence in South Ossetia in 2004, mobility policies affected much more
than the transit of people and goods. While this aspect deserves a separate study, the South
Ossetian experience suggests these policies can affect diplomatic relations between the major
actors at stake; processes of conflict resolution and confidence building between the motherland
and the de facto states; viability of the de facto states; and livelihoods of borderland populations.
Further study would be required, of course, to establish causal links.
In this sense, Russia‟s mobility policies cohered with its foreign policy of maintaining a
presence in the South Caucasus. Increasing permeability of the international border between the
Russian Federation and the two de facto state led the two separatist regions to look northward for
trade and economic resources. Russia‟s refusal to acknowledge Abkhazia‟s and South Ossetia‟s
independence until 2008, however, shows that it took a practical and informal approach to
furthering its goal.Georgia‟s mobility policies, on the other hand, were at times far more
inconsistent with its goal of reintegrating Abkhazia and South Ossetia. Its insistence on
implementing the CIS embargo in Abkhazia and its lack of initiative to establish commercial and
60
Kukhianidze, Alexandre, Alexandre Kupatadze and Roman Gosiridze, Smuggling through Abkhazia and
Tskhinvali Region in Georgia.
61
Closson, 181.
62
Theresa Freese, „A Report from the Field: Georgia‟s War against Contraband and its Struggle for Territorial
Integrity‟, SAIS Review, 25, no.1 (2005), 110; Kukhianidze, Alexandre, Alexandre Kupatadze and Roman
Gosiridze, Smuggling through Abkhazia and Tskhinvali Region in Georgia, 19.
63
Vakhtang Dzhikaev and Alan Parastaev, „Economy and Conflict in South Ossetia‟, in From War Economies
to Peace Economies in the South Caucasus, eds. Champain, Phil, Klein, Diana and Mirimanova, Natalia,
(London: International Alert, 2004), 205.
64
OCHA Georgia, South Ossetia Briefing Note 2003, Briefing Note, (Tbilisi: United Nations, 2003), 2.
65
Closson, 180.
66
ICG, 10.
166
transport links across the de facto border only widened the cleavage between motherland and the de
facto states. Its more pragmatic approach in South Ossetia contributed to peaceful relations and
mitigated animosity Ŕ at least until early 2004, when the decision to curtail TransCam commercial
flow precipitated the situation. In addition, limiting the movement of goods and people across the
de facto borders (whether explicit or implicitly generated by a lack of legal framework and
infrastructure) severely impacted the livelihoods of borderland populations and residents of the de
facto states. This effect created a siege mentality and undermined confidence in Georgian
sovereignty. This study has shown, however, that an array of state and nonstate actors stood to gain
from boundary activation. In the case of Abkhazia, and in South Ossetia before 2004, the
maintenance of a de facto border, respectively semi-permeable and permeable, suited the interests
of key stakeholders of borderland economies.
A similar variety of actors and interests characterised boundary activation and deactivation
in the de facto states, which which were driven by aspirations for economic viability and state
building. Inevitably, local actors were forced to respond to the Georgian and Russian policies that
hardened and softened the boundaries. The locals contributed to boundary dynamics within the
territories that they controlled, whether by acquiescing to violence as a method for boundary
activation in the Gali region, or by regulating trade and suppressing insecurity on the TranCam.
Finally, this paper fails to tackle the interests of organised crime and transnational
networks in boundary activation and their impact on the de facto borders of Abkhazia and South
Ossetia. This is mainly due to the paucity of data and scarcity of established accounts. A
comparative approach with other post-conflict settings, however, leads us to suspect that Georgia
and the adjacent areas were ideal environments for organised crime in the interwar period.
Favourable conditions included porous borders, weak rule of law, poorly paid officials and
pervasive corruption at all levels. 67 Moreover, weak governments and institutions, loss of state
control over significant areas of national territory and economic collapse enabled organised crime
to flourish throughout the CIS.68 What is unclear, however, whether Ŕ and if so, how Ŕ organized
crime affected boundary permeability. While data gathering in this field is likely to be hazardous, a
careful study of the issue would certainly help to illuminate boundary dynamics in the region.
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The Role of the “DebOra” Cross-Border Eurometropolis in the
Hungarian-Romanian CBC Relations
A Case Study of Shopping Tourism in Debrecen and Oradea
TÖMÖRI Mihály1
Abstract. The role of borders among the member states of the European Union, including
Hungary and Romania, has considerably changed in recent years. Euroregional institutions, such
as euroregions and eurometropolises, have successfully transformed dividing borders into
connective borders. Cross-border cooperation has become one of the major goals of neighbouring
borderlands. One of the most important cross-border activities, shopping tourism, can serve as a
significant driving force behind the cooperation of regions or cities. Using an empirical case study
approach, this paper introduces the significance of cross-border shopping tourism in creating the
eurometropolis of two neighbouring cities, Debrecen and Oradea, along the Hungarian-Romanian
border. The paper concludes that the majority of foreign customers in Debrecen and Oradea come
from neighbouring areas, so the cooperation of the two cities should be deepened further, in order
to better exploit the mutual benefits.
Keywords: shopping tourism, retail, Debrecen, Oradea, eurometropolis, cross-border
cooperation
Introduction
The borders are often seen as obstacles to cross-border activities, and borderlands are
usually regarded as peripheral and disadvantageous areas2. In many cases, however, borders and
borderlands can become important venues for economic or social activities, such as tourism and
shopping. Cross-border shopping and tourism can generate positive changes on both sides of the
border and turn borderlands into favourable settings of opportunity. This paper argues, through an
empirical study conducted in two cities (Debrecen and Oradea) along the Hungarian-Romanian
border, that shopping tourism is an important aspect of cross-border relationships and it should be
exploited in developing the cross-border eurometropolis of Debrecen and Oradea.
The changing role of borders in the European Union
At the end of the 19th century and at beginning of the 20th century, Europe was divided
along borders and political conflicts prevailed on the whole continent during the two world wars.
Following the Second World War, many European politicians sought to promote European
integration and borderland cooperation to avoid further conflicts. Several decades ago in Western
Europe, euroregions and eurometropolises were formed to give a joint reply to the common
challenges of neighbouring regions and cities, to exploit common energies, and to eliminate the
negative effects of borders impeding social and economic development. The European integration
process ultimately succeeded, after the European Union managed to overcome many deeply rooted
economic, political, and ethnic challenges. As a result, Europe today is much less divided by its
state borders3.
The European Integration process has recently extended out to the former Soviet bloc
countries as well. This process gradually transformed the formerly closed, hostile, and strictly
1
University of Debrecen, Hungary.
István Süli-Zakar, “A Study of State Borders as Factors Blocking Socio-Economic Progress in North-Eastern
Hungary”, Földrajzi Közlemények (Geographical Review – International Edition) 116, 40 (1992): 53-64.
3
Klára Czimre, Cross-Border Co-operation – Theory and Practice, (Debrecen: Debreceni Egyetem Kossuth
Egyetemi Kiadója, 2006); Süli-Zakar, “A határ menti területek (külső perifériák) fejlesztésének kérdései”, in
A terület- és településfejlesztés alapjai, ed. István Süli-Zakar (Budapest-Pécs: Dialóg Campus Kiadó, 2003),
233-270.
2
171
guarded borders into open and connective boundaries. Consequently, borderlands are now trying to
cooperate and solve cross-border issues together. Numerous euroregions have been formed along
the borders of Central- and Eastern-European countries was a way to foster cross-border
cooperation. Along the Hungarian-Romanian border the most notable euroregional institutions
include the Hajdú-Bihar Ŕ Bihor Euroregion and the Bihar-Bihor Euroregion4. In recent years, the
cooperation of borderland cities (eurometropolises) has become even more important than
euroregions. Eurometropolises collaborate in addressing cross-border problems to harmonize their
economy, services, medical and educational activities. Among the various cross-border
organizations along the Hungarian-Romanian border, the joint initiative of Debrecen and Oradea to
set up a common cross-border eurometropolis (DebOra Eurometropolis) is still regarded as
innovative5. Nevertheless, the Institute for Euroregional Studies “Jean Monnet” European Centre of
Excellence (administered jointly by the University of Debrecen and the University of Oradea) has
contributed to the development of the DebOra Eurometropolis with significant research results6.
This paper introduces one element of these research results: cross-border shopping and shopping
tourism in Debrecen and Oradea.
Defining shopping tourism
Shopping and tourism are among the most important cross-border activities for generating
positive social and economic changes. Shopping and tourism are interconnected in many ways, and the
relationship between the two phenomena is rather complex. Although shopping tourism is a
phenomenon well known in common parlance, constructing a scientific framework and definition for it
is rather complicated7. Shopping is one of the most common and enjoyable leisure activities among
tourists, and in many cases it represents a basic motivation for travel. The relationship between shopping
and tourism can be divided into two categories. The first one, where the primary purpose of the tourist
trip is to shop, is termed „shopping tourism‟. The second is called „tourist shopping‟, where shopping is
done as a secondary activity during a trip which might be motivated primarily by something else (e.g.
sunbathing, ecotourism, cultural tourism, etc.)8.
A unique type of shopping tourism that has received considerable attention is shopping in
border areas Ŕ also known as cross-border shopping. This consumer activity takes place near
international boundaries. Economic, legal and social differences on opposite sides of an
international border can be the major driving force for cross-border travel. As a result, activities
such as gambling, prostitution, drinking, and shopping become important tourist activities in border
regions9. Cross-border shopping, where people travel beyond the boundaries of their own nation
specifically to shop in a neighbouring country, is common in all parts of the world10.
In North-America the cross-border shopping phenomenon has received considerable
attention along the USA-Canada11 and USA-Mexico borders12. Research on cross-border shopping
4
Süli-Zakar, “A határ menti területek fejlesztése, az eurorégiók és az eurometropoliszok szerepe”, in A terület- és
településfejlesztés alapjai II, ed. István Süli-Zakar (Budapest-Pécs: Dialóg Campus Kiadó, 2010), 275-311.
5
Süli-Zakar, “A határ menti területek fejlesztése, az eurorégiók és az eurometropoliszok szerepe”, 275-311.
6
Ioan Horga and István Süli-Zakar, “Contributions of Institute for Euroregional Studies Oradea-Debrecen to
Shaping the Border into a Space for Knowledge and Development”, Analele Universităţii din Oradea, Seria
Relaţii Internaţionale şi Studii Europene (2010): 170-183.
7
Mihály Tömöri, “Investigating Shopping Tourism along the Borders of Hungary Ŕ A Theoretical
Perspective”, GeoJournal of Tourism and Geosites 6, 2 (2010): 202-210.
8
Dallen J. Timothy, Shopping Tourism, Retailing and Leisure, (Clevedon: Channel View Publications, 2005), 42.
9
Timothy, “Borderlands: An Unlikely Tourist Destination?”, IBRU Boundary and Security Bulletin (2000): 57-65.
10
Timothy and Richard Butler, “Cross-Border Shopping a North American Perspective”, Annals of Tourism
Research 22, 1 (1995): 16-34; Timothy, “Shopping Tourism, Retailing and Leisure”, 53.
11
Livio Di Matteo, “Using alternative methods to estimate the determinants of cross-border trips”, Applied
Economics 31 (1999): 77-88; Timothy and Butler, “Cross-Border Shopping a North American Perspective”,
16-34; Timothy, “Shopping Tourism, Retailing and Leisure”.
12
Richard V. Adkisson and Linda Zimmermann, “Retail Trade on the U.S.-Mexico Border During the
NAFTA Implementation Era”, Growth and Change 35, 1 (2004): 77-89; Timothy, “Shopping Tourism,
Retailing and Leisure”.
172
in Europe so far has focused mainly on Western-Europe13 and Central- and Eastern-Europe14.
Empirical knowledge about contemporary cross-border shopping along the Hungarian-Romanian
border and the role of cities near borders in this phenomenon is still limited. Our research aimed to
explore a small segment of this cross-border shopping phenomenon in two neighbouring cities on
opposite sides of the Hungarian-Romanian border: Debrecen and Oradea.
Research goals and questions
Cross-border shopping is a well-known phenomenon along most international borders in
the world. Although a considerable amount of scientific research has dealt with cross-border
shopping along the borders of Hungary15, our knowledge of present day characteristics of crossborder shopping along the Hungarian-Romanian border remains limited. In addition, little attention
has been paid so far to the role of neighbouring cities on opposite sides of the border in crossborder shopping and shopping tourism. Thus, based on our previous research results16 an empirical
survey was conducted in Debrecen and Oradea to explore the current character and significance of
cross-border shopping in the two cities. The research primarily aimed to:
1. estimate the quantity / proportion of foreign shoppers within the total number of
customers in the two cities;
2. examine the geographical scope of shopping tourists (i.e. Where do they come from?);
3. study the behaviour and shopping habits of cross-border shoppers;
4. compare foreign shoppers‟ spending with that of domestic shoppers; and
5. explore the languages used by shop assistants to communicate with foreigners.
The ultimate goal of the study is to highlight the importance of cross-border shopping
tourism as a significant tool for developing the DebOra Eurometropolis.
Research methodology
Doing research in cross-border shopping is rather difficult, since the relevant shopping data are
not routinely collected or compiled in official records. Consequently, our research was based on a
13
Silvia Banfi, Massimo Filippini and Lester C. Hunt, “Fuel tourism in border regions: The case of
Switzerland”, Energy Economics 27 (2005): 689-707; Susanne Bygvrå, “The road to the Single European
Market as seen through the Danish retail trade: Cross-border shopping between Denmark and Germany”,
The International Review of Retail, Distribution and Consumer Research 8 (1998): 147-165.
14
Gábor Michalkó and Tamara Rátz, “Typically Female Features in Hungarian Shopping Tourism”,
Migracijske i etničke teme 1-2 (2006): 79-93; Michalkó, “Relationship between the Yugoslavian Tourism
and Retail Turnover in Hungary”, Turizam 4 (2000): 131-133; Michalkó, A bevásárlóturizmus,
(Székesfehérvár: Kodolányi János Főiskola, 2004); Kaja Pogačar and Metka Sitar, “Cross-border Region
Graz-Maribor: Challenges and Potentials of Integration Processes” in Proceedings REAL CORP 2009
Tagungsband, ed. Manfred Schrenk, Vasily V. Popovich, Dirk Engelke and Pietro Elisei (2009), 73-82;
Halina Powęska, “Cross-border shopping in Poland in the early 21 st century”, Acta Scientiarum Polonorum
Oeconomia 7, 1 (2008): 111-121; Tamás T. Sikos and András Kovács, “The development of the retail sector
in South-Slovakia” in Proceedings of the International Innovation Conference for Co-operation
Development (InCoDe), ed. János Fojtik (Pécs, 2008), 177-191.
15
Liviu Chelcea, “A hiány kultúrája az államszocializmus idején”, Replika 39 (2000): 135-153; Michalkó and
Rátz, “Typically Female Features in Hungarian Shopping Tourism”, 79-93; Michalkó, “Relationship
between the Yugoslavian Tourism and Retail Turnover in Hungary”, 131-133; Michalkó, “A
bevásárlóturizmus”; Sikos and Kovács, “The development of the retail sector in South-Slovakia”, 177-191.
16
Tömöri, “The Role of Shopping Tourism in Debrecen”, in Regional Development in the RomanianHungarian Cross-Border Space – From National to European Perspective, ed. István Süli-Zakar and Ioan
Horga (Debrecen: Debreceni Egyetem Kossuth Egyetemi Kiadó, 2006), 403-408; Tömöri, “Strengthening
Cross-Border Cooperations: A Case Study of Shopping Tourism in Debrecen”, in Neighbours and Partners:
On the two sides of the border, ed. (Debrecen: Debreceni Egyetem Kossuth Egyetemi Kiadó, 2008), 345350; Tömöri, “Adalékok a hazai és a debreceni bevásárlóturizmus vizsgálatához”, in Acta Iuventutis
Geographica 1, ed. István Süli-Zakar (Debrecen: Debreceni Egyetem Kossuth Egyetemi Kiadó, 2009), 101108; Tömöri, “Határokon átìvelő kiskereskedelem: egy debreceni esettanulmány”, Geográfus
Doktoranduszok X, (Országos Konferenciája CD-ROM, 2010).
173
standard survey questionnaire, comprising 13 questions. The survey was carried out with the help of
university students studying at the Department of Social Geography and Regional Development
Planning in Debrecen and at the Department of International Relations and European Studies in Oradea.
Students were asked to have the questionnaires filled in by shop assistants, shopkeepers and managers.
This group of respondents was targeted, because it was presupposed that they possess the most relevant
information about foreign shoppers, since they have the most direct contact with this segment of
consumers. As a result, answers were based on the subjective opinion of respondents. Altogether 312
questionnaires were fully completed, 208 in Debrecen and 104 in Oradea.
The survey aimed to sample both traditional and modern retail environments. In Debrecen,
the traditional retail milieu comprised the high street of Debrecen, which is called Piac Street (or
Market Street), while modern retail environments included the Fórum Shopping Mall and the Tesco
hypermarket (Figure 1).
Figure 1. Study areas in Debrecen
Source: edited by Tömöri, M.
Figure 2. Study areas in Oradea
Source: edited by Tömöri, M.
In Oradea the high street of the city, called Republicii Street, represented the traditional
retail environment, while modern retail exemplars included the Crisul Center, the Lotus Center, the
Real hypermarket and the Carrefour hypermarket (Figure 2).
Research results
The overall proportion of foreign (vs domestic) shoppers was examined first. Results
suggest that Debrecen has a greater share of foreign shoppers than Oradea. The majority of
respondents in Debrecen (64%) and in Oradea (75%) claimed that foreign customers accounted
for1-10% of their total population of shoppers. Both in Debrecen and Oradea, nearly one in five
(19%) respondents estimated their share of foreigners shoppers to fall between 11-30%. While 16%
of Debrecen‟s believed their proportion of foreign shoppers to exceed 30%, this was true for only
6% of those in Oradea (Figure 3).
174
Figure 3. Proportion of foreign shoppers (within the total number of shoppers) in retail units (%)
Source: own research, edited by Tömöri, M.
Foreign shoppers appeared to come from nearly all continents and regions of the world
except for Latin-America. The overall majority of foreign customers come from European
countries both in the case of Debrecen (81%) and Oradea (86%). The relatively high percentage
(11%) of foreign shoppers from the Near-East in Debrecen may be explained by the fact that many
students studying at the University of Debrecen Ŕ who also shop in the city- come from countries
such as Israel or Iran. In Oradea, Asians (9%) Ŕ mainly Chinese immigrants - comprised the second
most frequent group of foreign shoppers. (Figures 4 & 5).
0,2%
1%
1%
2% 2%
4%
3%
Europe
11%
Europe
9%
Near-East
Asia
North-America
Africa
Africa
Near-East
Asia
81%
Australia
Australia
86%
North-America
Figure 4. Origin of foreign shoppers in Figure 5. Origin of foreign shoppers in Oradea
Debrecen according to continents
according to continents (multiple answers
(multiple answers were possible)
were possible)
Results suggest that cross-border shopping is very important even across the Debrecen and
Oradean borders. Sixty two percent (62%) of respondents in Debrecen claimed that foreign
customers came from the neighbouring Romania, and 90% of respondents in Oradea said that
foreign shoppers came from Hungary. Customers from Germany and Austria comprised the next
most common grouping, as reported by 38% of respondents in each of the DebOra cities.
Customers from the Ukraine and Russia were also frequently mentioned (35%) in Debrecen.
Among the other European foreign shoppers mentioned by Debrecen respondents were those form
the United Kingdom (13%), followed by the Czech Republic and Slovakia (10%), Poland (8%) and
Italy (6%). In Oradea, shoppers from Italy (32%) took third place, followed by customers from
Spain (11%), the United Kingdom (10%), France (7%) and the Ukraine and Russia (6%). Other
European countries did not reach 5% (Figures 6 & 7).
175
100%
100%
90%
90%
80%
80%
70%
62%
70%
60%
50%
40%
90%
60%
38%
50%
35%
38%
40%
30%
20%
13%
10%
32%
30%
10%
8%
6%
20%
11%
10%
7%
6%
Spain
United
Kingdom
France
Ukraine /
Russia
10%
0%
Romania Germany / Ukraine / United
Czech
Poland
Austria
Russia Kingdom Republic /
Slovakia
0%
Italy
Hungary Germany /
Austria
Figure 6. Origin of foreign shoppers in Debrecen
from Europe (according to countries)
Italy
Figure 7. Origin of foreign shoppers in
Oradea from Europe (according to countries)
The behaviour and shopping habits of foreign customers show some interesting patterns. Forty
percent (40%) of respondents in Debrecen and 39% in Oradea claimed that foreigners came with a
definite shopping purpose; in other words, they knew what they wanted to buy and they looked for
specific items or products. On the other hand, 46% of respondents in Debrecen and 38% in Oradea
thought that foreigners were primarily browsing in the shop and they did not have a specific shopping
objective. Nevertheless, many respondents emphasized that “browsers” often bought something after
they looked around in the shop, which suggests that “impulse buying” (unplanned) was quite frequent
among these shoppers. Last, but not least, 12% of those asked in Debrecen, and 23% in Oradea claimed
that foreign customers inquired about shop-related products or services (Figure 8).
Debrecen
40%
46%
12% 2%
definite shopping purpose
browsing
asking for information
(about products, etc.)
Oradea
39%
0%
20%
38%
40%
60%
23%
80%
do not know / no answer
100%
Figure 8. Behaviour of foreign shoppers. Source: own research, edited by Tömöri, M.
Another interesting and important aspect of foreign shoppers‟ behaviour is their spending.
In this case, respondents were asked to estimate foreign shoppers‟ spending in comparison to
domestic shoppers‟ spending. Research results show that foreign customers‟ spending is quite
similar in Debrecen and Oradea. Forty percent (40%) of those asked in Debrecen and 41% in
Oradea estimated that foreigners spent more than domestic shoppers. By contrast, 25% of
respondents in Debrecen and 26% in Oradea claimed that foreigners spent less than domestic
customers. Finally, 36% of those asked in Debrecen and 33% in Oradea thought that foreign
customers spent roughly the same amount of money as domestic shoppers (Figure 9).
176
Debrecen
40%
25%
36%
foreigners spend more
foreigners spend less
Oradea
41%
0%
20%
26%
40%
60%
foreigners spend the
same
33%
80%
100%
Figure 9. Foreign shoppers‟ spending compared to domestic shoppers.
Finally, the language of communication between shop assistants and foreign customers is
of interest to this analysis. Results (Figure 10), suggest that respondents in Oradea might have
better foreign language proficiency than those in Debrecen. English was the most widespread and
frequently used language in both Debrecen and Oradea. Ninety three percent (93%) of those asked
in Oradea and 77% in Debrecen claimed that they could communicate with foreigners in English.
In Debrecen, German was the second most commonly reported language (24%), but it was less
common (7%) among respondents in Oradea.
More than half of the respondents (51%) in Oradea and 22% in Debrecen said that they
were able to communicate with foreign shoppers in Hungarian. The high percentage of Hungarian
is not surprising in Oradea, since a significant Hungarian minority still lives in the city. 17 As a
result, many people can speak Hungarian, and most foreign customers come from the neighbouring
Hungary. The relatively high percentage of Hungarian as the language of communication in
Debrecen is much more surprising. This may be because most shoppers who come from Romania
to shop in Debrecen are in fact Hungarians18. Alternatively, it may be that shop assistants using
Hungarian do not know any foreign language, so they try to speak in Hungarian. Although only 4%
could communicate with foreign shoppers in Romanian in Debrecen, while in Oradea this number
was 15%. Russian was much more widespread in Debrecen (7%) than in Oradea (1%). On the other
hand, more respondents in Oradea than in Debrecen were able to communicate with foreigners in
French (13% vs. 1%) and Italian (10% vs. 0,5%). Other languages (2%) do not represent a
significant percentage either in Debrecen or in Oradea. Finally, 6% of respondents in Debrecen
claimed that they were unable to communicate with foreigners, because they did not speak any
foreign language. By contrast, none of those asked in Oradea said that they could not communicate
with foreigners. This fact also suggests that respondents in Oradea were more likely than those in
Debrecen to have some foreign language knowledge (Figure 10).
17
Oradea (also called Nagyvárad in Hungarian) was part of Hungary before 1920, however the new borders
created by the Trianon Treaty (1920) left Oradea on the Romanian side.
18
The number of Hungarians is still significant along the Western borderlands of Romania, which used to be
part of Hungary before 1920. After the Trianon Treaty (1920) these Hungarians found themselves living in
Romania.
177
100%
93%
90%
80%
77%
70%
60%
51%
50%
40%
30%
24%
15%
20%
10%
Debrecen
22%
7%
4%
13%
7%
1%
1%
Oradea
10%
0,5%
2%2%
6%
0%
0%
Figure 10. Languages used during communication with foreign shoppers. (multiple answers were
possible)
Conclusions
According to the results of our empirical study, foreign customers are present in retail
establishments both in Debrecen and Oradea. The proportion of foreign shoppers (vs. domestic)
customers appears somewhat higher in Debrecen than in Oradea. In most cases the share of foreign
shoppers does not exceed 10%, however, in some shops their proportion is above 30%, and in a
handful of retail units it reaches to even 50 or 60%.
From these results we propose three categories of foreign shoppers:
1. The first and most important category can be termed “cross-border shoppers”. This category
involves customers living in the borderlands of Hungary or Romania who cross the border
in order to shop in Debrecen or Oradea.
2. The second category comprises tourists who visit Debrecen or Oradea primarily for leisure
purposes (e.g. sightseeing, visiting museums, etc.) but during their stay they also go
shopping.
3. Finally, university students and immigrants make up the third group of foreign customers.
University students mainly come from the Near-East and North-America and their
significance is more prominent in Debrecen. The share of immigrant shoppers is marginal in
both cities.
Cross-border shopping can generate positive economic and social effects on both sides of
the border, so local governments, retailers and actors in tourism should pay more attention to crossborder shopping and (shopping) tourists in order to better exploit the mutual benefits of this
phenomenon.
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Regionalism in a Europe without Borders.
Some Approaches on Bihor County
Adriana POPESCU1, Ludovic NICA2
Abstract. Regionalism nowadays is definitely in focus. Establishments of various regional
organizations are seen in almost every part of the world. Therefore, this paper aims at focusing on
regionalism developed especially at European level. Considering this, one of the purposes is to
outline the main characteristics of regionalism, its capacities of tackling with regional issues and
its implications when is brought to stand face to face with regionalization. In order to understand
better the features of regionalism network we resorted to its approaches on the Bihor County.
Different raising questions – To which degree can we talk about regionalism in this case? What
type of regionalism? How it is developing and what are its outcomes? – are undoubtedly
challenging and deserve a special attention. The appealing to the case of Bihor County accounts on
the region‟s peculiarity as a “micro-Europe”, greatly allowing us to point out regionalism‟s
implications from political, economic, social and cultural point of views. Additionally, since the
„new‟ regionalism is foreshadowing we endeavor to notice if there takes place a nascent of this in a
relatively malleable region.
Keywords: European region, regionalism, regionalization, „new‟ regionalism, regional
identity, subsidiarity, Bihor consciousness, Bihor “micro-Europe”
The European approach of the region
The region concept has often elicited serious debates even in relation to derivate idioms
like regionalism and regionalization. Consequently, the region comes into sight as a topic that
poses and raises important and interesting predicaments. Taking into consideration these facts, we
begin with the intention and the aim of unravel, in a certain degree, a part of these questions
focusing mainly on regionalism‟s countenances. First of all, we do not intend to insist on giving
numerous definitions about region by appealing to diverse criteria. Still, region is a complex
concept but at the same time is an ambiguous term. For that matter the debate on its definition
gained little consensus. Thus, the concept can be bordered linguistically (Antique Rome was
administratively divided in more regiones3), can be submitted to a territorial, geographical criterion
(the region appears as the intermediate territorial level between state and locality, as a physical
space4) or can be defined by cultural tenet5 (Denis de Rougemont regards regions as living spaces).
Conversely, we can observe regions as institutional divisions constructed over time for a better
administration of the state or resulted after a political decision. If we analyze this definition we will
1
University of Oradea.
University of Oradea.
3
Will Durant, Cezar şi Hristos, (Bucharest: Prietenii Cărţii, 2002), 288.
4
Urban A. Wannop, The Regional Imperative. Regional Planning and Governance in Britain, Europe and the
United States, (London: Jessica Kingsley Publisher Ltd., 1995), 31-35.
5
The regions are “virtual..., encompassed in geography, history, ecology, ethnicity and economic possibilities,
but blocked in the states‟ sovereignty that resides on both parts of a frontier” in: Denis de Rougemont,
L‟Avenir est notre affaire, (Paris: Stock, 1977), 127. This is a definition that considers the language, dialects,
social communication models and the sense of a common identity and not last the political actors and their
capacity to influence the community. For Denis de Rougemont the regions had to take the nation-states‟
place in a federal construction beginning with regionalism assumed from the lower level of the society, from
the individual. The nation-state did not have to be destroyed but had to be overcome by the two buffer tiers:
the federal and regional level. The imposing conclusion from Rougemont studies is that the European
integration must be realized in parallel with the process of regionalization, outlining a reaching finality of a
new European geopolitical standard: the regions.
2
180
understand better why there are differences in what concerns the report state-region. Therefore, in
such a situation the region comes to be seen as an integrant part of the political, economic, social
and national system, overall being dependent or subordinated to the central power6.
The advocates of regionalist waves observed from the beginning that the reposition of
Europe on regional basis is neither possible nor durable as long as there will exist the national
conscience and national identity, as long as the history and the national frontiers will be used for
realizing political governmental actions. That is why different regionalist entrepreneurs propose
alternatives (permeability, spirituality or progressive dysfunction of borders) or deny fundamental
elements of the nation-state like the territory and the frontiers. Vibrant regions come in this way
focusing on the need for economic security and social safety. They look for the development of ties
across national boundaries while nation-states are assisting at their authority devolution.
In view of the fact that the region concept has undeniably multiple understandings given
by the criteria implied for depiction, we start from focusing our entire attention on the attempts to
give a common definition in the frame of the European system. For that matter, neither the
Assembly of European Regions, the European Parliament, nor the European Commission have
managed to come to an agreement; the definitions have the same nature, being purely descriptive. It
is indeed very difficult to provide a representation to the notion of region because there is no
official consensus at the European level. Nonetheless, there is acknowledge the fact that this lack is
owed mainly to the different states‟ experience in the field of regionalism, regionalization. As a
result, numerous states do not recognize to regions their quality of governing echelon and others
are making differences in what concerns the nature and functions of regions.
For instance, the Assembly of European Regions‟ Statute asserts the region as “the
territorial body of public law established at the level immediately below that of the state and
endowed with political self-government” (art. 2). Certainly, this definition has a quite graphic
character but beside this it is important because it talks about the existence of an elected council or
in its absence it gives the local collectivities the possibility to constitute an association at their tier.
On the other hand, the European Parliament‟s Community Charter for Regionalization offers a
more institutionalized explanation. This one presents a conception in the same time geographical
and institutional of the region. The definition corresponds in fact to an extrapolation of the Spanish
experience prescribing to the state a precise model of regionalization: “a territory which
constitutes, from a geographical point of view, a clear-out entity or a similar grouping of
territories where there is a continuity and whose population possesses certain shared features and
wishes to safeguard the resulting specific identity and to develop it with the object of stimulating
cultural, social and economic progress”7. Yet, it is important to outline that the provisions of this
Charter were adopted in a period in which Maastricht, and implicitly the notion of political Europe,
were scarcely foreshadowing. But despite this fact the Charter‟s article highlights factors such as:
population‟s continuity, common characteristics, specific identity and social, cultural or economic
progress aims.
Alternatively, if we would like a more economic delineation, then we had to resort to the
European Commission vision. For the “treaties guardian” a region “represents only an instrument
of structural promotion”8. However, the definition has a positive aspect because in the situation in
which more and more regions are on the verge of bridging themselves to the global economy, there
is a need for a supervisor to fill the gap between the regions‟ expectations and those of their nationstates. Therefore, under such circumstances, important questions can be raised with reference to the
importance of regions only from an economic point of view, the inertia of natural regions that do
not look for a better, clearer definition by their own authorities or the position of the consciousness
of a regional identity. Nevertheless, even if there is a lack of a concrete definition it must be
6
Michael Keating, Regions and Regionalism in Europe, (Montpellier: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd., 2004),
529-568.
7
European Parliament, EP Resolution on Community regional policy and the role of the regions and Annexed
Community Charter for Regionalization (A2-0218/88/Parts A and B), (Brussels, 1988), 9,
http://aei.pitt.edu/1758/1/ep_resolution_regional_11_88.pdf.
8
Regional Studies Association, Regions Magazine 272, 1 (December 2008): 3.
181
outlined the fact that it must not have a definition that encompasses constraints. After all, regions
can be perceived as flexible blocks, so their domestic or foreign boundaries can constantly be
rearticulated. In addition, the formation of a region needs more then telling its story from inside
out, it needs a symbolic dimension, it needs that regional identity which will legitimize institutions
representing regional interests. Here comes into sight regionalism, the below points being intended
to observe if it can cope and even try to solve the above mentioned problems.
Several considerations on Regionalism
Regionalism, particularly at the present time, is a current that strongly asserts itself on the
European scene. After the Second World War, the weakening of the nation-state creates the
favorable environment for the development and the theoretical approach of this phenomenon 9.
Nonetheless, from the start it must be stressed the dual nature of regionalism. In the case in which it
is applied in the domestic affairs of a state, regionalism progresses as the tendency to promote the
development of life and the regional organization of the state. In opposition, outside a state,
regionalism avows itself through the promotion of solidarity and by participating to the
development of a group of nations that have common interests10. Actually, regionalism is a
dynamic concept that enhances constantly. Yet, according too Louise Fawcett and Andrew Hurrell
opinion, historically, is hard to appreciate clearly when regionalism begin. In general, regionalism
was theoretically analyzed in terms of social cohesiveness (history, ethnicity, language, religion,
culture, ideology, trade, etc.) or regional interdependence11 (mutual responsibility, sharing a
common set of principles, etc.). Additionally, having little consensus regarding the definition of the
region, regionalism can be found fostered as portrayal or fostered as doctrine12. Thus, there are
different arrays of regionalism.
Usually, regionalism can be identified as “governing a state or a governing project of a
state based on the reorganization of a particular regional space” 13. From this point, we can deduce
that regionalism is not only an administration type of a territory but is also a political project by
which a state is governed in its attempt to organize its political and economic space into regions. As
a result, with a political character, regionalism, in a certain measure, can offer the theoretical
support for the creation of regions. Other definitions consider regionalism a political strategy with
specific goals Ŕ the creation of regional institutions14 Ŕ or even a leading mechanism of achieving
these objectives. However, regionalism needs social validation because it is calling for the so
known “fields of social consciousness”15 Ŕ constituents regarding regional specifics, identity,
solidarity, the region being seen as a collective mobilizing base for the attainment of political,
social, economic and cultural aims).
Consequently, from a political standpoint and while regionalism can be perceived as a
process of acknowledging by certain communities of some economic disparities, ethno-cultural
alienations, state centralism in which they live, there have emerged several types of regionalism.
The most important are outlined below:
 Offensive Regionalism Ŕ developed especially in the „70s, is characterized by economic
nationalism, opposition to change and a strong defense of the specific features of the region
(traditional manufacturing areas, rural areas);
 Autonomist Regionalism Ŕ is constantly in search for obtaining a self-governing attribute
(historic regions, ethnic regions);
9
Michael Keating, The New Regionalism in Western Europe, (Montpellier: Edward Elgar Publishing Ltd.,
1998), 23.
10
Encyclopaedia Universalis, Encyclopaedia Universalis: corpus 15, (Paris: Encyclopaedia Britannica Inc.,
1994), 794.
11
Joseph Nye, International Regionalism, (Boston: Little, Brown & Co., 1968), 7.
12
De Louise L‟Estrange Fawcett and Andrew Hurrell, Regionalism in world politics: regional organization
and International order, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1995), 39.
13
Andrew Gamble, Regionalism and global governance, (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 1996), 65-66.
14
Domenico Fisichella, Ştiinţa Politică. Probleme, concepte, teorii, (Iaşi: Polirom, 2007), 166-170.
15
Andrew Evans, “Regionalism in the EU: Legal organization of a challenging social phenomenon”, Journal
of European Integration 24, 3 (2002): 219.
182
 Integrative Regionalism Ŕ is looking for the entire integration of the region in the national
state, lacking of any claims for autonomy (Romania);
 Competitive Regionalism Ŕ a strong region, especially from an economic point of view,
sees the state as an obstacle and not as a partner, the social capital being the main driving force
(„the new regionalism‟)16.
In view of the fact that regionalism can achieve, in some conditions, the status of political
movement we resort here to Slaughter vision. According to this, the international system should be
comprehend not as a “system of states” but as a “world of governments”17. This means that there are a
whole range of networks of inter-governmental forms of collaboration. Regionalism is a type of intergovernmental cooperation bringing in: interdependencies, increasing negotiations, protecting cultural
specifics and dealing with neighbor rivalries. So, regionalism gains political significance, status when its
networks of interdependence begin to inflict important costs on other actors18. Hence, if the region is a
social construct and regionalism is the centripetal force supporting the formation of regions lets
find out what regionalization encompasses.
The position of Regionalization
In general terms, by regionalization is understood the establishment of a new tier in the
territorial organization of a state by creating regional institutions and transferring administrative
competences to the regional level. Regionalization is a problem related to the internal organization
of a state and mainly is carried out by judicial and administrative means. Hereupon, regionalization
is a top-down approach, the central authorities being those that initiate and implement this process.
Regionalization sometimes is a political project and other time is a spontaneous process 19.
This formula of political nature represents the decentralization20 of the state. Additionally, from an
economic point of view, by regionalization must be understood an autonomous process that leads to
the increasing of the economic interdependence degree in a particular geographic space.
Practically, the more the process penetrates the society‟s foundation, the more complex and
stronger will become the regional bonds21. At this kind of juncture, regionalization represents the
“growth of societal integration within a region... a „soft regionalism‟”22. Regionalization is a
process of operating the construction of an autonomous capacity of action that aims to promote an
infra-national territory but supra-local by mobilizing economic means or, by the case, identity
springs of local or regional solidarities. This process can be carried out starting from pre-existent
institutions or from a new territorial plan intended to comply better with those objectives. In the
frame of the European construction process, defining regionalization supposes means of correcting
economic and social disparities between different parts of Europe, the so desired integration is
achieved through regionalization and communalization of powers23.
In the doctrine, the regionalization phenomenon acquires three senses:
a) pseudo-regionalization Ŕ a form of de-concentration of the central administration at
territorial level;
b) administrative regionalization Ŕ it functions at an intermediate level of power between
the level of cities, communes, counties, departments and the national level represented by the state;
c) super-regionalization Ŕ political, found at the halfway between regionalization and
federalism.
16
Keating, “Regions and Regionalism in Europe”, 118-121.
Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004): 5-6.
18
Fawcett, and Hurrell, 39-42.
19
Björn Hettne, “Beyond the „new‟ regionalism”, New Political Economy 10, 4 (2005): 543-560.
20
In general terms, by decentralization is understood the division of power between the central and local
structures, the latter lacking of any type of sovereignty.
21
Andrew Hurrel, Regionalism in Theoretical Perspective, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 22-34.
22
Fawcett, and Hurrell, 39.
23
Congress of Local and Regional Authorities, Resolution of the Conference of local and regional authorities
of Europe on imbalances in Europe (RES 100), (1978), 2-3, https://wcd.coe.int/wcd/com.instranet.
InstraServlet?command=com.instranet.CmdBlobGet&InstranetImage=330832&SecMode=1&DocId=66197
4&Usage=2.
17
183
For the last two senses, the regionalization phenomenon meets the terms of local
autonomy, one that gains extended valences with respect to the meaning that it had till now. It can
be observed that, at least in the last 20 years, it emerged another series of actors that can not enter
in the category of primary subjects to law but which gain certain prerogatives that could allow, at
least theoretically, their framing as secondary actors on the stage of international law. To be more
rigorous, we observe that this phenomenon takes place especially at European level, under the
auspices of the European Union and of the Council of Europe, two organizations with regional
vocation.
We can state that moreover there is a noticeable presence of an international regional law
through which the regions assert their will on the international stage. In the meantime, the nationstate sees itself restricted, constrained to accept the molding of its policy. All these have happened
in the context of the international order atomization and identity‟s affirmation. Consequently,
regarding the fact that a state decides to start its decentralization through regional
institutionalization, we note here the five forms of regionalization proposed by Professor G.
Marcou:
Administrative regionalization - the process is based on the delegation of some
responsibilities to the authorities subordinated to the central government. E.g. Bulgaria, Estonia,
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Slovakia, Sweden, etc.;
Regionalization through existing local collectivities - the process takes place through the
decentralized institutions that act in their own frame of power. E.g. Denmark, Finland, Germany,
Hungary, Ireland, Romania, etc.;
Decentralization - the process conducts to the emergence of a new territorial entity that
will form a region. There is established an administrative council elected by universal, direct vote
but it lacks of any normative power. E.g. Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia, Sweden, United
Kingdom, etc.;
Regional autonomy - the process leads to the delegation of legislative power to a regional
assembly so here we can talk about competences guaranteed by the Constitution or a document
with a similar value. However, despite the existence of an executive organ, such regions do not
represent the nation-state. E.g. Belgium, Italy, Portugal, Spain, etc.;
Regionalization through federal authorities - the finality of the process is the federal state,
a union of states that all have equal rights. E.g. Austria, Belgium, Germany24.
Overall, between regionalism and regionalization is developing a strong interdependence25
but there is no degree of interchangeability. Intra-European regionalism finds vigor and an
international stature that produces new game rules, rules that comes to be imitated in other zones
like South America. Hence, each region tries to play its own card, occasionally a card in relation
with the region‟s local population who notice in this a mean to detach from a nation-state usually
weaker26. The distinction between the two main terms is made even by Charles Ricq that defines
regionalism as “a bottom-up process” while regionalization is certainly a top-down approach27.
The „New Regionalism‟ in focus
Starting with the „80s appeared a strong wave of regionalism because the old mechanisms
did not manage to administer it anymore. The state‟s power and authority were eroded from three
directions: through internationalization, by sustaining the local and regional interests and by the
advancement of local and regional society. These states‟ erosions lead to a stronger type of
regionalism that overcomes the national frame and creates an environment for a competition
24
Gérard Marcou, La régionalisation en Europe, (Luxembourg: European Parliament, 1999), 17-34.
Michelle Cini, EU Politics, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 288, 292-296.
26
Bertrand Badie and Marie-Claude Smouts, Le retourment du monde: Sociologie de la scène internationale,
(Paris: Dalloz-Sirey, 1992), 51.
27
Adrian Liviu Ivan, Federalism şi regionalizare în context european, (Cluj-Napoca: Institutul Cultural
Român, 2004), 42.
25
184
between regions28. This is a more ambitious form of regionalism. It demands solid foundation and
especially new conditions while the region is brought to the core stage of international politics.
In the traditionalist models, the relation with the global market was intermediated by the
state. The relation state-region was one of mutual support modeled by the states‟ willing that
wanted to remain the main actors of the international relations. In this kind of regionalism, the
regions claim the competitive advantages that can be obtained by direct participation on the global
market. In addition, the regions try to find a place in the interior of a socio-political structure both
at national and supranational level. The region is not anymore just a functional space but is one
social and political. The performance of a region is assured by a political system under the form of
a regional government or administrative institutions that act in a territory29. One of the forces that
sustain regionalism is the functional dynamic of economic restructuring. There are not only
economies contained by territorial boundaries instead there are production models. From an economic
point of view, the regions were based on the concept of comparative advantage: a region will produce
those things that will bring a certain successful input. The new regions are based on a dynamic
concept, on the competitive advantage: the political decision makers look to maximize the territory‟s
capacity by creating advantages mainly at human capital level that is going to be used in the global
competition30. In the quite fragmented system of local governing policies there are attempts to attract
investments. Usually, these are drawn in the zones near cities with a developed infrastructure. That is
why there is a competition between cities in order to assure a uniform development. A regional
approach would impose cooperation, the regions being the cross cut point of various
interdependences, both functional and institutional.
Regionalism changes the functional sense of the territory. In the past, the territorial
policies focused on the mediator role of the local political elites and on the distribution of resources
in order to benefit of comparative advantages. The new sense of regional policy must deal with the
global competition and for this reason has to adapt its policies 31. It is developing now even a
process of re-evaluation of the past. The renaissance of regional history becomes a challenge
towards the history‟s national interpretation and a guiding instrument of a regional society vis-à-vis
the future. Regionalism has reborn in the field of art, music and literature by presenting social
realism, cultural pluralism, diversity and even social conflicts. For that matter, the revival of the
regional culture is very important for the creation of a modern regional identity being presented as
a way towards modernization and globalization32.
The main element for the creation of a region is regional identity. Even if it is quite
difficult to draw such an identity and its elements, there are at least three components that must be
emphasized:
 The first element is cognitive. The people should be aware of the region‟s existence and of
its geographical limits. Moreover, they should know the regional specifics in order to be able to
compare it with those of other regions;
 The second element is affective. This is in fact an interpretation of the first element due to
the perception of the inhabitants of the regional identity and solidarity;
 The third element relates to the way in which the region is used as collective mobilizing
and action base in search for the social, economic and political objectives.
The regional identity can be rooted in historic traditions and myths but in the
contemporary form is a social structure elaborated in a context under the pressure of the three
objectives. An identity shared both from its cognitive and affective dimensions do not always have
political consequences. However, the encouragement of multiple identities can determine the
28
Andrew F. Cooper, Christopher W. Hughes and Philippe de Lombaerde, Regionalisation and global
governance. The taming of globalisation?, (New York: Routledge, 2008), 65-72.
30
Paul Samuelson and William Nordhaus, Economie Politică, (Bucharest: Teora, 1995), 21-36.
31
Michael Keating and John McGarry, Minority Nationalism and the changing International Order, (Oxford:
Oxforford University Press, 2001), 3-14.
32
John A. Agnew, David N. Livingstone and Alisdair A. Rogers, Human geography: an essential anthology,
(London: Blackwell Publishing, 1996), 385-388.
29
185
individuals to assume regional identities without giving up to those national 33. Regionalism
surprises the region in full process of positioning in the national and global system. The region can
be a core frame for political actions‟ analysis. Instead, these have to be coherent and encompassed
in a regional institutionalized configuration. The regional sentiment may manifest and tend towards
autonomy but this can happen only if exists a de-politicization of it.
Regionalism and the political, economic and social life of regions
A consequence of the state‟s regionalization is the appearance of regional branches of
national or regional parties. These can play an important role both at regional and central level
because the regional branches can have a higher or lower degree of interdependence. Find in direct
fight for votes, these need a much more liberty of action in order to include in their action programs
regional matters. The voters‟ behavior is influenced by the regional context and the political elites‟
mastery to bring the local problems on to the national agenda34. Politically, regionalism found place
in every ideological structure from the extremist right to the left one, the territory remaining the
most efficient base of debating and obtaining compromises.
From an economic point of view, regionalism is based on restructure and the change of
production procedures. The transnational corporations create global investment strategies
distributing resources along the regional and states‟ borders. The formation of regions as
production systems is affected by the competition for the draw of multinational capitals35. The
economic regionalism determined the transformation of the regional development policy by the
European Commission implication. There was a need for a better regional competitive environment
due to the decrease of trust in the state as tool of economic, social regulator (subventions, state
aids). Because there is a lack of homogeneity at the political level there matured diverse regional
development models:
1. The bourgeois regionalism is addressed to strong regions from an economic perspective
and is concentrated around local business elites that are in cooperation with regional governments
and agencies. This is a model of high costs, emphasizing elements like: competition, productivity,
technology and added value. Social policies are definitely excluded. The regions do not have a
continuously strategy of increasing the productivity but overall are able to recover their
investments. E.g. Flanders, West Germany, etc.36;
2. The strategy of labor economics workshops is characterized by competition with lower
costs, low salaries and taxes due to the lack of a labor market strongly regulated. The region has the
role to distribute globally the work force but lacks of an active policy of employment, the regional
institutional level being weak represented. The surplus of work volume is taken by the migration
flows that accept low pays and work conditions while the consequences of such policy are
disastrous on competition. The negative effects can be put even on the fact that the investment
flows are generally speculative so there can appear social crises. This type of model is met in the
South Europe‟s regions in the „90s and in the British conservatory governing period of Edward
Heath37;
3. The social-democratic strategy is one with high costs. It is characterized by an enhanced
and active union movement. Its policy is the result of the cooperation between the government, the
business environment and the unions. This strategy implies a high public investment being based
on education and professional learning. It can be found in the old industrialized regions that are
now in decline38;
33
Niles M. Hansen, Benjamin H. Higgins and Donald J. Savoie, Regional policy in a changing world, (New
York:
Plenum Press, 1990), 71-75.
35
Liviu Voinea, Corporaţii transnaţionale şi capitalism global, (Iaşi: Polirom, 2007), 67-69.
36
Christopher T. Harvie, The Rise of Regional Europe, (London: Routledge, 1994), 24-26.
37
38
Keating, 173.
34
186
4. The strategy of creating a nation is encountered in the regions that are in search of
territorial autonomy and secession. It is based on two important pillars: culture and language. The
cooperation with other regions is purely functional and is directed towards regions with the same
strategy, projecting the region‟s image as a national entity39.
The regions can be appreciated as fight scenes for gaining control over the state, struggling
to achieve the statute of actors and promoting a regional interest. A victory is represented by the
creation of the Committee of Regions after the adoption of the “European Union Treaty” 40. As well,
the implementation of the European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation (EGTC) Regulation and
the introduction of a new objective regarding territorial cooperation have shaped new action
possibilities for regions and for the manifestation of regionalism. In other words, this creates a
communitarian judicial instrument for cross border cooperation and offers to regions the possibility
to get associated in various forms of collaboration. Moreover, these and the right of civil initiative
developed alongside Lisbon Treaty‟s adoption, furnish EGTC the possibility of becoming a power
and pressure structure in the European Union. Such an improvement could then easily convert the
Committee of Regions in an actively involved institution in the European Union decisional
process41.
Additionally, the regional interests are sustained even financially by the European
Commission (a third of the European budget goes for the regional policy). Likewise, the regional
policy develops between two convergent interests: the Commission promotes the course of action
while the Council of the European Union, after intergovernmental negotiations, applies the
distribution policy42. In the competition between regions, states and the Commission were adopted
the following principles: the subsidiarity principle43 and the principle of integrating the regional
development guidelines in other communitarian policies. This is intended to lead to the creation of
a strong network of bonds between regions44.
Regionalism and Subsidiarity Principle
Jacques Delors in “Le nouveau concept européen” asserted that subsidiarity is a barrier
against centralizing tendencies from the central power: “in any system of federal inspiration like the
European Community, the subsidiarity principle brings a permanent counter-weight to the spillover mechanisms that tend in a complex world to excessively charge the echelon of the central
power” (169). The subsidiarity notion is indeed a principle of social organization that lacks
normative character. In a first sense, the subsidiarity principle evokes the idea of substitution. This
means that the superior authority and, first of all, the state can not intervene unless an inferior
authority or a person proved its incapacity. This is based on the principle of non-interference of
power. The second sense of the subsidiarity principle suggests the idea of help, of intervention.
This time it is not analyzed if the authority has the right to interfere but if it has the duty to do so. In
39
Constitution
Society,
Separatist,
Independence,
and
Decentralization
Movements,
http://www.constitutionsociety.org/cs_separ.htm.
40
Mario Telò, European Union and new regionalism: regional actors and global governance in a PostHegemonic Era, (London: Ashgate Publishing Ltd, 2007), 225-230.
41
Regulation (EC) no. 1082/2006 of the European Parliament and the Council of 5 July 2006 regarding a
European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation (EGTC).
42
Liesbet Hooghe, Cohesion policy and European integration: building multi-level governance, (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1996), 110-112.
43
“The Community shall act within the limits of the powers conferred upon it by this Treaty and of the
objectives assigned to it therein. In areas which do not fall within its exclusive competence, the Community
shall take action, in accordance with the principle of subsidiarity, only if and in so far as the objectives of the
proposed action cannot be sufficiently achieved by the Member States and can therefore, by reason of the
scale or effects of the proposed action, be better achieved by the Community. Any action by the Community
shall not go beyond what is necessary to achieve the objectives of this Treaty” in: European Union, Treaty
on European Union, C191, 29 July 1992, art. 3B, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/dat/
11992M/htm/11992M.html.
44
Jennifer Wozniak Boyle, Conditional leadership: The European Commission and European Regional
Policy, (Oxford: Lexington Books, 2006), 186-190.
187
contrast with sovereignty, the subsidiarity does not accept a flat degree of power centralization 45.
To compensate for, it could permit certain flexibility in the distribution of competences between the
levels of power46.
The doctrine talks about the vertical and horizontal subsidiarity. The former regards the
connection of the European Union governance with the different tiers of territorial governing. The
latter concern especially the relations between public and private actors. The concepts are
important since in a European system subsidiarity could become a constitutional principle. This
would happen if there could be solved the competence conflict between authorities despite the
governing level at which they situate
If the division of competences between the European Union and Member States is pretty
clear the things do not stand the same in what concerns the nation-state and the sub-state territorial
formations. We must not forget that at the national level are the central units, regional units and the
units of other local collectivities47. It is noticeable that an institutional conflict between regional
and local powers can occur. That is why in Spain many metropolitan areas have been faded out
through regional law. Also, in Italy the mayors of big cities are the rivals of the regions‟ presidents
and many urban areas that should have been founded did not see daylight. For that reason, in
general, the apparition of regions was justified by the nearness to the citizens48.
Regionalism through the European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation
The adoption of the European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation (EGTC) Regulation
and the introduction of a new objective regarding territorial cooperation have shaped new action
possibilities for regions and for the manifestation of regionalism. In other words, it creates a
communitarian judicial instrument for cross border cooperation and offers to regions the possibility
to get associated in the cross border territorial cooperation. Moreover, the pass from cross border
cooperation to territorial cooperation implies the fact that regions can extend their field of action
across local cooperation and the nearest collectivities can extend their field of action towards the
integral development of territories that share common synergies and possibilities49. EGTC have
been established by the 1082/2006 Regulation, representing a materialization of the European
governance principles entailed by the European Commission in the “White Charter” from 2001.
Under such circumstances, the efficiency of operations, cross border policies and territorial
cooperation depends in general on the consensus about a real “partnership” between all the
territorial and socio-economic actors involved. Consequently, is important to establish the
participation form of civil society‟s representing organizations in the territorial cooperation
projects50. Nevertheless, this collaboration form and the right of civil initiative developed alongside
of the Lisbon Treaty‟s adoption, gives EGTC the possibility of becoming a power and pressure
structure in the European Union. Such an improvement could then easily convert the Committee of
Regions in an actively involved institution in the European Union decisional process.
The interest towards regionalism, and implicitly towards decentralization, promotes border
regions and invites them do adapt their local specifics, supporting their entrance in mutual
interregional cooperation forms. For example, the Bihor County has developed cross border
collaborations through the Bihor-Hajdu-Bihor Euroregion and Carpathian Euroregion which are
constituted from border regions that are in their own national states economic-social peripheries. In
the case of the former, a normal step to take is its institutionalization in the new legislative frame of
the European Union and its transformation in EGTC. In order to increase the actions‟ efficiency in
45
Kees Kersbergen and Bertjan Verbeek, “Subsidiarity as a Principle of Governance in the European Union”,
Comparative European Politics 2, 2 (August 2004): 142-162.
46
Giovanni Grevi, “Subsidiarity and the Debate on the Future of Europe”, CESifo Forum 3, 4 (October 2002): 12.
47
Gérard Marcou, “Les régions entre l‟État et les collectivités locales dans les États fédéraux ou à autonomies
régionales: décentralisation ou centralisation?”, Territoires 2020 8 (2003): 13-18.
48
Paul Wagstaff, Regionalism in the European Union, (Wiltshire: Cromwell Press, 1999), 210.
49
Regulation (EC) no. 1082/2006 of the European Parliament and the Council of 5 July 2006 regarding a
European Grouping of Territorial Cooperation (EGTC).
50
European Commission, White Paper on “European Governance” COM (2001) 428 final, (Brussels, 2001),
10-18, 26-35, http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/en/com/2001/ com2001_0428en01.pdf.
188
the territorial cooperation field and in order to apply the subsidiarity principle would be useful a
more wide management from the EGTC of the cross border or sometimes transnational projects
financed from communitarian or national funds.
Regionalism approaches on Bihor County
Romania is today developing a process of regionalization mainly through existing local
collectivities. From a juridical point of view, Romania draws its national objectives in the field of
regional policy by the 151/1998 Law (revised by the 315/2004 Law). During its accession process
Ŕ negotiation “Chapter 21” - Romania applied to instruments like: PHARE, the Instrument for
Structural Policies for pre-Accession (ISPA) and the Special pre-Accession Programme for
Agriculture and Rural Development (SAPARD).
The regional development policy at territorial level is implemented through 8 units known
as development regions. A development region is constituted by the free association of neighbor
counties without being territorial-administrative units and lacking of any juridical personality
(North, South-East, South Muntenia, South-West Oltenia, West, North-West, Centre and
Bucharest-Ilfov). Their regional development policies are encompassed in the “National
Development Plan” based on “Regional Operational Programs” with priority axes for the whole
series of intended objectives or measures. From an institutional point of view, each development
region has a Regional Development Council (presidents of counties), a Regional Development
Agency (non-governmental) and a Regional Committee for the elaboration of Regional
Development Plans. Accordingly, the institutional system mentioned above is based mainly on
partnership principles51.
The development region that comes in the center of our attention is the North-West region.
From geographical and scientific point of views, North-West Region can be identified with the area
known as North Transylvania. This is a title used more often recently because of tourist and
investment purposes in the idea of establishing it as a regional brand. Hence, considering the
European Commission classification of regions, North-West is a NUTS II area, while its counties,
including Bihor, are NUTS III types. With a functional nature, founded on homogeneous social
criteria and complementary economies, North-West region consists of 15 sub-regions (counties, group
of counties) and priority axes (villages, communes).The region is formed by the following six
counties: Bihor, Bistriţa-Năsăud, Cluj, Maramureş, Satu-Mare and Sălaj. Geographically, North-West
region has 34,159 km2, covering 14% of the Romanian territory, 43 cities and municipalities and for
the 2006 year has a number of 2,730,132 inhabitants52. It is certainly an important border region Ŕ
Hungary and Ukraine being its foreign neighbors Ŕ with a strategic position favorable for economy.
Territorially, the region develops mainly around three poles: Cluj-Napoca (Cluj County), Oradea
(Bihor County) and Baia-Mare (Maramure; County). Oradea is the second important economic,
industrial pole at regional level, being an urban centre with large inter-counties functions. On the
other hand, in what regards the European Spatial Development programs it is achieving the status of a
growth pole. In fact, Bihor County is an effervescent area with progressive economic development
sustaining the major initiatives of political, economic or social actors.
As a bottom-up current, regionalism approaches on Bihor County lead to the
acknowledgment of the local community of belonging to the region, ascertaining that specific
problems can be solved at their level and not by a faraway central government. For that reason, the
regional schemes proposed by regionalism fuse large interdependencies from economic point of
view (trade, investments flows), from political perspective (representative institutions) and even
from social standpoints (education, mobility, migration).Therefore, let us bring into discussion the
questions raised by the local identity. If we name the language as an essential factor then we can
observe certain definite particularities of this linguistic element. This happens because beside the
majority‟s language it can be noticed a strong Hungarian minority that enjoys a status compatible
with all the actual norms and regulations related to minorities problem. According to the 2002
51
Zbigniew Rykiel, “European integration raison d‟état and the EU‟s eastern policy”, Regions and
Regionalism 2, 7 (2005): 173.
52
National Institute for Statistics, Regional Statistics, http://www.cluj.insse.ro/cmscluj/rw/pages/statReg.ro.do.
189
census, from a population of 600,246 inhabitants in Bihor County, 67.38% were Romanians,
25.96% were Hungarians, 5.0% were Roma and 1.66% other ethnics53. As well, national minorities
(excluding the Roma) have access to education in their native language, so the educational
infrastructure has minority schools or classes at all tiers of teaching. Another significant factor to
be taken into account when we talk about influencing a regional identity can be religion. The
North-West Region has different religious communities (Orthodox, Roman Catholic, Protestant,
Baptist, etc.). Unfortunately, many of these are fighting for more places of worship that hinder a
stronger ecumenical dialogue. In addition, the majority church is one still pretty strong connected
with the state. Though, the church can play a vital role in founding some bonds between EGTC,
helping to the creation of some networks that in time can become veritable pressure structures in
imposing regional principles.
West studies about regionalism show that this develops in areas where young people have
a high mobility54. The County‟s economy (based mostly on agriculture, industry55), to a large
extent, depends on human resource Ŕ students, the workforce, the active population. The workforce
is pretty cheap and is involved more in subcontracting activities. But despite these shortcomings,
the workforce is one of the principal elements on which the County‟s competitiveness is based.
Alternatively, for instance, in Bihor, University of Oradea is the public education institution that
emphasizes especially the importance of students‟ mobility programs. Annually a significant
number of students benefit from such mobility programs generating a development germ of
regionalism. Next to this fact, there is also an augmented number of cross border workers. The
nascent of regionalism‟s germ can take place through the importation of mentality and its
adaptation to the local specificity or through the local spirit modernization and its adaptation to the
European specificity.
In what concerns the political life, unfortunately it is obvious that a regional political life is
born during election. There aren‟t any regionalist parties only the central ones are indeed elaborating a
kind of homogeneous program. The latter usually encompasses some general guidelines that are then
embellished by the candidates and folded eventually on local or regional interests. Local branches of
parties have almost the same centralization degree as the state, the examples being numerous. If we
analyze the media we will find many scandals regarding the replacement of some branches‟
presidents at the command of the centre even if the local option may be different. The lack of local
and regional attachment is encouraged by the lack of a civic regional behavior of the voter. Still, the
first step has been made. The Democratic Alliance of Hungarians in Romania, partner in the actual
governing coalition Ŕ from which it obtained major concessions at legislative level Ŕ decided at
county level to go along with the opposition in order to work for the local interest. This can clearly be
understood as a sign of the political decision makers maturing and the fact that they are now in the full
search of their own interest.
Bringing into discussion the administration in the Bihor County, like in other regions, this
acknowledges an excessive politicization. This has effects on the distribution of funds from central
level raising inter-regional disputes. Yet, we could not speak about regional governance but we can
insist on functional governance, considering the Council for Regional Development as the local
power negotiation forum. Regarding mass-media there is a local and a central one. Even if firstly
the lack of regional media can be seen as a handicap in fact it is regionalism‟s ace that permits the
local tier Ŕ when it will be ready to evolve Ŕ to bring the local mark to a higher level.
From a collaborative viewpoint, North-West region from the beginning stated its intention
to take part in all the European programs regarding cross-border cooperation. As a result, for
Interreg III A Program and the Neighborhood Instrument Romania-Ukraine the eligible regional
parts are three counties: Bihor, Maramureş and Satu-Mare. This sort of cooperation is owed to
traditional cultural relations, similarity of economic structure, possibilities of strong transport
connections and experience in implementing PHARE CBC programs. The establishment of such
53
Romania Census (March 2002), http://www.recensamant.ro/.
Keating, “Regions and Regionalism in Europe”, 102.
55
The services sector starts to bring a high contribution to the regional GDP through the significant number of
enterprises, companies. The majority of these are classified as SME (Small and Medium Enterprises).
54
190
regional partnerships intends to involve regional, local partners in the process of development
policies creation and giving them a regional dimension. One of the most important aspects that
appear from participating in European programs is the functional specialization of each county‟s
territory. The interest towards regionalism promotes border regions and invites them do adapt their
local specifics, supporting their entrance in mutual interregional cooperation forms. For example,
the Bihor County has developed cross border collaborations through the Bihor-Hajdu-Bihor
Euroregion56 and Carpathian Euroregion. For that reason, according to the annual reports of NorthWest Regional Development Agency, between 1999-2005 in North-West Region were contracted
approximately 400 PHARE funded projects and 149 governmental projects, while at 31 March
2011 in Bihor County were under development 40 projects financed from European funds.
If we perceive regionalism in Bihor County as a political current we can characterize it,
partially, as an interactive regionalism because all its constituents are integrated in the national
system despite the fact that the interactions are bottom-up ones, still pretty weak. The development
model is that of “labor economics workshops”. It assumes low costs for companies to create
competitive products but if we consider the human resource then appears a comparative advantage.
This model does not assume major investments even if the profits are gained immediately. On long
term, this strategy will create a vicious circle in which the low quality of the workforce, the
technology and the infrastructure will claim the introduction of some frail production processes.
Taken as a whole, regionalism is developing in the Bihor County as a mark of diversity. Here, in a
region characterized by multicultural features from diverse standpoints, regionalism progresses by
portraying itself as comprehensive but not compelling, multilevel but undoubtedly not anti-state.
Conclusions
Regionalism is a valuable format to address regional questions. Regions can emerge from
above, by the initiative of a central government or they can form from below, by the inquiries of
firms, sub-national authorities. Regionalism is a source of widely opened forms of regional
cooperation, asserting itself as the support to regions‟ formation and demanding social validation.
Thus, the regional identity is the core element of this current. By regionalism local collectivities
should be maintained to the forefront of the European affairs. At European level there is no
concrete definition on region. However, is much more important not having a unique depiction than
having a constrained one. Regionalism shows us that the region is indeed, as Denis de Rougemont
put it, “a live space” that can continuously be rearticulated in order to respond better to local
collectivities expectations. While regionalism stresses the importance of social consciousness, of a
heritage, a past and of a future, a finality of a region, regionalization is the corresponding approach,
the source of identity formation, being able to make possible dealing with, recovering or
overcoming regional economic imbalances, disparities.
In what concerns Bihor County here can be encountered regionalism. The desired type
would be an integrative regionalism but there is still a long road to take in order to obtain this goal.
Nevertheless, regionalism in Bihor County is developing rapidly in various parts of life. It appears
to be a practice and even a format that has various goals, avowing itself as a phenomenon of its
own. As it could already been noticed, regionalism in the Bihor County favors from a range of
perspectives Ŕ politically, economically, socially, culturally Ŕ cohesion and diversification at the
same time. For that reason, it can be seen as the meet point of socio-political interactions aiming to
establish a forum for a regional agenda. Perceiving Bihor County as a micro-Europe permit us
observing that regionalism approaches as a panacea are here intended to sustain change, support
adaptability, prevent exclusion and reduce economic disparities. Overall, regionalism is not
unilateral, particularly in Bihor County, it promotes, facilitates bilateral and multilateral
connections, interactions.
56
For this Euroregion a normal step to take is its institutionalization in the new legislative frame of the
European Union and its transformation in EGTC. However, for a better efficiency in the territorial
cooperation field, such an EGTC would need a more wide management of the cross border/transnational
projects financed from communitarian or national funds.
191
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IV. Focus
Erhard BUSEK (Wien) ◄► Moving Borders
Moving Borders
Erhard BUSEK1
Moving Borders was in every century a characteristic of politics. Moving borders in the
20th century happened from the time of the downfall of great empires like Austria-Hungary, Czarist
Russia and Ottoman Empires connected with creating a multitude of new borders, which happened
again after the Second World War and even moreso in Europe since 1989. After the changes in
former Yugoslavia and in the Soviet Union we have laso whitnessed a development in that most
borders are losing importance, partly due to the process of European integration. The most visible
sign is the Schengen area. You are not anymore waiting at border stations, because within this zone
they ceased to exist. So far we have even tougher borders to enter the Schengen zone and it has
created a lot of changes especially for the countries of former Yugoslavia; before 1991 its citizens
could easily relocate to Austria and to other European countries, but now they had a lot of
difficulties due to visa regulations. Only Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina are left. Visa-regime is a
tough issue in the relations EU-Russia.
Borders have also another importance and therefore they are surely changing in our time.
Communication has moved even to a borderless situation by internet, mobile phone, radio and
television. In this context we are really living in a global village and it is quite clear that in a village
there are not really borders but sometimes steal fences. There is also another development, which is
mainly driven by technology, not only in communication. Everything is accessible. Nearly for
everybody and in time. We are calling it “Gleichzeitigkeit” - “simultaneous”. We have some fields
of our everyday life that are especially dependant on this situation. For example science and
research, technological developments in the construction, business and production, how the
markets function and so on. Out of this we have the presence of a similar world nearly everywhere.
If you are going through the capitals of the world you can look at stores, which are quite similar in
fashion, Mc Donald‟s is everywhere, but also the approach to life for example how the younger
generation is feeling, what they are thinking, drinking, wearing I think it is getting global standards,
that means without borders. The banking crises of these days have shown us that what is happening
on a one place has a huge impact on another place, even on all places.
Nearly borderless is also tourism Ŕ we are eager to visit every place. Especially if there is
a good PR working for this. The jobs are also commuting from one place to the other. Maybe some
industries are closed and others are coming up. We have nearly no textile industry in Europe,
because it is cheaper to do it in Turkey, India, China or elsewhere. Also we have this migration in
our cities because it is quite usual to have Turkish quarters in Central Europe, in the suburbs of the
French big cities and so on. There are a lot of human beings coming from Northern Africa and even
we are getting a mix of religions. You may consider our debate about minarets in our countries.
Also new borders are appearing. For example, between the generations. The language that the
younger generation is using differs quite a lot to what my generation is speaking. Also there are
new borders in how modern technology can be used the capacity of the elder generation is limited.
Even our grandchildren are really better in this world of YouTube, Wikipedia and Google. I can
continue endlessly but you can image how the changes are going on and how the importance of the
word “border” is changing. But still, there are borders and they will not vanish. We have to live
with other kinds of borders but we have also to live within a world, which is partly borderless. I am
asking you to look to the world of energy, with which you are familiar. There are limits for
industries, countries, professions that are depending on the availability of energy. Even a new
political grouping is coming out of those, who have easier excess to energy. So it might happen
also on other fields. Therefore everything is on the move.
1
Coordinator of the Southeast European Cooperative Initiative (SECI).
195
Allow me to be a little bit philosophical, because sometimes a basic view is helpful. You
know the mythology of Babylon. They tried to build up a tower, which should reach Heaven. In
literature and in arts there is always this example. They failed and the result was the division of
mankind, especially by languages. The turmoil of languages was created and that is for sure our
current predicament. The intention of building this tower was not to look to heaven but to quote
exactly, “they wanted to make themselves a name”. Because otherwise they would be destroyed
over all countries Ŕ so it is written in the Bible. Obviously the human being has a great fear to be
spread over, to be divided, to be destroyed and that is the reason to build up borders because then
you can overview where you are. It is instead of building a unity which we always want. That is the
real background of a lot of political efforts, of the creation of superpowers, of the United Nations,
of the Holy Alliance or whatever the name is. So far there is a desire in us to be in a communal
area, to have a centre and we are trying it on a different way. By states, by churches, by empires, by
global order and so on. If it is not possible, the result is a kind of alienation, we are trying to draw
borders against the other, geographically, by language, by mentality and so on. An other
consequence is also that we are always looking also for our own identity to define ourselves and to
develop divergences to the other. So you have not only new borders in Europe on the map by
custom services. Even I may say by Schengen zone we are overcoming the borders now.
Sometimes we are creating even tougher borders by visa regulations but also we are creating
differences by languages. In the centre of old Yugoslavia there was a Serbo-Croatian language. For
sure, a little bit artificial, but it was working and it is still working in the elder generation. But for
now for example the Croatians are working very hard to differentiate their language from the Serbs.
The Montenegrinians fixed in their constitution that they are speaking Montenegrinian and the
Bosniaks are trying to differentiate their language by Turkish words, even by Viennese words. The
Moldovans are quite tough on the fact that their language is not Romanian, but Moldovan and the
same is happening with the Macedonians towards Bulgarian. Also my Slovak friends are telling me
that the Slovak youth are not any more understanding Czech, even this famous Czech childrenmovies, they are aired now by the Slovak TV with subtitles. Here you have the result of Babylon:
the differentiation of languages and the difficulties to understand each other. Obviously it is a
warning that we shall not invest too much energy to find an “ideal language” so to be without
borders as it was tried by the Viennese philosophy on positivism. So it makes no sense to be angry
about losing a language. I think we have to train and to develop techniques to live with this. In
English we are naming it “muddling through” or to use a title of a book “Thriving on Chaos”.
I give you an example in which direction it is leading. For sure English is the lingua franca of
our time. But is this the real English or isn‟t it a problem for the real English speaking people? Already
we have developed American English as a literary language and also in technology and by computer we
are using a specific language, which is based on English but it is quite different. I was present at the
meeting of the Ministers of Science and Research in the European Union. We were using our native
languages; we had lunch one day and we were discussing who is getting how much money. Everybody
used English. The only poor guy on our table who was not really understood was the English Minister,
because he was speaking Oxford English and nobody was able to understand it.
But let us go a little bit further on. It makes no sense to spend a lot of time on diagnosis
even if it might be more fruitful than the therapy, we know from the medical sides. The expert
language of science and technology is delivering differences en gros and en detail. The languages
we are using are connected to subcultures or also with profiled media on every field of science.
Technology, business and so on are developing their own language and their own logics. It is a kind
of much differentiated identities, where you need a key to enter the empire of the gifted, where we
understand each other. It is starting very primitively: look at all the advice we are getting in the
written form to use mobile phones, coffee machines, computers and so on. All these user advice is
written in a specific language, which is not really understandable for the common. I dear say that
we have a tendency to lose clear words. Even the word “language” is now very seldom. We are
more using “communication”. For sure it has a social aspect. The connection from me to you, from
one group to the other, also using the endless possibilities of technique for communication.
Sometimes I have the impression that communication exists for itself and it is not anymore devoted
196
to submit content. It is a real question, if communication is always now devoted to cross borders.
Sometimes it makes borders visible.
I think it is a result of the appreciation of the individuality, seen from an ethic or cultural
view. We are living after times where the collective approach was quite stronger and there were
really only few groups that still exist: Now we have a differentiation in specialization. I am asking
you to discuss with the book keeper how they are explaining chash-flow, the way to reach a
balance and so on. Every institution, every enterprise, every field of science and research has it
specific language, even if you are trying to fit it to the world of the computer. The diagnosis is quite
clear. There is an amplification of language, there is division of labour, the development of specific
world of life and also we have the problem to understand, what is happening simultaneously but it
is also different in the same time. And that is happening in the time of globalisation. So we are
getting new borders between us. Especially in lifestyle. You have human beings living as
existentialists, some religious, some are more devoted to romanticism or to informatics, friends of
the 21st century in difference to nostalgic people and I may say, we are also living in different
worlds. The world of our week is different from the days we in which we are working all the day
time creates an other style, our approach to the world is sometimes only looking to social insurance
or to chaos. We have the Bobos and the Yuppies. Lifestyle is quite in fashion in our time. Styling is
everything and is also a question of the peer group. Every group has it language, it is used for
namedropping. I am not criticizing this. It is a kind of richness of the life, but it is differentiated
also with borders. And these borders are moving quite quickly. We do not know exactly in which
time we are living: are we living in modern times, are we living in post modern times or are we
living in post post modern times?
Even the instruments, we are using for communication, i.e. to talk with each other, are
sometimes instruments to ignore the other, if I am looking in our cities, where the youngsters are
going around with their mobile phones. If they are using the mobile phone they are not able to look
around and what the environment is, in which they are moving. We have also the division between
younger and elder generation. The extensibility to the possibilities of our life for the elderly one is
limited and so far we have also ways of discrimination, which is an expression of borders existing
between human beings. Some like it simple, some like it leaner, some like more techniques and so
on. We are looking for answers. Sometimes they are given in a very populist way because it is
simple for everybody understanding but it is not really an instrument to overcome borders. Others
are trying to avoid any perception of our world because it is extremely difficult to live with the
variety in which we are. But it is a characteristic of our culture. In the Glifford lectures 1985 more
than 20 years ago they spoke about the richness of variety: “The voice of science is a Babel of
diverse languages and cultures. That is to me the joy and charm of science.” But a lot of human
beings are not prepared to except the variety. Intolerance of ambiguity and uncertainty is spread
over. Also intolerance against the “other”. The aliens and the barbarian, those, who are speaking
other languages or even have the difficulty to use a language.
But to make a clear statement: the variety of our life is irreversible. If you are making it
reversible that it is only possible through power, dictatorship or an artificial unity. That might be
possible by the “global village”. But I think we are getting poorer by this. The variety and the
parallelism of our live world are necessary to be accepted. In this sense and in the same time we are
lowering borders and we are getting more borders up and we have to develop the capacity to live
with. For sure that can create conflicts. Samuel Huntington with his “Clash of Civilisations” has
outlined it. His thesis is not true, because the division lines, which he has drawn between different
religions are not the reality of Europe. He have to look to the other side, what has happened around
1900 in Vienna was in a certain way a clash of civilisations between different nations, religions,
philosophies. But it was extremely productive. It is a wrong way to make the world simple?
Because the terrible simplificateurs are a real danger. So I would urge you to be happy to live also
with borders, that mean differentiation, but also to live with the efforts to overcome it by keeping
your own position.
But how to do this? For sure it is not simple and it is very much depending on education. It
is specialization and at the same time a kind of an universal view to the problem. So far we need
more general education that we are able to understand the world in which we are living. That is
197
depending on our school systems but also on the cultural climate of the society. It is depending on
the media and also on the paradigms that are shaping now.
How is this imagination of education starting? First at all we have to look to the danger of
only to be a specialist. This view is not very new. Georg Christoph Lichtenberg has said for
centuries “Who understands nothing beside chemistry is also not understanding it rightly.” Seneca
rightly said, we are learning not for life but only for school. It is really strange that this sentence
was always turned around. The real challenge is cultural literacy. To understand the common
content and their roots, the real meaning of the words and the priorities for the future of our life. So
far it is extremely important to build bridges. That does not mean to encourage those who are
crossing borders in science and the universities by academies and so on. I think it is also necessary
in the common education in schools. We need not only to develop alphabets and basic computer
language, but there is necessary knowledge about cultures, the capacity to receive tradition and arts,
experiences and history. We have to connect the different worlds of life. So fair in the real
meaning, we have to move borders. Sir Karl Popper named it “The World 3”, in his understanding
the world of the spirit which helps us perceive the physical and social realities. That is not only
history. It is also what is told. That means to tell mythology and also the experiences of our
ancestors. That is not only the job of the politicians. They are not the best in this job, because they
have to look to the day and not to the perspectives of the future, because the next election is coming
for sure quite soon. But the politicians have to keep in mind what the famous Austrian poet Hugo
von Hofmannsthal had said: “Politics is communication about the essentials”. It is up to you, there
is the feeling if it is really happening now. But I am asking you to understand politics not only as
parliaments parties, governments and so on. I think there is a kind of politics, which is also
expressed by meetings of scientists or managers, by festivals and by the richness of the world. They
have a political responsibility, which you can connect also with a very old definition by Aristotle
“Anthropos zoon politicon estin” - because he is a “zoon logon echon”. The man is a political being
because this political being has the capacity of language. That means to tell something to the other
and to hear it. This is a real importance of the cross border function of language. Language is not
only an instrument to name the things. Language is also a medium and expression of the view main
relations and the social live.
I have to confess that language is also used to create borders in a political sense. Some are
trying to occupy the language. If you have listened to the language to totalitarian systems, they are
changing the language. George Orwell‟s 1984 had even a ministry for the Truth, where the
language was changed to give another impression. I give you one example. Years ago in Austria
somebody said we have plus 0 growth of the economy. If you are saying we have Ŕ 0 growth, it is
the same, because 0 = 0. But the impression imprinted by the language is for sure different. So you
can also create images by languages, not reality, fiction language I think is also extremely
important. If you are looking to the world of movies, they are trying it to do it. If you are looking to
the presentation in some media we have also the impression they are living in fiction and not in
reality. This is also a kind of creating borders between reality and fiction. Leading in other
direction is necessary. So far the way, in which we are able to speak with each other is a way where
we are able to move borders. We have the ability to play with words, to chat with each other. If you
want to move off from democracy, you are changing always the language. Even if you are going
the way of populism, which is happening very much in our days, it is also a different language. It is
not anymore focusing on the facts. It is creating “image”. So far we are living now in a world of
design. Things have to look artificial, quite convenient but nothing to do with the reality. They are
also developing a very specific language, if we are speaking about “drop out”, “burnout”, “bailout”
or what ever. The younger generation in the German language is speaking to be “Cool” or
“megageil” and so on. It is also division of the generations.
In politics are languages always very sensitive and very political. Sometimes we have the
impression that it is not possible. For example we are asking in Austria and Germany that every
foreigner is coming to us and wants to live with us must be able to speak German, but sometimes I
have doubts that even those are born here are able to speak a correct German. That might be the
same also in other languages. We have also to speak about, that a lot of immigrants in the 19 th
Century created a very valuable world in the centre of Europe. If I am looking to science, poetry,
198
arts, literature, those who have created this richness of culture here in the centre of Europe are
coming of different directions. There were crossing borders very successfully learning from each
other by crossing borders and taking pieces of everything with and by this mixture we are creating
a lot of new things. You can name it multicultural, multiethnic, or whatever you want, but it is the
expression of richness. So not only moving borders but also crossing borders can be seen as a kind
of richness and not only losing identity but also creating a new identity.
The language is only one part of the problem. We are creating also other borders, which
are sometimes very necessary. For example being in the banking crises of our days we need new
rules on a global level. It is for sure no solution if the nation state has a revival, because the nation
state is not able to handle with global problems. We need global rules. Sometimes it is tried for
example by the world trade organisation (WTO) but this is only a very small beginning. The
economy is globalized and there is no way back. Why should there be a way back? What is
necessary is to set some boundaries, rules and limitations. It is quite the same with the results of
science. If you are looking to biogenetics it makes no sense to forbid research, it makes only sense
to say what should be done, what should be used what is helpful and what might be dangerous for
the human species. So far we are looking forward to create a certain kind of borders within us, what
is possible and what should not be done. Here the regions, the nation state, the continent Europe
and the other parts of the world are involved. It is also a question of the disciplines, of the
economic space and institutions. It can be only done, if we are talking about this and we creating a
common understanding. A common understanding in what is common and what is different. Allow
me to use also what the Bible has brought to us. I started with the Babylon tower and I will give
you the answer, which is example of Pentecost. The disciples of Jesus were waiting that Jesus
might come back, but he is gone to heaven. He did not come but the spirit came and in paintings it
is used that tongues of fire do it. Difficult to show visually in which way the spirit is coming over
the human being, but there is one very important sentence in the Bible: “everybody was able to
understand the other in his own language”. That is what is necessary to move borders. To have the
ability to listen to the other, to understand him in his language and to answer in my own language.
That is not the question of translation. It is a question of empathy, of compassion. You are out of
the business world and it is quite natural, that you are communicating on your subject in your own
language. But you are depending on the framework-conditions, you are depending that the other
understands you and you are getting a common understanding. You have to understand a conflict
but also the compromise and that is the only chance to come together. Moving borders is a very
interesting challenge, it is a conditionality without this nothing is really functioning. So we have to
move ourselves because we are sometimes the real border hindering a better mutual understanding.
I am asking you to move on, not only in your business, in your results, but also in the essentials of
our world. The conditions are not so bad.
Book reviews
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La lutte des orgueils politiques ou la conquête de l’or noir ?!
Mariana BUDA
Review of Questions Internationales, Les Etats du Golfe. Prospérité et insécurité.
No. 46 novembre-décembre 2010, La Documentation Française, Paris, ISSN : 17617146
Keywords: securité, géopolitique du Golfe, Roumanie, intégration européenne
La revue Questions Internationales, parue sous la prestigieuse Maison d‟Edition La
Documentation Française, propose dans chaque numéro un débat sur les plus importants
questions qui se déroulent sur le scénario international. Problématique existante depuis des années,
problème qui paraît toujours sans solution, la lutte continue qui existe dans les pays du Golfe fait le
sujet principal de ce numéro de la revue.
Du point de vue de la structure, la revue est composée de plusieurs parties. La plus
importante est centrée sur le dossier principal du numéro, c‟est-à-dire les dimensions multiples de
l‟intérêt du Golfe, présenté sur un tiers des 127 pages de la revue. Les autres rubriques existantes
abordent d‟autres aspects de la vie politique internationale : la Roumanie et son intégration dans
l‟Union Européenne, défis et solutions, l‟évolution de l‟Indonésie en Asie et le portrait de Paul
Doumer, personnalité marquante qui gère l‟Indochine française au tournant des XIXe et XXe
siècles.
Donc, le dossier portant sur le « Les Etats du Golfe. Prospérité et insécurité » se compose
de plusieurs articles relevant sur le sujet. On compte sur 9 interventions présentées dans un ordre
qui nous font bien comprendre le problème et qui nous introduisent dans le monde du Golfe
Persique.
Dans son premier article, Le Golfe, comble d‟or noir aux mille tuiles, Serge Sur présente
le Golfe d‟aujourd‟hui. Même si on ne sait plus comment l‟appeler, le Golfe Persique, le Golfe
Arabe, le Golfe Arabo-persique1, le territoire qui se trouve dans cette zone géographique reste « à
la jonction de plusieurs mondes, de plusieurs époques et de plusieurs civilisations »2. L‟incursion
qu‟on nous fait l‟auteur dans cet espace est à la fois historique, politique, religieuse, géographique
et actuelle. On passe par toutes les étapes parcourues de ces Etats, en arrivant aux menaces
universelles et à l‟insécurité persistante. C‟est un premier article très bon, placé très bien dans l‟en
tête du dossier, car il offre les détails les plus pertinents pour mieux visualiser la problématique du
Golfe. Laurence Louër continue la série des articles du dossier destiné aux Pays du Golfe avec
« Des évolutions sociales, politiques et religieuses singulières ». C‟est un article bien documenté et
bien explicite, avec des cartes et images qui illustrent l‟évolution unique de cette partie du Golfe.
Cet article offre l‟image singulière de chaque pays qui fait partie des Etats du Golfe et les conflits
ou les conditions sociopolitiques qui y existent : « Sans négliger les aspects qui donnent à ces pays
une unité socioculturelle et économique, il convient donc de prêter attention à ce qui singularise
chacun d‟entre eux »3. Cette partie met en évidence, à mon avis, dans une manière très explicite, le
pourquoi des luttes qui ont commencé dans la zone et informe le public du point de vue de la
réalité. Le troisième article, « Le pétrole : malédiction ou bénédiction », par Keyvan Piram, fait une
incursion dans l‟évolution et la découverte du pétrole dans la zone du Golfe. Cause des principaux
problèmes là-bas, l‟or noir pour lequel les luttes ont commencé, le pétrole joue un rôle essentiel
1
Serge Sur, Le Golfe, comble d‟or noir aux mille tuiles, dans la revue Questions Internationales, Les Etats du
Golfe. Prospérité et insécurité, numéro 46 novembre-décembre 2010, La Documentation Française, Paris, p. 4.
2
Ibidem.
3
Laurence Louër, Des évolutions sociales, politiques et religieuses singulières, dans la revue Questions
Internationales, Les Etats du Golfe. Prospérité et insécurité, numéro 46 novembre-décembre 2010, La
Documentation Française, Paris, p. 16.
201
dans l‟histoire contemporaine du Golfe Persique. L‟enjeu principal devient la capacité de gérer une
région tellement riche et une région tellement désirée à cause de sont potentiel.
Gabriel Sensenbrenner, spécialiste des systèmes financiers des pays arabes au Fond
Monétaire International met en évidence « Des puissances financières internationales de premier
plan ». Il explique dans son article en quoi consiste la richesse des pays du Golfe et la manière dans
laquelle le pétrole leur a permis d‟investir de l‟argent non seulement dans le monde entier, mais
surtout dans le développement des économies locales. En ce moment, les défis principaux sont
surmonter la crise internationale et continuer les investissements publics. En analysant les
économies et le pouvoir financier de ces pays, l‟auteur estime que « le Golfe pourrait devenir un
véritable pont entre l‟Europe, l‟Asie et l‟Afrique »4. D‟autre part, l‟article de Marc Valeri, « Des
Etats entre consolidation autoritaire et contraintes réformistes » vient comme un complément de
l‟article de Laurence Louër. Même si les Etats du Golfe ont évolué du point de vue social, politique
et économique, ils restent toujours entre les barrières des contraintes réformistes et sous autorité des
systèmes politiques anachroniques et de l‟autorité spirituelle. L‟auteur présente la situation de
presque chaque état appartenant au Golfe et les reformes menés, mettant en évidence, de cette
manière, la réalité existante.
Emile Hokayem, chercheur spécialisé dans les questions de sécurité au Moyen Orient,
dévoile les multiples enjeux de sécurité et de défense des pays du Golfe dans son article « Des
multiples enjeux de sécurité et de défense ». La carte qui accompagne l‟article illustre d‟une manière
bien évidente l‟environnement géostratégique du Golfe. Dans cette région, la présence américaine
reste toujours centrale, bien qu‟elle soit contestée. D‟autres états ont fait aussi de ces pays une
priorité, comme par exemple la France ou le Royaume Uni, impliques dans différents domaines de la
défense et de la sécurité5. A son tour, le dossier sur les Pays du Golfe continue avec l‟entretien
d‟Hubert Colin de Verdière, diplomate, ancien ambassadeur à Abou Dhabi, en Iran. Il décrit quelques
scénarios pour l‟avenir du Golfe en présentant des situations réelles avec lesquelles les Pays du Golfe
se confrontent. Il parle de la politique, de l‟économie, de la sécurité et des enjeux en même temps, en
se basant sur des cas concrets et des situations existantes en Golfe.
Depuis ses premières interventions en Golfe, la présence des Etats Unis a toujours été
contestée. Le fait est expliqué par Philippe Droz-Vincent, maître de conférences en sciences
politiques à L‟Institut d‟études politiques de Toulouse et à Sciences Po Paris, dans son article « Les
Etats Unis dans le Golfe : une présence contestée ». Il décrit d‟une manière objective l‟intervention
des Etats Unis dès le début, en détaillant chaque fois autant la position des américains comme la
position des Etats du Golfe, les points positifs, mais également les inconvénients de cette
intervention. Le dossier sur les pays du Golfe finit par l‟article de Djilali Benchabane, « Les Émirats
arabes unis : l‟exemple d‟une société traditionnelle globalisée ». Même si les Émirats se trouvent
dans une zone instable politiquement, ils ont bien réussi diversifier leur économie et même rechercher
une certaine stabilité du point de vue de la politique. Certes, le pétrole existant là-bas a toujours
constitué une source d‟hégémonie politique, mais les émirats arabes ont rapidement compris la
nécessité de diversifier les sources pour faire augmenter l‟économie. Bien sûr, l‟enjeu principal des
émirats reste à découvrir s‟il existe un modèle qui fasse coexister une économie émergente avec la
consolidation d‟une nation6. En guise de conclusion, le dossier présente les principales étapes de
l‟histoire des pays du Golfe, par années, en surprenant et expliquant les plus importants
événements. Egalement, on nous présente une liste d‟ouvrages et articles sur le sujet du Golfe.
4
Gabriel Sensenbrenner, Des puissances financières internationales de premier plan, dans la revue Questions
Internationales, Les Etats du Golfe. Prospérité et insécurité, numéro 46 novembre-décembre 2010, La
Documentation Française, Paris, p. 38.
5
Emile Hokayem, Des multiples enjeux de sécurité et de défense, dans la revue Questions Internationales,
Les Etats du Golfe. Prospérité et insécurité, numéro 46 novembre-décembre 2010, La Documentation
Française, Paris, p. 61.
6
Djilali Benchabane, Les Émirats arabes unis : l‟exemple d‟une société traditionnelle globalisée, dans la
revue Questions Internationales, Les Etats du Golfe. Prospérité et insécurité, numéro 46 novembredécembre 2010, La Documentation Française, Paris, p. 87.
202
Dans la section Questions européennes, le no. 46 de la revue Questions Internationales,
présente un débat sur l‟intégration de la Roumanie dans l‟Union Européenne, article signé par Edith
Lhomel : « L‟intégration de la Roumanie dans l‟Union Européenne : un premier bilan mitigé ». Le
premier bilan après l‟intégration de la Roumanie dans l‟Union Européenne, montre les points positifs
et les points négatifs de la Roumanie avant et juste après l‟intégration. Incursion historique mais aussi
présentation objective de l‟évolution roumaine dans le sein européen, l‟article joue le rôle d‟un
observatoire très analytique et concret des faits. La Roumanie a fait des erreurs, elle a encore des
problèmes à résoudre, mais c‟est peut-être normal pour une démocratie toujours en transition.
La partie de la revue ou on analyse divers aspects de la réalité contemporaine, Regards
sur le monde, traite le sujet de l‟« Indonésie : l‟énigme d‟une démocratie émergente ». L‟auteur,
François Raillon, surprend quelques aspects de l‟évolution de l‟Indonésie après la fin du régime
Soeharto. Avec les résultats atteints actuellement et après avoir dépassé certains moments critiques
dans sa trajectoire, maintenant on peut classifier l‟Indonésie parmi les grandes puissances
émergentes. La revue finit par esquisser le portrait de « Paul Doumer, archétype du grand
administrateur coloniale de la IIIe République ». Personnalité marquante de la vie politique
française jusqu'à la Grande Guerre, il insuffle une impulse majeur à la colonisation de l‟Indochine.
Dans l‟article présenté par Amaury Lorin, on voit tout son parcours et ses réussites, mais également
on nous inspire de le prendre comme modèle.
Numéro dédié aux grands ensembles surtout, mais aussi à la réussite de petites espaces, la
revue Questions Internationales laisse son empreinte dans nos mémoires après l‟avoir lue. La
problématique qui m‟a suscité l‟intérêt et la question que je me pose après avoir parcouru les textes
de la revue est si on parle plutôt de la lutte des orgueils politiques, donc de la suprématie, ou de la
conquête de l‟or noir, donc de la richesse ? Peut-être les deux.
Mariana Buda, Université d‟Oradea
University of Oradea, Faculty of History, Geography and International Relations
[email protected]
La géopolitique, un instrument sine qua non dans l’organisation mondiale
Mariana BUDA
Compte-rendu du livre : Exercices géopolitiques pour l’Union Européenne. Les
puissances et leurs différends. Nicolas Bárdos-Féltoronyi. Editions L‟Harmattan,
Paris, 2010, 254 p., ISBN 978-2-296-11803-4
Mots clés : géopolitique, géostratégie, grandes puissances, Union Européenne,
organisation mondiale
Le Grand Dictionnaire français définit la géopolitique comme l'étude de l'influence des
facteurs géographiques, économiques et culturels sur la politique des Etats et sur les relations
internationales. La géopolitique est apparue à la fin du XIXe siècle, grâce à l‟allemand Friedrich
Ratzel (1844-1904). Le terme géopolitique, quant à lui, a été utilisé pour la première fois par Rudolf
Kjellén, professeur suédois de Science Politique et Géographie qui définit la géopolitique comme « la
science de l‟État comme organisme géographique ou comme entité dans l‟espace » : c'est-à-dire l‟État
comme pays, territoire, domaine ou, plus caractéristique, comme règne.
Dans le plus large des sens, la géopolitique est décrite comme la science qui étudie les
rapports entre la géographie des états et les politiques développées par ceux-ci. Mais le contenu de
ce terme a gagné des significations nouvelles et des dimensions différentes dans la sémantique
politico-diplomatique du XXème siècle. Le substantif géopolitique et l‟adjectif géopolitique sont
des termes présents dans presque toutes les explications faites aux différentes évolutions
internationales dans les moyens académiques, journalistiques et, pas dernièrement, politiques.
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D‟autre part, l‟importance des facteurs géopolitiques dans la vie des êtres humains n‟a pas été une
invention du XXème siècle. Les analyses et les constats des plusieurs savants et hommes de
sciences, surtout de l‟histoire moderne de l‟humanité, ont démontré l‟importance de la géographie
physique et des éléments tels que reliefs, ressources naturelles, climat, dans le domaine des
relations internationales. Non obstant, on assiste également à une continue diminution des
frontières naturelles, routes de transport et communication, potentiel agricole, etc., donc à une
diminution du facteur géographique.
Les dérives de la géopolitique a conduit au bannissement de cette discipline dans les
universités jusque dans les années 1970-1980, où l'étude des nouveaux conflits lui a permis de
retrouver une légitimité par l'utilisation des connaissances de la géographie physique et humaine, de
l'histoire et de la science politique. Les enjeux de la géopolitique sont désormais liés à ceux de la
démographie, des flux migratoires, de la prolifération nucléaire, de l'accès à l'eau potable, des
ressources alimentaires, du réchauffement climatique, des régionalismes. On peut, donc, affirmer, que
la géopolitique comporte plusieurs aspects. On peut parler de la géo-économie, de la géo-culture, de la
position des régions, etc. Spécialiste en géopolitique et dans les relations économiques internationales,
Nicolas Bárdos-Féltoronyi, dans son ouvrage « Exercices géopolitiques pour l‟Union Européenne.
Les puissances et leurs différends », analyse tous ces aspects et propose une lecture qui s‟adresse à
tout public qui veut mieux comprendre les actions de divers Etats dans l‟organisation mondiale.
En fait, le livre est construit autour de quelques réflexions de l‟auteur. D‟abord, on se
demande si l‟adhésion ou l‟intégration de certains pays eurasiatiques à l'Union Européenne est-elle
possible, probable ou souhaitable. Dans ce sens, l‟auteur explique quelles seraient les mutations
géopolitiques du continent eurasiatique susceptibles d'avoir un impact sur l'Union Européenne. Après,
il fournit des éléments pour une définition d'une géostratégie de l'Union Européenne dans le contexte
du continent eurasiatique. On comprend, maintenant, le titre de l‟ouvrage. Nicolas Bárdos-Féltoronyi,
par l‟intermède des cartes très bien construites et des analyses sur des chiffres concrètes, il propose
plusieurs variantes et plusieurs exercices pour comprendre l‟organisation mondiale dans des cas
spécifiques. Les exercices se déroulent autour de grandes puissances mondiales, comme les Etats Unis
d‟Amérique, certains pays asiatiques, la Russie et l‟Union Européenne, en prenant en compte les
différents aspects de la géopolitique.
L'analyse proposée vise à éclairer les dimensions variées de la géopolitique dans l'optique
de l'Union Européenne. Il s'agit de propos qui situent essentiellement l'Union Européenne par
rapport à l'ensemble eurasiatique et les puissances qui y interviennent. La problématique
géopolitique qu'entretiennent la Russie, la Chine et les Etats-Unis dans leurs rapports complexes et
mouvants avec l'Union Européenne demeure ici constamment présente. Donc, après définir les
notions théoriques, tout au départ, il s'imposa de traiter deux questions dès le début: pour situer
l'Union Européenne de « l'extérieur », il fallait se demander comment se dessine le système des
grandes puissances aujourd'hui, alors que, pour la fixer de « l'intérieur », l'interrogation devait
porter sur les limites, les frontières et la portée de l'UE. Cette analyse est poursuivie par celle des
trois pays coincés entre l'Union Européenne et la Russie, et trois autres dans la Caucasie
méridionale, auxquels les Etats-Unis s'intéressent manifestement. A quelle zone d'influence
appartiendront-ils ? En ce qui concerne les territoires situés de la mer Méditerranée jusqu'aux
confins de la Russie et de la Chine, des discussions semblables se présentent en termes
géopolitiques. Des « grands jeux » s'y déroulent méritant l'attention. Il y a des candidats pour
devenir une grande puissance. Il faut aussi les scruter. Il s'en suivra un examen de quelques cas
« géoéconomiques » et, pour terminer, on cernera certaines vicissitudes « géoculturelles ». La
partialité éventuelle, voire inéluctable, des analyses proposées par l'auteur s'explique sans doute par
la tension qui existe entre son anti-impérialisme invétéré et ses recherches scientifiques, entre son
militantisme pacifiste et son engagement chrétien.
L‟ensemble du livre est organisé autour de six chapitres, plus un chapitre introductif. Le
premier chapitre introduit les notions d‟ordre explicatif, en proposant « une grille d‟analyse ». Donc,
l‟auteur présente même avant de commencer son analyse les critères d‟après lesquels il organisera son
discours pour la suite. On fait connaissance avec les acteurs institutionnels de ses recherches et la
géopolitique qu‟ils suivent, avec l‟image du pouvoir et la raison politique des Etats, avec les
phénomènes de globalisation, de hiérarchisation du monde, du temps mesuré dans un Etat. D‟autres
204
acteurs avec lesquels il opère sont les entreprises multinationales, les Eglises, les banques
multinationales. On constate, donc, que les analyses que l‟auteur fait se distribuent sur tous les niveaux
possibles et couvrent tous les aspects de pouvoir de l‟Etat. D‟autre part, on sait bien ce qu‟on trouvera
dans le livre et on peut s‟imaginer dès le début une analyse complexe et très complète.
Le chapitre suivant, « Comment situer l‟UE dans le monde ? », représente le premier
exercice proposé par l‟auteur. Après une introduction dans le sujet et après une suite de détails
d‟ordre géographique, on est spectateurs d‟une incursion dans le système des grandes puissances
d‟aujourd‟hui : la Russie, les Etats Unis, L‟Union Européenne. Textes illustrés avec des cartes
précis et avec des explications concrètes, l‟auteur explique la position géopolitique de l‟Union
Européenne, et comme entité à l‟intérieur et à l‟extérieur du continent européen. Certes, les critères
économiques sont bien mis en évidence, par des comparaisons pragmatiques. Tel que Nicolas
Bárdos-Féltoronyi présente dans le chapitre introductif, où il présente la grille de son analyse, les
critères culturels, idéologiques sont également bien mis en évidence par des comparaisons
concrètes. On trouve aussi des comparaisons faits entre les critères démographiques,
géographiques, qualification de la population, etc., importants, bien sûr, lorsqu‟on voit une analyse
comportant sur l‟organisation mondiale. L‟approche de l‟auteur est très intéressante. Il propose
constamment des stratégies et exemplifie différentes perspectives. On note bien sa formation dans
la géopolitique, mais également son appartenance à un environnement multiculturel et
multiethnique. Le chapitre intitulé « Des situations « entre-deux » : pays plats et transitaires », ou le
deuxième grand exercice du livre, porte sur les pays qui géographiquement se trouvent autour de
l‟Union Européenne et qui représentent un intérêt pour les grands puissances. On parle ici de
l‟Ukraine, du Bélarus, de la République Moldave, des pays de la Caucasie méridionale, de la
Turquie. Apparemment c‟est la richesse de ces pays et leurs ressources naturelles qui les rend
importants pour l‟Union Européenne et non seulement. C‟est aussi la raison pour laquelle l‟Union
Européenne a développé la politique du voisinage européen. En même temps, en voit des enjeux
multiples, présentés en détails par Nicolas Bárdos-Féltoronyi, avec des chiffres concrets et des
situations de la vie actuelle. D‟autre part, il semble que l‟intérêt vis-à-vis de ces pays n‟est pas
seulement entre l‟Union Européenne et les autres pays de l‟Europe, mais il s‟étend jusqu'aux Etats
Unis de l‟Amérique, sans parler de la Russie, de la Chine, intéressés notamment du contrôle du
transit des gaz naturels.
En ce qui suit, l‟auteur présente les « Objets des « grands jeux » différenciés ». Dans cette
partie, on prend part à un exercice qui vise notamment la Turquie, la Caucasie méridionale et l‟Asie
Centrale. Les objets dont l‟auteur parle sont en fait les ressources naturelles que ces pays détiennent
et dont les grandes puissances sont intéressées. La Turquie est une ressource en soi. Sa position
géographique est un grand atout. En plus, l‟auteur affirme que la Turquie constitue pour l‟Union
Européenne un moindre risque géopolitique à l‟intérieur qu‟à l‟extérieur. Donc, il voit une Union
Européenne avec la Turquie dedans. En ce qui concerne la Caucasie méridionales les enjeux sont
les trois mers qui ont toujours été l‟espace propice pour les oléoducs et les gazoducs tellement
disputés au fil des ans. A continuation, si on parle des pays de l‟Asie centrale, on voit surtout les
enjeux engendrés par les voisins lointains de ces pays, ou leurs « protecteurs », tel que l‟auteur les
appelle. L‟incursion dans les problématiques les plus intimes de ces pays, illustré avec des tableaux
comparatifs et avec des cartes suggestives, représente une vraie leçon de géographie, économie et
culture en même temps. On remarque bien la ténacité avec laquelle l‟auteur décrit les relations
existantes entre ces pays et surtout il surprend très bien l‟intérêt des grandes puissances.
A présent, il ne faut pas parler des exercices de géopolitique seulement dans des cas ou des
situations bien évidentes. Dans le chapitre numéro 4, Nicolas Bárdos-Féltoronyi propose un exercice
visant « Autres grandes puissances eurasiatiques : avérées, virtuelles ou potentielles ». Dans cette
situation il prend l‟exemple de la Chine. Certains considèrent la Chine comme faisant partie de
l‟ensemble de grandes puissances mondiales. D‟autres ne trouvent pas que la Chine représente une
grande et importante puissance du point de vue politique et surtout géopolitique. Mais, l‟auteur de cet
ouvrage, en entrant dans les détails et en analysant les aspects d‟une possible relation entre la Chine et
l‟Union Européenne, reconnait le rôle décisif de ce pays asiatique dans l‟organisation mondiale.
Le chapitre 5 du livre, « Cas géopolitiques », propose l‟incursion dans le monde
économique mondiale. On note bien ici les finesses que l‟auteur connait dans ce secteur et la vue
205
d‟ensemble qu‟il propose. Faisant partie de la géopolitique, la géo-économie vise à examiner la
stratégie des entreprises qui s‟imbriquent dans la stratégie des Etats et vice-versa. En fait, la géoéconomie, après les années ‟80, commence à devenir synonyme au processus de globalisation. Il y
a dans le monde un certains nombre d‟entreprises ou compagnies multinationales qui dominent le
marché mondial. Soutenus par certaines banques, ces compagnies actent comme les acteurs
institutionnels et fonctionnent au niveau global comme les états. Un autre aspect pris en compte
dans ce chapitre par l‟auteur est la monnaie. On assiste à une explication minutieuse entre les
différences qui existent entre l‟euro et le dollar, le pourquoi du besoin d‟une monnaie forte et
d‟autres aspects qui font références à la dimension monétaire dans le monde. Dans ses analyses
économiques, Nicolas Bárdos-Féltoronyi prend en considération même le blanchissement d‟argent
et des capitaux, la vente des drogues à échelle mondiale et même l‟argent gris, c‟est-a-dire l‟argent
qui provient du trafic des armes.
La dernière partie du livre, « Cas géoculturels », est dédiée aux exercices géoculturelles
proposés par l‟auteur au lecteur intéressé. La géo-culture est une partie intégrante de la
géopolitique, tel que la géo-économie. Elle étudie des discours spécifiques, comme ceux
idéologiques, propagandistes, publicitaires, etc., qui peuvent contribuer à maintenir, modifier ou
acquérir les espaces. La géo-culture est un exercice important, car c‟est la rhétorique qui forme le
discours politique et, certes, c‟est le discours politique qui forme les idées politiques et plus tard les
futures actions politiques. Un aspect important c‟est également le discours proposé par l‟Eglise, qui
dans certains pays joue le rôle de l‟Etat. Donc, dans une organisation mondiale cohérente, il faut
tenir compte de tous les aspects qui forment ce qu‟on appelle géopolitique.
Bref, l‟ouvrage proposé par l‟auteur qui porte ses origines en Hongrie, est une analyse
minutieuse de tous les aspects engendrés par la géopolitique concernant l‟organisation mondiale.
On apprend que le monde est comme une table d‟échecs où tous les pays jouent un rôle
extrêmement important, si non pour soi pour les autres qui observent le potentiel. Mais, dans cette
organisation il faut prendre en considération également la géo-économie, la géo-culture, donc
toutes les parties de la géopolitique, car parfois il y des aspects qui jouent un rôle plus important
qu‟on ne s‟imagine pas. On remarque bien la multitude des cartes qui rend plus accessible le texte
et les explications de l‟auteur. La géopolitique a à la base la géographie physique, donc des
explications concrètes comme celles de l‟auteur s‟imposent. Ce qu‟on remarque bien également est
le fait que, par la présentation faite, le livre est compréhensible et facilement à suivre même pour
les non initiés dans la géopolitique et géostratégie. La bibliographie présentée à la fin de chaque
chapitre, ou parfois sous-chapitre, démontre la recherche intense que l‟auteur a fait pour réaliser
cette synthèse, mais également constitue un appui pour ceux qui veulent obtenir plus
d‟informations sur une partie ou autre.
Le titre de l‟ouvrage est très suggestif et bien choisi. On considère cela parce que certains
des cas exposés dans le livre sont pour l‟instant des scénarios possibles pour l‟organisation
mondiale, mais qui ne sont pas dépourvu de logique ou de substance. C‟est difficile d‟affirmer si
l‟ouvrage est exhaustif ou pas, mais ce qui est certes est le fait qu‟on a à faire avec un sujet
complexe qui est analysé dans toutes les perspectives.
Mariana Buda, Université d‟Oradea
[email protected]
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Eastern European Frontier and Cross-Border Cooperation
Cristina-Maria DOGOT
Review of: Alexandru ILIEŞ, Euroregional cross-border cooperation premises at the
eastern external border of EU. Romania – Borders and Borderlands (Geography
Institute of University of Gdansk, Bernardinum Gdansk-Pelplin, Poland, 2009) 126p.
Keywords: geopolitics, border, cross-border cooperation, administrative-territorial
structure, euro-region.
The recent communitarian membership of Romania and Central and Eastern European
countries triggered new challenging approaches of border cooperation between the former
communist states. This new form of cooperation, which might be considered as “micro-diplomacy”
or at least as a possibility to develop different local transnational projects with a minimum
implication of the central administrative and political powers, is much more provocative if we
consider the high degree of centralism to which the former communist states were accustomed.
The theoretical approaches concerning the new concepts and realities emanating from the
communitarian space, concepts and realities like subsidiarity, decentralisation, regionalism or
regionalisation, and yet cross-border cooperation knew their own Romanian “career” too. Nongovernmental organisations, intellectuals, politicians or academics have been or have become
interested in these concepts and realities, the result of this interest consisting, among others, of
numerous debates and mainly publications which threaten from different perspectives all these
topics. Examples are really numerous, so we will limit to make reference to only a few of them.
Regarding the NGO‟s, the most important were the organisation Liga Pro Europa and the group
Provincia, both dedicated mainly to the problems of decentralisation, regionalisation and
subsidiarity, and developing an important publishing activity (the review Altera and respectively
Provincia). Although less vocal then the civil society representatives, the academics and
researchers were also preoccupied both by the intrinsic principles and by the rules of the European
integration. So, nowadays there is an important Romanian bibliography (books, magazine or
newspaper articles) concerning the communitarian nature, principles, rules, immediate or long term
social, economic or political objectives of the European Union. All this literature could be
categorised in indifferent ways and we propose different perspectives: from the chronological
perspective: the literature emerged before and after Romania‟s accession to the communitarian
structures; from the methodical perspective: theoretical or/and descriptive approaches;
supranational or/and national approaches; from the perspective of the author‟s profession: works
written by academics, researchers, politicians, EU officials, etc. This presentation could be
continued with some other different approaches that are possible to be distinguished among the
very large number of writings on the communitarian space.
The work which is the point of this review is one whose author belongs to the academic
environment, but this is not the main aspect which we would like to underline. As the title of the
reviewed book suggests, the core concept of this work is that of the border and borderland, and this
topic is what we consider to be representative for the specializations in Geography and
International Relations and European Studies at the University of Oradea (and the proof is even this
very Journal).The interest for this topic is not accidental for a part of the academic team of the
University of Oradea. Situated “on the border” (in fact only at 15 kilometres from the crossing
point of Borş), it is possible to assert that for the academic staff (as for the inhabitants of the city or
Oradea), to live so closely to the border and have so many restrictions on movement represented a
situation difficult to accept. The frontier must have been as sad as Michel Foucher7considered the
Berlin Wall for the Germans. While living so close and yet so far from the “other world” could
7
M. Foucher, Front et frontieres, Fayard, 1991.
207
raise an immense desire to overcome the barrier that the border is, and then when it becomes
possible, to understand and explain its role, functions, limits and benefits.
Nevertheless, the book of Alexandru Ilieş is neither historical nor does it study the
psychological effects of the frontiers; it proposes a geopolitical approach of the concepts of border
and borderland, the basis of this analyse being the common border regions of Romania, Hungary
and Ukraine from the point of view of the administrative-territorial units which participate in the
process of cross-border cooperation. The author starts off from offering a general historical and
geographical perspective of Romania and the geopolitical position of this country. Hence, the
author is using a lot of maps and quantitative data in order to highlight the geopolitical importance
of one of the largest eastern European and communitarian country. A. Ilieş continues the general
approach of his book by offering the reader the European view on the geopolitical position of
Romania “in the new European political whole”. This part of the book (the second chapter) pays
attention to the very important period of the Cold War, when two new concepts concerning the
frontiers appear inside the newly created communitarian space: internal and external frontiers. In
the same period, given the new economic and even political communitarian directions, the study of
frontiers became a priority, especially from the economic and customs perspective, the author
underlining his asserts by significant quantitative data concerning the different stages of evolution
of the European common policies. Another benchmark used by the author to substantiate his claims
is the enlargements of the European Community. Hence, A. Ilieş offers a full length explanation of
how the widening of communitarian space geographically and politically changed the European
borders, how the former external communitarian borders became internal European borders. The
most spectacular could be considered the integration of Austria, when the length of the borders
with socialist states increased; the integration of Greece, which increased the length of the external
borders of the European Community in the Balkan region; the reunification of Germany, when the
internal German border disappeared; and the integration of the former communist states, especially
of Baltic States, Romania and Bulgaria, when the external borders of the EU have reached their
extreme eastern limits so far8.
After this general presentation, the author dedicates a chapter on the typology and
definitions of the frontiers, offering the necessary connection to Romanian laws, too, together with
a very detailed presentation of the characteristics of the Romanian borders. Hence, owing to the
book of A. Ilieş the reader could find out, be it for scientific or only for information purpose, a sum
of highly synthetic and precise information concerning the Romanian borders (e.g.: the length of
Romanian borders; the typology of Romanian borders (hydrographical, maritime, air borders, free
zones) or even the status of special border regime of embassies or consulates situated on Romanian
territories and of the vessels and aircrafts that travel under Romanian flag).
In the same manner, the book of A. Ilieş offers us an important presentation of the border
role and functions, making a short comparison between the situation during the communist period,
when the border was particularly separating and very aggressive (militarily), and the present days,
when borders have become very friendly, permeable, allowing for great human and goods mobility.
In order to argue his assertions, the author offers numerous examples sustaining the dynamism of
the Romanian-Hungarian or even of Romanian-Ukrainian borders. In this way, the author directs
the reader to the core subject of his book, the cross-border cooperation between the three abovementioned Eastern countries. The last part (Ch. 4) of the book of A. Ilieş focuses on the problem of
the emergence of the new post-communist administrative territorial structures in charge with the
regional cross-border cooperation.
It is already well-known that the administrative-territorial structures of the former
communist countries had their roles and attributions established by the central government, without
any influence of the “inferior” administrative entities. This situation created a highly centralised
administrative system, even when the political system of the single party decided to apply some
administrative changes (as the case of Romanian Fundamental Law of 1952, when, theoretically,
8
We must not forget the integration of Finland, which provided 1380.2km borderland with Russia.
208
Romania experienced the regionalisation9). The challenges of the post-communist period and
especially the self-assumed goal of the European integration represented the main basis of the
administrative changes registered by the former communist states from the Central-Eastern
Europe10. The post-communist administrative changes concern not only the internal functionality of
the administrative apparatus, but also some changes to how the segments of the administrative staff
will report to the external plan, i.e. regional, European or, in the context of globalization, even
international.
Professor Alexandru Ilieş makes reference to some of the changes registered by the
Romanian administrative system and begins with the Nomenclature of Territorial Units for
Statistics (NUTS), which represent: NUTS 1, Romania; NUTS 2, 8 development regions 11; NUTS
3, 41 counties and Bucharest; NUTS 4, doesn‟t exist; NUTS 5.265 municipalities and towns and
2.686 communes with 13.092 villages. The author will focus preponderantly on the NUTS 1, 2 and
5, because these levels are (or could be) part of the cross-border cooperation process, accordingly
to Law 215/2001 of the local government. Another very important element emphasized by the
author is the highlighting (by a suggestive map and some relevant data) of the 19 border counties
(NUTS 312) which develop cross-border activities, 12 of these counties being placed (either
completely or partially) at the external border of the European Union. Howewer, A. Ilieş not only
provides quantitative data concerning the length of the borders of these counties, he also looks into
the form and position of their borders. Thus, the author distinguishes a triangular border (county of
Timiş) and a rectangular border (counties of Satu Mare and Botoşani). Specific to the counties of
Timiş and Satu Mare is the fact that only one side of the county borders with a non-EU member
state. Another typology established by A. Ilieş concerns the: i./ counties having only external
communitarian borders (9 counties); ii./ counties having only internal communitarian borders (8
counties); iii./ counties having mixed borders (4 counties); counties containing internal border (2
counties, given Danube‟s international regime).The author distinguishes three “border rings”
formed by the administrative areas of the NUTS 5 units, i.e. small and larger towns and communes.
Thus, the first ring is formed by 236 towns and communes that have direct contact with the
borderline; the second ring contains 263 administrative-territorial units that are separated from the
border by ring II and contains, at the western Romanian border, the most important towns (Oradea
included); and ring III, formed by “the administrative-territorial units adjacent to ring II and which,
from the point of view of the width extension area of the Romanian border zone... would be its
inner limit”. The given position of an administrative-territorial unit (ring I, II or III) determines its
specific border area related activities, and according to Romanian laws the core public institutions
of cross-border cooperation are the Local and County Counties.
After a detailed presentation of the problems of border and of Romanian administrativeterritorial units, the author makes the connections with the similar entities of the neighbouring
countries: Hungary, Ukraine, Republic of Moldova, Bulgaria and Serbia. Hence, it is possible to
find out the fundamental necessary information on the correspondent border administrativeterritorial unit of the contiguous countries: Hungarian counties (megyek) and localities (települes);
Ukrainian regions, districts, towns, urban and rural localities (the latter with composing villages);
the Republic of Moldova‟s counties, towns, communes, one accepted (Gagauzia) and one de facto
(Transnistria) autonomous region; Bulgarian regions, sub-regions (equivalent to Romanian
counties), towns and communes; Serbian provinces, districts, municipalities, towns and rural
localities. The author highlights the high symmetry between Hungarian and Romanian
9
C. Dogot, “Administraţia publică româneascăde la comunism la reformă şi europenizare”, în: Sorin Şipoş et
al., Politici imperial în Estul şi Vestul spaţiului românesc, Oradea/Chişinău, Ed. Universităţii din
Oradea/Editura Cartdidact Chişinău, 2010, p. 493.
10
This is not the case to consider that the administrations of the older European democracies were not
influenced by the fall of the communist regimes and by the European Union enlargement. Their changes
only were less spectacular, considered as a normal evolution, a continuity of the long-time process.
11
Regions are the main institutional novelty in the Romanian administrative system.
12
The 19 border counties (NUTS 3) include implicitly the municipalities, cities, communes and villages
(NUTS 5).
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administrative-territorial units part of cross-border cooperation process. Although the author does
not specify it, the most dynamic cross-border cooperation is between Romania, Hungary and
Ukraine, and especially within the Charpatica and Transcharpatica Euroregions. However,
indifferently to the cross-border cooperation registers high or low dynamism, the simple existence
of the Euroregions could offer to no-communitarian states (Ukraine, Moldova or Serbia) an
excellent basis to exert relationships with the communitarian institutions (which provides the
necessary funds for the cross-border cooperation). The lack of dynamism concerning the crossborder cooperation is due especially to the institutional rigidity (and the case of Moldova, where
the neo-communist regime blocked or at least does not support the Europeanization of its
administrative structures, is a representative one, beside that of Serbia for a given period), and it
could be important both in short, in middle or in long term. Nevertheless, being part of an
Euroregion remains of the utmost importance because it signifies the intrinsic (even latent)
possibility to participate, at a given moment, when it is more favourable, in a cross-border
cooperation project.
A. Ilieş‟s conclusions are rather positive where Romania is concerned. In the author‟s
opinion, Romania‟s geographical, geopolitical, geostrategic or geo-economic position have been
fundamental in the case of numerous, either positive or negative, regional or international situations
throughout the history. The fall of the Romanian communist regime opened a new way for this
country, and its position on European continent is seen as a basis of this new opportunity, i.e. to be
part of an original economic and political entity, the European Union. Nevertheless, to be a
member of the European Union after almost half of century of membership of the communist bloc
arises certain challenges and requests different changes in different public areas. The administrative
and territorial changes represent a part of the fields where these changes were necessary, and the
cross-border cooperation is one of the reasons for these changes were required. In his book
Alexandru Ilieş explains a major part of the process of Europeanization of Romanian
administrative-territorial system, but not without making the necessary connections with similar
changes that happened in contiguous countries. A. Ilieş largely explains every administrativeterritorial system of Romania‟s partners in the process of cross-border cooperation, giving a lot of
data that was necessary in order to create a holistic image of the institutions involved in the crossborder cooperation process, within the Euroregions. Hence, given the data offered by Professor A.
Ilieş, it is possible to have a comprehensive image of the Romanian, Hungarian, Ukrainian and
Serbian regional and local actors participating in the cross-border cooperation process. By its very
synthetic character, the book of A. Ilieş could be used either by students, as a very useful reading
material, either by researchers or specialists in the problem of cross-border cooperation or by the
EU or national officials who are working in the cross-border cooperation or related domains.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Dogot, Cristina, “Administraţia public românească de la comunism la reformă şi europenizare”, în:
Sorin Şipoş et al., Politici imperial în Estul şi Vestul spaţiului românesc, Oradea/Chişinău,
Ed. Universităţii din Oradea/EdituraCartdidact din Chişinău, 2010.
Foucher, Michel, Front et frontières, Paris, Fayard, 1991.
Cristina-Maria Dogot
E-mail: [email protected]
210
Regional Development and Cross-Border Cooperation: A Basis for the
Multilevel Governance?
Constantin Vasile ŢOCA
Review of Ioan Horga, Iordan Gh. Bărbulescu, Mykolia PALINCHAK şi Istvan
SULI-ZAKAR, Regional and Cohesion Policy Insights into the role of the
Partnership Principle in the New Policy Design (Oradea/Debrecen, University of
Oradea Press, University of Debrecen Press, 2011), 311p.
Keywords: regional development, CoR White Paper, MLG, cross - border cooperation
The volume Regional and Cohesion Policy Insights into the role of the Partnership
Principle in the New Policy Design, editated by Ioan HORGA, Iordan Gh BĂRBULESCU,
Mykolia PALINCHAK şi Istvan SULI-ZAKAR is structured in two major parts: Regional
Development: Performances And Perspectives and Cross-Border Cooperation And COR White
Paper On Multilevel Governance.
The first part of the volume approaches a series of ideas that address the regional
dimension at European level, but also at national level. The regionalization is the major topic,
together with studies on administrative-legislative dimension concerning the efficiency, the
reforms, the importance of regional policy in the process of regionalization. Then, the IT field is
approached, the demographical analysis and, last but not least, elements of multiculturalism.
It analyzes the idea of a European dream, where all countries have the same purpose. It is
bringing into light the issues of which this “ideal” is touching, and those obstacles are represented
by the problem of sovereignty and freedom of choice as well as the globalization process and the
new rising idea of nationalism. An interesting study talks about the effect of international economy
on the IT industry. The cost cuts had some bad effects on the industry, however the factories from
Budapest and Debrecen, which are part of the big T-System production chain can keep up with the
market requirements. It also talks about the quality maintenance of the products manufactured in
Hungary as well as the ownership structure and the IT Services that Hungary provides for its
consumers.
In the field of The Europeanization of Regional Governance in Post-Lisbon EU: The Role
of Regional Legislative Assemblies it is underlined the role of the Lisbon Treaty has in the regional
legislative assemblies and how it affects the governance of the nations. It also brings in discussion
the role and the way the subsidiarity principle works. He shows how this principle was improved
by adding different protocols (at the Amsterdam Treaty for example). Basically, in this article the
author shows how the Lisbon Treaty influenced regional governance and how the subsidiarity
principle is applied. It clarifies the evolution of the EU Regional and Cohesion Policy from the
cross-cutting policy of balanced growth point of view. It also brings into light the challenges this
cohesion policy faces and one of this challenges is the big differences of GDP in different
European countries. It is also about the emergence of multi-level governance and about the new
emphasis on growth and competitiveness. As a conclusion the author considers that the path of
Regional and Cohesion Policy followed an interesting way, from simple redistribution mechanism
to a genuine structural policy.
The collective work emphasizes the complexity of the Regional Policy and how it has
been applied in some countries and how it failed in others. It presents the motivation of the
initiator, the struggles made for keeping up the system and the regionalization in Eastern Europe.
To enter the EU you must have a regionalization program which translates as the regional
conditionality. As a case study, the author brings up the situation of Romania and its
regionalization.
In the direction of changes in the system of de-concentrated public administration in
Hungary after 1990, so that in the competition between cities, the leaders of individual settlements,
motivated by different reasons, strive to increase the number of public administration bodies in
211
their cities and to establish new institutions there. The main question that are rising on the margins
of the study refers to: how the governmental approach was done towards the de-concentrated state
administrative organizations alter after the regime change and how this fact influenced their
territorial structure and the other direction or problem studied is which towns in Hungary can be
regarded as winners of regionalization.
The space of Croatia is analysed from the perspective of the negotiations with EU starting
with the year 2005, underlying its evolution, so that it is represented the activity of Croatian public
administration from the perspective of reforms from the years 1990-2009, the concept of regional
development showing a series of differences of socio-economic development between its regions,
mostly due to its geographical location, developing 3 major objectives of regional policy that is
based on the regions of development which in April 2007, according to Eurostat announced the
division of Croatia into 3 development areas following the NUTS ii (North-Western, Central and
Eastern regions, together with the coast region with the Croatian Adriatic Sea. From the perspective
of the complexity of analyzed and presented elements at the level of Croatian space making the
modernization and economic, politic, financial and administrative developments very difficult both
at national and regional level., with the perspective of collaboration between the non-governmental
actors and the private sector, the public administration reform is a process that covers the entire
civil society in its whole complexity, implementation of a public administration reform.
The question of territorial cohesion Ŕ spatial income inequalities in two different regions
of Hungary Ŕ is observed from geographical perspective both through intermediation of the
analysis of regional development and spatial inequalities, Hungarian trends of income inequalities,
where it is emphasized that Nemes Nagy, J. modified the Kuznets-Williamson inverted U
hypothesis with special emphasis on the inequality processes of the post-socialist transition
countries, and at the level of investigated regions are emphasized the characteristics based on
indicators. In the Northern Great Plain and in the Western Transdanubia regions, the development
of spatial income inequality is measured by the weighted Gini-coefficient of inequality, being
observed the evolution of the coefficient between the years 1988-2008. Finally, the possible effect
of the current financial and economic crisis on spatial processes and income inequalities might be
modeled from this point of view. The potential for transnational cluster development in EU MacroRegions, starts with a conceptual delimitation, clustering versus transnational networking, being
followed by case studies regarding clusters versus transnational networks in the Baltic Sea Region
and in the Danube Region, from the perspective of the projects and of initiatives with the purpose
of developing the dimension of cooperation. The dimension of industrial restructuring in the North
Great Plain Region (Hungary), is analysed through the intermediation of a series representative
indicators: production of industry per capita, gross domestic product per capita in Hungary,
industrial investments, employees in industry, industrial export on the North Great Plain Region.
All these elements underline characteristics of the analyzed region, but it is presented the industrial
structure on sectors of activity, but also the number of employees in this field of activity.
The industrial restructuring of the region follows the trends in Hungary, but the
significance of the leading industrial sector is smaller, meanwhile the traditional food and textile
industries and in most of the settlements in the region industrial employment decreased
significantly in the years following the change of the regime. The geographical potential and
historical tradition in Upper Bistra Valley (Bihor County), as perspectives, premises of local
development by the perspective of the tourism dimension. In this sense there are presented
elements of localization of the area with its component elements, localities, evaluation of resources,
the place of touristic potential, human resources presented in the area delimitated on the basis on
ethnic criterion. As perspectives of development there are underlined the opportunities of financing
from the area of European funds, in this sense being identified the funds which come from the
framework of Regional Operational Program. There are offered a series of solutions for a
sustainable tourism, as an important element in this sense being emphasized the historical-religious
attraction, ecotourism, sportive tourism, relaxation and recreation in the same time.
The second chapter brings into discussion the domain of Cross-Border Cooperation and
COR White Paper on Multilevel Governance, being emphasized analyses concerning the
delimitation of the concept of MLG with study cases, programs of cross-border cooperation, the
212
importance of CoR in this direction, new form of territorial cooperation, the operationalization of
the concept of cross border worker. The studies regarding the concept of Multilevel governance is
strictly connected with a series of essential elements in the framework of the process of application,
like: regionalism, regionalization, decentralization, devolution of power, public administration,
subsidiary principle (SP), representative documents at European level in the case of White Paper of
MLG (WPMLG) Lisbon Treaty from this scheme being remembered the Committee of the Region
(CoR), institution that becomes the master of subsidiarity.
The analyses in the direction of MLG and a new interpretation of subsidiarity by the white
paper on MLG but also the increased role given to the national and sub-national actors in
implementing the subsidiarity principle occupies an important and actual place, being emphasized
the role of regional networks in multilevel governance, and as a case study the Network of Eastern
External Border Regions (NEEBOR), as the success case of NEEBOR gave evidence for that in the
eastern external border area. On the margins of the analysis of this great field of interest are
emphasized the advantages and disadvantages of CoR‟s White Paper on Multilevel Governance
with the purpose of reinforcing partnership in practice and encouraging dialogue between actors
with different institutional background.
An interesting case study is concerned with the investing dimension, applying theories and
theoretical instruments, taking as basis for analyses the first calise economical theories and
reaching the contemporary economic period, where it is emphasized the Theory of Keynes.
Keynesian economics is one of the outstanding trends of modern macroeconomic theory according
to which the capitalism is unable to exist without active intervention of the state into development
of social economic processes, without expanding substantially the functions of the state, here being
explained a series of representative Formulas for this theory: The Keynesian multiplier formula, the
accelerator. The impact of the newest investment theories on transformational crises and economic
restructuring of the mature markets of the world as well as potential to apply them in the context of
Ukraine‟s emerging economy have been analyzed. The dimension of cross-border cooperation is
analyzed from the perspective of European institutions having attributions in this direction, the
structural funds for this area, passing from the insertion of a few interesting concepts such as
“micro-diplomacy” and “global micro diplomacy”, provincialism.
Relevant case studies are undertaken for the Euroregion Tirol – South Tirol – Trentino,
where there are emphasis on the contribution of civil society in opposition with the political aspect
very tensioned sometimes, so that the organizations from the sphere of civil society having the
power to develop friendly relations and through their intermediation to gather the people from
different regions.
The case study at the Romanian Ŕ Hungarian boundary: from the perspective of the new
instrument of cross-border cooperation EGCT proposes the development of an Eurometropolis
Debrecen-Oradea on the basis of the new legal instrument of territorial cooperation, being based on
the idea of the existent cross border cooperation between the communities of Debrecen and Oradea
but also on the research carried out in the two communities which emphasizes the wish of
cooperation with the purpose of commune and durable development and, last but not least, this
equation being sustained also by the examples of good practices which function at European level
between at least two neighboring communities which are situated on one side and on the other of
the boundaries of at least two states.
European protection of data is put in direct connection with the evolution of informatics
technologies which advances in opposition with classical civil law instruments of protecting
personal good appear to be insufficient, and the proposal The European Data Protection Supervisor
has been appointed as an independent supervisory authority responsible for the protection of
individual fundamental rights and freedoms in the purpose of this hypothesis being analyzed the
origin and the Legal Grounds of the European Data Protection Supervisor, the legal status of the
European Data Protection Supervisor, the duties of the European Data Protection Supervisor so
that, in conclusion, being considered that together with the Court of Justice of the European Union
procedures the activity of the European Data Protection Supervisor seems to create a rather effective
system of protecting an individual‟s right to privacy with regard to the protection of his personal data.
213
European Neighbourhood and Partnership Instrument (ENPI) has considerably enhanced
the scope for cross-border cooperation (CBC), analysing from this perspective the program that has
to support sustainable development along both sides of the EU‟s external borders, to help decrease
differences in living standards across these borders, and to address the challenges and opportunities
following on EU enlargement or otherwise arising from the proximity between regions, the area of
eligibility, priorities and budget and the proposals made are the efficiency-making of cooperation
and the development of new possibilities of cooperation.
An innovative method concerning cross border cooperation has in its view cross border
communication, using methods and instruments concerning the learning of neighbouring region
languages. This purpose is promoted by European official documents and the used methods are the
education and the media. The importance and the influence of the means of mass communication is
emphasized with the purpose of underlining the power of multinational companies in a globalized
world, offering in this sense a series of studies based on statistical data.
From the perspectives of external boundary of EU, focusing on the relation Romania Ŕ
Republic of Moldova where the Moldovan space is analyzed from the perspective of identity crises,
the bidirectional orientation taking into consideration CIS and EU, and, last but not least, the
influences of Russia and Romania in Bessarabia, and as element of cross border cooperation is
Black Sea which can represent a bridge and thus new instruments are identified, projects from
developing this areal.
International economic relations have developed a strong both communication and product
standards. Communication through advertising has changed the perception of products and services
to an extent that it has influenced perception in consumers. Growing product standards have
become a strong point for companies that have linked information campaign and product standards
to the increase of business. The debate on standardization has concentrated on minimizing the
faults in particular the difference in implementation on a national and international level. The
development of the policy of standardization is a response to it being an important tool of the
economic agent. Advertising is also analyzed as a means of brand development in a globalized
economy, one that ensures the credibility of companies.
The relations of cross border cooperation at the level of Romanian-Hungarian boundary is
emphasized through the intermediation of two regions from the neighborhood: The Northern Great
Hungarian Plain (Hungary) and the North Ŕ West regions (Romania) which are analyzed from the
perspective of the regional fields of development, focusing on the comparative analysis of the
purposes, identifying a series of similarities such as historical, social and economic dimension.
The approach of the theme of decentralization and its effects on development at
subnational level in Hungary, starts from surprising various aspects of decentralization in Europe,
proposing possible ways of economic development at subnational level through decentralization,
possible economic threats of decentralization in Hungary, so that the number of economic actors
will increase as a result of the decentralization process.
Territorial planning is a field that requires in-depth analysis and strong specialist studies.
Although this has been sufficient until now, a greater involvement of the public is crucial for a
complete and cohesive project. It is important that projects be included in a system of public
debate; quality is still essential but no longer sufficient for a successful project. This idea contains
the basics of modern participatory democracy but also goes beyond normal procedure for project
development. The means of informing and consulting the public opinion are present in the
technology of today, the integration of Web 2.0 interactivity in a virtual environment is only one of
the possibilities of implementing e-participation.
A concept of actuality and studied at cross-border level is represented by the frontier
workers, in this field being analyzed the community worker concept through the perspective of
European legislation, being underlined the importance of border worker as element of cohesion in
cross border cooperation.
The volume Regional and Cohesion Policy Insights into the role of the Partnership
Priniple in the New Policy Design represents a very consistent analysis of the concept of MLG
through the means of CoR With Paper, underlining its role and importance on European plan,
applicability and functionality and last but not least, the advantages and disadvantages it brings.
214
The dimension of cross-border cooperation is underlined both at regional level,
Euroregional level, and, last but not least, county level, through case studies and analysis which to
emphasize similar elements from one side and of the other of the boundary, examples of good
practice, the possibility of development of the concept of cross border worker which is at the
beginning, but there are perspectives of development through multinational companies and, last but
not least, being emphasized territorial cooperation, more exactly the implementation of the new
legal instrument at European level of EGTC.
The perspectives of regional development, of descentralization, are analized at the level of
neighbouring countries, but also there are analized experiences achieved on national level,
performances, and, of course, perspectives of development. Media represents an instrument and a
channel in the same time and through its intermediation the multinational companies are acting and,
at the cross border level, it can represent an ellement of connection and cohesion on long term, and
the dimension IT, network plays a role more important through the rapid development of
technologies of mass communication. In conclusion the scientific works published in the volume
offers us an immage of ensemble, of actuality and of perspective in the same time at regional level,
of cross border cooperation, of concept of MLG, of European legislation and European institutions
with attributions in this field and on their bases can be developed a series of functinal models at the
level of internal boundaries of European Union but also at the external boundaries, based on
European funds managed with the purpose of regional and cross border development.
Constantin Vasile Ţoca
E-mail: [email protected]
About the Authors
Florin ABRAHAM is Ph.D in History; senior researcher within the National Institute for the Study
of Totalitarianism; Scientific Director at „Ovidiu Sincai” Institute. Recent books: Transformarea
Romaniei: 1989-2006. Rolul factorilor externi/ The Transformation of Romania: 1989-2006. The
Role of the External Factors, INST/NIST, Bucharest, 2006; Colectivizarea agriculturii in Romania.
Cadrul legislativ, 1949 – 1962/ Collectivization of agriculture in Romania. Legislative framework,
1949 – 1962 INST/NIST, Bucharest, 2007 (co-author). E-mail: [email protected]
Lucian BOGDAN is Ph.D. candidate in History at the Faculty of European Studies at the BabeşBolyai University of Cluj-Napoca. Among his major works are: „Shifts in U.S. Foreign Policy on
the Eve of the New Presidential Administration”, in Studia Universitatis Babeş-Bolyai. Studia
Europea, Year LIV, vol. 2/2009, pp. 93-105; „The Intercultural Dimension: An Essential
Prerequisite for the Success of the American Export of Democracy”, in Studia Universitatis BabeşBolyai. Studia Europea, Year LIV, vol. 4/2009, pp. 125-140. E-mail: [email protected]
Bettina BRUNS is project coordinator, Leibniz-Institute for Regional Geography. Publications:
"Schwere Arbeit, unsicheres Brot" - Schmuggel an der polnisch-russischen Grenze als prekäre
Erwerbsform. In: Lukowski, Wojciech / Wagner, Mathias (Hrsg.): Alltag im Grenzland.
Schmuggel als ökonomische Strategie an der EU-Ostgrenze. Wiesbaden: VS-Verlag; Bruns,
Bettina (2010): Grenze als Ressource Ŕ Die soziale Organisation von Schmuggel am Rande der
Europäischen Union. Wiesbaden: VS Verlag. Forthcoming publication: Bettina Bruns;
Miggelbrink, Judith; Müller, Kristine: Smuggling and small-scale trade as part of informal
economies Ŕ empirical findings from the Eastern external EU border. In: International Journal of
Sociology and Social Policy. E-mail: [email protected]
Erhardt BUSEK was Vice Chancellor of Austria (1991-1995) and Special Co-ordinator of the
Stability Pact for South Eastern Europe (2002-2008). Actually he is Coordinator of the Southeast
European Cooperative Initiative (SECI), President of the European Forum Alpbach, Chairman of
the "Institute for the Danube Region and Central Europe". Among latest publications: 10 Years
Southeast European Cooperative Initiative: From Dayton to Brussels. Edited by Erhardt Busek.
(Wien-New York: Springer, 2010); Erhardt Busek, Eine Seele für Europa. Aufgaben für einen
Continent, (Wien: Kremayr Und Scheriau, 2008). E-mail: [email protected]
Radu CARP is Professor, Scientific Secretary, Faculty of Political Science, University of
Bucharest. Publications: Dumnezeu la Bruxelles. Religia în spaţiul public european (God in
Brussels. Religion in the European Public Space). (Cluj-Napoca: Eikon, 2009); (with Ioan
Stanomir), Inventarea Constituţiei. Proiecte intelectuale şi dezvoltare instituţională în Principate în
secolul XIX (Inventing the Constitution. Intellectual Projects and Institutional Development in the
19th Century Romanian Principalities). (Bucureşti: C.H. Beck, 2009); Partide şi profile creştin Ŕ
democrate (Christian - Democrat Parties and Profiles). (Bucureşti: Curtea Veche, 2011). E-mail:
[email protected]
Cristina DOGOT is lecturer at the University of Oradea, Faculty of History, Geography and
International Relations. Publications: Cristina-Maria Dogot, Le fédéralisme, fondement intellectuel
de la construction européenne. Le fédéralisme personnaliste de Denis de Rougemont,
(Saarbrucken, Editions universitaires européennes, 2011); „The Principle of Subsidiarity in the
Process of Romania‟s Integration in European Union”, in: Studia Universitatis Babeş-Bolyai.
Studia Europea, Year IV, vol. 1/2010, pp. 87-116. E-mail: [email protected]
Valentina GÎDEA is Ph.D candidate in History at the Faculty of European Studies at the BabeşBolyai University of Cluj-Napoca. Publications: Le premier “non” du General de Gaulle pour la
Grande Bretagne, Cluj-Napoca, EFES, 2010; Alexandra Pop, Valentina Gîdea, „The Analysis of
the PNȚ Economic Policy during the Interwar Period”, Studia Universitatis Babeş-Bolyai. Studia
Europea, Year LV, vol. 2/2010, pp. 177-946; Claudia-Valentina Gîdea, Alexandra Pop, „NPP
during the interwar period and today in Political Studies Forum”, (Le Forum des Études Politiques)
Year 2, 2010, Editura Universităţii de Vest, Timişoara. E-mail: [email protected]
217
Ljiljana MANIC is Ph.D. in Cultural Studies and Assistant Professor at the Faculty of Culture and
Media, Megatrend University, Belgrade. Publications: “The Role of the Mass Media in Promoting
Philanthropy”, in: Yearbook of the Faculty of Culture and Media, Megatrend University, Belgrade,
no 3, January, 2011; Типологија и развој непрофитних организација у Србији (Tipology of Non
profit Organizations in Serbia), Yearbook of the Faculty of Culture and Media, Megatrend
University, Belgrade, No.. 2, 2010. E-mail: [email protected]
Ludovic NICA has a Master Diploma in “Euroregional Studies and Cross-border Relations” at
University of Oradea; National School of Political and Administrative Studies, Bucharest, Master
Diploma in “European Policy and Economy”; “Moldova şi perspectiva aderării la UE”, European
Union: poartă spre noi membri, Oradea: University of Oradea, 2010, 113-120;
[email protected].
Anca OLTEAN is research assistant at the Institute for Euroregional Studies within the University
of Oradea and Ph.D candidate in History. “Israel in the European neighbourhood policy” in Ioan
Horga, Grigore Silaşi, Istvan Suli-Zakar, Stanislaw Sagan (ed.), Intercultural dialogue and
European Neighbourhood Policy, University of Oradea Press, 2009, p. 261-269. E-mail:
[email protected]
Monica OPROIU is Ph.D candidate in Political Sciences at the NSPSPA, with a thesis focusing on
the European Union and conflict resolution in its wider neighbourhood. She is working also as a
researcher at the Center for Conflict Prevention and Early Warning in Bucharest. Publications:
Monica Oproiu, Iulian Chifu (eds). “The Russian-Georgian War. The decision-makers‟ reactions
during the crisis” (Curtea Veche Publishing House, 2010). E-mail: [email protected]
Philippe PERCHOC est docteur en science politique de l'Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris
(CERI). Assistant académique au Collège d'Europe, Bruges, et Président et rédacteur en chef du
group de debats Nouvelle Europe. Ouvrages recentes: « Le compromis mémoriel européen. Une
étude balte », dans BONNARD, P. & MINK, G., L'Europe et ses gisements mémoriels (Paris :
Houdiard, 2010); „L‟identité européenne par les frontières”, in: Alexandravicius, P., L‟Europe en
tant que puissance mondiale, Presses de l‟Université Romeris, Vilnius, pp. 137-148. Translated in
Lithuanian, Europos galia pasaulyje: kolektyvinė monografija. E-mail: [email protected]
Adriana POPESCU has a Master Diploma in “Euroregional Studies and Cross-border Relations”
at University of Oradea; National School of Political and Administrative Studies, Bucharest,
Master Diploma in “European Policy and Economy”. Publications: “Uniunea Europeană Ŕ o
comunitate de securitate în formare”, in: European Union: poartă spre noi membri, Oradea:
University of Oradea, 2010, 70-83, [email protected].
REMÉNYI Péter is Lecturer, PhD, Department of Political Geography and Regional
Development, Institute of Geography, Faculty of Sciences, University of Pécs. Publications:
„International institutional co-operations in the border areas of Hungary and Serbia”, in: Megatrend
Review. The international review of applied economics, 7 (1) (2010): 119-140; „Etnikai
homogenizáció a volt Jugoszláviában” (Ethnic homogenization in the former Yugoslavia), in:
Balkán Füzetek Különszám I, (2009): 122-129; REMÉNYI P. and VÉGH A. 2006: „Az ezredforduló
határkérdései, határváltozásai a Nyugat-Balkánon” („Border issues and border changes in the
Western Balkans at the turn of the millennium”.). Földrajzi Értesìtő (Hungarian Geographical
Bulletin), LV. évf. 1Ŕ2. sz. pp. 195Ŕ211. E-mail: [email protected]
Giulia PRELZ OLTRAMONTI is a PhD candidate in Political Sciences at Université libre de
Bruxelles and a Visiting fellow at the Centre d'Etude de la Vie Politique. She holds a MA degree in
Conflict, Security and Development from King‟s College London and a BA degree in European
Social and Political Studies from University College London. Publications: „“Engagement Through
Cooperation”: coming too late‟, in translation: „ « Géorgie: L‟engagement par la coopération»: un
train
de
retard‟,
Caucaz.com,
Tbilisi,
April
2011
(http://www.caucaz.com/home/breve_contenu.php?id=614). E-mail: [email protected])
218
Denis ROLLAND Institut universitaire de France. Directeur du groupe de recherche Frontières,
Acteurs et Représentations de l'Europe (FARE), créé en 2007. Directeur d‟études et professeur,
Sciences-Po Paris, Centre d‟histoire. Publications: Denis Rolland, L'Amérique latine et la France
: acteurs et réseaux d'une relation culturelle, (Rennes, Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2011);
Denis Rolland, Pour une gouvernance démocratique européenne. Les écoles d‟études politiques du
Conseil de l‟Europe, (Paris: L‟Harmattan, 2010). E-mail: [email protected]
Tibor TŐKÉS is PhD candidate at the University of Debrecen, Hungary, and at Paris Sorbonne
University (Paris IV), France since 2008. He is writing his PhD thesis on the comparative analysis
of the Hungarian and French regional development planning policy. Publications: Tibor Tőkés.
Brief history of regionalization in France-New Results of cross-border co-operation. Edited by
Gábor KOZMA, Debrecen, 2011, Didakt Kft; Tőkés, Tibor. Histoire bréve de l‟aménagement du
territoire français et la DIACT- ACTA Iuventutis Geographica. Sous la direction de István SÜLIZAKAR, Debrecen, 2009, Editions de l‟Université de DEBRECEN (Maison d‟Editions
Universitaire de L‟Université Kossuth), p.143-158. E-mail: [email protected]
Mihály TÖMÖRI is a PhD candidate at the Department of Social Geography and Regional
Development Planning at the University of Debrecen, Hungary. He is member of the Commission
on Global Change and Human Mobility of the International Geographical Union (IGU). His major
publications in English: Spatial Diffusion of Metro Cash & Carry Focusing on Hungary and
Romania, Oradea, 2010; Strengthening Cross-Border Cooperation: A Case Study of Shopping
Tourism in Debrecen, Debrecen, 2008; The Role of Shopping Tourism in Debrecen, Debrecen,
2006. E-mail: [email protected]
Nada TORLAK is Ph.D. in Cultural Studies and Assistant Professor at the Faculty of Culture and
Media, Megatrend University of Belgrade. Publications: Monography “Abuse of women in
advertisements”, 2011, award Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs of the Republic of Serbia, UN
and The Government of the Kingdom of Norwayş „Rodna ravnopravnost u ogledalu zenske stampe
“, (Gender equality in the mirror women's press), Yearbook of the Faculty of Culture and Media,
Megatrend University, Belgrade, no 3, January, 2011. E-mail: [email protected]
Natasa SIMEUNOVIC BAJIC is Ph.D. in Cultural Studies and Assistant Professor at the Faculty
of Culture and Media, Megatrend University, Belgrade. Publications: “Concept and Reality of
European Public Sphere: Eurovision Song Contest“, in: Horst Pöttker / Christian Schwarzenegger
(ed.), Europäische Öffentlichkeit und Journalistische Verantwortun, Herbert von Halem Verlag,
Koln, Germany, 2010, Journalismus International, 6;. E-mail: [email protected]
Helga ZICHNER is research assistant at the Leibniz-Institute for regional geography.
Publications: Bruns, Bettina / Zichner, Helga (2010): Moral an der Grenze? Theoretische
Überlegungen und empirische Befunde zur Moral im Alltag an der östlichen Außengrenze der
Europäischen Union. In: Geographische Revue 1: 21-36 ; Helga Zichner & Andreas Wust: “Here is
the wall!” Ŕ Is it? Transborder practices of small-scale economic actors at the Romanian-Ukrainian
border”, in: Revue d‟études comparatives Est-Ouest, No. 4/2010, 171-193. E-mail: [email protected]
Eurolimes
Has published
Vol. 1/2006 Europe and its Borders: Historical Perspective
Vol. 2/2006 From Smaller to Greater Europe: Border Identitary Testimonies
Vol. 3/2007 Media, Intercultural Dialogue and the New Frontiers of Europe
Vol. 4/2007 Europe from Exclusive Borders to Inclusive Frontiers
Vol. 5/2008 Religious frontiers of Europe
Vol. 6/2008 The Intercultural Dialogue and the European Frontiers
Vol. 7/2009 Europe and the Neighbourhood
Vol. 8/2009 Europe and its Economic Frontiers
Vol. 9/2010 The Cultural Frontiers of Europe
Vol. 10/2010 The Geopolitic of European Frontiers
Vol. 11/2011 Leaders of the Borders, Borders of the Leaders
Will publish
Vol. 12/2011 Communication and European Frontiers
Vol. 13/2012 Permeability and the impermeability of socio-economic frontiers within
European Union
Vol. 14/2012 Enlargements, Borders and the changes of EU political priorities
Vol. 15/2013 A security dimension as trigger and result of frontiers modifications
Vol. 16/2013 Cross border governance an the borders evolutions

Leaders of the Borders, Borders of the Leaders

Transcription

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